Decree for the establishment of courts-martial in the annexed Eastern territories of the province of Upper Silesia dated 1 June 1942
Decree for the establishment of courts-martial in the annexed Eastern territories of the province of Upper Silesia dated 1 June 1942
On the basis of number 13 of the decree of the cabinet council for the Reich defense, for the administration of criminal jurisdiction against Poles and Jews in the annexed Eastern territories and the district of the previous Free City of Danzig, dated 4 December 1941 (RGBl. I, p. 759), the following is decreed in agreement with the Reichminister of the Interior and the Reichminister of Justice:
Par. 1.
1. Severe violations of Poles and Jews against Germans, as well as other criminal acts by Poles and Jews which seriously endanger the German reconstruction work, can be sentenced by courts-martial, until further notice.
I reserve for myself the decision as to whether or not the criminal act is a crime in the sense of paragraph 1.
Par. 2.
The courts-martial pass sentence of death, transfer to the secret state police acquittal.
Par. 3.
1. Courts-martial will be established for the district of a state police administration office. They consist of one president and two members.
2. President is the leader of the state police administrative office or his permanent deputy. The members will be appointed by the leader of the state police administration office.
Par. 4.
1. During the trial thecourtmust do officially everything that is necessary to discover the truth. If necessary, the accused is to be tried with the assistance of an interpreter.
2. The names of the judges and of the accused, the evidences on which the sentence is based, furthermore the crime, the sentence including a brief justification, as well as the day of the sentencing are to be recorded.
3. Otherwise the courts-martial determines its proceeding according to its dutiful judgment.
Par. 5.
1. The decisions of the courts-martial are not legally contestable.
2. The sentences of the courts-martial are subject to a reexamination which leads to confirmation or voiding.
3. The confirmation makes the sentence lawful and executable.
Par. 6.
The right of confirmation or voiding of the courts-martial sentences is mine and, on my orders, that of the higher SS and police officer.
Par. 7.
The courts-martial can, for special reasons, forego a penalty or transfer the case to another court.
Par. 8.
This decree becomes effective on the day of its publication.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1276-PS
MOST SECRETThe Chief of the Security Police and the SDIV A 2 a - Bk. No. 502/42 Most Secret
In written communications, please give this reference No., the date and subject.
In written communications, please give this reference No., the date and subject.
Berlin SW 11, 17 June 1944Prinz-Albrecht-Strasse 8Local tel. no. 120040 Trunks 126421Reichsbank Clearance Account: 1/146.Post Office Transfer Account: Berlin2336.Express Letter Security Section IIIRecd: 20 June 1944No. 20/44 Most SecretAnnexes: Nil 94To:Supreme Command Armed ForcesOps. Staff of the Armed ForcesI C III general security
For the attention of Colonel of the General Staff Martini not represented in the department
For the attention of Colonel of the General Staff Martini not represented in the department
Berlin W 35,Tirpitzufer 74/76.
Subject: Commando operations. Fuehrer's order of 18.10.1942Reference: Communication of Counter Intelligence Bureau Defense Section III 527/2. 44g (C 2) of 21.3.1944.
Subject: Commando operations. Fuehrer's order of 18.10.1942
Reference: Communication of Counter Intelligence Bureau Defense Section III 527/2. 44g (C 2) of 21.3.1944.
The C-in-C of the Security Police and the SD in Paris reports the arrest of isolated parachutists ofFrench nationalityin English uniform near Plumelec/Morbihan. It is evident from interrogation thatmembers of the De Gaulle Army, after reporting voluntarily to the "Service Air Special," were taking part in a 14-days special training camp, in which were 300 Frenchmen and 300 Englishmen. Apparently only Frenchmen are used for operations in France. The parachute-jump is made in groups of ten, each consisting of:
1 Lieutenant2 wireless operators7 sabotage experts.Armament: each man1 sub-machine gun1 pistol1 carbine1 stabbing weapon.Equipment: Sabotage and radio apparatus,including Eureka gear i.e.D/F beacons.(therefore arrested by the SD? [marginal note in pencil])
The group which was arrested had orders to carry out railway sabotage in the district around Rennes. The acts of sabotage were obviously to be carried out by the group as a body. In addition, the group was to await further orders in some hiding-place.
Apparently they were not ordered to link up with the local resistance organisations. The arrested men had no civilian identity cards on them.
The employment of such groups is for the most part obviously planned for regions where, due to the action of the Security Police, there are no more local resistance or sabotage organisations in existence, or where the enemy knows that sabotage organisations were only counterfeited by tricks of the security police, which had meanwhile been disclosed.
* * *I consider it essential that the necessary orders should also be given from there, in order that the lesser unitsof the Armed Forces may not—as has often been the case recently—interpret them wrongly and turn the Commando troops over to the Security Police instead of slaughtering them in combat as they retreat. It is only a question of handing them over to the Security Police when members of Commandos of this kind are not captured in battle by the Armed Forces but by other means, e.g., by being handed over by the native police.
If a few isolated Commando troopsare spared at first for interrogation purposes, I consider it necessary for theSecurity Police authorities to take part inthe interrogation. The further treatment of members of Commandos, who are finally to be treated as killed in action [Gefallene], is, however, even in these cases, the responsibility of the Armed Forces.
I request that the measures taken from there be reported to me.
By Order
Signed: Mueller
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1279-PS
MOST SECRETWFSt/Qu (Admin. 1)No. 007893/44 Most Secret[The number is changed, in pencil, to 009074/44]One copy has been destroyed[remainder of pencil note illegible] 27/722.7.19442 Copies2nd Copy
Subject: Treatment of members of foreign "military missions" captured with partisan groups.
Subject: Treatment of members of foreign "military missions" captured with partisan groups.
Minutes of a meeting
1. The Fuehrer has decided that members of Anglo-American and Soviet-Russian so-called "military missions", captured in the partisan fighting in the South-East, are to be treated in the same way as those taking part in a commando-operation and not as prisoners of war.
2. Independently of the above, the Ag. Ausl., following queries made by the RSHA—Military Section—has put forward for decision the question of how British and American soldiers, captured with the partisan groups are to be treated.
The following are the resulting opinions:
a.C-in-C, South-East
The members of allied military missions are to be handed over to the SD, should the opinion below (b) be inapplicable.
b.Supreme Command of the Armed Forces/Prisoners of war generalin conjunction withSupreme Command of the Army/Army General Staff Alien Armies in the Westand Armed Forces Ops. Staff/Op. (Army).
Treatment as prisoners of war in accordance with Order: Armed Forces Ops. Staff/Op (Army) No. 03408/43 Secret, dated 18.8.43.
c.Supreme Command of the Armed Forces/Chief of Prisoners of War Sectionin conjunction withArmed Forces Reserve(WR) andArmed Forces Ops Staff/Org I.
Treatment as prisoners of war in accordance with Order: Armed Forces Ops Staff/Org II No. 02958/43 Secret, dated 8.7.43, which disregards differences of nationality. The only exception made is in the case of commando operations. (then they are handed over to the Security Service [SD]).
d.RSHA/Section IV
Fundamentally treatment as prisoners of war under the directives mentioned in b and c, but a more definite ruling is required to decide whether and in what circumstances, they are to be handed over to the Security Service [SD].
e.RSHA/Military Section
Considers that the Commando Ordercannotbe applied to partisan fighting in the south East, that to do so would be dangerous in that it might imperil those taking part in our own operation (Brandenburg).
No opinion on the question of foreign missions.
f.Ag. Ausl.
Fundamentally, treatment as prisoners of war, that implies that members of missions were taking part in a commando-operation.
g.Armed Forces Ops Staff/Op.(Army)
Treatment as the members of partisan groups themselves, i.e., as prisoners of war if they are in uniform and are captured or surrender in open battle, or executed if they are in civilian clothes or are captured in a sabotage- or commando-operation.
[The whole of g is crossed out.]
[The whole of g is crossed out.]
3.Opinion and proposal of the Armed Forces Ops. Staff
According to the orders issued to date, even for example, the British captured in the "Rosselsprung" operation must be treated as prisoners of war. This is especially evident in the Op. (Army)-Order dated 18.8.43.
[This last sentence is put in parenthesis, underlined, Op (Army) crossed out and a large query inserted in the margin.]
[This last sentence is put in parenthesis, underlined, Op (Army) crossed out and a large query inserted in the margin.]
The Commando Order has never yet been applied to such missions, its extended application to cover them has not yet been ordered. If the missions are to be treated otherwise than in accordance with the orders to date, it must first be decided whether a foreign mission acting with the partisan groups in the South-East is to be called a commando-operation and therefore treated as such. Such a decision seems to be indicated even if it does not correspond completely to the wording of the Commando-Order or to the previous definition of a commando operation (as an especially under-hand and still unusual form of warfare which must be combatted with the appropriate counter measures). The principle must be adopted from the start that all members of partisan groups, even in the South-East are fundamentally guerrillas. Indeed they are treated as prisoners of war for reasons of expediency, in order to obtain the largest possible number of deserters and workers. There is no reason for this with regard to the members of foreign missions who are not numerous. There is therefore no necessity to treat them, in every case, in the same way as the members of partisan groups themselves. Basically, it would be far more appropriate to consider Anglo-American as well as Soviet-Russian military missions as commando-operations and to treat their members accordingly.
The appended Order is therefore proposed.
W [Initialed by Warlimont]
MOST SECRETWFSt/Qu(Admin.1) 27.7.1944No. 009074/44 Most Secret2 Copies1st Copy
Subject: Treatment of members of foreign "military missions" captured with partisan groups.
Subject: Treatment of members of foreign "military missions" captured with partisan groups.
K [initialled in pencil by Keitel]Minutes of a meeting
1. The Fuehrer has decided that members of Anglo-American and Soviet-Russian so-called "military missions", captured in the partisan fighting in the South East, are to be treated in the same way as those taking part in a commando-operation and not as prisoners of war.
2. Independently of the above, the Ag. Ausl. following queries made by the RSHA—Military section—, has put forward for decision the question of how British and American soldiers, captured with the partisan groups, are to be treated.
The following are the resulting opinions:
a.C-in-C, South East.
The members of allied military missions are to be handed over to the SD, should the opinion below (b) be inapplicable.
b.Supreme Command of the Armed Forces/Prisoners of War Generalin conjunction withSupreme Command of the Army/Army General Staff/Alien Armies in the West:
Treatment as prisoners of war in accordance with OrderSupreme Command of the Armed Forces/Armed Forces Ops Staff/Op. (Army) No. 03408/43 Secret, dated 18.8.43.
c.Supreme Command of the Armed Forces/Chief of Prisoners of War Sectionin conjunction withArmed Forces Reserve(WR):
Treatment as prisoners of war in accordance with Order: Armed Forces Ops. Staff/Org II No. 02958/43 Secret, dated 8.7.43 which disregards differences of nationality. The only exception made is in the case of commando-operations (then they are handed over to the Security Service [SD]).
d.RSHA/Section IV
Fundamentally as prisoners of war under the directives mentioned in b and c, but a more definite ruling is required to decide whether, and in what circumstances, they are to be handed over to the Security Service [SD].
e.RSHA/Military Section:
Considers that the Commando-Ordercannot be appliedto partisan fighting in the South East that to do so would be dangerous in that it might imperil those taking part in our own operations (Brandenburg).
No opinion on the question of Foreign Missions.
f.Ag. Ausl.
Fundamentally, treatment as prisoners of war, that implies that members of missions were taking part in a commando-operation.
3.Opinion and proposal of the Armed Forces Ops Staff
According to the Orders issued to date, even, for example, the British captured in the "Ruesselsprung" operation must be treated as prisoners of war.
The Commando-Order has never yet been applied to such missions, its extended application to cover them has not yet been ordered. If the missions are to be treated otherwise than in accordance with the orders to date, it must first be decided whether a foreign mission acting with the partisan groups in the South East is to be called a commando operation and therefore treated as such. Such a decision seems to be indicated even if it does not correspond completely to the wording of the commando-order or to the previous definition of a commando-operation (as an especially under-hand and still unusual form of warfare which must be combatted with the appropriate counter measures). The principle must be adopted from the start that all members of partisan groups, even in the South East, are fundamentally guerillas. Indeed, they are treatedasprisoners of war, for reasons of expediency, in order to obtain the largest possible number of deserters and workers. There is no reason for this with regard to the members of foreign missions who are not numerous. There is therefore no necessity to treat them in every case, in the same way as the members of partisan groups themselves. Basically, it would be far more appropriate to consider Anglo-American as well as Soviet-Russian military missions as commando-operations and to treat their members accordingly.
The appended Order is therefore proposed.
Sgd: WarlimontDistribution:
Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces via the Deputy Chief of the Armed Forces Ops Staff.
Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces via the Deputy Chief of the Armed Forces Ops Staff.
1st CopyQu. (Draft) 2nd Copy
[The second copy of the above dated 27.7.1944 marked "Draft" is also contained in 1279-PS it is initialled at the end by Warlimont and has an illegible pencil note at the top. In the second copy the first words of 2 and 3 are underlined in pencil. The type-script of both copies is identical.]
MOST SECRETDraftSupreme Command of the Armed Forces
No. 007893/4 Most Secret/Armed Forces Ops. Staff/QU (Admin. 1)
No. 007893/4 Most Secret/Armed Forces Ops. Staff/QU (Admin. 1)
[The number is changed to 009074/44]Fuehrer Headquarters 22.7.1944—Copies, —Copy
Subject: Treatment of members of foreign "military missions" captured with partisan groups.
Subject: Treatment of members of foreign "military missions" captured with partisan groups.
The Special Orders for the treatment of captured members of partisan groups do not apply to members of foreign so-called "military mission" (Anglo-American or Soviet-Russian) captured in the fight against partisan groups in the areas under the command of the C-in-C South East and South West. They are therefore to be treated, not as prisoners of war, but in accordance with the Fuehrer's Order on the extermination of terrorist and sabotage troops, dated 18.10.1942 (OKW/WFSt No. 003830/42 Most Secret).
This order is not to be distributed beyond the divisional or equal-ranking staffs of the other branches of the Armed Forces. Any papers distributed to Army Headquarters and equal-ranking staffs, of the Armed Forces are to be recalled, when read, and destroyed.
[This last sentence is changed to "This order is not to be distributed beyond General Headquarters and equal-ranking staffs of other branches of the Armed Forces and is to be destroyed when read."]
Keitel
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1285-PS
"The German Police"[Extracts from handbook "Die Deutsche Polizei" 1943]B. Use of weapons on command
1. Every policeman is compelled to make use of his weapon if a superior officer, in compliance with his duty, orders him to do so.
2. In such a case, the superior officer alone bears the responsibility.
Use of weapons on the part of the police in the case of fugitive PWs
Use of weapons on the part of the police in the case of fugitive PWs
3. Fugitive Russian prisoners of war shall be fired upon without previous challenge.
4. Under no circumstances will warning shots be fired.
To a: According to paragraph 1 of the law mentioned * * * the following become as of 1 April 1937 immediate Reichs officials [unmittelbare Reichsbeamte]:
1. Officials occupying TO positions [Planstellen] in the agency "Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief of German Police in the Reichs Ministry of the Interior".
2. The officials of the Security Police [Secret State Police—Gestapo], and Criminal Police, however not the Police administrative officials working with the state police administrations for the criminal police.
3. The officials of the Protective Police [Schutzpolizei] and the Gendarmerie [Landjaegerei] and the police medical and police veterinary officials, police vocational school teachers and technical officials working with these organizations.
The personal salaries and welfare expenses of these officials and the operational expenses of the whole state police will be borne from 1 April 1937 on by the Reich, the same for the salaries, etc. of all employees and workers working at police agencies, who likewise on 1 April 1937 enter the Reichs service (paragraph 1(2) and paragraph 2). Hence from the fiscal year 1937 on there will be made up a Reichs budget for the police.
To b: For all police officials uniform official titles are introduced through the law cited * * * along with equal pay; only a few exceptions (retaining of some former official designations for the present incumbents) are permitted in the implementative regulations (transition lists).
To c: Through the German police official law [24 June 1937, RGBl I, 653] the same legal situation is created for all process servers without differentiation. Hence in Germany there is no longer a Prussian or a Bavarian process server, but now only a German process server, who is everywhere subject to the same legal regulations, wears the same uniform, and has the same official designation of rank.
The laws cited [relating to police officials] are valid since 1 October 1938 also for the former Austrian federal executive police, which including the police administrative officials by the decree of 27 October 1938 (RGBl. I, p. 1633) is at the same time taken over into the Reichs budget and thereby brought into the Reichs service.
More detailed regulations on this matter are to be found in the implementative regulations of 15 May 1939 [RGBl. I, p. 945]. According to these the valid functional police law in the former state of Austria is not affected.
To d: According to paragraph 1 of the law [28 March 1940, RGBl. I, p. 613] the police administrative officials of upper middle and simple civil service rank are transferred onto the Reichs budget. The officials of the higher police administrative service of a federal state can with the consent of the latter be transferred onto the Reichs budget.
[Pp. 81-82]III. Security Police [Sicherheitspolizei]
At the head of the Security Police is the chief of the security police and of the Security Service [SD]. Provisionally the Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief of the German Police in the Reichs Ministry of the Interior has taken over leadership personally. He unites in his person the direction of the security police and of the "Security Service of the Reichsfuehrer SS".
The security police is composed of the secret state police (including frontier police) and criminal police which in the central instance together with the central offices of the security service are united in the Chief Office for Reichs Security [RSHA].
Thereby the governmental security police and the party's SS intelligence activity complement each other in the unified central agency both organizationally and in leadership.
With the Chief Office for Reichs Security rest the elaboration of all organizational, personnel, economic, and technical affairs of the security police and security service; besides this however, the central agencies of the state police and criminal executives and the central direction of the security service information nets are also included.
In the field of functional legislation the Chief Office for Reichs Security, insofar as its interests are touched upon, either controls the framing of the law or has a part therein.
The chief office for Reich security is composed at present of 7 offices, to these several special institutes are attached.
The following serve to train the members of the security police and the security service:
1. The leaders' school of the security police in Berlin-Charlottenburg.
2. The elementary school of the security police in Fuerstenberg/Mecklenburg.
The establishment of special sport and technical schools is planned.
The criminal-technical institute [KTI] is available for all chemical and physical experiments and research to the whole security police.
The chief of the security police and of the security service is president of the international criminal-police commission. Through this personal union an especially close exchange of findings and methods of the German criminal police with other nations which are also connected with the IKpK is assured.
IV. Higher SS and Police Leaders
Higher SS and police leaders are installed for the area of every military district [Wehrkreis] as well as in the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, in the General Government, in Norway, the Netherlands and in parts of the occupied area of the Soviet Union, who are in their areas the representatives of the Reichsfuehrer SS and chief of the German police in regard to all duties for which the Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief of German Police is responsible.
Inspectors of the order and security police are subordinate to the higher SS and police leaders.
[P. 83]
Inspectors (Commanders) of the Security Police and Security Service
Inspectors (Commanders) of the Security Police and Security Service
Inspectors of the Security Police and Security Service—without prejudice to their subordination to the higher SS and police leaders—are installed in the field of responsibility of the security police in corresponding manner for the exercise of inspectoral authority.
Outside of territory strictly a part of the Reich, commanders of the security police and security service are appointed whose duty it is to lead the security police forces employed there.
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1292-PS
Fuehrer Headquarters, 4th Jan. 1944To Rk. 13402 c DoubleRef.: Allocation of Labor 1944
1. A conference took place with the Fuehrer to-day which was attended by:
The Plenipotentiary for the Employment of Labor, Gauleiter Sauckel,The Secretary for Armament and War Production, Speer,The Chief of the Supreme Command of the Army, General Field Marshal Keitel,General Field Marshal Milch,The Acting Reich Minister for Food and Agriculture, State Secretary Backe,The Minister of the Interior, Reich Fuehrer of the SS, Himmler,and myself.(The Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Minister of National Economy had repeatedly asked to be permitted to participate prior to the Conference, but the Fuehrer did not wish their attendance).
The Plenipotentiary for the Employment of Labor, Gauleiter Sauckel,
The Secretary for Armament and War Production, Speer,
The Chief of the Supreme Command of the Army, General Field Marshal Keitel,
General Field Marshal Milch,
The Acting Reich Minister for Food and Agriculture, State Secretary Backe,
The Minister of the Interior, Reich Fuehrer of the SS, Himmler,
and myself.
(The Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Minister of National Economy had repeatedly asked to be permitted to participate prior to the Conference, but the Fuehrer did not wish their attendance).
The Fuehrer declared in his introductory remarks:
I want a clear picture:
(1) How many workers are required for the maintenance of German War Economy?
(a) For the maintenance of present output?
(b) To increase its output?
(2) How many workers can be obtained from Occupied Countries, or how many can still be gained in the Reich by suitable means (increased output)?
For one thing, it is this matter of making up for losses by death, infirmity, the constant fluctuation of workers, and so forth, and further it is a matter of procuring additional workers.
The Plenipotentiary for the Employment of Labor, Sauckel, declared that, in order to maintain the present pool of workers, he would have to add at least 2-1/2 but probably 3 million new workers in 1944. Otherwise production would fall off. ReichministerSpeerdeclared that he needs anadditional1.3 million laborers. However, this would depend on whether it will be possible to increase production of iron ore. Should this not be possible, he would need no additional workers. Procurement of additional workers from Occupied Territory would, however, be subject to the condition that these workers will not be withdrawn from armament and auxiliary industries already working there. For this would mean a decrease of production of these industries which he could not tolerate. Those, for instance, who are already working in France in industries mentioned above, must be protected against being sent to work in Germany by the Plenipotentiary for the Employment of Labor. The Fuehrer agreed with the opinions of Reichminister Speer and emphasized that the measures taken by the Plenipotentiary for the Employment of Labor should order no circumstances which would lead to the withdrawal of workers from Armament and auxiliary industries working in occupied territories, because such a shift of workers would only cause disturbance of production in occupied countries.
The Fuehrer further called attention to the fact that at least 250,000 laborers will be required for preparations against air attacks in the field of civilian air raid protection. For Vienna alone 2000-2500 are required immediately. The Plenipotentiary for the Employment of Labor must add at least 4 million workers to the manpower pool, considering that he requires 2-1/2 million workers for maintenance of the present level, that Reich Minister Speer needs 1.3 million additional workers, and that the above-mentioned preparations for security measures against air attacks call for 0.25 million laborers.
The Plenipotentiary for Employment of Labor, Sauckel, declared that he will attempt with fanatical determination to obtain these workers. Until now, he has always kept his promise as to the number of workers to be furnished. With the best of intentions, however, he is unable to make a definite promise for 1944. He will do everything in his powers to furnish the requested manpower in 1944. Whether it will succeed depends primarily on whatGermanenforcement agents will be made available. His project cannot be carried out with domestic enforcement agents.
The Reichfuehrer SS explained that the enforcement agents put at his disposal are extremely few, but that he would try helping the Sauckel project to succeed by increasing them and working them harder. The Reichfuehrer SS made immediately available 2000 to 2500 men from concentration camps for air raid preparations in Vienna.
Generally all participants in the conference agreed that it will be possible to treat additional manpower even at home by activation and intensification of available labor, especially the Prisoners of War, provided they are given awards in form of additional food, clothing, and so forth. State Secretary Backe will examine to which extent help can be given with additional food. Field MarshalMilchremarked that especially in agriculture, many women, who are really able to work, evade it because they receive family-allotments from their husbands who were inducted into the Armed Forces, and the wages for work done would be deducted from their family allotment. In their primitive way of thinking they therefore believe that they would have to work for nothing. Therefore on one hand, wages should not be deducted from the family allotment; on the other hand, it should be ruled that women who refuse work would, in consequence, receive no family allotment, or only a reduced family allotment.
The Fuehrer did not comment, declaring that he did not wish to go into details any longer.
Results of the Conference:
(1) The Plenipotentiary for Employment of Labor shall procure at least 4 million new workers from occupied territories.
(2) These workers may not be taken from armament and auxiliary industries in actual production in the occupied territories.
(3) It is to be examined by what means the output of workers now on hand can be increased and intensified, especially that of Prisoners of War.
(4) The Plenipotentiary for the Employment of Labor shall get in touch with the Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs before taking any action.
Signed: Dr. Lammers
II. Reichleiter Bormann has received a copy of paragraph I.
III. To the State Secretary for cognizance.
IV. Original to Mr. C. Please return. (Arrival at Fuehrer Headquarters, 6 January 1944.)
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1301-PS
Financing of the armament
The following explanations take as their premise the fact that the execution of the armament program is by its speed and extentthemission of German policy, that everything else therefore must be subordinated to this purpose, unless the neglect of other questions would endanger the main goal. Even after 16 March 1935, the difficulty continues to exist, that one cannot attempt the influencing of the German people by propaganda for support of the armament, without endangering internationally our position. The financing of the armament program, already almost impossible, is being made especially difficult by that.
Further, another prerequisite must be presented. The printing press can only be used for the financing of armament to the extent which the maintenance of money value allows. Each inflation increases the prices of foreign raw materials, and increases the prices within the country; thus it is a snake, which bites its tail. The fact that our armament had to be camouflaged completely until 16 March 1935, and for the biggest part even afterwards, has led to that, that the printing press has already been made use of at the start of the armament program; whereas it would have been natural to put it at the final point of the financing. Of the 3775 millions in the portfolio of the Reichsbank plus 866 millions set aside in bills of exchange==total of 4641 millions, the bills of exchange to finance armament represent 2374 millions (status of 30 April 1935). The Reichsbank has invested most of the German mark sums, available to its administration and belonging to foreigners, in armament bills of exchange. Thus our armament was partly financed with the property of our political opponents. Also used for the financing of the armament program were the 500 millions RM, which came together through the Reich loan placed at the savings banks in Jan 1935. In the regular budget the following amounts were provided for the armed forces: fiscal year 1933/34 RM 750 millions, fiscal year 1934/35 RM 1100 millions, fiscal year 1935/36 RM 2500 millions.
The sum of the deficits of the budgets increase since 1928, according to the estimate 1935/36, up to 5 to 6 billions RM. At present this total deficit is already being financed by short-term credits from the money market. Thus it already burdens in this amount the possibilities of use of the public market for armament. The Reich Minister of Finance is justified in saying in his budget explanations: "Since an annual deficit ... is an impossibility permanently, since one cannot count with certainty on an increased tax income, covering the deficit and other previous debts; since on the other hand only a balanced budget offers a secure basis for our great future task in the armament policy, fundamentally and consciously—a budget policy must be followed, which will solve the problem of financing of armament by organic and planned decrease of other expenses, not only from the point of view of income, but also of expenses, that means saving."
How urgent this demand is can further be construed from the fact that an unending number of tasks were attacked and are in the process of execution by state and party, all of which cannot be covered by the budget but by subscriptions and credits, which must be raised besides the regular taxes by business. This simultaneous existence of various budgets, which however all serve a more or less public purpose, present the greatest obstacle to the gaining of a clear picture of the financing possibilities of armament. A whole series of ministries and numerous agencies of the party have their own budget in addition to their share of the Reich budget, and thus accordingly income and expense possibilities, which, although they are based on the financial sovereignty of the state, are not subordinated to the control of the Minister of Finance and thus also not to the control of the cabinet. Exactly as in the field of politics, the too far reaching delegation of legislative authority to individuals in Germany has led to the condition of many states within the state, thus the condition of parallelism and divergence [Nebeneinander und Gegeneinander] of numerous state and party agencies has absolutely a disastrous effect on the financing possibility of armament. If in this field, no concentration and no unified control is introduced finally, one must fear the worst for the solution of the almost impossible task of financing of armament.
Thus the following tasks result:
1. A commissioner must at first determine all sources and incomes, which are derived from Reich, State and Party funds, as well as from profits of public or party enterprises.
2. Then, a commission, appointed by the Fuehrer must investigate how these funds were used up to now, and how much can be taken from these funds in the future from their present purpose, and made available to the financing of armament.
3. The same commission has to examine the assets of all public and official party organizations, how the assets have been invested, and to what extent these assets can be utilized for the financing of armament.
4. The Reichministry of Finance is to be commissioned to investigate the possibilities of an increased tax income by the introduction of new taxes or the increase of existing tax rates.
The financing of armament previously by the Reich Bank was a necessity under the existing political conditions, and the political success has proved the correctness of this action. However, now other methods of financing of armament must be attempted under all conditions. With that, all not absolutely necessary expenses in other fields must be refrained from, and the entire, actually small, financial power of Germany must be concentrated on this one goal, the financing of armament. Whether the financial problem will succeed with this method of approach is as yet doubtful, but without such concentration it will fail with certainty.
Memorandum 9.III.1936 on the supply situation in the field of fuels and its effect on the Wehrmacht.
The simultaneous throttling and blocking of foreign sources of liquid fuel has caused an increasingly critical situation of supply of the German market since the beginning of the year 1936.
This situation calls for a description of the serious effects on the preparedness for action of the Wehrmacht and of the extraordinary measures which necessitate a decision in this matter.
The supply of the Wehrmacht is based on the home production, the reserves which can be made available in case of mobilization and the foreign imports which still for some time must fill the present gaps of supply.
I.The German production.
The anticipating measures taken during the last 2 years by the Reich Cabinet to increase the home production of fuel, will not bring about an essential improvement of the supply situation during the current year because of the time required for factory construction and the uninterrupted increase of demand, but cannot bring an appreciable relief until the year 1938. The list in enclosure 1 of the requirements in case of mobilization and of the supply of these requirements by production, as well as the graphs added to the other enclosures, show the influence to be expected from the German production on the entire supply.
The expanding German production favors mainly light fuels, especially fuel for airplanes, and in addition, oil for airplane engines. As to the other kinds required by the Wehrmacht in case of war, we cannot expect any improvement for the time being; as to heating oils it may be anticipated that the situation will deteriorate. The developments of new processes (Uhde and Pott), the extent of which will shortly permit an opinion, offers certain possibilities of auxiliary supply which do not appear on the graphs, because the extent of the production possible until 1938 cannot yet be foreseen.
The inadequacy of the supply on the basis of home production is a fact which cannot be eliminated during the next 2-3 years, even with the greatest efforts and in spite of the planning started for additional expansion of production.
II.Reserves.
To assure the requirements of the Wehrmacht it becomes necessary to bridge the supply gaps by reserves. For the first period of mobilization the Wehrmacht relies on the reserves of business, especially of great importing corporations, which also in peace time consider stored reserves for about 3 months as indispensable for smooth distribution. The Wehrmacht ought to be enabled to count on the amount of these reserves remaining constant.
Beyond that the Wehrmacht accumulates its own reserves in large storage houses so that considerable national reserves will be available as buffers in case of supply difficulties.
III.Dependency of the overall supply on imports.
The obstacle to importing encountered to a large extent during the last weeks, and which have been brought about by an accumulation of economic-political events in foreign trade, endanger not only the maintenance of industrial reserves but also the continuation of the storage policy of the Wehrmacht. They shake the very foundations of the motorization program of industry and consequently also of Wehrmacht mobilization of mechanized vehicles to the extent planned for in case of war.
In particular large gaps have been opened:
1. due to the Russian prohibition of exporting petroleum, by which the benzol-association supplying about 20% of the German market got into considerable difficulties.
2. due to suddenly considerably increased demands of the Rumanians, who offer fuel only in exchange for foreign bills proper [Bardevisen] and/or at greatly increased prices in marks. The contribution of Rumanian imports to the supply of German requirements was 40% during the last year. The firm Olex which contributes 11% to the German market has already been forced, due to the obstruction of Rumanian deliveries, to decrease its business considerably, and will face a close-down of its market supply if relief is not procured before June 1936. Due to this reduction of imports similar stoppages are to be expected by the other great organizations of distribution during the same period.
IV.Means to secure the supply.
In considering how to meet the situation the following devices areunbearablefor the Wehrmacht:
1. Reduction of mechanized traffic because this would, in addition to precarious economic and psychological effects, bring about a throttling of German motorization, which in view of the requirements of the Wehrmacht in case of war, would be a shock to mobility and supply of replacements.
2. Just as undesirable is to be considered the diminishing of reserves. The industrial reserves constitute the basis for mobilization, which has to rely on firm figures which remain about constant. As a decrease of reserves has already started, the further development in this direction is to be counteracted immediately. Aid from the reserves of the Wehrmacht cannot be granted because these modest quantities being ultimate reserves cannot be diminished under any circumstances.
Consequently, only the following means are to be considered:
1. Conceding to the Rumanian demands of paying imports in marks on a considerably raised price-basis.
2. Additional payments in foreign bills proper [Bardevisen] of imports from Anglo-Saxon countries.
3. Investigation to what extent an improvement can be achieved by accelerating or expanding the facilities for German production.
The first course has been followed by the authorization to negotiate new contracts on the basis of the Rumanian demands. Adequate and punctual delivery to the market, however, is not yet assured hereby.
Re. 2. Foreign bills [Devisen] for the minimum of the indispensable import requirements can probably be obtained only by reduction of import of other necessities. The narrow limits of the presently assured raw materials for armament do not allow for a decrease of such imports which are indispensable for the Wehrmacht. In particular we cannot do without the necessary quantities of metals required by the Wehrmacht for current procurements.
Re. 3. As a result of investigations made, essential changes cannot be expected at a date within sight.
V.Uniform management of the petroleum industry.
During the last few months the Wehrmacht has repeatedly emphasized the unavoidable call for a uniform and planned steering of the entire German petroleum industry. The present dangerous situation of the German fuel industry puts this necessity again into the spotlight. The lack of stern guidance in the present moment must lead to severest damages to the public and the defense of the country. The duty of a management according to plans of the petroleum industry must be in the first line to avert the permanent threat to mechanized traffic and the preparedness of the Wehrmacht for action lying in the extensive dependency on forces outside of the German sphere of control.