Mago had landed from Spain at Genua, had taken it, and was trying to change Liguria into a Carthaginian province; just as the Romans had spread in Spain from one single place. Yet he made but little progress in the Apennines and in the Alps, as he had to deal with a host of unmanageable petty tribes. Although indeed he got reinforcements and money, his means at first were inconsiderable; yet he always obliged the Romans to employ some forces against him. Once he defeated them in the country of the Insubrians: so that, if he had not now been recalled, he would certainly have given them a great deal of trouble. He embarked, but died of the wounds which he had received in that engagement.
Hannibal had likewise had positive orders to embark, and one cannot understand why the Romans did not do their utmost to destroy his fleet: he reached Africa without an accident. Against Carthage itself, the Romans were not able to undertake anything: it was too strong a town. Nor had Scipio as yet taken any other city that was fortified, though he was master of many open places. Hannibal landed near Adrumetum; hehad taken with him all those whom he could find in Bruttium able to bear arms, and he had embodied among his troops all the Roman and Italian deserters, whose only chance of life depended on the war with Rome. His army consisted of about forty thousand men. Yet when he beheld the state of things at Carthage, he made an attempt to negotiate; for he saw how unlikely it was that the war would be successfully carried on, and he knew well that, if a battle were lost, the city would obtain a peace from which it might never recover. Scipio likewise was very anxious for peace; for he was always afraid that they would not prolong hisimperium. The conditions which Hannibal offered, were too low, as he demanded for the Carthaginians the sovereignty over Africa, leaving indeed to the Romans the countries which they had conquered, but refusing everything else; Scipio still wished to keep to the former conditions, with a trifling compensation for the wrong which had been done. All was spoilt at last by the folly of the Carthaginian people, who, now that Hannibal was come, thought that Scipio’s army would be destroyed like that of Regulus; and thus the famous battle of Zama was brought on (550). Hannibal, according to the testimony of Polybius, here also displayed the qualities of a great general. He drew up his army in three lines. The foremost was formed of a medley of foreign troops enlisted from among the most opposite races; behind these were placed the Carthaginian citizens, who only took up arms in times of the utmost need, but were forced by these very circumstances to be brave; behind these again, as a reserve, were the Italians whom he had brought over, and they were a considerable body: in front of the whole were eighty elephants, and on the wings were the cavalry. This is the only battle in which Hannibal made use of elephants. The Romans were set in their usual array ofhastati,principes, andtriarii, save only that Scipio left large spaces between each of these three divisions, whereas otherwise they were so placed behindeach other, that the maniples of the one always covered the intervals between two maniples of the others. In these wide spaces, as well as in front of the lines, he put the light troops, that when the elephants approached, they might hurl their missiles at them, and then, should they enter these open lanes, assail them with javelins. On the wings, he set the Numidian and Roman horse. The result of the battle shows that this cavalry was now superior, in quality at least, to that of the Carthaginians; for the latter was soon put to flight. The object with regard to the elephants was partly attained, as most of them ran right through these lanes, although there were some, who turned themselves sideways upon the men who were armed with javelins. Now began the shock between thehastatiand the Carthaginian mercenaries, who, after a gallant fight, were forced to throw themselves upon the Carthaginian phalanx behind them, but were driven back again by these upon the Romans; so that they were trampled down between the two. Thehastati, however, had to give way before the Carthaginians; Scipio then made them fall back, and theprincipesand thetriariimove sideways towards the wings, so as to attack the Carthaginians in the flank: this had the fullest success. The Italians alone fought with desperate courage; but the Carthaginian cavalry had been all destroyed, and the Romans burst upon the Carthaginian rear, on which the rout became such, that nearly the whole of the army was cut to pieces. Hannibal himself escaped with a small handful of men to Adrumetum.
Nothing else was now thought of in Carthage, but peace. It was the great Hannibal who principally negociated it, and accepted the conditions, which of course were much harder than the former ones; the eagerness, however, of Scipio to hurry on the peace, was the saving of Carthage. Her independence was acknowledged; the towns and provinces which had belonged to the Carthaginians in Africa before the war, they wereindeed still to keep as subjects; but in this there was trickery, as they were to prove, what they had possessed. Instead of thirty triremes being left to them, as at first, only ten were now allowed them; they had to deliver over their elephants, and were no more to tame any; they were to pay ten thousand Euboïc talents (15,000,000 dollars) within fifty years; to give a hundred and fifty hostages to be chosen by the Romans themselves, (which was very hard, as hostages were so badly treated among the ancients;) and to yield up all the Roman prisoners and deserters, and likewise the unfortunate Italians who had come over with Hannibal. Whether these were all put to death as rebels, or sold for slaves, is not told us by Livy, who indeed says not a word about the whole of this article: Appian has given the account of it, and therefore so did Polybius likewise. They were moreover to acknowledge Masinissa as king of the Numidians within the boundaries prescribed by the Romans; to conclude a passive alliance offensive and defensive, with the Romans, on whom, however, it was not to be binding; and to feed and keep the Roman soldiers for six months longer. In Africa, they might wage war only with the consent of the Romans; out of Africa, not at all; and they were not to enlist mercenaries anywhere in Europe.
Some fools in Carthage wanted to speak against these conditions; but Hannibal seized hold of one Gisgo, and dragged him down from the platform on which he was haranguing. An outcry was raised about the violation of the liberty of the citizen; Hannibal, however, justified himself, saying that ever since his ninth year, he had been for six and thirty years away from his country, and therefore was not so accurately acquainted with the law; that, moreover, he deemed the peace to be necessary. All men of sense had become aware that the peace was now unavoidable, and that matters would have taken a different turn, if Hannibal had been supported at the right time.
Scipio now evacuated Africa; all the Carthaginian ships of war were brought to sea, and there set fire to. Thus ended, after sixteen years, the second Punic war and the rivalry of Carthage. Rome had made an immense booty.[30]