In his speech at Dundee on June 5, from which the passage concerning the Dardanelles is reproduced below, Winston Spencer Churchill's reference to "losses of ships" constituted the official comment on the sinking by submarine attack on May 26 and 27 of the British battleships Triumph in the Gulf of Saros, and Majestic off Sedd-el-Bahr. That increased to six the sum of battleships lost to the Allies in the Dardanelles operations. The review of the operations from May 15 to June 17, shows a development of slow trench warfare on land, which postpones the attainment of a few miles to a victory confidently predicted by Mr. Churchill.
In his speech at Dundee on June 5, from which the passage concerning the Dardanelles is reproduced below, Winston Spencer Churchill's reference to "losses of ships" constituted the official comment on the sinking by submarine attack on May 26 and 27 of the British battleships Triumph in the Gulf of Saros, and Majestic off Sedd-el-Bahr. That increased to six the sum of battleships lost to the Allies in the Dardanelles operations. The review of the operations from May 15 to June 17, shows a development of slow trench warfare on land, which postpones the attainment of a few miles to a victory confidently predicted by Mr. Churchill.
In the course of his speech at Dundee on June 5, 1915, Winston Spencer Churchill said:
The operations which are now proceeding at the Dardanelles will give him (Mr. Balfour) the opportunity of using that quality of cool, calm courage and inflexibility which fifteen years ago prevented Ladysmith from being left to its fate and surrendered to the enemy. I have two things to say to you about the Dardanelles.
First, you must expect losses both by land and sea. But the fleet you are employing there is your surplus fleet, after all other needs have been provided for. Had it not been used in this great enterprise it would have been lying idle in your southern ports. A large number of the old vessels, of which it is composed, have to be laid up in any case before the end of the year, because their crews are wanted for the enormous reinforcements of new ships which the industry of your workships is hurrying into the water. Losses of ships, therefore, as long as the precious lives of the officers and men are saved—which in nearly every case they have been—losses of that kind, I say, may easily be exaggerated in the minds both of friend and foe. Military operations will also be costly, but those who suppose that Lord Kitchener—(loud cheers)—has embarked upon them without narrowly and carefully considering their requirements in relation to all other needs and in relation to the paramount need of our army in France and Flanders—such people are mistaken, and not only mistaken, they are presumptuous.
My second point is this. In looking at your losses squarely and soberly you must not forget at the same time the prize for which you are contending. The army of Sir Ian Hamilton, the fleet of Admiral de Robeck are separated only by a few miles from a victory such as this war has not yet seen. When I speak of victory I am not referring to those victories which crowd the daily placards of any newspapers. I am speaking of victory in the sense of a brilliant and formidable fact shaping the destinies of nations and shortening the duration of the war. Beyond those few miles of ridge and scrub on which our soldiers, our French comrades, our gallant Australian and New Zealand fellow-subjects are now battling, lie the downfall of a hostile empire, the destruction of an enemy's fleet and army, the fall of a world-famous capital, and probably the accession of powerful allies. The struggle will be heavy, the risks numerous, the losses cruel, but victory when it comes will make amend for all. There never was a great subsidiary operation of war in which a more complete harmony of strategic, political, and economic advantages were combined, or which stood in truer relation to the main decision, which is in the central theatre. Through the Narrows of the Dardanelles and across the ridges of the Gallipoli Peninsula lie some of the shortest paths to a triumphant peace.
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Scene of the Dardanelles operations. The black line marks the approximate allied position, the dotted line the approximate Turkish position, on June 18, 1915.
PARIS, June 14.—An official note given out today presents a summary of the operations in the Dardanelles from May 15 to June 1 as follows:
Heavy fighting has taken place during this time. Today our progress is somewhat slower than it was in the beginning, but every inch of ground gained has been organized in such a manner as to permit the repelling of counter-attacks, and each advance has been held. The physical aspects of the country make fighting extremely difficult and dangerous, as the battle front presents the form of a triangle.
During the second half of May there were attacks on the Turkish line of intrenchments in front of Kereves Dere and the redoubt called the 'Bouchet,' which we took May 8. All the Turkish counter-attacks failed completely.
Our position being assured here, we endeavored to capture a small fortress situated on the extreme left of the enemy's line. On account of the strategic position of this fortress it was impossible to take it in the ordinary way by an artillery attack, followed by a bayonet charge; such a method would have resulted in heavy loss of life. The attack had to be a surprise. On the night of May 28 a mixed company composed of thirty-four white and thirty-two negro troops, all volunteers, under the command of a Lieutenant, received orders to slip out of our first trench one by one and crawl on their hands and knees to the opposing trench. Here they were to surprise the occupants and kill them without a shot. Two other companies bringing up the rear were to go at once to the assistance of the first company if the plan failed.
At 11:45 P.M. our men, having gone forward in accordance with instructions, rushed over the embankments of the enemy trenches. The Turks were completely surprised. They discharged their guns into the air and immediately took to flight. Thanks to the rapidity of our attack our only casualties were one Sergeant and two men wounded.
The Turks attacked twice without success, and dawn saw us firmly established in our new positions.
LONDON, June 6.—Official announcement was made tonight that the British troops at the Dardanelles, as a result of their new offensive movement last week, captured two lines of Turkish trenches along a three-mile front. The statement follows:
On the night of June 3-4 the Turks, having heavily bombarded a small fort in front of the extreme right French position, which previously had been captured, launched an infantry attack against it which was repulsed with heavy loss to the enemy. At the same time the Turks set fire to scrub in front of the left centre of the position occupied by the British division and attacked, but with no success.
On the morning of the 4th of June Sir Ian Hamilton ordered a general attack on the Turkish trenches in the southern area of the Gallipoli Peninsula, preceded by a heavy bombardment by all guns, assisted by battleships, cruisers, and destroyers.
At a given signal the troops rushed forward with the bayonet. They were immediately successful all along the line except in one spot, where the heavy wire entanglement was not destroyed by the bombardment.
Indian troops on our extreme left made a magnificent advance. They captured two lines of trenches, but, owing to the fact that the troops on their right were hung up by this wire entanglement, they were obliged to retire to their original line. The regular division made good progress on the left centre, capturing a strong redoubt and two lines of trenches beyond it, about 500 yards in advance of their original line.
The Territorial Division on our centre did brilliantly, advancing 600 yards and capturing three lines of trenches, but though the advanced captured trench was held all day and half of the ensuing night, they had to be ordered back in the morning to the second captured line, as both their flanks were exposed.
The Naval Division on our right centre captured a redoubt and a formidable line of trenches constructed in three tiers 300 yards to their front, but they, too, had to be ordered back, owing to the heavy enfilading fire.
The French Second Division advanced with great gallantry and élan. They retook for the fourth time that deadly redoubt they call 'Le Haricot,' but unfortunately the Turks developed heavy counter-attacks through prepared communication trenches, and under cover of an accurate shell fire were able to recapture it.
General Gouraud
GENERAL GOURAUDCommander of the French Land Forces Operating Against the Dardanelles(Photo from Medem)
On the French extreme right the French captured a strong line of trenches which, though heavily counter-attacked twice during the night, they still occupy.
We captured 400 prisoners, including ten officers. Among the prisoners were five Germans, the remains of a volunteer machine gun detachment from the Goeben (the Turkish cruiser Sultan Selim). Their officer was killed and the machine gun was destroyed.
During the night information was received that enemy reinforcements were advancing from the direction of Maidos toward Kithia. Thereupon Lieutenant General Birdwood arranged to attack the trenches in front of Quinn's post at 10 P.M., which was successfully carried out, and the captured trenches held throughout the night. The Turkish casualties were heavy.
At 6:30 A.M. the enemy heavily counter-attacked, and by means of heavy bombs forced our men out of the most forward trench, though we still hold communication trenches made during the night.
The result of these operations is that we have made an advance of 500 yards, which includes two lines of Turkish trenches along a front of nearly three miles. We are now consolidating our new positions and strengthening the lines.
LONDON, June 15.—There have been so many rumors recently that the Allies had forced the Dardanelles that Sir James H. Dalziel asked Premier Asquith this afternoon in the House of Commons if there was any truth in such reports.
"None whatever," was the reply. The Premier said that it was not in the public interest to say anything now about the Dardanelles. "The operations are of the highest importance," he added, "and they will be pushed to a successful conclusion."
The following announcement concerning the operations was given out officially today:
The situation on the Gallipoli Peninsula has developed into trench warfare. After our success on the 4th instant the Turks have evinced a great respect for our offensive, and by day and by night they have to submit to captures of trenches.
On the night of the 11th-12th of June two regiments of a British regular brigade made a simultaneous attack on the advanced Turkish trenches, and after severe fighting, which included the killing of many snipers, succeeded in maintaining themselves, in spite of bombs, in the captured position.
On the morning of the 13th a counter-attack was made by the Turks, who rushed forward with bombs, but coming under the fire of the naval machine gun squadron were annihilated. Of the fifty who attacked, thirty dead bodies were counted in front of that part of our trenches.
The situation is favorable to our forces, but is necessarily slow on account of the difficulties of the ground. The Turkish offensive has sensibly weakened.
CONSTANTINOPLE, June 5, (by Courier to Berlin and Wireless to Sayville, L.I.)—The forces of the Allies on the Gallipoli Peninsula at Ari Burnu and Sedd-el-Bahr are in the greatest danger, as a result of the withdrawal of the bombarding fleets—made necessary by the activity of German submarines—and the consequent difficulty of maintaining communications oversea from the Aegean Islands.
The English position is at present desperate.
The inability to land heavy artillery was at first compensated for by the protection given by the guns of the fleet, but the withdrawal of the ships from Ari Burnu leaves the shore forces resting almost on the water's edge without means of meeting attacks.
Heavy Turkish batteries are mounted on the surrounding heights.
These statements are made after a week spent in the Turkish field under the first personal pass issued to a newspaper correspondent by Field Marshal Liman von Sanders, the Commander in Chief of the Turkish Army.
The Turks are fighting confidently, aided by a few German machine gun squads.
The farthest advance made by the English at Ari Burnu is 1,000 yards from shore; at Sedd-el-Bahr, about two miles.
Have seen Forts Chanak and Kalid Bahr, and find they are still intact.
The net results of the English attempt to force the Dardanelles are at present almost nil.
The general impression at Constantinople and Berlin is that the attack as at present conducted is a failure.
The bombardment of March 18 was ineffectual, owing to the inadequacy of the landing forces, and the failure of the Entente powers to embroil Bulgaria against Turkey.
KRITHIA, Dardanelles, June 17, (via London, June 19.)—The allied troops who landed at Sedd-el-Bahr, on the Gallipoli Peninsula, hold about ten square miles of the extreme southern part of the peninsula, the occupancy of which is maintained with the greatest difficulties.
The ground held by the Allies consists principally of a small plateau to the north of Sedd-el-Bahr and two adjoining ridges to the northwest, between which the Turks are pushing advance trenches.
The Associated Press correspondent, who spent two days in the trenches, found the Turkish troops in excellent condition and spirits, in spite of the fact that the Allies were using every conceivable means to carry on the operations, including bombs thrown from catapults and from aeroplanes.
From the Turkish station of artillery fire control the effect of the Turkish fire upon the allied trenches could be observed today, and the shells were reaching the mark. The sanitary and supply services of the Turks are being carried on efficiently. The number of wounded at the hospital bases at the front was small, although the fighting during the night had been fairly severe.
During the daytime both sides are usually inactive, the Turks preferring night bayonet attacks. Many Turkish batteries are in position, but the nearness of the opposing trenches makes their work difficult, and for the most part they are directing their attention to the reserves of the Allies and to changing shifts which are exposed at certain points. The Turks, in this, have the support of their heavy batteries on the Asiatic side, which, since the retirement of the allied fleet, work without fear of being molested, bombarding chiefly the allied right wing, composed of French, home, and Colonial troops.
Weber Pasha, the German General commanding the south group, gave the correspondent every opportunity to visit the Sedd-el-Bahr district, placing no restrictions whatever upon his movements. The result was a thorough inspection of the ground. Weber Pasha made no comment on the situation himself beyond saying that "the failure of the Allies to consummate their plan of forcing the Dardanelles is too obvious for discussion."
Weber Pasha, who is a member of the German military mission which undertook the improvement of the Ottoman Army organization, is fully confident that the Turks will be able to meet the Gallipoli situation, and that the Allies will never advance against the Dardanelles forts.
It has been ascertained that only a few German officers are active in the south group. German privates are employed in special lines.
Krithia, once a thriving village of about 4,000 inhabitants, is probably the most ruined place in all Europe. The Allies left no house standing during their bombardment.
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—From The Plain Dealer, Cleveland.
Poor Darius Green, he tried to fly.
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—From The World, New York.
"God Bless You."
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—From The Sun, New York.
"Et tu, Brute!"
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—From The Herald, New York.
Will He Haul It Down?
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—From The Evening Sun, New York.
The White Feather.
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—From The Sun, New York.
"Emperor William has telegraphed his deep indignation at the wicked attack upon beloved Karlsruhe. The poor innocent victims among civilians have greatly affected him."—Berlin Press Dispatch.
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—From The Express, Los Angeles.
Peace and Prosperity.
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—From Punch, London.
[The allusion is to the New British Coalition Cabinet.]
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—From Simplicissimus, Munich.
"Here is a sample of a new shell. It is wrapped up in a little bit of a protest—but you needn't take that very seriously."
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—From The Sketch, London.
The British Sea Lion returns from Shrimping.
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—From Lustige Blaetter, Berlin.
Look out Sisyphus, the fall may be a terrible one!
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—From Lustige Blaetter, Berlin.
"Come in, little boats! But you'll never get out again!"
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—From The Bystander, London.
Bulgaria contemplates the outlook with some trepidation.
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Map of the frontier between Italy and Austria where the Italians were advancing on June 18, 1915, to capture Trieste. The boxed numbers indicate altitudes in meters.
Official reviews of the first month, ending June 23, of Italy's war with Austria-Hungary are still lacking.[4]On May 24 it was officially reported in London that Italy had given her adhesion to the agreement, already signed by the allied powers, not to conclude a separate peace. Active war operations were begun by Austria on the same day; bombs were dropped on Venice and five other Adriatic ports, shelled from air and some from sea. The attackers were driven off.The rapid advance of the Italian armies which invaded Austria on the east had by May 27 carried part of the forces across the Isonzo River to Monfalcone, sixteen miles northwest of Trieste. Another force penetrated further to the north in the Crownland of Goritz and Gradisca. On June 4 the censored news from Udine, Italy, reported that encounters with the enemy thus far had been merely outpost skirmishes, but had allowed Italy to occupy advantageous positions in Austrian territory. The first important battle of the Italian campaign, for the possession of Tolmino, was reported on June 7.A general Italian advance took place on June 7 across the Isonzo River from Caporetto to the sea, a distance of about forty miles. On June 12 reports from the Trentino indicated an Italian advance on Rovereto in Tyrol, thirteen miles southwest of Trent, and upon Mori, near by. Monfalcone was taken by the Italians on June 10—the first serious blow against Trieste—as Monfalcone is a railway junction and its electrical works operate the light and power of Trieste. In the extreme north, on the threshold of the Carnic Alps, after three days' fighting it was reported on June 10 that the Italians had swept the Austrians from Monte Croce and possessed themselves of Freikofel. The Austrian city of Gradisca was reported taken on June 11, as indicated in an official statement signed by Lieut. Gen. Count Cadorna, Chief of Staff of the Italian Army. The defenses of Goritz were shelled by the Italian artillery on June 13, and on June 14 the Italian eastern army had pushed forward along the Gulf of Trieste toward the town of Nabresina, nine miles from Trieste.Count CadornaLIEUT. GEN. COUNT CADORNAChief of the Italian General Staff(Photo from Paul Thompson)The Italian advance was checked—but not until June 16, more than three weeks after the beginning of the war—by an elaborate system of intrenchments prepared by the Austrians along the Isonzo River. On June 17 the Italians in the Trentino had arrived at the town of Mori, where their forces were blocked by the fortifications between that town and Rovereto. On June 18 a dispatch of The Associated Press from Rome reported that the Austrians had then so strengthened their forces that they were taking the offensive both from Mori and Rovereto against the Italians, who were encamped at Brentanico at the foot of Mount Altissimo, at Serravale, situated in the Lagardina Valley, and also in the Arsa Valley. Tolmino, on Austria's battlefront to the north of Goritz, was being heavily fortified by the Austrians with a garrison of some 30,000 men, this place being considered indispensable to their operations as the key to the Isonzo Valley. On June 20, the fourth week of the war, was reported by General Cadorna as marking a brilliant victory at Plava. But on the following day reports from Rome indicated that the Italians were encountering strong and better-organized resistance from the Austrians. On June 22 dispatches from the Italian front to Berlin declared that serious reverses had been experienced by the Italians in their attempts to storm the Austro-Hungarian line along the Isonzo River.Two things have puzzled the public: First, the status of Germany in regard to Italy declaring war against Austria-Hungary, arraying herself on the side of the Entente powers, and pledging herself, in turn, as each of them had done, not to make a separate peace with the enemy, and, second, the apparent weakness of the Austrian defensive in the Trentino and on the eastern frontier of Venetia.Diplomatic relations between Rome and Berlin have been severed, but neither Chancellery has yet (June 23) found the other guilty of an aggression sufficiently grave to warrant a declaration of war. There is nothing astonishing in this situation. A similar situation obtained between Paris and Vienna and London and Vienna long after a state of war existed between Germany and Russia, France, and England.The Italian plan of campaign apparently consists (1) in neutralizing the Trentino by capturing or "covering" her defenses and cutting her two lines of communication with Austria proper—the railway which runs south from Innsbruck and that which runs southwest from Vienna and joins the former at Franzensfeste, and (2) in a movement in force from the eastern frontier, with Trieste captured or "covered" on the right flank, in the direction of the Austrian fortress of Klagenfurt and Vienna, only 170 miles northeast from the present base of operations—a distance equal to that from New York City to Cape Cod.The initial weakness of the Austrian defensive, which will doubtless be strengthened as troops can be spared from the seat of war in Galicia, is due to the fact that the invaded regions are normally defended by the Fourteenth and Third Army Corps, which were, in August, sent with two reserve corps to defend the Austrian line in Galicia. To fill the casualties in these corps the drain on the population has been great, so that when Italy began her invasion the defenses of the country were chiefly in the hands of the hastily mobilized youths below the military age of 19 and men above the military age of 42.During the last six months, when Vienna gradually came to realize that war with Italy was inevitable, the Austro-Hungarian military authorities enrolled a new army of men who had already seen military service, but, for various reasons, had not been availed of in the present war. They were men of an unusually high mental and physical standard and had received additional training under German officers. Their ages were from 35 to 40, and they numbered from 700,000 to 800,000. On the desire of the German War Office this new army, which should have been sent to the Italian frontiers, was diverted to Galicia toward the last of April, and since then has been the backbone of the Teutonic drive against Russia in that region.Below are given a sketch of the Alpine frontier by G.H. Perris, appearing in The London Chronicle of May 29; Colonel Murray's article on Italy's armed strength, and the speeches of mutual defiance uttered by the German Imperial Chancellor in the Reichstag on May 28 and the Italian Premier at the Capitol in Rome on June 2.
Official reviews of the first month, ending June 23, of Italy's war with Austria-Hungary are still lacking.[4]On May 24 it was officially reported in London that Italy had given her adhesion to the agreement, already signed by the allied powers, not to conclude a separate peace. Active war operations were begun by Austria on the same day; bombs were dropped on Venice and five other Adriatic ports, shelled from air and some from sea. The attackers were driven off.
The rapid advance of the Italian armies which invaded Austria on the east had by May 27 carried part of the forces across the Isonzo River to Monfalcone, sixteen miles northwest of Trieste. Another force penetrated further to the north in the Crownland of Goritz and Gradisca. On June 4 the censored news from Udine, Italy, reported that encounters with the enemy thus far had been merely outpost skirmishes, but had allowed Italy to occupy advantageous positions in Austrian territory. The first important battle of the Italian campaign, for the possession of Tolmino, was reported on June 7.
A general Italian advance took place on June 7 across the Isonzo River from Caporetto to the sea, a distance of about forty miles. On June 12 reports from the Trentino indicated an Italian advance on Rovereto in Tyrol, thirteen miles southwest of Trent, and upon Mori, near by. Monfalcone was taken by the Italians on June 10—the first serious blow against Trieste—as Monfalcone is a railway junction and its electrical works operate the light and power of Trieste. In the extreme north, on the threshold of the Carnic Alps, after three days' fighting it was reported on June 10 that the Italians had swept the Austrians from Monte Croce and possessed themselves of Freikofel. The Austrian city of Gradisca was reported taken on June 11, as indicated in an official statement signed by Lieut. Gen. Count Cadorna, Chief of Staff of the Italian Army. The defenses of Goritz were shelled by the Italian artillery on June 13, and on June 14 the Italian eastern army had pushed forward along the Gulf of Trieste toward the town of Nabresina, nine miles from Trieste.
Count Cadorna
LIEUT. GEN. COUNT CADORNAChief of the Italian General Staff(Photo from Paul Thompson)
The Italian advance was checked—but not until June 16, more than three weeks after the beginning of the war—by an elaborate system of intrenchments prepared by the Austrians along the Isonzo River. On June 17 the Italians in the Trentino had arrived at the town of Mori, where their forces were blocked by the fortifications between that town and Rovereto. On June 18 a dispatch of The Associated Press from Rome reported that the Austrians had then so strengthened their forces that they were taking the offensive both from Mori and Rovereto against the Italians, who were encamped at Brentanico at the foot of Mount Altissimo, at Serravale, situated in the Lagardina Valley, and also in the Arsa Valley. Tolmino, on Austria's battlefront to the north of Goritz, was being heavily fortified by the Austrians with a garrison of some 30,000 men, this place being considered indispensable to their operations as the key to the Isonzo Valley. On June 20, the fourth week of the war, was reported by General Cadorna as marking a brilliant victory at Plava. But on the following day reports from Rome indicated that the Italians were encountering strong and better-organized resistance from the Austrians. On June 22 dispatches from the Italian front to Berlin declared that serious reverses had been experienced by the Italians in their attempts to storm the Austro-Hungarian line along the Isonzo River.
Two things have puzzled the public: First, the status of Germany in regard to Italy declaring war against Austria-Hungary, arraying herself on the side of the Entente powers, and pledging herself, in turn, as each of them had done, not to make a separate peace with the enemy, and, second, the apparent weakness of the Austrian defensive in the Trentino and on the eastern frontier of Venetia.
Diplomatic relations between Rome and Berlin have been severed, but neither Chancellery has yet (June 23) found the other guilty of an aggression sufficiently grave to warrant a declaration of war. There is nothing astonishing in this situation. A similar situation obtained between Paris and Vienna and London and Vienna long after a state of war existed between Germany and Russia, France, and England.
The Italian plan of campaign apparently consists (1) in neutralizing the Trentino by capturing or "covering" her defenses and cutting her two lines of communication with Austria proper—the railway which runs south from Innsbruck and that which runs southwest from Vienna and joins the former at Franzensfeste, and (2) in a movement in force from the eastern frontier, with Trieste captured or "covered" on the right flank, in the direction of the Austrian fortress of Klagenfurt and Vienna, only 170 miles northeast from the present base of operations—a distance equal to that from New York City to Cape Cod.
The initial weakness of the Austrian defensive, which will doubtless be strengthened as troops can be spared from the seat of war in Galicia, is due to the fact that the invaded regions are normally defended by the Fourteenth and Third Army Corps, which were, in August, sent with two reserve corps to defend the Austrian line in Galicia. To fill the casualties in these corps the drain on the population has been great, so that when Italy began her invasion the defenses of the country were chiefly in the hands of the hastily mobilized youths below the military age of 19 and men above the military age of 42.
During the last six months, when Vienna gradually came to realize that war with Italy was inevitable, the Austro-Hungarian military authorities enrolled a new army of men who had already seen military service, but, for various reasons, had not been availed of in the present war. They were men of an unusually high mental and physical standard and had received additional training under German officers. Their ages were from 35 to 40, and they numbered from 700,000 to 800,000. On the desire of the German War Office this new army, which should have been sent to the Italian frontiers, was diverted to Galicia toward the last of April, and since then has been the backbone of the Teutonic drive against Russia in that region.
Below are given a sketch of the Alpine frontier by G.H. Perris, appearing in The London Chronicle of May 29; Colonel Murray's article on Italy's armed strength, and the speeches of mutual defiance uttered by the German Imperial Chancellor in the Reichstag on May 28 and the Italian Premier at the Capitol in Rome on June 2.
The organization of the military forces of Italy is based upon the law of organization of 1887 and the recruiting law of 1888. Modifications have been made in these laws from time to time in regard to the strength of the annual contingent trained with the colors and the duration of the periods of training, but the original laws have not been altered in principle, and have now had time to completely materialize.
Every man in Italy is liable to military service for a period of nineteen years from the age of 20 to 39. All young men on reaching the age of 20, if passed medically fit for military service, are divided into three categories—first, those who are taken by lot for color service; second, those for whom there is no room with the colors, and, third, those who are exempted from military service for family reasons specified by law. Men placed in the first category serve for two years with the colors, after which they go to the active army reserve for six years. Men in the second category are sent at once into the active army reserve for the period of eight years, after which both they and the men in the first category are passed into the mobile militia reserve for four years, and subsequently into the territorial militia for seven years, making nineteen years altogether. The men in the third category pass all their nineteen years' obligatory period of military service in the territorial militia, receiving no training whatever till they are called up to their depots when mobilization is ordered. The following table shows the periods of service of the men according to the categories in which they are placed by the recruiting authorities. The figures are years:
In the above table the mobile militia corresponds to the German Landwehr, and the territorial militia to the Landsturm.
After deducting emigrants, men put back for the following year, those who are medically unfit, and one-year volunteers, the average number of recruits placed each year in the first category is approximately 150,000, in the second category 36,000, and in the third category 28,000. All men in the first category are fully trained, while those in the second category, who correspond to the German Ersatz Reserve, are only partially trained, being called up at the discretion of the War Minister for one or more periods of training not exceeding twelve months altogether during their eight years' service.
Last year's returns, which were published in the Italian press, gave the approximate war strength of the army as under:
According to a calculation, which need not be given in detail here, the above number of total men available includes upward of 1,200,000 fully trained soldiers, who have been through the ranks, with perhaps another 800,000 partially trained men of the second category, the remaining million being completely untrained men, who have passed all their nineteen years of obligatory service in the third category.
The organization for putting the above numbers of men into the field is as follows: The fully trained men are organized in four armies, each army consisting of three corps, one cavalry division, and a number of troops for the lines of communication. The twelve corps are recruited and organized on a territorial basis, each corps having its allotted area, as shown in the sketch, which also indicates the locality of corps headquarters. The Italian army corps, which is larger than that in other European armies, is composed of two active army divisions, with thirty guns each, one mobile militia division, brought up to strength from the territorial militia, one regiment of Bersaglieri, or light infantry, one cavalry regiment, one field artillery regiment of six batteries, (corps artillery,) and other technical and administrative units. The strength of the corps amounts to 50,000 men, with 8,400 horses and 126 guns, and this gives each of the four armies a strength of 150,000 men, 25,200 horses, and 378 guns, with the addition of a cavalry division of 4,200 sabres. The first line Italian army, therefore, which can be put into the field seven days after mobilization is ordered amounts to 600,000 men, 100,800 horses, 1,512 guns, and 16,200 sabres. But these cadres only absorb half the fully trained men called out on mobilization; duplicate corps will consequently be formed to take the place of the twelve first-line corps as soon as they have been dispatched to their concentration rendezvous. It is believed that sufficient guns have now been provided for these twelve duplicate corps, but it is unlikely that more than two cavalry divisions could be formed in addition to the four divisions with the first-line armies. These duplicate corps would be ready to take the field three or four weeks after the concentration of the first twelve corps. The above calculations show that within a few weeks after the declaration of war Italy can place in the field a force of 1,200,000 men, (24 corps,) and would still have 1,800,000 men of fighting age left at the depots after the field armies had been dispatched to the front.
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Map showing the Military Districts of Italy.
The infantry are armed with the Mannlicher (1891) rifle, the field artillery with the 75-millimeter quick-firing Krupp gun, (1906,) and the mountain batteries, of which there are twenty-four, with a new 65-millimeter (2.56-inch) quick-firing gun of Italian construction. The heavy artillery is armed with a 149-millimeter field howitzer, also of Italian construction.
The organization of the Italian Army and the quality of the troops composing it were both tested in the Tripoli campaign, (1911-12,) and all military judges agree that the results prove the army to have reached a high standard of efficiency. The mobilization was only partial, but it was well carried out, and between October and December, 1911, 90,000 men, with 12,000 horses, were transported to Tripoli and Benghasi without a single hitch. Italian officers are well educated, and the men are brave and disciplined. Unlike the Austro-Hungarian Army, which is composed of men split into a variety of racial sections, the Italian Army is absolutely homogeneous, and the troops will enter the European struggle with the moral consciousness that they are fighting, not with aggressive intentions, but for the principle of nationality, which is the keynote to that marvelous progress which Italy has made since she became a nation in 1860.
The Italian Navy has ten up-to-date battleships in commission, all armed with twelve-inch guns, six of these being pre-dreadnoughts and four quite recently built dreadnoughts. These four latter ships carry a more powerful primary armament than the battleships of any other European country, the Dante Alighieri, the first of the type built, carrying twelve and the Conte di Cavour, Leonardo-da-Vinci, and Giulio Cesare thirteen twelve-inch guns mounted on the triple-turret system. Two more ships of the same class—the Caio Duilio and Andrea Dorea—are due to be commissioned this Autumn, and their completion will doubtless now be accelerated. Then there are four more battleships under construction, known as the Dandolo class—the Dandolo, Morosini, Mazzini, and Mameli—two of which are due to be launched in 1916 and two others in 1917. When completed these ships will be equal in gun power and speed to the ships of the Queen Elizabeth class, for they will carry eight fifteen-inch guns paired in four turrets—the triple-turret system having been abandoned—twenty six-inch and twenty-two fourteen-pr. guns, their speed being 25 knots. Besides these ten, or practically twelve, completed battleships, Italy has ten armored cruisers in commission and three twenty-eight knot light cruisers, but no fastgoing battle cruisers corresponding to those in the British and German Navies. She has also twenty-seven completed destroyers and thirteen thirty-two knot destroyers laid down, along with fifty-one torpedo boats and sixteen submarines, with four others building. With this fleet, which is half as strong again as the Austrian fleet, Italy can secure complete control of the Adriatic Sea and lock up the Austrian ships in Pola.
We have all learned a good deal of French, Russian, and Austrian geography in the last ten months; and, in the same sad school, we shall now become better acquainted with the region of mountain and plain which, through and for 140 miles east of Lake Garda, is the Austro-Italian borderland, and with the northeastern coast of the Adriatic, where there will be important side issues. There is this great difference, among others, between the Adriatic and the Alpine military problems: On the one side, the Germanic powers can now only assume the defensive; on the other, they can, and probably will, attempt the invasion of provinces dear not only to Italians, for their homes and a splendid galaxy of historic associations, but to cultivated minds throughout the world for treasures of art abounding even in the humblest towns and villages.
The irregularity of this northern frontier is the product of an unhappy history; it does not follow the line of the mountain summits or any other natural feature, and still less is it a limit marked by race or language. A glance at the map shows its salient characteristic—the piece of the Austrian Tyrol, from forty to sixty miles wide, which is thrust southward toward the great plain of Lombardy and Venetia, and toward the four provincial capitals, Brescia, Verona, Vicenza, and Belluno. The Trentino—as it is called, after the very ancient city of Trent, once the chief town of Tyrol, now a market centre dignified by many towers and poverty-stricken palaces and castles—is thoroughly Italian; but it still gathers much of its importance, as it has done ever since Roman times, from the fact that the best and oldest road from Germany and West Austria over the Alps runs through it to Verona. For nearly half a century one of the grandest of mountain railways has followed this olden track of conquest and pilgrimage, from Innsbruck over the Brenner Pass, through Botzen, and down the Adige Valley. More recently a branch line has been built which runs from Trent southeastward to Padua and Venice.
It is not only the Italian resistance to Austrian aggression and tyranny that has made this doorway into the lowlands about the Po a vast battlefield. From the Middle Ages onward France and Austria constantly fought out their quarrels here. In 1796, Napoleon, after routing Marshal Wurmser at Lonato and Castiglione, small towns to the south of the Lake of Garda, drove him up the Adige Valley to Trent, and then round the side track already named, the Brenta Valley, by Bassano back to Mantua. In 1848 the Piedmontese Army advanced upon the famous quadrilateral of fortresses, then Austrian, covering the entry—Mantua and Peschiera on the Mincio, Verona and Legnago on the Adige. Charles Albert was far from being another Napoleon; and the three days' battle of Custoza, when four weary and ill-found Italian brigades held out against Radetzky's five army corps, did not serve to turn the tide of the national fortunes. That year saw the first appearance of Garibaldi as a military leader and the accession of the present Austrian Emperor; and it is strange now to recall that in the war of 1859, when Lombardy was liberated by the French and Sardinian Armies, this same Francis Joseph was actually in command of the Austrian forces. The battle of Solferino, fought on a front of five leagues, along the hills to the south of Lake Garda, was a terrible butchery, even by the worst of modern standards, for in twelve hours 25,000 of the 300,000 combatants were killed or wounded. In the war of 1866 Garibaldi took a body of volunteers up the Adige; but the treaty which gave Venetia to the new Kingdom of Italy left the Trentino still to be recovered.
The Adige and Brenta Valley roads to Trent and Botzen are, then, clearly marked out for Italian effort in the present juncture; and if the Austrians have the advantage of innumerable defensive positions on the mountain heights, they have the disadvantage of very long and frail lines of supply and reinforcement. It may be supposed that the Alpine regiments, which are in some ways the flower of the Italian Army, will also attempt the lesser approaches to Tyrol from the west, by the Val di Sole and the Valtelline, and from the east from Belluno and Pieve. The Brenner railway, with its twenty-two tunnels and sixty large bridges, is peculiarly vulnerable. With many cities and good railways behind them, and a popular welcome in front, the Italian troops, on the other hand, will face the hill roads, now generally free from snow, with confidence.
Very different are the natural conditions on the only other part of the frontier where the hostile forces can well come to grips. The Alps gradually fall and break up into separate ridges as we pass east; and beyond Udine there is a flat gap, 50 miles wide, beyond which lies Trieste, with its fine harbor and predominantly Italian population. Further north, where the main line for Vienna passes the border at Pontebba, to penetrate the double barrier of the Carinthian and Styrian Alps, there can be little temptation to adventure on either side. But in the lowlands of Friuli a beginning has been made, the advance at one point, Caporetto, reaching as far as the River Isonzo, while Terzo, Cormons, and other small places have been occupied. If there is to be any large-scale warfare on the Alpine frontier, it must apparently occur either in this gap or in and about the Adige Valley, on the way to Trent.
When I spoke eight days ago there was still a glimpse of hope that Italy's participation in the war could be avoided. That hope proved fallacious. German feeling strove against the belief in the possibility of such a change. Italy has now inscribed in the book of the world's history, in letters of blood which will never fade, her violation of faith.
I believe Machiavelli once said that a war which is necessary is also just. Viewed from this sober, practical, political standpoint, which leaves out of account all moral considerations, has this war been necessary? Is it not, indeed, directly mad? [Cheers.] Nobody threatened Italy; neither Austria-Hungary nor Germany. Whether the Triple Entente was content with blandishments alone history will show later. [Cheers.] Without a drop of blood flowing, and without the life of a single Italian being endangered, Italy could have secured the long list of concessions which I recently read to the House—territory in Tyrol and on the Isonzo as far as the Italian speech is heard, satisfaction of the national aspirations in Trieste, a free hand in Albania, and the valuable port of Valona.
Why have they not taken it? Do they, perhaps, wish to conquer the German Tyrol? Hands off! [Prolonged cheers.] Did Italy wish to provoke Germany, to whom she owes so much in her upward growth of a great power, and from whom she is not separated by any conflict of interests? We left Rome in no doubt that an Italian attack on Austro-Hungarian troops would also strike the German troops. [Cheers.] Why did Rome refuse so light-heartedly the proposals of Vienna? The Italian manifesto of war, which conceals an uneasy conscience behind vain phrases, does not give us any explanation. They were too shy, perhaps, to say openly what was spread abroad as a pretext by the press and by gossip in the lobbies of the Chamber, namely, that Austria's offer came too late and could not be trusted.
What are the facts? Italian statesmen have no right to measure the trustworthiness of other nations in the same proportion as they measured their own loyalty to a treaty. [Loud cheers.] Germany, by her word, guaranteed that the concessions would be carried through. There was no occasion for distrust. Why too late? On May 4 the Trentino was the same territory as it was in February, and a whole series of concessions had been added to the Trentino of which nobody had thought in the Winter.
It was, perhaps, too late for this reason, that while the Triple Alliance, the existence of which the King and the Government had expressly acknowledged after the outbreak of war, was still alive, Italian statesmen had long before engaged themselves so deeply with the Triple Entente that they could not disentangle themselves. There were indications of fluctuations in the Rome Cabinet as far back as December. To have two irons in the fire is always useful. Before this Italy had shown her predilection for extra dances. [Cheers and laughter.] But this is no ballroom. This is a bloody battlefield upon which Germany and Austria-Hungary are fighting for their lives against a world of enemies. The statesmen of Rome have played against their own people the same game as they played against us.
It is true that the Italian-speaking territory on the northern frontier has always been the dream and the desire of every Italian, but the great majority of the Italian people, as well as the majority in Parliament, did not want to know anything of war. According to the observation of the best judge of the situation in Italy, in the first days of May four-fifths of the Senate and two-thirds of the Chamber were against war, and in that majority were the most responsible and important statesmen. But common sense had no say. The mob alone ruled. Under the kindly disposed toleration and with the assistance of the leading statesmen of a Cabinet fed with the gold of the Triple Entente, the mob, under the guidance of unscrupulous war instigators, was roused to a frenzy of blood which threatened the King with revolution and all moderate men with murder if they did not join in the war delirium.
The Italian people were intentionally kept in the dark with regard to the course of the Austrian negotiations and the extent of the Austrian concessions, and so it came about that after the resignation of the Salandra Cabinet nobody could be found who had the courage to undertake the formation of a new Cabinet, and that in the decisive debate no member of the Constitutional Party in the Senate or Chamber even attempted to estimate the value of the far-reaching Austrian concessions. In the frenzy of war honest politicians grew dumb, but when, as the result of military events, (as we hope and desire,) the Italian people become sober again it will recognize how frivolously it was instigated to take part in this world war.
We did everything possible to avoid the alienation of Italy from the Triple Alliance. The ungrateful rôle fell to us of requiring from our loyal ally, Austria, with whose armies our troops share daily wounds, death, and victory, the purchase of the loyalty of the third party to the alliance by the cession of old-inherited territory. That Austria-Hungary went to the utmost limit possible is known. Prince Bülow, who again entered into the active service of the empire, tried by every means, his diplomatic ability, his most thorough knowledge of the Italian situation and of Italian personages, to come to an understanding. Though his work has been in vain the entire people are grateful to him. Also this storm we shall endure. From month to month we grow more intimate with our ally. From the Pilitza to the Bukowina we tenaciously withstood with our Austro-Hungarian comrades for months the gigantic superiority of the enemy. Then we victoriously advanced.
So our new enemies will perish through the spirit of loyalty and the friendship and bravery of the central powers. In this war Turkey is celebrating a brilliant regeneration. The whole German people follow with enthusiasm the different phases of the obstinate, victorious resistance with which the loyal Turkish Army and fleet repulse the attacks of their enemies with heavy blows. Against the living wall of our warriors in the west our enemies up till now have vainly stormed. If in some places fighting fluctuates, if here or there a trench or a village is lost or won, the great attempt of our adversaries to break through, which they announced five months ago, did not succeed, and will not succeed. They will perish through the heroic bravery of our soldiers.
Up till now our enemies have summoned in vain against us all the forces of the world and a gigantic coalition of brave soldiers. We will not despise our enemies, as our adversaries like to do. At the moment when the mob in English towns is dancing around the stake at which the property of defenseless Germans is burning, the English Government dared to publish a document, with the evidence of unnamed witnesses, on the alleged cruelties in Belgium, which are of so monstrous a character that only mad brains could believe them. But while the English press does not permit itself to be deprived of news, the terror of the censorship reigns in Paris. No casualty lists appear, and no German or Austrian communiqués may be printed. Severely wounded invalids are kept away from their relations, and real fear of the truth appears to be the motive of the Government.
Thus it comes about, according to trustworthy observation, that there is no knowledge of the heavy defeats which the Russians have sustained, and the belief continues in the Russian "steam-roller" advancing on Berlin, which is "perishing from starvation and misery," and confidence exists in the great offensive in the west, which for months has not progressed. If the Governments of hostile States believe that by the deception of the people and by unchaining blind hatred they can shift the blame for the crime of this war and postpone the day of awakening, we, relying on our good conscience, a just cause, and a victorious sword, will not allow ourselves to be forced by a hair's breadth from the path which we have always recognized as right. Amid this confusion of minds on the other side, the German people goes on its own way, calm and sure.
Not in hatred do we wage this war, but in anger—[loud cheers]—in holy anger. [Renewed cheers from all parts of the House.] The greater the danger we have to confront, surrounded on all sides by enemies, the more deeply does the love of home grip our hearts, the more must we care for our children and grandchildren, and the more must we endure until we have conquered and have secured every possible real guarantee and assurance that no enemy alone or combined will dare again a trial of arms. [Loud cheers.] The more wildly the storm rages around us the more firmly must we build our own house. For this consciousness of united strength, unshaken courage, and boundless devotion, which inspire the whole people, and for the loyal co-operation which you, gentlemen, from the first day have given to the Fatherland, I bring you, as the representatives of the entire people, the warm thanks of the Emperor.
In the mutual confidence that we are all united we will conquer, despite a world of enemies. [Loud and prolonged applause.]
I address myself to Italy and to the civilized world in order to show not by violent words, [cheers,] but by exact facts and documents, how the fury of our enemies has vainly attempted to diminish the high moral and political dignity of the cause which our arms will make prevail. I shall speak with the calm of which the King of Italy has given a noble example, [loud cheers, and shouts of "Long live the King!"] when he called his land and sea forces to arms. I shall speak with the respect due to my position and to the place in which I speak. I can afford to ignore the insults written in Imperial, Royal, and Archducal proclamations. Since I speak from the Capitol, and represent in this solemn hour the people and the Government of Italy, I, a modest citizen, feel that I am far nobler than the head of the house of the Habsburgs. [Loud cheers.]
The commonplace statesmen who, in rash frivolity of mind and mistaken in all their calculations, set fire last July to the whole of Europe and even to their own hearths and homes, have now noticed their fresh colossal mistake, and in the Parliaments of Budapest and Berlin have poured forth brutal invective of Italy and her Government with the obvious design of securing the forgiveness of their fellow-citizens and intoxicating them with cruel visions of hatred and blood. ["Bravo!"] The German Chancellor said he was imbued not with hatred, but with anger, and he spoke the truth, because he reasoned badly, as is usually the case in fits of rage. ["Hear, hear!" and laughter.] I could not, even if I chose, imitate their language. An atavistic throwback to primitive barbarism is more difficult for us who have twenty centuries behind us more than they have. ["Hear, hear!"]
The fundamental thesis of the statesmen of Central Europe is to be found in the words "treason and surprise on the part of Italy toward her faithful allies." It would be easy to ask if he has any right to speak of alliance and respect for treaties who, representing with infinitely less genius, but with equal moral indifference, the tradition of Frederick the Great and Bismarck proclaimed that necessity knows no law, and consented to his country trampling under foot and burying at the bottom of the ocean all the documents and all the customs of civilization and international law. [Cheers.] But that would be too easy an argument. Let us examine, on the contrary, positively and calmly, if our former allies are entitled to say that they were betrayed and surprised by us.
Our aspirations had long been known, as was also our judgment on the act of criminal madness by which they shook the world and robbed the alliance itself of its closest raison d'etre. The Green Book prepared by Baron Sonnino, with whom it is the pride of my life to stand united in entire harmony in this solemn hour after thirty years of friendship—[prolonged cheers and shouts of "Long live Sonnino!"]—shows the long, difficult, and useless negotiations that took place between December and May. But it is not true, as has been asserted without a shadow of foundation, that the Ministry reconstituted last November made a change in the direction of our international policy. The Italian Government, whose policy has never changed, severely condemned, at the very moment when it learned of it, the aggression of Austria against Serbia, and foresaw the consequences of that aggression, consequences which had not been foreseen by those who had premeditated the stroke with such lack of conscience.
Baron Sydney Sonnino
BARON SYDNEY SONNINOItalian Minister of Foreign Affairs(Photo from Paul Thompson)
As proof of this statement, Signor Salandra read the following telegram sent by the Marquis di San Giuliano to the Duke of Avarna (Italian Minister in Vienna) on July 25 last:
"Salandra, von Flotow, and myself have had a long conversation. Salandra and I emphatically pointed out to von Flotow that Austria had no right, according to the spirit of the treaty of the Triple Alliance, to make a démarche like that made in Belgrade without coming to an agreement beforehand with her allies."
In effect, [continued Signor Salandra,] Austria, in consequence of the terms in which her note was couched, and in consequence of the things demanded, which, while of little effect against the Pan-Serbian danger, were profoundly offensive to Serbia, and indirectly so to Russia, had clearly shown that she wished to provoke war. Hence we declared to von Flotow that, in consequence of this procedure on the part of Austria and in consequence of the defensive and conservative character of the Triple Alliance Treaty, Italy was under no obligation to assist Austria if, as the result of this démarche, she found herself at war with Russia, because any European war would in such an event be the consequence of the act of provocation and aggression committed by Austria.
The Italian Government on July 27 and 28 emphasized in clear and unmistakable language to Berlin and Vienna the question of the cession of the Italian provinces subject to Austria, and we declared that if we did not obtain adequate compensation the Triple Alliance would have been irreparably broken. [Loud and prolonged cheers.] Impartial history will say that Austria, having found Italy in July, 1913, and in October, 1913, hostile to her intentions of aggression against Serbia, attempted last Summer, in agreement with Germany, the method of surprise and the fait accompli.
The horrible crime of Serajevo was exploited as a pretext a month after it happened—this was proved by the refusal of Austria to accept the very extensive offers of Serbia—nor at the moment of the general conflagration would Austria have been satisfied with the unconditional acceptance of the ultimatum. Count Berchtold on July 31 declared to the Duke of Avarna that, if there had been a possibility of mediation being exercised, it could not have interrupted hostilities, which had already begun with Serbia. This was the mediation for which Great Britain and Italy were working. In any case, Count Berchtold was not disposed to accept mediation tending to weaken the conditions indicated in the Austrian note, which, naturally, would have been increased at the end of the war.
If, moreover, Serbia had decided meanwhile to accept the aforementioned note in its entirety, declaring herself ready to agree to the conditions imposed on her, that would not have persuaded Austria to cease hostilities. It is not true, as Count Tisza declared, that Austria did not undertake to make territorial acquisitions to the detriment of Serbia, who, moreover, by accepting all the conditions imposed upon her, would have become a subject State. The Austrian Ambassador, Herr Merey von Kapos-Mere, on July 30, stated to the Marquis di San Giuliano that Austria could not make a binding declaration on this subject, because she could not foresee whether, during the war, she might not be obliged, against her will, to keep Serbian territory. [Sensation.]
On July 29 Count Berchtold stated to the Duke of Avarna that he was not inclined to enter into any engagement concerning the eventual conduct of Austria in the case of a conflict with Serbia.
Where is, then, the treason, the iniquity, the surprise, if, after nine months of vain efforts to reach an honorable understanding which recognized in equitable measure our rights and our liberties, we resumed liberty of action? The truth is that Austria and Germany believed until the last days that they had to deal with an Italy weak, blustering, but not acting, capable of trying blackmail, but not enforcing by arms her good right, with an Italy which could be paralyzed by spending a few millions, and which by dealings which she could not avow was placing herself between the country and the Government. [Very loud cheers.]
I will not deny the benefits of the alliance; benefits, however, not one-sided, but accruing to all the contracting parties, and perhaps not more to us than to the others. The continued suspicions and the aggressive intentions of Austria against Italy are notorious and are authentically proved. The Chief of the General Staff, Baron Conrad von Hoetzendorf, always maintained that war against Italy was inevitable, either on the question of the irredentist provinces or from jealousy, that Italy intended to aggrandize herself as soon as she was prepared, and meanwhile opposed everything that Austria wished to undertake in the Balkans, and consequently it was necessary to humiliate her in order that Austria might have her hands free, and he deplored that Italy had not been attacked in 1907. Even the Austrian Minister of Foreign Affairs recognized that in the military party the opinion was prevalent that Italy must be suppressed by war because from the Kingdom of Italy came the attractive force of the Italian provinces of the empire, and consequently by a victory over the kingdom and its political annihilation all hope for the irredentists would cease.
Von Hoetzendorff
GENERAL KONRAD VON HOETZENDORFOn the Staff of the Archduke Eugene in the Campaign Against Italy
Archduke Eugene
THE ARCHDUKE EUGENETitular Commander in Chief of the Austrian Forces Operating Against Italy
We see now on the basis of documents how our allies aided us in the Lybian undertaking. The operations brilliantly begun by the Duke of the Abruzzi against the Turkish torpedo boats encountered at Preveza were stopped by Austria in a sudden and absolute manner. Count Aehrenthal on Oct. 1 informed our Ambassador at Vienna that our operations had made a painful impression upon him and that he could not allow them to be continued. It was urgently necessary, he said, to put an end to them and to give orders to prevent them from being renewed, either in Adriatic or in Ionian waters. The following day the German Ambassador at Vienna, in a still more threatening manner, confidentially informed our Ambassador that Count Aehrenthal had requested him to telegraph to his Government to give the Italian Government to understand that if it continued its naval operations in the Adriatic and in the Ionian Seas it would have to deal directly with Austria-Hungary. [Murmurs.]
And it was not only in the Adriatic and in the Ionian Seas that Austria paralyzed our actions. On Nov. 5 Count Aehrenthal informed the Duke of Avarna that he had learned that Italian warships had been reported off Saloniki, where they had used electric searchlights—[laughter]—and declared that our action on the Ottoman coasts of European Turkey, as well as on the Aegean Islands, could not have been allowed either by Austria-Hungary or by Germany, because it was contrary to the Triple Alliance Treaty.
In March, 1912, Count Berchtold, who had in the meantime succeeded Count Aehrenthal, declared to the German Ambassador in Vienna that, in regard to our operations against the coasts of European Turkey and the Aegean Islands, he adhered to the point of view of Count Aehrenthal, according to which these operations were considered by the Austro-Hungarian Government contrary to the engagement entered into by us by Article VII. of the Triple Alliance Treaty. As for our operations against the Dardanelles, he considered it opposed, first, to the promise made by us not to proceed to any act which might endanger the status quo in the Balkans, and, secondly, to the spirit of the same treaty, which was based on the maintenance of the status quo.
Afterward, when our squadron at the entrance to the Dardanelles was bombarded by Fort Kumkalessi and replied, damaging that fort, Count Berchtold complained of what had happened, considering it contrary to the promises we had made, and declared that if the Italian Government desired to resume its liberty of action, the Austro-Hungarian Government could have done the same. [Murmurs.] He added that he could not have allowed us to undertake in the future similar operations or operations in any way opposed to this point of view. In the same way our projected occupation of Chios was prevented. It is superfluous to remark how many lives of Italian soldiers and how many millions were sacrificed through the persistent vetoing of our actions against Turkey, who knew that she was protected by our allies against all attacks on her vital parts. [Cheers.]
We were bitterly reproached for not having accepted the offers made toward the end of May, but were these offers made in good faith? [Laughter and cheers.] Certain documents indicate that they were not. Francis Joseph said that Italy was regarding the patrimony of his house with greedy eyes. Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg said that the aim of these concessions was to purchase our neutrality, and, therefore, gentlemen, you may applaud us for not having accepted them. [Loud cheers.] Moreover, these concessions, even in their last and belated edition, in no way responded to the objectives of Italian policy, which are, first, the defense of Italianism, the greatest of our duties; secondly, a secure military frontier, replacing that which was imposed upon us in 1866, by which all the gates of Italy are open to our adversaries; thirdly, a strategical situation in the Adriatic less dangerous and unfortunate than that which we have, and of which you have seen the effects in the last few days. All these essential advantages were substantially denied us.
To our minimum demand for the granting of independence to Trieste the reply was to offer Trieste administrative autonomy. Also the question of fulfilling the promises was very important. We were told not to doubt that they would be fulfilled, because we should have Germany's guarantee, but if at the end of the war Germany had not been able to keep it, what would our position have been? And in any case, after this agreement, the Triple Alliance would have been renewed, but in much less favorable conditions, for there would have been one sovereign State and, two subject States. [Murmurs.]
On the day when one of the clauses of the treaty was not fulfilled, or on the day when the municipal autonomy of Trieste was violated by an imperial decree or by a lieutenant's orders, to whom should we have addressed ourselves? To our common superior—to Germany? [Laughter.] I do not wish to speak of Germany to you without admiration and respect. I am the Italian Prime Minister, not the German Chancellor, and I do not lose my head. [Loud cheers.] But with all respect for the learned, powerful, and great Germany, an admirable example of organization and resistance, in the name of Italy I declare for no subjection and no protectorate over any one. [Cheers.] The dream of a universal hegemony is shattered. The world has risen. The peace and civilization of future humanity must be founded on respect for existing national autonomies. [Loud cheers.] Among these Germany will have to sit as an equal, and not as a master. [Loud cheers.]
But a more remarkable example of the unmeasured pride with which the directors of German policy regard other nations is given in the picture which Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg drew of the Italian political world.
Signor Salandra here read the portion of the German Chancellor's speech to which he referred, and added:
I do not know if it was the intention of this man, blinded by rage, personally to insult my colleagues and me. If that was the case, I should not mention it. We are men whose life you know, men who have served the State to an advanced age, men of spotless renown—[loud cheers]—men who have given the lives of their children for their country. [Loud cheers.]
The information on which this judgment was based is attributed by the German Chancellor to him whom he calls the best judge of Italian affairs. Perhaps he alludes to Prince Bülow, with the brotherly desire to shoulder responsibilities upon him. Now, I do not wish you to entertain an erroneous idea of Prince Bülow's intentions. I believe that he had sympathies for Italy, and did all he could to bring about an agreement. But how great and how numerous were the mistakes he made in translating his good intentions into action! He thought that Italy could be diverted from her path by a few millions ill-spent and by the influence of a few persons who have lost touch with the soul of the nation—[loud cheers]—by contact, attempted, but, I hope, not accomplished, with certain politicians. [Loud cheers.]
The effect was the contrary. An immense outburst of indignation was kindled throughout Italy, and not among the populace, but among the noblest and most educated classes and among all the youth of the country, which is ready to shed its blood for the nation. This outburst of indignation was kindled as the result of the suspicion that a foreign Ambassador was interfering between the Italian Government, the Parliament, and the country. [Loud cheers.] In the blaze thus kindled internal discussions melted away, and the whole nation was joined in a wonderful moral union, which will prove our greatest source of strength in the severe struggle which faces us, and which must lead us by our own virtue, and not by benevolent concessions from others, to the accomplishment of the highest destinies of the country. [Loud and prolonged cheers.]