THE THIRD PUNIC WAR.
The third Punic war had been long threatened, owing to the relations between Carthage and Masinissa. The peace lasted more than fifty years, during which the Carthaginians had never given any handle for complaint,nor do we know of any mentioned on the side of Rome. It may be said that this must have been a time of some prosperity for Carthage, as at the end of it we find the city wealthy and well-peopled. This we may also easily understand: the wars in the east were highly profitable to Carthage, since as a neutral state it had free intercourse everywhere; as, for instance, during the war between Syria and Egypt, when the trade of these two countries was altogether stopped. The energy of the Carthaginians could not turn itself to foreign affairs, and therefore it was engaged at home in accumulating wealth. Whilst, however, Carthage by the peace of Scipio was placed in fact in a kind of pupillage, its national character and constitution seem to have quite fallen away: the rottenness of the government, and the anarchical preponderance of the rabble, was, to use Polybius’ remarkable words, an old evil, older even than at Rome. We see that a power like that of the consuls at Rome had by this time long ceased to exist in Carthage, and that the authority of the senate was also very much reduced. A people of eastern origin, with republican self-government, but without institutions like those which among the Greeks and Romans checked democratical degeneracy, could not but sink into utter lawlessness.
The real thorn in their side from abroad, was the neighbourhood of Masinissa. He may have had instructions from Rome; yet, even if it were not so, he knew well, that however much he worried the Carthaginians, even though he were hatefully in the wrong, the Romans would never declare against him. The Carthaginians showed immense forbearance, and resigned themselves to their hard lot. In such cases, one should indeed yield to necessity, yet always cling to the feeling of being unfortunate; for as soon as that is lost, cowardice and baseness spring up: we can hardly help believing that the Carthaginians had fallen into this condition, and given themselves up.
Very soon after the end of the second Punic war, quarrels already began. Masinissa put forth impudent claims to the oldest Phœnician settlements, to the rich coast of Bysacene which the Carthaginians had possessed from the very first. Polybius says that those districts had belonged to Carthage as early as in the days of the Roman kings. This was so barefaced, that the Romans had not the hardihood to declare for him openly. Scipio Africanus went over as Roman commissioner and umpire. The facts were so glaring, that he could not possibly decide for Masinissa; yet he did not scruple with unjustifiable policy to refuse to give sentence, and thus Carthage and Masinissa remained at enmity with each other, and the Carthaginians must have felt convinced, that any active resistance would involve them in a war with the Romans: they were therefore obliged to confine themselves to the defensive. Their position was a most unhappy one; just like that of the states with which Napoleon had made peace in order to bring on their ruin, in which cases he set everything like truth at defiance. Unluckily for Carthage, Masinissa reigned upwards of fifty years after the peace of Scipio, and during the whole of his life played his game with Rome so cleverly, that her sad condition grew worse and worse. Already before the war with Perseus, soon after the death of Philip, they complained bitterly of Masinissa, who wrested from them one district after another. The Romans for the sake of appearances sent over arbitrators, who, however, allowed the affair to drag on and never decided anything. And the plot thickened so much, that at last it came to a war between Carthage and Masinissa, the date of which cannot be stated with chronological precision,—very likely, not quite so close upon the breaking out of the third Punic war.[56]Theterritory of Carthage at that time was about as much as modern Tunis, and the western part of Tripoli; Masinissa, by his continual conquests, was the lord of one of the mightiest kingdoms which the world then knew, and was much stronger than the Carthaginians. The Carthaginians had gathered together a considerable army under Hasdrubal, one of their generals; but their former disasters had not made them more warlike: they did not what Macchiavell had wished for his own native city, not having yet come to the conviction that they ought ever to rely on their own bravery, and likewise to lighten the lot of their own subjects: had it not been for this, the war might, after all, have taken quite a different turn. They had amended none of the faults of their military system, and they still carried on the war by means of mercenaries. Hasdrubal went out to meet Masinissa with an army of fifty thousand men; but he was quite an incapable general, and though the battle was not decisively lost, he looked upon himself as beaten, and retreated without securing his connexion with Carthage: he was, therefore, cut off, and now began to make offers of peace, which, however, Masinissa haughtily rejected. The latter would not consent to let go the army thus hemmed in, which hunger and distress had driven to extremity, until the Carthaginians gave hostages as pledges for the peace being kept, undertook to pay five thousand talents within fifty years, and recognised his encroachments upon them. When the defenceless and disarmed soldiers were now marching off, Gulussa, Masinissa’s youngest son, fell upon them, and cut most of them to pieces. Masinissa had the hostages, and so he still demanded that the peace should be kept, and even complained to the Romans of the Carthaginians not being disposed to abide by it. The Romans had already for some time turned their attention again to Carthage, very likely on account of the flourishingstate of its trade, and because they had been told that stores of timber for building ships were heaped up in the arsenals: for though indeed this had been by no means forbidden in the treaties, the Carthaginians were thus able at a moment’s warning to build a fleet. Rome now called for the surrender or the destruction of this timber; and while the debates on the subject were going on, old Cato incessantly urged in the senate, that Carthage should be destroyed. The government of the world had given the senate an importance which made up for the loss of power at home from the growth of the democratic principle, and the senators felt more and more like kings. Now the senate, with regard to Carthage, was divided between two opinions,—the one of blind dogged hatred, that Carthage should be destroyed, at the bottom of which was the consciousness that Rome was the object of universal hatred; the other, that of P. Cornelius Scipio Nasica, which held on the other hand that Carthage was a godsend, as nothing else could keep Rome well balanced. Nasica seems to have been fully aware of the actual condition of the state, and so were many others; but with regard to the remedy, opinions were divided. Some thought that there was no help for it, and that therefore one ought to go ahead, and make the most of a short life. Cato was one of these. Others, like Nasica, believed that the evil might at least be checked by superficial means, as a thorough reform could not perhaps be carried out. A small party, which afterwards came forward with Tib. Gracchus at its head, tried to root out the disease by desperate remedies. Whether this justice to Carthage in Nasica sprang indeed from a love of righteousness, is more than we can tell; yet it may be that the son of him who was called “the Best” wished to behave uprightly: certain it is that he was powerless, and the destruction of Carthage was decreed. When Masinissa had beaten the Carthaginians, and it was fancied that the end might be easily gained, the Romans began toreproach the Carthaginians for that war with Masinissa, as if it had been a breach of the treaty, when in fact it had only been a measure of self-defence. The Carthaginians in their alarm sent embassy after embassy, begging of the Romans to tell them what they were to do to preserve the peace. But they were put off with crooked answers, and assured that it was not meant to undertake anything against them, only they ought to do their best to give satisfaction to Rome. Resistance seemed so hopeless, that the utmost humiliation was a necessity for Carthage: there was peace in all the rest of the world, and Rome was fully at leisure.
In the year 603, two consular armies under L. Marcius Censorinus and M’. Manilius, amounting, it is said, to eighty thousand men, were sent in a large fleet to Sicily, and put on shore near Lilybæum. Thither also the last Carthaginian ambassadors were directed to repair, as the consuls were furnished with instructions. The Carthaginians saw that the Romans were bent upon their ruin, and that nothing was left to them, but to defend themselves to the last gasp; and yet the ambassadors still appeared before the consuls. These gave as their answer, that they could not then explain themselves; but that it was not the wish of the Romans to bereave them of their freedom, and that if they yielded to the commands which they would receive, they should retain their liberties: still, it was added, as they had too often already broken the peace, and as great preparations of theirs had been observed, and too many factions were at work among them, Rome was to have a guarantee; they should give three hundred children of the first families as hostages. These, to the despair of their parents, were sent to Sicily. Carthage had not a friend in the wide world: her very oldest allies became faithless; even Utica, which hitherto had always stood by her, now hopeless of her fate had thrown itself into the arms of the Romans, by whom it was received, although this was against the treaties. When the hostages weregiven, the Romans still sailed over to Africa, and landed, partly near Utica, and partly at the old camp of Scipio (castra Cornelia); here they took up a regular military position, and the consuls now summoned the magistrates of Carthage to receive their commands. They raised complaints that the Carthaginians had built ships beyond the number allowed by the treaty; that they had filled their arsenals with offensive weapons, which they meant to use against Rome only; and it was therefore required of them that they should surrender all their ships of war, and all the catapults, and that moreover they should deliver up all their arms and stores. Rome, it was also declared, would fully protect them, and the peace with Masinissa would be sanctioned. Hard as they felt this to be, the Carthaginians yielded to it; and the whole of the arms were brought on a thousand waggons, and under the eyes of the Roman commissioners, to the Roman camp. The Romans, on first landing, had demanded a supply of corn for their army, and received the grain from the magazines of the city, which was thus very nearly reduced to a state of famine. With this the Carthaginians thought to have done enough; but now the ambassadors received the last audience. They were led through the ranks of the whole army to the tribunal of the consuls, who now told them, that all that had been done betokened the good will of the Carthaginian government, yet that the latter was not even master of the town; that so long as this strong city was standing, Rome was not safe; and that Carthage therefore must be demolished, and its inhabitants were to build for themselves an open town in the inland country, two (German) miles away from the sea. When the ambassadors remonstrated, the consuls said that they had promised safety to the men, and not to the walls; that the people should not be harmed, and they might just as well live ten (Roman) miles from the sea as those who dwelt in Rome. The outbursts of rage and despair at this infamous deceit were of no avail;the last awful prayer was, that the consuls would, before the ambassadors returned, cause the Roman fleet to make its appearance before Carthage, to strike it with dismay. This was no treason in them; it was prompted by despair. Those among them who had advised their countrymen to yield, saw full well that, if they went home, they should fall victims to the rage of the people; and they therefore remained under the protection of the Romans. Those who came back, refused to answer the people, who had gone out to meet them, and they weeping brought the answer into the senate. It was resolved to die upon the ruins of the city; the gates were immediately shut, and all the Romans and Italians in the town were seized and tortured to death. This the consuls had not expected. They were indeed well informed men,—Manilius was even a highly distinguished jurist,—but they were unfit for war; it may be that the fate of the town appeared to themselves so dreadful, that their heart sickened, and they went to work without spirit. Had they at once advanced to the city, they would have taken it, and the misery been less; but they loitered in the camp, waiting till the Carthaginians should surrender. Things, however, took quite a different turn. The citizens made up their minds not to yield themselves up; they laid hold of everything that might serve as a weapon, and worked day and night with unexampled energy; the women gave their hair for the ropes of the catapults, the slaves were set free, the walls were manned, and the war declared. When the consuls saw that they had made a bad business of it, they wished to storm the town. But across that neck of land on which Carthage lay, it was fortified by a threefold wall, three miles long, forty-five feet (thirty πήχεις) high, and twenty-five feet thick, in which in former times there had been arsenals; and on the side towards the sea, there was one somewhat lower. Both of these the Romans tried to storm, but were beaten back. The country in the neighbourhood of the citywas left to Hasdrubal, the general who had fought against Masinissa, and whom they had been obliged to sacrifice. This Hasdrubal, with an army of twenty thousand men, formed of outcasts and refugees, and acting independently, had ravaged the country, and at the same time had waged a war of pillage against Masinissa. He and all the rest who had been banished were reinstated, and Carthage appointed him as her general without the city.
This war is so dismal, that I can hardly bear to think of it, and still less to tell of it at any length. There is nothing more heartrending than this struggle of despair, which indeed could not end otherwise than in the destruction of the whole people, and that most miserably, but which yet must be gone through. At first, one is glad to see the discomfiture of the Romans, the whole might of the unskilful consuls being baffled by the despair of the besieged. The Carthaginians defended themselves bravely within the city: their commander is unknown; without, there were Hasdrubal and Himilco Phameas as partisans. The way in which the latter carried on the war, so as by means of diversions to give the town a free opening to provision itself, strongly reminds one of the achievements of Francesco Ferrucci at the siege of Florence by Charles V., in the years 1529 and 1530; who was at last taken prisoner and hanged by the Spaniards, whose behaviour there was like that of the French in Tyrol. But although Phameas distinguished himself very much as a military man, yet his end shows how great was the corruption of those times. After having done things which were so brilliant, that he ought to have felt called upon indeed to remain true, he entered into negotiations with the Roman consul; and he told his men that the fate of Carthage was decided, that every one must now take care of himself, and that he could pledge himself for the safety of all those who should join him. A few thousand men went over. The Roman senate did not blush to give this traitor splendidgarments, money, landed estates, and other things of the same kind. This was a heavy blow for Carthage; and yet at this very time it seemed as if its fate was about to take a more propitious turn.
Masinissa again showed himself to be a base perfidious oriental. His faithfulness to Rome had hitherto been quite natural, as to this connexion he owed his greatness; but now he had rather see Carthage saved than destroyed, although still weakened. He could not shut his eyes to the fact that if Carthage was once a Roman province, he should no longer be able to fleece it; and that moreover, as the Romans held the maximbella ex bellis serendi, they would soon find a handle for quarrels: for if Carthage was no more, they would then have no reason whatever for sparing him. And thus mistrust betrayed itself between him and the Romans: he sent no troops, but merely asked what they wanted? Offended at this, they told him that they would let him know it in time, and thereupon he answered that he would wait for it. Yet they afterwards called upon him for his help, and it was granted them. He even began to treat with Carthage, wishing that it would unconditionally throw itself into his arms. This is a thing which often happens in eastern history: the same bashaw, for instance, who had stirred up the Sultan against Ali Pacha, would at last, when he was weakened, have been glad to see him saved. After the death of Masinissa, his son Gulussa was very suspicious of the Romans. Had the Carthaginians thrown themselves into the arms of Masinissa or his son, these would have declared for them, and it is very possible that the Roman rule in Africa would then have been broken.
The attacks on Carthage were left off, the siege was raised, and the two consuls confined themselves to waging war against Hasdrubal and Himilco. But Hasdrubal defeated the consul Manilius, who was obliged to fall back with his army to Utica: on this occasion P. Scipio first distinguished himself. In the following year(604), the consuls L. Calpurnius Piso and L. Mancinus came over, and carried on the war in a very bungling manner. Hasdrubal posted himself at Nepheris, a fortified place a few days’ marches from the city, and every attempt to drive him out was unsuccessful; and what is really astonishing, the sea was open to the Carthaginians, although they had no fleet, and they continued to get supplies from thence. The bad progress of the war, in which the Romans took only single towns, was the amazement of the whole world, and it strengthened the belief that the Nemesis for Rome’s ambition would at length appear. At the same time happened the rising in Macedonia under the pseudo-Philip; the Spaniards also roused themselves to new hopes, and the Carthaginians tried to stir up commotions every where. This general agitation, which reached far into Asia, gave Carthage the courage to hold out, and not to enter into a league with the Numidians.
The Romans were so much the more ashamed, as such base conduct as theirs had been towards Carthage could not but rise up in judgment against them; and therefore their dissatisfaction with the generals was very great. In the year 605, P. Scipio was chosen consul. He is in the classical ages never called Æmilianus, although the analogy of this appellation is quite correct; but he is spoken of asP. Scipio, Paulli filius. Thus it is always in Cicero, there being no manuscript which has Æmilianus: in thefasti, this surname is always of modern interpolation.[57]
Scipio is one of those characters, which have a great name in history, but of which we may ask, do they deserve their fame? I do not gainsay his great qualities: he is a distinguished general, a very eminent man in his day, and he has done many praise-worthy and righteous deeds. But he made a display of this worthiness; evenquite ordinary acts of his were to be cried up as great achievements: one really blushes for the age in which such things could have been given out as being above common. From what we are told by his teacher and friend Polybius himself, who loved him dearly, we may see that he also thought that there was much in him which was mere ostentation. He had received from Polybius a most varied education, and had been particularly instructed by him in the art of war. Besides this military ability, he was remarkable as a political character: he was one of those who were for upholding the existing state of things; he found himself comfortable in it; for him what was established was all right, and he did not trouble himself with asking whether it might not have been wrong in its origin. Perhaps he looked upon the condition of the republic as so hopeless, that he believed, that any change must have shaken it: such views are held by many otherwise true-hearted and honest men. In no respect is he to be compared to the elder Scipio, who was a man of real genius, and felt himself to be far above all his contemporaries, so that with great love for his countrymen, he had hatred against any one who wanted to put himself on a par with him. The latter was artless, even to rashness; whereas, on the contrary, his adopted grandson was a made up man, in whom genius was wanting. The education of the younger Scipio was much more finished than that of the elder one; for he had all the knowledge of a well instructed Greek, and he lived with the most distinguished men, such as Polybius and Panætius. He allowed himself to be employed by his nation for two terrible destructions, which were quite against his feelings; yet he did not all he could to prevent them: the elder Scipio would not have destroyed Carthage. Besides which, his behaviour towards his brother-in-law Tib. Gracchus is altogether blameable: for with all his influence and might he backed the thoroughly bad party; whence also he was so much hated by the people, as was seen at hisdeath. The introduction to theSomnium Scipionisis not to be considered as historical by any means: the very fact that he had first come to Africa as a military tribune under Manilius and Censorinus, is incorrect; it is one of Cicero’s historical blunders. Cicero has treated him with particular favour. Thus it often happens that we identify ourselves with some personage in history or in literature; we learn to feel like him, and to feel as his case were ours, and we then ascribe to him quite a different character from that which is really his. Scipio’s position was not altogether unlike that of Cicero.
Whilst still very young, Scipio stood for the ædileship, instead of which he was chosen to be consul, although thelex Villia annaliswas then rigorously observed. The provisions of this law we cannot state for certain: they were not the same as in aftertimes; the statutes which were in force in Cicero’s days, dated from the age of Sylla. Nevertheless Scipio was elected consul by the unanimous voice of public opinion.
a.triple wall.b.Byrsa.c.harbour.d.newly dug canal.e.Megara (Magalia).f.Roman Carthage.
a.triple wall.b.Byrsa.c.harbour.d.newly dug canal.e.Megara (Magalia).f.Roman Carthage.
Carthage was built on a peninsula, of which, however, it did not take up the whole, as indeed has been supposed, but only the southern half: this mistake arose from its having been said that the city was twenty-three (Roman) miles in circumference. It seems to have been entirely surrounded by a sort of breastwork. This is now known from the excavations of Colonel Humbert, who was several years in the service of the Dey of Tunis; but the results of his researches have not yet foundtheir way into books.[58](His papers fell into the hands of a downright adventurer, Count Camillo Borgia, who copied his drawings, and passed them off as his own.) The old town of Carthage was so thoroughly destroyed, that no traces of it are found above ground;—the place on which it stood was laid under a curse, and therefore the later Roman Carthage was founded by the side of it;—yet there is still to be seen a quay built of great blocks of hewn stone, from which I had a piece broken off as a relic, which is, however, still lying at Leghorn. Where it faced the isthmus, the city, as has been remarked before, was fenced by a triple wall; next to this was the Bozra; on the south was the port, which was detached, as at Cadiz. The harbour (Cothon), which was dug out, had several basins with a narrow entrance, like the docks in London: from the offing one sailed into the harbour for merchant vessels, and from thence by a canal to the arsenal, which was situated on an island, and strongly fortified; round the basins, there were storehouses with the equipments for every ship. This port was of later origin; probably there was a third district also. In the course of time, there had likewise grown up a large suburb, Megara or Magalia, the situation of which cannot be exactly defined: it was quite covered with gardens, but was also surrounded by a wall. As the coast was very steep, it was difficult to land there. It is the present El Marsa. The Roman Carthage, founded again by C. Gracchus and Cæsar, was in this neighbourhood, as may be clearly made out from the antiquities, which are brought to light there. The only Carthaginian relics to be found in it, are tombs; which is easily accounted for, as it lay outside of the city.
Appian is the only source, which gives us the detailsof this war. Fortunately he has copied from Polybius; for otherwise he is below criticism. Yet even then, his account, like that of Zonaras, is very obscure and unconnected. We merely gather from thence that Scipio landed on the outer part of the peninsula, where he took up his position, and made himself master of the suburb; so that Carthage was confined to the old town and the harbours. About a year before his consulship already, a Roman officer had discovered the possibility of landing at Megara, and of taking possession of it; and by this means Carthage was brought to great distress, as a large part of the provisions used to come in that way. Nothing could be done against the walls on the landside; Scipio, therefore, directed his attack against the side from the bay with redoubled energy. In the meanwhile, the Carthaginians summoned Hasdrubal to the city, and he entrenched himself on the isthmus before it; but when the suburb was taken, he threw himself panic-struck into the town, and the Romans occupied his fortified camp; so that the Carthaginians were entirely hemmed in. Another Carthaginian general, Bithyas, had remained in the interior of the country; and he behaved admirably, always supplying the city with provisions, which he conveyed to it through the very midst of the unwieldy Roman ships. To cut off from Carthage this support, Scipio now chose as a last expedient, the gulf being shallow, to choke up the mouth of the harbour by running a dam across; and this was so much the easier, as the swell, when coming from the Syrtes, carries with it a good deal of mud. The harbour has ceased to exist; yet one may still very distinctly make out its site and shape from the silt which has been washed in. From the dam, Scipio tried to batter the wall of the harbour with his engines: the desperate struggles of the Carthaginians to hinder this, beggar all description. The greatest feat which they accomplished, was the building of a whole fleet of fifty triremes in the arsenal, and then,—as the latter wasconnected by a canal with the outer harbour, the entrance of which Scipio was endeavouring to block up,—digging from thence an outlet on the other side to the sea, by which they brought out their ships to attack the Roman fleet in the gulf. Polybius (in Appian) justly remarks, that, if at that moment they had fearlessly fallen upon the Roman fleet, they would undoubtedly have destroyed it, as the Romans had utterly neglected their naval concerns. Unhappily, they slackened after their more than human effort, and, lingering for some days, irretrievably lost time, and with it all the fruits of their labour: the Romans got their ships ready as well as they could, and thus the Carthaginians were driven back, particularly by the Græco-Asiatic ships of Sida, which fought quite in a way of their own. Four of these small vessels would cast anchor, on which they swung round as on a pivot, and thus defended themselves against the Carthaginians, an example which was followed by the others. The Carthaginians retreated. The next day, they wished to renew the attack: but they got foul of each other in the narrow entrance, the canal, which they had dug, being unfortunately not wide enough, and the Romans bore down upon them, and drove them against the wall of the harbour; so that this gigantic undertaking was again baffled. The Carthaginians now saw nothing but ruin before their eyes. Scipio first took the harbour for merchantmen, and from thence he advanced through the canal against the arsenal. Thus the city was conquered bit for bit, and the Romans made their way as far as the arsenal; as this could not have been held, the Carthaginians, perhaps too hastily, at once set fire to it, and then to the storehouses for the ships. The Romans were in possession of both harbours, and the fight was for the old city, Bozra (Byrsa), which had no walls on that side, but only leant upon the threefold wall on the isthmus: from the harbour, three large streets led up to the Byrsa, and in these the rich and the old families seem to have lived:—onemay still trace in the description the gradual development of the city. The houses there were most of them seven or eight stories high, with flat roofs. (We must look upon Carthage as having been with regard to art and beauty like the fine towns of Greece, but with much more of Roman grandeur and massiveness: the building of stately streets is ascribed to them by the Romans as a thing peculiarly their own; the Greeks knew nothing of it.) There was now the same struggle as at Saragossa. House after house was defended and taken; the enemy broke through the party-walls, they fought from room to room, and when they had forced their way up the stairs, and driven the unfortunate inmates from the last stories, they tried to throw bridges from the roofs across the streets. The superior strength of the Romans assured them the victory, besides which, a most fearful famine was raging in the city where people were already feeding on dead bodies: and yet the besieged would not hear of surrender, though indeed such a thing could hardly have been mooted, as Hasdrubal had treated the Roman prisoners with the most horrible barbarity. When, after much bloodshed, part of the city was already taken, the Romans stopped short, and set fire to the buildings; on which the Carthaginians, fleeing before the flames, pulled up the houses, and thus raised up a huge mound of rubbish against the wall and the citadel: the harrowing description of this fire is evidently from Polybius, the unfortunate eye-witness of the horrors which now took place. The soldiers deliberately buried the wounded alive under the ruins! Thus the old town was reached, and now every one tried only to save himself; the priests went as suppliants with signs of truce, and begged for mercy: Scipio then caused it to be announced that the lives of those who would come out should be spared. On this, the people which still survived, fifty thousand in number, came forth; the Roman deserters only, with Hasdrubal and his family, retreated to the highest part of the citadel, a most hallowedplace which was called Ἀσκληπιεῖον. Hasdrubal was base enough to sue for his life; but his wife slew her children, and cursing him, even from the pinnacle of the temple, threw herself into the flames, an example which was followed by the deserters. Thus Scipio became master of a heap of smouldering ruins drenched with blood. Much must, however, have been preserved, as he took from the temples many Sicilian trophies, which he sent back to that island. Neither Tarentum nor Capua had been destroyed by the senate; but Scipio had to raze Carthage to the ground at their command. He now completed the work already begun, and drove a plough-share across the site as a sign of its everlasting desolation: the army, when it went away, left only that utter wilderness in the midst of which Marius seated himself sixty years afterwards. The prisoners were treated with more or less humanity: most of them were sold for slaves, some also were slain; a few of those of higher rank met with a better fate, and were distributed among the Italian towns. Bithyas was one of these; their race and their name perished from the earth. The Romans, whose forefathers had put to death the great C. Pontius, spared the life of Hasdrubal: he was kept for the triumph.
Carthage had stood for seven hundred years. Part of its territory was given to the Numidian kings, the three sons of Masinissa; the rest became a Roman province, under the rule of a proconsul or prætor.