To the Reich Minister for Ecclesiastical Affairs, Berlin W 8, Leipziger Str. 3.
To the Reich Minister for Ecclesiastical Affairs, Berlin W 8, Leipziger Str. 3.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 862-PS
TOP SECRET
The Deputy General of the Armed Forces with the Reich Protector in Bohemia and Moravia.No. 22/40 top secret; Prague, 15 October 1940.
The Deputy General of the Armed Forces with the Reich Protector in Bohemia and Moravia.
No. 22/40 top secret; Prague, 15 October 1940.
TOP SECRET(through officers only)Re: Basic political principles in the Protectorate4 copies, 1st copyTOP SECRET(through officers only)1 Annex[Pencil marks]:K [Keitel] 21/XJ [Jodl] Chief OKWthrough Chief WFStW [Warlimont] 18/10
On 9 October of this year the office of the Reich Protector held an official conference in which State Secretary SS Lt. General K.H. Frank spoke about the following:
Since creation of the protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, party agencies, industrial circles, as well as agencies of the central authorities of Berlin have had difficulties about the solution of the Czech problem.
After ample deliberation, the Reich Protector expressed his view about the various plans in a memorandum. In this, three ways of solution were indicated:
a.German infiltration of Moravia andreduction of the Czech nationality to a residual Bohemia.
This solution is considered as unsatisfactory, because the Czech problem, even if in a diminished form, will continue to exist.
b.Many arguments can be brought up against the most radical solution, namely the deportation of all the Czechs. Therefore the memorandum comes to the conclusion that it cannot be carried out within a reasonable space of time.
c.Assimilation of the Czechs, i.e. absorption of about half of the Czech nationality by the Germans, insofar as this is of importance by being valuable from a racial or other standpoint [blut-und sonst wertmaessig Bedentunghat]. This will take place among other things, also by increasing the Arbeitseinsatz of the Czechs in the Reich territory (with the exception of the Sudeten German border district), in other words by dispersing the closed Czech nationality.
The other half of the Czech nationality must be deprived of its power, eliminated, and shipped out of the country by all sorts of methods. This applies particularly to the racially mongoloid part and to the major part of the intellectual class. The latter can scarcely be converted ideologically and would represent a burden by constantly making claims for the leadership over the other Czech classes and thus interfering with a rapid assimilation.
Elements which counteract the planned Germanization are to be handled roughly and should be eliminated.
The above development naturally presupposes an increased influx of Germans from the Reich territory into the Protectorate.
After a discussion, the Fuehrer has chosen solution c (assimilation) as a directive for the solution of the Czech problem and decided that, while keeping up the autonomy of the Protectorate on the surface, the Germanization will have to be carried out in a centralized way by the office of the Reich Protectorate for years to come.
From the above no particular conclusions are drawn by the armed forces. This is the direction which has always been represented from here. In this connection, I refer to my memorandum which was sent to the Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, dated 12 July 1939, file number 6/39, top secret, entitled: "The Czech Problem." (Attached as annex).
The Deputy General of the Armed Forces with the Reich Protector in Bohemia and Moravia.
Signed: FRIDERICIInfantry Lt. GeneralDistribution:
OKW-L—1st CopyOKH-O Qu V—2nd CopyChief H Ruest and Bd E-Ic.—3rd CopyDraft—4th Copy
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 864-PS
TOP SECRETL IV Berlin, 20 October 1939Only copyWritten by officer 20 Oct.[illegible initials]Conference between the Fuehrer and Chief OKWon the future shape of Polish relationswith Germany(Evening of 17 October 1939)
1. The Armed Forces will welcome it if they can dispose of administrative questions in Poland.
On principle there cannot be 2 administrations.
2. Poland is to be made independent. She will neither be part of the German Reich nor a district administered by the Reich.
3. It is not the task of the Administration to make Poland into a model province or a model state of the German order or to put her economically or financially on a sound basis.
The Polish intelligensia must be prevented from forming a ruling class. The standard of living in the country is to remain low; we only want to draw labor forces from there. Poles are also to be used for the administration of the country. However, the forming of national political groups may not be allowed.
4. The administration has to work on its own responsibility and must not be dependent on Berlin. We don't want to do there what we do in the Reich. The responsibility does not rest with the Berlin Ministries since there is no German administrative unit concerned.
The accomplishment of this task will involve a hard racial struggle [Volkstumskampf] which will not allow any legal restrictions. The methods will be incompatible with the principles otherwise adhered to by us.
The Governor General is to give the Polish nation only bare living conditions and is to maintain the basis for military security.
5. In Cracow German officers have visited the Bishops. Prince Radziwill is owner of his huge estates [Latifundien].
These problems cannot be solved socially.
6.Our interests lie as follows: Precautions are to be taken that the territory is important to us from a military point of view as an advanced jumping-off point and can be used for strategic concentration of troops. To that end therailroads,roads, and thecommunications channelsare to be kept in order and utilized for our purposes.
Any tendencies towards the consolidation of conditions in Poland are to be suppressed. The "Polish muddle" [polnische Wirtschaft] must be allowed to develop. The government of the territory must make it possible for us to purify theReich territoryfrom Jews and Polacks, too. Collaboration with new Reich provinces [Posen and West Prussia] only forresettlements(Compare Mission Himmler).
Purpose: Shrewdness and severity must be the maxims in this racial struggle in order to spare us from going to battle on account of this country again.
[illegible initials] 20 Oct.W.[initialed by General Warlimont]20 Oct.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 865-PS
I name Reichsleiter Alfred Rosenberg as my Commissioner for the central control of questions connected with the East-European Region.
An office, which is to be established in accordance with his orders, is at the disposal of Reichsleiter Rosenberg for the carrying out of the duties thereby entrusted to him.
The necessary money for this office is to be taken out of the Reich Chancellery Treasury in a lump sum.
Fuehrer's Headquarters 20th April 1941.The FuehrerSigned: Adolf HitlerReich Minister and Head of Reich ChancellerySigned: Dr. Lammers
TOP SECRETThe Reich Minister and the Head of the Reich ChancelleryVossstrasse 6, Berlin W8, 21st April 1941At present Fuehrer Headquarters.Mail, without exception, to be sent to the Berlin address.
To: the Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, General Field Marshal Keitel
To: the Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, General Field Marshal Keitel
Personal. By courier.My dear General Field Marshal.
Herewith I am sending you a copy of the Fuehrer's Decree by which the Fuehrer appointed Reichsleiter Alfred Rosenberg as his Commissioner for the central control connected with the East-European Region. In this capacity Reichsleiter Rosenberg is to make the necessary preparations for the probable emergency with all speed. The Fuehrer wishes that Rosenberg shall be authorized for this purpose to obtain the closest cooperation of the highest Reich authorities, receive information from them, and summon the representatives of the Highest Reich Authorities to conferences. In order to guarantee the necessary secrecy of the commission and the measures to be undertaken, for the time being only, those of the highest Reich Authorities should be informed, on whose cooperation Reichsleiter Rosenberg will primarily depend. They are: the Commissioner for the Four-year Plan, the Reich Minister of Economies, and you yourself.
Therefore may I ask you, in accordance with the Fuehrer's wishes, to place your cooperation at the disposal of Reichsleiter Rosenberg, in carrying out of the task imposed upon him.
It is recommended, in the interests of secrecy, that you name a representative in your office with whom the office of the Reichsleiter can communicate and who in addition to your usual deputy should be the only one to whom you should communicate the contents of this letter.
I should be obliged if you would acknowledge the receipt of this letter.
Heil HitlerYours very sincerelyDr. Lammers
TOP SECRETThe Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces25 April 1941By courier.
To The Head of the Reich Chancellery, Reich Minister Dr. Lammers
To The Head of the Reich Chancellery, Reich Minister Dr. Lammers
Personal.Dear Reich Minister,
I acknowledge receipt of the copy of the Fuehrer's Decree in which the Fuehrer appointed Reichsleiter Alfred Rosenberg as his Commissioner for the central control of questions connected with the East-European Region. I have named General of the Artillery Jodl, Head of the Armed Forces Operational Staff, as my permanent Deputy and Major General Warlimont as his Deputy.
Heil HitlerYours very sincerelyK.25/4.
TOP SECRETThe Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces25th April 1941.By courierTo Reichsleiter RosenbergPersonalDear Reichsleiter,
The Head of the Reich Chancellery has sent me a copy of the Fuehrer's Decree, by which he has appointed you his Commissioner for the central control of questions connected with the East-European Region. I have charged General of the Artillery Jodl, Head of the Armed Forces Operational Staff and his Deputy, Major General Warlimont with solving these questions, as far as they concern the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces. Now I ask you, as far as your Office is concerned, to deal with him only.
Heil HitlerYours very sincerelyK.25/4.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 870-PS
[Stamp:]TOP SECRETCopy to Rk. 1952 German Secret Reich matter.Information for the Fuehrer
I report the following, concerning the sabotage plot, through which at the two largest Oslo dockyards 23500 was sunk and 25800 tonnage was damaged:
I.Backgrounds.
1. The personnel of both dockyards had the reputation of being extremely radical marxistic before the war. Both dockyards strikes were declared in September 1941. At the second day of the strike I have taken measures so harsh and decisive that starting there and then, and until this plot happened, peace and order prevailed at both enterprises.
2. In connection with the withdrawal of the 20th (mountain) Army, England has given out the following order to the personnel of the dockyards: "Either you blow up the ships or we shall be forced to shell town and port." The efficiency of that order of the day is confirmed not only by the plot itself but also by statements. Therefore it is clear that the saboteurs do not only have active helpers or groups of helpers amongst the personnel, but that they also enjoy passive support respectively protection by the rest of the crowd.
II.Countermeasures.
1. My old method is entirely out of question. Countersabotage in Norway is useless on account of lack of objects. Counter terror in this instance would bypass its goal and in addition would lead to the most disadvantageous consequences, according to the opinion, shared by Reich Leader of SS Himmler and chief of the Security Police Kaltenbrunner.
2. A permanent and sufficient boarding of the ships by military guards must fail because, on account of lack of forces. Navy and army state that they cannot furnish additional units. Guarding by police is impossible, because only six under strength battalions of about 400 men are at my disposal in the entire country. [Pencilled note of Keitel: No, the Armed Forces can guard its ships itself?]
3. As much as a stronger and permanent military guarding of every ship is desirable, this measure would in no way exclude the possibility of further attacks, because such guards are not able to judge if the Norwegian specialists handle their jobs right or wrong. [Pencilled note of Keitel: But the Marines can do that.]
4. Just now I received a cable of Field Marshall General Keitel, in which the issue of a decree is demanded according to which members of the personnel and if the occasions arises their next of kin (liability of next of kin) are collectively kept responsible for cases of sabotage occurring in their departments.
This demand makes only sense and promises success only, if I am actually allowed to perform executions by firing squad. [Pencilled note of Keitel: Yes, that is the best.] If this is not possible, such a decree would cause exactly the opposite reaction.
a.The Norwegian expects German defeat within a very short time. An arrest therefore, does not only frighten him, but gives him security on the one hand, and on the other hand an alibi with the Emigrant Government.
b.This decree would only add fuel to the fire of the Swedish agitators and would not be crowned by success. But such shootings by firing squads are prohibited by the Fuehrer decree. On the other hand, if I could get renewal liberty of action in this regard, and if I could use my old methods again, without considering Sweden, then such a decree would gain the necessary weight and, with that doubtlessly lead to success.
III.Suggestion.
1. A military guard is ordered for every ship. The main dockyard committee has to submit specific suggestions regarding the respective strength and the methods of duty patroling.
2. So many workers, foremen, technicians, and engineers are to be taken from German dockyards that we are able to plant amongst personnel of the most important Norwegian dockyards at least 10 percent of German specialists. The dockyard main committee can also order the method of planting only if, on account of this—at the worst—the production capacity German dockyards decrease accordingly, one should consider that by such measures the tenfold of this waste will be secured on the Norwegian side, [Pencilled note of Keitel: I regard this measure as expedient, if decrees 3 and 4 should be declined. K.] For, only by employing these Norwegian Specialists forces it will be possible to keep the Norwegian experts under such constant control at their work, that it is made quite impossible for them to commit acts of sabotage.
3. Establishing of the three-shift system, in order that at any day or night time Norwegian personnel is on board and, in case, is also blown into the air. It is up to the dockyard main committee to decide if and to which extent this system is workable.
4. In this connection the dockyard main committee should be charged in principle with the central responsibility for the security in the dockyards: for the main committee in its competence has at its disposal the decisive prerogatives, which can warrant that security. Thereby it goes without saying, that it has at its disposal the Security Police with all its facilities and that the Armed Forces put at the disposal of the guards to the ordered extent.
5. While accomplishing these measures one has to take into account the possibility of a strike. As I possess only limited liberty of action, at present this would be more than unpleasant. In spite of this I am of the opinion that taking the danger into the bargain, the measures suggested should be ordered.
Signed: TerbovenReich Commissioner
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 871-PS
Top SecretWFSt/Qu.2 (North) 6 December 19442 copies, 1st copy
KR—Teletype to Reichminister and Head of Reich Chancellery, Reichminister Dr. Lammers.
KR—Teletype to Reichminister and Head of Reich Chancellery, Reichminister Dr. Lammers.
Sir:
In the matter of checking sabotage in Norway, I agree with the view of the Reich Commissioner for Occupied Norwegian territory, to the extent that I expect results from reprisals only if they are carried out ruthlessly and if Reich Commissioner Terboven is authorized to carry out shootings.
Should the Fuehrer not grant this authorization, I consider the proposal of Reich Commissioner Terboven (No. III of his communication) as adequate to the purpose.
I note moreover that the mentioned 10% of German specialists [Fachraefte] would require from 800-1,000 persons. For guard duty it is possible to supply supplementary personnel from the Wehrmacht, to a limited extent.
In contrast to the view of Reich Commissioner Terboven, I anticipate a certain success from this procedure at least to the extent that Marines will be used.
For your information, there is going forward to you simultaneously a teletype addressed to the Wehrmacht Commandant (W. Bhf) Norway, through which the report of the Reich Commissioner, transmitted to me, evidently released.
Heil HitleryoursSigned: KeitelOKW/WFST/Qu. 2 (North) Nr. 0014371/44g.K.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 872-PS
TOP SECRETArmed Forces Ops Staff 3.2.41.S.O. only 5 Copies, 5th CopyAccess only through officer44089/41 Top Secret S.O. onlyConference of "Fall Barbarossa" and "Sonnenblume"The following persons attended:The FuehrerChief of the Supreme Command of the Armed ForcesChief of the Armed Forces Ops StaffC-in-C ArmyChief of the Army General StaffChief of Army Op. sectionColonel SchmundtMajor ChristianMajor Engel
Chief of Army General Staff—1. Enemy strength approximately 100 Infantry divisions, 25 Cavalry divisions, approximately 30 mechanized divisions.Our own strength about the same, far superior in quality.
Chief of Army General Staff—1. Enemy strength approximately 100 Infantry divisions, 25 Cavalry divisions, approximately 30 mechanized divisions.Our own strength about the same, far superior in quality.
In estimating the leading personalities, Timoshenko is the only outstanding figure. The only one, that is, according to Gen. Koestring.
Details of the strength and organization of the Russian divisions areimportant onlyin that even the Infantry Divisions include a comparatively large number of tanks, though the material is bad and merely thrown together.
In the case of mechanized divisions, we have superiority with regard to tanks, weapons [Schuetzen] and artillery. The Russians are superior in numbers, we in quality.
The Russians are normally equipped in artillery. Materials likewise inferior. The Command of the Artillery is insufficient. The Russian operational intentions are unknown. Strong forces are at the frontier. Any retreat could be only on a small scale since the Baltic States and Ukraine are vital to the Russians for supply reasons. Fortification work is in progress especially on the North and Southern flanks.
There is no fresh information on the communications system.
Directives to Army Groups so given that the Russian front will be split into 2 sections and a Russian retreat on the Dnjeper-Duena Line prevented.
The Army Group North and Center ordered to press forward across the Duena in a north-easterly direction with concentrated armored forces in 3 armored groups (the strongest in the South).
The most northerly group is to press on up to the region of Lake Peipus, then advance further to the East in cooperation with other two armored groups, who will be attacking Smolensk.
The Army Group South is to advance across the Dnieper in a south-easterly direction. Army Group North and Center is to carry out operations North of the Pripet Marshes. Army Group South will be to the South, that is, separate and independent. The main sector lies in the North; army reserves are massed there.
6 armored divisions are required from the "Marita" operation; of these the 2 training divisions are for the 1st line, a further 2 from Roumania itself for the Southern Group, the last 2 divisions are reserves for the Northern Group. It all depends on the Balkan situation (Turkey's attitude).
Fuehrer—When the die has been cast, the Turks will not make any further moves. No special protection of the Balkans is therefore necessary. One dangerous moment will be if North Africa is cleared by the British, thus enabling the British to operate in Syria with unhampered forces.
Chief of Army General Staff—Northern Group50}divs, 13 armored divs, 9 motorized divs. Southern } Attack ForcesGroup 30 divs, 5 armored divs, 3 motorized divs. }
In addition: Supreme Command of the Army Reserves.
Assignment of Pioneers is not entirely satisfactory. This is made good by additional bridge-building units [Brueckenmaterial].
Fuehrer—agreed with the large dispositions.
Chief of Army General Staff—It is proposed to isolate a large number of Russian troops in various places at the time the split is effected. The early use of reserves is necessary for this purpose.
Note: the Pripet Marshes are not definitelytaboo.
Note: the Pripet Marshes are not definitelytaboo.
Fuehrer—mentioned the Russians tactics of flank attacks.
Chief of Army General Staff—The cavalry divisions are particularly dangerous in this respect.
Orders issued to date:Orders for Army Group are binding.Orders for Armies set out the targets.Orders for Units leave possibility for changes.
He expounded onthe orders issued to Army groups, etc., up to the present.
Fuehrer—mentioned that the operational areas were enormous, that the enemy troops could be successfully encircled, only if the encirclement werecomplete(Cavalry divisions). (At the moment, there is a very biased play on in Moscow about Suwarow). The immediate surrender of the Baltic States, including Leningrad and the Ukraine, cannot be expected at once. It is, however, possible that after the initial defeat, the Russians, knowing our operational aims, will retreat on large scale and prepare for defense further East behind some barrier.
In this case, the North, regardless of the Russians in the East, will be cleared. From there (a favorable supply-base) a thrust in the rear of the Russians without a frontal attack. It is essential to wipe out large sections of the enemy and not to put them to flight. This will be accomplished if we occupy the flanking areas with the strongest possible forces. Then, with the enemy held in the center, he can be maneuvered out of it from the flanks.
Chief of Army General Staff—The Falkenhorst army can advance on Petsamo with 1-1/2 divisions, by using Swedish railways, with a further 1-1/2 divisions (including 1 SS Brigade). The aim is the protection of the Finnish northern industrial area, trapping and cutting off the Murmansk forces.
The Finns will probably make a strategic concentration in the South with 4 Army Corps [Aks] of which an attacking group of 5 divisions will advance in the direction of Leningrad, with 3 divisions against Lake Onegin, 2 divisions against Hango, they need strong support. There are 15 Russian divisions on the Finnish front, approximately 1 division in Murmansk.
Fuehrer—assumed that Sweden would join with us at a price. The price: the Aaland Islands (not our possessions). There is no question of a union between Finland and Sweden as this would not suit the European New Order.
Norway must be under protection; no repercussions are desired from that quarter. Artillery reinforcements are required.
In the South: The most important task is the protection of the oil fields, therefore speedy action from Roumania is necessary.
Chief of Army General Staff—Position of Hungary. If Hungary is not to participate, we must withdraw from Hungary. The destination of the march will be given as Roumania. At the last minute the direction will change towards the Russian frontier. Hungary will permit anything so long as she is given the corresponding political assurances. Agreements with all states taking part (with the exception of Roumania) can be made only at the eleventh hour. With Roumania it is a matter of life and death.
Chief of Army General Staff—Armored reconnaissance forces are still scarce.
Flak questionis still unsettled, it depends on the conditions of the roads (to follow in writing).
The Air Force commands 30 Flak battalions, in addition 30 batteries set up by the Army.
The Navymust hasten the opening of supply routes to the Baltic.
Supplyis a road transport problem as the gauge has to be changed on the railroads here. A system of long-distance trucks, which can bring supplies to supply bases.
Agreement with the Air Force that all transport is to be used to the full.
Supply areas, shifted to the region of East Poland, are at present being developed. (Possibilities in Roumania are still being explored).
In connection with Marita, the difficulties of transporting back those forces urgently needed for Barbarossa were stressed.
The intended time periodwas discussed with a plan. 1st Deployment Staffel [Aufmarschstaffel] transfer now, Front-Germany-East. 2nd Deployment Staffel [Aufmarschstaffel] from the middle of March will give up 3 divisions for reinforcement in the West. Army groups and Army High Commands are being withdrawn from the West. There are already considerable reinforcements though still in the rear area. From now on, Attila can be carried out only under difficulties. Industrial traffic is hampered by transport movements. From the middle of April, Hungary will be approached about the march through. 3 deployment staffels from the middle of April. Felix is now no longer possible as the main part of the artillery is being entrained.
In industrythe full capacity time table is in force. No more camouflage.
From 25.IV-15.V, 4 staffels to withdraw considerable forces from the West. (Seeloewe can no longer be carried out). The strategic concentration in the East is quite recognizable.
The full capacity time table remains. 8 Marita divisions complete the picture of the disposition of forces on the plan.
C-in-C Army—requested that he no longer have to employ 5 control divisions for this, but might hold them ready as reserves for commanders in the West.
Fuehrer—When Barbarossa commences, the world will hold its breath and make no comment.
Chief of the Air Force General Staff—joined the conferences.
Fuehrer—discussed the Italian situation in the Mediterranean.
He stated that the loss of North Africa could be withstood in the military sense but must have a strong psychological effect on Italy.
Britain can hold a pistol to Italy's head and force her either to make peace and retain everything or after the loss of North Africa to be bombarded. This would be to our disadvantage. British forces in the Mediterranean area will not be tied down. We ourselves have a weak base there through Southern France. The British have the free use of a dozen divisions and can employ them most dangerously, i.e. in Syria.
We must make every effort to prevent this. Italy must be given support.
We are already doing this in Marita. We must, however, attempt to render effective assistance in North Africa.
The Italians are of the opinion that they can put up a defense now only at Tripoli. This is not feasible. The Air Force cannot operate there. Therefore the position cannot be held. There must be some larger protection zone. Our blocking units can also be effective only in larger protection zones.
He discussed the connection between successes, even defensive successes there and Balkan events, possibly a peaceful settlement in the Balkans.
What can be done?
Land units will arrive late even if not too late. Graziani must receive some kind of support. Therefore the Air Force must be employed, if possible with Stuka groups, with jumping-off bases and homefields in Lybia.
If this can bring the British advance to a standstill, the intended blocking unit is still insufficient and must be reinforced by a mobile unit (strong armored division).
The British personnel and material must have been exhausted during the advance. If the British encounter fresh and well-equipped German forces, the situation will soon alter.
Query from C-in-C Army. Can we spare an armored division for this?
C-in-C Army—unwillingly from Marita.
Fuehrer—out of the question.
C-in-C Army—If it comes to that, Barbarossa is also in need.
Fuehrer—
If we send help to North Africa, we must do so at once before the Italians. (We have made the offer to the Italians).
The primary consideration is: Can the Air Force intervene now.
The time required for the transport of Air Force supplies, blocking unit, and armored divisions must be established at once.
Then, what are the climatic conditions?
C-in-C Army—It is important that British supplies by land and sea are stopped. This can be done only by the German Air Force.
Fuehrer—The Italians must be asked how long they can allow for the transport of the above-mentioned German troops.
If necessary, transport groups must be employed.
Proposal: General Jeschonek III/KG for special duties, from Foggia.
C-in-C Army—proposed that the blocking unit should first be reinforced by 1 armored regiment. The rest to follow. The Fuehrer agreed.
Chief of Air Force General Staff—spoke of the position of the ground-organization in North Africa. Only in Benghazi are Stuka-Forces ready within range for operations.
Fighter forces will naturally be sent there also, or Italian fighters be placed under German orders.
It is most important that the air base of Malta be subdued.
Fuehrer—agreed. The Italians are to withdraw Italian fighters from the Channel coast. (He will speak to the Duce.)
The Air Forcemust test immediately, the possibilities of intervening in North Africa. The Army is to see to the transport for the blocking unit.
The transport must be speeded up. Reinforcement by an armored regiment, further reinforcement up to an armored division, will be withdrawn from Marita. Flak forces on ahead.
C-in-C Army—proposed a united command of all mobile forces under 1st General Headquarters. Cooperation with the Air Force which also commands the Italian naval air forces.
Conclusions:
1.Barbarossa.
a.The Fuehrer on the whole was in agreement with the operational plan. When it is being carried out, it must be remembered that themain aimis to gain possession of the Baltic States and Leningrad.
b.The Fuehrer desires that the operation map and the plan of the disposition of forces be sent to him as soon as possible.
c.Agreements with neighboring states, who are taking part, may not be concluded until there is no longer any necessity for camouflage. The exception is Roumania with regard to the reinforcing of the Moldau.
d.It must, at all costs, be possible to carry out Attila (auxiliary measure).
e.The strategic concentration for Barbarossa will be camouflaged as a feint for Seeloewe and the subsidiary measure Marita.
2.Sonnenblume.
a.The Air Force must intervene as soon as possible with Stuka and Fighter forces. Bases and jumping-off bases in accordance with decisions made in North Africa. It is desired that the Italian fighter forces be placed under German orders.
b.The 10th Flieger Korps is to take over the task of protecting the transports to East Africa, in the closest cooperation with the Italian Air Force and Naval Commander in Catania.
c.The 10th Flieger Korps is to strike a strong blow against the British troops in Cyrenaica as soon as possible (with the use of the heaviest bombs).
The main task is to disrupt British supplies by land and sea; next, to combat the British fleet.
First of all, attempts must be made to subdue the air base of Malta.
d.TheArmyis to continue the transport of the blocking unit. This is, however, to be reinforced at once with armor. Preparations for adding one Armored Division (II Staffel from Marita). Flank forces on ahead. 1st General Headquarters to be established immediately. United German Supreme Command over all mobile forces will be proposed to the Italians.
CertifiedDistribution: [signature illegible]Chef L CaptainI HI KI LIV
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 873-PS
TOP SECRETL IV/QuFuehrer's Hq., 1 May 1941For senior Officers onlyOnly by officer1 original copyConference with Chief "L" on the 30 April 1941
1.Timetable Barbarossa:
The Fuehrer has decided:Action Barbarossabegin 22 June. From 23 May maximal troop movements performance schedule. At the beginning of operations the OKH reserves have not yet reached the appointed areas.
2.Proportion of actual strength in the plan Barbarossa:
Sector North: German and Russian forces approximately of the same strength.Sector Middle: Great German superiority.Sector South: Russian superiority.
Sector North: German and Russian forces approximately of the same strength.
Sector Middle: Great German superiority.
Sector South: Russian superiority.
3.Russian strategic concentration:
Continued movements of strong forces to the German-Russian boundary.
4.Estimate by the Supreme Commander of the Army of course Barbarossa will take.
Presumably violent battles of the frontiers, duration up to 4 weeks. In course of the following development weaker resistance may be expected.
Opinion of Russian soldiers: A Russian will fight, on appointed spot, up to the last breath.
5.Conversations with Finlandare approved by the Fuehrer according to the OKW WFST part II Op. 44594/41 g.K. Chefs of the 28 April 1941.
6.Conversations with Hungaryare only possible in the last third of May. The Fuehrer believes the Hungarians will be prepared to carry out defensive operations on the Russian border, but they will not allow any German attack from Hungary.
7.Conversations with Roumaniawill be possible only at a very advanced date.
8.Concealment of conversationswith friendly countries: projected German assault in the West, hence Eastern Front must be covered. Participation of friendly countries only as a purely defensive measure.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 874-PS
TOP SECRETThe Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces.Hq. of the Fuehrer, 9 March 41DRAFTHonorable Reich Minister (TODT)
For the missions which the Fuehrer has assigned to the Armed Forces in the East, extensive measures for the diversion and deception of friend and foe are necessary prerequisites for the success of the operations.
The Supreme Command of the Armed Forces has issued guiding rules for the deception in accordance with more detailed directives of the Fuehrer. These rules aim essentially at continuing preparations for the attack against England in an increasing degree. Simultaneously the actual preparations for deployment in the East should be represented as a diversionary maneuver to divert from plans which are being pursued for an attack against England. In order to insure success for these measures, it is indispensable that these same principles are being also followed on the part of the organization Todt.
[initials] K. J. W. [Keitel, Jodl, and Warlimont.]
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 876-PS
MOST SECRETFuehrer's Headquarters, 12 May 1941
Supreme Command of the Armed ForcesWFSt/Section L (I Op)No. 44699/41 most secret, S.O. onlyS.O. only; access only through officer 18 copies, 12th copy