“1. The German Reich Government refuses to adhere to the Geneva Resolution of 17 May.“The Treaty of Versailles was not broken by Germany unilaterally, but the well-known paragraphs of the dictate of Versailles were violated, and consequently invalidated, by those powers who could not make up their minds to follow the disarmament requested of Germany with their own disarmament as agreed upon by Treaty.“2. Because the other powers did not live up to their obligations under the disarmament program, the Government of the German Reich no longer considers itself bound to those articles, which are nothing but a discrimination against the German nation for an unlimited period of time, since, through them, Germany is being nailed down in a unilateral manner contrary to the spirit of the agreement.” (2288-PS)
“1. The German Reich Government refuses to adhere to the Geneva Resolution of 17 May.
“The Treaty of Versailles was not broken by Germany unilaterally, but the well-known paragraphs of the dictate of Versailles were violated, and consequently invalidated, by those powers who could not make up their minds to follow the disarmament requested of Germany with their own disarmament as agreed upon by Treaty.
“2. Because the other powers did not live up to their obligations under the disarmament program, the Government of the German Reich no longer considers itself bound to those articles, which are nothing but a discrimination against the German nation for an unlimited period of time, since, through them, Germany is being nailed down in a unilateral manner contrary to the spirit of the agreement.” (2288-PS)
In conjunction with other phases of planning and preparation for aggressive war, there were various programs for direct and indirect training of a military nature. They included not onlythe training of military personnel, but also the establishment and training of other military organizations, such as the Police Force, which could be and were absorbed by the Army. The extent of this program for military training is indicated by Hitler’s boast of the expenditure of ninety billion Reichsmarks during the period 1933 to 1939, in the building up of the armed forces.
In a speech by Adolf Hitler delivered on 1 September, 1939, (2322-PS), which was published in the “Voelkischer Beobachter” under the heading “The Fuehrer announces the Battle for the Justice and Security of the Reich”, the following passage occurred:
“For more than six years now, I have been engaged in building up the German Armed Forces. During this period more than ninety billion Reichsmarks were spent building up theWehrmacht. Today, ours are the best-equipped armed forces in the world, and they are superior to those of 1914. My confidence in them can never be shaken.” (2322-PS)
“For more than six years now, I have been engaged in building up the German Armed Forces. During this period more than ninety billion Reichsmarks were spent building up theWehrmacht. Today, ours are the best-equipped armed forces in the world, and they are superior to those of 1914. My confidence in them can never be shaken.” (2322-PS)
The secret nature of this training program and the fact of its early development is illustrated by a report to Hess, in 1932, concerning the secret training of flying personnel, as well as the early plans to build a military air force (1143-PS). This report was sent in a letter from Schickedantz to Rosenberg, for delivery to Hess. Apparently Schickedantz was very anxious that no one but Hess should get this letter, and therefore sent it to Rosenberg for personal delivery to Hess. The letter points out that the civilian pilots should be so organized as to enable their transfer into the military air force organization. The letter dated 20 October 1932, reads:
“Dear Alfred [Rosenberg]: I am sending you enclosed a communication from the RWM forwarded to me by our confidential man (Vertrauensmann) which indeed is very interesting. I believe we will have to take some steps so that the matter will not be procured secretly for the Stahlhelm. This report is not known to anybody else. I intentionally did not inform even our tall friend.” [Rosenberg, in an interrogation on 5 October 1945, identified this “tall friend” as being Von Albensleben.] “I am enclosing an additional copy for Hess, and ask you to transmit the letter to Hess by messenger, as I do not want to write a letter to Hess for fear that it might be read somewhere.Mit bestem Gruss, Yours Amo.” (1143-PS)
“Dear Alfred [Rosenberg]: I am sending you enclosed a communication from the RWM forwarded to me by our confidential man (Vertrauensmann) which indeed is very interesting. I believe we will have to take some steps so that the matter will not be procured secretly for the Stahlhelm. This report is not known to anybody else. I intentionally did not inform even our tall friend.” [Rosenberg, in an interrogation on 5 October 1945, identified this “tall friend” as being Von Albensleben.] “I am enclosing an additional copy for Hess, and ask you to transmit the letter to Hess by messenger, as I do not want to write a letter to Hess for fear that it might be read somewhere.Mit bestem Gruss, Yours Amo.” (1143-PS)
Enclosed in the report is:
“Air Force Organization”“Purpose: Preparation of material and training of personnelto provide for the case of the armament of the air force.“Entire management as a civilian organization will be transferred to Col. Von Willberg, at present commander of Breslau, who, retaining his position in the Reichwehr, is going on leave of absence.“(a) Organizing the pilots of civilian air lines in such a way as to enable their transfer to the air force organization.“(b) Prospects to train crews for military flying. Training to be done within the organization for military flying of the Stahlhelm [steel helmet] which is being turned over to Col. Hanel, retired.“All existing organizations for sport flying are to be used for military flying. Directions on kinds and tasks of military flying will be issued by this Stahlhelm directorate. The Stahlhelm organization will pay the military pilots 50 marks per hour flight. These are due to the owner of the plane in case he himself carries out the flight. They are to be divided in case of non-owners of the plane, between flight organization, proprietor and crew in the proportion of 10:20:20. Military flying is now paid better than flying for advertisement (40). We therefore have to expect that most proprietors of planes or flying associations will go over to the Stahlhelm organization. It must be achieved that equal conditions will be granted by the RWM, also the NSDAP organization.” (1143-PS)
“Air Force Organization”
“Purpose: Preparation of material and training of personnelto provide for the case of the armament of the air force.
“Entire management as a civilian organization will be transferred to Col. Von Willberg, at present commander of Breslau, who, retaining his position in the Reichwehr, is going on leave of absence.
“(a) Organizing the pilots of civilian air lines in such a way as to enable their transfer to the air force organization.
“(b) Prospects to train crews for military flying. Training to be done within the organization for military flying of the Stahlhelm [steel helmet] which is being turned over to Col. Hanel, retired.
“All existing organizations for sport flying are to be used for military flying. Directions on kinds and tasks of military flying will be issued by this Stahlhelm directorate. The Stahlhelm organization will pay the military pilots 50 marks per hour flight. These are due to the owner of the plane in case he himself carries out the flight. They are to be divided in case of non-owners of the plane, between flight organization, proprietor and crew in the proportion of 10:20:20. Military flying is now paid better than flying for advertisement (40). We therefore have to expect that most proprietors of planes or flying associations will go over to the Stahlhelm organization. It must be achieved that equal conditions will be granted by the RWM, also the NSDAP organization.” (1143-PS)
D.Secret Rearmament
The program of rearmament and the objectives of circumventing and breaching the Versailles Treaty are forcefully shown by a number of Navy documents, showing the participation and cooperation of the German navy in this rearmament program which was secret at first. When it was deemed safe to say so, the Navy openly acknowledged that it had always been its objective to break the Versailles Treaty.
In 1937 the Navy High Command (OKM) published a secret book entitled, “The Fight of the Navy Against Versailles, 1919 to 1935”, written by Sea Captain Schussler (C-156). The preface refers to the fight of the navy against the unbearable regulations of the peace treaty of Versailles. The table of contents includes a variety of navy activities, such as saving of coastal guns from destruction as required by Versailles; independent armament measures behind the back of the government and behind the back of the legislative bodies; resurrection of the U-boat arm; economic rearmament; and camouflaged rearmament from 1933 to the freedom from the restrictions in 1935. (C-156)
This book points out the significant effect of seizure of power by the Nazis in 1933 on increasing the size and determining the nature of the rearmament program. It also refers to the far-reaching independence in the building and development of the navy, which was only hampered insofar as concealment of rearmament had to considered in compliance with the Versailles Treaty (C-156). With the restoration of what was called the military sovereignty of the Reich in 1935—the reoccupation of the demilitarized zone of the Rhineland—the external camouflage of rearmament was eliminated.
This book of the German navy bears the symbol of the Nazi Party, the Swastika, in the spread eagle on the cover sheet, and it is headed “secret”, underscored (C-156). Raeder has identified this book in an interrogation and explained that the Navy tried to fulfill the letter of the Versailles Treaty and at the same time to make progress in naval development. The following are pertinent extracts from the book:
“The object and aim of this memorandum under the heading ‘Preface’, is to draw a technically reliable picture based on documentary records and the evidence of those who took part in the fight of the Navy against the unbearable regulations of the peace treaty of Versailles. It shows that the Reich navy after the liberating activities of the Free Corps and of Scapa Flow did not rest, but found ways and means to lay with unquenchable enthusiasm, in addition to the building up of the 15,000-man navy, the basis for a greater development in the future, and so create by work of soldiers and technicians the primary condition for a later rearmament. It must also distinguish more clearly the services of these men, who, without being known in wide circles, applied themselves with extraordinary zeal in responsibility in the service of the fight against the peace treaty; thereby stimulated by the highest feeling of duty, they risked, particularly in the early days of their fight, themselves and their position unrestrainedly in the partially self-ordained task. This compilation makes it clearer, however, that even such ideal and ambitious plans can be realized only to a small degree if the concentrated and united strength of the whole people is not behind the courageous activity of the soldier. Only when the Fuehrer had created the second and even more important condition for an effective rearmament in the coordination of the whole nation and in the fusion of the political, financial and spiritual power, could the work of the soldier find its fulfillment. The framework of this peace treaty, themost shameful known in world history, collapsed under the driving power of this united will, [signed] The Compiler”. (C-156)
“The object and aim of this memorandum under the heading ‘Preface’, is to draw a technically reliable picture based on documentary records and the evidence of those who took part in the fight of the Navy against the unbearable regulations of the peace treaty of Versailles. It shows that the Reich navy after the liberating activities of the Free Corps and of Scapa Flow did not rest, but found ways and means to lay with unquenchable enthusiasm, in addition to the building up of the 15,000-man navy, the basis for a greater development in the future, and so create by work of soldiers and technicians the primary condition for a later rearmament. It must also distinguish more clearly the services of these men, who, without being known in wide circles, applied themselves with extraordinary zeal in responsibility in the service of the fight against the peace treaty; thereby stimulated by the highest feeling of duty, they risked, particularly in the early days of their fight, themselves and their position unrestrainedly in the partially self-ordained task. This compilation makes it clearer, however, that even such ideal and ambitious plans can be realized only to a small degree if the concentrated and united strength of the whole people is not behind the courageous activity of the soldier. Only when the Fuehrer had created the second and even more important condition for an effective rearmament in the coordination of the whole nation and in the fusion of the political, financial and spiritual power, could the work of the soldier find its fulfillment. The framework of this peace treaty, themost shameful known in world history, collapsed under the driving power of this united will, [signed] The Compiler”. (C-156)
The summary of the contents indicated in the chapter titles is significant:
“I. First, defensive action against the execution of the Treaty of Versailles (from the end of the war to the occupation of the Ruhr, 1923).“1. Saving of coastal guns from destruction to removal of artillery equipment and ammunition, hand and machine weapons. * * *“3. Limitation of destruction in Heligoland.“II. Independent armament measures behind the back of the Reich Government and of the legislative body (from 1923 to the Lomann case in 1927).“1. An attempt to increase the personnel strength of the Reich Navy.“2. Contributing to the strengthening of patriotism among the people.“3. Activities of Captain Lohmann.“4. Preparation for the resurrection of the German U-boat arm.“5. Building up of the air force.“6. Attempt to strengthen our mine arm (Die Mine).“7. Economic rearmament.“8. Miscellaneous measures.“a. The Aerogeodetic, and;“b. Secret evidence.“III. Planned armament work countenance by the Reich government but behind the back of the legislative body from 1927 to the seizure of power, 1933.“IV. Rearmament under the leadership of the Reich Government in camouflage (from 1933 to the freedom from restrictions, 1935).” (C-156)
“I. First, defensive action against the execution of the Treaty of Versailles (from the end of the war to the occupation of the Ruhr, 1923).
“1. Saving of coastal guns from destruction to removal of artillery equipment and ammunition, hand and machine weapons. * * *
“3. Limitation of destruction in Heligoland.
“II. Independent armament measures behind the back of the Reich Government and of the legislative body (from 1923 to the Lomann case in 1927).
“1. An attempt to increase the personnel strength of the Reich Navy.
“2. Contributing to the strengthening of patriotism among the people.
“3. Activities of Captain Lohmann.
“4. Preparation for the resurrection of the German U-boat arm.
“5. Building up of the air force.
“6. Attempt to strengthen our mine arm (Die Mine).
“7. Economic rearmament.
“8. Miscellaneous measures.
“a. The Aerogeodetic, and;
“b. Secret evidence.
“III. Planned armament work countenance by the Reich government but behind the back of the legislative body from 1927 to the seizure of power, 1933.
“IV. Rearmament under the leadership of the Reich Government in camouflage (from 1933 to the freedom from restrictions, 1935).” (C-156)
The following is a passage from Chapter IV:
“The unification of the whole nation which was combined with the taking over of power on 30 January 1933 was of the decisive influence on the size and shape of further rearmament.“While the second chamber,Reichsrat, approached its dissolution and withdrew as a legislative body, theReichstagassumed a composition which could only take a one-sidedattitude toward the rearmament of the armed forces. The government took over the management of the rearmament program upon this foundation.“Development of the Armed Forces.”“This taking over of the management by the Reich Government developed for the armed forces in such a manner that the War Minister, General von Blomberg, and through him the three branches of the armed forces, received far-reaching powers from the Reich Cabinet for the development of the armed forces. The whole organization of the Reich was included in this way. In view of these powers the collaboration of the former inspecting body in the management of the secret expenditure was from then on dispensed with. There remained only the inspecting duty of the accounting office of the German Reich.“Independence of the Commander in Chief of the Navy”“The commander-in-chief of the Navy, Admiral Raeder, honorary doctor, had received the help of a far-reaching independence in the building and development of the navy. This was only hampered insofar as the previous concealment of rearmament had to be continued in consideration of the Versailles Treaty. Besides the public budget there remained the previous special budget, which was greatly increased in view of the considerable credit for the provision of labor, which was made available by the Reich. Wide powers in the handling of these credits were given to the Director of the Budget Department of the navy, up to 1934 Commodore Schussler, afterwards Commodore Foerster. These took into consideration the increased responsibility of the Chief of the Budget.“Declaration of Military Freedom”“When the Fuehrer, relying upon the strength of the armed forces executed in the meanwhile, announced the restoration of the military sovereignty of the German Reich, the last-mentioned limitation on rearmament works namely, the external camouflage, was eliminated. Freed from all the shackles which have hampered our ability to move freely on and under water, on land and in the air for one and a half decades, and carried by the newly-awakened fighting spirit of the whole nation, the armed forces, and as part of it, the navy, can lead with full strength towards its completion the rearmament already under way with the goal of securing for the Reich its rightful position in the world.” (C-156)
“The unification of the whole nation which was combined with the taking over of power on 30 January 1933 was of the decisive influence on the size and shape of further rearmament.
“While the second chamber,Reichsrat, approached its dissolution and withdrew as a legislative body, theReichstagassumed a composition which could only take a one-sidedattitude toward the rearmament of the armed forces. The government took over the management of the rearmament program upon this foundation.
“Development of the Armed Forces.”
“This taking over of the management by the Reich Government developed for the armed forces in such a manner that the War Minister, General von Blomberg, and through him the three branches of the armed forces, received far-reaching powers from the Reich Cabinet for the development of the armed forces. The whole organization of the Reich was included in this way. In view of these powers the collaboration of the former inspecting body in the management of the secret expenditure was from then on dispensed with. There remained only the inspecting duty of the accounting office of the German Reich.
“Independence of the Commander in Chief of the Navy”
“The commander-in-chief of the Navy, Admiral Raeder, honorary doctor, had received the help of a far-reaching independence in the building and development of the navy. This was only hampered insofar as the previous concealment of rearmament had to be continued in consideration of the Versailles Treaty. Besides the public budget there remained the previous special budget, which was greatly increased in view of the considerable credit for the provision of labor, which was made available by the Reich. Wide powers in the handling of these credits were given to the Director of the Budget Department of the navy, up to 1934 Commodore Schussler, afterwards Commodore Foerster. These took into consideration the increased responsibility of the Chief of the Budget.
“Declaration of Military Freedom”
“When the Fuehrer, relying upon the strength of the armed forces executed in the meanwhile, announced the restoration of the military sovereignty of the German Reich, the last-mentioned limitation on rearmament works namely, the external camouflage, was eliminated. Freed from all the shackles which have hampered our ability to move freely on and under water, on land and in the air for one and a half decades, and carried by the newly-awakened fighting spirit of the whole nation, the armed forces, and as part of it, the navy, can lead with full strength towards its completion the rearmament already under way with the goal of securing for the Reich its rightful position in the world.” (C-156)
An interrogation of Raeder concerning this book went as follows:
“Q. I have here a document,C-156, which is a photostatic copy of the work prepared by the High Command of the Navy, and covers the struggle of the Navy against the Versailles Treaty from 1919 to 1935. I ask you initially whether you are familiar with the work?“A. I know this book. I read it once when it was edited.“Q. Was that an official publication of the Germany navy?“A. This Captain Schuessler, indicated there, was Commander in the Admiralty. Published by the OKM, which was an idea of these officers to put all these things together.“Q. Do you recall the circumstances under which the authorization to prepare such a work was given to him?“A. I think he told me that he would write such a book as he told us here in the foreword.“Q. In the preparation of this work he had access to the official naval files, and based his work on the items contained therein?“A. Yes, I think so. He would have spoken with other persons, and he would have had the files, which were necessary.“Q. Do you know whether before the work was published, a draft of it was circulated among the officers in the Admiralty for comment?“A. No, I don’t think so. Not before it was published. I saw it only when it was published.“Q. Was it circulated freely after its publication?“A. It was a secret object. I think the upper commands in the Navy had knowledge of it.“Q. It was not circulated outside of the naval circles?“A. No.“Q. What then is your opinion concerning the comments contained in the work regarding the circumventing of the provisions of the Versailles Treaty?“A. I don’t remember very exactly what is in here. I can only remember that the Navy had always the object to fulfill the word of the Versailles Treaty, but wanted to have some advantages. But the flying men were exercised one year before they went into the Navy. Quite young men. So that the word of the Treaty of Versailles was filled. They didn’t belong to the Navy, as long as they were exercised in flying, and the submarines were developed but not in Germany, and not in the Navy, but in Holland. There was a civil bureau, and in Spain there was an Industrialist; in Finland, too, andthey were built much later when we began to act with the English government about the Treaty of thirty-five to one-hundred, because we could see that then the Treaty of Versailles would be destroyed by such a treaty with England, and so in order to keep the word of Versailles, we tried to fulfill the word of Versailles, but tried to have advantages.“Q. Would the fair statement be that the Navy High Command was interested in avoiding the limited provisions of the Treaty of Versailles regarding the personnel and limits of armaments, but would it attempt to fulfill the letter of the treaty, although actually avoiding it?“A. That was their endeavor”.
“Q. I have here a document,C-156, which is a photostatic copy of the work prepared by the High Command of the Navy, and covers the struggle of the Navy against the Versailles Treaty from 1919 to 1935. I ask you initially whether you are familiar with the work?
“A. I know this book. I read it once when it was edited.
“Q. Was that an official publication of the Germany navy?
“A. This Captain Schuessler, indicated there, was Commander in the Admiralty. Published by the OKM, which was an idea of these officers to put all these things together.
“Q. Do you recall the circumstances under which the authorization to prepare such a work was given to him?
“A. I think he told me that he would write such a book as he told us here in the foreword.
“Q. In the preparation of this work he had access to the official naval files, and based his work on the items contained therein?
“A. Yes, I think so. He would have spoken with other persons, and he would have had the files, which were necessary.
“Q. Do you know whether before the work was published, a draft of it was circulated among the officers in the Admiralty for comment?
“A. No, I don’t think so. Not before it was published. I saw it only when it was published.
“Q. Was it circulated freely after its publication?
“A. It was a secret object. I think the upper commands in the Navy had knowledge of it.
“Q. It was not circulated outside of the naval circles?
“A. No.
“Q. What then is your opinion concerning the comments contained in the work regarding the circumventing of the provisions of the Versailles Treaty?
“A. I don’t remember very exactly what is in here. I can only remember that the Navy had always the object to fulfill the word of the Versailles Treaty, but wanted to have some advantages. But the flying men were exercised one year before they went into the Navy. Quite young men. So that the word of the Treaty of Versailles was filled. They didn’t belong to the Navy, as long as they were exercised in flying, and the submarines were developed but not in Germany, and not in the Navy, but in Holland. There was a civil bureau, and in Spain there was an Industrialist; in Finland, too, andthey were built much later when we began to act with the English government about the Treaty of thirty-five to one-hundred, because we could see that then the Treaty of Versailles would be destroyed by such a treaty with England, and so in order to keep the word of Versailles, we tried to fulfill the word of Versailles, but tried to have advantages.
“Q. Would the fair statement be that the Navy High Command was interested in avoiding the limited provisions of the Treaty of Versailles regarding the personnel and limits of armaments, but would it attempt to fulfill the letter of the treaty, although actually avoiding it?
“A. That was their endeavor”.
Raeder had his explanations:
“Q. Why was such a policy adopted?“A. We were much menaced in the first years after the first war by danger that the Poles would attack East Prussia and so we tried to strengthen a little our very, very weak forces in this way, and so all our efforts were directed to the aim to have a little more strength against the Poles, if they would attack us; it was nonsense to them of attacking the Poles in this state, and for the Navy a second aim was to have some defense against the entering of French forces into the Ostsee, or East Sea, because we knew the French had intentions to sustain the Poles from ships that came into the Ostsee Goettinger, and so the Navy was a defense against the attack by the Poles, and against the entrance of French shipping into an Eastern Sea. Quite defensive aims.“Q. When did the fear of attack from Poles first show itself in official circles in Germany would you say?“A. When the first years they took Wilma. In the same minute we thought that they would come to East Prussia. I don’t know exactly the year, because those judgments were the judgments of the German government ministers, of the Army and Navy Ministers, Groner and Noske.“Q. Then those views in your opinion were generally held existing perhaps as early as 1919 or 1920, after the end of the First World War?“A. Oh, but the whole situation was very, very uncertain, and about those years in the beginning, I can not give you a very exact thing, because I was then two years in the Navy archives to write a book about the war, and how the cruisers fought in the first war. Two years, so I was not with these things.”
“Q. Why was such a policy adopted?
“A. We were much menaced in the first years after the first war by danger that the Poles would attack East Prussia and so we tried to strengthen a little our very, very weak forces in this way, and so all our efforts were directed to the aim to have a little more strength against the Poles, if they would attack us; it was nonsense to them of attacking the Poles in this state, and for the Navy a second aim was to have some defense against the entering of French forces into the Ostsee, or East Sea, because we knew the French had intentions to sustain the Poles from ships that came into the Ostsee Goettinger, and so the Navy was a defense against the attack by the Poles, and against the entrance of French shipping into an Eastern Sea. Quite defensive aims.
“Q. When did the fear of attack from Poles first show itself in official circles in Germany would you say?
“A. When the first years they took Wilma. In the same minute we thought that they would come to East Prussia. I don’t know exactly the year, because those judgments were the judgments of the German government ministers, of the Army and Navy Ministers, Groner and Noske.
“Q. Then those views in your opinion were generally held existing perhaps as early as 1919 or 1920, after the end of the First World War?
“A. Oh, but the whole situation was very, very uncertain, and about those years in the beginning, I can not give you a very exact thing, because I was then two years in the Navy archives to write a book about the war, and how the cruisers fought in the first war. Two years, so I was not with these things.”
The same kind of aims and purposes are reflected in the tableof contents of a history of the German Navy, 1919 to 1939, found in captured official files of the German Navy (C-17). Although a copy of the book itself has not been found, the project was written by Oberst Scherff, Hitler’s special military historian. The table of contents however, is available. It refers by numbers to groups of documents and notes in the documents, which evidently were intended as working material for the basis of the chapters to be written in accordance with the table of contents. The title of this table of contents fairly establishes the navy planning and preparations that were to get the Versailles Treaty out of the way, and to rebuild the navy strength necessary for war. Some of the headings in the table of contents read:
“Part A (1919—The year of Transition.)“Chapter VII.First efforts to circumvent the Versailles Treaty and to limit its effects.“Demilitarization of the Administration, incorporation of naval offices in civil ministries, etc. Incorporation of greater sections of the German maritime observation station and the sea-mark system in Heligoland and Kiel, of the Ems-Jade-Canal, etc. into the Reich Transport Ministry up to 1934;“Noskos’ proposal of 11.8.1919 to incorporate the Naval Construction Department in the Technical High School, Berlin;“Formation of the “Naval Arsenal Kiel”.“(b) The saving from destruction of coastal fortifications and guns.“1. North Sea. Strengthening of fortifications with new batteries and modern guns between the signing and the taking effect of the Versailles Treaty; dealings with the Control Commission—information, drawings, visits of inspection, result of efforts.”* * * * * *“2. Baltic. Taking over by the Navy of fortresses Pilau and Swinemunde;“Salvage for the Army of one-hundred and eighty-five movable guns and mortars there.“3. The beginnings of coastal air defense.“Part B (1920-1924. The Organizational New Order)Chapter V.“The Navy“Fulfillment and avoidance of the Versailles Treaty“Foreign Countries“(a)The inter-allied Control Commissions.“(b)Defense measures against the fulfillment of the Versailles Treaty and independent arming behind the back of the Reich Government and the legislative bodies.“1. Dispersal of artillery gear and munitions, of hand and automatic weapons.“2. Limitation of demolition work in Heligoland.“3. Attempt to strengthen personnel of the navy, from 1923.“4. The activities of Captain Lohmann (founding of numerous associations at home and abroad, participations, formation of “sports” unions and clubs, interesting the film industry in naval recruitment).“5. Preparation for re-establishing the German U-boat arm since 1920. (Projects and deliveries for Japan, Holland, Turkey, Argentine and Finland. Torpedo testing.)“6. Participation in the preparation for building of the Luftwaffe (preservation of aerodromes, aircraft construction, teaching of courses, instruction of midshipmen in anti-air raid defense, training of pilots).“7. Attempt to strengthen the mining branch.Part C (1925-1932. Replacement of Tonnage)Chapter IV.“The Navy, The Versailles Treaty, Foreign Countries.“(a)The activities of the Inter-allied Control Commissions (up to 31.1.27; discontinuance of the activity of the Naval Peace Commission)“Independent armament measures behind the back of the Reich Government and legislative bodies up to the Lohmann case.“1. The activities of Captain Lohmann (continuation), their significance as a foundation for the rapid reconstruction work from 1935.“2. Preparation for the re-strengthening of the German U-boat arm from 1925 (continuation), the merit of Lohmann in connection with the preparation for rapid construction in 1925, relationship to Spain, Argentine, Turkey: the first post war U-boat construction of the German Navy in Spain since 1927; 250 ton specimen in Finland, preparation for rapid assembly; electric torpedo; training of U-boat personnel abroad in Spain and Finland. Formation of U-boat school in 1932 disguised as an anti-U-boat school.“3. Participation in the preparation for the reconstruction of the Luftwaffe (continuation). Preparations for a Naval Air Arm, Finance Aircraft Company Sevra, later LuftdienstCMRH; Naval Flying School Warnemunde; Air Station List, training of sea cadet candidates, Military tactical questions “Air Defense Journeys”, technical development, experimental station planning, trials, flying boat development DOX etc., catapult aircraft, arming, engines ground organization, aircraft torpedoes, the Deutschland Flight 1925 and the Seaplane Race 1926.“4. Economic rearmament (“the Tebeg”—Technical Advice and Supply Company as a disguised Naval Office abroad for investigating the position of raw materials for industrial capacity and other War economic questions.)“5. Various measures. (The NV Aerogeodetic Company—secret investigations.)“(c)Planned armament work with the tacit approval of the Reich government, but behind the backs of the legislative bodies(1928 to the taking over of power.)“1. The effect of the Lohmann case on the secret preparations; winding up of works which could not be advocated; resumption and carrying on of other work.“2. Finance question. (“Black Funds” and the Special Budget).“3. The Labor Committee and its objectives.“(d)The Question of Marine Attaches(The continuation under disguise; open re-appointment 1932-1933).“(e)The question of Disarmament of the Fleet abroad and in Germany(The Geneva Disarmament Conference 1927; the London Naval Treaty of 1930; the Anglo-French-Italian Agreement 1931. The League of Nations Disarmament Conference 1932).“Part D (1933-1939. The Germany Navy during the Military Freedom Period)“I. National Socialism and the question of the Fleet and of prestige at sea.“II. Incorporation of the navy in the National Socialist State.”“III. The Re-armament of the Navy under the Direction of the Reich Government in a Disguised Way.” (C-17)
“Part A (1919—The year of Transition.)
“Chapter VII.
First efforts to circumvent the Versailles Treaty and to limit its effects.
“Demilitarization of the Administration, incorporation of naval offices in civil ministries, etc. Incorporation of greater sections of the German maritime observation station and the sea-mark system in Heligoland and Kiel, of the Ems-Jade-Canal, etc. into the Reich Transport Ministry up to 1934;
“Noskos’ proposal of 11.8.1919 to incorporate the Naval Construction Department in the Technical High School, Berlin;
“Formation of the “Naval Arsenal Kiel”.
“(b) The saving from destruction of coastal fortifications and guns.
“1. North Sea. Strengthening of fortifications with new batteries and modern guns between the signing and the taking effect of the Versailles Treaty; dealings with the Control Commission—information, drawings, visits of inspection, result of efforts.”
* * * * * *
“2. Baltic. Taking over by the Navy of fortresses Pilau and Swinemunde;
“Salvage for the Army of one-hundred and eighty-five movable guns and mortars there.
“3. The beginnings of coastal air defense.
“Part B (1920-1924. The Organizational New Order)
Chapter V.
“The Navy
“Fulfillment and avoidance of the Versailles Treaty
“Foreign Countries
“(a)The inter-allied Control Commissions.
“(b)Defense measures against the fulfillment of the Versailles Treaty and independent arming behind the back of the Reich Government and the legislative bodies.
“1. Dispersal of artillery gear and munitions, of hand and automatic weapons.
“2. Limitation of demolition work in Heligoland.
“3. Attempt to strengthen personnel of the navy, from 1923.
“4. The activities of Captain Lohmann (founding of numerous associations at home and abroad, participations, formation of “sports” unions and clubs, interesting the film industry in naval recruitment).
“5. Preparation for re-establishing the German U-boat arm since 1920. (Projects and deliveries for Japan, Holland, Turkey, Argentine and Finland. Torpedo testing.)
“6. Participation in the preparation for building of the Luftwaffe (preservation of aerodromes, aircraft construction, teaching of courses, instruction of midshipmen in anti-air raid defense, training of pilots).
“7. Attempt to strengthen the mining branch.
Part C (1925-1932. Replacement of Tonnage)Chapter IV.
“The Navy, The Versailles Treaty, Foreign Countries.
“(a)The activities of the Inter-allied Control Commissions (up to 31.1.27; discontinuance of the activity of the Naval Peace Commission)
“Independent armament measures behind the back of the Reich Government and legislative bodies up to the Lohmann case.
“1. The activities of Captain Lohmann (continuation), their significance as a foundation for the rapid reconstruction work from 1935.
“2. Preparation for the re-strengthening of the German U-boat arm from 1925 (continuation), the merit of Lohmann in connection with the preparation for rapid construction in 1925, relationship to Spain, Argentine, Turkey: the first post war U-boat construction of the German Navy in Spain since 1927; 250 ton specimen in Finland, preparation for rapid assembly; electric torpedo; training of U-boat personnel abroad in Spain and Finland. Formation of U-boat school in 1932 disguised as an anti-U-boat school.
“3. Participation in the preparation for the reconstruction of the Luftwaffe (continuation). Preparations for a Naval Air Arm, Finance Aircraft Company Sevra, later LuftdienstCMRH; Naval Flying School Warnemunde; Air Station List, training of sea cadet candidates, Military tactical questions “Air Defense Journeys”, technical development, experimental station planning, trials, flying boat development DOX etc., catapult aircraft, arming, engines ground organization, aircraft torpedoes, the Deutschland Flight 1925 and the Seaplane Race 1926.
“4. Economic rearmament (“the Tebeg”—Technical Advice and Supply Company as a disguised Naval Office abroad for investigating the position of raw materials for industrial capacity and other War economic questions.)
“5. Various measures. (The NV Aerogeodetic Company—secret investigations.)
“(c)Planned armament work with the tacit approval of the Reich government, but behind the backs of the legislative bodies(1928 to the taking over of power.)
“1. The effect of the Lohmann case on the secret preparations; winding up of works which could not be advocated; resumption and carrying on of other work.
“2. Finance question. (“Black Funds” and the Special Budget).
“3. The Labor Committee and its objectives.
“(d)The Question of Marine Attaches(The continuation under disguise; open re-appointment 1932-1933).
“(e)The question of Disarmament of the Fleet abroad and in Germany(The Geneva Disarmament Conference 1927; the London Naval Treaty of 1930; the Anglo-French-Italian Agreement 1931. The League of Nations Disarmament Conference 1932).
“Part D (1933-1939. The Germany Navy during the Military Freedom Period)
“I. National Socialism and the question of the Fleet and of prestige at sea.
“II. Incorporation of the navy in the National Socialist State.”
“III. The Re-armament of the Navy under the Direction of the Reich Government in a Disguised Way.” (C-17)
The policy development of the navy is also reflected from the financial side. The planned organization of the navy budget for armament measures was based on a co-ordination of military developments and political objectives. Military-political development was accelerated after the withdrawal from the League of Nations. (C-17)
A captured document, entitled “Chef der Marineleitung, Berlin, 12 May 1934,” and marked “Secret Commando Matter,” discusses the “Armament Plan (A.P.) for the 3rd Armament Phase.” (C-153). This document, which bears the facsimile signature of Raeder at the end, speaks of war tasks, war and operational plans, armament target, etc., and shows that it was distributed to many of the High Command of the Navy. Dated 12 May 1934, it shows that a primary objective was readiness for a war without any alert period. The following are pertinent extracts:
* * * “The planned organization of armament measures is necessary for the realization of the target; this again requires a coordinated and planned expenditure in peace time. This organization of financial measures over a number of years according to the military viewpoint is found in the armament program and provides“a.for themilitary leadersa sound basis for their operational considerations and“b.for the political leaders a clear picture of what may be achieved with the military means available at a given time.”* * * * * *“All theoretical and practical A-preparations are to be drawn up with a primary view to readiness for a war without any alert period.” (C-153)
* * * “The planned organization of armament measures is necessary for the realization of the target; this again requires a coordinated and planned expenditure in peace time. This organization of financial measures over a number of years according to the military viewpoint is found in the armament program and provides
“a.for themilitary leadersa sound basis for their operational considerations and
“b.for the political leaders a clear picture of what may be achieved with the military means available at a given time.”
* * * * * *
“All theoretical and practical A-preparations are to be drawn up with a primary view to readiness for a war without any alert period.” (C-153)
The conspiratorial nature of these Nazi plans and preparations long before the outbreak of hostilities is illustrated in many other ways. Thus, in 1934, Hitler instructed Raeder to keep secret the U-Boat construction program; also the actual displacement and speed of certain ships. Work on U-Boats had been going on, as already indicated, in Holland and Spain. The Nazi theory was ingenious in that respect. The Versailles Treaty forbade re-arming by the Germans in Germany, but the Nazis said it did not forbid them to rearm in Holland, Spain, and Finland.
Secrecy was equally important then because of the pending naval negotiations with England. The subject was discussed in a conversation between Raeder and Adolf Hitler in June 1934. The record of that conversation (C-189) is not signed by Raeder, but in an interrogation on 8 November 1945, Raeder admitted that (C-189) was a record of this conversation, and that it was in his handwriting, though he did not sign his name at the end. The report is headed, “Conversation with the Fuehrer in June 1934 on the occasion of the resignation of the Commanding Officer of theKarlsruhe.” It reads:
“1. Report by the C-in-C Navy concerning displacement of D. and E. (defensive weapons).“Fuehrer’s instructions: No mention must be made of a displacement of 25-26,000 tons, but only of improved 10,000-ton (ships). Also, the speed over 26 nautical miles may be stated.“2. C-in-C Navy expresses the opinion that later on the Fleet must anyhow be developed to oppose England, that therefore from 1936 onwards, the large ships must be armed with 35 c.m. guns (Like the King George Class).“3. The Fuehrer demands to keep the construction of the U-Boats completely secret. Plebiscite also in consideration of the Saar.” (C-189)
“1. Report by the C-in-C Navy concerning displacement of D. and E. (defensive weapons).
“Fuehrer’s instructions: No mention must be made of a displacement of 25-26,000 tons, but only of improved 10,000-ton (ships). Also, the speed over 26 nautical miles may be stated.
“2. C-in-C Navy expresses the opinion that later on the Fleet must anyhow be developed to oppose England, that therefore from 1936 onwards, the large ships must be armed with 35 c.m. guns (Like the King George Class).
“3. The Fuehrer demands to keep the construction of the U-Boats completely secret. Plebiscite also in consideration of the Saar.” (C-189)
In order to continue the increase in navy strength, as planned, more funds were needed than the navy had available. Hitler therefore proposed to put funds of the Labor Front at the disposal of the navy. This appears from another Raeder memorandum of a conversation between Raeder with Hitler, on 2 November 1934 (C-190). This report, again, is not signed, but it was found in Raeder’s personal file and seems clearly his memorandum. It is headed: “Conversation with the Fuehrer on 2.11.34 at the time of the announcement by the Commanding Officer of the “Emden”. It reads:
“1. When I mentioned that the total funds to be made available for the armed forces for 1935 would presumably represent only a fraction of the required sum, and that therefore it was possible that the navy might be hindered in its plans, he replied that he did not think the funds would be greatly decreased. He considered it necessary that the navy be speedily increased by 1938 with the deadlines mentioned. In case of need, he will get Dr. Ley to put 120-150 million from the Labor Front at the disposal of the navy, as the money would still benefit the workers. Later in a conversation with Minister Goering and myself, he went on to say that he considered it vital that the navy be increased as planned, as no war could be carried on if the navy was not able to safeguard the ore imports from Scandinavia.“2. Then, when I mentioned that it would be desirable to have six U-Boats assembled at the time of the critical situation in the first quarter of 1935, he stated that he would keep this point in mind, and tell me when the situation demanded that the assembling should commence.” (C-190)
“1. When I mentioned that the total funds to be made available for the armed forces for 1935 would presumably represent only a fraction of the required sum, and that therefore it was possible that the navy might be hindered in its plans, he replied that he did not think the funds would be greatly decreased. He considered it necessary that the navy be speedily increased by 1938 with the deadlines mentioned. In case of need, he will get Dr. Ley to put 120-150 million from the Labor Front at the disposal of the navy, as the money would still benefit the workers. Later in a conversation with Minister Goering and myself, he went on to say that he considered it vital that the navy be increased as planned, as no war could be carried on if the navy was not able to safeguard the ore imports from Scandinavia.
“2. Then, when I mentioned that it would be desirable to have six U-Boats assembled at the time of the critical situation in the first quarter of 1935, he stated that he would keep this point in mind, and tell me when the situation demanded that the assembling should commence.” (C-190)
Then there is an asterisk and a note at the bottom:
“The order was not sent out. The first boats were launched in the middle of June 35 according to plan.” (C-190)
“The order was not sent out. The first boats were launched in the middle of June 35 according to plan.” (C-190)
The development of the armament industry by the use of foreign markets was a program encouraged by the navy, so that thisindustry would be able to supply the requirements of the navy in case of need. A directive of Raeder, dated 31 January 1933, and classified “Secret Commando Matter,” requires German industry to support the armament of the navy (C-29). It provides:
“TOP SECRETGeneral directions for support given by the German Navy to the German Armament Industry“The effects of the present economic depression have led here and there to the conclusion that there are no prospects of an active participation of the German Armament Industry abroad, even if the Versailles terms are no longer kept. There is no profit in it and it is therefore not worth promoting. Furthermore, the view has been taken that the increasing “self-sufficiency” would in any case make such participation superfluous.“However obvious these opinions may seem, formed because of the situation as it is today, I am nevertheless forced to make the following contradictory corrective points:“a.The economic crisis and its present effects must perforce be overcome sooner or later. Though equality of rights in war politics is not fully recognized today, it will, by the assimilation of weapons, be achieved at some period, at least to a certain extent,“b.The consequent estimation of the duties of the German Armament Industry lies mainly in theMilitary-politicalsphere. It is impossible for this industry to satisfy, militarily and economically, the growing demands made of it by limiting the deliveries to our own armed forces. Its capacity must therefore be increased by the delivery of supplies to foreign countries over and above our own requirements.“c.Almost every country is working to the same end today, even those which, unlike Germany, are not tied down by restrictions. Britain, France, North America, Japan, and especially Italy are making supreme efforts to ensure markets for their armament industries. The use of their diplomatic representations, of the propaganda voyages of their most modern ships and vessels, of sending missions and also of the guaranteeing of loans and insurance against deficits are not merely to gain commercially advantageous orders for their armament industries, but first and foremost to expand their output from the point of view of military policy.“d.It is just when the efforts to do away with the restrictions imposed on us have succeeded, that the German Navyhas an ever-increasing and really vital interest in furthering the German Armament Industry and preparing the way for it in every direction in the competitive battle against the rest of the world.“e.If, however the German Armament Industry is to be able to compete in foreign countries, it must inspire theconfidenceof its purchasers. The condition for this is that secrecy for our own ends be not carried too far. The amount of material to be kept secret under all circumstances in the interest of the defence of the country is comparatively small. I would like to issue a warning against the assumption that, at the present stage of technical development in foreign industrial states, a problem of vital military importance which we perhaps have solved, has not been solved there. Solutions arrived at today, which may become known, if divulged to a third person by naturally always possible indiscretion, have often been already superseded by new and better solutions on our part, even at that time or at any rate after the copy has been made. It is of greater importance that we should be technically well to the fore in any really fundamental matters, than that less important points should be kept secret unnecessarily and excessively.“f.To conclude: I attach particular importance to guaranteeing the continuous support of the industry concerned by the navy, even after the present restrictions have been relaxed. If the purchasers are not made confident that something special is being offered them, the industry will not be able to stand up to the competitive battle and therefore will not be able to supply the requirements of the German Navy in case of need.” (C-29)
“TOP SECRET
General directions for support given by the German Navy to the German Armament Industry
“The effects of the present economic depression have led here and there to the conclusion that there are no prospects of an active participation of the German Armament Industry abroad, even if the Versailles terms are no longer kept. There is no profit in it and it is therefore not worth promoting. Furthermore, the view has been taken that the increasing “self-sufficiency” would in any case make such participation superfluous.
“However obvious these opinions may seem, formed because of the situation as it is today, I am nevertheless forced to make the following contradictory corrective points:
“a.The economic crisis and its present effects must perforce be overcome sooner or later. Though equality of rights in war politics is not fully recognized today, it will, by the assimilation of weapons, be achieved at some period, at least to a certain extent,
“b.The consequent estimation of the duties of the German Armament Industry lies mainly in theMilitary-politicalsphere. It is impossible for this industry to satisfy, militarily and economically, the growing demands made of it by limiting the deliveries to our own armed forces. Its capacity must therefore be increased by the delivery of supplies to foreign countries over and above our own requirements.
“c.Almost every country is working to the same end today, even those which, unlike Germany, are not tied down by restrictions. Britain, France, North America, Japan, and especially Italy are making supreme efforts to ensure markets for their armament industries. The use of their diplomatic representations, of the propaganda voyages of their most modern ships and vessels, of sending missions and also of the guaranteeing of loans and insurance against deficits are not merely to gain commercially advantageous orders for their armament industries, but first and foremost to expand their output from the point of view of military policy.
“d.It is just when the efforts to do away with the restrictions imposed on us have succeeded, that the German Navyhas an ever-increasing and really vital interest in furthering the German Armament Industry and preparing the way for it in every direction in the competitive battle against the rest of the world.
“e.If, however the German Armament Industry is to be able to compete in foreign countries, it must inspire theconfidenceof its purchasers. The condition for this is that secrecy for our own ends be not carried too far. The amount of material to be kept secret under all circumstances in the interest of the defence of the country is comparatively small. I would like to issue a warning against the assumption that, at the present stage of technical development in foreign industrial states, a problem of vital military importance which we perhaps have solved, has not been solved there. Solutions arrived at today, which may become known, if divulged to a third person by naturally always possible indiscretion, have often been already superseded by new and better solutions on our part, even at that time or at any rate after the copy has been made. It is of greater importance that we should be technically well to the fore in any really fundamental matters, than that less important points should be kept secret unnecessarily and excessively.
“f.To conclude: I attach particular importance to guaranteeing the continuous support of the industry concerned by the navy, even after the present restrictions have been relaxed. If the purchasers are not made confident that something special is being offered them, the industry will not be able to stand up to the competitive battle and therefore will not be able to supply the requirements of the German Navy in case of need.” (C-29)
This surreptitious rearmament, in violation of treaty obligations, starting even before the Nazi came into power, is illustrated by a 1932 order of Raeder, chief of the naval command, addressed to the main naval command, regarding the concealed construction of torpedo tubes in E-Boats (C-141). He ordered that torpedo tubes be removed and stored in the naval arsenal but be kept ready for immediate refitting. By using only the number permitted under the Treaty, at a given time, and by storing them after satisfactory testing, the actual number of operationally effective E-Boats was constantly increased.
This German order for the concealed armament of E-Boats, issued by Raeder on 10 February 1932, provides:
“In view of our treaty obligations and the Disarmament Conference steps must be taken to prevent the 1st E-Boat-Half-Flotilla,which in a few months will consist of exactly similar newly built (E)-Boats, from appearing openly as a formation of torpedo-carrying boats as it is not intended to count these E-Boats against the number of torpedo-carrying boats allowed us.“I therefore order:“1. S2-S5, will be commissioned in the shipyard Luerssen, Vegesack without armament, and will be fitted with easily removable cover-sheet-metal on the spaces necessary for torpedo-tubes. The same will be arranged by T.M.I. [Inspectorate of Torpedoes and Mining] in agreement with the naval arsenal, for the Boat ‘S1’ which will dismantle its torpedo-tubes, on completion of the practice shooting, for fitting on another boat.“2. The torpedo-tubes of all S-Boats will be stored in the naval arsenal ready for immediate fitting. During the trial runs the torpedo-tubes will be taken on board one after the other for a short time to be fitted and for practice shooting so that only one boat at a time carries torpedo armament. For public consumption this boat will be in service for the purpose of temporary trials by the T.V.A. [Technical Research Establishment].“It should not anchor together with the other, unarmed boats of the Half-Flotilla because of the obvious similarity of type. The duration of firing, and consequently the length of time the torpedo-tubes are aboard, is to be as short as possible.“3. Fitting the torpedo-tubes on all E-Boats is intended as soon as the situation of the political control allows it.” (C-141)
“In view of our treaty obligations and the Disarmament Conference steps must be taken to prevent the 1st E-Boat-Half-Flotilla,which in a few months will consist of exactly similar newly built (E)-Boats, from appearing openly as a formation of torpedo-carrying boats as it is not intended to count these E-Boats against the number of torpedo-carrying boats allowed us.
“I therefore order:
“1. S2-S5, will be commissioned in the shipyard Luerssen, Vegesack without armament, and will be fitted with easily removable cover-sheet-metal on the spaces necessary for torpedo-tubes. The same will be arranged by T.M.I. [Inspectorate of Torpedoes and Mining] in agreement with the naval arsenal, for the Boat ‘S1’ which will dismantle its torpedo-tubes, on completion of the practice shooting, for fitting on another boat.
“2. The torpedo-tubes of all S-Boats will be stored in the naval arsenal ready for immediate fitting. During the trial runs the torpedo-tubes will be taken on board one after the other for a short time to be fitted and for practice shooting so that only one boat at a time carries torpedo armament. For public consumption this boat will be in service for the purpose of temporary trials by the T.V.A. [Technical Research Establishment].
“It should not anchor together with the other, unarmed boats of the Half-Flotilla because of the obvious similarity of type. The duration of firing, and consequently the length of time the torpedo-tubes are aboard, is to be as short as possible.
“3. Fitting the torpedo-tubes on all E-Boats is intended as soon as the situation of the political control allows it.” (C-141)
Along similar lines the navy was also carrying on the concealed preparation of auxiliary cruisers, under the disguised designation of Transport Ships O. The preparations under this order were to be completed by 1 April 1935. At the very time of construction of these ships as commercial ships, plans were made for their conversion. This was the result of a Top Secret order from the command office of the navy, dated 12 March 1934, and signed in draft by Groos. This order bears the seal of theReichministerium, Marineleitung, over the draft signature. It provides:
“Subject: Preparation of Auxiliary Cruisers.“It is intended to include in the Establishment Organization 35 (AG-Aufstellungsgliederung) a certain number of auxiliary cruisers which are intended for use in operations on the high seas.“In order to disguise the intention and all the preparations the ships will be referred to as “Transport Ships O”. It is requested that in future this designation only will be used.“The preparations are to be arranged so that they can be completed by 1.4.35.” (C-166)
“Subject: Preparation of Auxiliary Cruisers.
“It is intended to include in the Establishment Organization 35 (AG-Aufstellungsgliederung) a certain number of auxiliary cruisers which are intended for use in operations on the high seas.
“In order to disguise the intention and all the preparations the ships will be referred to as “Transport Ships O”. It is requested that in future this designation only will be used.
“The preparations are to be arranged so that they can be completed by 1.4.35.” (C-166)
In the official navy files, notes were kept year by year, from 1927 to 1940, on the reconstruction of the German Navy. One of these notes discloses that the displacement of the battleship “Scharnhorst-Gneisenau” was actually greater than the tonnage which had been notified to the British under the treaty obligations:
“The true displacement of the battleship ‘Scharnhorst-Gneisenau’and‘F/G’ exceeds by 20 percent in both cases the displacement reported to the British.” (C-23)
“The true displacement of the battleship ‘Scharnhorst-Gneisenau’and‘F/G’ exceeds by 20 percent in both cases the displacement reported to the British.” (C-23)
There is annexed to this document a table with reference to different ships, and two columns, headed “Displacement by Type”; one column reads “Actual Displacement,” and the other, “Notified Displacement.” The actual displacement of the “Scharnhorst”, is thus shown to be 31,300 tons, although the notified displacement was only 26,000 tons. On the “F/G” actual was 41,700, while notified was 35,000. On the “HI”, actual was 56,200 tons, while notified was 46,850. And so on down the list. (C-23)
In these notes there also occurs the statement:
“In a clear cut program for the construction, the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor has set the navy the task of carrying out the aims of his foreign policy.” (C-23)
“In a clear cut program for the construction, the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor has set the navy the task of carrying out the aims of his foreign policy.” (C-23)
The German Navy constantly planned and committed violations of armament limitation, and with characteristic German thoroughness had prepared superficial pretexts to explain away these violations. Following a conference with the chief of “A” section [the military department of the Navy], an elaborate survey list was prepared and compiled, giving a careful list of the quantity and type of German naval armament and ammunition on hand under manufacture or construction (C-32). A statement of the justification or defense that might be used was included in those instances where the Versailles Treaty was violated or its allotment has been exceeded. The list contained 30 items under “Material Measures” and 14 items under “Measures of Organization.” The variety of details covered necessarily involved several sources within the navy, which must have realized their significance.
This Top Secret document, which is headed “A Survey Report of German Naval Armament after Conference with Chief of “A” Section, dated 9 September 1933,” contains three columns, one headed “Measure,” one headed “Material Measures, Details,” and the third headed “Remarks.” The “Remarks” contain the pretextor justification for explaining away the violations of the treaty. The following are examples:
“1. Exceeding the permitted number of mines.” Then figures are given. “Remarks: Further mines are in part ordered, in part being delivered.” (C-32)
“Number 2. Continuous storing of guns from the North Sea area for Baltic artillery batteries.” The remarks column reads, “Justification: Necessity for over-hauling. Cheaper repairs.” (C-32)
“Number 6. Laying gun-platforms in the Kiel area.” Remarks: “The offense over and above that in serial number 3 lies in the fact that all fortifications are forbidden in the Kiel area. This justification will make it less severe; pure defense measures.” (C-32)
“Number 7. Exceeding the calibre permitted for coastal batteries.” Remarks: “Possible justification is that, though the calibre is larger, the number of guns is less.” (C-32)
“Number 8. Arming of mine-sweepers.” Remarks: “The guns are taken from the fleet reserve stores, have been temporarily installed only for training purposes. All nations arm their mine-sweeping forces (equality of rights).” (C-32)
“Number 13. Exceeding the number of machine guns, et cetera, permitted.” Remarks: “Can be made light of.” (C-32)
“Number 18. Construction of U-boat parts.” Remarks: “Difficult to detect. If necessary can be denied.” (C-32)
“Number 20. Arming of fishing vessels.” Remarks: “For warning shots. Make little of it.” And so on throughout the list (C-32). This document must have been used as a guide for negotiators who were attending the Disarmament Conference, as to the position that they might take.
E.Withdrawal From the Disarmament Conference and the League of Nations: Building of the Air Force.
At this point, on 14th October 1933, Germany withdrew from the International Disarmament Conference and from the League of Nations. The Nazis took this opportunity to break away from the international negotiations and to take an aggressive position on an issue which would not be serious enough to provoke reprisal from other countries. At the same time, Germany attached so much importance to this action that it considered the possibility of the application of sanctions by other countries. In anticipation of the probable nature of such sanctions and the countries which might apply them, plans were made for armed resistance on land, at sea, and in the air. Military preparationswere ordered in a directive from the Reichsminister for Defense (von Blomberg) to the head of the Army High Command (Fritsch), the head of the Navy High Command, (Raeder), and the Reichsminister for Air, (Goering) (C-140). This directive, dated 25 October 1933, 11 days after the withdrawal from the Disarmament Conference and the League of Nations, provides: