“The question for Germany is where the greatest possible conquest could be made at lowest cost.“German politics must reckon with its two hateful enemies, England and France, to whom a strong German colossus in the center of Europe would be intolerable. Both these states would oppose a further reinforcement of Germany, both in Europe and overseas, and in this opposition they would have the support of all parties. Both countries would view thebuilding of German military strong points overseas as a threat to their overseas communications, as a security measure for German commerce, and retrospectively a strengthening of the German position in Europe.“England is not in a position to cede any of her colonial possessions to us owing to the resistance which she experiences in the Dominions. After the loss of prestige which England has suffered owing to the transfer of Abyssinia to Italian ownership, a return of East Africa can no longer be expected. Any resistance on England’s part would at best consist in the readiness to satisfy our colonial claims by taking away colonies which at the present moment are not in British hands, for example, Angola. French favors would probably be of the same nature.“A serious discussion regarding the return of colonies to us could be considered only at a time when England is in a state of emergency and the German Reich is strong and well armed. The Fuehrer does not share the opinion that the Empire is unshakeable.“Resistance against the Empire is to be found less in conquered territories than amongst its competitors. The British Empire and the Roman Empire cannot be compared with one another in regard to durability; after the Punic Wars the latter did not have a serious political enemy. Only the dissolving effects which originated in Christendom, and the signs of age which creep into all states, made it possible for the Ancient Germans to subjugate Ancient Rome.“Alongside the British Empire today a number of States exist which are stronger than it. The British Mother Country is able to defend its colonial possession only allied with other states and not by its own power. How could England alone, for example, defend Canada against attack by America, or its Far Eastern interests against an attack by Japan?“The singling out of the British Crown as the bearer of Empire unity is in itself an admission that the universal empire cannot be maintained permanently by power politics. The following are significant pointers in this respect:“(a) Ireland’s struggle for independence.“(b) Constitutional disputes in India where England, by her half measures, left the door open for Indians at a later date to utilize the non-fulfillment of constitutional promises as a weapon against Britain.“(c) The weakening of the British position in the Far East by Japan.“(d) The opposition in the Mediterranean to Italy which—by virtue of its history, driven by necessity and led by a genius—expands its power position and must consequently infringe British interests to an increasing extent. The outcome of the Abyssinian War is a loss of prestige for Britain which Italy is endeavoring to increase by stirring up discontent in the Mohammedan World.“It must be established in conclusion that the Empire cannot be held permanently by power politics by 45 million Britons, in spite of all the solidity of her ideals. The proportion of the populations in the Empire, compared with that of the Motherland, is nine to one, and it should act as a warning to us that if we expand in space, we must not allow the level of our population to become too low.“France’s position is more favorable than that of England. The French Empire is better placed geographically, the population of its colonial possessions represents a potential military increase. But France is faced with difficulties of internal politics. At the present time only 10 per cent approximately of the nations have parliamentary governments, whereas 90 per cent of them have totalitarian governments. Nevertheless, we have to take the following into our political consideration as power factors:“Britain, France, Russia and the adjoining smaller states.“The German question can be solved only by way of force, and this is never without risk. The battles of Frederick the Great for Silesia, and Bismarck’s wars against Austria and France had been a tremendous risk and the speed of Prussian action in 1870 had prevented Austria from participating in the war. If we place the decision to apply force with risk at the head of the following expositions, then we are left to reply to the questions ‘when’ and ‘how’. In this regard we have to decide upon three different cases.“Case 1. Period 1943-45: After this we can only expect a change for the worse. The rearming of the Army, the Navy and the Air Force, as well as the formation of the Officers’ Corps, are practically concluded.“Our material equipment and armaments are modern; with further delay the danger of their becoming out-of-date will increase. In particular the secrecy of ‘special weapons’ cannot always be safeguarded. Enlistment of reserves would be limited to the current recruiting age groups and an addition from older untrained groups would be no longer available.“In comparison with the rearmament, which will have beencarried out at the time by other nations, we shall decrease in relative power. Should we not act until 1943-45, then, dependent on the absence of reserves, any year could bring about the food crisis, for the countering of which we do not possess the necessary foreign currency. This must be considered as a ‘point of weakness in the regime.’ Over and above that, the world will anticipate our action and will increase counter-measures yearly. Whilst other nations isolate themselves we should be forced on the offensive.“What the actual position would be in the years 1943-45 no one knows today. It is certain, however, that we can wait no longer.“On the one side the large armed forces, with the necessity for securing their upkeep, the aging of the Nazi movement and of its leaders, and on the other side the prospect of a lowering of the standard of living and a drop in the birth rate, leaves us no other choice but to act. If the Fuehrer is still living, then it will be his irrevocable decision to solve the German space problem no later than 1943-45. The necessity for action before 1943-45 will come under consideration in cases 2 and 3.“Case 2. Should the social tensions in France lead to an internal political crisis of such dimensions that it absorbs the French Army and thus renders it incapable for employment in war against Germany, then the time for action against Czechoslovakia has come.“Case 3. It would be equally possible to act against Czechoslovakia if France should be so tied up by a war against another State that it cannot ‘proceed’ against Germany.“For the improvement of our military political position it must be our first aim, in every case of entanglement by war, to conquer Czechoslovakia and Austria, simultaneously, in order to remove any threat from the flanks in case of a possible advance Westwards. In the case of a conflict with France it would hardly be necessary to assume that Czechoslovakia would declare war on the same day as France. However, Czechoslovakia’s desire to participate in the war will increase proportionally to the degree to which we are being weakened. Its actual participation could make itself felt by an attack on Silesia, either towards the North or the West.“Once Czechoslovakia is conquered—and a mutual frontier, Germany-Hungary is obtained—then a neutral attitude by Poland in a German-French conflict could more easily be relied upon. Our agreements with Poland remain valid onlyas long as Germany’s strength remains unshakeable; should Germany have any setbacks then an attack by Poland against East Prussia, perhaps also against Pomerania, and Silesia, must be taken into account.“Assuming a development of the situation, which would lead to a planned attack on our part in the years 1943 to ’45, then the behaviour of France, England, Poland and Russia would probably have to be judged in the following manner.“The Fuehrer believes personally, that in all probability England and perhaps also France, have already silently written off Czechoslovakia, and that they have got used to the idea that this question would one day be cleaned up by Germany. The difficulties in the British Empire and the prospect of being entangled in another long-drawn-out European War, were decisive factors in the nonparticipation of England in a war against Germany. The British attitude would certainly not remain without influence on France’s attitude. An attack by France, without British support, is hardly probable assuming that its offensive would stagnate along our Western fortifications. Without England’s support, it would also not be necessary to take into consideration a march by France through Belgium and Holland, and this would also not have to be reckoned with by us in case of a conflict with France, as in every case it would have as a consequence, the enmity of Great Britain. Naturally we should in every case, have to bar our frontier during the operation of our attacks against Czechoslovakia and Austria. It must be taken into consideration here that Czechoslovakia’s defence measures will increase in strength from year to year, and that a consolidation of the inside values of the Austrian Army will also be effected in the course of years. Although the population of Czechoslovakia, in the first place is not a thin one, the embodiment of Czechoslovakia and Austria would nevertheless constitute the conquest of food for five to six million people, on the basis that a compulsory emigration of two million from Czechoslovakia, and of one million from Austria could be carried out. The annexation of the two States to Germany, militarily and politically, would constitute a considerable relief, owing to shorter and better frontiers, the freeing of fighting personnel for other purposes, and the possibility of reconstituting new armies up to a strength of about twelve Divisions, representing a new Division per one million population.“No opposition to the removal of Czechoslovakia is expected on the part of Italy; however, it cannot be judged today what would be her attitude in the Austrian question, since it would depend largely on whether the Duce were alive at the time or not.“The measure and speed of our action would decide Poland’s attitude. Poland will have little inclination to enter the war against a victorious Germany, with Russia in the rear.“Military participation by Russia must be countered by the speed of our operations; it is a question whether this needs to be taken into consideration at all, in view of Japan’s attitude.“Should Case 2 occur—paralyzation of France by a Civil War—then the situation should be utilizedat any timefor operations against Czechoslovakia, as Germany’s most dangerous enemy would be eliminated.“The Fuehrer sees Case 3 looming near; it could develop from the existing tensions in the Mediterranean, and should it occur, he has firmly decided to make use of it any time, perhaps even as early as 1938.“Following recent experiences in the course of events of the war in Spain, the Fuehrer does not see an early end to hostilities there. Taking into consideration the time required for past offensives by Franco, a further three years duration of war is within the bounds of possibility. On the other hand, from the German point of view, a one hundred per cent victory by Franco is not desirable; we are more interested in a continuation of the war and preservation of the tensions in the Mediterranean. Should Franco be in sole possession of the Spanish Peninsula, it would mean the end of Italian intervention and the presence of Italy on the Balearic Isles. As our interests are directed towards continuing the war in Spain, it must be the task of our future policy to strengthen Italy in her fight to hold on to the Balearic Isles. However, a solidification of Italian positions on the Balearic Isles can not be tolerated either by France or by England and could lead to a war by France and England against Italy, in which case Spain, if entirely in white [Franco’s] hands, could participate on the side of Italy’s enemies. A subjugation of Italy in such a war appears very unlikely. Additional raw materials could be brought to Italy via Germany. The Fuehrer believes that Italy’s military strategy would be to remain on the defensive against Franceon the Western frontier and carry out operations against France from Libya, against the North African French colonial possessions.“As a landing of French-British troops on the Italian coast can be discounted, and as a French offensive via the Alps to Upper Italy would be extremely difficult, and would probably stagnate before the strong Italian fortifications, French lines of communication by the Italian fleet will to a great extent paralyze the transport of fighting personnel from North Africa to France, so that at its frontiers with Italy and Germany, France will have, at its disposal, solely the metropolitan fighting forces.“If Germany profits from this war by disposing of the Czechoslovakian and the Austrian questions, the probability must be assumed that England—being at war with Italy—would not decide to commence operations against Germany. Without British support, a warlike action by France against Germany is not to be anticipated.“The date of our attack on Czechoslovakia and Austria must be made independent of the course of the Italian-French-English war and would not be simultaneous with the commencement of military operations by these three States. The Fuehrer was also not thinking of military agreements with Italy, but in complete independence and by exploiting this unique favorable opportunity, he wishes to begin to carry out operations against Czechoslovakia. The attack on Czechoslovakia would have to take place with the speed of lightning [blitzartig schnell].“Fieldmarshal von Blomberg and Generaloberst von Fritsch in giving their estimate on the situation, repeatedly pointed out that England and France must not appear as our enemies, and they stated that the war with Italy would not bind the French Army to such an extent that it would not be in a position to commence operations on our Western frontier with superior forces. Generaloberst von Fritsch estimated the French forces which would presumably be employed on the Alpine frontier against Italy to be in the region of twenty divisions, so that a strong French superiority would still remain on our Western frontier. The French would, according to German reasoning, attempt to advance into the Rhineland. We should consider the lead which France has got in mobilization, and quite apart from the very small value of our then existing fortifications—whichwas pointed out particularly by Generalfieldmarshal von Blomberg—the four motorized divisions which had been laid down for the West would be more or less incapable of movement. With regard to our offensive in a Southeasterly direction, Fieldmarshal von Blomberg drew special attention to the strength of the Czechoslovakian fortifications, the building of which had, assumed the character of a Maginot Line and which would present extreme difficulties to our attack.“Generaloberst von Fritsch mentioned that it was the purpose of a study which he had laid on for this winter to investigate the possibilities of carrying out operations against Czechoslovakia with special consideration of the conquest of the Czechoslovakian system of fortifications; the Generaloberst also stated that owing to the prevailing conditions, he would have to relinquish his leave abroad, which was to begin on the 10 November. This intention was countermanded by the Fuehrer, who gave as a reason that the possibility of the conflict was not to be regarded as being so imminent. In reply to statements by Generalfieldmarshal von Blomberg and Generaloberst von Fritsch regarding England and France’s attitude, the Fuehrer repeated his previous statements and said that he was convinced of Britain’s nonparticipation and that consequently he did not believe in military action by France against Germany. Should the Mediterranean conflict already mentioned, lead to a general mobilization in Europe, then we should have to commence operations against Czechoslovakia immediately. If, however, the powers who are not participating in the war should declare their disinterestedness, then Germany would, for the time being, have to side with this attitude.“In view of the information given by the Fuehrer, Generaloberst Goering considered it imperative to think of a reduction or abandonment of our military undertaking in Spain. The Fuehrer agreed to this, insofar as he believed this decision should be postponed for a suitable date.“The second part of the discussion concerned material armament questions.“(Signed) Hossbach”. (386-PS)
“The question for Germany is where the greatest possible conquest could be made at lowest cost.
“German politics must reckon with its two hateful enemies, England and France, to whom a strong German colossus in the center of Europe would be intolerable. Both these states would oppose a further reinforcement of Germany, both in Europe and overseas, and in this opposition they would have the support of all parties. Both countries would view thebuilding of German military strong points overseas as a threat to their overseas communications, as a security measure for German commerce, and retrospectively a strengthening of the German position in Europe.
“England is not in a position to cede any of her colonial possessions to us owing to the resistance which she experiences in the Dominions. After the loss of prestige which England has suffered owing to the transfer of Abyssinia to Italian ownership, a return of East Africa can no longer be expected. Any resistance on England’s part would at best consist in the readiness to satisfy our colonial claims by taking away colonies which at the present moment are not in British hands, for example, Angola. French favors would probably be of the same nature.
“A serious discussion regarding the return of colonies to us could be considered only at a time when England is in a state of emergency and the German Reich is strong and well armed. The Fuehrer does not share the opinion that the Empire is unshakeable.
“Resistance against the Empire is to be found less in conquered territories than amongst its competitors. The British Empire and the Roman Empire cannot be compared with one another in regard to durability; after the Punic Wars the latter did not have a serious political enemy. Only the dissolving effects which originated in Christendom, and the signs of age which creep into all states, made it possible for the Ancient Germans to subjugate Ancient Rome.
“Alongside the British Empire today a number of States exist which are stronger than it. The British Mother Country is able to defend its colonial possession only allied with other states and not by its own power. How could England alone, for example, defend Canada against attack by America, or its Far Eastern interests against an attack by Japan?
“The singling out of the British Crown as the bearer of Empire unity is in itself an admission that the universal empire cannot be maintained permanently by power politics. The following are significant pointers in this respect:
“(a) Ireland’s struggle for independence.
“(b) Constitutional disputes in India where England, by her half measures, left the door open for Indians at a later date to utilize the non-fulfillment of constitutional promises as a weapon against Britain.
“(c) The weakening of the British position in the Far East by Japan.
“(d) The opposition in the Mediterranean to Italy which—by virtue of its history, driven by necessity and led by a genius—expands its power position and must consequently infringe British interests to an increasing extent. The outcome of the Abyssinian War is a loss of prestige for Britain which Italy is endeavoring to increase by stirring up discontent in the Mohammedan World.
“It must be established in conclusion that the Empire cannot be held permanently by power politics by 45 million Britons, in spite of all the solidity of her ideals. The proportion of the populations in the Empire, compared with that of the Motherland, is nine to one, and it should act as a warning to us that if we expand in space, we must not allow the level of our population to become too low.
“France’s position is more favorable than that of England. The French Empire is better placed geographically, the population of its colonial possessions represents a potential military increase. But France is faced with difficulties of internal politics. At the present time only 10 per cent approximately of the nations have parliamentary governments, whereas 90 per cent of them have totalitarian governments. Nevertheless, we have to take the following into our political consideration as power factors:
“Britain, France, Russia and the adjoining smaller states.
“The German question can be solved only by way of force, and this is never without risk. The battles of Frederick the Great for Silesia, and Bismarck’s wars against Austria and France had been a tremendous risk and the speed of Prussian action in 1870 had prevented Austria from participating in the war. If we place the decision to apply force with risk at the head of the following expositions, then we are left to reply to the questions ‘when’ and ‘how’. In this regard we have to decide upon three different cases.
“Case 1. Period 1943-45: After this we can only expect a change for the worse. The rearming of the Army, the Navy and the Air Force, as well as the formation of the Officers’ Corps, are practically concluded.
“Our material equipment and armaments are modern; with further delay the danger of their becoming out-of-date will increase. In particular the secrecy of ‘special weapons’ cannot always be safeguarded. Enlistment of reserves would be limited to the current recruiting age groups and an addition from older untrained groups would be no longer available.
“In comparison with the rearmament, which will have beencarried out at the time by other nations, we shall decrease in relative power. Should we not act until 1943-45, then, dependent on the absence of reserves, any year could bring about the food crisis, for the countering of which we do not possess the necessary foreign currency. This must be considered as a ‘point of weakness in the regime.’ Over and above that, the world will anticipate our action and will increase counter-measures yearly. Whilst other nations isolate themselves we should be forced on the offensive.
“What the actual position would be in the years 1943-45 no one knows today. It is certain, however, that we can wait no longer.
“On the one side the large armed forces, with the necessity for securing their upkeep, the aging of the Nazi movement and of its leaders, and on the other side the prospect of a lowering of the standard of living and a drop in the birth rate, leaves us no other choice but to act. If the Fuehrer is still living, then it will be his irrevocable decision to solve the German space problem no later than 1943-45. The necessity for action before 1943-45 will come under consideration in cases 2 and 3.
“Case 2. Should the social tensions in France lead to an internal political crisis of such dimensions that it absorbs the French Army and thus renders it incapable for employment in war against Germany, then the time for action against Czechoslovakia has come.
“Case 3. It would be equally possible to act against Czechoslovakia if France should be so tied up by a war against another State that it cannot ‘proceed’ against Germany.
“For the improvement of our military political position it must be our first aim, in every case of entanglement by war, to conquer Czechoslovakia and Austria, simultaneously, in order to remove any threat from the flanks in case of a possible advance Westwards. In the case of a conflict with France it would hardly be necessary to assume that Czechoslovakia would declare war on the same day as France. However, Czechoslovakia’s desire to participate in the war will increase proportionally to the degree to which we are being weakened. Its actual participation could make itself felt by an attack on Silesia, either towards the North or the West.
“Once Czechoslovakia is conquered—and a mutual frontier, Germany-Hungary is obtained—then a neutral attitude by Poland in a German-French conflict could more easily be relied upon. Our agreements with Poland remain valid onlyas long as Germany’s strength remains unshakeable; should Germany have any setbacks then an attack by Poland against East Prussia, perhaps also against Pomerania, and Silesia, must be taken into account.
“Assuming a development of the situation, which would lead to a planned attack on our part in the years 1943 to ’45, then the behaviour of France, England, Poland and Russia would probably have to be judged in the following manner.
“The Fuehrer believes personally, that in all probability England and perhaps also France, have already silently written off Czechoslovakia, and that they have got used to the idea that this question would one day be cleaned up by Germany. The difficulties in the British Empire and the prospect of being entangled in another long-drawn-out European War, were decisive factors in the nonparticipation of England in a war against Germany. The British attitude would certainly not remain without influence on France’s attitude. An attack by France, without British support, is hardly probable assuming that its offensive would stagnate along our Western fortifications. Without England’s support, it would also not be necessary to take into consideration a march by France through Belgium and Holland, and this would also not have to be reckoned with by us in case of a conflict with France, as in every case it would have as a consequence, the enmity of Great Britain. Naturally we should in every case, have to bar our frontier during the operation of our attacks against Czechoslovakia and Austria. It must be taken into consideration here that Czechoslovakia’s defence measures will increase in strength from year to year, and that a consolidation of the inside values of the Austrian Army will also be effected in the course of years. Although the population of Czechoslovakia, in the first place is not a thin one, the embodiment of Czechoslovakia and Austria would nevertheless constitute the conquest of food for five to six million people, on the basis that a compulsory emigration of two million from Czechoslovakia, and of one million from Austria could be carried out. The annexation of the two States to Germany, militarily and politically, would constitute a considerable relief, owing to shorter and better frontiers, the freeing of fighting personnel for other purposes, and the possibility of reconstituting new armies up to a strength of about twelve Divisions, representing a new Division per one million population.
“No opposition to the removal of Czechoslovakia is expected on the part of Italy; however, it cannot be judged today what would be her attitude in the Austrian question, since it would depend largely on whether the Duce were alive at the time or not.
“The measure and speed of our action would decide Poland’s attitude. Poland will have little inclination to enter the war against a victorious Germany, with Russia in the rear.
“Military participation by Russia must be countered by the speed of our operations; it is a question whether this needs to be taken into consideration at all, in view of Japan’s attitude.
“Should Case 2 occur—paralyzation of France by a Civil War—then the situation should be utilizedat any timefor operations against Czechoslovakia, as Germany’s most dangerous enemy would be eliminated.
“The Fuehrer sees Case 3 looming near; it could develop from the existing tensions in the Mediterranean, and should it occur, he has firmly decided to make use of it any time, perhaps even as early as 1938.
“Following recent experiences in the course of events of the war in Spain, the Fuehrer does not see an early end to hostilities there. Taking into consideration the time required for past offensives by Franco, a further three years duration of war is within the bounds of possibility. On the other hand, from the German point of view, a one hundred per cent victory by Franco is not desirable; we are more interested in a continuation of the war and preservation of the tensions in the Mediterranean. Should Franco be in sole possession of the Spanish Peninsula, it would mean the end of Italian intervention and the presence of Italy on the Balearic Isles. As our interests are directed towards continuing the war in Spain, it must be the task of our future policy to strengthen Italy in her fight to hold on to the Balearic Isles. However, a solidification of Italian positions on the Balearic Isles can not be tolerated either by France or by England and could lead to a war by France and England against Italy, in which case Spain, if entirely in white [Franco’s] hands, could participate on the side of Italy’s enemies. A subjugation of Italy in such a war appears very unlikely. Additional raw materials could be brought to Italy via Germany. The Fuehrer believes that Italy’s military strategy would be to remain on the defensive against Franceon the Western frontier and carry out operations against France from Libya, against the North African French colonial possessions.
“As a landing of French-British troops on the Italian coast can be discounted, and as a French offensive via the Alps to Upper Italy would be extremely difficult, and would probably stagnate before the strong Italian fortifications, French lines of communication by the Italian fleet will to a great extent paralyze the transport of fighting personnel from North Africa to France, so that at its frontiers with Italy and Germany, France will have, at its disposal, solely the metropolitan fighting forces.
“If Germany profits from this war by disposing of the Czechoslovakian and the Austrian questions, the probability must be assumed that England—being at war with Italy—would not decide to commence operations against Germany. Without British support, a warlike action by France against Germany is not to be anticipated.
“The date of our attack on Czechoslovakia and Austria must be made independent of the course of the Italian-French-English war and would not be simultaneous with the commencement of military operations by these three States. The Fuehrer was also not thinking of military agreements with Italy, but in complete independence and by exploiting this unique favorable opportunity, he wishes to begin to carry out operations against Czechoslovakia. The attack on Czechoslovakia would have to take place with the speed of lightning [blitzartig schnell].
“Fieldmarshal von Blomberg and Generaloberst von Fritsch in giving their estimate on the situation, repeatedly pointed out that England and France must not appear as our enemies, and they stated that the war with Italy would not bind the French Army to such an extent that it would not be in a position to commence operations on our Western frontier with superior forces. Generaloberst von Fritsch estimated the French forces which would presumably be employed on the Alpine frontier against Italy to be in the region of twenty divisions, so that a strong French superiority would still remain on our Western frontier. The French would, according to German reasoning, attempt to advance into the Rhineland. We should consider the lead which France has got in mobilization, and quite apart from the very small value of our then existing fortifications—whichwas pointed out particularly by Generalfieldmarshal von Blomberg—the four motorized divisions which had been laid down for the West would be more or less incapable of movement. With regard to our offensive in a Southeasterly direction, Fieldmarshal von Blomberg drew special attention to the strength of the Czechoslovakian fortifications, the building of which had, assumed the character of a Maginot Line and which would present extreme difficulties to our attack.
“Generaloberst von Fritsch mentioned that it was the purpose of a study which he had laid on for this winter to investigate the possibilities of carrying out operations against Czechoslovakia with special consideration of the conquest of the Czechoslovakian system of fortifications; the Generaloberst also stated that owing to the prevailing conditions, he would have to relinquish his leave abroad, which was to begin on the 10 November. This intention was countermanded by the Fuehrer, who gave as a reason that the possibility of the conflict was not to be regarded as being so imminent. In reply to statements by Generalfieldmarshal von Blomberg and Generaloberst von Fritsch regarding England and France’s attitude, the Fuehrer repeated his previous statements and said that he was convinced of Britain’s nonparticipation and that consequently he did not believe in military action by France against Germany. Should the Mediterranean conflict already mentioned, lead to a general mobilization in Europe, then we should have to commence operations against Czechoslovakia immediately. If, however, the powers who are not participating in the war should declare their disinterestedness, then Germany would, for the time being, have to side with this attitude.
“In view of the information given by the Fuehrer, Generaloberst Goering considered it imperative to think of a reduction or abandonment of our military undertaking in Spain. The Fuehrer agreed to this, insofar as he believed this decision should be postponed for a suitable date.
“The second part of the discussion concerned material armament questions.
“(Signed) Hossbach”. (386-PS)
The record of what happened thereafter is well-known to history. The Anschluss with Austria, under military pressure from the Nazis, occurred in March 1938. Pressure on Czechoslovakia resulted in the Munich Pact of September 1938. That Pact wasviolated, and Czechoslovakia invaded by Germany on 15 March 1939.
Another captured document, a file kept by Colonel Schmundt, Hitler’s adjutant, reveals the truth concerning the deliberateness of the aggressions against Czechoslovakia (388-PS). The file was found in a cellar of the Platterhof at Obersalzberg, near Berchtesgaden. It consists of a work-file of originals and duplicates, incidental to the preparations for the annexation of Czechoslovakia. The German title is “Grundlagen zur Studie Gruen”, (Basic Principles for “Case Green”), “Green” being a codeword for the aggression against Czechoslovakia. Item No. 2 in this file is dated 22 April 1938. It is a summary, prepared by Schmundt, the adjutant, of a discussion on 21 April 1938 between Hitler and Wilhelm Keitel. This item, like the other items in the file, relates to “Case Green”. This meeting occurred within approximately one month following the successful annexation of Austria. In the carrying out of the conspiracy, it became necessary to revise the “Plan Green”, to take into account changed conditions, as a result of the bloodless success against Austria. Item 2 reads:
“Berlin, 22 April 1938.“Bases of the Dissertation onGruen.“Summary of discussion between Fuehrer and General Keitel of 21 April:“A. Political Aspect.“1. Strategic surprise attack out of a clear sky without any cause or possibility of justification has been turned down. As result would be: hostile world opinion which can lead to a critical situation. Such a measure is justified only for the elimination of thelastopponent on the mainland.“2. Action after a time of diplomatic clashes, which gradually come to a crisis and lead to war.“3. Lightning-swift action as the result of an incident (for example, assassination of German ambassador in connection with an anti-German demonstration.)“Military Conclusions.“1. The preparations are to be made for the political possibilities (2 and 3). Case 2 is the undesired one since “Gruen” will have taken security measures.“2. The loss of time caused by transporting the bulk of the divisions by rail—which is unavailable, but should be cut down as far as possible—must not impede a lightning-swift blow at the time of the action.“3. ‘Separate thrusts’ are to be carried out immediatelywith a view to penetrating the enemy fortification lines at numerous points and in a strategically favorable direction. The thrusts are to be worked out to the smallest detail (knowledge of roads, composition of the columns according to their individual tasks). Simultaneous attacks by the Army and Air Force.“The Air Force is to support the individual columns (for example divebombers; sealing off installations at penetration points, hampering the bringing up of reserves, destroying signal communications traffic, thereby isolating the garrisons.)“4. Politically, the first four days of military action are the decisive ones. If there are no effective military successes, a European crisis will certainly arise. Accomplished Facts must prove the senselessness of foreign military intervention, draw Allies into the scheme (division of spoils) and demoralize ‘Gruen.’“Therefore: bridging the time gap between first penetration and employment of the forces to be brought up, by a determined and ruthless thrust by a motorized army. (e.g. via Pilsen, Prague.)“5. If possible, separation of transport movement ‘Rot’ from ‘Gruen’. [‘Rot’ was the code name for their then plan against the West.] A simultaneous strategic concentration ‘Rot’ can lead ‘Rot’ to undesired measures. On the other hand, it must be possible to put ‘Case Rot’ into operation at any time.“C. Propaganda.“1. Leaflets on the conduct of Germans in Czechoslovakia (Gruenland.)“2. Leaflets with threats for intimidation of the Czechs (Gruenen).[Initialled by Schmundt]” (388-PS)
“Berlin, 22 April 1938.
“Bases of the Dissertation onGruen.
“Summary of discussion between Fuehrer and General Keitel of 21 April:
“A. Political Aspect.
“1. Strategic surprise attack out of a clear sky without any cause or possibility of justification has been turned down. As result would be: hostile world opinion which can lead to a critical situation. Such a measure is justified only for the elimination of thelastopponent on the mainland.
“2. Action after a time of diplomatic clashes, which gradually come to a crisis and lead to war.
“3. Lightning-swift action as the result of an incident (for example, assassination of German ambassador in connection with an anti-German demonstration.)
“Military Conclusions.
“1. The preparations are to be made for the political possibilities (2 and 3). Case 2 is the undesired one since “Gruen” will have taken security measures.
“2. The loss of time caused by transporting the bulk of the divisions by rail—which is unavailable, but should be cut down as far as possible—must not impede a lightning-swift blow at the time of the action.
“3. ‘Separate thrusts’ are to be carried out immediatelywith a view to penetrating the enemy fortification lines at numerous points and in a strategically favorable direction. The thrusts are to be worked out to the smallest detail (knowledge of roads, composition of the columns according to their individual tasks). Simultaneous attacks by the Army and Air Force.
“The Air Force is to support the individual columns (for example divebombers; sealing off installations at penetration points, hampering the bringing up of reserves, destroying signal communications traffic, thereby isolating the garrisons.)
“4. Politically, the first four days of military action are the decisive ones. If there are no effective military successes, a European crisis will certainly arise. Accomplished Facts must prove the senselessness of foreign military intervention, draw Allies into the scheme (division of spoils) and demoralize ‘Gruen.’
“Therefore: bridging the time gap between first penetration and employment of the forces to be brought up, by a determined and ruthless thrust by a motorized army. (e.g. via Pilsen, Prague.)
“5. If possible, separation of transport movement ‘Rot’ from ‘Gruen’. [‘Rot’ was the code name for their then plan against the West.] A simultaneous strategic concentration ‘Rot’ can lead ‘Rot’ to undesired measures. On the other hand, it must be possible to put ‘Case Rot’ into operation at any time.
“C. Propaganda.
“1. Leaflets on the conduct of Germans in Czechoslovakia (Gruenland.)
“2. Leaflets with threats for intimidation of the Czechs (Gruenen).
[Initialled by Schmundt]” (388-PS)
Particular attention should be drawn to paragraph 3 of this document, under the heading “Political Aspect”, which reads as follows:
“Lightning-swift action as the result of an incident (example: Assassination of German ambassador as an upshot of an anti-German demonstration).” (388-PS)
“Lightning-swift action as the result of an incident (example: Assassination of German ambassador as an upshot of an anti-German demonstration).” (388-PS)
The document as a whole establishes that the conspirators were planning the creation of an incident to justify to the world their own aggression against Czechoslovakia. It establishes that consideration was being given to assassinating the German ambassador at Prague to create the requisite incident.
C.Formulation and Execution of the Plan to Invade Poland.
The next phase of the aggression was the formulation and execution of the plan to attack Poland, resulting in the initiation of aggressive war in September 1939. Here again the careful and meticulous record keeping of Hitler’s adjutant, Schmundt, has provided a document in his own handwriting which throws down the mask (L-79). The document consists of minutes of a conference held on 23 May 1939. The place of the conference was the Fuehrer’s Study in the New Reich Chancellery. Goering, Raeder and Keitel were present. The subject of the meeting was, “Indoctrination on the political situation and future aims.”
The authenticity and accuracy of Schmundt’s record of the meeting of 23 May 1939 has been admitted by Keitel in a pretrial interrogation. The minutes read as follows:
“Top Secret“To be transmitted by officer only“Minutes of a Conference on 23 May 39”“Place: The Fuehrer’s Study, New Reich Chancellery.“Adjutant on duty: Lt-Col. (G.S.) Schmundt.“Present: The Fuehrer, Field-Marshal Goering, Grand-Admiral Raeder, Col-Gen. von Brauchitsch, Col-Gen. Keitel, Col-Gen. Milch, Gen. (of Artillery) Halder, Gen. Bodenschatz, Rear-Adml. Schniewindt, Col. (G.S.) Jeschonnek, Col. (G.S.) Warlimont, Lt-Col. (G.S.) Schmundt, Capt. Engel (Army), Lieut-Commd. Albrecht, Capt. v. Below (Army).“Subject: Indoctrination on the political situation and future aims.“The Fuehrer defined as the purpose of the conference:“1. Analysis of the situation.“2. Definition of the tasks for the Armed Forces arising from the situation.“3. Exposition of the consequences of those tasks.“4. Ensuring the secrecy of all decisions and work resulting from these consequences.“Secrecy is the first essential for success.“The Fuehrer’s observations are given in systematized form below.“Our present situation must be considered from two points of view:“1. The actual development of events between 1933 and 1939;“2. The permanent and unchanging situation in which Germany lies.“In the period 1933-1939, progress was made in all fields.Our military situation improved enormously.“Our situation with regard to the rest of the world has remained the same.“Germany had dropped from the circle of Great Powers. The balance of power had been effected without the participation of Germany.“This equilibrium is disturbed when Germany’s demands for the necessities of life make themselves felt, and Germany re-emerges as a Great Power. All demands are regarded as ‘Encroachments’. The English are more afraid of dangers in the economic sphere than of the simple threat of force.“A mass of 80 million people has solved the ideological problems. So, too, must the economic problems be solved. No German can evade the creation of the necessary economic conditions for this. The solution of the problems demands courage. The principle, by which one evades solving the problem by adapting oneself to circumstances, is inadmissible. Circumstances must rather be adapted to aims. This is impossible without invasion of foreign states or attacks upon foreign property.“Living space, in proportion to the magnitude of the state, is the basis of all power. One may refuse for a time to face the problem, but finally it is solved one way or the other. The choice is between advancement or decline. In 15 or 20 years’ time we shall be compelled to find a solution. No German statesman can evade the question longer than that.“We are at present in a state of patriotic fervour, which is shared by two other nations: Italy and Japan.“The period which lies behind us has indeed been put to good use. All measures have been taken in the correct sequence and in harmony with our aims.“After 6 years, the situation is today as follows:“The national-political unity of the Germans has been achieved, apart from minor exceptions. Further successes cannot be attained without the shedding of blood.“The demarcation of frontiers is of military importance.“The Pole is no ‘supplementary enemy’. Poland will always be on the side of our adversaries. In spite of treaties of friendship, Poland has always had the secret intention of exploiting every opportunity to do us harm.“Danzig is not the subject of the dispute at all. It is a question of expanding our living space in the East and of securing our food supplies, of the settlement of the Baltic problem. Food supplies can be expected only from thinly populatedareas. Over and above the natural fertility, thorough-going German exploitation will enormously increase the surplus.“There is no other possibility for Europe.“Colonies: Beware of gifts of colonial territory. This does not solve the food problem. Remember—blockade.“If fate brings us into conflict with the West, the possession of extensive areas in the East will be advantageous. Upon record harvests we shall be able to rely even less in time of war than in peace.“The population of non-German areas will perform no military service, and will be available as a source of labour.“The Polish problem is inseparable from conflict with the West.“Poland’s internal power of resistance to Bolshevism is doubtful. Thus Poland is of doubtful value as a barrier against Russia.“It is questionable whether military success in the West can be achieved by a quick decision, questionable too is the attitude of Poland.“The Polish government will not resist pressure from Russia. Poland sees danger in a German victory in the West, and will attempt to rob us of the victory.“There is therefore no question of sparing Poland, and we are left with the decision:“To attack Poland at the first suitable opportunity.[This sentence is underscored in the original German text.]“We cannot expect a repetition of the Czech affair. There will be war. Our task is to isolate Poland. The success of the isolation will be decisive.“Therefore, the Fuehrer must reserve the right to give the final order to attack. There must be no simultaneous conflict with the Western Powers [France and England].“If it is not certain that a German-Polish conflict will not lead to war in the West, then the fight must be primarily against England and France.“Fundamentally therefore: Conflict with Poland—beginning with an attack on Poland—will only be successful if the Western Powers keep out of it. If this is impossible, then it will be better to attack in the West and to settle Poland at the same time.“The isolation of Poland is a matter of skillful politics.“Japan is a weighty problem. Even if at first for various reasons her collaboration with us appears to be somewhatcool and restricted, it is nevertheless in Japan’s own interest to take the initiative in attacking Russia in good time.“Economic relations with Russia are possible only if political relations have improved. A cautious trend is apparent in Press comment. It is not impossible that Russia will show herself to be disinterested in the destruction of Poland. Should Russia take steps to oppose us, our relations with Japan may become closer.“If there were an alliance of France, England and Russia against Germany, Italy and Japan, I would be constrained to attack England and France with a few annihilating blows. The Fuehrer doubts the possibility of a peaceful settlement with England. We must prepare ourselves for the conflict. England sees in our development the foundation of a hegemony which would weaken England. England is therefore our enemy, and the conflict with England will be a life-and-death struggle.“What will this struggle be like?[This sentence is underscored in the German original.]“England cannot deal with Germany and subjugate us with a few powerful blows. It is imperative for England that the war should be brought as near to the Ruhr basin as possible. French blood will not be spared (West Wall). The possession of the Ruhr basin will determine the duration of our resistance.“The Dutch and Belgium air bases will be occupied by armed forces. Declarations of neutrality must be ignored. If England and France intend the war between Germany and Poland to lead to a conflict, they will support Holland and Belgium in their neutrality and make them build fortifications in order finally to force them into cooperation.“Albeit under protest, Belgium and Holland will yield to pressure.“Therefore, if England intends to intervene in the Polish war, we must occupy Holland with lightning speed. We must aim at securing a new defense line on Dutch soil up to the Zuider Zee.“The war with England and France will be a life-and-death struggle.“The idea that we can get off cheaply is dangerous; there is no such possibility. We must burn our boats, and it is no longer a question of justice or injustice, but of life or death for 80 million human beings.“Question: Short or long war?“Every country’s armed forces or government must aim at a short war. The government, however, must also be prepared for a war of 10-15 years’ duration.“History has always shown that the people have believed that wars would be short. In 1914, the opinion still prevailed that it was impossible to finance a long war. Even today this idea still persists in many minds. But on the contrary, every state will hold out as long as possible, unless it immediately suffers some grave weakening (e.g. Ruhr basin). England has similar weaknesses.“England knows that to lose a war will mean the end of her world power.“Englandis the driving force against Germany.“Her strength lies in the following:“1. The British themselves are proud, courageous, tenacious, firm in resistance and gifted as organizers. They know how to exploit every new development. They have the love of adventure and bravery of the Nordic race. Quality is lowered by dispersal. The German average is higher.“2. World power in itself. It has been constant for 300 years. Extended by the acquisition of allies, this power is not merely something concrete, but must also be considered as a psychological force embracing the entire world. Add to this immeasurable wealth, with consequential financial credit.“3. Geopolitical safety and protection by strong sea power and a courageous air force.“England’s weakness:“If in the World War I we had had two battleships and two cruisers more, and if the battle of Jutland had begun in the morning, the British fleet would have been defeated and England brought to her knees. It would have meant the end of this war. It was formerly not sufficient to defeat the fleet. Landings had to be made in order to defeat England. England could provide her own food supplies. Today that is no longer possible.“The moment England’s food supply routes are cut, she is forced to capitulate. The import of food and fuel depends on the fleet’s protection.“If the German Air Force attacks English territory, England will not be forced to capitulate in one day. But if the fleet is destroyed immediate capitulation will be the result.“There is no doubt that a surprise attack can lead to a quick decision. It would be criminal, however, for the government to rely entirely on the element of surprise.“Experience has shown that surprise may be nullified by—“1. Disclosure outside the limit of the military circles concerned.“2. Mere chance, which may cause the collapse of the whole enterprise.“3. Human failings.“4. Weather conditions.“The final date for striking must be fixed well in advance. Beyond that time, the tension cannot be endured for long. It must be borne in mind that weather conditions can render any surprise intervention by Navy and Air Force impossible.“This must be regarded as a most unfavorable basis of action.“1. An effort must be made to deal the enemy a significant or the final decisive blow right at the start. Consideration of right and wrong or treaties do not enter into the matter. This will only be possible if we are not involved in a war with England on account of Poland.“2. In addition to the surprise attack, preparation for a long war must be made, while opportunities on the Continent for England are eliminated.“The Army will have to hold positions essential to the Navy and Air Force. If Holland and Belgium are successfully occupied and held, and if France is also defeated, the fundamental conditions for a successful war against England will have been secured.“England can then be blockaded from Western France at close quarters by the Air Force, while the Navy with its submarines extend the range of the blockade.“Consequences:“England will not be able to fight on the Continent:“Daily attacks by the Air Force and Navy will cut all her life-lines:“Germany will not bleed to death on land.“Such strategy has been shown to be necessary by World War I and subsequent military operations. World War I is responsible for the following strategic considerations which are imperative—“1. With a more powerful Navy at the outbreak of the War, or a wheeling movement by the Army towards the Channel ports, the end would have been different.“2. A country cannot be brought to defeat by an air force. It is impossible to attack all objectives simultaneously, and the lapse of time of a few minutes would evoke defense counter-measures.“3. The unrestricted use of all resources is essential.“4. Once the Army, in cooperation with the Air Force and Navy, has taken the most important positions, industrial production will cease in flow in to the bottomless pit of the Army’s battles, and can be diverted to benefit the Air Force and Navy.“The Army must, therefore, be capable of taking these positions. Systematic preparation must be made for the attack.“Study to this end is of the utmost importance.“The aim will always be to force England to her knees.“A weapon will only be of decisive importance in winning battles, so long as the enemy does not possess it.“This applies to gas, submarines and the Air Force. It would be true of the latter, for instance, as long as the English Fleet had no available countermeasures; it will no longer be the case in 1940 and 1941. Against Poland, for example, tanks will be effective, as the Polish Army possesses no counter-measures.“Where straightforward pressure is no longer considered to be decisive, its place must be taken by the elements of surprise and by masterly handling. * * *”* * * * * *“Purpose:“1. Study of the entire problem.“2. Study of the events.“3. Study of the means needed.“4. Study of the necessary training.“Men with great powers of imagination and high technical training must belong to the staff, as well as officers with sober sceptic powers of understanding.“Working principles:“1. No one is to take part in this who does not have to know of it.“2. No one can find out more than he must know.“3. When must the person in question know it at the very latest? No one may know anything before it is necessary that he know it.“On Goering’s question, the Fuehrer decided that:“a.The armed forces determine what shall be built.“b.In the shipbuilding program, nothing is to be changed.“c.The armament programs are to be modeled on the years 1943 or 1944.[Schmundt certified this text.]” (L-79)
“Top Secret
“To be transmitted by officer only
“Minutes of a Conference on 23 May 39”
“Place: The Fuehrer’s Study, New Reich Chancellery.
“Adjutant on duty: Lt-Col. (G.S.) Schmundt.
“Present: The Fuehrer, Field-Marshal Goering, Grand-Admiral Raeder, Col-Gen. von Brauchitsch, Col-Gen. Keitel, Col-Gen. Milch, Gen. (of Artillery) Halder, Gen. Bodenschatz, Rear-Adml. Schniewindt, Col. (G.S.) Jeschonnek, Col. (G.S.) Warlimont, Lt-Col. (G.S.) Schmundt, Capt. Engel (Army), Lieut-Commd. Albrecht, Capt. v. Below (Army).
“Subject: Indoctrination on the political situation and future aims.
“The Fuehrer defined as the purpose of the conference:
“1. Analysis of the situation.
“2. Definition of the tasks for the Armed Forces arising from the situation.
“3. Exposition of the consequences of those tasks.
“4. Ensuring the secrecy of all decisions and work resulting from these consequences.
“Secrecy is the first essential for success.
“The Fuehrer’s observations are given in systematized form below.
“Our present situation must be considered from two points of view:
“1. The actual development of events between 1933 and 1939;
“2. The permanent and unchanging situation in which Germany lies.
“In the period 1933-1939, progress was made in all fields.
Our military situation improved enormously.
“Our situation with regard to the rest of the world has remained the same.
“Germany had dropped from the circle of Great Powers. The balance of power had been effected without the participation of Germany.
“This equilibrium is disturbed when Germany’s demands for the necessities of life make themselves felt, and Germany re-emerges as a Great Power. All demands are regarded as ‘Encroachments’. The English are more afraid of dangers in the economic sphere than of the simple threat of force.
“A mass of 80 million people has solved the ideological problems. So, too, must the economic problems be solved. No German can evade the creation of the necessary economic conditions for this. The solution of the problems demands courage. The principle, by which one evades solving the problem by adapting oneself to circumstances, is inadmissible. Circumstances must rather be adapted to aims. This is impossible without invasion of foreign states or attacks upon foreign property.
“Living space, in proportion to the magnitude of the state, is the basis of all power. One may refuse for a time to face the problem, but finally it is solved one way or the other. The choice is between advancement or decline. In 15 or 20 years’ time we shall be compelled to find a solution. No German statesman can evade the question longer than that.
“We are at present in a state of patriotic fervour, which is shared by two other nations: Italy and Japan.
“The period which lies behind us has indeed been put to good use. All measures have been taken in the correct sequence and in harmony with our aims.
“After 6 years, the situation is today as follows:
“The national-political unity of the Germans has been achieved, apart from minor exceptions. Further successes cannot be attained without the shedding of blood.
“The demarcation of frontiers is of military importance.
“The Pole is no ‘supplementary enemy’. Poland will always be on the side of our adversaries. In spite of treaties of friendship, Poland has always had the secret intention of exploiting every opportunity to do us harm.
“Danzig is not the subject of the dispute at all. It is a question of expanding our living space in the East and of securing our food supplies, of the settlement of the Baltic problem. Food supplies can be expected only from thinly populatedareas. Over and above the natural fertility, thorough-going German exploitation will enormously increase the surplus.
“There is no other possibility for Europe.
“Colonies: Beware of gifts of colonial territory. This does not solve the food problem. Remember—blockade.
“If fate brings us into conflict with the West, the possession of extensive areas in the East will be advantageous. Upon record harvests we shall be able to rely even less in time of war than in peace.
“The population of non-German areas will perform no military service, and will be available as a source of labour.
“The Polish problem is inseparable from conflict with the West.
“Poland’s internal power of resistance to Bolshevism is doubtful. Thus Poland is of doubtful value as a barrier against Russia.
“It is questionable whether military success in the West can be achieved by a quick decision, questionable too is the attitude of Poland.
“The Polish government will not resist pressure from Russia. Poland sees danger in a German victory in the West, and will attempt to rob us of the victory.
“There is therefore no question of sparing Poland, and we are left with the decision:
“To attack Poland at the first suitable opportunity.[This sentence is underscored in the original German text.]
“We cannot expect a repetition of the Czech affair. There will be war. Our task is to isolate Poland. The success of the isolation will be decisive.
“Therefore, the Fuehrer must reserve the right to give the final order to attack. There must be no simultaneous conflict with the Western Powers [France and England].
“If it is not certain that a German-Polish conflict will not lead to war in the West, then the fight must be primarily against England and France.
“Fundamentally therefore: Conflict with Poland—beginning with an attack on Poland—will only be successful if the Western Powers keep out of it. If this is impossible, then it will be better to attack in the West and to settle Poland at the same time.
“The isolation of Poland is a matter of skillful politics.
“Japan is a weighty problem. Even if at first for various reasons her collaboration with us appears to be somewhatcool and restricted, it is nevertheless in Japan’s own interest to take the initiative in attacking Russia in good time.
“Economic relations with Russia are possible only if political relations have improved. A cautious trend is apparent in Press comment. It is not impossible that Russia will show herself to be disinterested in the destruction of Poland. Should Russia take steps to oppose us, our relations with Japan may become closer.
“If there were an alliance of France, England and Russia against Germany, Italy and Japan, I would be constrained to attack England and France with a few annihilating blows. The Fuehrer doubts the possibility of a peaceful settlement with England. We must prepare ourselves for the conflict. England sees in our development the foundation of a hegemony which would weaken England. England is therefore our enemy, and the conflict with England will be a life-and-death struggle.
“What will this struggle be like?[This sentence is underscored in the German original.]
“England cannot deal with Germany and subjugate us with a few powerful blows. It is imperative for England that the war should be brought as near to the Ruhr basin as possible. French blood will not be spared (West Wall). The possession of the Ruhr basin will determine the duration of our resistance.
“The Dutch and Belgium air bases will be occupied by armed forces. Declarations of neutrality must be ignored. If England and France intend the war between Germany and Poland to lead to a conflict, they will support Holland and Belgium in their neutrality and make them build fortifications in order finally to force them into cooperation.
“Albeit under protest, Belgium and Holland will yield to pressure.
“Therefore, if England intends to intervene in the Polish war, we must occupy Holland with lightning speed. We must aim at securing a new defense line on Dutch soil up to the Zuider Zee.
“The war with England and France will be a life-and-death struggle.
“The idea that we can get off cheaply is dangerous; there is no such possibility. We must burn our boats, and it is no longer a question of justice or injustice, but of life or death for 80 million human beings.
“Question: Short or long war?
“Every country’s armed forces or government must aim at a short war. The government, however, must also be prepared for a war of 10-15 years’ duration.
“History has always shown that the people have believed that wars would be short. In 1914, the opinion still prevailed that it was impossible to finance a long war. Even today this idea still persists in many minds. But on the contrary, every state will hold out as long as possible, unless it immediately suffers some grave weakening (e.g. Ruhr basin). England has similar weaknesses.
“England knows that to lose a war will mean the end of her world power.
“Englandis the driving force against Germany.
“Her strength lies in the following:
“1. The British themselves are proud, courageous, tenacious, firm in resistance and gifted as organizers. They know how to exploit every new development. They have the love of adventure and bravery of the Nordic race. Quality is lowered by dispersal. The German average is higher.
“2. World power in itself. It has been constant for 300 years. Extended by the acquisition of allies, this power is not merely something concrete, but must also be considered as a psychological force embracing the entire world. Add to this immeasurable wealth, with consequential financial credit.
“3. Geopolitical safety and protection by strong sea power and a courageous air force.
“England’s weakness:
“If in the World War I we had had two battleships and two cruisers more, and if the battle of Jutland had begun in the morning, the British fleet would have been defeated and England brought to her knees. It would have meant the end of this war. It was formerly not sufficient to defeat the fleet. Landings had to be made in order to defeat England. England could provide her own food supplies. Today that is no longer possible.
“The moment England’s food supply routes are cut, she is forced to capitulate. The import of food and fuel depends on the fleet’s protection.
“If the German Air Force attacks English territory, England will not be forced to capitulate in one day. But if the fleet is destroyed immediate capitulation will be the result.
“There is no doubt that a surprise attack can lead to a quick decision. It would be criminal, however, for the government to rely entirely on the element of surprise.
“Experience has shown that surprise may be nullified by—
“1. Disclosure outside the limit of the military circles concerned.
“2. Mere chance, which may cause the collapse of the whole enterprise.
“3. Human failings.
“4. Weather conditions.
“The final date for striking must be fixed well in advance. Beyond that time, the tension cannot be endured for long. It must be borne in mind that weather conditions can render any surprise intervention by Navy and Air Force impossible.
“This must be regarded as a most unfavorable basis of action.
“1. An effort must be made to deal the enemy a significant or the final decisive blow right at the start. Consideration of right and wrong or treaties do not enter into the matter. This will only be possible if we are not involved in a war with England on account of Poland.
“2. In addition to the surprise attack, preparation for a long war must be made, while opportunities on the Continent for England are eliminated.
“The Army will have to hold positions essential to the Navy and Air Force. If Holland and Belgium are successfully occupied and held, and if France is also defeated, the fundamental conditions for a successful war against England will have been secured.
“England can then be blockaded from Western France at close quarters by the Air Force, while the Navy with its submarines extend the range of the blockade.
“Consequences:
“England will not be able to fight on the Continent:
“Daily attacks by the Air Force and Navy will cut all her life-lines:
“Germany will not bleed to death on land.
“Such strategy has been shown to be necessary by World War I and subsequent military operations. World War I is responsible for the following strategic considerations which are imperative—
“1. With a more powerful Navy at the outbreak of the War, or a wheeling movement by the Army towards the Channel ports, the end would have been different.
“2. A country cannot be brought to defeat by an air force. It is impossible to attack all objectives simultaneously, and the lapse of time of a few minutes would evoke defense counter-measures.
“3. The unrestricted use of all resources is essential.
“4. Once the Army, in cooperation with the Air Force and Navy, has taken the most important positions, industrial production will cease in flow in to the bottomless pit of the Army’s battles, and can be diverted to benefit the Air Force and Navy.
“The Army must, therefore, be capable of taking these positions. Systematic preparation must be made for the attack.
“Study to this end is of the utmost importance.
“The aim will always be to force England to her knees.
“A weapon will only be of decisive importance in winning battles, so long as the enemy does not possess it.
“This applies to gas, submarines and the Air Force. It would be true of the latter, for instance, as long as the English Fleet had no available countermeasures; it will no longer be the case in 1940 and 1941. Against Poland, for example, tanks will be effective, as the Polish Army possesses no counter-measures.
“Where straightforward pressure is no longer considered to be decisive, its place must be taken by the elements of surprise and by masterly handling. * * *”
* * * * * *
“Purpose:
“1. Study of the entire problem.
“2. Study of the events.
“3. Study of the means needed.
“4. Study of the necessary training.
“Men with great powers of imagination and high technical training must belong to the staff, as well as officers with sober sceptic powers of understanding.
“Working principles:
“1. No one is to take part in this who does not have to know of it.
“2. No one can find out more than he must know.
“3. When must the person in question know it at the very latest? No one may know anything before it is necessary that he know it.
“On Goering’s question, the Fuehrer decided that:
“a.The armed forces determine what shall be built.
“b.In the shipbuilding program, nothing is to be changed.
“c.The armament programs are to be modeled on the years 1943 or 1944.
[Schmundt certified this text.]” (L-79)
These minutes demonstrate that the Nazi conspirators were proceeding in accordance with a plan. They demonstrate the cold-blooded premeditation of the assault on Poland. They demonstrate that the questions concerning Danzig, which the Nazis had agitated with Poland as a political pretext, were not true questions, but were false issues, issues agitated to conceal their motive of aggressive, expansion for food, andLebensraum.
Just one week prior to the launching of the attack on Poland, Hitler made an address to his chief military commanders, at Obersalzberg, on 22 August 1939. [Three reports of this meeting are available: (L-3;798-PS; and1014-PS). The first of the three documents (L-3) was obtained through an American newspaperman, and purported to be original minutes of the Obersalzberg meeting, transmitted to the newspaperman by some other person. There was no proof of actual delivery to the intermediary by the person who took the notes. That document (L-3) therefore, merely served as an incentive to search for something better. The result was that two other documents (798-PS) and (1014-PS) were discovered in the OKW files at Flensberg. These two documents indicate that Hitler on that day made two speeches, one apparently in the morning and one in the afternoon. Comparison of those two documents with the first document (L-3) led to the conclusion that the first document was a slightly garbled merger of the two speeches, and therefore was not relied upon.]
On this day of 22 August 1939, Hitler addressed the supreme commanders of the three branches of the armed forces, as well as the commanding generals, (Oberbefehlshabers) as follows:
“I have called you together to give you a picture of the political situation, in order that you may have insight into the individual element on which I base my decision to act, and in order to strengthen your confidence. After this, we will discuss military details.“It was clear to me that a conflict with Poland had to come sooner or later. I had already made this decision in Spring. [Apparently this referred to (L-79).] But I thought I would first turn against the West in a few years, and only afterwards against the East. But the sequence cannot be fixed. One cannot close one’s eyes even before a threatening situation. I wanted to establish an acceptable relationship withPoland, in order to fight first against the West, but this plan which was agreeable to me could not be executed, since essential points have changed.“It became clear to me that Poland would attack us, in case of a conflict in the West.“Poland wants access to the sea.“The further development became obvious after the occupation of the Memel region, and it became clear to me that under the circumstances a conflict with Poland could arise at an unopportune moment.“I enumerate as reasons for this reflection, first of all, two personal constitutions, my own personality, and that of Mussolini. Essentially, it depends on me, my existence, because of my political activity.“Furthermore, the fact that probably no one will ever again have the confidence of the whole German people as I do. There will probably never again be a man in the future with more authority. My existence is, therefore, a factor of great value. But I can be eliminated at any time by a criminal or an idiot.“The second personal factor is Il Duce. His existence is also decisive. If something happens to him, Italy’s loyalty to the alliance will no longer be certain. The basic attitude of the Italian Court is against the Duce. Above all, the Court sees in the expansion of the empire a burden. The Duce is the man with the strongest nerves in Italy.“The third factor, favorable for us is Franco. We can only ask benevolent neutrality from Spain, but this depends on Franco’s personality. He guarantees a certain uniformity and steadiness of the present system in Spain. We must take into account the fact that Spain does not as yet have a Fascist Party of our internal unity.“On the other side, a negative picture, as far as decisive personalities are concerned. There is no outstanding personality in England or France.“For us it is easy to make decisions. We have nothing to lose: we can only gain. Our economic situation is such, because of our restrictions, that we cannot hold out more than a few years. Goering can confirm this. We have no other choice; we must act. Our opponents risk much and gain only little. England’s stake in a war is unimaginably great. Our enemies have men who are below average. No personalities, no masters, no men of action.“Besides the personal factor, the political situation is favorablefor us; in the Mediterranean rivalry among Italy, France, and England; in the Orient tension, which leads to the alarming of the Mohammedan world.“The English empire did not emerge from the last war strengthened. From a maritime point of view, nothing was achieved: Conflict between England and Ireland, the south African Union became more independent, concessions had to be made to India, England is in great danger, unhealthy industries. A British statesman can look into the future only with concern.“France’s position has also deteriorated, particularly in the Mediterranean.“Further favorable factors for us are these:“Since Albania, there is an equilibrium of power in the Balkans. Yugoslavia carries the germ of collapse because of her internal situation.“Rumania did not grow stronger. She is liable to attack and vulnerable. She is threatened by Hungary and Bulgaria. Since Kemal’s death, Turkey has been ruled by small minds, unsteady weak men.“All these fortunate circumstances will no longer prevail in two to three years. No one knows how long I shall live. Therefore conflict better now.“The creation of Greater Germany was a great achievement politically but militarily it was questionable, since it was achieved through a bluff of the political leaders. It is necessary to test the military, if at all possible, not by general settlement, but by solving individual tasks.“The relation to Poland has become unbearable. My Polish policy hitherto was in contrast to the ideas of the people. My propositions to Poland, the Danzig corridor, were disturbed by England’s intervention. Poland changed her tune towards us. The initiative cannot be allowed to pass to others. This moment is more favorable than in two to three years. An attempt on my life or Mussolini’s could only change the situation to our disadvantage. One cannot eternally stand opposite one another with cocked rifle. A suggested compromise would have demanded that we change our convictions and make agreeable gestures. They talked to us again in the language of Versailles. There was danger of losing prestige. Now the probability is still great that the West will not interfere. We must accept the risk with reckless resolution. A politician must accept a risk as much asa military leader. We are facing the alternative to strike or to be destroyed with certainty sooner or later.”* * * * * *“Now it is also a great risk. Iron nerves, iron resolution.”* * * * * *“We need not be afraid of a blockade. The East will supply us with grain, cattle, coal, lead and zinc. It is a big arm, which demands great efforts. I am only afraid that at the last minute someSchweinhundwill make a proposal for mediation.”* * * * * *“Goering answers with thanks to the Fuehrer and the assurance that the armed forces will do their duty.” (798-PS)
“I have called you together to give you a picture of the political situation, in order that you may have insight into the individual element on which I base my decision to act, and in order to strengthen your confidence. After this, we will discuss military details.
“It was clear to me that a conflict with Poland had to come sooner or later. I had already made this decision in Spring. [Apparently this referred to (L-79).] But I thought I would first turn against the West in a few years, and only afterwards against the East. But the sequence cannot be fixed. One cannot close one’s eyes even before a threatening situation. I wanted to establish an acceptable relationship withPoland, in order to fight first against the West, but this plan which was agreeable to me could not be executed, since essential points have changed.
“It became clear to me that Poland would attack us, in case of a conflict in the West.
“Poland wants access to the sea.
“The further development became obvious after the occupation of the Memel region, and it became clear to me that under the circumstances a conflict with Poland could arise at an unopportune moment.
“I enumerate as reasons for this reflection, first of all, two personal constitutions, my own personality, and that of Mussolini. Essentially, it depends on me, my existence, because of my political activity.
“Furthermore, the fact that probably no one will ever again have the confidence of the whole German people as I do. There will probably never again be a man in the future with more authority. My existence is, therefore, a factor of great value. But I can be eliminated at any time by a criminal or an idiot.
“The second personal factor is Il Duce. His existence is also decisive. If something happens to him, Italy’s loyalty to the alliance will no longer be certain. The basic attitude of the Italian Court is against the Duce. Above all, the Court sees in the expansion of the empire a burden. The Duce is the man with the strongest nerves in Italy.
“The third factor, favorable for us is Franco. We can only ask benevolent neutrality from Spain, but this depends on Franco’s personality. He guarantees a certain uniformity and steadiness of the present system in Spain. We must take into account the fact that Spain does not as yet have a Fascist Party of our internal unity.
“On the other side, a negative picture, as far as decisive personalities are concerned. There is no outstanding personality in England or France.
“For us it is easy to make decisions. We have nothing to lose: we can only gain. Our economic situation is such, because of our restrictions, that we cannot hold out more than a few years. Goering can confirm this. We have no other choice; we must act. Our opponents risk much and gain only little. England’s stake in a war is unimaginably great. Our enemies have men who are below average. No personalities, no masters, no men of action.
“Besides the personal factor, the political situation is favorablefor us; in the Mediterranean rivalry among Italy, France, and England; in the Orient tension, which leads to the alarming of the Mohammedan world.
“The English empire did not emerge from the last war strengthened. From a maritime point of view, nothing was achieved: Conflict between England and Ireland, the south African Union became more independent, concessions had to be made to India, England is in great danger, unhealthy industries. A British statesman can look into the future only with concern.
“France’s position has also deteriorated, particularly in the Mediterranean.
“Further favorable factors for us are these:
“Since Albania, there is an equilibrium of power in the Balkans. Yugoslavia carries the germ of collapse because of her internal situation.
“Rumania did not grow stronger. She is liable to attack and vulnerable. She is threatened by Hungary and Bulgaria. Since Kemal’s death, Turkey has been ruled by small minds, unsteady weak men.
“All these fortunate circumstances will no longer prevail in two to three years. No one knows how long I shall live. Therefore conflict better now.
“The creation of Greater Germany was a great achievement politically but militarily it was questionable, since it was achieved through a bluff of the political leaders. It is necessary to test the military, if at all possible, not by general settlement, but by solving individual tasks.
“The relation to Poland has become unbearable. My Polish policy hitherto was in contrast to the ideas of the people. My propositions to Poland, the Danzig corridor, were disturbed by England’s intervention. Poland changed her tune towards us. The initiative cannot be allowed to pass to others. This moment is more favorable than in two to three years. An attempt on my life or Mussolini’s could only change the situation to our disadvantage. One cannot eternally stand opposite one another with cocked rifle. A suggested compromise would have demanded that we change our convictions and make agreeable gestures. They talked to us again in the language of Versailles. There was danger of losing prestige. Now the probability is still great that the West will not interfere. We must accept the risk with reckless resolution. A politician must accept a risk as much asa military leader. We are facing the alternative to strike or to be destroyed with certainty sooner or later.”
* * * * * *
“Now it is also a great risk. Iron nerves, iron resolution.”
* * * * * *
“We need not be afraid of a blockade. The East will supply us with grain, cattle, coal, lead and zinc. It is a big arm, which demands great efforts. I am only afraid that at the last minute someSchweinhundwill make a proposal for mediation.”
* * * * * *
“Goering answers with thanks to the Fuehrer and the assurance that the armed forces will do their duty.” (798-PS)
In his second speech on 22 August 1939 the Fuehrer had this to say: