Operations Department of the Army (Heer), 1932-35.Chief of the National Defense Section in the High Command of the Armed Forces (Abteilung Landesverteidigung im OKW), 1935-Oct. 1938.Artillery Commander (“Artillerie Kommandeur”) of the 44th Division. Vienna and Brno, Oct 1938-27 Aug. 1939.Chief of Operation Staff of the High Command of the Armed Forces (Chef des Wehrmachtsfuhrungstabes in Oberkommando der Wehrmacht), August 1939-1945.
Operations Department of the Army (Heer), 1932-35.
Chief of the National Defense Section in the High Command of the Armed Forces (Abteilung Landesverteidigung im OKW), 1935-Oct. 1938.
Artillery Commander (“Artillerie Kommandeur”) of the 44th Division. Vienna and Brno, Oct 1938-27 Aug. 1939.
Chief of Operation Staff of the High Command of the Armed Forces (Chef des Wehrmachtsfuhrungstabes in Oberkommando der Wehrmacht), August 1939-1945.
Dates of Promotion:
1932—Major and Oberstleutnant1936—Oberst1939—Generalmajor1940—General der Artillerie1944—Generaloberst (2865-PS).
1932—Major and Oberstleutnant
1936—Oberst
1939—Generalmajor
1940—General der Artillerie
1944—Generaloberst (2865-PS).
Jodl’s most important office was that of Chief of the Operations Staff (Wehrmachtsfuehrungstab) in OKW. In this capacity he was directly subordinate to Keitel and equal in status to other departmental chiefs in OKW. However, insofar as the planning and conduct of military affairs are concerned, Jodl and his staff were more influential than the other departments.
The OKW Operations Staff was also divided into sections. Of these the most important was the “National Defense” section, of which Warlimont was chief. He was primarily concerned withthe development of strategic questions. From 1941 onwards Warlimont, though charged with the same duties, was known as Deputy Chief of the OKW Operations Staff. (3707-PS)
Jodl drafted many directives for Hitler to sign, for the preparation of military operations and plans of deployment, and for the possible initiation and commencement of military measures relating to matters of organization, operations, or “war-economics.” While in a theater of operations, Jodl would report twice daily to Hitler about operations, and then prepare the Fuehrer directives. There was direct contact between Hitler and Jodl, though Keitel was kept informed of what passed between them.
In addition to certain ministerial functions, the OKW was Hitler’s military staff. Its most important duty was the development of strategic and operational plans. Such plans were worked out by the OKW Operations Staff in broad outline, and then in more detail by the Commanders and Chiefs of Staffs of the Army, Navy, and Air Force. After Hitler had approved the plans they were transmitted by the OKW to the appropriate military authorities (3705-PS;3702-PS;3707-PS).
Jodl’s loyalty to the Nazi party doctrine is evident in a speech he delivered on 7 November 1943. He spoke of the National Socialist Movement and its struggle for internal power as the preparation for liberation from the Treaty of Versailles. (L-172)He also stated, in a speech on the occasion of the attempted assassination of Hitler, that his aims had been in general agreement with the aims of the party. (1808-PS)
At the sixth meeting of the Working Committee of the Reich Defense Council on 7 February 1934 Jodl pointed out that the practical execution of the preparations for mobilization, which had been ordered by the Army and the highest Reich authorities, were making a considerable enlargement of personnel necessary. He suggested, however, that this enlargement of personnel ought not to result in “the disquieting of foreign countries through conspicuous mobilization measures.” (EC-405)
In the presence of Jodl, Generalmajor Keitel pointed out at the eleventh meeting that the mobilization year was to begin on 1 April and to end on 31 March of the following year. A “Mobilization Book for Civilian Agencies” was to be issued for the first time on 1 April 1936. Keitel said that this day, to the extentpossible, should find the nation ready and prepared. He declared that, according to the will of the Fuehrer, the economic management of the country should put the enhancement of military capacity deliberately above all other national tasks. It was the function of all members of the Reich Defense Council, he emphasized, to use all available resources economically and to ask for only such funds and raw materials that were absolutely and exclusively needed for the defense of the Reich. Colonel Jodl said that the Mobilization Book for the Civilian Departments constituted the unified basis for the carrying out of mobilization outside of the Army (EC-406).
(See “F,” 1 through 7, in Section 4 of this Chapter on Keitel, where the joint responsibility of Keitel and Jodl for these activities is discussed.)
(1)Murder and ill treatment of civilian population in occupied, territories and on the high seas.Jodl ordered the forcible evacuation of all persons in a northern district of Norway, and the burning of all their dwellings. This was to be done so that the inhabitants of that area could not help the Russians (754-PS). Shortly thereafter an evacuation took place in Finnmark County in northern Norway, in the course of which 30,000 houses were damaged. (1800-PS)
Jodl was aware that in 1942 there were continual arrests in Belgrade, and that from fifteen to thirty followers of Mihalovic were shot every day. (1383-PS)
Jodl initialled an order signed for Hitler by Keitel, which provided that enemy civilians guilty of offenses against German troops should be killed without a military trial, and that punishment could be waived in the case of German soldiers who committed offenses against enemy civilians. (886-PS)
Rosenberg was appointed by Hitler on 20 April 1941 “Deputy for a Centralized Treatment of Problems concerning the Eastern Territories.” The highest Reich authorities were to cooperate fully, and Keitel was asked to designate a representative of OKW to sit with Rosenberg. Jodl was appointed as Keitel’s representative with Warlimont as his deputy, and Keitel wroteto Rosenberg on 25 April 1941 that Jodl and Warlimont would be the OKW representatives. (865-PS)
Responsibility for crimes committed under Rosenberg’s authority thus attach to Jodl as well. In this connection reference is made to Section 7 of this chapter on Rosenberg.
(2)Deportation of civilian populations of and in Occupied Territories for slave labor and for other purposes.Jodl knew of the deportation of workers, for he once told Hitler that the military commander of France had reported that over 220,000 workers had been deported into the Reich in the past six months. (1383-PS)
(3)Murder and ill treatment of prisoners of war, and of other members of the Armed Forces of the countries with whom Germany was at war and of persons on the high seas.On 18 October 1942 Hitler ordered that commando troops, even if in uniform, should be killed, not only in battle, but in flight or while attempting to surrender. This order was issued by Jodl’s department. (498-PS)
A supplementary explanation of the commando order, signed by Hitler, was distributed to commanding officers only, with a covering memorandum dated 19 October 1942, signed by Jodl (503-PS). Several cases are known in which the order was carried out. (508-PS;509-PS)
Three specific instances were mentioned by the G-3 of the C in C, Norway, where captured members of sabotage units were executed after interrogations which resulted in valuable intelligence. These occurred at Gloafjord, Drontheim, and at Stavanger. (512-PS)
On 23 June 1944 C in C West requested instructions re-defining the scope of the commando order. In view of the extensive landings in Normandy, it had become difficult to decide which paratroops should be considered sabotage troops under the terms of the order, and which should be considered as engaged in normal combat operations. The question was answered by an order of 25 June 1944, one copy of which was signed by Keitel, reaffirming the full force of the original order. (531-PS;551-PS)
When allied fliers were forced to land in Germany, they were sometimes killed by the civilian population. The police had orders not to protect the fliers, nor to punish civilians for lynching them. A proposal was considered to order the shooting without court-martial of enemy airmen who had been forced down after engaging in specified “acts of terror.” It is not certain that theorder was ever issued, but it is certain that Keitel and Jodl knew of the lynchings, did nothing to prevent them and in fact considered giving them official justification.
(See also “F” at the end of Section 4 of this Chapter on Keitel, where the joint responsibility of Keitel and Jodl for the lynching of Allied airmen is discussed.)
Ernst Kaltenbrunner was born on 4 October 1903 at Ried on Inn (near Braunau) Austria. He spent his youth in Hitler’s native district. Later he moved to Linz, where he attended the StateRealgymnasium. He studied law and obtained a law degree in 1926. He spent the first year as apprentice lawyer at Linze-on-Danube and then worked as a lawyer-candidate, first at Salzburg and after 1928 at Linz (2938-PS).
Kaltenbrunner joined the Nazi Party and the SS in Austria in 1932. Prior to 1933 he was the District speaker (Gauredner) and legal counsellor (Rechtsberater) of the SS division (Abschnitt) VIII. After 1933 he was the fuehrer of regiment (Standarte) 37 and later of the SS division VIII (2892-PS).
In January 1934 Kaltenbrunner was jailed by the Dollfuss government on account of his Nazi views, and sent with other leading National Socialists into the concentration camp Kaisersteinbruch.He is said to have started and led a hunger strike of the prisoners and thereby to have forced the government to dismiss 490 National Socialist prisoners. In the following year he was jailed again because of suspicion of High Treason and committed to the military court at Wels (Upper Danube). After an investigation of many months the accusation of High Treason was dropped, but he was condemned to six months’ imprisonment for conspiracy. His right to practice law was suspended because of his Nazi activities (2938-PS).
After the Spring of 1935 Kaltenbrunner was the leader of the Austrian SS. In the magazine of the SIPO and SD, issue of 15 May 1943, it is stated:
“It redounds to his credit that in this important position he succeeded through energetic leadership in maintaining the unity of the Austrian SS, which he had built up, in spite of all persecution, and succeeded in committing it successfully at the right moment. After the annexation, in which the SS was a decisive factor, he was appointed State Secretary for Security Matters on 11 March 1938 in the new National-Socialist cabinet of Seyss-Inquart. A few hours later he was able to report to Reichsfuehrer SS Heinrich Himmler, who had landed at Aspern, the Vienna airport, on 12 March 1938, 3 a. m., as the first National Socialist leader, that the Movement had achieved a complete victory and that ‘The SS is in formation and awaiting further orders.’ ” (2938-PS)
“It redounds to his credit that in this important position he succeeded through energetic leadership in maintaining the unity of the Austrian SS, which he had built up, in spite of all persecution, and succeeded in committing it successfully at the right moment. After the annexation, in which the SS was a decisive factor, he was appointed State Secretary for Security Matters on 11 March 1938 in the new National-Socialist cabinet of Seyss-Inquart. A few hours later he was able to report to Reichsfuehrer SS Heinrich Himmler, who had landed at Aspern, the Vienna airport, on 12 March 1938, 3 a. m., as the first National Socialist leader, that the Movement had achieved a complete victory and that ‘The SS is in formation and awaiting further orders.’ ” (2938-PS)
Hitler promoted Kaltenbrunner on the date of the Anschluss to the rank of SS Brigadefuehrer and leader of the SSOberabschnittDonau. On 11 September 1938 he was promoted to the rank of SS Gruppenfuehrer. During the liquidation of the Austrian national government and the reorganization of Austria into Alps and Danube Districts, he was appointed Higher SS and Police Leader to the governors of Vienna, Lower Danube, and Upper Danube, in Corps Area (Wehrkreis) XVII, and in April 1941 was promoted to Major General of the Police (2938-PS).
On 30 January 1943 Kaltenbrunner was appointed Chief of the Security Police and SD (RSHA), succeeding Heydrich, who had been assassinated in Prague in June 1942. Kaltenbrunner held this position until the end of the war (2644-PS).
On 4 October 1943 at Pozen, Poland, in a speech delivered to Gruppenfuehrers of the SS, Himmler made special reference to “our comrade Obergruppenfuehrer Kaltenbrunner, who has succeeded our fallen friend Heydrich” (1919-PS).
On 9 December 1944 the decoration known as the Knight’s Cross of the War Merit, Cross with Swords, was given to SSObergruppenfuehrer and General of the Police Dr. Ernst Kaltenbrunner, Chief of the Security Police and the SD (2770-PS).
In addition he held the Golden insignia of Honor and theBlutorden. He was a member of the Reichstag after the 9th election period 1938 (2892-PS).
Toward the end of the war, Kaltenbrunner’s power increased greatly, especially after the attack on Hitler of 20 July 1944. He gained direct access to Hitler. He was very friendly with Fegelein and his wife, who was the sister of Eva Braun. So powerful had Kaltenbrunner become toward the end that even Himmler feared him. On 13 April 1945 the chief of the German foreign intelligence service, Schellenberg, asked Himmler to receive the representative of the Jewish World Congress, Mr. Storsch, from Stockholm, and Himmler said,
“But how am I going to do that in regard to Kaltenbrunner? I shall then be completely at his mercy!” (2990-PS).
“But how am I going to do that in regard to Kaltenbrunner? I shall then be completely at his mercy!” (2990-PS).
As Chief of the Security Police after 30 January 1943, Kaltenbrunner was the head of the RSHA and the regional offices of the Gestapo, SD, and Kripo. Directly under Kaltenbrunner were the Chiefs of the main offices of the RSHA, including Amt III (the SD), Amt IV (the Gestapo), Amt V (the Kripo), and Amt VI (the SD in foreign intelligence) (L-219).
Kaltenbrunner had direct responsibility over the offices of the RSHA. All important matters had to be referred to him or had to be handled under general or special authority granted by him to office chiefs.
“All decisions of principal character are signed by the Chief of the Security Police personally. An office chief has only the authority to sign ‘acting for’ and a chairman ‘by order of’ if the subjects treated in the respective decrees fit into the general laid-down principles according to the plan of distribution of authority. In case of doubt it was the duty to get the question cleared up by reporting it to the Chief of Security Police and SD.” (L-34)“To my knowledge no chief of office or any of the officials of the RSHA, authorized to sign, had the right to sign in any principal affairs of particular political significance without consent of the Chief of the Security Police—not even duringhis temporary absence. From my own experience I can furthermore declare that the chief of Amt IV, Mueller, particularly was very hesitant in signing documents concerning questions of general nature and in some cases of greater importance, and that he put aside events of such nature in most cases for the return of the Chief of the Security Police, whereby often much time was lost.” (L-50).
“All decisions of principal character are signed by the Chief of the Security Police personally. An office chief has only the authority to sign ‘acting for’ and a chairman ‘by order of’ if the subjects treated in the respective decrees fit into the general laid-down principles according to the plan of distribution of authority. In case of doubt it was the duty to get the question cleared up by reporting it to the Chief of Security Police and SD.” (L-34)
“To my knowledge no chief of office or any of the officials of the RSHA, authorized to sign, had the right to sign in any principal affairs of particular political significance without consent of the Chief of the Security Police—not even duringhis temporary absence. From my own experience I can furthermore declare that the chief of Amt IV, Mueller, particularly was very hesitant in signing documents concerning questions of general nature and in some cases of greater importance, and that he put aside events of such nature in most cases for the return of the Chief of the Security Police, whereby often much time was lost.” (L-50).
Schellenberg, the Chief of Amt VI of the RSHA, has stated:
“I know of no limitation placed on Kaltenbrunner’s authority as Chief of the Security Police and SD (RSHA). He promptly entered upon the duties of the office and assumed direct charge of the office and control over the Amts * * * He made it very clear in his official relations with all of us who were hisAmtChiefs that he was the head of the office exercising full executive powers and deciding all matters of policy. He permitted us to issue directives within the organization in our own names pursuant to fixed policies established by him, but all important matters had to be submitted to him whether he signed them or we signed them. He was constantly informed of all matters of importance which went on in the entire organization. (2939-PS)
“I know of no limitation placed on Kaltenbrunner’s authority as Chief of the Security Police and SD (RSHA). He promptly entered upon the duties of the office and assumed direct charge of the office and control over the Amts * * * He made it very clear in his official relations with all of us who were hisAmtChiefs that he was the head of the office exercising full executive powers and deciding all matters of policy. He permitted us to issue directives within the organization in our own names pursuant to fixed policies established by him, but all important matters had to be submitted to him whether he signed them or we signed them. He was constantly informed of all matters of importance which went on in the entire organization. (2939-PS)
During Kaltenbrunner’s term in office as Chief of the Security Police and SD, the following crimes were committed by the SIPO and SD pursuant to policy established by the RSHA or orders issued out of the RSHA for all of which he was responsible by virtue of his office.
(1)Mass murders of civilians of occupied countries by Einsatz Groups.A general discussion of this and the following twelve crimes of theGestapoand SD appears in Section 6 of Chapter XV. That this crime continued after January 1943 is shown by the following documents:3012-PS;2752-PS;2890-PS.
(2)Screenings of prisoner of war camps and executing racial and political undesirables.That this crime continued after January 1943 is shown by the following document:2622-PS.
(3)The taking of recaptured prisoners of war to concentration camps, where in some cases they were executed.That this crime continued after January 1943 is shown by the following documents:1650-PS;L-158;1514-PS.
(4)Establishing concentration camps and committing racial and political undesirables to concentration and annihilation camps for slave labor and mass murder.That this crime continued after January of 1943 is shown by the following documents:D-50;D-46;L-41;701-PS.
(5)Deportation of citizens of occupied countries for forced labor and disciplining of forced labor.That this crime continued after January 1943 is shown by the following documents:3012-PS;1063-B-PS.
(6)The execution of captured commandos and paratroopers and protection of civilians who lynched Allied fliers.That this crime continued after January 1943 is shown by the following documents:1276-PS;532-PS;526-PS;R-110;745-PS.
(7)The taking of civilians of occupied countries to Germany for secret trial and punishment.That this crime continued after January 1943 is shown by the following document:835-PS.
(8)Punishment of citizens of occupied territories under special criminal procedure and by summary methods.That this crime continued after January 1943 is shown by the following document:L-5.
(9)The execution and confinement of persons in concentration camps for crimes allegedly committed by their relatives.That this crime continued after January 1943 is shown by the following document:L-37.
(10)Seizure and spoliation of public and private property.That this crime continued after January 1943 is shown by the following documents:2620-PS;L-18.
(11)Murder of prisoners in SIPO and SD prisons.That this crime continued after January 1943 is shown by the following document:L-53.
(12)Persecution of Jews.That this crime continued after January 1943 is shown by the following documents:L-18;1061-PS;2375-PS;2605-PS.
(13)Persecution of the churches.That this crime continued after January 1943 is shown by the following document:1815-PS.
(1)Kaltenbrunner was fully cognizant of conditions in concentration camps and of the fact that concentration camps were used for slave labor and mass murder.Mauthausen concentration camp was established in Austria while Kaltenbrunner was the Higher SS and Police Leader for Austria, and was frequently visited by Kaltenbrunner before he was appointed Chief of the Security Police and SD (L-51). On the occasion of one such visitin 1942, Kaltenbrunner personally observed the gas chamber in operation (2753-PS). After he became Chief of the Security Police and SD, Kaltenbrunner visited Mauthausen concentration camp but with less frequency (L-51). On one occasion he made an inspection of the camp grounds with Himmler and had his photograph taken during the course of the inspection (2641-PS). After a visit to Mauthausen in 1944 Kaltenbrunner reported to hisAmtChiefs with pride that he had helped to build up Mauthausen when he was Higher SS and Police Leader in Austria and that the camp was engaged in valuable armament work (2990-PS). Mauthausen concentration camp was classified by Heydrich in January 1941 in category III, a camp for the most heavily accused prisoners and for asocial prisoners who were considered incapable of being reformed (1063-A-PS).
There were frequent conferences between the RSHA and executives of the SSWirtschaftandVerwaltungshauptamtwho had charge of the internal administration of concentration camps. The affidavit of Rudolf Mildner states with respect to these conferences: