THE THIRD SAMNITE WAR.
The peace between the Romans and the Samnites had lasted four years at most. During this interval, the Samnites had, by the defence of Nequinum or Narnia, paved the way for the continuance of the war: they wanted merely to rest themselves, and to collect their strength. By the conditions of their agreement with Rome, they ought to have kept themselves from every sort of hostility against the neighbouring states; yet this was impossible. In Lucania the feuds of the two parties soon broke out again: the country had recovered its independence, and attacked Tarentum; the Samnites declared war with Lucania, and the Lucanians, being hard pressed, put themselves under the protection of the Romans. As these did not like to see the Samnites recovering their power, they required them to give up the Lucanian conquest, in accordance with the peace. The Samnites returned a haughty answer, and warned the Roman ambassadors not to make their appearance in Samnium. In the year 454, whilst in Etruria there was at one moment a truce, and at another a quarrel with some of the towns, open war broke out again with the Samnites. We behold the Apulians allied with Samnium; for Apulia was too far away for Rome to have maintained her dominion there: the Sabines also we find on good terms with the Samnites, and in some instances even in a league with them. Thustherefore had circumstances taken a turn by which the condition of Samnium became somewhat more favourable; on the other hand, the power of Rome had so much spread in the meanwhile, that she was a much more terrible enemy for Samnium to face.
This war took quite a different course from the former ones, from which we may infer that the state of things had changed. The Romans do not again transfer the scene of war into Apulia, whether it was that the Apulians had fallen away from them, or because they were hindered by other circumstances. They now attacked the Samnites in front, who do not go into the Æquian country, but into the Falernian district in the neighbourhood of Vescia. The war lasted eight years, and was still more ruinous for the Samnites than the one before; yet they carried it on with great energy, and the whole of their plan, although not crowned with success, is one of the grandest which history can produce; butvictrix causa Diis placuit. In the first campaign, the Romans were at once in the heart of Samnium, and they advanced into Lucania to assist its people: Rome indeed had also sometimes the worst of it; but she did not lose any great battles. In the year 455, both the Roman armies, that of Fabius, and that of Decius, were in Samnium, waging there a war of extermination, of which the account in Livy clearly bears the stamp of authenticity: he had genuine memoirs before him; yet these often contained most irreconcilable statements. The Romans marched from place to place, and wherever they encamped, they destroyed in the country round every trace of cultivation: Fabius had his camp in eighty-six, Decius in forty-five places. They took but few towns; for the Samnites defended themselves on their hills with such lion-hearted courage, that it was impossible to reduce them.—In 456, Volumnius and Ap. Claudius were consuls, Decius proconsul. Volumnius is said to have beaten the Samnites again and again, and at last to have compelled their army to fleeinto Etruria: this is a calumnious misrepresentation of the heroic spirit and the vast plan of the Samnites. Their army was so far from having been driven out of the country, that Gellius Egnatius fought for several years in Etruria; and even after the destruction of his force, the Samnites a long time held their ground in Samnium: they, on the contrary, conceived the grand idea of abandoning their country to the mercy of the enemy, and of carrying the war into Etruria. The Etruscans had during the last hundred years become better acquainted with the Gauls, who, being settled in the Romagna, had lost their love of roving, and were peacefully engaged in husbandry: individuals only enlisted as warriors. But as on the other side of the Alps the national migration was still going on, the transalpine hosts from time to time crossed the mountains, and then the Gauls were again set in motion. Such a migration must have taken place about this period; and the Etruscans availed themselves of the favourable moment, to take the Gauls in their pay against the Romans. It must have cost them much to come to this resolution; for if the Gauls had settled on the lower Tiber, amid the ruins of Rome, Etruria was surrounded and annihilated. Nevertheless, passion and hatred against the Romans were stronger motives than prudence. The Etruscans, with the exception of a few townships, had in the hope of this reinforcement again taken up arms, violating even their accustomed faith with regard to armistices; Perusia, for instance, did not keep the thirty years’ peace. Now as the Etruscans were indeed a wealthy, and with their serfs to fight at their side, a valiant people, but wanting in generals; the Samnites determined to march through the land of the Pentrians, Marsians, Sabines, and Umbrians, to Etruria. This is not here the fate of the heroic Vendeans, who in the month of October 1793, with all their population passed the Loire, and left their home to be laid waste, because they could not defend it: the Samniteswere but an army, and the Romans did not hinder their march. This is one of the most brilliant feats in ancient history, and it excited in Rome not a little dismay.
The junction of Gellius Egnatius with the Etruscans was difficult to effect on account of the new Roman colonies: the Samnites had to march by Antrodoco; Volumnius followed them, but he could not prevent the union. It took place in 456; and the Romans were so far from looking upon them as fugitives, that the consul Volumnius received orders from the senate, to transfer the war from Samnium into Etruria, where Ap. Claudius seemed not to be equal to the emergency of the case. Ap. Claudius, in his patrician pride, considered this as an insult; and he demanded that Volumnius should leave the province: this insolent and egregious folly might have put the very existence of the republic in jeopardy. Volumnius was ready to return, and was only induced by the entreaties of his army to remain. In this year, the Gauls had not yet stirred; it is possible that the hosts which were expected, had not yet crossed the Alps.
The campaign of the year 457, is the turning point of the fate of Italy. The Romans made immense exertions. One body of troops was left behind on the frontier of Samnium, in order to hinder the Samnites from any attempt at offensive war against Rome: perhaps it consisted chiefly of Campanians and Lucanians: it merely acted on the defensive. The army under the proconsul Volumnius marched against the Gauls; and the old consular one of Appius, which was stationed in the neighbourhood of Foligno, was reinforced by two new legions, which Fabius had enlisted. Besides these, there were two armies of reserve, consisting of those who had to take up arms in case of need only, part of them perhaps a mere militia armed with spears: one was encamped on the Vatican hill before the city; the other was thrown forward as far as Falerii, in order tokeep up the communication. The consul Decius went to the army, to take the command of the legions; to him Fabius brought his reinforcement. The Romans had posted themselves in the Umbrian mountains, near Nuceria, and had gone into cantonments there; a detachment was sent to Camerinum[149]on the most northern slope of the Apennines, to prevent the Gauls from marching through the defiles to Spoleto in the rear of the Romans. The Gauls, we must assume, passed the Apennines by Ariminum and Sena. Here Polybius comes to our aid. The legion which had been pushed on as far as Camerinum, was surprised and cut to pieces; so that the Romans knew nothing of the defeat, until the Gallic horsemen, charging on, displayed the heads of the slain Romans stuck on their lances.—The Etruscans, Samnites, and Umbrians, had combined their forces; until then they had remained on the defensive. Then the two Roman generals again resolved on an exceedingly bold undertaking: elsewhere ἀσφάλεια is wont to be the leading principle of their strategy. They made a movement in flank against an enemy immensely their superior in numbers; the main army marched from Nuceria through the Apennines, which are not very high there, to Sentinum; the Gauls and Samnites were stationed on the right, the Etruscans and Umbrians on the left of it. Between the two, they advanced as far as where the Apennines towards the Adriatic end in ranges of low hills, as if they meant to invade the country of the Senones; the latter, however, instead of advancing, fell back upon their frontier, and the Romans disposed themselvesen échelons. The consuls called in the reserves. Cn. Fulvius moved from Falerii (Civita Castellana) into the position which had been left by the main army, and was detached against Assisium in the neighbourhood of Perusia: here there is a very highand strong range of mountains, from which he might invade the country, and entice the Etruscans to separate themselves from the Gauls. All this is quite certain, and I am led to think that the second reserve also marched afterwards on to Falerii. At Rome, they were surely forward enough in their preparations for arming, to be able to withstand any sudden invasion from Samnium. Another fact besides is hardly to be doubted, although Polybius merely gives it as a supposition. Volumnius also, who again faced the Samnites in their own country, must have been summoned back; so that by forced marches, he approached on the decisive day through the country of the Sabines above Terni, and abandoned Samnium to its fate.
The diversion of Fulvius against Perusia was crowned by the most complete success; the Etruscans and Umbrians detached considerable divisions of their main army to their own country, to protect the frontiers from the devastations of the enemy. These were the best troops of the Etruscans, whilst, on the other hand, Fulvius had the worst of the Roman. As generals in the battle, there are mentioned only the two consuls Q. Fabius V. and P. Decius IV.; but most certainly, as mentioned before, Volumnius also was there as proconsul: about fifty to sixty thousand men faced an enemy of infinitely superior numbers. There were a great many reasons for proceeding to Sentinum: in the first place, to draw the Etruscans away from their own home, so that, if they should be obliged to retreat, being separated from their allies, they would have to move by the arc of which the Romans had cut the chord; in the next place, they made the Gauls tremble for their own country, and it was to be expected that a great part of them would be scattered in order to protect their open villages; and lastly, they were afraid of the ἀπόνοια of the Gauls. If they had cut off the retreat of the Gauls in the south, these would have fought much more desperately; now they had the retreat into their own landopen before them, and they had not yet crossed the mountains.
The result rewarded their wisdom. Yet the numbers of the enemy were so much superior, that the Romans did not trust to the efforts of human bravery alone; but Decius had resolved upon devoting himself to the infernal gods, and he had induced the plebeian pontiff M. Livius to accompany him, in order, if necessary, to perform the consecration in the midst of the battle. Decius faced the Gauls; Fabius the Etruscans, Umbrians, and Samnites; the legions of Volumnius may have been stationed in the centre. Of these enemies, the Samnites were by far the most formidable. Fabius had a style of his own in his strategy, as is the case with nearly every distinguished general;[150]he kept back the reserve to the very last,—a manœuvre the practicability of which entirely depends upon the composition of the army; it is only possible with very well trained troops; with young soldiers one risks a defeat;—when the foremost battalions were nearly destroyed, then only he led on the reserve, which was still quite fresh, and in this manner he almost always succeeded. Thus also now against the Samnites. But a different system was that of Decius against the Gauls, and must have been: this is the grand characteristic of the Roman order of battle, that they fought against every enemy in a special manner. The Greek wars are not by any means interesting, but so much the more are those of the Romans. The Greek phalanges pushed against each other, and the masses were immoveable; the Roman method on the contrary was light and flexible: Polybius, a very good officer, found it adapted to every circumstance. Fabius tried to weary out the Samnites, as it was summer, a season which the labourer from the warmer country bears much more easily thanthe Samnite, who dwelt in the cooler valleys. The Gauls also were easily wearied; but they were a numberless swarm which with the utmost impetuosity threw themselves upon the enemy; the first onset was the worst; if its shock was resisted, the victory was almost sure. To meet this first attack, Decius did everything in his power, but in vain: the innumerable cavalry of the Gauls, although at first driven back, advanced again with its overwhelming superiority of numbers; and now they brought forward their thousand war chariots, which were a terrible sight for the horses of the Romans. These took fright, and the flight began without any fault of the riders. For two days, the armies had faced each other; on the morning of the third, the Romans had an omen which prophesied victory to them; namely, a hind came down from the mountains, chased by a wolf, who caught her, and tore her in pieces. The day notwithstanding seemed to end disastrously; but Decius, after the example of his father, now devotes himself to death, and he rushes into the midst of the Gallic hosts, adding yet to the form in use the prayer, that fear and death might go before him. Hereupon affright is said to have spread through the army of the foe, and to have stopped it in its career. However this may have been, the death of Decius decided the battle. The Romans rallied, picked up thepilafrom the field of carnage, and hurled them against the Gauls; the barbarian cavalry, having pushed on too far, was surrounded and overpowered; and Fabius, who had already discomfited the Samnites, sent his troops to give aid, and he now also led on the reserve. On this, the Gauls, who, like the Russians at the battles of Zorndorf and Austerlitz, were in one dense mass, broke, and could only scatter and flee: the retreat of the Samnites, Etruscans, and Umbrians to their camp was less of a rout. The loss of the Romans is stated to have been about seven thousand men of one army, and twelve hundred of the other; the Gauls had five and twenty thousand killed,and between seven and eight thousand taken prisoners, which is very credible. They went back again into their own land, without troubling themselves about any thing further, and the Samnites again accomplished an immense undertaking. Gellius Egnatius himself had fallen, either in the battle, or in the retreat; but the Samnite army was once more obliged to march round that of the Romans, or else quite through it, pursued by Volumnius, and attacked by the peoples into whose territory they trespassed, and whom they had to plunder in order to live. Five thousand of them reached their homes.
Thus ended the greatest campaign for achievements, known in the earlier Roman history. The numbers of the armies are corrupted in most of the books: Livy has for the Gauls 40,330 foot, and 46,000 horse; the former number has been left unchanged, but the 46,000 were brought down to 6,000; it ought, however, to have been 1,000,000 foot and 46,000 horse.[151]These are numbers, however, which do not belong to history, but merely to the chroniclers. The battle of Sentinum was so glorious, that the Greeks also knew of it, and Duris of Samos mentions in his history that a hundred thousand Gauls had been slain in it.
A campaign of such historical importance as that of the year 457, fills one indeed with pity, but at the same time with the greatest respect. The end of the third Samnite war brought misery and ruin upon Samnium. However blind the struggles of the Samnites may seem to have been, yet in truth they were great. We shall now give a short sketch of the rest of the war. Until 461, when it ended (the peace itself was only concluded in 462), it was continued in the same manner, and the Samnites renewed their attempts to break through into Etruria, but in vain. The Romans wedge themselves into Samnium; the Samnites retaliate in the country between the Liris and the Vulturnus. On the whole,during the last years, they still display mighty efforts: even as late as the year of the battle of Sentinum, they make an inroad through Campania. In the second year after,[152]they are said to have sent two great armies into the field, one of which binds itself by a solemn oath to fight to the last man. The only wonder is where they found the means, especially to keep up the style that they did, as Livy mentions that they had shields embossed with gold and silver: such magnificence sounds quite fabulous in a people which had been so reduced for years.[153]That, however, the consuls Postumius and Carvilius wonspoliaof extraordinary splendour in their victories over the Samnites, is an historical fact; from part of these, a brazen colossus was erected in front of the Capitol.
But in reality, the war was decided as early as in 459 by the consuls L. Papirius and Sp. Carvilius. It is characteristic of the way in which it was waged, that the Samnite towns, both then, and afterwards in the war of Sylla, so entirely vanished from the earth, that the later geography did not know of them any more; and that no Samnite antiquities whatever are found in those regions. The last great battle was fought in the year 460. At that time, the son of the great Fabius, Q. Fabius Gurges, had marched into the country of the Pentrians; against him commanded C. Pontius, the conqueror at Caudium: from this wemay infer, that the Caudines certainly took part in the war. The Romans were beaten, and they lost the whole of their baggage, the news of which reached Rome: they had, it is true, cut their way through the enemy; but they were not able to go on with the campaign. Then Fabius begged hard that theimperiummight not be taken from his son; and he succeeded in carrying a motion to that effect, and in getting permission to go out as legate to his son with a reinforcement: this was the greatest reward which the republic could give to that great man. He now gained a most decisive victory, by which, as Orosius justly remarks, an end was put to the Samnite war; for, although Eutropius tells us that it lasted a year longer, he is indeed such a careless writer, that no stress is to be laid on what he says. The sequel of the victory was horrid: C. Pontius was taken prisoner, led in the triumph, and then put to death: a fouler stain than this is not to be found in the whole of the Roman history. His native city Caudium must also at that time have been razed to the ground.
At the end of this war, when it was too late to turn the scale, it happened that new allies declared for the Samnites. These were the Sabines, whose peace with Rome had lasted for a century and a half, and that in such a manner, that we must believe what we are told by one whose authority is otherwise not quite to be trusted, that they had the right of Roman citizenship. This might have induced the Romans to grant the Samnites the peace, although they were not crushed: on what conditions, we are not able to make out. The Romans took advantage of it to establish on the frontiers of Apulia, Samnium, and Lucania, the large colony of Venusia, the native place of Horace: twenty thousandcoloniare said to have been sent thither; if this be true, it must have got a large country district. By means of this colony, Samnium was cut off from Tarentum, and such indeed was its importance, that the numbergiven becomes not unlikely: in the war against Pyrrhus, it saved Rome; without it, after the battle of Heraclea, the army of Lævinus would have been utterly destroyed. Some time afterwards, they founded a colony besides at Æsernia in Samnium.