Chapter 62

Christmas Drive.On 22 September 1942, Goering ordered a special drive in the Western occupied countries to purchase presents for the civil population in Germany for the coming Christmas. The Roges Company effected the distribution of the articles in Germany.Special Drive WABO.This drive was pursuant to Hitler’s order to Speer to procure Christmas packages for the soldiers. The O. Todt Cantine accepted offers of sale on the black market and Pimetex did the buying.Special Drive LOWA(Degenkolb locomotive program). The purchase were made by Pimetex. (ECH-7)

Special Drive WABO.This drive was pursuant to Hitler’s order to Speer to procure Christmas packages for the soldiers. The O. Todt Cantine accepted offers of sale on the black market and Pimetex did the buying.

Special Drive LOWA(Degenkolb locomotive program). The purchase were made by Pimetex. (ECH-7)

As of 15 January 1943, black market purchases totaled approximately 1,100,000,000 RM, including:

RM 929,100,000 in France.RM 103,881,929 in Belgium, andRM 73,685,162.64 in Holland. (1765-PS)

RM 929,100,000 in France.

RM 103,881,929 in Belgium, and

RM 73,685,162.64 in Holland. (1765-PS)

Payment in France was made out of occupation funds, in Belgium out of such funds and through the clearing, and in Holland through “normal bank transactions” (1765-PS;ECR-132). As appears very clearly from the report of Col. Veltjens of 15 January, 1943, substantially all the goods so purchased were shipped to the Reich. (1765-PS)

(3)The Nazi conspirators compelled the nationals of the occupied countries to produce and distribute materials and equipment in accordance with the German general war requirements.The “stripping” and “buying-out” phases of the Nazi spoliation were both gradually superseded by a regulated program for the utilization of the industrial plant of the occupied areas and the transfer of orders (subcontracting) to local concerns. The Nazi conspirators established comprehensive rationing controls under which essential raw materials were made available only to those who produced in the German interest; those reluctant to produce on German order were placed under compulsory administration. “This,” Keitel noted in commenting on the controls established in France, “is * * * booty of the victor”. (EC-613)

Belgium

The means employed in Belgium were typical. Production quotas for coal, iron and steel, textiles and leather, and other products were fixed by the Ministry of Economics and itsReichsstellen, in some cases after consultation with the Reich Minister (Funk). (ECH-2)

Comprehensive production controls were established in Belgium to assure the fulfillment of these quotas. Pursuant to plans developed in advance of the invasion (EC-155), a decree was issued by the Military Commander on 27 May, 1940, creating so-called “Goods Offices,” endowed with authority to issue general and special orders to Belgian firms requiring production of designated products, and the sale thereof to designated buyers, and with the further power to prohibit production or sale without license (3604-PS). By decree of the Military Commander of 29 April, 1941, the appointment of a commissar to direct operations of private plants was authorized. (3610-PS)

The German Goods Offices (ECH-3) were transferred to similar units established by Belgian decree of 3 September, 1940. (Whether this decree was issued on German order or suggestion does not appear.) The Germans supervised the Belgian Goods Offices and adopted as German orders both the Belgian decree establishing the Offices and the orders issued thereunder, andprescribed punishment by fine and imprisonment for violations. (3609-PS)

For the first two years of the occupation, German control was exercised mainly through prohibitions and restrictions, that is, by a priority system (ECH-4), although even then important sectors of the Belgian economy, notably textiles and leather products, were controlled by “positive” orders directing the amount in kind to be produced and the persons to whom distribution must be made (ECH-4;ECH-2). During this period the Military Commander issued instructions to the Goods Offices through “command channels,” that is, through the Belgian Minister of Economics. (ECH-3)

On 6 August, 1942, the Military Commander, however, published a decree reaffirming explicitly the power to compel production of designated articles (3612-PS), a signal for the introduction of “positive” controls. In 1943, on instructions from the Reich Ministry of Economics, German representatives selected from theReichsstellenwere attached directly to the Belgian Goods Offices (ECH-3). At the end of 1943, the office of the “Ruestungsobmann” of the Speer Ministry for Armaments and War Production began issuing “positive orders” for production to individual concerns directly, without clearing with the Goods Offices, pursuant to decree of the Minister for Armaments and War Production (Speer). (ECH-3)

Production facilities in Belgium which were not deemed to serve the German interest were shut down. By order of 30 March 1942, the Military Commander prohibited the enlargement of existing plants and the construction of new ones without German authorization, and provided for the closing down of factories at his discretion (3616-PS). In the iron and metal industry alone at least 400 plants “not important for the war effort” had been closed down by 15 April 1943 (EC-335). By the end of the occupation, 1360 put of a total of 2164 plants in the textile industry had been closed down. (ECH-19)

France and Holland

Substantially the same system was put into effect in France and Holland. German Goods Offices were established in Occupied France at the same time as in Belgium (3604-PS). These were subsequently abolished in November, 1940, however, when the Vichy Government, at the “suggestion” of the Nazis, created raw material rationing boards, on which delegates of the German Military Administration served as technical advisers (EC-613;EC-616). In the Netherlands, controls were exercised by thelocal German Armament Inspectorate (EC-471;EC-472-A), who, it is believed, made use of the rationing boards set up in Holland before the outbreak of war.

C.The Nazi Conspirators Acquired Ownership of Belgian, Dutch, and French Participations in European Industries by Means of Governmental Pressure and Through the Use of Funds Unlawfully Exacted from the Occupied Countries and Their Nationals.

The Nazi conspirators were not content with securing for Germany the supplies necessary for the period of the war. They aimed at obtaining permanent ownership and domination of European industry to the fullest extent possible, and embarked on a program to that end even during the progress of the war.

(1)The Nazi conspirators established a program to acquire for German interests ownership of Belgian, Dutch, and French participations during the war.On 23 May 1940, recommendation was made that it would be opportune to secure all Dutch and Belgian stocks “in order, especially in the case of holding companies, to win influence * * * over the controlled companies” (EC-41). The memorandum recommended the taking possession of stocks of the dominated companies located in foreign countries and influencing the decisions of members of holding companies located in Holland and Belgium or of other owners of such stock. Because of the provisions of Article 46 of the Hague Regulations prohibiting confiscation of private property, it was deemed more advisable to influence members of holding companies through careful guiding than through plain force. (EC-41)

At a meeting held in the Reich Ministry of Economics on 3 June 1940 on the subject of “Belgian and Dutch capital shares in southeastern European countries,” it was decided that regulations should be issued immediately by the Military Commander for Belgium prohibiting the destruction, transfer, or disposition of any bonds or stocks of these countries, and that registration should be required of owners and trustees. (1445-PS)

In a memorandum of 2 August 1940 Goering declared that the goal of the Germans’ economic policy was the “increase of German influence with foreign enterprises,” that it was “necessary already now that any opportunity is used to make it possible for the German economy to start the penetration even during the war of the interesting objects of the economy of the occupied countries,” and directed that the transfer of capital from Germany tothe occupied countries be facilitated to make possible the immediate purchase of enterprises in the occupied countries. (EC-137)

At a meeting at the Reich Ministry of Economics on 8 August 1940 on the subject of “Acquisition of shares of important foreign enterprises in southeastern Europe,” Dr. Schlotterer of the Reich Ministry of Economics commented that “private economical penetration of the Southeast area by German influence is desirable, likewise the supplanting of British and French interests in that territory” (EC-43). The group present, including representatives of the Reich Ministry of Economics and the Reichsbank, agreed that “attempts should be made immediately to acquire shares” and that “in doing so the tendency should be preserved to present a bill for the shares at the peace conference.” It was further agreed that “it should be attempted if possible to transfer the shares into private hands” but that “in order to make the right selection it appears necessary to introduce an intermediary stage” in which “first of all, enterprises should be taken over through banks, thereupon the plants should be managed as a matter of trusteeship for the Reich with the aim that the Reich (Reich Marshal Goering)” undertake handing them over to private industry. (EC-43)

(2)The Nazi conspirators carried out this program by compulsory sale where necessary and by purchases financed out of occupation charges and under clearing agreements with the occupied countries.

Belgium

Immediate steps were taken to implement these measures in Belgium. The annual report of the Commissar at the National Bank from May 1940-41 states:

“According to the directions of the Reichsmarshal Goering as early as September 1940 the first measures for a closer formation of capital ties between the Belgian and German economy were taken. Two different procedures were concerned here:“1. Direct negotiations between German industrialists and Belgian industrialists, for the purpose of obtaining constructive participations in important Belgian enterprises which offer the basis for collaboration between the two economies even after the war. Furthermore, it is desired to transfer to German hands important Belgian participations in foreign enterprises whose administration is located in Belgium, particularly so far as enterprises are concerned which are locatedin the Balkans and in which a general German interest exists.“2. Ties which result from purchases of stock by German parties on the Belgian stock markets. For this purpose the Reich Economic Minister has given general permission to 32 German banks to obtain participation rights, particularly stocks, in a limited quantity in Belgium. Till now use has been made of this permission in the amount of about 25 million RM, to which can be added an additional 10 million RM for the procurement of Belgian participations in Rumania, Bulgaria, and the former Poland.” (ECR-24)

“1. Direct negotiations between German industrialists and Belgian industrialists, for the purpose of obtaining constructive participations in important Belgian enterprises which offer the basis for collaboration between the two economies even after the war. Furthermore, it is desired to transfer to German hands important Belgian participations in foreign enterprises whose administration is located in Belgium, particularly so far as enterprises are concerned which are locatedin the Balkans and in which a general German interest exists.

“2. Ties which result from purchases of stock by German parties on the Belgian stock markets. For this purpose the Reich Economic Minister has given general permission to 32 German banks to obtain participation rights, particularly stocks, in a limited quantity in Belgium. Till now use has been made of this permission in the amount of about 25 million RM, to which can be added an additional 10 million RM for the procurement of Belgian participations in Rumania, Bulgaria, and the former Poland.” (ECR-24)

In his report for November 1940 the Military Commander for Belgium stated:

“A certain readiness exists on the part of the Belgians to give up investments in stocks in such countries which, at the present time, are being ruled militarily or economically by Germany. Among the important business deals of this kind which have been concluded should be mentioned the taking over by theKreditanstalt, Wien(Credit Institute, Vienna) of an essential interest in theAllgemeiner Jugoslawischer Bankverein(General Yugoslav Bank Association) from theSocieté Generale(capital approximately 1 million RM) and the taking over by theDeutsche Bankof the overwhelming majority [translator’s note: of shares] of theBanca Commerciala Romanafrom theSocieté Generale(capital approximately 2 million RM). TheDeutsche Bankalso succeeded in acquiring shares of theKreditanstalt, Wien, of approximately 800,000 RM nominally from theSocieté Generaleand from one of its subsidiaries. Negotiations between theDeutsche Bankand theSocieté Generaleon the transfer of approximately 25% of the capital of theBanque Generale du Luxembourgare about to be concluded. Through this deal theDeutsche Banktogether with the other German groups obtains the absolute majority of the Luxembourger Bank (approximately 70% of the shares). TheDeutsche Bankgets the right to acquire another 25% of the shares which for the time being, remained with theSocieté Generale.” (EC-34)

While the Military Commander of Belgium may have given some assurance that the owners would not be compelled to sell (ECH-22), in at least one instance, purchase could be effected only by military order (EC-335). In this instance the procurement for the Main Branch of Trustees East of shares of the Belgian“Trust Metallurgique” in electricity and road enterprises of East Silesia and the General Government, as well as purchase of shares in the iron works Ostrovica for the Reichswerk Hermann Goering had “to be done, at the request of the Reich Ministry for Economics, forcibly, as an agreement on a financial basis could not be obtained.” (EC-335)

The German acquisition of Belgian stock participations was financed through the Belgium-German clearing. The Belgian clearing balances of 20 March 1940 included an item of 296 millions bfrs., which “is explained by out-payment of large clearing transfers to purchase Belgian capital participations in Balkan enterprises” (ECR-14). Increasing transfers resulting from the German capital penetration program precipitated a controversy with the Emission Bank, which was resolved by the Commissar’s issuance of an order requiring the bank to make payment (ECR-24). As a sequel, “capital” payments were separated from those for “goods and services” and financed by a separate “capital” clearing agreement covering purchases of securities and other “capital” transactions (ECR-24). The Belgian clearing “credit” under the capital clearing, as of 31 July 1943, amounted to 1,071,000,000 bfrs (ECR-173). As shown below, (seeinfra, D, 2) the Belgian credit under the capital clearing traffic represents a forced loan, exacted for a purpose not even remotely related to the needs of the occupation army.

France and Holland

The limited evidence, in the presently available German documents indicates that similar methods were employed in French and Dutch participations. The procedure followed in the Netherlands is indicated below in the discussion of the removal of restrictions on the free transfer of Reichsmarks in that country. (Seeinfra, D, 5.) In France, participations of a value of 121,000,000 RM were purchased for German interests, paid for in part out of occupation funds and in part through the clearing. (1991-PS)

D.The Nazi Conspirators Compelled the Occupied Countries and Their Nationals to Furnish the Monetary Requirements for the German Exploitation, by Means of Occupation Levies, Forced Loans, and the Requisition of Gold and Foreign Exchange in Amounts Far in Excess of the Needs of the Occupation Armies.

Except for the early period of the occupation, during whichReichskreditkassencertificates were issued to finance the needs of the occupation troops (Lemkin,Axis Rule In Occupied Europe, p. 329), the Nazis obtained the necessary local currency throughthe levy of excessive occupation charges, the imposition of clearing arrangements under which the local central banks were compelled to finance exports to the Reich, and by requisition of gold and foreign exchange.

(1)The Nazi conspirators exacted excessive occupation charges from the conquered countries.

Belgium

The Nazi conspirators demanded from Belgium both “internal occupation costs” and “external occupation costs” (ECR-32). The former was defined as “those sums which are gotten out of the country to finance the needs of the German military formations located in the country” (ECR-32). The term “external occupation costs” was used interchangeably with the title “antibolshevistic contribution” (EC-401). Under whatever theory, the exaction of occupation charges was made “to the limit of capacity”. (ECR-59)

Throughout the period of German occupation, a substantial part of the contribution charges obtained from Belgium was used as a matter of regular practice “not for occupation cost purposes” (ECR-166;ECR-155-A;ECR-35), including:

(a) Exports to Germany, Holland, and France (ECR-89;ECR-104).

(b) Exchange for Belgian francs of RKK certificates, a “not inconsiderable part” of which did “not have the least thing to do with occupation costs” (ECR-39;ECR-142).

(d) Purchases in the “black market” (ECR-106), many of them destined for export. (Seesupra, B, (2).)

(e) General war expenses, including the supply of troops based in Belgium for military operations against England (ECH-5); the Commander-in-Chief of the Army rejected a recommendation of the Military Commander that a distinction be drawn between occupation troops and those for military operations (ECH-5).

Notwithstanding the extensive use of occupation levies for non-occupation purposes, the contributions exacted from Belgium

“were not only sufficient to cover the needs of theWehrmacht* * * but also made it possible * * * to fund a cash reserve which reached at certain times about 2,500,000,000 bfrs”. (ECH-5)

France

The occupation cost accounts of theReichskreditkassein Paris disclose on their face that a large part of the occupation fundswas obtained and used for nonoccupational purposes. Two sets of occupation cost accounts, were maintained: Account A, into which payments were made on behalf of various Reichs ministeries and agencies, and for specified purposes; and Account B, into which payments were made for disposal for theWehrmacht(3615-PS). The funds in Account A were used for obviously nonoccupational purposes, as follows:

The available records do not disclose the full extent to which theWehrmachtused the funds at its disposal in Account B for nonoccupational purposes. It is certain, however, that large sums were expended for such purposes. Thus, a communication of theOKW to the Foreign Office of 6 November 1942, explaining the decrease in reserve for Account B, states:

“In addition, payments to a considerable extent had to be made from the occupation cost funds which were not allotted to meet the demands of those units of the German Wehrmacht stationed in France. On 15 January the B account of occupation costs was approximately 3 bill. RM. The reason for the decrease appears from the following compilation:Million RM.a.For procurement of goods exported from France during the period of 1 Jan.-31 Oct. 1942 an estimated 10 × 90 mill. RM900b.To Roges Raw Material Trading Company Ltd. for purchases on black market700c.For procurement of foreign bills by the Navy (the purchase of foreign bills with French francs was necessary to buy and repair merchant ships in Spanish harbors. These merchant ships are to serve for supplying Rommel’s Panzer army in Africa)40d.Reimbursement to Foreign Office (account Syria)4e.Allotments in favor of families of French workersw orking in Germany1.5f.Special commissioner Rumania1.3g.Costs of building completions for directors of French powder factories0.2———1,647Therefrom it appears that the decrease of reserves of occupation cost funds amounting to 3,000 mill. RM on 15 January 1942 is primarily due to expenditures for purposes unrelated to the occupation.” (1741-PS)

Therefrom it appears that the decrease of reserves of occupation cost funds amounting to 3,000 mill. RM on 15 January 1942 is primarily due to expenditures for purposes unrelated to the occupation.” (1741-PS)

Holland

Occupation charges were fixed at about 100,000,000 gulden a month (ECR-174;EC-86). (100 RM = 75 gulden, approximately (EC-468)).

Expenditures were divided between “occupation” purposes and “nonoccupation” purposes, according to whether “the products purchased or produced on orders of the armed forces of the Netherlands remain in the Netherlands (occupation cost) or leave the Netherlands (nonoccupation cost)” (ECR-174). During the 20-month period from March 1941 to October 1942, inclusive (the only period for which figures are available), out of the totaloccupation charges of 1,545,500,000 gulden, 433,800,000 gulden were expended for “nonoccupation” purposes (ECR-175-193). A large part of the “pure” occupation expenditure, moreover, was for general war expenses, including the construction of fortifications and airfields, and the letting of shipbuilding contracts. (ECR-180, 181, 183, 187, 191)

In theory, only the “occupation” costs were supposed to be charged to the Netherlands (ECR-174); until April 1941, the “nonoccupation” expenditures were returned to the Military Commander in the Netherlands (ECR-175). The claim of the Netherlands to the sums “returned,” however, was rejected. Moreover, as appears from the above cited reports (ECR-175-193), nonoccupation expenditure continued even after April 1941, when reimbursements ceased. (ECR-176)

During the first year of the occupation Germany exacted an additional levy from the Netherlands under the heading of “external occupation costs,” amounting to 500,000,000 RM (ECR-194). Of this sum, 100,000,000 RM was paid in gold; the remainder was paid by a transfer of the clearing balance of the Netherlands Bank at theVerrechnungskasseto the German Ministry of Finance, that is, was used to reduce a credit which arose by reason of exports to the Reich. (ECR-194)

In April 1942, “at the instigation of the Reich Commissioner Seyss-Inquart,” the Netherlands began to pay a “voluntary contribution to the war against Bolshevism” of 50,000,000 guilders per month, retroactive to 1 July 1941, of which 10,000,000 per month was paid in gold (ECR-195). By 31 March 1944, this “contribution” amounted to 2,150,000,000 RM. (EC-86)

It is immaterial whether this “contribution” was made at the direction of Seyss-Inquart or was in fact the “voluntary” act of the then President of the Netherlands Bank and Treasurer in the Ministry of Finance, Van Tonningen. Van Tonningen was appointed by Seyss-Inquart and acted in the German interest. His acts, like that of civilian administrators in occupied territories generally, must be charged to the occupant. (Seeinfra,Conclusion.) The spirit in which he discharged his duties is sympathetically described by the German Commissar at the Netherlands Bank as follows:

“The new President of the Netherlands Bank, Mr. Rost Van Tonningen, is, in contrast to a large part of the leadership, penetrated in his movements and his official acts by the greater German thought, and convinced of the necessity of the creation of a greater European economic space. This ideological attitude in itself gives him the correct positionon financial and monetary policy questions for his country in relation to the greater German economic space. Furthermore, it makes easier cooperation with my office, a fact which deserves special mention in consideration of the frequently observed passive conduct of the Netherlands agencies before the entrance into office of the new President. I consider as a fortunate solution the fact that the Reichskommissar for the Occupied Dutch Areas has also entrusted Mr. Rost Van Tonningen with the Treasury of the Ministry of Finance (Schatzamt des Finanzministeriums). Mr. Rost Van Tonningen took over this office at the end of the month of April. Thus there is a guarantee that the financial and monetary policy of the country will be conducted according to unified points of view.” (ECR-196)

(2)The Nazi conspirators financed exports from the occupied countries to Germany by means of forced loans under the guise of clearing agreements.

Belgium

The principle of the clearing system is as follows:

The importer makes a deposit of the purchase price in his own currency at the national clearing agency of his country, which places the same amount to the credit of the clearing agency of the exporting country. The latter institution then pays the exporter in his own currency. Thus if trade between two countries is unequal the clearing agency of one acquires a claim against the agency of the other which, however, is satisfied only when a shift in the balance of trade gives rise to an offsetting claim.

In the order establishing the German-Belgium clearing, the Belgium clearing agency was the National Bank of Belgium (3608-PS). The administration of the clearing was shortly thereafter transferred to Emission Bank, an organization originally incorporated by Belgian interests pursuant to order of the Military Commander of 27 June 1940 (ECR-24). The change was one in name only, however, since at this time the management of the two banks was substantially identical and the Emission Bank obtained its currency by loan from the National Bank. The Emission Bank was, by its charter terms, subject to orders of the Commissar at the National Bank; the Commissar obtained the same powers over the National Bank by German order of 16 December 1940. (ECR-24)

The Belgian total “credit” under the clearing, as of 31 July 1944, amounted to 60,837,000,000 bfrs = 4,867,000,000 RM, ofwhich 54,993,000,000 bfrs = 4,399,000,000 RM arose from the Belgian-German clearing for goods and services. (ECR-173)

The continued increase in the Belgian “credit” was due mainly to “the increasing Belgian export to Germany for which there are only small imports from Germany on the other side of the account.” (ECR-149)

The entire Belgian credit under the clearing constitutes a forced loan, largely for nonoccupation purposes:

(a) The Belgian-German clearing was established by circular of the Reichs Minister of Economics, 4 July 1940 (ECH-6), which was published to the Belgians by proclamation of the Military Commander of 10 July 1940 (EC-604;3608-PS).

(b) “Since it was to be foreseen that as the result of the increased deliveries from Belgium to the Reich, which were not matched by opposite accounts, particularly in the early period, the clearing status would develop to the favor of the Emission Bank” (ECR-24), an agreement was signed by the Emission Bank and the German Reichsbank on 16/17 August 1940 under which each undertook to pay out clearing transfers immediately (ECR-24;ECH-5).

(c) This agreement did not prescribe what must be financed through the clearing; it merely provided for immediate payment of claim arising thereunder without waiting until the account should be balanced by equalizing of imports and exports. As the Military Commander stated, the German-Belgian clearing was “not regulated by an agreement, but has been regulated unilaterally by my proclamation of 10 July 1940” (EC-604). The Military Commander made clear the absolute power asserted by the German authorities over the Belgian Note Banks (as the Germans described the Emission and National Banks). He stated:

“* * * The claim made to the Commissar that the Emission Bank is entitled to ask in every case for detailed explanation of compensation payments coming from Germany is incorrect. The clearing activities between Germany and Belgium are not regulated by an agreement but have been regulated unilaterally by my proclamation on July 10, 1940 and are not subject to any Belgian control. Inter-alia the transfer of all payments which have been specially authorized by the Reich Ministry of Economy has been expressly permitted * * *.” (EC-604)

(d) The Commissar freely invoked his directive power over the Note Banks.

1. When, in April 1941, the clearing balance of the EmissionBank exceeded 1,500,000 bfrs the Emission Bank refused to pay out several large sums arising by virtue of German-Belgian “capital” transactions. Thereupon, the Commissar issued an order directing the bank to make the payment. (ECR-24)2. In December 1941, the Emission Bank refused to pay out a sum of 43,256,000 RM transferred from Paris. The Commissar thereupon issued an order directing the bank to do so. (ECR-172)3. In October 1942, the Emission Bank refused to pay out certain amounts expended for purchases on the Belgian black market. The military administrator, however, “held down the increasing resistance of the Note Banks which culminated at the end of October of this year in a public threat of resignation by the Governor of the National Bank, by the heaviest pressure, and forced the Note Banks, while emphasizing his willingness to negotiate on certain Belgian proposals, again to take up the global clearing transfers for German procurement agencies which were cut off for a period” (ECR-132). The nature of this pressure is explicitly shown in the following communication from the Commissar to the President of the Emission Bank dated 29 October 1942:“The Military Commander has ordered me to inform you of the following:“The requested extension of time for the resumption of business relations with the Armed Forces Clearing Institute (Wehrmachtverrechnungskasse) and for the payment of the arrears of RM 60 million have been denied. An official will determine tomorrow at 10 a. m. whether payment has been made.“Severest measures against you and all responsible parties must be expected in case of failure to pay.“If acts of sabotage occur on the equipment and the values of the National Bank or the Emission Bank, you and the gentlemen designated on the enclosed list will be held responsible personally and your property will be seized. Your liability is a joint one.” (EC-605)

2. In December 1941, the Emission Bank refused to pay out a sum of 43,256,000 RM transferred from Paris. The Commissar thereupon issued an order directing the bank to do so. (ECR-172)

3. In October 1942, the Emission Bank refused to pay out certain amounts expended for purchases on the Belgian black market. The military administrator, however, “held down the increasing resistance of the Note Banks which culminated at the end of October of this year in a public threat of resignation by the Governor of the National Bank, by the heaviest pressure, and forced the Note Banks, while emphasizing his willingness to negotiate on certain Belgian proposals, again to take up the global clearing transfers for German procurement agencies which were cut off for a period” (ECR-132). The nature of this pressure is explicitly shown in the following communication from the Commissar to the President of the Emission Bank dated 29 October 1942:

“The Military Commander has ordered me to inform you of the following:

“The requested extension of time for the resumption of business relations with the Armed Forces Clearing Institute (Wehrmachtverrechnungskasse) and for the payment of the arrears of RM 60 million have been denied. An official will determine tomorrow at 10 a. m. whether payment has been made.

“Severest measures against you and all responsible parties must be expected in case of failure to pay.

“If acts of sabotage occur on the equipment and the values of the National Bank or the Emission Bank, you and the gentlemen designated on the enclosed list will be held responsible personally and your property will be seized. Your liability is a joint one.” (EC-605)

France

The “credit” balance of the Bank of France under the Franco-German clearing established on 14 November 1940 amounted to 4,400,000,000 RM as of September 1943 (3615-PS). The clearingarrangement was designed, of course, principally for the financing of exports, that is, for purposes not related to the needs of the occupation army. (EC-619)

Coercion in the establishment of the Franco-German clearing is readily demonstrable. Extreme pressure was brought to bear, particularly in regard to the rate of exchange established in the agreement, by threatening to cut off communications between “occupied” and “nonoccupied” zones in France (3602-PS;3603-PS), a step which would have destroyed the last vestige of economic order in France. The harsh terms of the agreement, which required the Bank of France to make immediate payment for exports to Germany regardless of the balance of trade, fixed the rate of exchange at 20 francs to the mark (as compared to 10 to 1 before the war), and gave Germany a unilateral option to cancel at any time, forcibly suggest that the agreement would not voluntarily have been accepted. (EC-619)

Holland

The clearing system between Holland and Germany was of short duration, being cancelled effective 1 April 1941, when free transfer of Reichsmarks to Holland was introduced. (Seeinfra, D, (5).) It is therefore not deemed of sufficient importance to warrant discussion at this point.

(3)The Nazi conspirators unlawfully took over the gold reserve of the National Bank of Belgium and the Netherlands Bank in the interest of the German general war effort.

Belgium

The gold of the National Bank, deposited with the Bank of France and transferred to Dakar, was brought to Berlin pursuant to German-French “agreement” in the amount of 545,700,000 RM (ECR-149), and there deposited with the Reichsbank in Berlin (ECR-24). Because of the “high demands on gold and foreign exchange” which led to a “considerable straining of the reserves” (EC-401), the “Reich Government felt itself required to lay claim to the gold of the National Bank for the Reich” (ECR-149). A decision to proceed by requisitioning under paragraph 52 of the Hague Regulations (EC-401) was not executed, apparently because of fears on the part of the Reichsbank that title thus acquired would not be recognized (ECR-115). On order of Goering (ECH-5, part 9, Annex XIII), the gold was then “requisitioned on 19 September 1942 by the Oberpraesident of the Province of Mark Brandenburg for the Deputy of the Four-Year Plan, on the basis of the Reich Contribution Law (Reichsleistungsgesetz)of 1.IX.1939 (Sec. 15, paragraph 1, No. 5, and Sec. 2a)” (ECR-149).

Holland

As shown above, part of the Dutch “voluntary” contribution to the “war against Bolshevism” was paid in gold. The gold was, in fact, taken from the Netherlands Bank. (EC-401)

(4)The Nazi conspirators unlawfully compelled the nationals of the occupied countries to surrender and offer for sale all precious metals and foreign exchange to the local central banks, which delivered them to the German Reichsbank.

Belgium

By German decree of 17 June 1940 and administrative orders issued pursuant thereto the Belgians were required to surrender gold and foreign exchange notes to the Emission Bank, which in turn, delivered the loot to the Reichsbank (ECR-24).

By May 1943, the Reichsbank had acquired in this fashion gold and foreign exchange of the value of 23,400,000 RM. (ECR-149)

Holland

Gold and foreign exchange delivered by the Netherlands Bank to the Reichsbank “on the basis of the direction of the Reichsmarshal” (Goering) amounted to 74,000,000 RM through November 1940. (EC-465)

France

It is believed that the same practice was followed in France, but evidence as to details has not been found in the German documents presently available.

(5)The Nazi conspirators used German Reichsmarks as currency in the Netherlands, for purposes unrelated to the needs of the occupational troops, which currency they caused to be freely exchanged for gulden by the Netherlands Bank.The Nazi conspirators, animated in part by the view that the Netherlands were “akin in blood to the German nation” (3613-PS), sought to promote a “mutual interpenetration of the German and Netherlands economies” through the acquisition by Germans of Dutch participations (EC-468) and Dutch investment in German securities. (ECR-174)

To this end, restrictions on the free transfer of Reichsmark and gulden across the German-Dutch border were removed. Conversations between the Reich Economics and Finance Ministers in October 1940 led to the first step in this direction, the issuance by the Economics Minister of a Circular (Runderlass)—No.89/40—which produced substantial changes in the foreign exchange control along the German-Dutch borders (EC-468). This provided,inter-alia, that RM 1,000 or its equivalent in gulden could be taken across the German-Dutch border by travelers or in border trade without permit, and permitted Germans to transfer to Holland up to 5,000 RM per person per month for any purpose except purchase of goods without any permission (EC-468).

These relaxations were made effective in Holland by free exchange of Reichsmarks for gulden by the Netherlands Bank, introduced “on the initiative” of the Commissar, and by enforced acceptance of Reichsmark currency by the Dutch business population. (EC-468)

The Reichsmarks thus made available in the Netherlands were mainly used to purchase Dutch securities on the stock exchange (EC-468). Permission to make such purchases was extended to a large number of German banks by the German Ministry of Economics. The transfers were made with “reluctance” by the Dutch, in connection with which the Reich Commissar at the Netherlands Bank observed, “it may be pointed out with some justification that an out-payment of gulden made against a Reichsmark credit, which can only result through the burdening of the Netherlands State credit, represents no genuine transfer” (EC-468).

Notwithstanding the objections of the then Commissar at the Netherlands Bank (EC-468), circular 87/40 was soon followed by No. 29/41 of 31 March 1941, which abolished almost completely all restrictions on the free use of the Reichsmark in Holland (ECR-197). Circular 29/41 provided that all foreign exchange transactions between Germany and the Netherlands were freed of control, the only important exception being that German investments of more than 100,000 gulden in Holland required permission of the Reichskommissar in the Netherlands. The clearing agreement was abolished, and payments between Germany and the Netherlands were permitted by simple bank checks, drafts, or postal money orders. A simultaneous order by the Reich Commissar for the Occupied Netherlands Areas lifted all restrictions set by Netherlands foreign exchange law on such transactions (ECR-197).

After this “introduction of free payments traffic” or “removal of the foreign exchange frontiers,” payments for exports from Holland were made in Germany “through the accounts of the banks, mainly through the account of the Netherlands Bank,which takes on the exchange into gulden means of payment without further formalities.” (ECR-174)

This exchange presumably merely continued the practice introduced earlier at the “instigation” of Seyss-Inquart. At all events, the President of the Bank, Van Tonningen, was a Nazi agent, and his acts may be charged to the Nazi conspirators.

The result of this radical step was this:

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