“By surprise and without consulting his ministers, Schuschnigg ordered a plebiscite for Sunday, 13, March, which should bring strong majority for the Legitimists in the absence of plan or preparation.“Fuehrer is determined not to tolerate it. The same night, March 9 to 10, he calls for Goering. General v. Reichenau is called back from Cairo Olympic Committee. General v. Schebert is ordered to come, as well as Minister Glaise Horstenau, who is with the District leader (Gauleiter) Buerckel in the Palatinate. General Keitel communicates the facts at 1:45. He drives to the Reichskanzlei at 10 o’clock. I follow at 10:15, according to the wish of General v. Viebahn, to give him the old draft.“Prepare case Otto.“1300 hours: General K informs Chief of Operational Staff (and) Admiral Canaris. Ribbentrop is being detained in London. Neurath takes over the Foreign Office.“Fuehrer wants to transmit ultimatum to the Austrian Cabinet. A personal letter is dispatched to Mussolini and the reasons are developed which force the Fuehrer to take action.“1830 hours: Mobilization order is given to the Command of the 8th Army (Corps Area 3) 7th and 13th Army Corps; without reserve Army.” (1780-PS)
“By surprise and without consulting his ministers, Schuschnigg ordered a plebiscite for Sunday, 13, March, which should bring strong majority for the Legitimists in the absence of plan or preparation.
“Fuehrer is determined not to tolerate it. The same night, March 9 to 10, he calls for Goering. General v. Reichenau is called back from Cairo Olympic Committee. General v. Schebert is ordered to come, as well as Minister Glaise Horstenau, who is with the District leader (Gauleiter) Buerckel in the Palatinate. General Keitel communicates the facts at 1:45. He drives to the Reichskanzlei at 10 o’clock. I follow at 10:15, according to the wish of General v. Viebahn, to give him the old draft.
“Prepare case Otto.
“1300 hours: General K informs Chief of Operational Staff (and) Admiral Canaris. Ribbentrop is being detained in London. Neurath takes over the Foreign Office.
“Fuehrer wants to transmit ultimatum to the Austrian Cabinet. A personal letter is dispatched to Mussolini and the reasons are developed which force the Fuehrer to take action.
“1830 hours: Mobilization order is given to the Command of the 8th Army (Corps Area 3) 7th and 13th Army Corps; without reserve Army.” (1780-PS)
In a directive of the Supreme High Command of the Armed Forces, dated 11 March 1938 and initialed by Jodl and Keitel, Hitler stated his mixed political and military intentions:
“1. If these measures prove unsuccessful, I intend to invade Austria with armed forces to establish constitutional conditions and to prevent further outrages against the pro-German population.* * * * * *“4. The forces of the Army and Air Force detailed for this operation must be ready for invasion and/or ready for action on the 12th of March 1938 at the latest from 1200 hours.“I reserve the right to give permission for crossing and flying over the frontier, and to decide the actual moment for invasion.“5. The behavior of the troops must give the impression that we do not want to wage war against our Austrian brothers. It is in our interest that the whole operation shall be carried out without any violence but in the form of a peaceful entry welcomed by the population. Therefore any provocation is to be avoided. If, however, resistance is offered it must be broken ruthlessly by force of arms.” (C-102)
“1. If these measures prove unsuccessful, I intend to invade Austria with armed forces to establish constitutional conditions and to prevent further outrages against the pro-German population.
* * * * * *
“4. The forces of the Army and Air Force detailed for this operation must be ready for invasion and/or ready for action on the 12th of March 1938 at the latest from 1200 hours.
“I reserve the right to give permission for crossing and flying over the frontier, and to decide the actual moment for invasion.
“5. The behavior of the troops must give the impression that we do not want to wage war against our Austrian brothers. It is in our interest that the whole operation shall be carried out without any violence but in the form of a peaceful entry welcomed by the population. Therefore any provocation is to be avoided. If, however, resistance is offered it must be broken ruthlessly by force of arms.” (C-102)
An implementing directive of 11 March 1938 issued by Jodl provided further:
“If Czechoslovakian troops or militia units are encountered in Austria, they are to be regarded as hostile.“The Italians are everywhere to be treated as friends especially as Mussolini has declared himself uninterested in the solution of the Austrian Question”. (C-103)
“If Czechoslovakian troops or militia units are encountered in Austria, they are to be regarded as hostile.
“The Italians are everywhere to be treated as friends especially as Mussolini has declared himself uninterested in the solution of the Austrian Question”. (C-103)
The military preparations for invasion were complete.
(3)The Events of 11 March in Austria.The events of 11 March 1938 in Austria are available in three separate accounts. Although these accounts differ in some minor details, they afford each other almost complete corroboration with regard to the way in which the German Government deprived Austria of its sovereignty.
The first account is contained in a third affidavit executed by Schuschnigg (2996-PS). Schuschnigg first states that he had been discussing the plebiscite with Seyss-Inquart, and that Seyss-Inquart had made some procedural objections but in general indicated his general willingness to support the plebiscite. Schuschnigg went to bed on March 10 thinking the plebiscite would be a success. But on the morning of March 11 he was told that traffic from Germany had stopped, and that German Army forces were moving to the border. After 10 a. m. Seyss-Inquart came to Schuschnigg’s office with Glaise-Horstenau. Glaise-Horstenau had just come from Berlin and reported that Hitler was in a rage. (2996-PS)
Schuschnigg’s affidavit then relates the three ultimatums presented by the German Government:
“Seyss-Inquart was then and there called to the telephone and, upon his return, read to me from a scrap of paper which he held in his hand, the contents of a telephone call which he alleged was just then received by him from Goering in Berlin. The contents as he read it to me was as follows: ‘The Chancellor must revoke the proposed plebiscite within the time of one hour, and after three or four weeks, Austria must oblige herself to carry out a plebiscite concerning theAnschluss according to the SAAR status, otherwise the German Army is ordered to pass the Austrian frontier’.“I further state and say that after informing the Federal President of this demand made on Austria by Germany, we decided to recall the Plebiscite, and thereupon I informed Seyss-Inquart and Glaise-Horstenau of our intentions.“Seyss-Inquart said that he would go to the telephone and inform Goering in Berlin concerning the decision of the Austrian Government, at that time made. In a few minutes, he, Seyss-Inquart, returned to my office, and informed me further, as follows:‘I have had a telephone conversation with Goering, and Goering has ordered me to inform the Federal Chancellor Schuschnigg, as follows:‘ “The situation can only be saved for Austria when Schuschnigg resigns as the Chancellor of Austria within two hours and Seyss-Inquart is appointed as the new Chief of the Austrian Government; if Seyss-Inquart does not inform me, Goering, within two hours, I, Goering, will suppose that you are hindered from doing so” ’.“I then reported to the Federal President the new developments, and, after some conversation with him and other members of the Government, I decided to resign. The Federal President reluctantly accepted my resignation at 3:30 p. m. on the afternoon of the 11th of March 1938. He expressed himself unwilling to appoint Seyss-Inquart as the Federal Chancellor—he therefore asked me to continue my duties as caretaker Chancellor until he had decided who would succeed me as Federal Chancellor. I accepted and remained as ‘caretaker Chancellor’ from 3:30 p. m., 11 March 1938 until about 11:30 p. m. the same night, when Seyss-Inquart was appointed to the position of Federal Chancellor.“I further state and say that at about 3:30 p. m. on the afternoon of 11 March 1938, the Foreign Office of the Austrian Government contacted the Embassy of Germany in Vienna, to ascertain if the demands that had been then and there made by Goering on Austria were the official demands of the German Government. The Military Attache of Germany in Vienna, one Lieutenant General Muff, came before the Austrian Federal President, and repeated the contents of the German ultimatums that had previously been delivered to us by Seyss-Inquart.“I furthermore state and say, that the Federal President, at about 7:30 or 8:00 o’clock p. m. on the night of 11 March1938 ordered me, as caretaker Chancellor, to broadcast the events of the day and to protest against the demands made on Austria during that day by Germany. Furthermore, to inform the world that Austria had been forced to give in to those demands of Germany through superior force * * *.” (2996-PS)
“Seyss-Inquart was then and there called to the telephone and, upon his return, read to me from a scrap of paper which he held in his hand, the contents of a telephone call which he alleged was just then received by him from Goering in Berlin. The contents as he read it to me was as follows: ‘The Chancellor must revoke the proposed plebiscite within the time of one hour, and after three or four weeks, Austria must oblige herself to carry out a plebiscite concerning theAnschluss according to the SAAR status, otherwise the German Army is ordered to pass the Austrian frontier’.
“I further state and say that after informing the Federal President of this demand made on Austria by Germany, we decided to recall the Plebiscite, and thereupon I informed Seyss-Inquart and Glaise-Horstenau of our intentions.
“Seyss-Inquart said that he would go to the telephone and inform Goering in Berlin concerning the decision of the Austrian Government, at that time made. In a few minutes, he, Seyss-Inquart, returned to my office, and informed me further, as follows:
‘I have had a telephone conversation with Goering, and Goering has ordered me to inform the Federal Chancellor Schuschnigg, as follows:‘ “The situation can only be saved for Austria when Schuschnigg resigns as the Chancellor of Austria within two hours and Seyss-Inquart is appointed as the new Chief of the Austrian Government; if Seyss-Inquart does not inform me, Goering, within two hours, I, Goering, will suppose that you are hindered from doing so” ’.
‘I have had a telephone conversation with Goering, and Goering has ordered me to inform the Federal Chancellor Schuschnigg, as follows:
‘ “The situation can only be saved for Austria when Schuschnigg resigns as the Chancellor of Austria within two hours and Seyss-Inquart is appointed as the new Chief of the Austrian Government; if Seyss-Inquart does not inform me, Goering, within two hours, I, Goering, will suppose that you are hindered from doing so” ’.
“I then reported to the Federal President the new developments, and, after some conversation with him and other members of the Government, I decided to resign. The Federal President reluctantly accepted my resignation at 3:30 p. m. on the afternoon of the 11th of March 1938. He expressed himself unwilling to appoint Seyss-Inquart as the Federal Chancellor—he therefore asked me to continue my duties as caretaker Chancellor until he had decided who would succeed me as Federal Chancellor. I accepted and remained as ‘caretaker Chancellor’ from 3:30 p. m., 11 March 1938 until about 11:30 p. m. the same night, when Seyss-Inquart was appointed to the position of Federal Chancellor.
“I further state and say that at about 3:30 p. m. on the afternoon of 11 March 1938, the Foreign Office of the Austrian Government contacted the Embassy of Germany in Vienna, to ascertain if the demands that had been then and there made by Goering on Austria were the official demands of the German Government. The Military Attache of Germany in Vienna, one Lieutenant General Muff, came before the Austrian Federal President, and repeated the contents of the German ultimatums that had previously been delivered to us by Seyss-Inquart.
“I furthermore state and say, that the Federal President, at about 7:30 or 8:00 o’clock p. m. on the night of 11 March1938 ordered me, as caretaker Chancellor, to broadcast the events of the day and to protest against the demands made on Austria during that day by Germany. Furthermore, to inform the world that Austria had been forced to give in to those demands of Germany through superior force * * *.” (2996-PS)
The report from Gauleiter Rainer to Reichscommissioner Buerckel also discusses the events of March 11. In general, Rainer’s report corroborates Schuschnigg’s affidavit. (812-PS)
Another document recalls vividly the events of 11 March 1938. This document, which was found in a building of the courtyard of the German Air Ministry, is a binder containing typed transcripts of some 27 telephone conversations, held in Goering’s office in the Air Ministry on 11 March 1938 and up to 14 March 1938. Most of the conversations were conducted by Goering, although at least one was held by Hitler (2949-PS). (For purposes of convenience these telephone calls are marked with an identifying letter, running from A through Z and then beginning again with AA).
The first group of conversations took place between Field Marshal Goering, who was identified as F., and Seyss-Inquart, who was identified as S. The transcript is in part, in the language of these two persons and is in part a summary of the actual conversations. At 2:45 p. m. the following conversation occurred:
“F:How do you do, doctor. My brother-in-law, is he with you?“S:No.“Thereupon the conversation took approximately the following turn:“F:How are things with you? Have you resigned, or do you have any news?“S.The Chancellor has cancelled the elections for Sunday, and therefore he has put S. and the other gentlemen in a difficult situation. Besides having called off the elections, extensive precautionary measures are being ordered, among others curfew at 8 p. m.“F:Replied that in his opinion the measures taken by Chancellor Schuschnigg were not satisfactory in any respect. At this moment he could not commit himself officially. F. will take a clear stand very shortly. In calling off the elections, he could see a postponement only, not a change of the present situation which had been brought about by the behavior of the Chancellor Schuschnigg in breaking the Berchtesgaden agreement.“Thereupon a conversation took place between F. and the Fuehrer. Afterwards F. phoned again S. This conversation was held at 15:05.“F:Told S. that Berlin did not agree whatsoever with the decision made by Chancellor Schuschnigg since he did not enjoy any more the confidence of our government because he had broken the Berchtesgaden agreement, and therefore further confidence in his future actions did not exist. Consequently, the National Minister, S. and the others, are being requested to immediately hand in their resignation to the Chancellor, and also to ask the Chancellor to resign. F. added that if after a period of one hour no report had come through the assumption would be made that S. would no more be in the position to phone. That would mean that the gentlemen had handed in their resignations. S. was then told to send the telegram to the Fuehrer as agreed upon. As a matter of course, an immediate commission by the Federal President for S. to form a new cabinet would follow Schuschnigg’s resignation.” (2949-PS, Part A)
“F:How do you do, doctor. My brother-in-law, is he with you?
How do you do, doctor. My brother-in-law, is he with you?
“S:No.
No.
“Thereupon the conversation took approximately the following turn:
“F:How are things with you? Have you resigned, or do you have any news?
How are things with you? Have you resigned, or do you have any news?
“S.The Chancellor has cancelled the elections for Sunday, and therefore he has put S. and the other gentlemen in a difficult situation. Besides having called off the elections, extensive precautionary measures are being ordered, among others curfew at 8 p. m.
The Chancellor has cancelled the elections for Sunday, and therefore he has put S. and the other gentlemen in a difficult situation. Besides having called off the elections, extensive precautionary measures are being ordered, among others curfew at 8 p. m.
“F:Replied that in his opinion the measures taken by Chancellor Schuschnigg were not satisfactory in any respect. At this moment he could not commit himself officially. F. will take a clear stand very shortly. In calling off the elections, he could see a postponement only, not a change of the present situation which had been brought about by the behavior of the Chancellor Schuschnigg in breaking the Berchtesgaden agreement.
Replied that in his opinion the measures taken by Chancellor Schuschnigg were not satisfactory in any respect. At this moment he could not commit himself officially. F. will take a clear stand very shortly. In calling off the elections, he could see a postponement only, not a change of the present situation which had been brought about by the behavior of the Chancellor Schuschnigg in breaking the Berchtesgaden agreement.
“Thereupon a conversation took place between F. and the Fuehrer. Afterwards F. phoned again S. This conversation was held at 15:05.
“F:Told S. that Berlin did not agree whatsoever with the decision made by Chancellor Schuschnigg since he did not enjoy any more the confidence of our government because he had broken the Berchtesgaden agreement, and therefore further confidence in his future actions did not exist. Consequently, the National Minister, S. and the others, are being requested to immediately hand in their resignation to the Chancellor, and also to ask the Chancellor to resign. F. added that if after a period of one hour no report had come through the assumption would be made that S. would no more be in the position to phone. That would mean that the gentlemen had handed in their resignations. S. was then told to send the telegram to the Fuehrer as agreed upon. As a matter of course, an immediate commission by the Federal President for S. to form a new cabinet would follow Schuschnigg’s resignation.” (2949-PS, Part A)
Told S. that Berlin did not agree whatsoever with the decision made by Chancellor Schuschnigg since he did not enjoy any more the confidence of our government because he had broken the Berchtesgaden agreement, and therefore further confidence in his future actions did not exist. Consequently, the National Minister, S. and the others, are being requested to immediately hand in their resignation to the Chancellor, and also to ask the Chancellor to resign. F. added that if after a period of one hour no report had come through the assumption would be made that S. would no more be in the position to phone. That would mean that the gentlemen had handed in their resignations. S. was then told to send the telegram to the Fuehrer as agreed upon. As a matter of course, an immediate commission by the Federal President for S. to form a new cabinet would follow Schuschnigg’s resignation.” (2949-PS, Part A)
Thus Goering told Seyss-Inquart that it was not enough for Schuschnigg to cancel the election. And twenty minutes later he telephoned Seyss-Inquart to state that Schuschnigg must resign. When informed at about an hour later that Schuschnigg had resigned, he pointed out that in addition it was necessary to have Seyss-Inquart at the head of the Cabinet.
An hour later Goering phoned Dombrowski at the German Embassy in Vienna. He was concerned that the Nazi Party and all its formations should be legalized promptly:
“Goering: Now to go on. The Party has definitely been legalized?“Dombrowski: But that is * * * it isn’t necessary to even discuss that.“Goering: With all of its organizations.“Dombrowski: With all of its organizations within this country.“Goering: In uniform?“Dombrowski: In uniform.“Goering: Good.“Dombrowski: calls attention to the fact that the SA and SS have already been on duty for one-half hour which means everything is all right.” (2949-PS, Part C)
“Goering: Now to go on. The Party has definitely been legalized?
“Dombrowski: But that is * * * it isn’t necessary to even discuss that.
“Goering: With all of its organizations.
“Dombrowski: With all of its organizations within this country.
“Goering: In uniform?
“Dombrowski: In uniform.
“Goering: Good.
“Dombrowski: calls attention to the fact that the SA and SS have already been on duty for one-half hour which means everything is all right.” (2949-PS, Part C)
In addition Goering stated that the Cabinet must be formed by7:30 p. m., and he transmitted instructions, to be delivered to Seyss-Inquart, as to who should be appointed to the cabinet:
“Goering: Yes, and by 7:30 he also must talk with the Fuehrer and as to the Cabinet, Keppler will bring you the names. One thing I have forgotten, Fishbeck must have the Department of Economy and Commerce.“Dombrowski: That’s understood.“Goering: Kaltenbrunner is to have the Department of Security and Bahr is to have the armed forces. The Austrian Army is to be taken by Seyss-Inquart himself and you know all about the Justice Department.“Dombrowski: Yes, yes.“Goering: Give me the name.“Dombrowski: Well, your brother-in-law. Isn’t that right?“Goering: Yes?“Dombrowski: Yes.“Goering: That’s right and then also Fishbeck.” (2949-PS, Part C)
“Goering: Yes, and by 7:30 he also must talk with the Fuehrer and as to the Cabinet, Keppler will bring you the names. One thing I have forgotten, Fishbeck must have the Department of Economy and Commerce.
“Dombrowski: That’s understood.
“Goering: Kaltenbrunner is to have the Department of Security and Bahr is to have the armed forces. The Austrian Army is to be taken by Seyss-Inquart himself and you know all about the Justice Department.
“Dombrowski: Yes, yes.
“Goering: Give me the name.
“Dombrowski: Well, your brother-in-law. Isn’t that right?
“Goering: Yes?
“Dombrowski: Yes.
“Goering: That’s right and then also Fishbeck.” (2949-PS, Part C)
About twenty minutes later, at 5:26 p. m., Goering received the news that Miklas was refusing to appoint Seyss-Inquart as Chancellor. He issued instructions for an ultimatum to be delivered to Miklas. The telephone conversation between Goering and Seyss-Inquart went as follows:
“G:Now remember the following: You go immediately together with Lt. General Muff and tell the Federal President that if the conditions which are known to you are not accepted immediately, the troops who are already stationed at and advancing to the frontier will march in tonight along the whole line, and Austria will cease to exist. Lt. General Muff should go with you and demand to be admitted for conference immediately. Please, do inform us immediately about Miklas’ position. Tell him, there is no time now for any joke. Just through the false report we received before action was delayed, but now the situation is that tonight the invasion will begin from all the corners of Austria. The invasion will be stopped and the troops will be held at the border only if we are informed by 7:30 that Miklas has entrusted you with the Federal Chancellorship. (There follows a sentence which is broken up) M. does not matter whatever it might be, the immediate restoration of the Party with all its organizations (again interruption)and then call out all the National Socialists all over the country. They should now be in the streets. So remember, report must be given till 7:30. Lt. General Muff is supposed to come along with you. I shall inform him immediately. If Miklas could not understand it in 4 hours, we shall make him understand it now in 4 minutes.” (2949-PS, Part E)
“G:Now remember the following: You go immediately together with Lt. General Muff and tell the Federal President that if the conditions which are known to you are not accepted immediately, the troops who are already stationed at and advancing to the frontier will march in tonight along the whole line, and Austria will cease to exist. Lt. General Muff should go with you and demand to be admitted for conference immediately. Please, do inform us immediately about Miklas’ position. Tell him, there is no time now for any joke. Just through the false report we received before action was delayed, but now the situation is that tonight the invasion will begin from all the corners of Austria. The invasion will be stopped and the troops will be held at the border only if we are informed by 7:30 that Miklas has entrusted you with the Federal Chancellorship. (There follows a sentence which is broken up) M. does not matter whatever it might be, the immediate restoration of the Party with all its organizations (again interruption)and then call out all the National Socialists all over the country. They should now be in the streets. So remember, report must be given till 7:30. Lt. General Muff is supposed to come along with you. I shall inform him immediately. If Miklas could not understand it in 4 hours, we shall make him understand it now in 4 minutes.” (2949-PS, Part E)
Now remember the following: You go immediately together with Lt. General Muff and tell the Federal President that if the conditions which are known to you are not accepted immediately, the troops who are already stationed at and advancing to the frontier will march in tonight along the whole line, and Austria will cease to exist. Lt. General Muff should go with you and demand to be admitted for conference immediately. Please, do inform us immediately about Miklas’ position. Tell him, there is no time now for any joke. Just through the false report we received before action was delayed, but now the situation is that tonight the invasion will begin from all the corners of Austria. The invasion will be stopped and the troops will be held at the border only if we are informed by 7:30 that Miklas has entrusted you with the Federal Chancellorship. (There follows a sentence which is broken up) M. does not matter whatever it might be, the immediate restoration of the Party with all its organizations (again interruption)and then call out all the National Socialists all over the country. They should now be in the streets. So remember, report must be given till 7:30. Lt. General Muff is supposed to come along with you. I shall inform him immediately. If Miklas could not understand it in 4 hours, we shall make him understand it now in 4 minutes.” (2949-PS, Part E)
An hour later, at 6:28 p. m. Goering had an extensively interrupted telephone conversation with Keppler and Muff and Seyss-Inquart. When told that Miklas had refused to appoint Seyss-Inquart, Goering replied:
“Goering:Well, then Seyss-Inquart has to dismiss him; just go upstairs again and just tell him plainly that SI shall call on the National Socialists guard, and in 5 minutes the troops will march in by my order”. (2949-PS, Part H)
“Goering:Well, then Seyss-Inquart has to dismiss him; just go upstairs again and just tell him plainly that SI shall call on the National Socialists guard, and in 5 minutes the troops will march in by my order”. (2949-PS, Part H)
Well, then Seyss-Inquart has to dismiss him; just go upstairs again and just tell him plainly that SI shall call on the National Socialists guard, and in 5 minutes the troops will march in by my order”. (2949-PS, Part H)
After an interruption, Seyss-Inquart came to the telephone and informed Goering that Miklas was still sticking to his old viewpoint, although a new person had gone in to talk to him and there might be definite word in about ten minutes. The conversation proceeded as follows:
“G:Listen, so I shall wait a few more minutes, till he comes back, then you inform me via Blitz conversation in the Reich Chancellery—as usually, but it has to be done fast. I hardly can justify it as a matter of fact. I am not entitled to do so; if it cannot be done, then you have to take over the power; all right?“S.But if he threatens?“G.Yes.“S.Well, I see, then we shall be ready (antreten).“G.Call me via Blitz.” (2949-PS, Part H)
“G:Listen, so I shall wait a few more minutes, till he comes back, then you inform me via Blitz conversation in the Reich Chancellery—as usually, but it has to be done fast. I hardly can justify it as a matter of fact. I am not entitled to do so; if it cannot be done, then you have to take over the power; all right?
Listen, so I shall wait a few more minutes, till he comes back, then you inform me via Blitz conversation in the Reich Chancellery—as usually, but it has to be done fast. I hardly can justify it as a matter of fact. I am not entitled to do so; if it cannot be done, then you have to take over the power; all right?
“S.But if he threatens?
But if he threatens?
“G.Yes.
Yes.
“S.Well, I see, then we shall be ready (antreten).
Well, I see, then we shall be ready (antreten).
“G.Call me via Blitz.” (2949-PS, Part H)
Call me via Blitz.” (2949-PS, Part H)
It is plain that Goering and Seyss-Inquart had agreed on a plan for Seyss-Inquart to take over power if Miklas remained obdurate. The plan involved both the use of the National Socialist forces in Austria and invasion by German troops.
Later that night, at about 8:00 o’clock, Goering and Seyss-Inquart had another conversation. This was after the ultimatum had expired. Seyss-Inquart informed Goering that Miklas was still refusing to name Seyss-Inquart as Chancellor. The conversation then proceeded as follows:
“G:O.K. I shall give the order to march in and then you make sure that you get the power. Notify the leading people about the following which I shall tell you now! Everyone who offers resistance or organizes resistance,will immediately be subjected to our court-martial, the court-martial of our invading troops. Is that clear?“S:Yes.“G:Including leading personalities, it doesn’t make any difference.“S:Yes, they have given the order, not to offer any resistance.“G:Yes, it does not matter: The Federal President did not authorize you, and that also can be considered as resistance.“S:Yes.“G:Well, now you are officially authorized.“S:Yes.“G:Well, good luck, Heil Hitler.” (2349-PS, Part I)
“G:O.K. I shall give the order to march in and then you make sure that you get the power. Notify the leading people about the following which I shall tell you now! Everyone who offers resistance or organizes resistance,will immediately be subjected to our court-martial, the court-martial of our invading troops. Is that clear?
O.K. I shall give the order to march in and then you make sure that you get the power. Notify the leading people about the following which I shall tell you now! Everyone who offers resistance or organizes resistance,will immediately be subjected to our court-martial, the court-martial of our invading troops. Is that clear?
“S:Yes.
Yes.
“G:Including leading personalities, it doesn’t make any difference.
Including leading personalities, it doesn’t make any difference.
“S:Yes, they have given the order, not to offer any resistance.
Yes, they have given the order, not to offer any resistance.
“G:Yes, it does not matter: The Federal President did not authorize you, and that also can be considered as resistance.
Yes, it does not matter: The Federal President did not authorize you, and that also can be considered as resistance.
“S:Yes.
Yes.
“G:Well, now you are officially authorized.
Well, now you are officially authorized.
“S:Yes.
Yes.
“G:Well, good luck, Heil Hitler.” (2349-PS, Part I)
Well, good luck, Heil Hitler.” (2349-PS, Part I)
Another historical event—the famous telegram which Seyss-Inquart sent to the German Government requesting it to send troops into Austria to help put down disorder—was discussed over the telephone. A conversation held at 8:48 between Goering and Keppler proceeded as follows:
“G:Well, I do not know yet. Listen: The main thing is, that Inquart takes over all powers of the Government, that he keeps the radio stations occupied.“K:Well, we represent the Government now.“G:Yes, that’s it. You are the Government. Listen carefully: The following telegram should be sent here by Seyss-Inquart. Take the notes:‘The provisional Austrian Government which after the dismissal of the Schuschnigg Government, consider it its task to establish peace and order in Austria, sends to the German Government the urgent request, to support it in its task and to help it to prevent bloodshed. For this purpose it asks the German Government to send German troops as soon as possible’.“K:Well, SA and SS are marching through the streets, but everything is quiet. Everything has collapsed with the professional groups (?)” (2949-PS, Part L)
“G:Well, I do not know yet. Listen: The main thing is, that Inquart takes over all powers of the Government, that he keeps the radio stations occupied.
Well, I do not know yet. Listen: The main thing is, that Inquart takes over all powers of the Government, that he keeps the radio stations occupied.
“K:Well, we represent the Government now.
Well, we represent the Government now.
“G:Yes, that’s it. You are the Government. Listen carefully: The following telegram should be sent here by Seyss-Inquart. Take the notes:
Yes, that’s it. You are the Government. Listen carefully: The following telegram should be sent here by Seyss-Inquart. Take the notes:
‘The provisional Austrian Government which after the dismissal of the Schuschnigg Government, consider it its task to establish peace and order in Austria, sends to the German Government the urgent request, to support it in its task and to help it to prevent bloodshed. For this purpose it asks the German Government to send German troops as soon as possible’.
‘The provisional Austrian Government which after the dismissal of the Schuschnigg Government, consider it its task to establish peace and order in Austria, sends to the German Government the urgent request, to support it in its task and to help it to prevent bloodshed. For this purpose it asks the German Government to send German troops as soon as possible’.
“K:Well, SA and SS are marching through the streets, but everything is quiet. Everything has collapsed with the professional groups (?)” (2949-PS, Part L)
Well, SA and SS are marching through the streets, but everything is quiet. Everything has collapsed with the professional groups (?)” (2949-PS, Part L)
And a few minutes later the conversation continued as follows:
“G:Then our troops will cross the border today.“K:Yes.“G:Well, and he should send the telegram as soon as possible.“K:Will send the telegram to SI in the office of the Federal Chancery.“G:Please, show him, the text of the telegram and do tell him that we are asking him—well, he does not even have to send the telegram—all he needs to do is to say: agreed.“K:Yes.“G:Either call me at the Fuehrer’s or at my place. Well, good luck. Heil Hitler!” (2949-PS, Part L)
“G:Then our troops will cross the border today.
Then our troops will cross the border today.
“K:Yes.
Yes.
“G:Well, and he should send the telegram as soon as possible.
Well, and he should send the telegram as soon as possible.
“K:Will send the telegram to SI in the office of the Federal Chancery.
Will send the telegram to SI in the office of the Federal Chancery.
“G:Please, show him, the text of the telegram and do tell him that we are asking him—well, he does not even have to send the telegram—all he needs to do is to say: agreed.
Please, show him, the text of the telegram and do tell him that we are asking him—well, he does not even have to send the telegram—all he needs to do is to say: agreed.
“K:Yes.
Yes.
“G:Either call me at the Fuehrer’s or at my place. Well, good luck. Heil Hitler!” (2949-PS, Part L)
Either call me at the Fuehrer’s or at my place. Well, good luck. Heil Hitler!” (2949-PS, Part L)
It will be recalled that in the first conversation (Part A), held at 3:05 p. m., Goering had requested Seyss-Inquart to send the telegram agreed upon. But now the matter was so urgent that Goering dictated the exact wording of the telegram over the telephone.
And an hour later, at 9:54 p. m., a conversation between Dr. Dietrich in Berlin and Keppler in Vienna went as follows:
“D:I need the telegram urgently.“K:Tell the General Field Marshal that Seyss-Inquart agrees.“D:This is marvelous. Thank you.“K:Listen to the radio. News will be given.“D:Where?“K:From Vienna.“D:So Seyss-Inquart agrees?“K:Jawohl!” (2949-PS, Part M)
“D:I need the telegram urgently.
I need the telegram urgently.
“K:Tell the General Field Marshal that Seyss-Inquart agrees.
Tell the General Field Marshal that Seyss-Inquart agrees.
“D:This is marvelous. Thank you.
This is marvelous. Thank you.
“K:Listen to the radio. News will be given.
Listen to the radio. News will be given.
“D:Where?
Where?
“K:From Vienna.
From Vienna.
“D:So Seyss-Inquart agrees?
So Seyss-Inquart agrees?
“K:Jawohl!” (2949-PS, Part M)
Jawohl!” (2949-PS, Part M)
(4)The Order to Invade Austria.Communications with Austria were now suspended. But the German military machine had been set in motion. A Directive, dated 11 March 1938 at 2045 hours, from Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, initialled by General Jodl and signed by Hitler, ordered the invasion of Austria because of its failure to comply with the German ultimatum. The directive reads:
“Re: Operation Otto“Directive No. 2“1. The demands of the German ultimatum to the Austrian government have not been fulfilled.“2. The Austrian Armed Forces have been ordered to withdraw in front of the entry of German troops and to avoid fighting.“The Austrian Government has ceased to function of its own accord.“3. To avoid further bloodshed in Austrian towns, the entry of the German Armed Forces into Austria will commence,according to directive No. 1, at daybreak on 12.3.“I expect the set objectives to be reached by exerting all forces to the full, as quickly as possible.(signed) ADOLF HITLER” (C-182)
“Re: Operation Otto
“Directive No. 2
“1. The demands of the German ultimatum to the Austrian government have not been fulfilled.
“2. The Austrian Armed Forces have been ordered to withdraw in front of the entry of German troops and to avoid fighting.
“The Austrian Government has ceased to function of its own accord.
“3. To avoid further bloodshed in Austrian towns, the entry of the German Armed Forces into Austria will commence,according to directive No. 1, at daybreak on 12.3.
“I expect the set objectives to be reached by exerting all forces to the full, as quickly as possible.
(signed) ADOLF HITLER” (C-182)
(5)Communications with Rome—Avoidance of Disaster.But at the very time that Hitler and Goering had embarked on this military undertaking, they still had a question mark in their minds—Italy. Italy had massed forces on the Italian-Austrian border on the occasion of the 25 July 1934 putsch. Italy had traditionally been the political protector of Austria.
At 10:25 p. m. that evening, however, Hitler heard from Prince Philip of Hessen, his Ambassador at Rome, that he had just returned from the Palazzo Venezia, and Mussolini had accepted the whole affair in a very-friendly manner. The telephone conversation went thus:
“Hesen:I have just come back from Palazzo Venezia. The Duce accepted the whole thing in a very-friendly manner. He sends you his regards. He had been informed from Austria, Schuschnigg gave him the news. He had then said it would be a complete impossibility. It would be a bluff, such a thing could not be done. So he was told that it was unfortunately arranged thus and it could not be changed any more. Then Mussolini said that Austria would be immaterial to him.
I have just come back from Palazzo Venezia. The Duce accepted the whole thing in a very-friendly manner. He sends you his regards. He had been informed from Austria, Schuschnigg gave him the news. He had then said it would be a complete impossibility. It would be a bluff, such a thing could not be done. So he was told that it was unfortunately arranged thus and it could not be changed any more. Then Mussolini said that Austria would be immaterial to him.
“Fuehrer:Then, please, tell Mussolini, I will never forget him for this.
Then, please, tell Mussolini, I will never forget him for this.
“H:Yes.
Yes.
“F:Never, never, never, whatever happens. I am still ready to make a quite different agreement with him.
Never, never, never, whatever happens. I am still ready to make a quite different agreement with him.
“H:Yes, I told him that, too.
Yes, I told him that, too.
“F:As soon as the Austrian affair has been settled, I shall be ready to go with him through thick and thin, nothing matters.
As soon as the Austrian affair has been settled, I shall be ready to go with him through thick and thin, nothing matters.
“H:Yes, my Fuehrer.
Yes, my Fuehrer.
“F:Listen, I shall make any agreement—I am no longer in fear of the terrible position which would have existed militarily in case we had gotten into a conflict. You may tell him that I do thank him ever so much, never, never shall I forget that.
Listen, I shall make any agreement—I am no longer in fear of the terrible position which would have existed militarily in case we had gotten into a conflict. You may tell him that I do thank him ever so much, never, never shall I forget that.
“H:Yes, my Fuehrer.
Yes, my Fuehrer.
“F:I will never forget it, whatever will happen. If he should ever need any help or be in any danger, he can be convinced that I shall stick to him whatever might happen, even if the whole world were against him.
I will never forget it, whatever will happen. If he should ever need any help or be in any danger, he can be convinced that I shall stick to him whatever might happen, even if the whole world were against him.
“H:Yes, my Fuehrer.” (2949-PS, Part N)
Yes, my Fuehrer.” (2949-PS, Part N)
It will be recalled that Jodl referred in his diary (1780-PS) to the letter which Hitler sent to Mussolini. In this letter, dated 11 March 1938, after stating that Austria had been declining into anarchy, Hitler wrote: “I have decided to reestablish order in my Fatherland, order and tranquility, and to give to the popular will the possibility of settling its own fate in unmistakable fashion openly and by its own decision.” He stated that this was only an act of self-defense, that he had no hostile intentions toward Italy. (2510-PS)
After the invasion, when in Linz, Austria, Hitler communicated his gratitude to Mussolini once more, this time by telegraph: “Mussolini, I will never forget you for this.” (2467-PS)
(6)The Appointment of Seyss-Inquart as Chancellor.Late in the evening of March 11, President Miklas appointed Seyss-Inquart as Chancellor. The radio announcement of Seyss-Inquart’s appointment was made at 11:15 p. m. (2465-PS)
(7)Later Communications with London—Misleading Explanations.On Sunday, 13 March 1938, the day after the invasion, Goering, who had been left in charge of the Reich by Hitler, telephoned Ribbentrop in London. Their conversation disclosed the way in which the Nazis soothed and misled other nations:
“G: As you know the Fuehrer has entrusted me with the administration of the current government procedures (Fuehrung der Regierungsgeschaft). And therefore I wanted to inform you. There is overwhelming joy in Austria, that you can hear over the radio.“R: Yes, it is fantastic, isn’t it?“G: Yes, the last march into the Rhineland is completely overshadowed. The Fuehrer was deeply moved, when he talked to me last night. You must remember it was the first time that he saw his homeland again. Now, I mainly want to talk about political things. Well, this story we had given an ultimatum, that is just foolish gossip. From the very beginning the National Socialist ministers and the representatives of the people (Volksreferenten) have presented the ultimatum. Later on, more and more prominent people of the Movement Party participated, and as a natural result, the Austrian National Socialist ministers asked us to back them up, so they would not be completely beaten up against and be subjected to terror and civil war. Then we told them we would notallow Schuschnigg to provoke a civil war, under no circumstances. Whether by Schuschnigg’s direct order, or with consent the Communists and the Reds had been armed, and were already making demonstrations, which were photographed with “Heil Moskau” and so on; naturally; all these facts caused some danger for Wiener-Neustadt. Then you have to consider that Schuschnigg made his speeches, telling them the Fatherland Front (Vaterlandische Front) would fight to its last man; one could not know that they would capitulate like that and therefore Seyss-Inquart who already had taken over the government asked us to march in immediately. Before we had already marched up to the frontier since we could not know whether there would be a civil war or not. These are the actual facts which can be proved by documents. * * *”* * * * * *“G: No, no, I think so, too. Only, I did not know if you spoke already to these people. I want that you once more,—but no—not at all once more,—but generally speaking—tell the following to Halifax and Chamberlain: It is not correct that Germany has given any ultimatum. This is a lie by Schuschnigg, because the ultimatum was presented to him by S-I, Glaise-Horstenau and Jury. Furthermore, it is not true that we have presented an ultimatum to the Federal President, but it also was given by the others and as far as I know just a military-attache came along, asked by S-I, because of a technical question; he was supposed to ask whether in case S-I would ask for the support of German troops, Germany would grant this request. Furthermore, I want to state that S-I asked us expressly by phone as by telegram to send troops because he did not know about the situation in Wiener-Neustadt, Vienna, and so on; because arms had been distributed there. And then he could not know how the Fatherland Front might react since they always had had such a big mouth.“R: Mr. Goering, tell me, how is the situation in Vienna, is everything settled yet?“G: Yes. Yesterday I landed hundreds of airplanes with some companies, in order to secure the airfield andthey were received with joy. Today the advance unit of the 17 division marches in, together with the Austrian troops. Also I want to point out that the Austrian troops did not withdraw but that they got together and fraternized immediately with the German troops, wherever they were stationed.” (2949-PS, Part W)
“G: As you know the Fuehrer has entrusted me with the administration of the current government procedures (Fuehrung der Regierungsgeschaft). And therefore I wanted to inform you. There is overwhelming joy in Austria, that you can hear over the radio.
“R: Yes, it is fantastic, isn’t it?
“G: Yes, the last march into the Rhineland is completely overshadowed. The Fuehrer was deeply moved, when he talked to me last night. You must remember it was the first time that he saw his homeland again. Now, I mainly want to talk about political things. Well, this story we had given an ultimatum, that is just foolish gossip. From the very beginning the National Socialist ministers and the representatives of the people (Volksreferenten) have presented the ultimatum. Later on, more and more prominent people of the Movement Party participated, and as a natural result, the Austrian National Socialist ministers asked us to back them up, so they would not be completely beaten up against and be subjected to terror and civil war. Then we told them we would notallow Schuschnigg to provoke a civil war, under no circumstances. Whether by Schuschnigg’s direct order, or with consent the Communists and the Reds had been armed, and were already making demonstrations, which were photographed with “Heil Moskau” and so on; naturally; all these facts caused some danger for Wiener-Neustadt. Then you have to consider that Schuschnigg made his speeches, telling them the Fatherland Front (Vaterlandische Front) would fight to its last man; one could not know that they would capitulate like that and therefore Seyss-Inquart who already had taken over the government asked us to march in immediately. Before we had already marched up to the frontier since we could not know whether there would be a civil war or not. These are the actual facts which can be proved by documents. * * *”
* * * * * *
* * * * * *
“G: No, no, I think so, too. Only, I did not know if you spoke already to these people. I want that you once more,—but no—not at all once more,—but generally speaking—tell the following to Halifax and Chamberlain: It is not correct that Germany has given any ultimatum. This is a lie by Schuschnigg, because the ultimatum was presented to him by S-I, Glaise-Horstenau and Jury. Furthermore, it is not true that we have presented an ultimatum to the Federal President, but it also was given by the others and as far as I know just a military-attache came along, asked by S-I, because of a technical question; he was supposed to ask whether in case S-I would ask for the support of German troops, Germany would grant this request. Furthermore, I want to state that S-I asked us expressly by phone as by telegram to send troops because he did not know about the situation in Wiener-Neustadt, Vienna, and so on; because arms had been distributed there. And then he could not know how the Fatherland Front might react since they always had had such a big mouth.
“R: Mr. Goering, tell me, how is the situation in Vienna, is everything settled yet?
“G: Yes. Yesterday I landed hundreds of airplanes with some companies, in order to secure the airfield andthey were received with joy. Today the advance unit of the 17 division marches in, together with the Austrian troops. Also I want to point out that the Austrian troops did not withdraw but that they got together and fraternized immediately with the German troops, wherever they were stationed.” (2949-PS, Part W)
In view of the previous conversations, these are interesting explanations—that the ultimatum was made by Seyss-Inquart alone and not by Goering; that Lt. Gen. Muff, the military attache, came along merely to answer a technical question; and that Seyss-Inquart asked expressly by telephone and by telegram for troops. But perhaps this conversation can best be understood in light of the actual physical scene of time and place:
“G:Well, do come! I shall be delighted to see you.“R:I shall see you this afternoon.“G:The weather is wonderful here. Blue sky. I am sitting here on my balcony—all covered with blankets—in the fresh air, drinking my coffee. Later on I have to drive in, I have to make the speech, and the birds are twittering, and here and there I can hear over the radio the enthusiasm, which must be wonderful over there.“R:That is marvelous.” (2949-PS, Part W)
“G:Well, do come! I shall be delighted to see you.
Well, do come! I shall be delighted to see you.
“R:I shall see you this afternoon.
I shall see you this afternoon.
“G:The weather is wonderful here. Blue sky. I am sitting here on my balcony—all covered with blankets—in the fresh air, drinking my coffee. Later on I have to drive in, I have to make the speech, and the birds are twittering, and here and there I can hear over the radio the enthusiasm, which must be wonderful over there.
The weather is wonderful here. Blue sky. I am sitting here on my balcony—all covered with blankets—in the fresh air, drinking my coffee. Later on I have to drive in, I have to make the speech, and the birds are twittering, and here and there I can hear over the radio the enthusiasm, which must be wonderful over there.
“R:That is marvelous.” (2949-PS, Part W)
That is marvelous.” (2949-PS, Part W)
The British Foreign Office had protested the tactics employed by the German Government. In a letter dated 12 March 1938 Ambassador Neville Henderson, at the British Embassy, Berlin, wrote to Lord Halifax, Foreign Minister, as follows:
“My Lord,“With reference to your telegram No. 79 of March 11th, I have the honor to transmit to Your Lordship herewith a copy of a letter which I addressed to Baron von Neurath in accordance with the instructions contained therein and which was delivered on the same evening.“The French Ambassador addressed a similar letter to Baron von Neurath at the same time.” (3045-PS)
“My Lord,
“With reference to your telegram No. 79 of March 11th, I have the honor to transmit to Your Lordship herewith a copy of a letter which I addressed to Baron von Neurath in accordance with the instructions contained therein and which was delivered on the same evening.
“The French Ambassador addressed a similar letter to Baron von Neurath at the same time.” (3045-PS)
The enclosure was the note of March 11th from the British Embassy to Von Neurath and it reads as follows:
“Dear Reich Minister,“My Government are informed that a German ultimatum was delivered this afternoon at Vienna demandinginter alia, the resignation of the Chancellor and his replacement by the Minister of the Interior, a new Cabinet of which two-thirds of the members were to be National Socialists, and the re-admissionof the Austrian Legion to the country with the duty of keeping order in Vienna.“I am instructed by my Government to represent immediately to the German Government that if this report is correct, H.M.G. in the U.K. feel bound to register a protest in the strongest terms against such use of coercion backed by force against an independent State in order to create a situation incompatible with its national independence.“As the German Minister for Foreign Affairs has already been informed in London, such action is found to produce the greatest reactions of which it is impossible to foretell the issues.” (3045-PS)
“Dear Reich Minister,
“My Government are informed that a German ultimatum was delivered this afternoon at Vienna demandinginter alia, the resignation of the Chancellor and his replacement by the Minister of the Interior, a new Cabinet of which two-thirds of the members were to be National Socialists, and the re-admissionof the Austrian Legion to the country with the duty of keeping order in Vienna.
“I am instructed by my Government to represent immediately to the German Government that if this report is correct, H.M.G. in the U.K. feel bound to register a protest in the strongest terms against such use of coercion backed by force against an independent State in order to create a situation incompatible with its national independence.
“As the German Minister for Foreign Affairs has already been informed in London, such action is found to produce the greatest reactions of which it is impossible to foretell the issues.” (3045-PS)
Von Neurath wrote a letter of response dated 12 March 1938. He first objected to the fact that the British Government was undertaking the role of protector of Austria’s independence:
“In the name of the German Government I must point out here that the Royal British Government has no right to assume the role of a protector of Austria’s independence. In the course of diplomatic consultations on the Austrian question, the German Government never left any doubt with the Royal British Government that the formation of relations between Germany and Austria could not be considered anything but the inner concern of the German people and that it did not affect third Powers.” (3287-PS)
“In the name of the German Government I must point out here that the Royal British Government has no right to assume the role of a protector of Austria’s independence. In the course of diplomatic consultations on the Austrian question, the German Government never left any doubt with the Royal British Government that the formation of relations between Germany and Austria could not be considered anything but the inner concern of the German people and that it did not affect third Powers.” (3287-PS)
Then, in response to the assertions regarding Germany’s ultimatum, Von Neurath set out what he stated to be the true version of events:
“* * * Instead, the former Austrian Chancellor announced, on the evening of the 9th of March, the surprising and arbitrary resolution, decided on by himself, to hold an election within a few days which, under the prevailing circumstances, and especially according to the details provided for the execution of the election, could and was to have the sole purpose of oppressing politically the predominant majority of the population of Austria. As could have been foreseen, this procedure, being a flagrant violation of the agreement of Berchtesgaden, led to a very critical point in Austria’s internal situation. It was only natural that the members of the then Austrian Cabinet who had not taken part in the decision for an election protested very strongly against it. Therefore, a crisis of the Cabinet occurred in Vienna which, on the 11th of March, resulted in the resignation of the former Chancellor and in the formation of a new Cabinet. It is untrue that the Reich used forcefulpressure to bring about this development. Especially the assertion which was spread later by the former Chancellor, that the German Government had presented the Federal President with a conditional ultimatum, is a pure invention; according to the ultimatum he had to appoint a proposed candidate as Chancellor and to form a Cabinet conforming to the proposals of the German Government, otherwise the invasion of Austria by German troops was held in prospect. The truth of the matter is that the question of sending military or police forces from the Reich was only brought up when the newly formed Austrian Cabinet addressed a telegram, already published by the press, to the German Government, urgently asked for the dispatch of German troops as soon as possible in order to restore peace and in order to avoid bloodshed. Faced with the immediately threatening danger of a bloody civil war in Austria, the German Government then decided to comply with the appeal addressed to it.“This being the state of affairs, it is impossible that the attitude of the German Government, as asserted in your letter, could lead to some unforeseeable reactions. A complete picture of the political situation is given in the proclamation which, at noon today, the German Reich Chancellor has addressed to the German people. Dangerous reactions to this situation can take place only if eventually a third party should try to exercise its influence, contrary to the peaceful intentions and legitimate aims of the German Government on the shaping of events in Austria, which would be incompatible with the right of self-government of the German people.” (3287-PS)
“* * * Instead, the former Austrian Chancellor announced, on the evening of the 9th of March, the surprising and arbitrary resolution, decided on by himself, to hold an election within a few days which, under the prevailing circumstances, and especially according to the details provided for the execution of the election, could and was to have the sole purpose of oppressing politically the predominant majority of the population of Austria. As could have been foreseen, this procedure, being a flagrant violation of the agreement of Berchtesgaden, led to a very critical point in Austria’s internal situation. It was only natural that the members of the then Austrian Cabinet who had not taken part in the decision for an election protested very strongly against it. Therefore, a crisis of the Cabinet occurred in Vienna which, on the 11th of March, resulted in the resignation of the former Chancellor and in the formation of a new Cabinet. It is untrue that the Reich used forcefulpressure to bring about this development. Especially the assertion which was spread later by the former Chancellor, that the German Government had presented the Federal President with a conditional ultimatum, is a pure invention; according to the ultimatum he had to appoint a proposed candidate as Chancellor and to form a Cabinet conforming to the proposals of the German Government, otherwise the invasion of Austria by German troops was held in prospect. The truth of the matter is that the question of sending military or police forces from the Reich was only brought up when the newly formed Austrian Cabinet addressed a telegram, already published by the press, to the German Government, urgently asked for the dispatch of German troops as soon as possible in order to restore peace and in order to avoid bloodshed. Faced with the immediately threatening danger of a bloody civil war in Austria, the German Government then decided to comply with the appeal addressed to it.
“This being the state of affairs, it is impossible that the attitude of the German Government, as asserted in your letter, could lead to some unforeseeable reactions. A complete picture of the political situation is given in the proclamation which, at noon today, the German Reich Chancellor has addressed to the German people. Dangerous reactions to this situation can take place only if eventually a third party should try to exercise its influence, contrary to the peaceful intentions and legitimate aims of the German Government on the shaping of events in Austria, which would be incompatible with the right of self-government of the German people.” (3287-PS)
In light of the documents already adverted to, this version of events given by von Neurath is palpably untrue.
F.The Invasion and Absorption of Austria.
(1)The Invasion and Immediate Events: Control of Austria in Fact.In accordance with the directive of March 11 (C-182), the German Army crossed the Austrian border at daybreak on 12 March 1938. Hitler issued a proclamation to the German people announcing and purporting to justify the invasion (TC-47). The British Government and the French Government filed protests.
The German Government and the Austrian National Socialists swiftly secured their grip on Austria. Seyss-Inquart welcomed Hitler at Linz and they both expressed their joy over events of the day. Seyss-Inquart in his speech declared Article 88 of the Treaty of St. Germain inoperative. (2485-PS)
A telegram from the American Legation in Vienna to the Secretary of State, on 12 March 1938, gave a picture of what was happening in Vienna:
“Secretary of State,Washington.70, March 12, noon.“Numerous German bombers flying over Vienna dropping leaflets ‘National Socialist Germany greets its possession National Socialist Austria and its new government in true indivisible union’.“Continual rumors small German troop movements into Austria and impending arrival Austrian legion.“SS and SA in undisputed control in Vienna.“Police wear swastika arm bands. Schuschnigg and Schmidt rumored arrested.“Himmler and Hess here.WILEY” (L-292)
“Secretary of State,
Washington.
70, March 12, noon.
“Numerous German bombers flying over Vienna dropping leaflets ‘National Socialist Germany greets its possession National Socialist Austria and its new government in true indivisible union’.
“Continual rumors small German troop movements into Austria and impending arrival Austrian legion.
“SS and SA in undisputed control in Vienna.
“Police wear swastika arm bands. Schuschnigg and Schmidt rumored arrested.
“Himmler and Hess here.
WILEY” (L-292)
(2)Statutes of Consolidation: Control of Austria in Law.The law-making machine was put to work on the task of consolidation. First, Miklas was caused to resign as President (2466-PS). Seyss-Inquart became both Chancellor and President. He then signed a Federal Constitutional Law of 13 March 1938, for the Reunion of Austria with the German Reich, which in turn was incorporated into the Reich Statute of Reunion passed the same day (2307-PS). This Federal Constitutional Law declared Austria to be a province of the German Reich.
By annexing Austria into the German Reich, Germany violated Article 80 of the Treaty of Versailles, which provides:
“Germany acknowledges and will respect the independence of Austria within the frontier which may be fixed in a treaty between that State and the principle Allied and Associated Powers; she agrees that this independence shall be inalienable, * * *”
“Germany acknowledges and will respect the independence of Austria within the frontier which may be fixed in a treaty between that State and the principle Allied and Associated Powers; she agrees that this independence shall be inalienable, * * *”
Similarly, the Austrian invasion violated Article 88 of the Treaty of St. Germain, which provides:
“The independence of Austria is inalienable otherwise than with the consent of the Council of the League of Nations. Consequently Austria undertakes in the absence of the consent of the said Council to abstain from any act which might directly or indirectly or by any means whatever compromise her independence, particularly, and until her admission to membership of the League of Nations, by participation in the affairs of another Power.”
“The independence of Austria is inalienable otherwise than with the consent of the Council of the League of Nations. Consequently Austria undertakes in the absence of the consent of the said Council to abstain from any act which might directly or indirectly or by any means whatever compromise her independence, particularly, and until her admission to membership of the League of Nations, by participation in the affairs of another Power.”
This basic constitutional law provided for a plebiscite to be held on 10 April 1938, concerning the question of reunion. But this was a mere formality. The plebiscite could only confirm the union. It could not undo Germany’s union with and control over Austria. To illustrate the way in which legal consolidation was swiftly assured, with Austria occupied by troops, it is not necessary to do more than review some of the statutes passed within the month. Hitler placed the Austrian Federal Army under his command and required all members of the Army to take an oath of allegiance to Hitler as their Supreme Commander (2936-PS). Public officials of the Province of Austria were required to take an oath of office swearing obedience to Hitler, Fuehrer of the German Reich and People; Jewish officials, as defined, were not permitted to take the oath. (2311-PS)
Hitler and Frick signed a decree applying to Austria various Reich laws, including the law of 1933 against formation of new parties and the 1933 law for the preservation of unity of party and state (2310-PS). Hitler, Frick, and Goering ordered that the Reich Minister of the Interior be the central authority for carrying out the reunion of Austria with the German Reich. (1060-PS)
In connection with Germany’s extensive propaganda campaign to ensure acceptability of the German regime, Goebbels established a Reich Propaganda Office in Vienna (2935-PS). The ballot, addressed to soldiers of the former Austrian Army as “German soldier”, asked the voters whether they agreed with the “accomplishment” and “ratification” on March 13, 1938, of the reuniting of Austria with Germany (1659-PS). The groundwork was fully laid before the holding of the plebiscite “for German men and women of Austria” promised in the basic law of March 13. (2307-PS)
(3)The Importance of Austria in Further Aggressions.Germany’s desire to consummate the Anschluss with Austria, and its determination to execute that aim in the way and at the time that it did (with threat of military force, quickly, and despite political risks), was due to the importance of Austria in its further plans of aggression. The conference of the conspirators held on November 5, 1937, which laid plans for aggressive war in Europe, outlined as objectives in Austria the conquest of food, through expulsion of a million people, and an increase in fighting strength in part through the improvement in frontier. (386-PS)
Austria yielded material resources. Moreover she provided ready cash, taken from the Jews and from the Austrian Government.One of the first orders passed after the Anschluss was an order signed by Hitler, Frick, Schwerin von Krosigk, and Schacht, for the transfer to the Reich of the assets of the Austrian National Bank. (2313-PS)
Austria yielded human resources. Three months after Anschluss, there was enacted a decree requiring 21-year-old men to report for active military service. (1660-PS)
And the acquisition of Austria improved the military strategic position of the German Army. In a lecture delivered by General Jodl, Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces, on 7 November 1943, at Munich, to the Gauleiters, Jodl reviewed the situation in 1938: