Chapter XVIINDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBILITY OF DEFENDANTS
The crime of conspiracy is recognized, in various forms, in nearly every legal system. The Anglo-American doctrine of conspiracy, despite technical differences, is analogous in purpose to the Soviet notion of a “criminal gang” and the Frenchassociation de malfaiteurs. German law, both before and after the Nazi seizure of power, also contained a similar concept. The fundamentals of the doctrine, common to most systems of law, are reflected in Article 6 of the Charter, which declares it a crime to participate in “the formulation or execution of a common plan or conspiracy” to plan or wage aggressive war, to commit War Crimes, or to commit Crimes against Humanity. Count I of the Indictment charges the existence of such a conspiracy on the part of the defendants, acting together with divers other persons.
The essence of conspiracy is the joining together of persons to pursue unlawful ends, by legal or illegal means, or to pursue lawful ends by illegal means. A conspiracy may exist even though the ends or means employed by the conspirators might have been perfectly legal if carried out by one person acting alone. The gravamen of the crime is association and acting in concert for the purpose of formulating and executing a common plan involving criminal ends or means.
Participation in a common plan or conspiracy results in vicarious liability, in the sense that each member of the conspiracy is liable for the acts of every other conspirator, even though he may have actually committed no criminal acts himself. He still may be adjudged criminal for mere participation in a common plan to pursue a common criminal purpose, regardless of disparities in the functions performed by individual conspirators.
Nevertheless, in order to prove the participation of a certain person in a conspiracy, his own acts must be considered. The roles played by the various members of the Nazi conspiracy are necessarily different. The following sections sketch in rough outline the parts played by each of the 22 defendants (excepting Sauckel and Speer who are discussed in Chapter X) and the former defendant and co-conspirator, Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach, in the conspiracy to commit Crimes against Peace, War Crimes against Humanity, as alleged in Count I of the Indictment. These sections are by no means exhaustive but merely indicate the general lines of a particular defendant’s participation. Further and more detailed discussion of the parts played by the conspiratorsin particular phases of the conspiracy will be found under the pertinent subject matter in the preceding chapters.
For more than two decades Hermann Goering played one of the foremost roles amongst the Nazi conspirators. He, who called himself the most faithful paladin of the Fuehrer, was a key figure within the conspiracy, participating in nearly all phases of the conspiratorial activities. He took part in the Munich Beer Hall putsch of 1923; he promoted Hitler’s rise to power in 1933; he founded the Gestapo in 1933 and the concentration camps in 1934; and he created the German Luftwaffe, making it an instrument for aggressive war and using it to destroy other countries. As Plenipotentiary for the Four-Year Plan and chairman of the Ministerial Council for Defense, Goering became the Czar of German economy and administration and eventually the executive manager of the entire conspiracy.
The following list, the correctness of which has been certified by Goering and his attorney (2836-PS) is a partial statement of positions and offices held by him from 1922 to 1945:
1.Party member (1922-1945).2.Supreme Leader of the SA (1923—November 1923).3.Member of the Reichstag (1928).4.President of the Reichstag (1932).5.Prussian Minister of the Interior (1933-34).6.Prussian Prime Minister (1933-45).7.Prussian Chief of Secret State Police (1933-36).8.Prussian Chief of State Council (1933-36).9.Plenipotentiary for the Four-Year Plan (1936-45).10.Reichsminister for Air (1933-45).11.Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force (1935-45).12.President of the Cabinet Council for the Defense of the Reich (1939-45).13.Member of the Secret Cabinet Council (1938-45).14.Reichsmarschall (1939-45).15.Successor Designate to Hitler (1939-45).16.Head of Reichswerke Hermann Goering (1938-45).17.Head of Gestapo in Prussia (1933-34).
1.Party member (1922-1945).
Party member (1922-1945).
2.Supreme Leader of the SA (1923—November 1923).
Supreme Leader of the SA (1923—November 1923).
3.Member of the Reichstag (1928).
Member of the Reichstag (1928).
4.President of the Reichstag (1932).
President of the Reichstag (1932).
5.Prussian Minister of the Interior (1933-34).
Prussian Minister of the Interior (1933-34).
6.Prussian Prime Minister (1933-45).
Prussian Prime Minister (1933-45).
7.Prussian Chief of Secret State Police (1933-36).
Prussian Chief of Secret State Police (1933-36).
8.Prussian Chief of State Council (1933-36).
Prussian Chief of State Council (1933-36).
9.Plenipotentiary for the Four-Year Plan (1936-45).
Plenipotentiary for the Four-Year Plan (1936-45).
10.Reichsminister for Air (1933-45).
Reichsminister for Air (1933-45).
11.Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force (1935-45).
Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force (1935-45).
12.President of the Cabinet Council for the Defense of the Reich (1939-45).
President of the Cabinet Council for the Defense of the Reich (1939-45).
13.Member of the Secret Cabinet Council (1938-45).
Member of the Secret Cabinet Council (1938-45).
14.Reichsmarschall (1939-45).
Reichsmarschall (1939-45).
15.Successor Designate to Hitler (1939-45).
Successor Designate to Hitler (1939-45).
16.Head of Reichswerke Hermann Goering (1938-45).
Head of Reichswerke Hermann Goering (1938-45).
17.Head of Gestapo in Prussia (1933-34).
Head of Gestapo in Prussia (1933-34).
Goering was a member of and assisted in the Nazi conspiracy to commit crimes against peace, war crimes, and crimes against humanity, in the following ways:
(1)Acquisition and Consolidation of Power in Germany.
(a)Before 1933.Soon after joining the Party, Goering in 1923 was placed in command of the entire SA (2168-PS). In November 1923, he took part in the ill-fated attempt at Munich to gain control of the German State by force. In the encounter with the police, Goering was wounded and fled from Germany. (2532-PS)
After his return, Goering became more than a commander of street fighters. He was designated Hitler’s first political assistant.
“The movement was conducted by the Fuehrer from Munich. But one man has to act for him in Berlin, while Gauleiter Goebbels stirs up the masses and makes them ripe for National Socialism, a man on whom he could rely unconditionally to the same extent as if he acted himself. And thus, Hermann Goering became the political deputy of Adolf Hitler.” (3252-PS)
“The movement was conducted by the Fuehrer from Munich. But one man has to act for him in Berlin, while Gauleiter Goebbels stirs up the masses and makes them ripe for National Socialism, a man on whom he could rely unconditionally to the same extent as if he acted himself. And thus, Hermann Goering became the political deputy of Adolf Hitler.” (3252-PS)
Goering’s official biographer, the Ministerial Dirgent Gritzbach, tells of his dealings with the Bruening government, his attempts to “break down the barrier” around the Reich President, von Hindenburg, and of his “coup” as Reichstag President in September 1932 in procuring a vote of nonconfidence against the Papen government just before the Reichstag could be dissolved (3252-PS). Goering says in his own book,Aufbau einer Nation:
“The moment was unforgettable for me who have gone back and forth as representative so often between the Kaiserhof and the Wilhelmstrasse during the past year, when I hurried out to my car and could report to the questioning masses as the first one: ‘Hitler has become Reich Chancellor.’ ” (3251-PS)
“The moment was unforgettable for me who have gone back and forth as representative so often between the Kaiserhof and the Wilhelmstrasse during the past year, when I hurried out to my car and could report to the questioning masses as the first one: ‘Hitler has become Reich Chancellor.’ ” (3251-PS)
Goebbels also gave him full measure of credit:
“ ‘This is surely Goering’s happiest hour’ wrote Dr. Goebbels in his book Von Kaiserhof zur Reichskanzlei, and, quoting from it, said: that ‘Goering prepared diplomatically and politically in a long lasting all hard struggle the basis for Hitler’s rise.” (3252-PS)
“ ‘This is surely Goering’s happiest hour’ wrote Dr. Goebbels in his book Von Kaiserhof zur Reichskanzlei, and, quoting from it, said: that ‘Goering prepared diplomatically and politically in a long lasting all hard struggle the basis for Hitler’s rise.” (3252-PS)
In a letter written in 1935, Hitler summarized Goering’s contributions as follows:
“My dear Goering: When in November 1923 the Party tried for the first time to conquer the power of the State, you as Commander of the SA created within an extraordinarily short time that instrument with which I could bear that struggle. Highest necessity had forced us to act, but a wise providence at that time denied that success. After receiving a grave wound you again entered the ranks as soon as circumstances permitted as my most loyal comrade in the battle forpower. You contributed essentially to creating the basis for the 30th of January. Therefore, at the end of a year of the National Socialist Revolution, I desire to thank you whole-heartedly, my dear Party Comrade Goering, for the great values which you have for the National Socialist Revolution and consequently, for the German people. In cordial friendship and grateful appreciation.Yours,Adolf Hitler.”(3259-PS)
“My dear Goering: When in November 1923 the Party tried for the first time to conquer the power of the State, you as Commander of the SA created within an extraordinarily short time that instrument with which I could bear that struggle. Highest necessity had forced us to act, but a wise providence at that time denied that success. After receiving a grave wound you again entered the ranks as soon as circumstances permitted as my most loyal comrade in the battle forpower. You contributed essentially to creating the basis for the 30th of January. Therefore, at the end of a year of the National Socialist Revolution, I desire to thank you whole-heartedly, my dear Party Comrade Goering, for the great values which you have for the National Socialist Revolution and consequently, for the German people. In cordial friendship and grateful appreciation.
Yours,
Adolf Hitler.”
(3259-PS)
Goering himself has boasted:
“Numerous titles and honors have been bestowed on me during the past months, and still no title and no decoration could make me so proud, as the designation, given to me by the German people: ‘The most faithful paladin of our Fuehrer.’ In that, my relationship to the Fuehrer finds expression. I followed him for over a decade with unreserved faith, and I will follow him with the same unconditional faith until my end.” (3251-PS)
“Numerous titles and honors have been bestowed on me during the past months, and still no title and no decoration could make me so proud, as the designation, given to me by the German people: ‘The most faithful paladin of our Fuehrer.’ In that, my relationship to the Fuehrer finds expression. I followed him for over a decade with unreserved faith, and I will follow him with the same unconditional faith until my end.” (3251-PS)
(b)Prussia, 1933-36.Immediately after the 30th of January 1933, Goering was awarded the key post of acting Prussian Minister of the Interior, and shortly thereafter, that of Minister President of Prussia. In these capacities, he proceeded promptly to establish a regime of terror in Prussia designed to suppress all opposition to the Nazi program.
His chief tool was the Prussian police, which remained under his jurisdiction until 1936. As early as February 1933, he ordered the entire police forces to render unqualified assistance to the para-military organizations supporting the new government, such as the SA and the SS, and to crush all political opponents with firearms, if necessary, regardless of the consequences. (Directive of 10 February 1933, Ministerialblatt fuer die Preussische innere Verwaltung 1933, p. 148; Directive of 17 February 1933,id, p. 169). Goering has frequently and proudly acknowledged his own personal responsibility for the crimes committed pursuant to orders of this character:
“I declared at that time before thousands of fellow Germans, each bullet which leaves the barrel of a police pistol now is my bullet. If one calls this murder, then I have murdered; I ordered all this, I back it up. I assume the responsibility, and I am not afraid to do so.” (2324-PS; 3252-PS.)
“I declared at that time before thousands of fellow Germans, each bullet which leaves the barrel of a police pistol now is my bullet. If one calls this murder, then I have murdered; I ordered all this, I back it up. I assume the responsibility, and I am not afraid to do so.” (2324-PS; 3252-PS.)
Soon after he became Prussian Minister President, Goering began to develop the Gestapo, or Secret State Police. To quote from his own book:
“The most important thing for me was first, to get the instrument of power of the protective police and political police firmly in my hand. Here I undertook the first sweeping changes of personnel. Of the 32 available colonels of the protective police, I dismissed 22. Hundreds of officers and thousands of sergeants followed them in the course of the next months. New forces were procured, and everywhere, these forces were taken out of the large reserve pool of the SA and the SS.“For weeks, I personally worked on this transformation, and finally I created alone and from my own conviction and own thought the ‘Secret State Police Office’. That instrument, feared so much by the enemies of the state, which above all has contributed so much, that today a Communist or Marxist danger in Germany or Prussia is hardly worth talking about anymore.” (3251-PS)
“The most important thing for me was first, to get the instrument of power of the protective police and political police firmly in my hand. Here I undertook the first sweeping changes of personnel. Of the 32 available colonels of the protective police, I dismissed 22. Hundreds of officers and thousands of sergeants followed them in the course of the next months. New forces were procured, and everywhere, these forces were taken out of the large reserve pool of the SA and the SS.
“For weeks, I personally worked on this transformation, and finally I created alone and from my own conviction and own thought the ‘Secret State Police Office’. That instrument, feared so much by the enemies of the state, which above all has contributed so much, that today a Communist or Marxist danger in Germany or Prussia is hardly worth talking about anymore.” (3251-PS)
In a public address delivered on 11 December 1934, Goering boasted:
“We were firmly determined after assumption of power to hit the Communists so that in Germany they would never recover from our blow. For that we do not require a Reichstag fire. That has been one of the most important points on our program. In the former Weimar Constitution the destruction of Communism was unthinkable. For the execution of these measures we needed the instrument of a through and through reliable, and of the highest degree powerful, police force. I have created this instrument through the reorganization of the field police (Landespolizei) and the formation of a Secret State Police. These organizations will constitute a means for implanting fear in all enemies of the State, which a State needs if it wishes to defend itself for always”. (3440-PS)
“We were firmly determined after assumption of power to hit the Communists so that in Germany they would never recover from our blow. For that we do not require a Reichstag fire. That has been one of the most important points on our program. In the former Weimar Constitution the destruction of Communism was unthinkable. For the execution of these measures we needed the instrument of a through and through reliable, and of the highest degree powerful, police force. I have created this instrument through the reorganization of the field police (Landespolizei) and the formation of a Secret State Police. These organizations will constitute a means for implanting fear in all enemies of the State, which a State needs if it wishes to defend itself for always”. (3440-PS)
On 26 April 1933 Goering signed the first law officially establishing the Secret State Police in Prussia (2104-PS). On 30 November 1933, Goering signed a law naming himself, as Prime Minister, Chief of the Prussian Secret State Police (2105-PS). He continued in this position until sometime in 1936, when Himmler secured control of all police in the Reich.
Men and women taken into custody by the Gestapo were thrown, without judicial or other form of trial, into concentration camps, which had been established in Prussia as early as the spring of 1933. (3252-PS;L-83.)
As explained by Goering in his own book:
“Against the enemies of the State, we must proceed ruthlessly. It cannot be forgotten, that at the moment of our rise to power, according to the official election figures of March 1933, six million people still confess their sympathy for Marxism. * * * Therefore the concentration camps have been created, where we have first confined thousands of Communists and Social Democrat functionaries. * * *” (2344-PS)
“Against the enemies of the State, we must proceed ruthlessly. It cannot be forgotten, that at the moment of our rise to power, according to the official election figures of March 1933, six million people still confess their sympathy for Marxism. * * * Therefore the concentration camps have been created, where we have first confined thousands of Communists and Social Democrat functionaries. * * *” (2344-PS)
On 10 February 1936, Goering, as Prussian Minister President, signed a further basic law on the Prussian Secret State Police. Article 7 of this law provided:
“Orders in matters of the Secret State Police are not subject to the review of the administrative courts”. (2107-PS)
“Orders in matters of the Secret State Police are not subject to the review of the administrative courts”. (2107-PS)
Thus it was made quite clear by Goering’s own law that those imprisoned in concentration camps without trial of any kind were to have no recourse to any court. On the same day Goering signed a decree for the execution of the foregoing law, which further acknowledged his responsibility for Prussian concentration camps. Its provisions included the following:
“Art. 2 * * * (4) The Secret State Police Bureau administers the state concentration camps.” (2108-PS)
“Art. 2 * * * (4) The Secret State Police Bureau administers the state concentration camps.” (2108-PS)
The range of police terrorism under Goering’s leadership was almost limitless. A glance at a few of his police directives in these early days will indicate the extent and thoroughness with which every dissident voice was silenced:
Directive of 22 June 1933(Ministerial-Blatt fuer die Preussische innere Verwaltung, 1933, p. 731): Ordered all officials to watch the statements of employees of the Prussian civil service and to denounce to Goering those who made critical remarks (“Miesmacher”); failure to do so regarded as proof of hostile attitude.Directive of 23 June 1933(Ministerial-Blatt fuer die Preussische innere Verwaltung, 1933, p. 749): Suppressed all activities of the Social Democratic Party, including meetings and press, and ordered confiscation of its property.Directive of 30 June 1933(Ministerial-Blatt fuer die Preussische innere Verwaltung, 1933, p. 793): Ordered the Gestapo authorities to report to the Labor Trustees on political attitudes of workers, particularly in cases of criticism of the regime.Directive of 15 January 1934(Ministerial-Blatt fuer die Preussische innere Verwaltung, 1933, p. 137): Ordered the Gestapo and frontier police to keep track of and to watch emigres, particularly political emigres and Jews, residing inneighboring countries, and ordered them arrested and put into concentration camps if they returned to Germany.
Directive of 22 June 1933(Ministerial-Blatt fuer die Preussische innere Verwaltung, 1933, p. 731): Ordered all officials to watch the statements of employees of the Prussian civil service and to denounce to Goering those who made critical remarks (“Miesmacher”); failure to do so regarded as proof of hostile attitude.
Directive of 23 June 1933(Ministerial-Blatt fuer die Preussische innere Verwaltung, 1933, p. 749): Suppressed all activities of the Social Democratic Party, including meetings and press, and ordered confiscation of its property.
Directive of 30 June 1933(Ministerial-Blatt fuer die Preussische innere Verwaltung, 1933, p. 793): Ordered the Gestapo authorities to report to the Labor Trustees on political attitudes of workers, particularly in cases of criticism of the regime.
Directive of 15 January 1934(Ministerial-Blatt fuer die Preussische innere Verwaltung, 1933, p. 137): Ordered the Gestapo and frontier police to keep track of and to watch emigres, particularly political emigres and Jews, residing inneighboring countries, and ordered them arrested and put into concentration camps if they returned to Germany.
After the elimination of the forces of the opposition, the Nazis felt it necessary to dispose of nonconformists within their own ranks. During the Roehm purge of 30 June 1934, many people were murdered who had nothing to do with the internal SA revolt but were just “not liked very well” (2950-PS). Goering’s role in this bloody affair was related less than two weeks later by Hitler in a speech to the Reichstag:
“Meanwhile Minister President Goering had previously received my instructions that in case of a purge, he was to take analogous measures at once in Berlin and in Prussia. With an iron fist he beat down the attack on the National Socialist State before it could develop.” (3442-PS)
“Meanwhile Minister President Goering had previously received my instructions that in case of a purge, he was to take analogous measures at once in Berlin and in Prussia. With an iron fist he beat down the attack on the National Socialist State before it could develop.” (3442-PS)
(c)The Reich, 1933-39.Meanwhile, in the central Reich government, Goering occupied a series of the highest and most influential positions. The broad powers which devolved upon him made him, under Hitler, the Chief Executive of the Nazi State.
With the accession to power, Goering retained the somewhat empty title of Reichstag President but was also appointed Minister Without Portfolio and became a cabinet member. When in an early meeting (15 March 1933) the cabinet discussed the pending Enabling Act (which gave the Cabinet plenary powers of legislation) he offered the suggestion that the required two-thirds majority might be obtained simply by refusing admittance to the Social Democratic delegates (2962-PS). He became Reich Air Minister in May 1933 (2089-PS). In his capacity as Air Minister and Supreme Commander of the Luftwaffe, he sat as a member of and the Fuehrer’s deputy on the Reich Defense Council, which was established by the secret law of 21 May 1933 and continued by the secret law of 4 September 1938 (2261-PS;2194-PS). This Council was a war planning group whose purpose was “to plan preparations and decrees in case of war which later on were published by the Ministerial Council for the Defense of the Reich.” (2986-PS)
In 1936, Goering was made Plenipotentiary for the Four-Year Plan and acquired plenary legislative and administrative powers over all German economic life. (1862-PS)
Goering was a member of the Secret Cabinet Council established in 1938 to act as “an advisory board in the direction of foreign policy” (2031-PS).
The Ministerial Council for the Defense of the Reich, created in 1939, took over, in effect, all the legislative powers of the Cabinetwhich had not been reserved to Hitler’s personal control or to Goering as the Delegate for the Four-Year Plan. Goering became the Chairman of this Council. (2018-PS)
Finally, as the invading Nazi armies marched into Poland, Hitler announced the designation of Goering as successor designate, the heir apparent of the “New Order.”
(d)Economic Preparation for War, 1933-1939.
In April 1936, Goering was appointed Coordinator for Raw Materials and Foreign Exchange and empowered to supervise all State and Party activities in these fields (2827-PS). In this capacity he convened the War Minister, the Minister of Economics, the Reich Finance Minister, the President of the Reichsbank, and the Prussian Finance Minister to discuss inter-agency problems connected with war mobilization. At a meeting of this group on 12 May 1936, when the question of the prohibitive cost of synthetic raw material substitutes arose, Goering said:
“If we have war tomorrow, we must help ourselves by substitutes. Then money will not play any role at all. If that is the case, then we must be ready to create the prerequisites for that in peace.” (1301-PS)
“If we have war tomorrow, we must help ourselves by substitutes. Then money will not play any role at all. If that is the case, then we must be ready to create the prerequisites for that in peace.” (1301-PS)
At a subsequent meeting of the same men on 27 May 1936, Goering suggested a program of plant construction for the production of synthetic substitutes but warned against the financial strain involved in excessive overexpansion. He opposed any limitations dictated by orthodox financial policy and stated:
“All measures are to be considered from the standpoint of an assured waging of war.“Ready reserves must ordinarily be accumulated already in
“All measures are to be considered from the standpoint of an assured waging of war.
“Ready reserves must ordinarily be accumulated already in
On the Nurnberg Party Day in the fall of 1936, Hitler proclaimed the establishment of the Four-Year Plan, a comprehensive program of national self-sufficiency, and announced the appointment of Goering as “Plenipotentiary” in charge. In October, a decree was promulgated which implemented this announcement and provided for the execution of the plan. (1862-PS)
It is clear from Goering’s own statements in an interrogation on 25 June 1945 that the purpose of the Plan was to place Germany on a war footing economically:
“Goering: ‘My job was to organize the German economy and my energy was put to work to get things started and carried through * * *. My main task was to secure the food supply for Germany for many years ahead and to make Germany self-sufficient. The most important items were iron,petroleum and rubber. * * * The industry only wanted to have very high grade Swedish iron for business reasons. There was danger that during the war Germany would not be able to get iron from Sweden and there would be no iron.’Interrogator: ‘What war are you talking about? This is 1936 you’re speaking of.’Goering: ‘Any possibility of war. Perhaps with Russia, or in case there was war with anyone at any time and anywhere.’ ”
“Goering: ‘My job was to organize the German economy and my energy was put to work to get things started and carried through * * *. My main task was to secure the food supply for Germany for many years ahead and to make Germany self-sufficient. The most important items were iron,petroleum and rubber. * * * The industry only wanted to have very high grade Swedish iron for business reasons. There was danger that during the war Germany would not be able to get iron from Sweden and there would be no iron.’
Interrogator: ‘What war are you talking about? This is 1936 you’re speaking of.’
Goering: ‘Any possibility of war. Perhaps with Russia, or in case there was war with anyone at any time and anywhere.’ ”
When asked the reasons why the Four-Year Plan lost importance in 1942, Goering explained that his preoccupation with the Air Force did not allow him the necessary concentration on the affairs of the Four-Year Plan, and stated:
“The main task of the Four-Year Plan had been accomplished. This task was to get Germany ready.”
“The main task of the Four-Year Plan had been accomplished. This task was to get Germany ready.”
These answers confirm the comment Goering made in 1936, that his chief task as Plenipotentiary for the Four-Year Plan was “to put the whole economy on a war footing within four years.” (EC-408) As Plenipotentiary for the Four-Year Plan, Goering was virtually the economic dictator for Germany with control over all other interested Reich agencies. He was the “boss of the economy,” and all important decisions had to be referred to him.
Two important conferences show clearly how Goering inspired and directed the preparation of the German economy for aggressive war. On 8 July 1938 he addressed a number of leading German aircraft manufacturers, explained the political situation, and laid the groundwork for a vast increase in aircraft production. After stating that war with Czechoslovakia was imminent and boasting that the German air force was already superior in quality and quantity to the English, he continued:
“If Germany wins the war, she will be the greatest power in the world, dominating the world market, and Germany will be a rich nation. For this goal, risks must be taken. The only thing that matters is increased output regarding quantity and quality. Even if the manufacturers know that their present policies may mean their bankruptcy within three years, they will have to do it all the same * * * I want you to be perfectly resolved, today already, how you will run your business when war comes. The earlier the manufacturers make their preparations for mobilization today, the less danger there will be of work being held up. It must be determined for every worker whether he is essential for production upon outbreak of war, and measures must be taken tosecure his deferment in case of mobilization. (3441-PS). An executive will be put in charge to work on nothing but the complete preparation of each plant for mobilization day.” (R-140)
“If Germany wins the war, she will be the greatest power in the world, dominating the world market, and Germany will be a rich nation. For this goal, risks must be taken. The only thing that matters is increased output regarding quantity and quality. Even if the manufacturers know that their present policies may mean their bankruptcy within three years, they will have to do it all the same * * * I want you to be perfectly resolved, today already, how you will run your business when war comes. The earlier the manufacturers make their preparations for mobilization today, the less danger there will be of work being held up. It must be determined for every worker whether he is essential for production upon outbreak of war, and measures must be taken tosecure his deferment in case of mobilization. (3441-PS). An executive will be put in charge to work on nothing but the complete preparation of each plant for mobilization day.” (R-140)
A few weeks after the Munich agreement, on 14 October 1938, another conference was held in Goering’s office. He began with the statement that Hitler had instructed him to organize a gigantic armament program which would make insignificant all previous achievements. He indicated that he had been ordered to build as rapidly as possible an air force five times as large, to increase the speed of Army and Navy armament, and to concentrate on offensive weapons, principally heavy artillery and heavy tanks. He then proposed a specific program designed to accomplish these ends. (1301-PS)
(e)Military Mobilization for War.In his dual role as Reich Air Minister and Commander-in-Chief of the German Air Force, it was Goering’s function to develop the Luftwaffe to practical war strength. As early as March 1935 Goering frankly announced to the world that he was in the process of building a true military air force:
“After the German government expressed willingness to help, it became necessary to make a clear demarcation within German aviation, namely in this respect: which air force will be able to be made available? This situation brought about the decision as to those of the German aviation who will in future belong to the Air Force and those who will in future remain in civil aviation or in sport aviation. It was necessary to mark this separation also outwardly, so that the members of the German Air Force became soldiers according to the law and their leaders became officers.” (2292-PS)
“After the German government expressed willingness to help, it became necessary to make a clear demarcation within German aviation, namely in this respect: which air force will be able to be made available? This situation brought about the decision as to those of the German aviation who will in future belong to the Air Force and those who will in future remain in civil aviation or in sport aviation. It was necessary to mark this separation also outwardly, so that the members of the German Air Force became soldiers according to the law and their leaders became officers.” (2292-PS)
Two months later, in a speech to 1,000 Air Force officers, Goering spoke in a still bolder vein:
“I repeat: I intend to create a Luftwaffe which, if the hour should strike, shall burst upon the foe like a chorus of revenge. The enemy must have a feeling of being lost already before even having fought. * * *”
“I repeat: I intend to create a Luftwaffe which, if the hour should strike, shall burst upon the foe like a chorus of revenge. The enemy must have a feeling of being lost already before even having fought. * * *”
In the same year, he signed his name to the Conscription Law which provided for compulsory military service and constituted an act of defiance on the part of Nazi Germany in violation of the Versailles Treaty. (1654-PS)
Goering’s statements during this period left no doubt in the minds of Allied diplomats that Germany was engaged in full mobilization of air power for an impending war.
“Goering and Milch often said to me or in my presence thatthe Nazis had decided to concentrate on air power as the weapon of terror most likely to give Germany a dominant position and the weapon which could be developed the most rapidly and in the shortest time . . . High ranking Nazis with whom I had to maintain official contact, particularly men such as Goering, Goebbels, Ley, Frick, Frank, Darré and others, repeatedly scoffed at my position as to the binding character of treaties and openly stated to me that Germany would observe her international undertakings only so long as it suited Germany’s interests to do so.” (2385-PS)
“Goering and Milch often said to me or in my presence thatthe Nazis had decided to concentrate on air power as the weapon of terror most likely to give Germany a dominant position and the weapon which could be developed the most rapidly and in the shortest time . . . High ranking Nazis with whom I had to maintain official contact, particularly men such as Goering, Goebbels, Ley, Frick, Frank, Darré and others, repeatedly scoffed at my position as to the binding character of treaties and openly stated to me that Germany would observe her international undertakings only so long as it suited Germany’s interests to do so.” (2385-PS)
(2)The Launching of Aggressive War.Goering was the central figure in the preparation of Germany for military aggression. In German economic development and military growth he held the key positions throughout the prewar period. Although he held no official position in the field of foreign affairs, Goering also figured prominently in all of the major phases of Nazi international aggression between 1937 and 1941. As “No. 2 Nazi” he was a leading participant in every major plan of territorial aggrandizement or offensive military strategy.
Goering was the prompter and director of the diplomatic tragi-comedy leading to the Austrian Anschluss. In the middle of November 1937, Mr. Bullitt, the American Ambassador to France, reported the following conversation with Goering:
“I asked Goering if he meant that Germany was absolutely determined to annex Austria to the Reich. He replied that this was an absolute determination of the German Government. The German Government at the present time was not pressing this matter because of certain momentary political considerations, especially in their relations with Italy; but Germany would tolerate no solution of the Austrian question other than the consolidation of Austria in the German Reich. He then added a statement which went further than any I have heard on this subject: He said, ‘There are schemes being pushed now for a union of Austria, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia, either with or without a Hapsburg at the head of the unit. Such a solution is absolutely inacceptable to us, and for us the conclusion of such an agreement would be an immediatecasus belli’.” (L-151)
“I asked Goering if he meant that Germany was absolutely determined to annex Austria to the Reich. He replied that this was an absolute determination of the German Government. The German Government at the present time was not pressing this matter because of certain momentary political considerations, especially in their relations with Italy; but Germany would tolerate no solution of the Austrian question other than the consolidation of Austria in the German Reich. He then added a statement which went further than any I have heard on this subject: He said, ‘There are schemes being pushed now for a union of Austria, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia, either with or without a Hapsburg at the head of the unit. Such a solution is absolutely inacceptable to us, and for us the conclusion of such an agreement would be an immediatecasus belli’.” (L-151)
When the time came, on 11 March 1938, Goering was in complete command. Throughout the afternoon and evening of that day he directed by telephone the activities of Seyss-Inquart, also of Keppler, Ullrich, and the other Nazi operatives in Vienna. (2949-PS); (the pertinent portions of these telephone conversations havealready been referred to in Section 3 of Chapter IX on Aggression Against Austria.)
In the late afternoon Goering gave the following order to Seyss-Inquart:
“Now, remember the following: You go immediately together with Lt. General Muff and tell the Federal President that if the conditions which are known to you are not accepted immediately, the troops who are already stationed in and advancing to the frontier will march in tonight along the whole line, and Austria will cease to exist.” (2949-PS)
“Now, remember the following: You go immediately together with Lt. General Muff and tell the Federal President that if the conditions which are known to you are not accepted immediately, the troops who are already stationed in and advancing to the frontier will march in tonight along the whole line, and Austria will cease to exist.” (2949-PS)
Early the same evening he dictated to Seyss-Inquart the telegram which the latter was to send to Berlin requesting the Nazi Government to send German troops to “prevent bloodshed”. Two days later he was able to call Ribbentrop in London and say:
“Yes, the last march into the Rhineland is completely over-shadowed. The Fuehrer was deeply moved, when he talked to me last night. You must remember it was the first time that he saw his homeland again. Now, I merely want to talk about political things. Well, this story we have given an ultimatum, that is just foolish gossip.” (2949-PS)
“Yes, the last march into the Rhineland is completely over-shadowed. The Fuehrer was deeply moved, when he talked to me last night. You must remember it was the first time that he saw his homeland again. Now, I merely want to talk about political things. Well, this story we have given an ultimatum, that is just foolish gossip.” (2949-PS)
Goering played a similarly important role in the attack on Czechoslovakia. In March of 1938, at the time of the Anschluss with Austria, he had given a solemn assurance to the Czechoslovakian Minister in Berlin that the developments in Austria would in no way have a detrimental influence on the relations between Germany and Czechoslovakia, and had emphasized the continued earnest endeavor on the part of Germany to improve these mutual relations. In this connection, Goering used the expression: “Ich gebe Ihnen mein Ehrenwort.(I give you my word of honor)” (TC-27). On the other hand, in his address to German airplane manufacturers on 8 July 1938, he made his private views on this subject clear:
“Beyond this they fear that once we have pocketed Czechoslovakia, we will attack Hungary, the Rumanian oil wells, etc. Moreover, since there are democratic countries on the one hand, and authoritarian ones on the other, there is enough inflammable matter in the world anyway. When, how and where this inflammable matter will explode, no one among us can say. It may happen within some months, but it may also take some years. At present, the situation is this that Czechoslovakia has promised the Sudeten Germans to meet them half way. I am convinced that they will satisfy no more than some of their unimportant demands. Such action on their part would probably suit our policy best, since inthis case we could put the entire responsibility on England because she has engaged herself so deeply in this business.” (R-140)
“Beyond this they fear that once we have pocketed Czechoslovakia, we will attack Hungary, the Rumanian oil wells, etc. Moreover, since there are democratic countries on the one hand, and authoritarian ones on the other, there is enough inflammable matter in the world anyway. When, how and where this inflammable matter will explode, no one among us can say. It may happen within some months, but it may also take some years. At present, the situation is this that Czechoslovakia has promised the Sudeten Germans to meet them half way. I am convinced that they will satisfy no more than some of their unimportant demands. Such action on their part would probably suit our policy best, since inthis case we could put the entire responsibility on England because she has engaged herself so deeply in this business.” (R-140)
On 14 October 1938, shortly after the Munich agreement, Goering gave his views on the Czechoslovakian question at a conference in the Air Ministry:
“The Sudetenland has to be exploited with all the means. General Field Marshal Goering counts upon a complete industrial assimilation of the Slovakia. Czech and Slovakia would become German dominions. Everything possible must be taken out. The Oder-Danube Canal has to be speeded up. Searches for oil and ore have to be conducted in Slovakia, notably by State Secretary Keppler.” (1301-PS)
“The Sudetenland has to be exploited with all the means. General Field Marshal Goering counts upon a complete industrial assimilation of the Slovakia. Czech and Slovakia would become German dominions. Everything possible must be taken out. The Oder-Danube Canal has to be speeded up. Searches for oil and ore have to be conducted in Slovakia, notably by State Secretary Keppler.” (1301-PS)
Meanwhile, he was deceiving the representatives of the puppet Slovakian government to the same end:
“The Field Marshal considers that the Slovak negotiations toward independence are to be supported in a suitable manner. Czechoslovakia without Slovakia is still more at our mercy.” (2801-PS)
“The Field Marshal considers that the Slovak negotiations toward independence are to be supported in a suitable manner. Czechoslovakia without Slovakia is still more at our mercy.” (2801-PS)
In the following year, with the rape of Czechoslovakia complete Goering frankly stated what Germany’s purpose had been throughout the whole affair:
“In a rather long statement the field marshal explained that the incorporation of Bohemia and Moravia into the German economy had taken place, among other reasons to increase the German War potential by exploitation of the industry there.” (R-133)
“In a rather long statement the field marshal explained that the incorporation of Bohemia and Moravia into the German economy had taken place, among other reasons to increase the German War potential by exploitation of the industry there.” (R-133)
Goering was also a moving force in the later crimes against the peace. As the successor designate to Hitler, as Chief of the Air Forces, and as economic czar of Greater Germany, he was a party to all the planning for military operations of the Nazi forces in the East and the West. In the Polish affair, for example, it was Goering who in 1935 gave assurances to the Polish government that “there should be not the slightest fear in Poland that on the German side it (the German-Polish alliance) would not be continued in the future.” Yet, four years later, Goering helped formulate plans for the invasion of Polish territory.
With regard to the attack upon the Soviet Union, plans for the ruthless exploitation of Russian territory were made months in advance of the opening of hostilities. Goering was placed in charge of this army of spoliation, whose mission was that of “seizing raw materials and taking over all important concerns.” (1317-PS;1157-PS.)
These specific instances cover only a small part of Goering’sactivities in the field of aggressive war. There follows a partial list of additional documents which demonstrate Goering’s knowledge of and continued participation in the Nazi war program. They deal either with conferences on the highest war-planning levels which he attended, or with secret orders communicated to him outlining in advance the official plans for the execution of the successive acts of aggression.
Meetings and Conferences Attended:
Conference in Reichskanzlei, 5 November 1937, to outline the necessity for expanding German foreign policy; plans discussed for the acquisition of Austria and Czechoslovakia. (386-PS)
Entry in Jodl diary, 10 March 1938, referring to meeting attended by Goering and others at which the preparation of “Case Otto” and the mobilization of the army and the air force were ordered. (1780-PS)
Top secret conference with Hitler on 23 May 1939, the subject of which was indoctrination on the political situation and foreign aims. (L-79)
Meeting with Hitler, 22 August 1939, attended by commanders of the armed forces at which immediate plans for Polish invasion were discussed. (L-3;798-PS;1014-PS)
Hitler’s speech to all military commanders on 23 November 1939, regarding the invasion of the low countries. (789-PS)
Meetings of 8 February 1941 and 27 March 1941, at which Hitler outlined the prospective operations against Yugoslavia and Greece. (1746-PS)
Orders and Other Directives Received:
Directive of Blomberg to the armed forces containing plans for military operations in the event that sanctions were applied against German withdrawal from League of Nations. (C-140)
Top secret directive of Blomberg of 2 May 1935, with plans for operation “Schulung” (the reoccupation of the Rhineland). (C-139)
Top secret letter from Blomberg dated 24 June 1935, enclosing copy of secret Reich Defense Law of 21 May 1935 and decision of Reich Cabinet of the same date. (2261-PS)
Order of Blomberg of 2 March 1936, giving the operational basis for the Rhineland occupation. (C-159)
Directives from Hitler and Keitel April to August 1939 on preparation and invasion of Poland. (C-120)
Operational file, “Fall Weiss,” the code name for the Polish operation. (C-126)
Directive from GAF, dated 25 August 1938, regarding the acquisition of bases in the low countries. (375-PS)
Directive No. 6 for the conduct of the war, dated 9 October 1939, signed by Hitler, and orders of Keitel, dated 15 November 1939, on the plans for “Fall Gelb”, (operation in the West). (C-62)
Orders of the Supreme Command from 7 November 1939 to 9 May 1940, regarding the opening of the invasion in the West. (C-72)
Order of Hitler No. 8, 20 November 1939, for the execution of “Fall Gelb”. (440-PS)
Operational plans signed by Keitel on 28 November 1939, on action near the French-Belgium borders. (C-10)
Entries in Jodl diaries from 1 February to 26 May 1940 confirming plans for invasion of the West. (1809-PS)
OKW orders, 27 January 1940, signed by Keitel on preparation for “Fall Weseruebung” (Invasion of Norway and Denmark). (C-63)
Fuehrer order of 1 March 1940 for the execution of “Fall Weseruebung.” (C-174)
Most secret order from Hitler’s headquarters, dated 19 February 1941, on plans for the invasion of Greece. (C-59)
Top secret operational order on “Case Barbarossa” (invasion of the Soviet Union), dated 13 March 1941, signed by Keitel. (447-PS)
Time table for “Case Barbarossa,” signed by Keitel. (C-39)
Top secret memorandum of 29 October 1940, signed by Falkenstein, Luftwaffe liaison officer with OKW, discussing need for the seizure of air bases in the event of future war with the United States. (376-PS)
Basic order No. 24, dated 5 March 1941, signed by Keitel, regarding German collaboration with Japan. (C-75)
(1)Forced Labor, Deportation, and Enslavement of Residents of Occupied Territories.
The slave labor program of the Nazi conspirators had two criminal purposes. The first was to satisfy the labor requirements of the Nazi war machine by forcing residents of occupied countries to work in Germany, often directly in the German armament industry, and the second was to destroy or weaken the peoples of the occupied territories. Millions of foreign workers were taken to Germany, for the most part under pressure and generally by physical force. These workers were forced to labor under conditions of undescribable brutality and degredation, andoften they were used in factories and industries devoted exclusively to the production of munitions of war. (See Chapter X on The Slave Labor Program.)
Goering was at all times implicated in the slave labor program. Recruitment and allocation of manpower and determination of working conditions were included in his jurisdiction as Plenipotentiary for the Four-Year Plan, and from its beginning a part of the Four-Year Plan Office was devoted to such work. (1862-PS;2827-PS.)
The defendant Goering was present at a meeting in Hitler’s study on 23 May 1939 at which Hitler, after declaring his intention to attack Poland at the first suitable opportunity, said:
“If fate brings us into conflict with the West, the possession of extensive areas in the East will be advantageous. * * * The population of non-German areas will perform no military service and will be available as a source of labor.” (L-79)
“If fate brings us into conflict with the West, the possession of extensive areas in the East will be advantageous. * * * The population of non-German areas will perform no military service and will be available as a source of labor.” (L-79)
Soon after the fall of Poland, Goering as Plenipotentiary for the Four-Year Plan, began the enslavement of large numbers of Poles. On 25 January 1940, the defendant Frank, then Governor General of Poland, reported to Goering as follows: