Another small warning of the rising power of American arms was given on the Marne yesterday morning, when a fresh band of machine gunners helped a French regiment to break an attempt to cross the river.
Between the Oise and the Aisne homeric conflicts are reported from the neighborhood of Carlepont Wood, in which the hill called Mont de Choisy, after having been lost and recaptured five times, remains in French hands.
In all fields, therefore, the equalization of forces produces a result more and more favorable. The defense of Mont de Choisy is the work of French colonials. These troops had already distinguished themselves, particularly at Douaumont, before Verdun.
Though the pressure upon the Franco-British line from Verneuil, on the Marne, to Rheims, has been much less severe than that on the western flank of the offensive, it is to be noted that the enemy has some of his best divisions in the former area.
French cavalry corps, generally dismounted, but sometimes playing their old part, have rendered excellent service during the battle. One of them after forming an essential element in the retreating line, had to meet Saturday and Sunday repeated attacks conducted by four—perhaps five—German divisions in the Malmaison and Trotte Woods, which crown the hills northeast of Verneuil, forming the buttress of the allied positions beyond the Marne. In the Ourcq Valley toward La Fierté-Milon another body of dismounted cavalry had to stand against some of the best Prussian troops, including the first division of the Guards.
In his dispatch dated June 5 Mr. Perris noted that a marked pause had fallen on the battlefield. His comment was this:
The pause in the enemy's adventure is a sign of weakness on his part and of advantage to us. Germany is fighting againsttime. The superiority she gained from the east is passing. The power of surprise has been her greatest asset. After that everything depends for her on speed in the exploitation of her success, and every delay is loss.
The next thing to remark is the great skill with which General Foch has pursued what may be called his provisional Fabian strategy. With surprise and superior reserves in the hands of the enemy, he had to face a situation of extreme difficulty. To weaken other parts of the front prematurely in order to defend the Aisne would have invited a fresh blow in those other parts.
Two needs rose supreme—that of economizing men so as to hasten the day when the Allies should have the superiority of forces necessary to victory, and that of barring the road of the enemy toward every vital objective. These objects have been attained, and if it should turn out that the third act of the offensive is finished, this will mean that, with all the unquestionable ability and daring of the German General Staff, Foch has beaten them for the third time in the two and a half months of their maximum power.
In any case, nothing of first-class importance has been lost. The allied front has not been broken. The roads to Paris, toward which the offensive was turned on the third day, are blocked. The ruins of Rheims are nearly indefensible, but the road to Châlons is barred. The plateaus between the Oise and the Aisne and between the Aisne and the Ourcq stand like bastions of a vast fortress. Château-Thierry is lost, and the eastern railway and the high road are locally interrupted, but the Marne and the Paris road beside it are covered.
Finally, the enemy has engaged fifty divisions of his reserves in this battle, and many of them have suffered very heavily.
The attempt of part of the German 36th Division to cross the Marne at Jaulgonne was frustrated brilliantly by the Americans and French. It appears that a few men succeeded in getting across the river Thursday night [May 30] at this point, eight miles east of Château-Thierry, where the Marne makes a loop by the north.
They took shelter in the cutting and tunnel of the Paris-Châlons railway, which runs along the south bank, and though they lost seriously and their pontoons were destroyed, they got reinforcements over to the strength of a battalion.
An attack to clear them out was, therefore, organized, and this took place Sunday night, [June 2.] By that time the Germans had put twenty-two light bridges across the stream, of which four had been smashed by the French artillery, and had established a bridgehead with six machine guns and a hundred men in the railway station on the south bank opposite Jaulgonne.
This post was frontally attacked by a section of dismounted cavalry who, however, were held up by machine-gun fire until American machine guns came into action. Two sections of French infantry simultaneously fell upon the bridgehead and the Germans broke before them.
The prisoners, of whom there are a hundred, declare that their officers abandoned them at the beginning of the attack. A few men escaped by swimming, and thirty or forty others gained the northern bank by the pontoon boats. The rest of the battalion was wiped out.
The German losses in the action at the bridge of Château-Thierry were severe. It is estimated that a thousand bodies lay by and near the bridge, and the American machine gunners fired tens of thousands of cartridges.
In his dispatches on June 2 and June 5 Mr. Perris gave these further details of how the battle began:
As further details which I have received of their part in the beginning of the battle clearly show, these divisions, the 50th, 8th, 21st, and 25th, were, it will be remembered, tired from bitter and repeated actions in the course of the northern offensive. They had been on the front only seventeen days when last Monday's attack was made, and therefore had hardly had time to become thoroughly acquainted with the sector. The main force of the enemy assault fell on the front of the 50th and 8th Divisions, against whom there were four German divisions in line and two more in immediate reserve. The odds against the British on this day were two and a half to one.
The 50th Division on the left was doing well on the Craonne Plateau, when in the course of the morning they suddenly found that the enemy was behind them. Owing to this surprise, the neighboring brigade of the 50th Division suffered badly.
By afternoon General Fritz von Below's men had got to the line of the river, and in the evening the British were back at Guyencourt. By Wednesday evening they held a large crescent around Fismes from Lopeigne on the west through Coulanges and Lagery back to the Vesle at Muizon. By this time the fighting strength of the British units was greatly reduced, but reinforcements were coming up and the worst of the crisis was over. The full story of the splendid episode can hardly yet be told, but some day it will shine among the greatest achievements of the war.
Some time must yet elapse ere we can know fully and exactly what occurred on the Chemin des Dames at and after 4 A. M. on May 27. Many of the combatants have died a martyr's death and been buried byalien hands where they fell. Many more will long languish in prisoners' camps; but the remnants of some regiments have now come down from the front to rest, and by piecing together the narratives of these weary men it is possible to make the first outline of the story that will one day be told in all its pitifulness and terror.
One of them is the French infantry regiment which had long held the central sector of this front. For this last trial it had been prepared by months of trench raiding and strengthening its defenses. Submerged by a storm of fire and poison gas and by wave upon wave of assault, it went down in a single morning, fighting the hopeless fight to the bitter end. A small number lived to cross the Aisne in the afternoon, and these had to continue the struggle for four days and nights, practically without respite. Few are those, even in this war, who have survived such agony.
They were warned, and, so far as their local means allowed, were prepared for the attack. Gas masks, machine guns, grenade stores—everything was ready. The order was to hold ground between the second and third positions or to die in the effort, and it was carried out. It was to be expected that the telephone wires would be cut. There remained carrier pigeons. A rolling barrage two miles deep and of indescribable violence extinguished the poor efforts of the local batteries to reply. Thick clouds of artificial smoke, gas, and dust shrouded the assault, so that rocket signals were not seen at the rear and the enemy was invisible till he reached the parapets.
The line was almost immediately broken and the battle became a struggle of isolated groups, heavily outnumbered without the possibility of reinforcement, defending scraps of broken trench dugouts or quarries and still resisting long after the main tide of the conflict had passed south.
A copy lies before me of messages dated from 3:30 to 8:30 A. M. and sent back from these isolated groups by pigeon. No words could be so eloquent as their laconic brevity. When permission to retreat was given some officers refused to avail themselves of it.
The Colonel, with his staff papers, crossed the Aisne at 10 A. M. and organized the defense of the passage. The survivors of the regiment were re-formed on the south bank, and on the following day received a reinforcement of men, bringing it up to a quarter of its original strength. This handful had to meet the heavy attack southwest of Soissons on May 29, and a series of attacks on the following two days. No more was humanly possible, and they were withdrawn. They say that not a man had uttered a complaint.
A fourth phase of the German offensive opened June 9 on a front of 20 miles between Noyon and Montdidier, which Mr. Perris describes thus:
A new phase of the German offensive opened this morning at 4:30 o'clock on a front of about twenty miles, extending from Montdidier to Noyon. The artillery preparation, which again was rich in gas shells, began at midnight, and covered not only the front, but a deep zone behind it, especially villages and roads where the enemy thought to catch the French local reserves.
There were evident reasons for the choice of this sector, and in particular for seeking control of part of it, for a successful push south along the line of the Roye-Compiègne railway would add another converging road to the four roads leading toward Paris by the Oise, Aisne, Ourcq, and Marne Valleys, which had already been tried. On the other hand, the enemy could not reasonably hope for any such surprise as was obtained in the first act of the offensive before St. Quentin and in the third act of that on the Chemin des Dames.
In general, the French are resisting with dogged courage in their covering positions, which are beyond range of the enemy mine throwers. Evidence accumulates of the heaviness of the German losses in the recent fighting and of the disappearance of the shallow enthusiasm with which the offensive was begun.
In describing the progress of this assault Mr. Ferris wrote on June 10:
The front of the attack was twenty miles in length, as compared with a front of thirty miles in the attack on the Chemin des Dames and fifty miles in the first phase of the offensive on March 21, and so far it is only on the central half of this smaller front that any considerable impression has been made on the French lines.
Whatever may have been the exact design, there had not been this time the same extreme scruple to conceal troop movements, and for some days past the exceptional traffic of convoys, the suspicious activity of the enemy batteries in the correction of ranges and other signs had given warning of what was afoot.
One consequence was that, when the German infantry advanced yesterday morning, it had to meet a volume of fire very different from that which had answered the surprises of St. Quentin and the Aisne Heights. French gunners had thoroughly studied the ground before them and were all ready to deluge every path of approach directly that graycoat waves appeared. From the beginning, therefore, the German losses have been heavier than on the earlier occasions, and this must affect the development of the action.
In other respects the now familiar von Hutier manoeuvre appears to have been repeated, shock battalions carrying lightmachine guns and machine rifles concentrating upon local breaches in our line and leaving the task of cleaning up islands of resistance to the support troops while they pressed on rapidly to exploit the first success. It will probably be found that the operation was begun with about fifteen divisions in the line, approximately 150,000 men, giving a density of one division to a mile and a third.
Faced with a force superior in all arms, long resistance of the first line is impossible, but it is significant that at 8 o'clock yesterday morning, that is after four hours of a terrible storm of gas and explosive shells, followed by four hours of hand-to-hand struggle, our allies were still in a large part of the field fighting within what is called the zone of advanced posts, and only the centre had fallen back on the zone of principal resistance. Plemont Hill, overlooking Lassigny, was still holding out at that hour, although the front had lain immediately beneath it. The villages of Le Fretoy and Courcelles were lost during the morning, but were recovered by counterattacks, in which the French troops showed the highest spirit.
Up to late last night the only result that von Hutier could regard as in any degree justifying the effort made and the losses suffered was the capture of the villages of Ressons-sur-Matz and Mareuil-la-Motte, whereas on the French left before Ribecourt, by Le Tretoy to Courcelles, and on the right from Belval to Cannectancourt, the advance varied from one to two miles. At the centre it rather exceeded three.
This is a poor gain, judged by precedent, and was bought at an exorbitant price, but it has a certain tactical and perhaps superior consequence.
Later on June 10 Mr. Perris gave this further description of the progress of the fighting:
"This is the real battle," said a French staff officer, meaning to contrast today's fierce fighting between forces unequal indeed, but not crushingly so, with the attack on the Chemin des Dames. Here the French had a stronger line, their reserves were nearer, and they had sufficient notice to bring their batteries at every point into effective action. Effective, do I say? At many points it was a massacre of the columns of assault, and there is unanimity as well among the prisoners as among our own combatants that the ranks of the enemy have been torn and plowed with shot and shell. Never, perhaps, has the German Army paid so dearly for an advance which nowhere exceeds five miles.
This is the essential fact which governs all that follows; for if, as the German official press says with a measure of truth, the German objective is not a city or a port, but the complete destruction of the allied armies, so our objective is not to hold a certain geographical area, but to punish the advance so that the enemy forces will be exhausted, while ours are being constantly recruited from oversea for the last stroke that will give us the victory.
The smallness of the enemy's gains in this fourth phase of the grand battle is merely the sign that von Hutier found across his path an adversary prepared as far as was humanly possible, determined and able to contest every yard of ground.
Thus the village of Courcelles, only two miles from the old front, was lost, retaken, lost again, recovered, and remains in the hands of the French. Thus Plemont, a position insignificant as compared with the Aisne Heights, although encircled and covered with fire, was being defended till last evening. Since then no carrier pigeon has come in, and it must be presumed that the heroic handful of men who held this point of the front have been overcome. Their countrymen will not forget them.
By WALTER DURANTY
[Copyrighted]
The turning point of the great battle came on June 11, when the French delivered a desperate counterblow south of Montdidier and drove the Germans back from the Aronde River, regaining important ground along a front of seven and one-half miles, and capturing 1,000 prisoners and many heavy guns. This phase of the struggle is described by Walter Duranty, another special correspondent, whose dispatch is copyrighted forCurrent History Magazine.It is dated June 11, 1918.
As the battle continues it seems that the second week of June will rank as one of the bloodiest and most decisive periods in the world's history.
It is the veritable climax of four years of struggle. In the last twenty-four hours the violence of the fighting has increased still further. The limit of human endurance has been forced yet another notch higher. Along a front of nearly twenty miles the Germans are driving more than a quarter of a million men forward through a sea of blood. The defenders say that it is as though the whole of the German Army is engaged against them; no sooner is one battalion annihilated than another takes its place, and another and another.
Early yesterday morning a handful of dismountedcavalry, greatly employed for liaison work, fought their way back to the French lines from the surrounded hill of Plemont. They reported that the survivors of the French battalion occupying the position were still holding out when they left, and that no less than fourteen attacks had already been repulsed.
The grassy slopes of the hill bore a hideous carpet of thousands of German dead, over which new forces still advanced with the same madness of sacrifice as the Carthaginians of old, flinging their children, their possessions, and themselves into Moloch's furnace. The bloody religion of militarism that Germany has followed for forty years has led its votaries to culminating orgies of destruction.
But the defenders are not appalled by the fury of the struggle, nor by numbers. Each position is held until every foot of ground has been paid for by German blood. Again and again a swift counterattack, delivered at the right moment, has wrested from the assailant the fruits of the success he won so dearly and forced him to pay a toll of lives twice over. In the villages thus retaken, the poilus say, gray-clad corpses lay heaped up as though they had been collected for a gigantic funeral pyre, and more than once the advancing enemy was screened from the defenders' fire by a rampart of his own dead.
The general situation of the battle has changed little. In the centre the French have retired slightly. On the left also there is a southward bulge in the line. The right is still held by a wooded massif above Drelincourt. On the right the towers of Noyon Cathedral could just be distinguished. To the left smoke haze marked Lassigny, half hidden in a hollow. It was a natural fortress with an infinity of cover for guns, men, and machine guns against which no fury of sacrifice might prevail. Well may the Germans try to turn that grim salient by an advance further south in the centre—clearly their immediate objective. They held it once before last year's retreat and they know its strength.
As I returned from the observation post I passed through a great natural amphitheatre in a sort of mountain. At one side the Germans had carved a huge eagle, colored blood red, on a slab of rock above a grotto that had been their headquarters. Beneath it in Gothic letters was the Brandenburg motto, "On, Brandenburg, on!" The artist who designed the bird that is the symbol of German violence was well inspired. The Kaiser's eagles are red, indeed, clotted and stained from beak to claw with the crimson of countless slaughters.
The latest information from the battlefront emphasizes still more clearly the difference between the results of the new German method of attack when applied on a weakly held sector and a front where the allied strength is normal. On two previous occasions Hindenburg's storm divisions gained sensational success right from the outset by literally swamping small forces by sheer weight after the defenders had been half-stunned by the terrific bombardment to which their inferiority of artillery permitted no adequate response.
Conditions are very different today. In the first place there was no strategic surprise—the German move in this sector had been foreseen. The utmost vigilance was everywhere maintained, and unmistakable signs, such as the movement of troops, convoys, and artillery registration, had been carefully noted. Precautions to meet the shock had been taken. Against attack in depth by successive waves a depth defense had been planned, with a front line of thinly held outposts to minimize loss, and successive lines of greater strength extending back for kilometers.
When the German artillery storm broke out it was answered by a perfect hurricane of French fire. Not only was every possible point where the enemy troops might advance or batteries be hidden thoroughly registered, but artillery held in reserve had its guns trained on targets offered further in the rear by each hill, wood, or valley that the enemy might assail as a vantage point or medium for infiltration.
The consequence has been that, in direct contradiction to the former drives, the enemy's initial losses have been enormous and his gains small; and the French losses were greatly decreased. Above all, there has been no penetration of the line of resistance. In places it bulged slightly under pressure, but only at the price of the most dogged fighting and heavy sacrifice, and withal very slowly. One fact marks the difference sufficiently:
On May 27 the Germans had reached the Aisne—seven kilometers from the starting point, across difficult country—in four and one-half hours after the attack. In the first thirty hours of the present attack they had barely passed thinly held outposts. Along the whole thirty-kilometer front, from the Oise to Assainvillers—somewhat shorter than the area of bombardment—fifteen to twenty assaulting divisions were met by a galling machine-gun barrage and the terrible "75" fire curtain from quick-firers and batteries. Irreplaceable storm troops, whose training had taken months and whose existence was essential to the continuance of Hindenburg's new strategy, melted like snow beneath the August sun.
At Plemont—the scene of one of the most gallant actions in the checking of the March drive by the men of the same army—the Germans met a stubborn resistance, though their dead lay there thick as fresh-cut wheat but a few hundred yards beyond the lineof outposts. Even in the centre, where the enemy's progress was deepest, an unbroken line of defense was constituted by the same troops that had withstood the attack from the beginning. Their spirit and numbers were still sufficient, though the Germans opposing them had sent forward fresh storm troops in wave after wave.
The French counterblow described above by Mr. Duranty was of great importance in changing the entire aspect of affairs for the Allies. Mr. Perris, in a dispatch dated June 12, gave these further particulars:
Faces that wore a serious expression yesterday morning are decidedly cheerful today. The battle has, in fact, taken a better turn. It is a very dreadful struggle; no Frenchman can forget that fact, and in the fever of weighing and measuring results more distant observers should not for a moment overlook what they mean in flesh and blood. That being said, we may join in the satisfaction of our allies that on its third day the German onset has suffered a distinct check.
Following the front from west to east, the first thing to note is the series of French counterattacks on the left, carried to a considerable measure of success by skill in the direction and high spirit and fortitude in the ranks.
At 11 A. M. yesterday a movement began from a little east of the railway line between Domfront and Wacquemoulin. The infantry were supported by tanks, and along the whole line the Germans were swept back. A French contingent actually reached points which were within the German front. The French advance went well beyond Rubescourt and Le Fretoy, half way between Courcelles and Mortemer, and between Mery and Couvilly, beyond Belloy, and to the border of St. Maur.
Meanwhile the enemy had delivered a very powerful blow at the French centre and had driven a way, despite vigorous opposition, as far as the village of Antheuil, two miles south of the Matz. At 4 P. M. a further counterattack was therefore made from the French left centre, and the enemy advance was completely arrested. In these combats a certain amount of confusion was apparent in the German ranks, and the fact that 1,000 prisoners and some cannon were taken speaks eloquently. This was not the heaviest punishment. Eyewitnesses say that German corpses strew the battlefield in piles.
Three critical days of the offensive have then given the enemy at the cost of enormous losses a not very magnificent result. We now know that the program was to reach Compiègne on the second day. General von Hutier must be greatly disappointed.
The attack was begun with fourteen divisions, at full strength, in the line. They included at the centre divisions of the Prussian Guard and four other crack divisions. About twice as many divisions have now been thrown into this battle, ten already holding the sector and the rest being fresh reserves.
These figures may be measured by the fact that the total German forces in the west amount to 207 divisions, and that of these before the offensive only sixty-two were in the general reserve, the rest being engaged on the front. The more we consider in the light of material considerations like these what the German command essayed and what it has accomplished the more we shall appreciate the valor of the French armies and the qualities of their chiefs; and it is impossible to do justice to either without such reflection.
On June 12 Mr. Perris reported that the French were holding their gains and gave these further details of the counterattack the day before:
The French lines hold all the way round from the important position of Mery Plateau by the hamlets of St. Maur and Antheuil to Marest and Chevincourt. Time after time, last night and this morning, the gray-coated masses of General von Hutier came on, only to be mowed down by waves of fire from the 75s and machine guns, and their remnants dispersed with bayonet and grenade.
Yesterday's French counterattacks met great bodies of the enemy prepared to force another advance. Four divisions were found to be ranged in a space of two miles. Hence the frightful intensity of the combat and the abnormal slaughter.
The French tanks did very good service, and fleets of airplanes, British as well as French, swept down upon the battlefield before and behind our infantry, dropping bombs and raining down volleys of bullets wherever a group of enemy soldiers was seen. The numerical inferiority of the French was thus made good.
The block of wooded hills was very difficult to defend, even if the enemy had got no further than Mareuil. The woods prevented long views and open fields of fire; the deep ravines invited infiltrations; the Oise Valley at the back left supply and relief columns open to the German guns, and the Matz Valley, on the west, was the plain path of envelopment. These are the reasons why this corner was not held longer.
Among the wheat and beet fields of the gently rolling plateau further west, on the other hand, the defense had more advantage. There are folds of ground enough to hide its batteries and reserves, but in every direction there are open lines of fire, room for manoeuvre and nume rous railroads. Striking northeast from the Estrées Railway, the French threaten the German centre.
To continue the southward march, even if it were possible, before this pressure on the west had been disposed of would be reckless. Hutier has met his match.
First parade of United States National Army men in London. The photograph shows them rounding the corner at Hyde Park(©Central News Photo Service)
First parade of United States National Army men in London. The photograph shows them rounding the corner at Hyde Park(©Central News Photo Service)
General Philipot of the French Army decorating American officers who distinguished themselves in opposing the German advance in Picardy(French Pictorial Service)
General Philipot of the French Army decorating American officers who distinguished themselves in opposing the German advance in Picardy(French Pictorial Service)
On June 13 General von Hutier made a threatening thrust toward Compiègne, which was parried by the French and was practically the termination of further serious efforts in this phase by the Germans. Mr. Perris tells the story of it as follows:
South of the Aisne the high, bare farmlands extending from Soissons to the borders of the forest of Compiègne are cut by a valley running up from the other great forest of Villers-Cotterets to the river at Ambleny. This valley, with the villages of Laversine, Coeuvre, Cutry, Dommiers, and St. Pierre-Aigle, has constituted the front for the last fortnight, with French outposts on the east side, but the real line of resistance on the west.
Von Hutier having met with trouble beyond his expectations on the west of the Oise, his colleague, von Boehm, was sent yesterday morning to create a diversion on this flank of the battlefield. Five divisions, two of them fresh ones, were thrown forward on both sides of Laversine, a front of four miles.
Though outnumbered, the French have given a fine account of themselves, breaking repeated assaults of the enemy, who is reported to have got into the villages of Coeuvre and St. Pierre, a feat more than counterbalanced by the French advance at Damard, further south on the border of Villers-Cotterets Forest, and the admirable action of the Americans on the ground recently taken by them in Clignon Valley.
This, however, is not the best sign for the fifth day of the offensive. Von Hutier's thrust from the north toward Compiègne was by far the most threatening of the numerous lines of attack the German command has now opened. It has been brought to a stop by reactions of the French left and centre, and was this morning contained, as we may hope definitely, from the Mery Plateau and along the course of the Matz.
The feverish haste with which the enemy's attacks are multiplied as the field of the offensive is enlarged, speaks eloquently of the conscious need to bring the grand adventure to a speedy climax. But this haste involves heavy moral as well as numerical usury. Instead of a full normal period for refilling and new equipment, including rest at the rear, or in a quiet sector, and a course of fresh training being given to a division withdrawn from the line owing to its losses, it is hurriedly reconstituted and pushed back into the battlefront after as few days as possible.
Up to now the German armies have been sustained, not only by reinforcements from Russia, but by the long rest of the Winter months; otherwise they could not have accomplished what they have done. These sources of strength are being rapidly exhausted. The human material—cannon food—is failing in quality. The field depots have been emptied of recruits. Men from the depots in Germany are rushed to the front. Cavalry officers are dismounted to fill gaps in the infantry. Men detached for special work are called back to their units, and still the war god is unsatisfied.
Incorporation of the 1920 class began in April and May. Miners and mechanics are again turned into the fighting ranks, ill as they can be spared from industry. It is probable that not a division has been left in the east that would be fit for the western front. Wounded men and invalids imperfectly cured are pressed back into service. And behind the armies thus replenished there is the nation, hungry, enfeebled, terrorized, uttering words of despair even in its letters to the front. Ludendorff may well hurry!
A very brief diary of the battle at a single point will give an idea of its bitter violence. The small village of Courcelles lies across the chief road of the western wing of the offensive, only about two miles from its starting point with the Montdidier-Estrées railway, and the same distance behind it. For these reasons, and because it stands on a spur of the Mery Plateau, it was certain to be a hardly contested position.
On Sunday morning, June 9, taking advantage of the cover afforded by broad fields of well-grown wheat, the Germans came up the slope from Rollot and rushed the village. At 9:40 the French re-formed and retook it, capturing 200 men and four officers. Forty minutes later a new wave was brought up from the north, but was thrown back. Some storm troops, however, got around by the rear. These were in turn repulsed.
Several hours passed in which the three streets of broken houses were put in order for a siege. At 3 P. M. a fresh attack was repulsed. Later in the afternoon the German success at Mery and Belloy resulted in Courcelles being beset on three sides, only a narrow alley of communication to the west remaining open.
The defenders now had their blood up. The reserves would soon arrive. This western flank of the battle was of the utmost importance. It had become a point of honor that the village should not be lost.
At 4:40 A. M. on Monday, after a preparatory bombardment, the next blow fell. In ten minutes its failure was evident, thoughthe fighting about the barbed wire continued for an hour. Three more assaults followed in the afternoon and evening. In the last of these some Germans got into the village, but they were at last driven out. On Tuesday the heroes of this splendid defense reaped the only reward they desired. The great French counterattack definitely freed their little fortress.
This time it was the turn of the French to win the benefits of initiative and surprise. Only a quarter of an hour was given to the French artillery for its preparation work. Tanks and infantry then went forward in alternate lines. An officer describes the advance of the tanks rolling over the green wheatfields, while shells burst around them, as having the appearance of a battle at sea.
The allied airmen, swooping above the moving line, not only sowed death in the enemy's ranks with their machine guns, but also raced forward and dropped bombs with effect on heavy batteries in the rear, killing their crews and putting the guns out of action.
In some enemy units during this battle the men fought well. In others there have been unmistakable signs of demoralization. Such inequalities are not surprising in this crisis. The total superiority of force which a few months ago was enough to have terrified us, and which is still sufficiently serious to require every effort that can be put forth, is ebbing away.
All correspondents on June 14 united in the conclusion that the counterblows of the Allies and the brilliant reaction of the French from Courcelles to Mery ended the fourth phase of the great German offensive. Mr. Perris summed up the situation as follows on June 14:
The front has subsided into actions of no more than local importance. The five days' battle west of the Oise has ended for the Germans, after an advance varying from two to six miles, in a very costly reverse, and for the Allies in a brilliant success of good generalship and indomitable spirit in the ranks.
Beside the losses of the enemy, the French loss of the Thiescourt hills and the wooded part of the valley opposite is of little importance. The offensive which was to give a decision against them is far from finished, but in relation to the resistance it encounters it shows a falling, not a rising, gamut of power.
The first push toward Amiens ended in ten days, having entailed upon the Allies the sacrifice of a tract forty miles deep and serious casualties. The following attack in the north lasted about as long, but with much slighter gains. The German success on the Chemin des Dames brought the Crown Prince's vanguard to the Marne, twenty-five miles from its starting point, but that it touched much less vital ground is proved by the transfer of its centre of pressure to the Ourcq Valley near Villers-Cotterets.
From these results to those of the present week's fighting there is a marked descent, and this failure occurs in what must be accounted one of the most critical directions the enemy can pursue. The ambitious character of his design is now clear. It is not merely to divide the British from the French army and then destroy one of them, but also by a single series of converging operations to destroy them both.
His approach to Amiens as the centre of their joint communications and to Hazebrouck as the door to the Channel ports has been followed by an approach along four converging lines to the region of Paris, the centre of French administrative life. In fact, the attainment of all these objectives would not end the war, for I am sure there is in France, and there probably is in the other countries concerned, a deadly resolution that it shall not be ended in any such way; that, if Paris should be destroyed—which heaven forfend—another capital shall be found, and that there shall be no surrender while there is an army on its legs.
This offensive has had two aims—to reach the crescent north and east of Paris, whence a general attack could be launched, and to draw down, disperse, and harry the allied reserves preparatory to the final "Kaiserschlacht," the crowning blow along the whole line. Its relative failure is a great encouragement.
Walter Duranty, in reviewing the fourth phase of the offensive, sent the following cable dispatch toThe New York Timeson June 13:
It has been said that the secret of Pétain's rise in three years from the position of Colonel to Commander in Chief of the French armies is his knowledge of when to launch counterattacks. The ability to select the right place and time for a sudden stroke which nullifies the enemy's gains has been the attribute of great captains throughout history, and is one of the cardinal bases of successful strategy. In that one word, counterattacks, lies the explanation of the triumphant French resistance in the present battle against vastly superior numbers—that and the indomitable courage of the defenders.
The master tactician commanding the army whose sector has been assailed has so imbued his subordinates with his own principlesthat there is hardly a position in the whole range of operations that the Germans have not been forced to take two or three times over. For it is not only the counter-stroke on a grand scale, like that which has won back nearly all the Germans' gains on the left wing, which counts in a struggle of this kind, where the losses inflicted on the enemy are far more important than a hill or a village saved or abandoned. It is the unexpected change from defense to attack, at the psychological moment, that has maintained the spirit of the French troops and smashed their weakened assailants just as they were thinking their success was assured.
As the situation stands today [June 13] the Allies have won a great victory in one of the hardest fought battles of the war, and a carefully planned move in Hindenburg's desperate struggle against time has been met and nullified. The Germans have also learned to their cost that the American troops are already to be counted with. The enemy, whose morale is daily weakening under the strain of non-successes and never-ending calls upon his strength, has received a bitter reminder of the American menace, which more than any other factor is responsible for his convulsive striving after a speedy decision.
[M. Tardieu, in a cablegram June 18 to the French High Commission at Washington, stated that 80,000 Germans had been put out of action in the Noyon-Montdidier offensive, and that General von Hutier had failed completely to realize his objective—the capture of Compiègne.]
By AUSTIN WEST
[Copyright, 1918, byThe New York TimesCompany andCurrent History Magazine]
[See Map of Italian Front, Page 15]
An offensive was launched June 15, 1918, by the Austrians against the Italians with an army estimated to number 1,000,000 men. The attack was on a front from the Asiago Plateau to the sea, a distance of ninety-seven miles. The course of the struggle in the first four days indicated the failure of the drive. The details of the earlier stages of the battle are given herewith.
According to statements of prisoners, the Austrian objectives on the first day of the attack were Bassano, eight miles down the Brenta, and Treviso, eight miles west of the Piave. The attack along the Piave from the Venetian lagoons to Montello was aimed at possession of the main roads leading to Montebelluna, Treviso, and Mestre, five miles west of Venice, thereby cutting off Venice and thrusting toward the heart of the Venetian Plain.
In the meantime General Conrad von Hoetendorf's armies from Monte Grappa to Asiago were to sweep down upon Asolo and Bassano to prevent the retreat of the 3d Italian Army from the Piave and complete the march of invasion from the north.
Austria's hopes and aims are reflected very strikingly in an Order of the Day, dated June 14, compiled from Field Marshal Boroevic's proclamation and circulated among the troops of the 3d Regiment over Commander Mitteregger's signature. A copy has just fallen into Italian hands. It runs as follows:
From the Adige to the Adriatic the Austrian Army descends into the field against Italy. All the forces and all the material of the monarchy are for the first time massed against one single enemy as the outcome of preparations begun many months ago. Tomorrow the Italian command will learn this tremendous news from the mouths of our guns. The entire Italian front will be attacked, and to free himself from our iron grip, which will encircle his whole front, the enemy would be obliged to engage reserves far vaster than those at his disposal.
From trench warfare we shall pass to that of movement and shall occupy a country abounding in victuals and stores of every sort. Let us therefore press forward resolutely toward the City of Verona, where a century ago the august founder of our regiment stood victor against the combined armies of France and Italy.
Today, (June 17,) nevertheless, after forty-eight hours of fighting, the enemy still is held upon his first lines.
The British forces regained all the positions they held on the eve of the battle. The French contingents southeast of Asiago on Turcio Road recaptured Pennar in a bayonet charge and drove the Austrians back far beyond their starting point. Counterattacking at Cornone, our allies stopped effectually the enemy's dash toward Valstagna and took 500 prisoners. Fenilon and Moschin Mountains, overlooking the Brenta Valley, which the enemy overwhelmed in his first onrush, have also been retaken at the point of the bayonet, with 200 prisoners and forty machine guns.
Along the Piave enemy masses concentrated, chiefly on the eastern slopes on Montello and west of San Dona. In both districtspassage across the river was facilitated by a heavy rain of tear shells and smoke bombs, and amid the smoke pontoons and rafts were taken down to the water's edge. Three divisions got across from Colfosco and Ilas, fronting Nervesa, but they were hemmed around at the foot of Montello, at Fagare and Zenson, where the Austrians had penetrated some way ahead. The Italians, after thrusting them from the latter place, encircled some detachments in the river bend.
Croce Village, west of San Dona, was rewon and lost twice over, and now rests in the possession of Italian bombardiers, Bersagliere, and cyclist corps. But the best stroke of luck on the Piave occurred in the Saletto sector. Taking advantage of numerous islets at this point, where the river is nearly two miles wide, one Hungarian battalion of the 96th Regiment had safely crossed, and was being quickly followed by another. Italian gunfire smashed its boats, flinging the occupants into the water. Many were carried away and drowned in the rapid currents, while over a thousand survivors, including a Lieutenant Colonel, a Major, and thirty other officers, out of the haul of 3,000 odd prisoners taken during the day, were made captives by the Italians at that spot.
The Austrians employed such a large amount of gases that the whole battleline was enveloped in dense, impenetrable clouds. Fortunately, a heavy rain fell in that region, which lessened to some extent the effects of the gases.
The Italians fought fiercely with great dash, glad to get at the enemy after so many months of forced inactivity and with an intense desire to regain the country desecrated by the enemy's invasion.
The Austrians kept the Italians under deadly fire, especially aiming at their second lines, to prevent the arrival of reinforcements. This bombardment has small effect in the mountains, as, owing to the limited number of men one can employ at one time, these are able to protect themselves in dugouts excavated in the solid rock.
Snow, which is still lying on the mountains, is heaped up into immense mounds by the bombardment. Italian troops, clothed in white overalls to prevent their being seen against the whiteness, slowly advanced to engage the enemy in hand-to-hand fighting.
Despite the rain, the work accomplished by the English and Italian aviators was above praise. Flying low over the enemy troops, they brought confusion and terror into their midst, intrepidly engaging the Austrians in aerial combats, and bringing down in twelve hours many enemy planes, while also collecting invaluable military information. The English and French contingents co-operated with the Italians in perfect accord and a splendid spirit of camaraderie.
Except for lack of secrecy, the Austrians organized this supreme effort of theirs better than might have been expected. It was well planned and resolutely delivered. The credit due the Italians is all the greater for repulsing it completely in many places, containing it in others, and nowhere allowing it to break through.
The sector on which the enemy gained most ground is on the Piave. There the Austrians made three principal crossings of the river and established three bridgeheads or salients into the original Italian line.
To make this possible they blinded the Italian artillery and airplanes by using great quantities of smoke shells which covered the river and the Italian trenches on its bank with a dense black fog. Thus hidden, the Austrian patrols hurried across the water in boats and on rafts under no more than a random fire from the defense.
Having reached the western bank they pulled pontoon bridges across and pushed reinforcements rapidly forward. The most notable of these crossings was the enemy's penetration in the Montello sector, the position which the British forces held all last Winter.
This sector is the hinge between the mountain and the Piave sectors; it stands at the angle where the Piave leaves the mountains and enters the Venetian Plain. It is an isolated hog's back, 700 feet high in the middle and seven and a half miles long, running almost east and west, with the foot of its northern and eastern slopes washed by the river, its surface undulating, dotted with farms and little woods—an unusual feature—crossed from north to south by no fewer than twenty-four roads. The value of Montello to the enemy would have been that it would dominate from the flank and rear all the Italian positions defending the line of the Piave in the dead flat plain to the south.
The British, after reconquering the advanced positions, momentarily abandoned on June 15 with a view of strengthening the line, not only resisted all Austrian attempts, but counterattacked in a fashion that caused an Italian superior officer to remark: "They are slamming the gates of Italy in the face of the invader."
In a dispatch on June 19 Mr. West recorded the fact that the enemy, while maintaining pressure on the mountain front and Montello district, was redoubling his efforts on the Piave especially west of San Dona. The dispatch continues:
The Austrian hold of the last-named vicinity, also in the Zenson bend and at Saint Andrea, southeast of Montello, is being considerably weakened by the Italian artillery fire and constant counterattacks.
Saint Andrea itself, with the adjacent villages of Giavera, Bavaria, and Sovilla, has changed hands ten times over. The railroad running thence toward Montebelluna is hidden under a litter of dead bodies for a length of several kilometers. The haul of prisoners has risen from 6,000 to 9,000, General Diaz announced last night—an almost unique fact in an offensive of this nature and undoubtedlythe fruit of Italy's immediate readiness for an energetic reaction.
Stupendous acts of heroism are recorded. Gunners of an Alpine regiment stationed at the foot of Montello Hill, after being twice driven from their batteries, united themselves to some storm troops, fought the foe in a hand-to-hand encounter with daggers, and, recovering the cannon, readjusted the breechlocks, which they had taken away with them, and then fired pointblank into the adversary's ranks.
At Fagare two Hungarian battalions were annihilated amid the ruins of houses where they had taken refuge. At Candelu an enemy machine-gun corps, which had transformed the village into a fort, were killed by Italian mountain artillery, and in the neighboring sector of Salettuol the 3d Austrian Division lost 60 per cent. of its effectiveness.
Many of the prisoners at the moment of capture present the appearance of Bedouins, being clad merely in tattered shirts, with their rifles slung over their shoulders and a dagger in their hand. Nearly all carried postcard maps marking out their journey, with a program inscribed: "June 15, halt at Treviso. June 16, occupation of Venice." They also carried little packets of money coupons printed in Italian for spending in those cities.
[By the Cologne Gazette Editor at German Headquarters]
The task confronting us before the offensive seemed monstrous. What the combined and many times superior armies of the Napoleonic School and Kitchener's Army, young indeed but drawing its supplies from the resources of a world empire, had failed to accomplish against a force of almost Frederickian inferiority in numbers, this task was to be performed by the German Army, which, even after the absorption of the eastern units, was scarcely equal in strength, much less superior to the enemy. The big hammer had failed to beat down the little hammer; it was now the turn of the little hammer to pit itself against the big hammer. The German hinterland, diminutive in comparison with the continents working for the coalition, was not only to hold its own, but also to help to conquer in battle against the raw materials and industries of half Europe, America, Africa, and Asia. The German victory at Cambrai, which in a sense represented a transition from the old to a new era in the history of the war in the west, had already illuminated the difficulties that a brave and numerically superior enemy could oppose to our attack.
In contrast with the victorious confidence of our veteran defense troops—a confidence that at times excited the amazement of their own leaders—the enemy continued to contemplate the German undertaking with inveterate skepticism. British and French prisoners captured during the Winter months indeed held out to us the prospect of achieving an initial success similar to that which their own offensive had achieved. But nowhere in the world did any one reckon upon more than the customary initial success for our enterprise.
The German High Command decided from the very outset not to fight a "battle of matériel," but to build up success upon a more ideal foundation. Numerical inferiority was to be compensated by the warlike and moral qualities peculiar to the German Army organism. The same virtues that had proved the essential cause of the enemy's defeat were to form the surest guarantees of German victory. To the undeniable bravery of the English and French storming troops was to be opposed the utmost bravery of the German tribes; the good quality of the enemy leaders was to be met by better leading on the German side, and the thorough preparation of our adversaries by one still more thorough.
As the Supreme Command could confidently reckon upon the two first as given quantities, there remained as the chief task the preparation of the attack. Unity of command and of forces, the latter non-German only in respect of avaluable group of Austrian batteries that had been placed in the line, facilitated the tremendous work. Frictions and impediments that are inherent even in the best organized coalition armies were spared us. It is impossible to picture what was accomplished in the map rooms of the German staffs by experienced specialists in defensive warfare, who worked in silence for months, at the highest nervous pressure, in the face of the confident expectation of the homeland and growing tension and impatience abroad. But it is certain that an altogether enormous expenditure of organizing energy was required in order to impart the method of attack; to ascertain and control the situation of the enemy; to supply the striking force with munitions and provisions; and finally to produce that masterpiece, the veiled march into line.
He Extols Militarism and Defines the Issues of the War
The German Kaiser in two telegrams acknowledging congratulations on the thirtieth anniversary of his accession to the throne made announcements of historic interest regarding the issues of the war and the uses of militarism. On June 17 he telegraphed to the German Chancellor, Count von Hertling:
I express cordial thanks and kind good wishes to your Excellency and the State Ministry on the day on which, thirty years ago, I ascended the throne. When I celebrated my twenty-five-year jubilee as ruler I was able, with special gratitude, to point out that I had been able to do my work as a prince of peace. Since then the world picture has changed. For nearly four years, forced to it by our enemies, we have been engaged in the hardest struggle history records. God the Lord has laid a heavy burden upon my shoulders, but I carry it in the consciousness of our good right, with confidence in our ship, our sword, and our strength, and in the realization that I have the good fortune to stand at the head of the most capable people on earth. Just as our arms under strong leadership have proved themselves invincible, so also will the home land, exerting all its strength, bear with strong will the sufferings and privations which just now are keenly felt.Thus, I have spent this day 'midst my armies, and it moved me to the depths of my heart, yet filled with the most profound gratitude to God's mercy.I know that Prussian militarism, so much abused by our enemies, which my forefathers and I, in a spirit of dutifulness, loyalty, order, and obedience, have nurtured, has given Germany's sword and the German Nation strength to triumph, and that victory will bring a peace which will guarantee the German life.It will then be my sacred duty, as well as that of the States, with all our power to see to healing the wounds caused by the war and to secure a happy future for the nation. In most faithful recognition of the work hitherto performed, I rely on your approved strength and the help of the State Ministry. God bless our land and people!
I express cordial thanks and kind good wishes to your Excellency and the State Ministry on the day on which, thirty years ago, I ascended the throne. When I celebrated my twenty-five-year jubilee as ruler I was able, with special gratitude, to point out that I had been able to do my work as a prince of peace. Since then the world picture has changed. For nearly four years, forced to it by our enemies, we have been engaged in the hardest struggle history records. God the Lord has laid a heavy burden upon my shoulders, but I carry it in the consciousness of our good right, with confidence in our ship, our sword, and our strength, and in the realization that I have the good fortune to stand at the head of the most capable people on earth. Just as our arms under strong leadership have proved themselves invincible, so also will the home land, exerting all its strength, bear with strong will the sufferings and privations which just now are keenly felt.
Thus, I have spent this day 'midst my armies, and it moved me to the depths of my heart, yet filled with the most profound gratitude to God's mercy.
I know that Prussian militarism, so much abused by our enemies, which my forefathers and I, in a spirit of dutifulness, loyalty, order, and obedience, have nurtured, has given Germany's sword and the German Nation strength to triumph, and that victory will bring a peace which will guarantee the German life.
It will then be my sacred duty, as well as that of the States, with all our power to see to healing the wounds caused by the war and to secure a happy future for the nation. In most faithful recognition of the work hitherto performed, I rely on your approved strength and the help of the State Ministry. God bless our land and people!
In an address at Main Headquarters on June 15 he said that the war was not a matter of strategic campaign, but a struggle of two world views wrestling with each other. "Either German principles of right, freedom, honor, and morality must be upheld," he added, "or Anglo-Saxon principles with their idolatry of mammon must be victorious."
The Anglo-Saxons, he asserted, aimed at making the peoples of the world work as slaves for the Anglo-Saxon ruling race, and such a matter could not be decided in days or weeks, or even in a year.
The Emperor emphasized the fact that from the first he had realized that the trials of war would be great. The first outbreak of enthusiasm had not deceived him. Great Britain's intervention had meant a world struggle, whether he desired it or not. He said he was thankful that Field Marshal von Hindenburg and General Ludendorff had been placed at his side as counselors. Drinking to the health of the army and its leaders, the Emperor said:
The German people and army indeed are now one and the same and look up to you with gratitude. Every man out thereknows what he is fighting for, the enemy himself admits that, and in consequence we shall gain victory—the victory of the German standpoint. That is what is in question.
The German people and army indeed are now one and the same and look up to you with gratitude. Every man out thereknows what he is fighting for, the enemy himself admits that, and in consequence we shall gain victory—the victory of the German standpoint. That is what is in question.
The Emperor referred to the period of peace, which he described as "twenty-six years of profitable but hard work, though they could not always be regarded as successful in a political respect and had brought disappointments."
His interests had been centred in the work connected with the development of the army and the effort to maintain it at the level at which it had been intrusted to him. Now, in time of war, he could not better celebrate the day than under the same roof with the Field Marshal and his faithful, highly gifted Generals and General Staff. The Emperor continued:
In peace time in the preparation of my army for war my grandfather's war comrades gradually passed away, and as the German horizon gradually darkened, many a German, and not the least I, hoped with assurance that God would in this danger place the right man at our side. Our hope has not been disappointed.In your Excellency and in you, General Ludendorff, Heaven bestowed upon the German Empire and the German Army and staff men who are called upon in these great times to lead the German people in arms in its decisive struggle for existence and the right to live, and with its help to gain victory.
In peace time in the preparation of my army for war my grandfather's war comrades gradually passed away, and as the German horizon gradually darkened, many a German, and not the least I, hoped with assurance that God would in this danger place the right man at our side. Our hope has not been disappointed.
In your Excellency and in you, General Ludendorff, Heaven bestowed upon the German Empire and the German Army and staff men who are called upon in these great times to lead the German people in arms in its decisive struggle for existence and the right to live, and with its help to gain victory.
He sent the following telegram to the Crown Prince:
Under your leadership the armies of Generals von Boehm, von Below, and von Hutier have severely defeated the enemy and shattered the storm of his hurriedly brought-up army reserves. Eighty-five thousand prisoners and more than 1,000 guns are the outward signs of this tremendous battle success. To you and the participating commanders and troops I express my thanks and those of the Fatherland. The fighting spirit and fighting strength of my incomparable troops guarantee our final victory. God will further help.
Under your leadership the armies of Generals von Boehm, von Below, and von Hutier have severely defeated the enemy and shattered the storm of his hurriedly brought-up army reserves. Eighty-five thousand prisoners and more than 1,000 guns are the outward signs of this tremendous battle success. To you and the participating commanders and troops I express my thanks and those of the Fatherland. The fighting spirit and fighting strength of my incomparable troops guarantee our final victory. God will further help.
Field Marshal von Hindenburg, in congratulating the Emperor on behalf of the army, extolled the Emperor's "wise care for peace" during the first twenty-six years of his reign and Germany's brilliant progress in all works of peace in that period. If the German Army and people had been able for nearly four years in the face of a world of enemies to show such proof of their strength and right to existence as never yet in history had been demanded and given in such measure, he added, they also owed this to their war lord, who had indefatigably watched over the fighting efficiency of his armies. The Field Marshal renewed the unswerving loyalty until death of Germany's sons at the front, and concluded:
"May our old motto, 'Forward with God for King and Fatherland, for Kaiser and Empire,' result in many years of peace being granted to your Majesty after our victorious return home."