“Japan must take steps to seize Singapore as soon as possible, since the opportunity will never again be as favourable (whole English Fleet contained; unpreparedness of U. S. A. for war against Japan; inferiority of U. S. Fleet vis-à-vis the Japanese). Japan is indeed making preparations for this action, but according to all declarations made by Japanese officers she will only carry it out if Germany proceeds to land in England. Germany must therefore concentrate all her efforts on spurring Japan to act immediately. If Japan has Singapore all other East Asiatic questions regarding the U. S. A. and England are thereby solved (Guam, Philippines, Borneo, Dutch East Indies).“Japan wishes if possible to avoid war against U. S. A. She can do so if she determinedly takes Singapore as soon as possible.” (C-152)
“Japan must take steps to seize Singapore as soon as possible, since the opportunity will never again be as favourable (whole English Fleet contained; unpreparedness of U. S. A. for war against Japan; inferiority of U. S. Fleet vis-à-vis the Japanese). Japan is indeed making preparations for this action, but according to all declarations made by Japanese officers she will only carry it out if Germany proceeds to land in England. Germany must therefore concentrate all her efforts on spurring Japan to act immediately. If Japan has Singapore all other East Asiatic questions regarding the U. S. A. and England are thereby solved (Guam, Philippines, Borneo, Dutch East Indies).
“Japan wishes if possible to avoid war against U. S. A. She can do so if she determinedly takes Singapore as soon as possible.” (C-152)
The fact clearly appears from these minutes that military staff conferences had already been held with the Japanese to discuss the activation of Japanese military support against the British and to urge their immediate attack on Singapore. Another passage in the record of this meeting establishes this:
“Japan is indeed making preparations for this action, but according to all declarations made by Japanese officers she will only carry it out if Germany proceeds to land in England.” (C-152)
“Japan is indeed making preparations for this action, but according to all declarations made by Japanese officers she will only carry it out if Germany proceeds to land in England.” (C-152)
Apparently the Nazis were subsequently able to persuade the Japanese to eliminate this condition precedent to their performance under the contract.
Meanwhile, Ribbentrop continued to make further efforts toinduce the Japanese to aggression against the British Commonwealth. On 29 March 1941, he met with the Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka, who was then in Berlin. The following is a report of their conversations, found in the German Foreign Office Archives:
“REPORT ON THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE REICH MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (RAM) AND THE JAPANESE FOREIGN MINISTER MATSUOKA IN BERLIN ON 29 MARCH 1941.“The RAM resumed the preceding conversation with Matsuoka about the latter’s impending talks with the Russians in Moscow, where they had left off. He expressed the opinion, that it would probably be best, in view of the whole situation, not to carry the discussions with the Russians too far. He did not know how the situation would develop. One thing, however, was certain, namely, that Germany would strike immediately, should Russia ever attack Japan. He was ready to give Matsuoka this positive assurance, so that Japan could push forward to the South on Singapore, without fear of possible complications with Russia. The largest part of the German army was anyway on the Eastern frontiers of the Reich, and fully prepared to open the attack at any time. He (the RAM), however, believed that Russia would try to avoid development leading to war. Should Germany however enter into a conflict with Russia, the USSR would be finished off within a few months. In this case, Japan had of course even less reason to be afraid than ever, if it wants to advance on Singapore. Consequently, it need not refrain from such an undertaking because of possible fears of Russia.“He could not know of course, just how things with Russia would develop. It was uncertain whether or not Stalin would intensify his present unfriendly policy against Germany. He (the RAM) wanted to point out to Matsuoka, in any case, that a conflict with Russia was anyhow within the realm of possibility. In any case, Matsuoka could not report to the Japanese Emperor upon his return, that a conflict between Russia and Germany was impossible. On the contrary, the situation was such, that such a conflict, even if it were not probable, would have to be considered possible.”* * * * * *“Next, the RAM turned again to the Singapore question. In view of the fears expressed by the Japanese of possible attacks by submarines, based on the Philippines, and of theintervention of the British Mediterranean and Home fleets, he had again discussed the situation with General-Admiral Raeder. The latter had stated that the British Navy during this year would have its hands so full in the English home waters and in the Mediterranean, that it would not be able to send even a single ship to the Far East. General-Admiral Raeder had described the U. S. submarines as so bad that Japan need not bother about them at all.“Matsuoka replied immediately that the Japanese Navy had a very low estimate of the threat from the British Navy; it also held the view that, in case of a clash with the American Navy, it would be able to smash the latter without trouble. However it was afraid that the Americans would not take up the battle with their fleet; thus the conflict with the United States might perhaps be dragged out to five years. This possibility caused considerable worry in Japan.“The RAM replied that America could not do anything against Japan in the case of the capture of Singapore. Perhaps for this reason alone, Roosevelt would think twice before deciding on active measures against Japan. For while on one hand he could not achieve anything against Japan, on the other hand there was the probability of losing the Philippines to Japan; for the American president, of course, this would mean a considerable loss of prestige, and because of the inadequate rearmament, he would have nothing to offset such a loss.“In this connection, Matsuoka pointed out, that he was doing everything to reassure the English about Singapore. He acted as if Japan had no intention at all regarding this key position of England in the East. Therefore it might be possible that his attitude toward the British would appear to be friendly in words and in acts. However, Germany should not be deceived by that. He assumed this attitude not only in order to reassure the British, but also in order to fool the pro-British and pro-American elements so long, until one day he would suddenly open the attack on Singapore.“In this connection, Matsuoka stated that his tactics were based on the certain assumption that the sudden attack against Singapore would unite the entire Japanese nation with one blow. (“Nothing succeeds like success,” the RAM remarked.) He followed here the example of the words of a famous Japanese statesman, addressed to the Japanese Navy at the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese war: “You open fire, then the nation will be united.” The Japanese need to beshaken up to awaken. After all, as an Oriental, he believed in fate, which would come, whether you wanted it or not.”* * * * * *“Matsuoka then introduced the subject of German assistance in the blow against Singapore, a subject which had been broached to him frequently, and mentioned the proposal of a German written promise of assistance.“The RAM replied that he had already discussed these questions with Ambassador Oshima. He had asked him to procure maps of Singapore in order that the Fuehrer—who probably must be considered the greatest expert on military questions at the present time—could advise Japan on the best method of attack against Singapore. German experts on aerial warfare, too, would be at her disposal; they could draw up a report, based on their European experiences, for the Japanese on the use of divebombers from airfields in the vicinity against the British fleet in Singapore. Thus the British fleet would be forced to disappear from Singapore immediately.“Matsuoka remarked that Japan was less concerned with the British fleet, than with the capture of the fortifications.“The RAM replied that here, too, the Fuehrer had developed new methods for the German attacks on strongly fortified positions, such as the Maginot Line and Fort Eben-Emael, which he could make available to the Japanese.“Matsuoka replied in this connection that some of the younger, expert Japanese naval officers, who were close friends of his, were of the opinion that the Japanese naval forces would need three months until they could capture Singapore. As a cautious Foreign Minister, he had doubled this estimate. He believed he could stave off any danger which threatened from America, for six months. If, however, the capture of Singapore required still more time and if the operations would perhaps even drag out for a year, the situation with America would become extremely critical and he did not know as yet how to meet it.“If at all avoidable, he would not touch the Netherland East Indies, since he was afraid that in case of a Japanese attack on this area, the oilfields would be set afire. They could be brought into operation again only after 1 or 2 years.“The RAM added that Japan would gain decisive influence over the Netherland East Indies simultaneously with the capture of Singapore.” (1877-PS)
“REPORT ON THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE REICH MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (RAM) AND THE JAPANESE FOREIGN MINISTER MATSUOKA IN BERLIN ON 29 MARCH 1941.
“The RAM resumed the preceding conversation with Matsuoka about the latter’s impending talks with the Russians in Moscow, where they had left off. He expressed the opinion, that it would probably be best, in view of the whole situation, not to carry the discussions with the Russians too far. He did not know how the situation would develop. One thing, however, was certain, namely, that Germany would strike immediately, should Russia ever attack Japan. He was ready to give Matsuoka this positive assurance, so that Japan could push forward to the South on Singapore, without fear of possible complications with Russia. The largest part of the German army was anyway on the Eastern frontiers of the Reich, and fully prepared to open the attack at any time. He (the RAM), however, believed that Russia would try to avoid development leading to war. Should Germany however enter into a conflict with Russia, the USSR would be finished off within a few months. In this case, Japan had of course even less reason to be afraid than ever, if it wants to advance on Singapore. Consequently, it need not refrain from such an undertaking because of possible fears of Russia.
“He could not know of course, just how things with Russia would develop. It was uncertain whether or not Stalin would intensify his present unfriendly policy against Germany. He (the RAM) wanted to point out to Matsuoka, in any case, that a conflict with Russia was anyhow within the realm of possibility. In any case, Matsuoka could not report to the Japanese Emperor upon his return, that a conflict between Russia and Germany was impossible. On the contrary, the situation was such, that such a conflict, even if it were not probable, would have to be considered possible.”
* * * * * *
“Next, the RAM turned again to the Singapore question. In view of the fears expressed by the Japanese of possible attacks by submarines, based on the Philippines, and of theintervention of the British Mediterranean and Home fleets, he had again discussed the situation with General-Admiral Raeder. The latter had stated that the British Navy during this year would have its hands so full in the English home waters and in the Mediterranean, that it would not be able to send even a single ship to the Far East. General-Admiral Raeder had described the U. S. submarines as so bad that Japan need not bother about them at all.
“Matsuoka replied immediately that the Japanese Navy had a very low estimate of the threat from the British Navy; it also held the view that, in case of a clash with the American Navy, it would be able to smash the latter without trouble. However it was afraid that the Americans would not take up the battle with their fleet; thus the conflict with the United States might perhaps be dragged out to five years. This possibility caused considerable worry in Japan.
“The RAM replied that America could not do anything against Japan in the case of the capture of Singapore. Perhaps for this reason alone, Roosevelt would think twice before deciding on active measures against Japan. For while on one hand he could not achieve anything against Japan, on the other hand there was the probability of losing the Philippines to Japan; for the American president, of course, this would mean a considerable loss of prestige, and because of the inadequate rearmament, he would have nothing to offset such a loss.
“In this connection, Matsuoka pointed out, that he was doing everything to reassure the English about Singapore. He acted as if Japan had no intention at all regarding this key position of England in the East. Therefore it might be possible that his attitude toward the British would appear to be friendly in words and in acts. However, Germany should not be deceived by that. He assumed this attitude not only in order to reassure the British, but also in order to fool the pro-British and pro-American elements so long, until one day he would suddenly open the attack on Singapore.
“In this connection, Matsuoka stated that his tactics were based on the certain assumption that the sudden attack against Singapore would unite the entire Japanese nation with one blow. (“Nothing succeeds like success,” the RAM remarked.) He followed here the example of the words of a famous Japanese statesman, addressed to the Japanese Navy at the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese war: “You open fire, then the nation will be united.” The Japanese need to beshaken up to awaken. After all, as an Oriental, he believed in fate, which would come, whether you wanted it or not.”
* * * * * *
“Matsuoka then introduced the subject of German assistance in the blow against Singapore, a subject which had been broached to him frequently, and mentioned the proposal of a German written promise of assistance.
“The RAM replied that he had already discussed these questions with Ambassador Oshima. He had asked him to procure maps of Singapore in order that the Fuehrer—who probably must be considered the greatest expert on military questions at the present time—could advise Japan on the best method of attack against Singapore. German experts on aerial warfare, too, would be at her disposal; they could draw up a report, based on their European experiences, for the Japanese on the use of divebombers from airfields in the vicinity against the British fleet in Singapore. Thus the British fleet would be forced to disappear from Singapore immediately.
“Matsuoka remarked that Japan was less concerned with the British fleet, than with the capture of the fortifications.
“The RAM replied that here, too, the Fuehrer had developed new methods for the German attacks on strongly fortified positions, such as the Maginot Line and Fort Eben-Emael, which he could make available to the Japanese.
“Matsuoka replied in this connection that some of the younger, expert Japanese naval officers, who were close friends of his, were of the opinion that the Japanese naval forces would need three months until they could capture Singapore. As a cautious Foreign Minister, he had doubled this estimate. He believed he could stave off any danger which threatened from America, for six months. If, however, the capture of Singapore required still more time and if the operations would perhaps even drag out for a year, the situation with America would become extremely critical and he did not know as yet how to meet it.
“If at all avoidable, he would not touch the Netherland East Indies, since he was afraid that in case of a Japanese attack on this area, the oilfields would be set afire. They could be brought into operation again only after 1 or 2 years.
“The RAM added that Japan would gain decisive influence over the Netherland East Indies simultaneously with the capture of Singapore.” (1877-PS)
On 5 April, about a week after the conference just noted, Ribbentropagain met with Matsuoka and again pushed the Japanese another step along the road to aggressive war. The notes of this conference, which were also found in German Foreign Office Archives, reveal the following exchange:
“* * * In answer to a remark by Matsuoka, that Japan was now awakening and, according to the Japanese temperament, would take action quickly after the previous lengthy deliberation, the Reich Foreign Minister replied that it was necessary, of course, to accept a certain risk in this connection, just as the Fuehrer had done so successfully with the occupation of the Rhineland, with the proclamation of sovereignty of armament, and with the resignation from the League of Nations.”* * * * * *“The Reich Foreign Minister replied that the new German Reich would actually be built up on the basis of the ancient traditions of the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation, which in its time was the only dominant power on the European Continent.“In conclusion the Reich Foreign Minister once again summarized the points he wanted Matsuoka to take back to Japan with him from his trip:“1. Germany had already won the war. With the end of this year the world would realize this. Even England would have to concede it, if it had not collapsed before then, and America would also have to resign herself to this fact.“2. There were no conflicting interests between Japan and Germany. The future of both countries could be regulated for the long run on the basis that Japan should predominate in the Far East, Italy and Germany in Europe and Africa.“3. Whatever might happen, Germany would win the war. But it would hasten victory if Japan would enter the war. Such an entry into the war was undoubtedly more in the interest of Japan than in that of Germany, for it offered a unique opportunity which would hardly ever return, for the fulfillment of the national objectives of Japan, a chance which would make it possible for her to play a really leading role in East Asia.” (1882-PS)
“* * * In answer to a remark by Matsuoka, that Japan was now awakening and, according to the Japanese temperament, would take action quickly after the previous lengthy deliberation, the Reich Foreign Minister replied that it was necessary, of course, to accept a certain risk in this connection, just as the Fuehrer had done so successfully with the occupation of the Rhineland, with the proclamation of sovereignty of armament, and with the resignation from the League of Nations.”
* * * * * *
“The Reich Foreign Minister replied that the new German Reich would actually be built up on the basis of the ancient traditions of the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation, which in its time was the only dominant power on the European Continent.
“In conclusion the Reich Foreign Minister once again summarized the points he wanted Matsuoka to take back to Japan with him from his trip:
“1. Germany had already won the war. With the end of this year the world would realize this. Even England would have to concede it, if it had not collapsed before then, and America would also have to resign herself to this fact.
“2. There were no conflicting interests between Japan and Germany. The future of both countries could be regulated for the long run on the basis that Japan should predominate in the Far East, Italy and Germany in Europe and Africa.
“3. Whatever might happen, Germany would win the war. But it would hasten victory if Japan would enter the war. Such an entry into the war was undoubtedly more in the interest of Japan than in that of Germany, for it offered a unique opportunity which would hardly ever return, for the fulfillment of the national objectives of Japan, a chance which would make it possible for her to play a really leading role in East Asia.” (1882-PS)
Here again, in the portions just quoted, Ribbentrop is seen pursuing the same tack previously noted: Germany has already won the war for all practical purposes. Japan’s entry will hasten the inevitable end.AndJapan had better get the positions she wantsduringthe war. Ribbentrop’s assurances, (1877-PS) that Japan likewise had nothing to fear from the Soviet Unionif Japan entered the conflict, and his continual references to the weakness of the United States scattered throughout his conversations, were other means used to hurry along the Japanese.
The success of the Nazi methods is shown in a top secret report, dated 24 May 1941, from the German Military Attache in Tokyo to the Intelligence Division of the OKW. The last sentence in paragraph 1, states:
“The preparations for attack on Singapore and Manila stand.” (1538-PS)
“The preparations for attack on Singapore and Manila stand.” (1538-PS)
The fact appears from this sentence that the German military were keeping in close touch with the Japanese operational plans against Singapore, which the Nazi conspirators had fostered.
(2)Exhortations to Japanese Aggression Against the U.S.S.R.
The Nazi conspirators also directed their efforts to induce a Japanese “stab in the back” against the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Here again Ribbentrop appears as a central figure.
For some months prior to the issuance of Basic Order No. 24 regarding collaboration with Japan (C-75), the Nazi conspirators had been preparing “Fall Barbarossa”, the plan for attack on the U.S.S.R. Basic Order No. 24 decreed, however, that the Japanese “must not be given any intimation of the Barbarossa operation”. (C-75)
In his conference with the Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka on 29 March 1941, almost 3 weeks after the issuance of Basic Order No. 24, Ribbentrop nevertheless hinted at things to come. Ribbentrop assured Matsuoka that the largest part of the German Army was on the Eastern frontiers of the Reich fully prepared to open the attack at any time. Ribbentrop then added that, although he believed that the U.S.S.R. would try to avoid developments leading to war, nevertheless a conflict with the Soviet Union, even if not probable, would have to be considered possible. (1877-PS)
Whatever conclusions the Japanese Ambassador drew from these remarks in April 1941 can only be conjectured. Once the Nazis had unleashed their aggression against the U.S.S.R. in June of 1941, the tenor of Ribbentrop’s remarks left no room for doubt. On 10 July 1941, Ribbentrop despatched a coded telegram to Ott, the German Ambassador in Tokyo (2896-PS). Pertinent passages in that telegram read as follows:
“Please take this opportunity to thank the Japanese Ambassador in Moscow for conveying the cable report. It would be convenient if we could keep on receiving news from Russia this way. In summing up, I would like to say: I havenow, as in the past, full confidence in the Japanese Policy, and in the Japanese Foreign Minister, first of all because the present Japanese government would really act inexcusably toward the future of its nation if it would not take this unique opportunity to solve the Russian problem, as well as to secure for all time its expansion to the South and settle the Chinese matter. Since Russia, as reported by the Japanese Ambassador in Moscow, is in effect close to collapse, a report which coincides with our own observations as far as we are able to judge at the present war situation, it is simply impossible that Japan does not solve the matter of Vladivostok and the Siberian area as soon as her military preparations are completed.”* * * * * *“However, I ask you to employ all available means in further insisting upon Japan’s entry into the war against Russia at the soonest possible date, as I have mentioned already in my note to Matsuoka. The sooner this entry is effected, the better it is. The natural objective still remains that we and Japan join hands on the Trans-Siberian railroad, before winter starts. After the collapse of Russia, however, the position of the Three Power Pact states in the world will be so gigantic, that the question of England’s collapse or the total destruction of the English islands, respectively, will only be a matter of time. An America totally isolated from the rest of the world would then be faced with our taking possession of the remaining positions of the British Empire which are important for the Three Power Pact countries. I have the unshakable conviction that a carrying through of the new order as desired by us will be a matter of course, and there would be no insurmountable difficulties if the countries of the Three Power Pact stand close together and encounter every action of the Americans with the same weapons. I ask you to report in the near future as often as possible and in detail on the political situation there.” (2896-PS)
“Please take this opportunity to thank the Japanese Ambassador in Moscow for conveying the cable report. It would be convenient if we could keep on receiving news from Russia this way. In summing up, I would like to say: I havenow, as in the past, full confidence in the Japanese Policy, and in the Japanese Foreign Minister, first of all because the present Japanese government would really act inexcusably toward the future of its nation if it would not take this unique opportunity to solve the Russian problem, as well as to secure for all time its expansion to the South and settle the Chinese matter. Since Russia, as reported by the Japanese Ambassador in Moscow, is in effect close to collapse, a report which coincides with our own observations as far as we are able to judge at the present war situation, it is simply impossible that Japan does not solve the matter of Vladivostok and the Siberian area as soon as her military preparations are completed.”
* * * * * *
“However, I ask you to employ all available means in further insisting upon Japan’s entry into the war against Russia at the soonest possible date, as I have mentioned already in my note to Matsuoka. The sooner this entry is effected, the better it is. The natural objective still remains that we and Japan join hands on the Trans-Siberian railroad, before winter starts. After the collapse of Russia, however, the position of the Three Power Pact states in the world will be so gigantic, that the question of England’s collapse or the total destruction of the English islands, respectively, will only be a matter of time. An America totally isolated from the rest of the world would then be faced with our taking possession of the remaining positions of the British Empire which are important for the Three Power Pact countries. I have the unshakable conviction that a carrying through of the new order as desired by us will be a matter of course, and there would be no insurmountable difficulties if the countries of the Three Power Pact stand close together and encounter every action of the Americans with the same weapons. I ask you to report in the near future as often as possible and in detail on the political situation there.” (2896-PS)
Ott’s reply to this telegram (2897-PS), dated 13 July 1941, was as follows:
“Telegram(Secret Cipher System)“Tokyo 14 July 1941 0230 hrs.Arrived 14 July 1941 1120 hrs.As fast as possible!“#1217 dated 13.7for Minister for Foreign Affairs.Answer to telegram 10, #108 Reichsminister for Foreign AffairsArrived Tokyo 12 July 1941“I am trying with all means to work toward Japan’s entry into the war against Russia as soon as possible. Especially using arguments of personal message of Foreign Minister and telegram cited above, to convince Matsuoka personally, as well as the Foreign Office, Military elements, Nationalists and friendly business men. I believe that, according to military preparations, Japanese participation will soon take place. The greatest obstacles against which one has to fight thereby is the disunity among Activist groups which, without unified command, follows various aims and only slowly adjusts itself to the changed situation.Ott.” (2897-PS)
“Telegram
(Secret Cipher System)
“Tokyo 14 July 1941 0230 hrs.
Arrived 14 July 1941 1120 hrs.
As fast as possible!
“#1217 dated 13.7
for Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Answer to telegram 10, #108 Reichsminister for Foreign Affairs
Arrived Tokyo 12 July 1941
“I am trying with all means to work toward Japan’s entry into the war against Russia as soon as possible. Especially using arguments of personal message of Foreign Minister and telegram cited above, to convince Matsuoka personally, as well as the Foreign Office, Military elements, Nationalists and friendly business men. I believe that, according to military preparations, Japanese participation will soon take place. The greatest obstacles against which one has to fight thereby is the disunity among Activist groups which, without unified command, follows various aims and only slowly adjusts itself to the changed situation.
Ott.” (2897-PS)
On subsequent occasions Ribbentrop repeated his exhortations to induce the Japanese to aggression against the U.S.S.R. Three documents, covering July of 1942 and March and April of 1943, record these exhortations.
The first discussion occurred between Ribbentrop and Oshima, Japanese Ambassador to Berlin, on 9 July 1942. As a matter of background, it may be noted that at that time German armies were sweeping forward in the U.S.S.R. and the fall of Sevastapol had just been announced. The discussion proceeded as follows:
“Notes concerning the discussion between the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Ambassador Oshima at Steinort, on 9 July 1942.“He, the German Foreign Minister, had asked to see the Ambassador at this time when the situation was as described, because now a question of fateful importance had arisen concerning the joint conduct of the war: if Japan felt itself sufficiently strong militarily, the moment for Japan to attack Russia was probably now. He thought it possible that, if Japan attacked Russia now, it would lead to her (Russia’s) final moral collapse; at least it would hasten the collapse of her present system. In any case, never again would Japan have such an opportunity as existed at present, to eliminate once and for all the Russian colossus in Eastern Asia. He had discussed this question with the Fuehrer, and the Fuehrer was of the same opinion, but he wanted to emphasize one point right away: Japan should attack Russia only if she felt sufficiently strong for such an undertaking. Under no circumstances should Japanese operations against Russia be allowed to bog down at the halfway mark, and wedo not want to urge Japan into an action that is not mutually profitable.” (2911-PS)
“Notes concerning the discussion between the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Ambassador Oshima at Steinort, on 9 July 1942.
“He, the German Foreign Minister, had asked to see the Ambassador at this time when the situation was as described, because now a question of fateful importance had arisen concerning the joint conduct of the war: if Japan felt itself sufficiently strong militarily, the moment for Japan to attack Russia was probably now. He thought it possible that, if Japan attacked Russia now, it would lead to her (Russia’s) final moral collapse; at least it would hasten the collapse of her present system. In any case, never again would Japan have such an opportunity as existed at present, to eliminate once and for all the Russian colossus in Eastern Asia. He had discussed this question with the Fuehrer, and the Fuehrer was of the same opinion, but he wanted to emphasize one point right away: Japan should attack Russia only if she felt sufficiently strong for such an undertaking. Under no circumstances should Japanese operations against Russia be allowed to bog down at the halfway mark, and wedo not want to urge Japan into an action that is not mutually profitable.” (2911-PS)
Ribbentrop and Ambassador Oshima had another conference on 6 March 1943. It is noted, again for background, that the strategic military situation in the broad expanses of the U.S.S.R. had changed somewhat. In the previous month, February 1943, the Soviet Armies had completely defeated the German forces at Stalingrad and inflicted severe losses. To the north and west their winter offensive had recovered large areas from the hands of the invaders. In addition, combined U. S. and British forces had already landed in North Africa. The tone of Ribbentrop’s argument reflects the changed military situation. The familiar Japanese refrain of “so sorry please” likewise appears to have crept in. It is noted, in this regard, that the month of February 1943 had also seen the end of organized Japanese resistance on the island of Guadalcanal. The conference went as follows:
“Ambassador Oshima declared that he had received a telegram from Tokyo, and he is to report by order of his government to the Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs (RAM) the following: The suggestion of the German Government, to attack Russia, was the subject of a common conference between the Japanese Government and the Imperial headquarters, during which the question was discussed in detail and investigated exactly. The result is the following: the Japanese Government absolutely recognizes the danger which threatens from Russia, and completely understands the desire of its German ally that Japan on her part will also enter the war against Russia. However, it is not possible for the Japanese Government, considering the present war situation, to enter into the war. It is rather of the conviction that it would be in the common interest not to start the war against Russia now. On the other hand, the Japanese Government would never disregard the Russian question.“The Japanese Government has the intention to become aggressive again in the future on other fronts.“The RAM brought up the question, after the explanation by the Ambassador, of how the continued waging of the war is envisaged in Tokyo. At present, Germany wages the war against the common enemies, England and America, mostly alone, while Japan mostly behaves more defensively. However, it would be more correct that all powers allied in the Three Power Pact would combine their forces to defeat England and America, but also Russia together. It is not good when one part must fight alone. One cannot overstrain theGerman national strength. He has worried silently that certain forces work in Tokyo, who are of the opinion and who propagate it, that Germany would come through the fight victoriously, and that therefore Japan should consolidate itself further at first, before it makes further and utmost efforts.”* * * * * *“Then the RAM again brought up the question of the attack on Russia by Japan, and he declared that after all, the fight on the Burma front as well as in the South is actually more of a maritime problem, and on all fronts—except those in China—there are mostly very few ground forces committed. Therefore the attack on Russia is primarily an army affair, and he asked himself whether the necessary forces would not be ready for that”. (2954-PS)
“Ambassador Oshima declared that he had received a telegram from Tokyo, and he is to report by order of his government to the Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs (RAM) the following: The suggestion of the German Government, to attack Russia, was the subject of a common conference between the Japanese Government and the Imperial headquarters, during which the question was discussed in detail and investigated exactly. The result is the following: the Japanese Government absolutely recognizes the danger which threatens from Russia, and completely understands the desire of its German ally that Japan on her part will also enter the war against Russia. However, it is not possible for the Japanese Government, considering the present war situation, to enter into the war. It is rather of the conviction that it would be in the common interest not to start the war against Russia now. On the other hand, the Japanese Government would never disregard the Russian question.
“The Japanese Government has the intention to become aggressive again in the future on other fronts.
“The RAM brought up the question, after the explanation by the Ambassador, of how the continued waging of the war is envisaged in Tokyo. At present, Germany wages the war against the common enemies, England and America, mostly alone, while Japan mostly behaves more defensively. However, it would be more correct that all powers allied in the Three Power Pact would combine their forces to defeat England and America, but also Russia together. It is not good when one part must fight alone. One cannot overstrain theGerman national strength. He has worried silently that certain forces work in Tokyo, who are of the opinion and who propagate it, that Germany would come through the fight victoriously, and that therefore Japan should consolidate itself further at first, before it makes further and utmost efforts.”
* * * * * *
“Then the RAM again brought up the question of the attack on Russia by Japan, and he declared that after all, the fight on the Burma front as well as in the South is actually more of a maritime problem, and on all fronts—except those in China—there are mostly very few ground forces committed. Therefore the attack on Russia is primarily an army affair, and he asked himself whether the necessary forces would not be ready for that”. (2954-PS)
Ribbentrop kept on trying. He held another conference with Oshima about three weeks later, on 18 April 1943. The top secret notes of this conference reveal the following:
“The Reichminister for Foreign Affairs then stressed again that without any doubt this year presented the most favorable opportunity for Japan, if she felt strong enough and had sufficient anti-tank weapons at her disposal, to attack Russia, which certainly would never again be as weak as she is at the moment.” (2929-PS)
“The Reichminister for Foreign Affairs then stressed again that without any doubt this year presented the most favorable opportunity for Japan, if she felt strong enough and had sufficient anti-tank weapons at her disposal, to attack Russia, which certainly would never again be as weak as she is at the moment.” (2929-PS)
(3)Nazi Preparations and Collaboration with the Japanese Against the United States.The Nazi preparations and collaboration with the Japanese against the United States present a twofold aspect: one of preparations by the Nazis themselves for attack from across the Atlantic; the other of the fomenting of war in the Pacific.
In the previous discussion of the Nazi exhortations to the Japanese to war against the British Commonwealth and the U.S.S.R., reference has been made to certain documents relating to the United States. Those documents will be taken up again, in their relevant passages, to show their particular application. In the treatment of Ribbentrop’s urging the Japanese to war against the U.S.S.R., documents have been introduced chronicling conferences which took place after the dates of 7 December and 11 December 1941 when the Japanese and German Governments, respectively, initiated and declared aggressive war against the United States. These documents have indicated that Nazi awareness and acceptance of the direction in which their actions wereleading, as well as the universal aspects of their conspiracy and of their alliance with the Japanese.
(a)Preliminary Nazi Preparations Against the United States.The Nazi conspirators’ intentions against the United States must be viewed in the focus of both their over-all plan and their immediate commitments elsewhere. That their over-all plan involved ultimate aggressive war against the United States was intimated by Goering in a speech on 8 July 1938, when the Nazi conspirators had already forcibly annexed Austria and were perfecting their plans for occupation of Czechoslovakia. This speech was delivered to representatives of the aircraft industry and the copy which the prosecution has obtained was transmitted as the enclosure to a secret memorandum from Goering’s adjutant to General Udet, who was then in charge of experimental research for the Luftwaffe (R-140). The statement in the covering memorandum notes that the enclosure is a “copy of the shorthand minutes of the conference”. In the course of his long speech, Goering called for increased aircraft production and referred to the necessity for full mobilization of German industrial capacity. He continued:
“I still am missing entirely the bomber which flies with 5 tons of explosives as far as New York and back. I should be extremely happy to have such a bomber so that I would at last be able to stop somewhat the mouth of the arrogant people over there.” (R-140)
“I still am missing entirely the bomber which flies with 5 tons of explosives as far as New York and back. I should be extremely happy to have such a bomber so that I would at last be able to stop somewhat the mouth of the arrogant people over there.” (R-140)
Goering’s fervent hope, of course, was not capable of realization at that time, either technically or in the face of the Nazi conspirators’ schedule of aggression that has already been outlined. During the period of their preparation for and waging of aggressive war in Europe, up through the launching of the campaign against the U.S.S.R., it is only reasonable to believe that the Nazi conspirators were not disposed to involve the United States in war—at that time.
Nevertheless, even in the fall of 1940, the prosecution of war against the United States of America at a later date was on the military agenda. This is clearly shown in a document which was found in the files of the OKL, the German Air Force (376-PS). This memorandum is marked “Chefsache”—the German designation for Top Secret—and is directed from a Major von Falkenstein to an unspecified General, presumably a Luftwaffe General. Falkenstein, who was a Major of the General Staff, was at that time the Luftwaffe Liaison Officer with the Operations Staff of the OKW, which was the staff headed by Jodl. His memorandum, which he characterizes as a “briefresumé of the military questions current here”, is dated 29 October 1940. It covers several questions. Paragraph 5 states:
“5. The Fuehrer is at present occupied with the question of the occupation of the Atlantic Islands with a view to the prosecution of war against America at a later date. Deliberations on this subject are being embarked upon here. Essential conditions are at the present:—“a. No operational commitment“b. Portuguese neutrality“c. Support of France and Spain“A brief assessment of the possibility of seizing and holding air bases and of the question of supply is needed from the GAF.“Major Queisner will fetch the documents for himself from Ic Kurfurst (C. in C. GAF Rear Hq.). I would like to ask Colonel Schmidt to arrange that he be supplied with the information he desires.” (376-PS)
“5. The Fuehrer is at present occupied with the question of the occupation of the Atlantic Islands with a view to the prosecution of war against America at a later date. Deliberations on this subject are being embarked upon here. Essential conditions are at the present:—
“a. No operational commitment
“b. Portuguese neutrality
“c. Support of France and Spain
“A brief assessment of the possibility of seizing and holding air bases and of the question of supply is needed from the GAF.
“Major Queisner will fetch the documents for himself from Ic Kurfurst (C. in C. GAF Rear Hq.). I would like to ask Colonel Schmidt to arrange that he be supplied with the information he desires.” (376-PS)
The Nazi Military interest in the United States is further indicated by paragraph 7:
“7. General von Boetticher has made repeated reference, especially in his telegram 2314 dated 26/10, to the fact that in his opinion too many details of our knowledge of American aircraft industry are being published in the German press. The matter has been discussed at Armed Forces Supreme Command. I pointed out that the matter was a specifically GAF one, but have taken the liberty of referring the matter to you on its own merits.” (376-PS)
“7. General von Boetticher has made repeated reference, especially in his telegram 2314 dated 26/10, to the fact that in his opinion too many details of our knowledge of American aircraft industry are being published in the German press. The matter has been discussed at Armed Forces Supreme Command. I pointed out that the matter was a specifically GAF one, but have taken the liberty of referring the matter to you on its own merits.” (376-PS)
Again in July 1941, in his first flush of confidence resulting from early gains in the aggression against the U.S.S.R., the Fuehrer signed an order for further preliminary preparations for the attack on the United States. This top secret order, found in files of the German Navy, reads:
“By virtue of the intentions announced in Directive No. 32, for the further conduct of the War, I lay down the following principles to govern the strength of personnel and of material supplies:“1.In general: The military domination of Europe after the defeat of Russia will enable the strength of theArmyto be considerably reduced in the near future. As far as the reduced strength of the Army will allow, the Armoured units will be greatly increased.“Navalarmament must be restricted to those measures which have a direct connection with the conduct of the war against England and, should the case arise, against America.“The main effort in armament will be shifted to theAir Force, which must be greatly increased in strength.” (C-74)
“By virtue of the intentions announced in Directive No. 32, for the further conduct of the War, I lay down the following principles to govern the strength of personnel and of material supplies:
“1.In general: The military domination of Europe after the defeat of Russia will enable the strength of theArmyto be considerably reduced in the near future. As far as the reduced strength of the Army will allow, the Armoured units will be greatly increased.
“Navalarmament must be restricted to those measures which have a direct connection with the conduct of the war against England and, should the case arise, against America.“The main effort in armament will be shifted to theAir Force, which must be greatly increased in strength.” (C-74)
(b)Collaboration with the Japanese Against the United States.From the documents just quoted, it appears that the Nazi conspirators were making at least preliminary military plans of their own against the United States. The Nazi over-all plan with regard to the United States, however, was a complex one, involving in addition collaboration with the Japanese. In the course of their repeated representations to the Japanese to undertake an assault against British possessions in the Pacific-Far East, they again considered war against the United States.
It will be recalled that in Basic Order No. 24 regarding collaboration with the Japanese (C-75), which was issued on 5 March 1941, the Nazi policy was stated in subparagraph 3aas aiming at “forcing England to the ground quickly and thereby keeping the United States out of the war”. Nevertheless the Nazi conspirators clearly contemplated within the framework of that policy the possibility of the United States’ entry into the Far Eastern conflict which the Nazis were instigating. This could result from an attack by Japan on United States’ possessions practically simultaneously with the assault on the British Empire (as actually happened). Other possibilities of involvement of the United States were also discussed. Thus, Basic Order No. 24 stated in subparagraph 3 (c):
“c. The raw material situation of the pact powersdemands that Japan should acquire possession of those territories which it needs for the continuation of the war, especially if the United States intervenes. Rubber shipments must be carried out even after the entry of Japan into the war, since they are of vital importance to Germany.” (C-75)
“c. The raw material situation of the pact powersdemands that Japan should acquire possession of those territories which it needs for the continuation of the war, especially if the United States intervenes. Rubber shipments must be carried out even after the entry of Japan into the war, since they are of vital importance to Germany.” (C-75)
The order continues, in the unnumbered paragraph immediately below subparagraph 3 (d):
“In addition, attacks on other systems of bases of British naval power—extending to those of American naval power only if the entry of the United States into the war cannot be prevented—will result in weakening the enemy’s system of power in that region and also, just like the attack on sea communications, in tying down substantial forces of all kinds (Australia).” (C-75)
“In addition, attacks on other systems of bases of British naval power—extending to those of American naval power only if the entry of the United States into the war cannot be prevented—will result in weakening the enemy’s system of power in that region and also, just like the attack on sea communications, in tying down substantial forces of all kinds (Australia).” (C-75)
In these passages there is a clear envisionment of U.S. involvement, as well as a clear intent to attack. The vital threat to United States’ interests if Japan were to capture Singapore was also clearly envisaged by Raeder in his meeting of March 1941 with Hitler, Keitel, and Jodl, in which he stated:
“Japan must take steps to seize Singapore as soon as possible, since the opportunity will never again be as favourable (whole English Fleet contained: unpreparedness of U.S.A. for war against Japan: inferiority of U.S. Fleet vis-a-vis the Japanese). Japan is indeed making preparations for this action, but according to all declarations made by Japanese officers she will only carry it out if Germany proceeds to land in England. Germany must therefore concentrate all her efforts on spurring Japan to act immediately. If Japan has Singapore all other East Asiatic questions regarding the U.S.A. and England are thereby solved (Guam, Philippines, Borneo, Dutch East Indies).“Japan wishes if possible to avoid war against U.S.A. She can do so if she determinedly takes Singapore as soon as possible.” (C-152)
“Japan must take steps to seize Singapore as soon as possible, since the opportunity will never again be as favourable (whole English Fleet contained: unpreparedness of U.S.A. for war against Japan: inferiority of U.S. Fleet vis-a-vis the Japanese). Japan is indeed making preparations for this action, but according to all declarations made by Japanese officers she will only carry it out if Germany proceeds to land in England. Germany must therefore concentrate all her efforts on spurring Japan to act immediately. If Japan has Singapore all other East Asiatic questions regarding the U.S.A. and England are thereby solved (Guam, Philippines, Borneo, Dutch East Indies).
“Japan wishes if possible to avoid war against U.S.A. She can do so if she determinedly takes Singapore as soon as possible.” (C-152)
Ribbentrop also recognized the possibility of U.S. involvement as a result of the course of aggression that he was urging on the Japanese. In his meeting of 23 February 1941 with the Japanese Ambassador Oshima, the notes of which are contained in (1834-PS), Ribbentrop assured Matsuoka that a surprise intervention by Japan was bound to keep the United States out of the war since she was unarmed and could not risk either her fleet or the possibility of losing the Philippines as the result of a declaration of war. Two paragraphs later, Ribbentrop practically dropped the pretense that the United States would not be involved:
“The Reich Foreign Minister mentioned further that, if America should declare war because of Japan’s entry into the war, this would mean that America had had the intention to enter the war sooner or later anyway. Even though it would be preferable to avoid this, the entry into the war would, as explained above, be by no means decisive and would not endanger the final victory of the countries of the Three-Power Pact. The Foreign Minister further expressed his belief that a temporary lift of the British morale caused by America’s entry into the war would be cancelled by Japan’s entry into the war. If, however, contrary to all expectations, the Americans should be careless enough to send their Navy, in spite of all, beyond Hawaii and to the Far East, this would represent the biggest chance for the countries of the Three-Power Pact to bring the war rapidly to an end. He, the Foreign Minister, is convinced that the Japanese fleet would then do a complete job. Ambassador Oshima replied to this that unfortunately he does not think the Americans woulddo it, but he is convinced of a victory of his fleet in Japanese waters.” (1834-PS)
“The Reich Foreign Minister mentioned further that, if America should declare war because of Japan’s entry into the war, this would mean that America had had the intention to enter the war sooner or later anyway. Even though it would be preferable to avoid this, the entry into the war would, as explained above, be by no means decisive and would not endanger the final victory of the countries of the Three-Power Pact. The Foreign Minister further expressed his belief that a temporary lift of the British morale caused by America’s entry into the war would be cancelled by Japan’s entry into the war. If, however, contrary to all expectations, the Americans should be careless enough to send their Navy, in spite of all, beyond Hawaii and to the Far East, this would represent the biggest chance for the countries of the Three-Power Pact to bring the war rapidly to an end. He, the Foreign Minister, is convinced that the Japanese fleet would then do a complete job. Ambassador Oshima replied to this that unfortunately he does not think the Americans woulddo it, but he is convinced of a victory of his fleet in Japanese waters.” (1834-PS)
In the paragraphs that follow, Ribbentrop again stresses the mutual interdependence of the Tripartite Pact powers and suggests coordinated action. He indulged in a typical bit of Nazi cynicism:
“The Reich Foreign Minister then touched upon the question, explicitly pointed out as theoretical, that the contracting powers might be required, on the basis of new affronts by the U.S.A., to break off diplomatic relations. Germany and Italy were fundamentally determined on this; after signing of the Three-Power Pact we should proceed if the occasion arises, but also jointly in this matter. Such a lesson should open the eyes of the people in the U.S.A. to the situation and under certain conditions bring about a swing toward isolation in public opinion. Naturally a situation had to be chosen in which America found herself entirely in the wrong. The common step of the signatory powers should be exploited correspondingly in propaganda. The question, however, was in no way acute at the time.” (1834-PS)
“The Reich Foreign Minister then touched upon the question, explicitly pointed out as theoretical, that the contracting powers might be required, on the basis of new affronts by the U.S.A., to break off diplomatic relations. Germany and Italy were fundamentally determined on this; after signing of the Three-Power Pact we should proceed if the occasion arises, but also jointly in this matter. Such a lesson should open the eyes of the people in the U.S.A. to the situation and under certain conditions bring about a swing toward isolation in public opinion. Naturally a situation had to be chosen in which America found herself entirely in the wrong. The common step of the signatory powers should be exploited correspondingly in propaganda. The question, however, was in no way acute at the time.” (1834-PS)
Again on 29 March 1941, Ribbentrop—this time in a conference with the Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka—discussed the possible involvement of the United States. (1877-PS)
The Nazi conspirators knew that the aggressive war they were urging the Japanese to undertake both threatened the vital interests of the United States and could lead the U.S. to involvement in the contemplated Far Eastern conflict. This fact is clear from the report of the conference between Hitler and the Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka in Berlin on 4 April 1941 (1881-PS). The report states, in part:
“* * * Matsuoka then also expressed the request that the Fuehrer should instruct the proper authorities in Germany to meet as broad-mindedly as possible the wishes of the Japanese Military Commission. Japan was in need of German help particularly concerning the U-boat warfare, which could be given by making available to them the latest experiences of the war as well as the latest technical improvements and inventions. Japan would do her utmost to avoid a war with the United States. In case that the country should decide to attack Singapore, the Japanese Navy, of course, had to be prepared for a fight with the United States, because in that case America probably would side with Great Britain. He (Matsuoka) personally believed that the United States would be restrained by diplomatic exertions from enteringthe war at the side of Great Britain. The Army and Navy had, however, to count on the worst situation, that is, with war against America. They were of the opinion that such a war would extend for five years or longer and would take the form of guerrilla warfare in the Pacific and would be fought out in the South Sea. For this reason the German experiences in her guerrilla warfare are of the greatest value to Japan. It was a question how such a war would best be conducted and how all the technical improvements of submarines, in all details such as periscopes and such like, could best be exploited by Japan.“To sum up, Matsuoka requested that the Fuehrer should see to it that the proper German authorities would place at the disposal of the Japanese those developments and inventions concerning Navy and Army, which were needed by the Japanese.“The Fuehrer promised this and pointed out that Germany too considered a conflict with the United States undesirable, but that it had already made allowances for such a contingency.”* * * * * *“Matsuoka once more repeated his request that the Fuehrer might give the necessary instructions, in order that the proper German authorities would place at the disposal of the Japanese the latest improvement and inventions, which are of interest to them, because the Japanese Navy had to prepare immediately for a conflict with the United States.“As regards Japanese-American relationship, Matsuoka explained further that he has always declared in his country that sooner or later a war with the United States would be unavoidable, if Japan continued to drift along as at present. In his opinion this conflict would happen rather sooner than later. His argumentation went on, why should Japan, therefore, not decisively strike at the right moment and take the risk upon herself of a fight against America?” (1881-PS)
“* * * Matsuoka then also expressed the request that the Fuehrer should instruct the proper authorities in Germany to meet as broad-mindedly as possible the wishes of the Japanese Military Commission. Japan was in need of German help particularly concerning the U-boat warfare, which could be given by making available to them the latest experiences of the war as well as the latest technical improvements and inventions. Japan would do her utmost to avoid a war with the United States. In case that the country should decide to attack Singapore, the Japanese Navy, of course, had to be prepared for a fight with the United States, because in that case America probably would side with Great Britain. He (Matsuoka) personally believed that the United States would be restrained by diplomatic exertions from enteringthe war at the side of Great Britain. The Army and Navy had, however, to count on the worst situation, that is, with war against America. They were of the opinion that such a war would extend for five years or longer and would take the form of guerrilla warfare in the Pacific and would be fought out in the South Sea. For this reason the German experiences in her guerrilla warfare are of the greatest value to Japan. It was a question how such a war would best be conducted and how all the technical improvements of submarines, in all details such as periscopes and such like, could best be exploited by Japan.
“To sum up, Matsuoka requested that the Fuehrer should see to it that the proper German authorities would place at the disposal of the Japanese those developments and inventions concerning Navy and Army, which were needed by the Japanese.
“The Fuehrer promised this and pointed out that Germany too considered a conflict with the United States undesirable, but that it had already made allowances for such a contingency.”
* * * * * *
“Matsuoka once more repeated his request that the Fuehrer might give the necessary instructions, in order that the proper German authorities would place at the disposal of the Japanese the latest improvement and inventions, which are of interest to them, because the Japanese Navy had to prepare immediately for a conflict with the United States.
“As regards Japanese-American relationship, Matsuoka explained further that he has always declared in his country that sooner or later a war with the United States would be unavoidable, if Japan continued to drift along as at present. In his opinion this conflict would happen rather sooner than later. His argumentation went on, why should Japan, therefore, not decisively strike at the right moment and take the risk upon herself of a fight against America?” (1881-PS)
The passages just quoted show not only a realization of the probable involvement of the United States in the Far Eastern conflict that the Nazis were urging, but also a knowledge on their part that the Japanese Army and Navy were actually preparing war plans against the United States. Furthermore, the Nazis knew at least a part of what those war plans were. This fact is revealed in a secret telegram from the German military-attache in Tokyo, dated 24 May 1941 (1538-PS). The attache reportsthe conferences he has had regarding Japan’s entry in the war in the event Germany should become involved in war with the United States. In paragraph 1, this sentence appears:
“Preparations for attack on Singapore and Manila stand.” (1538-PS).
“Preparations for attack on Singapore and Manila stand.” (1538-PS).
A review of the Nazi position with regard to the United States at this point, the Spring of 1941, shows that in view of their press of commitments elsewhere and their aggressive plans against the U.S.S.R., set for execution in June of 1941, their temporary strategy was naturally a preference that the United States not be involved in war at that time. Nevertheless they had been considering their own preliminary plans against the United States, as seen in the Atlantic Islands document (376-PS). They were repeatedly urging the Japanese to aggression against the British Commonwealth, just as they would urge them to attack the U.S.S.R. soon after the launching of the Nazi invasion. They were aware that the course along which they were pushing the Japanese in the Far East would probably lead to involvement of the United States. Indeed, the Japanese Foreign Minister had told Hitler this in so many words, and their own military men had fully realized the implications of the move against Singapore. They knew also that the Japanese Army and Navy were preparing operational plans against the United States. They knew at least part of those plans.
The Nazi conspirators not only knew all these things. They accepted the risk of the aggressive course they were urging on the Japanese and pushed their Eastern allies still farther along that course. On 4 April 1941, Hitler told the Japanese Foreign Minister that in the event Japan were to become involved in war with the United States, Germany would immediately take the consequences and strike without delay. The following is a passage from the notes of the Hitler-Matsuoka conference in Berlin on 4 April 1941:
“In the further course of the discussion the Fuehrer pointed out that Germany on her part would immediately take the consequences, if Japan would get involved with the United States. It did not matter with whom the United States would first get involved, if with Germany or with Japan. They would always try to eliminate one country at a time, not to come to an understanding with the other country subsequently, but to liquidate this one just the same. Therefore Germany would strike, as already mentioned, without delay in case of a conflict between Japan and America, because the strength of the tripartite powers lies in theirjoined action. Their weakness would be if they would let themselves be beaten individually.” (1881-PS)
“In the further course of the discussion the Fuehrer pointed out that Germany on her part would immediately take the consequences, if Japan would get involved with the United States. It did not matter with whom the United States would first get involved, if with Germany or with Japan. They would always try to eliminate one country at a time, not to come to an understanding with the other country subsequently, but to liquidate this one just the same. Therefore Germany would strike, as already mentioned, without delay in case of a conflict between Japan and America, because the strength of the tripartite powers lies in theirjoined action. Their weakness would be if they would let themselves be beaten individually.” (1881-PS)
Hitler then encouraged Matsuoka in his decision to strike against the United States:
“The Fuehrer replied that he could well understand the situation of Matsuoka, because he himself was in similar situations (the clearing of the Rhineland, declaration of sovereignty of armed Forces). He too was of the opinion that he had to exploit favorable conditions and accept the risk of an anyhow unavoidable fight at a time when he himself was still young and full of vigor. How right he was in his attitude was proven by events. Europe now was free. He would not hesitate a moment to instantly reply to any widening of the war, be it by Russia, be it by America. Providence favored those who will not let dangers come to them, but who will bravely face them.” (1881-PS)
“The Fuehrer replied that he could well understand the situation of Matsuoka, because he himself was in similar situations (the clearing of the Rhineland, declaration of sovereignty of armed Forces). He too was of the opinion that he had to exploit favorable conditions and accept the risk of an anyhow unavoidable fight at a time when he himself was still young and full of vigor. How right he was in his attitude was proven by events. Europe now was free. He would not hesitate a moment to instantly reply to any widening of the war, be it by Russia, be it by America. Providence favored those who will not let dangers come to them, but who will bravely face them.” (1881-PS)
Here, in the passages just quoted, were assurance, encouragement, and abetment by the head of the German State, the leading Nazi co-conspirator, in April 1941. But the Nazi encouragement and promise of support did not end there. Another telegram from the German Ambassador in Tokyo regarding conversations with the Japanese Foreign Minister, dated 30 November 1941, one week before Pearl Harbor, read as follows: