Chapter 22

The Fuehrer and Commander-in-Chief of the German Armed Forces

OKW/WFSt/Abt.L(I) Nr. 33 408/40 gK Chefs.SECRETThe Fuehrer's Headquarters18 December 40(only through officer)9 copies, 4th copyDirective Nr. 21Case Barbarossa

The German Armed Forces must be preparedto crush Soviet Russia in a quick campaignbefore the end of the war against England (case Barbarossa).

For this purpose theArmywill have to employ all available units with the reservation that the occupied territories will have to be safeguarded against surprise attacks.

For the Eastern campaign theAirforcewill have to free such strong forces for the support of the Army that a quick completion of the ground operations may be expected and that damage of the eastern German territories will be avoided as much as possible. This concentration of the main effort in the East is limited by the following reservation: That the entire battle and armament area dominated by us must remain sufficiently protected against enemy air attacks and that the attacks on England and especially the supply for them must not be permitted to break down.

Concentration of the main effort of the Navy remains unequivocally against England also during an Eastern campaign.

If occasion arises I will order the concentration of troops for action against Soviet Russia eight weeks before the intended beginning of operations.

Preparations requiring more time to start are—if this has not yet been done—to begin presently and are to be completed by 15 May 1941.

Great caution has to be exercised that the intention of an attack will not be recognized.

The preparations of the High Command are to be made on the following basis:

I.General Purpose:

The mass of the RussianArmyin Western Russia is to be destroyed in daring operations by driving forward deep wedges with tanks and the retreat of intact battle-ready troops into the wide spaces of Russia is to be prevented.

In quick pursuit a (given) line is to be reached from where the Russian Airforce will no longer be able to attack German Reich territory. The first goal of operations is the protection from Asiatic Russia from the general line Volga-Archangelsk. In case of necessity, the last industrial area in the Urals left to Russia could be eliminated by the Luftwaffe.

In the course of these operations the Russian Baltic Sea Fleet will quickly erase its bases and will no longer be ready to fight.

Effective intervention by the RussianAirforceis to be prevented through forceful blows at the beginning of the operations.

II.Probable Allies and their tasks.

[Page 4,par. II]

2. It will be the task of Rumania, together with the forces concentrating there, to pin down the opponent on the other side and, in addition, to render auxiliary services in the rear area.

[Page 8,par. IV]

IV. It must be clearly understood that all orders to be given by the commanders-in-chief on the basis of this letter of instructions areprecautionary measures, in case Russia should change her present attitude toward us. The number of officers to be drafted for the preparations at an early time is to be kept as small as possible. Further co-workers are to be detailed as late as possible and only as far as each individual is needed for a specific task. Otherwise, the danger exists that our preparations (the time of their execution has not been fixed) will become known and thereby grave political and military disadvantages would result.

V. I am expecting the reports of the commanders-in-chief on their further plans based on this letter of instructions.

The preparation planned by all branches of the Armed Forces are to be reported to me through the High Command, also in regard to their time.

[signed] Hitler[initialed by: Jodl, Keitel, Warlimont and one illegible.]Distribution:Ob. d. H. (Op. Abt.)—1. copyOb. d. M. (Skl.)—2. copyOb. d. L. (Lw.Fue.St.)—3. copyOKW:WFSt.—4. copyAbt.—5-9. copy

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 447-PS

TOP SECRETTop SecretOnly thru officerOKWArmed Forces Operational StaffSection L (IV/Qu)44125/41 Top SecretFuehrer Hq, 13 March 19415 copies, 4th copy

Subject: Armed Forces Operational Staff/Section L(I)#33408/40. Top Secret. 18 December 1940Directives for Special Areas to Order #21(Case Barbarossa)

I. Area of operations and executive power

1. The authorization to issue orders and the regulations regarding supply for an area of operationswithin the armed forcesshall be set up by the High Command of the Armed Forces inEast Prussiaand in theGeneral Gouvernementat the latest four weeks before operations are started. The proposal by the High Command of the Army (OKH) is being made in time, after an agreement with the Commander of the Luftwaffe (Ob.d.L.) has been reached.

It is not contemplated todeclareEast Prussia and the General Gouvernementan area of operations. However, in accordance with the unpublished Fuehrer orders from 19 and 21 October 1939, the Supreme Commander of the Army shall be authorized to take all measures necessary for the execution of his military aim and for the safeguarding of the troops. He may transfer his authority onto the Supreme Commander of the Army Groups and Armies. Orders of that kind have priority over all orders issued by civilian agencies.

2.The Russian territorywhich is to be occupied shall be divided up into individual states withgovernments of their own, according to special orders, as soon as military operations are concluded. From this the following is inferred:

a.The area of operations, created through the advance of the Army beyond the frontiers of the Reich and the neighboring countries is to be limited in depth as far as possible. The Supreme Commander of the Army has the right to exercise the executive power in this area, and may transfer his authority onto the Supreme Commanders of the Army Groups and Armies.

b.In the area of operations, theReichsfuehrer SSis, on behalf of the Fuehrer, entrusted withspecial tasksfor the preparation of thepolitical administration, tasks which result from the struggle which has to be carried out between two opposing political systems. Within the realm of these tasks, the Reichsfuehrer SS shall act independently and under his own responsibility. The executive power invested in the Supreme Commander of the Army (OKH) and in agencies determined by him shall not be affected by this. It is the responsibility of the Reichsfuehrer SS that through the execution of his tasks military operations shall not be disturbed. Details shall be arranged directly through the OKH with the Reichsfuehrer SS.

c.As soon as the area of operations has reached sufficient depth, it is to belimited in the rear. The newly occupied territory in the rear of the area of operations is to be given its ownpoliticaladministration. For the present, it is to be divided, according to its genealogic basis and to the positions of the Army Groups, intoNorth(Baltic countries),Center(White Russia)andSouth(Ukraine). In these territoriesthe political administration is taken care of by Commissioners of the Reichwho receive their orders from the Fuehrer.

3. For the execution of allmilitary taskswithin the areas under the political administration in the rear of the area of operations,commanding officerswho are responsible to the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces (OKW) shall be in command.

The commanding officer is thesupreme representative of the Armed Forcesin the respective areas and the bearer of themilitary sovereign rights. He hasthe tasks of a Territorial Commanderand the rights of a supreme Army Commander or a Commanding General. In this capacity he is responsible primarily for the following tasks:

a.Close cooperation with the Commissioner of the Reich in order to support him in his political task.

b.Exploitation of the country and securing its economic values for use by German industry (see par. 4).

c.Exploitation of the country for the supply of the troops according to the needs of the OKH.

d.Military security of the whole area, mainly airports, routes of supply and supply-dumps against revolt, sabotage and enemy paratroops.

e.Traffic regulations.

f.Billeting for armed forces, police and organizations, and for PW's inasmuch as they remain in the administrative areas.

The commanding officer has the right, as opposed to thecivilianagencies, to issue orders which are necessary for the execution of the military tasks. His orders supersede all others, also those of the commissioners of the Reich.

Service directives, mobilization orders and directives on the distribution of the necessary forces shall be issued separately.

The time for the assumption of commandby the commanding officers will be ordered as soon as the military situation shall allow a change in the command without disrupting military operations. Until such time, the agencies set up by the OKH remain in office, operating according to the principles valid for the commanding officers.

4. The Fuehrer has entrusted the uniform direction ofthe administration of economyin the area of operations and in the territories of political administration to the Reich Marshal who has delegated theChief of the "Wi Rue Amt"with the execution of the task. Special orders on that will come from the OKW/Wi Rue Amt.

5. The majority of thePolice Forcesshall be under the jurisdiction of the Commissioners of the Reich. Requests for the employment of police forces in the area of operations on the part of the OKH are to be made as early as possible to the OKW/Armed Forces Operational Staff/Section Defense.

6. The behavior of the troops towards the population and the tasks of themilitary courtsshall be separately regulated, and commanded.

II.Personnel, Supply and Communication Traffic:

7. Special orders shall be issued by the OKW Armed Forces Operational Staff for the measures necessarybefore the beginning of operationsfor the restriction of travel, delivery of goods and communications to Russia.

8.As soon as operations begin, the German-Soviet Russian frontier and at a later stage the border at the rear of the area of operations will be closed by the OKH for any and all non-military traffic with the exception of the police organizations to be deployed by the Reichsfuehrer SS on the Fuehrer's orders. Billeting and feeding of these organizations will be taken care of by the OKH-Gen. Qu. who may for this purpose request from the Reichsfuehrer SS the assignment of liaison officers.

The border shall remain closed also for leading personalities of the highest government agencies and agencies of the Party. The OKW/Armed Forces Operational Staff shall inform the highest government and Party agencies of this fact. The Supreme Commander of the Army and the agencies under him shall decide on exceptions.

Except for the special regulations applying to the police organizations of the Reichsfuehrer SS, applications for entrance-permits must be submitted to the Supreme Commander of the Army exclusively.

III.Regulations regarding Rumania, Slovakia, Hungary and Finland.

9. The necessary arrangements with these countries shall be made by the OKW, together with the Foreign Office, and according to the wishes of the respective high commands. In case it should become necessary during the course of the operations to grant special rights, applications for this purpose are to be submitted to the OKW.

10.Police measuresfor the protection of the troops are permitted, independently from the granting of special rights. Further orders in this shall be issued later.

11.Special orders shall be issued at a later datefor the territories of these countries, on the following subjects:

Procurement of food and feed.Housing and machinery.Purchase and the shipment of merchandise.Procurement of funds and wage-control.Salaries.Request for indemnity-payments.Postal and telegraph services.Traffic.Jurisdiction.

Requests of units of the Armed Forces and agencies of the OKWfrom the respective governments regarding these subjects, are to besubmittedto the OKW/Armed Forces Operational Staff/ Section Defense not later than 27 March 1941.

IV.Directives regarding Sweden.

12. Since Swedencanonly become a transient-area for troops, no special authority is to be granted the commander of the German troops. However, he is entitled and compelled to secure the immediate protection of RR-transports against sabotage and attacks.

The Chief of the High Command of theArmed ForcesSigned: KEITELDistribution:OKH—1st copy.OKM—2nd copy.R.d.L.u.O.K.L.—3rd copy.Armed Forces Operational Staff—4th copy.Section L—5th copy.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 448-PS

Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces.OKW/WFST/Abt. L Nr. 44018/41 g. K. ChiefsF.H.Q. 11th Jan 44TOP SECRET13 copies, 4th copy.Order No. 22

Participation of German Forces in the Fighting in the Mediterranean Theater of Operations.

The situation in the Mediterranean Theater of Operation demands for strategical, political and psychological reasons German assistance, due to employment of superior forces by England against our allies.

Tripolitania must be held and the danger of a collapse of the Albanian front must be removed. Beyond that, the Army group Cavallero, in connection with later operations of the 12th Army, shall be enabled to start an attack also from Albania.

I order therefore, the following:

1. A blocking unit is to be recruited by the High Command of the Army which will be in a position to render valuable services to our Allies in the defense of Tripolitania especially against the English armored divisions. The principles for its composition will be given separately. The preparations for the transfer of the unit will be made in time to follow immediately the present transport of an Italian armored division and a motorized division to Tripoli (starting approximately 20 February).

2. The X Air Corps will retain Sicily as basis for operations. Its most important assignment will be the fight against the English Naval forces and their communications between the western and eastern Mediterranean. Besides that, provisions are also to be made, with the help of temporary landing fields, to attack the English unloading harbors and supply bases on the coast of Western Egypt and Cryenaica and thus give immediate support to the Army group of Graziani.

The Italian Government has been asked to declare the territory between Sicily and the North African coast a "restricted area" [Sperrgebiet] in order to facilitate the operations of the X Air corps and to avoid incidents against neutral ships.

3. For transfer to Albania, German units in the approximate strength of one corps, among them the 1st Mountain Division and Armored forces, are to be provided and held in readiness. The transport of the 1st Mountain Division is to commence, as soon as the approval of the Italians is received by the High Command of the Armed forces. In the meantime, it must be examined and determined with the Italian High Command in Albania whether and how many more forces for operational attacks could be employed to good advantage and could also be supplied besides the Italian Divisions.

The duty of the German forces will be:

a.To serve in Albania for the time being as a reserve for an emergency case, should new crises arise there;

b.To ease the burden of the Italian Army group when later attacking with the aim:

To tear open the Greek defense front on a decisive point for a far-reaching operation,

To open up the straits west of Saloniki from the back in order to support thereby the frontal attack of List's Army.

4. The directives for the questions of authority over the German troops to be employed in North Africa and Albania and the restrictions which are to be made with reference to their employment, will be settled by the High Command of the Armed Forces and the Italian Armed Forces staff.

5. The suitable transports available in the Mediterranean only as far as they are not already used for transportations to Tripoli, to be provided for the transfer of the Albania-bound troops. For transports of personnel, the transportation group Ju 52 stationed in Foggia is to be utilized.

Every effort should be made to complete the transfer of the bulk of the German forces to Albania before the transfer of the blocking unit to Lybia starts, (See 1) and the use of all German boats becomes necessary for this purpose.

[signed] Adolf HitlerDistribution:OKH/Gen Staff of Army, operating—1st cy.OKM/Skl—2nd cy.Ob.d.L./Lw.F.St.I a—3rd cy.OKW WFST—4th cy.————L—5th to 9th cy.WNV—10th cy.Foreign/Intelligence—11th cy.Armed Forces, Transport Chief—12th cy.German General with the Italian high command—13th cy.

F.H.Q. 29th Jan 41High Command of the Armed ForcesWFST/Abt. L(I) Nr. 44018/41 g.K. Chefs II. Anz.13 copies, 4th copy.

Ref: The Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces. OKW /WFST/Abt. L(L) Nr. 44018/41 gk Chefs. V. 11th Jan. 41

The measures ordered in Order 22 are to be given the following code names:

Operation Tripoli: "Sonnenblume"Operation Albania: "Alpenveilchen"The Chief of the High Commandof the Armed Forces.

By order(Signed) Warlimont

Distribution:OKH/general staff of Army, operations—1st cy.OKM/SKL—2nd cy.Ob. d. M./Lw Fuest—3rd cy.OKW:WFST—4th cy.Section L—5th to 9th cy.WNV—10th cy.Foreign/Intelligence—11th cy.Armed Forces, Transportation Ch.—12th cy.German General with the Italian high command—13th cy.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 498-PS

TOP SECRETThe FuehrerNo. 003830/42 g. Kdos. OKW/WFStFuehrer HQ, 18 Oct. 194212 copies, 12th copy.

1. For some time our enemies have been using in their warfare methods which are outside the international Geneva Conventions. Especially brutal and treacherous is the behavior of the so-called commandos, who, as is established, are partially recruited even from freed criminals in enemy countries. From captured orders it is divulged, that they are directed not only to shackle prisoners, but also to kill defenseless prisoners on the spot at the moment in which they believe that the latter as prisoners represent a burden in the further pursuit of their purposes or could otherwise be a hindrance. Finally, orders have been found in which the killing of prisoners has been demanded in principle.

2. For this reason it was already announced in an addendum to the Armed Forces report of 7 October 1942, that in the future, Germany, in the face of these sabotage troops of the British and their accomplices, will resort to the same procedure, i.e., that they will be ruthlessly mowed down by the German troops in combat, wherever they may appear.

3. I therefore order:

From now on all enemies on so-called Commando missions in Europe or Africa challenged by German troops, even if they are to all appearances soldiers in uniform or demolition troops, whether armed or unarmed, in battle or in flight, are to be slaughtered to the last man. It does not make any difference whether they are landed from ships and aeroplanes for their actions, or whether they are dropped by parachute. Even if these individuals, when found, should apparently be prepared to give themselves up, no pardon is to be granted them on principle. In each individual case full information is to be sent to the O.K.W. for publication in the Report of the Military Forces.

4. If individual members of such commandos, such as agents, saboteurs, etc. fall into the hands of the military forces by some other means, through the police in occupied territories for instance, they are to be handed over immediately to the SD. Any imprisonment under military guard, in PW stockades for instance, etc., is strictly prohibited, even if this is only intended for a short time.

5. This order does not apply to the treatment of any enemy soldiers who, in the course of normal hostilities (large-scale offensive actions, landing operations and airborne operations), are captured in open battle or give themselves up. Nor does this order apply to enemy soldiers falling into our hands after battles at sea, or enemy soldiers trying to save their lives by parachute after battles.

6. I will hold responsible under Military Law, for failing to carry out this order, all commanders and officers who either have neglected their duty of instructing the troops about this order, or acted against this order where it was to be executed.

[signed] Adolf Hitler

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 501-PS

Field Post Office Kiev, 16 May 1942No 32704B Nr 40/42TOP SECRETTo: SS-Obersturmbannfuehrer Rauff [Handwritten:]Berlin, Prinz-Albrecht-Str. 8 pers.R/29/5 Pradel n.Rb/R[Handwritten:] Sinkkel [?] b.R, p 16/6

The overhauling of vans by groups D and C is finished. While the vans of the first series can also be put into action if the weather is not too bad, the vans of the second series (Saurer)stop completely in rainy weather. If it has rained for instance for only one half hour, the van cannot be used because it simply skids away. It can only be used in absolutely dry weather. It is only a question now whether the van can only be used standing at the place of execution. First the van has to be brought to that place, which is possible only in good weather. The place of execution is usually 10-15 km away from the highways and is difficult to access because of its location; in damp or wet weather it is not accessible at all. If the persons to be executed are driven or led to that place, then they realize immediately what is going on and get restless, which is to be avoided as far as possible. There is only one way left; to load them at the collecting point and to drive them to the spot.

I ordered the vans of group D to be camouflaged as house-trailers by putting one set of window shutters on each side of the small van and two on each side of the larger vans, such as one often sees on farm-houses in the country. The vans became so well-known, that not only the authorities, but also the civilian population called the van "death van", as soon as one of these vehicles appeared. It is my opinion, the van cannot be kept secret for any length of time, not even camouflaged.

The Saurer-van which I transported from Simferopol to Taganrog suffered damage to the brakes on the way. The Security Command [SK] in Mariupol found the cuff of the combined oil-air brake broken at several points. By persuading and bribing the H.K.P. [?] we managed to have a form machined, on which the cuffs were cast. When I came to Stalino and Gorlowka a few days later, the drivers of the vans complained about the same faults. After having talked to the commandants of those commands I went once more to Mariupol to have some more cuffs made for those cars too. As agreed two cuffs will be made for each car, six cuffs will stay in Mariupol as replacements for group D and six cuffs will be sent to SS-Untersturmfuehrer Ernst in Kiev for the cars of group C. The cuffs for the groups B and A could be made available from Berlin, because transport from Mariupol to the north would be too complicated and would take too long. Smaller damages on the cars will be repaired by experts of the commands, that is of the groups in their own shops.

Because of the rough terrain and the indescribable road and highway conditions the caulkings and rivets loosen in the course of time. I was asked if in such cases the vans should be brought to Berlin for repair. Transportation to Berlin would be much too expensive and would demand too much fuel. In order to save those expenses I ordered them to have smaller leaks soldered and if that should no longer be possible, to notify Berlin immediately by radio, that Pol. Nr.——— is out of order. Besides that I ordered that during application of gas all the men were to be kept as far away from the vans as possible, so they should not suffer damage to their health by the gas which eventually would escape. I should like to take this opportunity to bring the following to your attention: several commands have had the unloading after the application of gas done by their own men. I brought to the attention of the commanders of those S.K. concerned the immense psychological injuries and damages to their health which that work can have for those men, even if not immediately, at least later on. The men complained to me about head-aches which appeared after each unloading. Nevertheless they don't want to change the orders, because they are afraid prisoners called for that work, could use an opportune moment to flee. To protect the men from these damages, I request orders be issued accordingly.

The application of gas usually is not undertaken correctly. In order to come to an end as fast as possible, the driver presses the accelerator to the fullest extent. By doing that the persons to be executed suffer death from suffocation and not death by dozing off as was planned. My directions now have proved that by correct adjustment of the levers death comes faster and the prisoners fall asleep peacefully. Distorted faces and excretions, such as could be seen before, are no longer noticed.

Today I shall continue my journey to group B, where I can be reached with further news.

Signed: Dr. BeckerSS Untersturmfuehrer

Reichs Security Main OfficeMessage Center1900, 15 June 1942 [Handwritten:]Riga E 2 II D 3a Maj PradelMessage No 152452 R 16/6WiederhausenRiga 7082—15-6-42—1855—BETo Reichs Security Main Office—Roem. 2D3A—BerlinTOP SECRETSubject: S-Vans

A transport of Jews, which has to be treated in a special way, arrives weekly at the office of the commandant of the Security Police and the Security Service of White Ruthenia.

The three S-vans, which are there, are not sufficient for that purpose. I request assignment of another S-van (5-tons). At the same time I request the shipment of 20 gas-hoses for the three S-vans on hand (2 Daimond, 1 Saurer), since the ones on hand are leaky already.

The commandant of the Security Police andthe Security Service"Ostland"Roem IT-126/42 GRSStamp: Signed: Truehe, SS-HauptsturmfuehrerNo 240/42II D 3a 16 June 42Procedure: [handwritten]1. When can we count on having another S-van ready?2. Are gas-hoses on hand, ordered or when to be delivered?3. Request answer.R 16/6

Reichs Security Main OfficeII D 3a B Nr 240/42 Berlin, 22 June 1945TOP SECRETStamped:Message Nr 107903Sent by message center2016, 22 June 421. FS [?]To the Commandant of the Security Police andSecurity Service OstlandRiga

Subject: S-Van

The delivery of a 5-ton Saurer can be expected in the middle of next month. The vehicle has been at the Reichs Security Main Office for repairs and minor alterations up to this time. 100 meters of hose will be supplied.

By order of

[signature as in heading]2. Dissemination at once by II D 3a (9)By directionRauff

Handwritten note:Berlin, 13 July 1942II D 3a (9)

Nr I.Z. Widderhausen[?] for further action and attention to the note of 13 July 1942 on back page of telegram from Belgrad. For the reasons mentioned 5 sections of hose, each of 10 meters, can be supplied me.

By direction

[signature illegible]

Reichs Security Main OfficeStamps: 1003 9 Jun 1942handwritten:After returnimmediate repairII D 3a No 964/4210 June 1942R 10/6Notify about repairND. Nr 144702Belgrad No. 3116 9.6.42 0950—SOM

To: Reichs Security Office, Amt Roem 2 D 3 KL. A—Z. HD. V. Major Pradel—Berlin.

Subject: Special-van-SaurerPreceding messages: None

The Drivers SS-Scharfuehrer Goetz and Meyer have fulfilled their special mission and could be ordered back with the van mentioned above. In consequence of a broken rear-axle-half, transportation cannot be made by car.

Therefore I have ordered the vehicle loaded and shipped back to Berlin by railroad.

Estimated arrival between 11th and 12th June 1942. The drivers Goetz and Meyer will escort the vehicle.

The commandant of Security Police and Security ServiceBelgrad—Roem I—BNR 3985/42.Signed: Dr. Schaefer, SS-Obersturmbannfuehrer

[Handwritten note back page]II D 3a (2)T.O.S. a Dr. SUKKELBerlin, 11 June 1942

For further action and immediate start of repairs. I request to be informed about arrival of vans.

By direction:

signed: JustBerlin, 16 June 1942.II D 3a (9)

Note

The vehicle arrived 16 June 1942 about 1300 h. After thorough cleaning the repairs will start immediately.

By direction

signed: [?]Berlin, 13 July 1942.II D 3a 9

1. Note: The S-truck Pol 71463 is ready.

2. Sent to themotor-pool management T.F. Niederhausenfor its information and further action.

By direction

signed: [?]

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 502-PS

TOP SECRETB 101Enclosures 2Berlin, 17 July 1941Office IV

Regulations (directives) for the commandos of the Chief of the Security Police and of the Security Service, which are to be activated in Stalags.

The activation of commandos will take place in accordance with the agreement of the Chief of the Security Police and Security Service and the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces as of 16 July 1941 (see enclosure I). The commandos will work independently according to special authorization and in consequence of the general regulations given to them, in the limits of the camp organizations. Naturally, the commandos will keep close contact with the camp commander and the defense officers assigned to him.

The mission of the commandos is the political investigating of all camp-inmates, the elimination and further "treatment"

a.of all political, criminal or in some other way undesirable elements among them.b.of those persons who could be used for the reconstruction of the occupied territories.

a.of all political, criminal or in some other way undesirable elements among them.

b.of those persons who could be used for the reconstruction of the occupied territories.

For the execution of their mission, no auxiliary means can be put at the disposal of the commandos. The "Deutsche Fahndungsbuch", the "Aufenthaltsermittlungsliste" and the "Sonderfahndungsbuch UdSSR" will prove to be useful in only a small number of cases; the "Sonderfahndungsbuch UdSSR" is not sufficient, because it contains only a small part of Soviet-Russians considered to be dangerous.

Therefore, the commandos must use their special knowledge and ability and rely on their own findings and self-acquired knowledge. Therefore, they will be able to start carrying out their mission only when they have gathered together appropriate material.

The commandos must use for their work as far as possible, at present and even later, the experiences of the camp commanders which the latter have collected meanwhile from observation of the prisoners and examinations of camp inmates.

Further, the commandos must make efforts from the beginning to seek out among the prisoners elements which appear reliable, regardless if there are communists concerned or not, in order to use them for intelligence purposes inside of the camp and, if advisable, later in the occupied territories also.

By use of such informers and by use of all other existing possibilities, the discovery of all elements to be eliminated among the prisoners, must succeed step by step at once. The commandos must learn for themselves, in every case by means of short questioning of the informers and eventual questioning of other prisoners.

The information ofoneinformer is not sufficient to designate a camp inmate to be a suspect, without further proof; it must be confirmed in some way if possible.

Above all, the following must be discovered:

All important functionaries of state and party, especiallyProfessional revolutionaries.Functionaries of the Komintern.All policy-forming party functionaries of the KPdSU and its fellow organizations in the central committees, in the regional and district committees.All Peoples-Commissars and their deputies.All former Political commissars in the Red Army.Leading personalities of the state authorities of central and middle regions.The leading personalities of the business world.Members of the Soviet-Russian intelligence.All Jews.All persons, who are found to be agitators or fanatical communists.

All important functionaries of state and party, especially

Professional revolutionaries.Functionaries of the Komintern.All policy-forming party functionaries of the KPdSU and its fellow organizations in the central committees, in the regional and district committees.All Peoples-Commissars and their deputies.All former Political commissars in the Red Army.Leading personalities of the state authorities of central and middle regions.The leading personalities of the business world.Members of the Soviet-Russian intelligence.All Jews.All persons, who are found to be agitators or fanatical communists.

Professional revolutionaries.

Functionaries of the Komintern.

All policy-forming party functionaries of the KPdSU and its fellow organizations in the central committees, in the regional and district committees.

All Peoples-Commissars and their deputies.

All former Political commissars in the Red Army.

Leading personalities of the state authorities of central and middle regions.

The leading personalities of the business world.

Members of the Soviet-Russian intelligence.

All Jews.

All persons, who are found to be agitators or fanatical communists.

It is not less important, as mentioned already, to discover all those persons who could be used for the reconstruction, administration and management of the conquered Russian territories.

Finally, all such persons must be secured who are still needed for the completion of further investigation, regardless if they are police investigations or other investigations, and for explanations of questions of general interest. Among them are all those especially, who because of their position and their knowledge are able to give information about measures and working methods of the Soviet-Russian State, of the communist party or of the Komintern.

In the final analysis, consideration must be given to the nativity in all decisions to be made. The leader of the Einsatz Kommando will give every week a short report by telephone or an express-letter to the Reichs-Security-Main-Office, containing:

1.Shortdescription of their activities in the past week.

2. Number of all definitely suspicious persons. (report of number sufficient)

3. Individual names of all persons found to be functionaries of the Komintern, leading functionaries of the party, Peoples-Commissars, leading personalities and Political commissars.

4. Number of all persons found not to be suspicious informers, with a short description of their position.

A.Prisoners-of-war.B.Civilians.

On the basis of those activity reports the Reichs-Security-Main-Office will issue immediately the further measures to be applied. For the measures to be applied on the basis of this successive directive the commandos are to demand the surrender of the prisoners involved from the camp command.

The camp commandants have received orders from the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, to approve such requests (see enclosure I).

Executions are not to be held in the camp or in the immediate vicinity of the camp. If the camps in the General-Government are in the immediate vicinity of the border, then the prisoners are to be taken for special treatment, if possible, into the former Soviet-Russian territory.

Should execution be necessary for reasons of camp discipline, then the leader of the Einsatz Kommando must apply to the camp commander for it.

The commandos have to keep lists about the special treatments carried out and must contain:

Current number.Family name and first name.Time and place of birth.Military rank.Profession.Last residence.Reason for special treatment.Day and place of special treatment(card file).

In regard to executions to be carried out and to the possible removal of reliable civilians and the removal of informers for the Einsatz-group in the occupied territories, the leader of the Einsatz-Kommando must make an agreement with the nearest State-Police-Office, as well as with the commandant of the Security Police Unit and Security Service and beyond these with the Chief of the Einsatz-group concerned in the occupied territories.

Reports of that kind are to be transmitted for information to the Reichs-Security-Main-Office, IV. A 1. Excellent behavior during and after duty, the best cooperation with the camp-commanders, and careful examinations are the duty of all leaders and members of the Einsatz-Kommando.

The members of the Einsatz-Kommando must be constantly impressed with the special importance of the missions entrusted to them.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 503-PS

Top SecretHigh Command of the Armed Forces.No 55 1781/42 g. K Chefs. W F St/QuF.H. Qu., 19 October 1942Top SecretBy officer only 22 copies, 21st copy

Added to the decree concerning the destruction of terror and sabotage troops (OKW/WFst No. 003830/42 top secret of 18 October 1942) a supplementary order of the Fuehrer is enclosed.

This order is intended for commanders only and must not under any circumstances fall into enemy hands.

The further distribution is to be limited accordingly by the receiving bureaus.

The bureaus named in the distribution list are held responsible, for the return and destruction of all distributed pieces of the order and copies made thereof.

The Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces

By order of

Jodl1 enclosure(distribution list—over)Distribution list:

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