Chapter 18

Adjutants' Office of the Armed Forces to the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor

Recd. 26 July 1938 App. 1No. 82/38 Most Secret

[pencil note:] Maj. Schmundt1 copy 3rd report to FuehrerBerlin, 12 July 1938L Iato L No. 1233/38 Most Secret2 copies 1st CopyConference NotesK [Initialled by Keitel]MOST SECRET

OKH issues new manoeuvre intentions for 1938. Reason for alteration: development of the western fortifications and spreading of the foot-and-mouth-disease.

Details:

1. Of the previouslyintended training manoeuvres, the following remain:

Fall exercise for the I Army CorpsTraining exercise for the XI Army CorpsFortress warfare exercise for the 1st Army Group Command

Fall exercise for the I Army Corps

Training exercise for the XI Army Corps

Fortress warfare exercise for the 1st Army Group Command

2.New training manoeuvres:

a.Fighting for fortificationsb.Coordination with the Air Forcec.Cooperation between ground attack, airplanes and field units commencing 1 August in the exercise area.d.Mobilization exercises for the Staffse.Supply and communications controlf.Chemical defense and cleansing of contaminated areas

a.Fighting for fortifications

b.Coordination with the Air Force

c.Cooperation between ground attack, airplanes and field units commencing 1 August in the exercise area.

d.Mobilization exercises for the Staffs

e.Supply and communications control

f.Chemical defense and cleansing of contaminated areas

3.Training Manoeuvres for armored divisions:

1st Armored Division up to 24 October at GRAFENWOHR, Corps HQ of the XVI Army Corps will also be there2nd Armored Division remains in Austria3rd Armored Division up to 24 September in KOENIGS-BRUEK, from 25 September near BRESLAU West of the ODER

1st Armored Division up to 24 October at GRAFENWOHR, Corps HQ of the XVI Army Corps will also be there

2nd Armored Division remains in Austria

3rd Armored Division up to 24 September in KOENIGS-BRUEK, from 25 September near BRESLAU West of the ODER

4.Training Manoeuvres for motorized divisions ready to march:

2nd motorized Division in exercise area A, from 28 September, in NEUHAMMER29th motorized Division in exercise area B20th motorized Division in exercise area C13th motorized Division in exercise area D1st light Division in exercise area E

2nd motorized Division in exercise area A, from 28 September, in NEUHAMMER

29th motorized Division in exercise area B

20th motorized Division in exercise area C

13th motorized Division in exercise area D

1st light Division in exercise area E

Commencement of the exercises not before 12 September, the end 24 November.

5.Terrain exercises for units ready to march:

These take place in the following Wehrkreise:II, III, IV, V, VI, VII, VIII, IX, X, XI, XIII, XVII,Commencement of terrain exercises: 20 September

These take place in the following Wehrkreise:

II, III, IV, V, VI, VII, VIII, IX, X, XI, XIII, XVII,

Commencement of terrain exercises: 20 September

6.Training Manoeuvres for the mountain divisions composed as on mobilization:

2nd Mountain Division in area STEYR-PICHL-WEGER3rd Mountain Division in area SEMMERING-BRUCKCommencement of exercises: 26 September, End: 24 November

2nd Mountain Division in area STEYR-PICHL-WEGER

3rd Mountain Division in area SEMMERING-BRUCK

Commencement of exercises: 26 September, End: 24 November

7.Training Manoeuvres for Training Divisions (Reserve Divisions):

a.15 August to 13 September:

Training Division VII Army Corps (69th Division) Field units Exercise Area NEUHAMMER,Training Division IX Army Corps (52nd Division) Field units Exercise Area GROSSBORN,Training Division III Army Corps (68th Division) Field units Exercise Area JUETERBOG.

Training Division VII Army Corps (69th Division) Field units Exercise Area NEUHAMMER,

Training Division IX Army Corps (52nd Division) Field units Exercise Area GROSSBORN,

Training Division III Army Corps (68th Division) Field units Exercise Area JUETERBOG.

b.9 September to 24 November:

Training Division IV Army Corps (56th Division) Field units Exercise Area OHRDRUFTraining Division VIII Army Corps (62nd Division) Field units Exercise Area SENNETraining Division XIII Army Corps (73rd Division) Field units Exercise Area MUENDINGENTraining Division XII Army Corps (79th Division) Field units Exercise Area WAHNFrom about 24 September these 4 divisions will train West of the RHINE.

Training Division IV Army Corps (56th Division) Field units Exercise Area OHRDRUF

Training Division VIII Army Corps (62nd Division) Field units Exercise Area SENNE

Training Division XIII Army Corps (73rd Division) Field units Exercise Area MUENDINGEN

Training Division XII Army Corps (79th Division) Field units Exercise Area WAHN

From about 24 September these 4 divisions will train West of the RHINE.

8.New dispositions:

a.Truck Regiment 616, 20 September to 24 October disposition by III Army Corps.b. Army Artillery:6 battalions: 15 August to 3 September disposition and training11 battalions: 9 September to 24 October disposition and training.Of these, beginning 24 September:5 battalions, to Reserve divisions West of the RHINE6 battalions to Terrain exercises of troops "ready to march"c. Engineer Battalions:3 Engineer Battalions, 9 September to 24 October, disposition and training.of these 2 battalions, 20 September, to terrain training of troops "ready to march"1 battalion, from 20 September to Reserve Division West of the Rhine.d. Artillery Intelligence Regiments:4 battalions and 2 Telephone communications companies (motorized) 9 September to 24 November.Disposition and training; from 28 September, the battalions will be situated in the neighborhood of BRESLAU, GRAFENWOEHR, NEWHAMMER, INGOLSTADT.

a.Truck Regiment 616, 20 September to 24 October disposition by III Army Corps.

b. Army Artillery:

6 battalions: 15 August to 3 September disposition and training

11 battalions: 9 September to 24 October disposition and training.

Of these, beginning 24 September:

5 battalions, to Reserve divisions West of the RHINE

6 battalions to Terrain exercises of troops "ready to march"

c. Engineer Battalions:

3 Engineer Battalions, 9 September to 24 October, disposition and training.

of these 2 battalions, 20 September, to terrain training of troops "ready to march"

1 battalion, from 20 September to Reserve Division West of the Rhine.

d. Artillery Intelligence Regiments:

4 battalions and 2 Telephone communications companies (motorized) 9 September to 24 November.

Disposition and training; from 28 September, the battalions will be situated in the neighborhood of BRESLAU, GRAFENWOEHR, NEWHAMMER, INGOLSTADT.

9.Employment of Engineer Battalions on the Western fortifications:

Employment of Engineer Battalions extended for no longer than 3 weeks, also 7 engineer battalions will be added.

10.Reich Party Rally and Harvest Festival:

Participation remains as intended.

11.Foreign Military Delegations:

The foreign military delegations as well as foreign military attaches will be invited to attend the fall exercises of the I Army Corps.

Z [Initialled by ZEITZLER]

[Item 17] [Typescript]Chief Section LWritten by General Staff OfficerMOST SECRETBerlin, 24 August 1938S.O. OnlyAccess only through Officer1 Copy

TIMING OF THE X-ORDER AND THE QUESTION OF ADVANCE MEASURES

TheLuftwaffe'sendeavor to take the enemy air forces by surprise at their peace-time airports justifiably leads them to oppose measures taken in advance of the X-order and to the demand that the X-order itself be given sufficiently late on X minus 1 to prevent the fact of Germany's mobilization becoming known to Czechoslovakia on that day.

TheArmy'sefforts are tending in the opposite direction. It intends to let OKW initiate all advance measures between X minus 3 and X minus 1 which will contribute to the smooth and rapid working of the mobilization. With this in mindOKH also demandsthat the X order be givennot later than 1400 on X minus 1.

To this the following must be said:

Operation (Aktion) Gruen will be set in motion by means of an "incident" in Czechoslovakia which will give Germany provocation for military intervention. The fixing of theexact timefor this incident is of the utmost importance.

It must come at a time when weather conditions are favorable for our superior air forces to go into action and at an hour which will enable authentic news of it to reach us on the afternoon of X minus 1.

It can then be spontaneously answered by the giving of the X order at 1400 on X minus 1.

On X minus 2 the Navy, Army and Air Force will merely receive an advance warning.

If theFuehrerintends to follow this plan of action, all further discussion is superfluous.

For then no advance measures may be taken before X minus 1 for which there is not an innocent explanation as we shall otherwise appear to have manufactured the incident. Orders for absolutely essential advance measures must be given in good time and camouflaged with the help of the numerous manoeuvres and exercises.

Also, the question raised by the Foreign Office as to whether all Germans should be called back in time from prospective enemy territories must in no way lead to the conspicuous departure from Czechoslovakia of any German subjects before the incident.

Even a warning of the diplomatic representatives in Prague is impossible before the first air attack, although the consequences could be very grave in the event of their becoming victims of such an attack (e.g. death of representatives of friendly or confirmed neutral powers).

If, for technical reasons, theevening hoursshould be considered desirable for the incident, then the following day cannot be X day, but it must be the day after that.

In any case we must act on the principle that nothing must be done before the incident which might point to mobilization, and that the swiftest possible action must be taken after the incident. (X-Fall).

It is the purpose of these notes to point out what a great interest the Wehrmacht has in the incident and that it must be informed of the Fuehrer's intentions in good time—insofar as the Abwehr Section is not also charged with the organization of the incident.

I request that the Fuehrer's decision be obtained on these points.

J 26/8[Initialled by Jodl]Notes: [in Schmundt's handwriting]Submitted on 30.8The Fuehrer will act on these lines.On 31.8 Col. v. S. Jodl notified. Schm 31.8

[ITEM 18] [In Schmundt's handwriting]CONFERENCEon 3 September 38 at the BERGHOFPresent: The FuehrerGeneraloberst v. BrauchitschGeneral of Artillery KeitelMajor Schmundt

Gen. Ob. v. Brauchitsch

Reports on the exact time of the transfer of the troops to "exercise areas" for "Gruen". Field units to be transferred on 28 Sept. From here will then be ready for action. When X Day becomes known, field units carry out exercises in opposite directions.

Fuehrer

Has objection. Troops assemble; field units a 2-day march away. Carry out camouflage exercises everywhere.

OKH must know when X-day is by 1200 noon, 27 September.

II.

The Fuehrer

Expresses different opinion on employment of troops for "Gruen". Aspects for the 2nd Army (OS) are smallest. Strongest Cz. fortifications there. Waste of troops; thrust in the 10th Army area, however, is promising. Roadblocks prepared everywhere in addition also in 2nd Army area. No reason for hindrance. The Czechs will stop opposite 2nd army and keep assault army ready east of Prague. A thrust against it into the heart of Cz. is to be made. Thrust in the 14th army area will fail because of means of transport. Therefore assemble all mot. and arm'd divisions with 10th army and employ in the thrust. Once we are through there, the South front, which is built up opposite our 12th army in 3 defense lines, will collapse. An army in the heart of Bohemia will bring about the decision. Possible repetition of Verdun in case of 2nd army. An attack there would mean bleeding to death for a task which cannot be accomplished.

v. Brauchitsch

Has objections because of the state of the mot. divisions, supply and untrained leaders.

The Fuehrer:

The course now planned corresponds to Cz. expectations.Opposite the 10th Army the enemy is not always in concrete emplacements. Possibility here of drawing in the Henlein people (uniforms). The line here is very far back. Cooperation between 10th and 12th armies. We must add motorized units to army. As formerly the "Prussian Cavalry." How else can we gather experiences? Decisive is the coordination of equal speeds. Breakthrough in sector of 2nd army not so rapid, so that a tactical success can be turned into a strategic one.The Fuehrergives orders for the development of the western fortifications; improvement of advance positions around Aachen and Saarbrucken. Construction of 300 to 400 battery positions (1600 artillery pieces). He emphasizes flanking action.

The course now planned corresponds to Cz. expectations.

Opposite the 10th Army the enemy is not always in concrete emplacements. Possibility here of drawing in the Henlein people (uniforms). The line here is very far back. Cooperation between 10th and 12th armies. We must add motorized units to army. As formerly the "Prussian Cavalry." How else can we gather experiences? Decisive is the coordination of equal speeds. Breakthrough in sector of 2nd army not so rapid, so that a tactical success can be turned into a strategic one.The Fuehrergives orders for the development of the western fortifications; improvement of advance positions around Aachen and Saarbrucken. Construction of 300 to 400 battery positions (1600 artillery pieces). He emphasizes flanking action.

Certified.SCHMUNDT, Major on the General StaffBERGHOF, 4 Sept 1938

[In Schmundt's writing][ITEM 19] [In Schmundt's handwriting]S.O. OnlyMOST SECRETDISCUSSIONNurnberg, 9 Sept to 10 Sept, 2200 to 0330.Present: FuehrerGeneraloberst v. BrauchitschGeneral HalderGeneral KeitelMajor SchmundtHauptmann EngelHauptmann v. Below [?]

General Halderstates reasons for operational plan "Gruen". Mission: to prevent retreat of Cz. Army from Moravia-Bohemia area. To beat army. To bring about rapid decision. Mission can be accomplished by pincer attack in the direction of Olmutz and Brunn to be undertaken by 2nd and 14th Armies. Difficult transport situation in Austria. Therefore main effort in 2nd Army area. Cz. frontier can only be lightly held. Withdrawal certain on part of Cz. forces. Several defensive lines favorable but terrain will delay second thrusts and allow time to be gained for a Cz. retreat, and so retain a rear position. This is to be avoided. The Bohemian Moravian heights which will confront the attacker in the last phase will favor probable Cz. line of action. The pincer attack makes a "rear attack" from behind these heights possible. This operation will definitely succeed. Reserves at first mainly local. Further reserves near and south of Prague. Opponent won't have time to form further reserves. Opponent does not possess closed armoured forces. They are distributed and consist of light units.

2nd Army.Weaknesses opposite its sector recognized. Installations only partly completed. Mostly lack armd cupolas. There are great gaps. Olmutz will be reached on the second day. Oppa is no obstacle, can be crossed by tanks as well as Inf. No armd forces opposing. Freudenthal only 35 men garrison. So-called light motorized forces on right flank are no danger. Consist partly of mounted units and will be engaged by adjoining Army. Were the attack, against expectations, to fail, then under no circumstances "bleed to death" before the position. Strategic concentration to be flexible. Rear sections will then be brought up to the points where success has been achieved. Cz fears the Glaz mountain area. Only demonstrations to be staged in this area; there will be a tie up of Cz forces. To provide cover eastwards tanks will be valuable.

On the rest of the mountain front: 4th (9?) Corps, and in the frontier sector demonstrations must be staged to tie up forces.

12th and 14th Armieswill work together. Their columns must necessarily support one another during the thrust and cause the front to collapse. Bohemia only weakly occupied at frontier: 1 Division to 120 kms. Operation therefore promising. After the thrust in a northerly direction 12 Army forces east and "races" for Brunn. The enemy will not be able to employ reserves according to plan.

10th Army facesPilsen Riegel which is strongly fortified. Bad roads. Tanks must break through here and establish bridge-heads for following up forces. Forces of the next wave will be brought up by truck units. After the 3rd and 4th Mobilization day 6 further divisions will be brought up to the 2nd and 3rd line and can be employed where success is in the balance.

The Fuehrer: We should not plan the action on the operations as we desire them, but take into consideration the probable course of action pursued by the enemy. With regard to his course of action two factors are decisive: 1. At the time of our rearmament between 1934 and 1938 our opponent must have endeavoured to secure himself against a tearing of the East-West Communication, in his case probably between Trappau and Nikolsburg. Against us this would imply the building of fortifications on the Upper Silesian frontier. In the South an agreement with Austria would achieve a defense north of the Danube, or an advance to the Danube to protect the Southern flank.

2. The latter is no longer possible. Therefore, as a result of the situation created in March 1938, it is all the more probable that they have increased their fortifications opposite our 2nd army. The enemy must hold there—otherwise there is no sense in holding the remaining front. Hence here the best regiments and fortifications are to be expected. Holding of the front facing the 2nd Army will decide the "To be or Not to be" of Cz. There is no doubt that the planned pincer movement is the most desirable solution and should take place. But its success is nevertheless too uncertain for it to be depended on. Especially as a rapid success is necessary from a political point of view. The first 8 days are politically decisive; within that week a far-reaching territorial gain must be achieved. Our artillery (210cm Howitzers) not adequate against fortifications. Where an attack is expected the element of surprise is ruled out. Besides from experience it is difficult to refrain from an action that achieves only part-success. More and more units are thrown into breaks, and bleeding-to-death which one wanted to avoid sets in (Verdun!!). Tanks are used up and are not available for the subsequent territory-gaining operation. The consequence is that motorized divisions have to advance without tanks. ("Tables Turned")

Also the objectives of the motorized units are not too far-removed and can be gained without fighting, so that they could be equally well gained by infantry troops. The motorized divisions will not be able to influence a decision to any extent. It is the task of motorized forces to bridge areas free of the enemy. Where an attack opens up a large free space, the commitment of motorized forces is justified. Compare with the use of army cavalry at the beginning of the 1914 war. It is catastrophic for tanks to have to stop and wait for infantry. This contradicts all laws of logic. In the 14th army sector fortifications can only have been begun since March. Hence, thrust toward Brunn will be easier. 2nd Pz Div can therefore be left there. However, this division should operate with the 29th motorized division.Therefore the 29th must not arrive on the evening of the 2nd day.The 2nd Pz must constitute the advance column of the 29th Div (Mot.). Are the road conditions suitable for the 29th? The 13th Division, which has no prospects of success as a Mot. division with the 12th Army, is to be transferred to the Reichenau Army together with 2nd Motorized Div. Thus 2 chances for victory will be created.

If pincer movement has no success, 10th Army will open way for 12th Army, bringing strong forces into the heart of the country. If both operations are successful, this means the end of Cz. In place of the two motorized divisions it is preferable to mobilize two further divisions which are to be brought up in trucks and buses. For the 10th Army the turn Northeast toward Prague may become necessary.

General Oberst v. Brauchitsch: Employment of motorized divisions was based on the difficult rail situation in Austria and the difficulties in getting other divs. (ready to march) into the area at the right time. In the West vehicles will have to leave on the 20th of Sept., if X-Day remains as planned. Workers leave on the 23rd, by relays. Specialist workers remain according to decision by Army Command 2.

The Fuehrer: Doesn't see why workers have to return home as early as X-11. Other workers and people are also on the way on mobilization day. Also the RR cars, they will stand around unnecessarily later on.

General Keitel: Workers are not under the jurisdiction of district commands (Bezirks Kdos.) in the West. Trains must be assembled.

v. Brauchitsch: 235,000 men RAD [Labour Service] will be drafted. 96 Construction Bns will be distributed (also in the east). 40,000 trained laborers stay in the West.

Fuehrer: Trained men should be distributed among newly formed divisions on 2nd line.

Brauchitsch: Will be investigated. Implies change of mobilization orders if war orders already in the hands of the people.

General Construction Inspector Dr. Todt (late brought into the conference): Delays in unloading of material through slow changeover in timetable of RRs only from 15 September. Transports must be in their appointed positions by X minus 11. Air zone to take 2nd place to the Infantry zone. Build battery positions.

Certified/s/ SCHMUNDTMajor on Gen. Staff

[ITEM 20] [Typescript]Schm [initialled by Schmundt]Nurnberg, 10 September 1938[Stamp]Office of the Armed Forces Adjutant attached to theFuehrer Reich ChancellorReceived 19 September 1938The Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed ForcesTOP SECRET

1. The whole RAD organization comes under the command of the Supreme Command of the Army effective 15 September.2. The Chief of OKW decides on the first commitments of this organization in conjunction with the Reichs Labor Leader (Reichsarbeitsfuehrer) and on assignments from time to time to the Supreme Commands of the Navy, Army and Air Force. Where questions arise with regard to competency he will make a final decision in accordance with my instructions.3. For the time being this order is to be made known only to the departments and personnel immediately concerned.

1. The whole RAD organization comes under the command of the Supreme Command of the Army effective 15 September.

2. The Chief of OKW decides on the first commitments of this organization in conjunction with the Reichs Labor Leader (Reichsarbeitsfuehrer) and on assignments from time to time to the Supreme Commands of the Navy, Army and Air Force. Where questions arise with regard to competency he will make a final decision in accordance with my instructions.

3. For the time being this order is to be made known only to the departments and personnel immediately concerned.

[signed] ADOLF HITLERSupreme Command of the Armed ForcesNo. 2038/38 Most Secret WFA/L IIcT 9.9

Distribution:

C-in-C of the ArmyReich Minister for Air and C-in-C of the Air ForceC-in-C of the NavyReichsminister of the Interiorfor the attention of Ministerial Director Dr. DanckwertsHead of Reich Labor Service through Admin Office (VOA)

Distribution:

Adjutant to the Fuehrer—1st CopyWZ, WH, WR—2nd to 4th CopiesArmed Forces Ops. Dept.—5th CopyLIa, Ib, Ic, IV, VOA—6th to 10th CopiesWNV—11th CopyOffice for Ausl/Abwehr—12th to 14th CopiesGeneral Armed Forces Office—15th to 17th CopiesArmed Forces Staff—18th to 20th CopiesSpare—21st to 25th Copies

25 Copies 1st CopyA true copy:HofmannOberst (Reserve)

[ITEM 21] [Typescript]Berlin, 14 September 193812 CopiesSupreme Command of the Armed ForcesNo. 2044/38 Most Secret WFA/L IIc[Stamp]Office of the Adjutant of the Armed Forces attachedto the Fuehrer and Reichs ChancellorReceived 19 Sept. 1938Reg. No. 198/35Despatched SchmClerk [initialled by Schmundt]

Subject: Employment of Reich Labor Service for Manoeuvres with Wehrmacht.

I. Effective 15 September the following units will be under command of the C-in-C of the Army

1. The RAD forces of the light road construction battalions.2. Those parent units of construction troops which are to be formed from personnel from 2 Gau Commands, 21 RAD Group Commands, and 91 RAD Battalions of Wehrkreis HQs VII, IX and XIII, and set up at Army Group HQ 2 (Heeresgruppenkommando) for the purpose of carrying out exercises within the areas of Wehrkreis HQs V and XII.3.a.The staff of Labor Gau W (Arbeitsgaustab) and the section and group staffs of the RAD employed on the construction of the Western fortifications and also RAD Battalions with the exception of those branches of the RAD attached to the Reich Minister for Air and the C-in-C of the Air Force (compare Section 8).b.Labor Gaus XXI, XXIV, XXV, XXVI, XXVII, and XXXII come under the Supreme Command of the Army only in matters affecting the defence of the country. Those RAD units from these Labor Gaus employed at the moment for purposes of the country's Kultur, etc., will retain these tasks for the time being, Labor Service for Girls [AWJ] is excepted from coming under the control of the Supreme Command of the Army.c.It must be borne in mind, when allotting military tasks to those sections of the RAD named inaandbabove, that in accordance with Appendix 7 to the Army Mobilization Plan for Deputy Gau Commands, Deputy Group Commands and Guard Units will remain with the RAD if and when mobilization takes place.4. The C-in-C of the Army and Reichs Labor Leader are requested to discuss all details under 1 and 3 direct.II. 5. Light road construction battalions are training-units of the Army. Their members are regarded as having been drafted into the Armed Forces for manoeuvre purposes and are soldiers.6. The members of remaining formations as per 2 and 3 who have been taken exclusively from the RAD will remain RAD leaders or men until mobilization.But it is possible that they will have to be attached to the Army for administration or that the army must furnish money if difficulties are encountered in prompt payment of the men.The C-in-C of the Army and the Reich Labor Leader are requested to settle details by direct agreement.7. In case of mobilization the regulations laid down in Appendix 7 of the plan for the mobilization of the army come into effect automatically and apply also to those exercise formations for which there have up to now been restrictive regulations with regard to their coming fully under the command of the Army.III. 8. Those RAD staffs and Battalions made over to the Luftwaffe in the Limes area will be under command of the Reich Minister for Air and the C-in-C of the Air Force beginning September 15. The same regulations apply in essence to them.

1. The RAD forces of the light road construction battalions.

2. Those parent units of construction troops which are to be formed from personnel from 2 Gau Commands, 21 RAD Group Commands, and 91 RAD Battalions of Wehrkreis HQs VII, IX and XIII, and set up at Army Group HQ 2 (Heeresgruppenkommando) for the purpose of carrying out exercises within the areas of Wehrkreis HQs V and XII.

3.a.The staff of Labor Gau W (Arbeitsgaustab) and the section and group staffs of the RAD employed on the construction of the Western fortifications and also RAD Battalions with the exception of those branches of the RAD attached to the Reich Minister for Air and the C-in-C of the Air Force (compare Section 8).b.Labor Gaus XXI, XXIV, XXV, XXVI, XXVII, and XXXII come under the Supreme Command of the Army only in matters affecting the defence of the country. Those RAD units from these Labor Gaus employed at the moment for purposes of the country's Kultur, etc., will retain these tasks for the time being, Labor Service for Girls [AWJ] is excepted from coming under the control of the Supreme Command of the Army.c.It must be borne in mind, when allotting military tasks to those sections of the RAD named inaandbabove, that in accordance with Appendix 7 to the Army Mobilization Plan for Deputy Gau Commands, Deputy Group Commands and Guard Units will remain with the RAD if and when mobilization takes place.

b.Labor Gaus XXI, XXIV, XXV, XXVI, XXVII, and XXXII come under the Supreme Command of the Army only in matters affecting the defence of the country. Those RAD units from these Labor Gaus employed at the moment for purposes of the country's Kultur, etc., will retain these tasks for the time being, Labor Service for Girls [AWJ] is excepted from coming under the control of the Supreme Command of the Army.

c.It must be borne in mind, when allotting military tasks to those sections of the RAD named inaandbabove, that in accordance with Appendix 7 to the Army Mobilization Plan for Deputy Gau Commands, Deputy Group Commands and Guard Units will remain with the RAD if and when mobilization takes place.

4. The C-in-C of the Army and Reichs Labor Leader are requested to discuss all details under 1 and 3 direct.

II. 5. Light road construction battalions are training-units of the Army. Their members are regarded as having been drafted into the Armed Forces for manoeuvre purposes and are soldiers.

6. The members of remaining formations as per 2 and 3 who have been taken exclusively from the RAD will remain RAD leaders or men until mobilization.

But it is possible that they will have to be attached to the Army for administration or that the army must furnish money if difficulties are encountered in prompt payment of the men.

The C-in-C of the Army and the Reich Labor Leader are requested to settle details by direct agreement.

7. In case of mobilization the regulations laid down in Appendix 7 of the plan for the mobilization of the army come into effect automatically and apply also to those exercise formations for which there have up to now been restrictive regulations with regard to their coming fully under the command of the Army.

III. 8. Those RAD staffs and Battalions made over to the Luftwaffe in the Limes area will be under command of the Reich Minister for Air and the C-in-C of the Air Force beginning September 15. The same regulations apply in essence to them.

The Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces

By OrderSigned Keitel

Distribution:

C-in-C of the Army—1st to 3rd CopyReich Minister for Air and C-in-C of the Air Forces—4th to 6th CopyHead of Reich Labor Service—7th to 8th CopyL Ia, II, IV—9th to 11th CopyDraft (VOA)—12th Copy

Distribution 2: 25 Copies

Adjutant to the Fuehrer—1st CopyWZ, WH, WR—2nd to 4th CopyArmed Forces Ops Dept—5th CopyArmed Forces Ops Dept/L Ib, Ic—6th CopyArmed Forces Communications (WNV)—7th CopyOffice of Ausl/Abwehr—8th to 10th CopyGeneral Armed Forces Office—11th to 13th CopyArmed Forces Staff—14th to 16th CopyDraft—17th CopySpare—18th to 25th Copy

A true Copy:HOFMANNOberst (Reserve)

[ITEM 22] [Typescript]MOST SECRETBerlin, 16 September 1938Supreme Command of the Armed ForcesWFA No. 194/38 Most Secret S.O. Only L IaS.O. OnlyAccess only through Officer7 Copies 5th Copy19.9.38Schm

Subject: Preparations on part of Reichsbahn etc.

The Reichsbahn must provide trains of empty trucks in great numbers by September 28 for the carrying out of mobilization exercises. This task now takes precedence over all others.

Therefore the train-loads for the Limes-job will have to be cut down after September 17 and those goods loaded previous to this date unloaded by September 20.

The Supreme Command of the Army (5th Division of the Army General Staff) must issue further orders after consultation with the authorities concerned.

However, in accordance with the Fuehrer's directive, every effort should be made to continue to supply the materials in as large quantities as feasible even after 20th September 1938, and this for reasons of camouflage as well as in order to continue the important work on the Limes.

Reports should be submitted on what can be done in this direction.

Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed ForcesSigned Keitel

Distribution:

Supreme Command of the Army—1 (Copy 1)C-in-C of the Air Force (Ketzinger's staff)—1 (Copy 2)General Inspector for Roads—1 (Copy 3)CertifiedZeitzlerOberst on the General StaffMajor Schmundt[There is no ITEM 23 in the file]

[ITEM 24] [Typescript]MOST SECRETBerlin, September 16, 193930 Copies 4th CopyT 9.9[Stamp]Schm[initialled by Schmundt]Office of the Armed ForcesAdjutant attached to the Fuehrer and Reich ChancellorRec. 19th Sept. 1938,EnclosuresReg. No. 199138DespatchedClerkSupreme Command of the Armed ForcesNo. 2120/38 Most Secret WFA/L IIc

Subject: Employment of the Reich Labor Service (RAD)

1. The following RAD forces will receive military training; in accordance with the instructions of the C-in-C of the Army:

From the area of the—

IInd Army Korps (AKs) 7 BattalionsIIIrd 2 BattalionsIVth 31 BattalionsVth 1 BattalionVIth 78 BattalionsVIIth 1 BattalionIXth 65 BattalionsXth 84 BattalionsXIth 33 Battalions

For the time being these battalions are still part of the RAD in matters regarding personnel, administration, and discipline.

2. The C-in-C of the Army and Reich Labor Leader are requested to settle all details by direct agreement.

For the Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces

By OrderJodl

Distribution:

Supreme Command of the Army—1st CopyReich Minister for Air and C-in-C of the Air Forces—2nd CopyHead of Reich Labor Service—3rd CopyWZ, WH, WR—5th-7th CopiesArmed Forces Ops Division—8th CopyL Ia, Ib, Ic, IV, VOA—9th-13th CopiesArmed Forces Communications Dept.—14th CopyOffice of Ausl/Abwehr—15th-17th CopiesGeneral Armed Force Office—18th-20th CopiesArmed Forces Staff—21st-23rd CopiesSpare—24th-30th Copies

[ITEM 25] [Telegram][Handwritten note]MOST SECRETS.O. ONLY

LAST NIGHT CONFERENCE TOOK PLACE BETWEEN FUEHRER AND OBERSTLEUTNANT KOECHLING. DURATION OF CONFERENCE 7 MINUTES. LT. COL. KOECHLING REMAINS DIRECTLY RESPONSIBLE TO OKW. HE WILL BE ASSIGNED TO KONRAD HENLEIN IN AN ADVISORY CAPACITY. HE RECEIVED FAR-REACHING MILITARY PLENARY POWERS FROM THE FUEHRER. THE SUDETEN GERMAN FREE CORPS REMAINS RESPONSIBLE TO KONRAD HENLEIN ALONE. PURPOSE: PROTECTION OF THE SUDETEN GERMANS AND MAINTENANCE OF DISTURBANCES AND CLASHES. THE FREE CORPS WILL BE ESTABLISHED IN GERMANY. ARMAMENT ONLY WITH AUSTRIAN WEAPONS. ACTIVITIES OF FREE CORPS TO BEGIN AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

[Pencil Note] 1045, 18 Sept 38RADIOED to Capt.Engel, Berlin.

[ITEM 26] [Telegram][Handwritten note]MOST SECRETS.O. ONLY[In Ink]18.9381030vb

GERMAN 2nd ARMY—COSEL—7 Inf. Div's, 1 Armd Div, 1 Inf Div on trucks, 1 Light Div, of these the following arrive on 1st X day: Two-thirds of one Inf Div, 1 Armd Div, and 1 Inf Div on trucks.

On 2nd X Day: one-third of one Inf Div.On 3rd X Day: 1 Inf DivOn 4th X Day: 1 Inf DivOn 5th X Day: 2 Inf Divs from 7th day on 1 Inf Div and one light Div.

On 2nd X Day: one-third of one Inf Div.

On 3rd X Day: 1 Inf Div

On 4th X Day: 1 Inf Div

On 5th X Day: 2 Inf Divs from 7th day on 1 Inf Div and one light Div.

8th Army:—FREIBURG—4 Inf Divs. The following is the timetable for arrival:

On 2nd X Day: two-thirds of one Inf DivOn 3rd X Day: one-third of one Inf DivOn 4th and 5th X Day: One Inf Div each day.4th Army Corps—Herrenhut, 2 Inf Divs of which one will arrive on the 1st day, the other on the 3rd day.

On 2nd X Day: two-thirds of one Inf Div

On 3rd X Day: one-third of one Inf Div

On 4th and 5th X Day: One Inf Div each day.

4th Army Corps—Herrenhut, 2 Inf Divs of which one will arrive on the 1st day, the other on the 3rd day.

10th Army:—SCHWANDORF—3 Inf Div's, 1 Armd Div, 1 Light Div, 3 Mot Inf Divs. They will arrive as follows:

On 1st X Day: 1 Inf Div and 1 Armd Div. 1 Light Div, 2 Mot Inf Divs.On 2nd X Day: 1 Inf Div., 1 Mot Inf Div.On 4th X Day: 1 Inf Div.

On 1st X Day: 1 Inf Div and 1 Armd Div. 1 Light Div, 2 Mot Inf Divs.

On 2nd X Day: 1 Inf Div., 1 Mot Inf Div.

On 4th X Day: 1 Inf Div.

12th Army:—PASSAU—7 Inf Div's, 1 Mountain Div, 1 Inf Div on trucks, Regt. They arrive as follows:

On 1st X Day: 1 Inf Div, 1 Mountain Div.On 2nd X Day: 2 Inf Div, 1 Inf Div on trucksOn 4th X Day: 2 Inf Div's.On 7th X Day: 1 Inf Div.On 8th X Day: 1 Inf Div.

On 1st X Day: 1 Inf Div, 1 Mountain Div.

On 2nd X Day: 2 Inf Div, 1 Inf Div on trucks

On 4th X Day: 2 Inf Div's.

On 7th X Day: 1 Inf Div.

On 8th X Day: 1 Inf Div.

14th Army:—VIENNA—1 Inf Div, 2 Mountain Div's, 1 Armd Div, 1 Light Div, 1 Mot Inf Div. N N Mot [?] They will arrive as follows:

On 1st X Day: one-third of one Inf Div, 1 Armd Div, 1 Mot. Div.On 2nd X Day: 2/3 of one Inf Div, 1 Light Div.On 3rd X Day: 2 Mountain Divs.

On 1st X Day: one-third of one Inf Div, 1 Armd Div, 1 Mot. Div.

On 2nd X Day: 2/3 of one Inf Div, 1 Light Div.

On 3rd X Day: 2 Mountain Divs.

ENDReich War Ministry/Naval Communication ServiceMOST SECRET 18.9

Renewed attention is called to strictest observance of secrecy regarding following message. Noted. Message begins—

[There follows a repetition of the above telegram in its exact form.]

Any questions?

[ITEM 27] [Typescript]

Army Appointments Held

Army Group Command: C-in-C: Gen. of Inf. AdamCofS : Gen. of Inf. WietersheimG-3 : Lt. Col. Muller1st Army HQ: C-in-C: Gen. of Arty BeckCofS : Maj. Gen. v. ApellG-3 : Col. v. Greiffenberg2nd Army HQ: C-in-C: Gen. v. RundstedtCofS : Brig Gen v. SalmuthG-3 : Lt. Col. Hasse3rd Army HQ: C-in-C: Gen. of Arty v. KuechlerCofS : Brig. Gen. HollidtG-3 : Lt. Col. Wagner4th Army HQ: C-in-C: Gen. (for special duties)v. HamersteinCofS : Maj. Gen. ViebahnG-3 : Lieut. Col. Metz5th Army HQ: C-in-C: Gen. of Inf LiebmannCofS : Brig. Gen. v. SodensternG-3 : Col. Duvert7th Army HQ: C-in-C: Gen. of Inf. (for specialduties) Baron Zeutterv. LotzenCofS : Brig. Gen. ModlG-3 : Col. v. Witzleben8th Army HQ: C-in-C: Gen. v. BockCofS : Brig. Gen. FelberG-3 : Col. Hauffe10th Army HQ: C-in-C: Gen. of Arty v. ReichenauCofS : Brig. Gen. BernardG-3 : Col. Dostler12th Army HQ: C-in-C: Gen. Ritter (for specialduties) v. LeebCofS : Maj. Gen. v. Lewinsky,known as v. MansteinG-3 : Lt. Col. Blumentritt14th Army HQ: C-in-C: Gen. of Inf ListCofS : Maj. Gen. RuoffG-3 : Col. Wohler

[ITEM 28:One Page Mobilization Schedule, not translated]

Berlin, 21 Sept 1938[ITEM 29] [Typescript]Chief, OKW

If the Czech Government accepts terms:

a.Cession of Sudeten German territory

b.Plebiscite in Czech-German territories,

The following military measures are to be considered:

1. The withdrawal by the Czechs from this territory of troops, police and Gendarmerie and other military units.2. The immediate surrender of arms in these territories.3. The immediate surrender of all fortifications in the areas with all arms and equipment.4. The immediate evacuation of fortifications by the military outside the above territories.5. The withdrawal of all military power behind a security line, which will include the fortifications under (4).6. The right of the German Wehrmacht to use all public transportation and communications, especially the railroads, for military purposes.7. The right to fly over the above territories and to maintain Air security up to the security line.8. The occupation of territories to be ceded including the adjoining railroad junctions, communications installations, towns, airfields, etc. inland beyond the last fortification line.9. Pacification and security of the Plebiscite Areas by:a. German Police (originally)b. International Police (later for plebiscite)10. Demobilization of the entire Czech armed forces in the remaining area of the country, discharge of all reserves, etc.11. Immediate discharge of all Sudeten-Germans in the armed forces from the whole of Czechoslovakia to be sent home into Sudeten-Germany.12. Closing down of entire armament industry until after the end of all negotiations.13.a.Prohibition of any new fortifications and field fortifications opposite the security line.b.Destruction of all existing fortifications which are situated beyond the future German borders.14. Demand further cession of territory on military grounds, namely the Pressburg bridgehead, the area northwest of Pilsen, the Eger sector west of the Elbe to Laun.15. Security line must be 25 km from the territory being ceded to Germany or the territory being put to the vote. (See number 5.)16. Cessation, immediately, of all military Intelligence work against Germany. Violation will be considered breach of neutrality.17. Immediate pardon and release of all Germans and Sudeten-Germans, convicted of espionage.18. Transfer of all Czech Air Force personnel to their peace time garrisons and prohibiting of all military flying operations.19. Prohibition of destruction or sabotage of any military installations, including ground installations of the Air Force, in the territories to be ceded.20. The closing down and handing over to the German armed forces of all radio transmitters of a military, official or private nature in the areas to be ceded.21. The handing over of all Railroad networks including rolling stock, undamaged.22. The handing over of all Public Utilities (power houses, gas works, etc.) undamaged.23. No materials of any kind to be transferred (such as raw materials, provisions, livestock, etc.).24. Prohibition of import of war equipment of any kind.25. Demobilization of Danube patrol and security vessels.

1. The withdrawal by the Czechs from this territory of troops, police and Gendarmerie and other military units.

2. The immediate surrender of arms in these territories.

3. The immediate surrender of all fortifications in the areas with all arms and equipment.

4. The immediate evacuation of fortifications by the military outside the above territories.

5. The withdrawal of all military power behind a security line, which will include the fortifications under (4).

6. The right of the German Wehrmacht to use all public transportation and communications, especially the railroads, for military purposes.

7. The right to fly over the above territories and to maintain Air security up to the security line.

8. The occupation of territories to be ceded including the adjoining railroad junctions, communications installations, towns, airfields, etc. inland beyond the last fortification line.

9. Pacification and security of the Plebiscite Areas by:

a. German Police (originally)b. International Police (later for plebiscite)

a. German Police (originally)

b. International Police (later for plebiscite)

10. Demobilization of the entire Czech armed forces in the remaining area of the country, discharge of all reserves, etc.

11. Immediate discharge of all Sudeten-Germans in the armed forces from the whole of Czechoslovakia to be sent home into Sudeten-Germany.

12. Closing down of entire armament industry until after the end of all negotiations.

13.a.Prohibition of any new fortifications and field fortifications opposite the security line.b.Destruction of all existing fortifications which are situated beyond the future German borders.

13.a.Prohibition of any new fortifications and field fortifications opposite the security line.

b.Destruction of all existing fortifications which are situated beyond the future German borders.

14. Demand further cession of territory on military grounds, namely the Pressburg bridgehead, the area northwest of Pilsen, the Eger sector west of the Elbe to Laun.

15. Security line must be 25 km from the territory being ceded to Germany or the territory being put to the vote. (See number 5.)

16. Cessation, immediately, of all military Intelligence work against Germany. Violation will be considered breach of neutrality.

17. Immediate pardon and release of all Germans and Sudeten-Germans, convicted of espionage.

18. Transfer of all Czech Air Force personnel to their peace time garrisons and prohibiting of all military flying operations.

19. Prohibition of destruction or sabotage of any military installations, including ground installations of the Air Force, in the territories to be ceded.

20. The closing down and handing over to the German armed forces of all radio transmitters of a military, official or private nature in the areas to be ceded.

21. The handing over of all Railroad networks including rolling stock, undamaged.

22. The handing over of all Public Utilities (power houses, gas works, etc.) undamaged.

23. No materials of any kind to be transferred (such as raw materials, provisions, livestock, etc.).

24. Prohibition of import of war equipment of any kind.

25. Demobilization of Danube patrol and security vessels.

[ITEM 30] [Typescript]Bayreuth 134[Pencil note written by Schmundt:] Not sent off. Schm26 September 1938

HEADQUARTERS OF THE SUDETEN-GERMAN FREE CORPS

Herr Benesch has dissolved the Sudeten-German Party and believes that he will thus be able to destroy the unity of the Sudeten-German radical group and to deal the death blow to the Sudeten-Germans. Konrad Henlein knew the answer to this. He issued a call on 17.9.38 for the formation of a Sudeten-German Free Corps. Within a few hours, thousands of Sudeten-Germans had already rallied to the colors all along the border. Thousands who were burning to fight for their tortured homeland were forced, to their great disappointment, to remain at their places of work, because it was impossible, in such a short period of time, to induct, equip and arm the masses of enthusiastic volunteers. For even in the first few hours after the appeal (probably the first instance in the history of the Free Corps) shock troops of the Free Corps began, in extremely daring operations, to secure the escape of their countrymen who had been hounded out of their homeland by their torturers.

Since 19 Sept.—in more than 300 missions—the Free Corps has executed its task with an amazing spirit ofattack(defense)* and with a willingness often reaching a degree of unqualified self-sacrifice. The result of the first phase of its activities: more than 1500 prisoners, 25 MG's and a large amount of other weapons and equipment, aside from serious losses in dead and wounded suffered by theenemy(The Czech Terrorists).*

Thousands of members of the Sudeten-German Free Corps stand shoulder to shoulder on the frontiers of Germany. They are inspired by but one desire: The freedom of the homeland within Adolf Hitler's Greater Germany.

For Konrad HenleinThe Chief of Staff

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