CHAPTER IX.Of the Classification of Sciences.1.THE Classification of Sciences has its chief use in pointing out to us the extent of our powers of arriving at truth, and the analogies which may obtain between those certain and lucid portions of knowledge with which we are here concerned, and those other portions, of a very different interest and evidence, which we here purposely abstain to touch upon. The classification of human knowledge will, therefore, have a more peculiar importance when we can include in it the moral, political, and metaphysical, as well as the physical portions of our knowledge. But such a survey does not belong to our present undertaking: and a general view of the connexion and order of the branches of sciences which our review has hitherto included, will even now possess some interest; and may serve hereafter as an introduction to a more complete scheme of the general body of human knowledge.2. In this, as in any other case, a sound classification must be the result, not of any assumed principles imperatively applied to the subject, but of an examination of the objects to be classified;—of an analysis of them into the principles in which they agree and differ. The Classification of Sciences must result from the consideration of their nature and contents. Accordingly, that review of the Sciences in which theHistoryof the Sciences engaged us, led to a Classification, of which the main features are indicated in that work. The Classification thus obtained, depends neither upon the faculties of the mind to which the separate parts of our knowledge owe their origin, nor upon the objects which each science contemplates; but upon a more137natural and fundamental element;—namely, theIdeaswhich each science involves. The Ideas regulate and connect the facts, and are the foundations of the reasoning, in each science: and having in another work more fully examined theseIdeas, we are now prepared to state here the classification to which they lead. If we have rightly traced each science to the Conceptions which are really fundamentalwith regard to it, and which give rise to the first principles on which it depends, it is not necessary for our purpose that we should decide whether these Conceptions are absolutely ultimate principles of thought, or whether, on the contrary, they can be further resolved into other Fundamental Ideas. We need not now suppose it determined whether or notNumberis a mere modification of the Idea of Time, andForcea mere modification of the Idea of Cause: for however this may be, our Conception of Number is the foundation of Arithmetic, and our Conception of Force is the foundation of Mechanics. It is to be observed also that in our classification, each Science may involve, not only the Ideas or Conceptions which are placed opposite to it in the list, but also all whichprecedeit. Thus Formal Astronomy involves not only the Conception of Motion, but also those which are the foundation of Arithmetic and Geometry. In like manner. Physical Astronomy employs the Sciences of Statics and Dynamics, and thus, rests on their foundations; and they, in turn, depend upon the Ideas of Space and of Time, as well as of Cause.3. We may further observe, that this arrangement of Sciences according to the Fundamental Ideas which they involve, points out the transition from those parts of human knowledge which have been included in our History and Philosophy, to other regions of speculation into which we have not entered. We have repeatedly found ourselves upon the borders of inquiries of a psychological, or moral, or theological nature. Thus the History of Physiology28led us to the consideration138of Life, Sensation, and Volition; and at these Ideas we stopped, that we might not transgress the boundaries of our subject as then predetermined. It is plain that the pursuit of such conceptions and their consequences, would lead us to the sciences (if we are allowed to call them sciences) which contemplate not only animal, but human principles of action, to Anthropology, and Psychology. In other ways, too, the Ideas which we hare examined, although manifestly the foundations of sciences such as we have here treated of also plainly pointed to speculations of a different order; thus the Idea of a Final Cause is an indispensable guide in Biology, as we have seen; but the conception of Design as directing the order of nature, once admitted, soon carries us to higher contemplations. Again, the Class of Palætiological Sciences which we were in theHistoryled to construct, although we there admitted only one example of the Class, namely Geology, does in reality include many vast lines of research; as the history and causes of the division of plants and animals, the history of languages, arts, and consequently of civilization. Along with these researches, comes the question how far these histories point backwards to a natural or a supernatural origin; and the Idea of a First Cause is thus brought under our consideration. Finally, it is not difficult to see that as the Physical Sciences have their peculiar governing Ideas, which support and shape them, so the Moral and Political Sciences also must similarly have their fundamental and formative Ideas, the source of universal and certain truths, each of their proper kind. But to follow out the traces of this analogy, and to verify the existence of those Fundamental Ideas in Morals and Politics, is a task quite out of the sphere of the work in which we are here engaged.28Hist. Ind. Sc.b. xvii. c. v. sect. 2.4. We may now place before the reader our Classification of the Sciences. I have added to the list of Sciences, a few not belonging to our present subject, that the nature of the transition by which we are to extend our philosophy into a wider and higher region may be in some measure perceived.139The Classification of the Sciences is given over leaf.A few remarks upon it offer themselves.ThePureMathematical Sciences can hardly be calledInductiveSciences. Their principles are not obtained by Induction from Facts, but are necessarily assumed in reasoning upon the subject matter which those sciences involve.The Astronomy of the Ancients aimed only at explaining the motions of the heavenly bodies, as amechanism. Modern Astronomy, explains these motions on the principles of Mechanics.The termPhysics, when confined to a peculiar class of Sciences, is usually understood to exclude the Mechanical Sciences on the one side, and Chemistry on the other; and thus embraces the Secondary Mechanical and Analytico-Mechanical Sciences. But the adjectivePhysicalapplied to any science and opposed toFormal, as in Astronomy and Optics, implies those speculations in which we consider not only the Laws of Phenomena but their Causes; and generally, as in those cases, their Mechanical Causes.The termMetaphysicsis applied to subjects in which the Facts examined are emotions, thoughts and mental conditions; subjects not included in our present survey.140Fundamental Ideas orConceptions.Sciences.Classification.SpaceGeometry⎫Time⎪Pure MathematicalNumberArithmetic⎬SignAlgebra⎪Sciences.LimitDifferentialsâŽMotionPure Mechanism⎱Pure MotionalFormal Astronomy⎰Sciences.CauseForceStatics⎫MatterDynamics⎪MechanicalInertiaHydrostatics⎬Fluid PressureHydrodynamics⎪Sciences.Physical AstronomyâŽOutnessMediumof SensationAcoustics⎫Intensityof QualitiesFormal Optics⎪SecondaryScales of QualitiesPhysical Optics⎬MechanicalThermotics⎪Sciences.AtmologyâŽ(Physics.)PolarityElectricity⎫Analytico-Mecha-Magnetism⎬nical Sciences.GalvanismâŽ(Physics.)Element (Composition)ChemicalAffinitySubstance (Atoms)ChemistryAnalytical Science.SymmetryCrystallography⎱Analytico-Classifi-LikenessSystematic Mineralogy⎰catory Sciences.Degrees of LikenessSystematic Botany⎫ClassificatorySystematic Zoology⎬NaturalAffinityComparative AnatomyâŽSciences.(Vital Powers)AssimilationIrritability(Organization)BiologyOrganical Sciences.Final CauseInstinctEmotionPsychology(Metaphysics.)ThoughtHistorical CausationGeology⎫Distribution of⎪PalætiologicalPlants and Animals⎬Glossology⎪Sciences.EthnographyâŽFirst CauseNatural Theology.
CHAPTER IX.Of the Classification of Sciences.
1.THE Classification of Sciences has its chief use in pointing out to us the extent of our powers of arriving at truth, and the analogies which may obtain between those certain and lucid portions of knowledge with which we are here concerned, and those other portions, of a very different interest and evidence, which we here purposely abstain to touch upon. The classification of human knowledge will, therefore, have a more peculiar importance when we can include in it the moral, political, and metaphysical, as well as the physical portions of our knowledge. But such a survey does not belong to our present undertaking: and a general view of the connexion and order of the branches of sciences which our review has hitherto included, will even now possess some interest; and may serve hereafter as an introduction to a more complete scheme of the general body of human knowledge.
2. In this, as in any other case, a sound classification must be the result, not of any assumed principles imperatively applied to the subject, but of an examination of the objects to be classified;—of an analysis of them into the principles in which they agree and differ. The Classification of Sciences must result from the consideration of their nature and contents. Accordingly, that review of the Sciences in which theHistoryof the Sciences engaged us, led to a Classification, of which the main features are indicated in that work. The Classification thus obtained, depends neither upon the faculties of the mind to which the separate parts of our knowledge owe their origin, nor upon the objects which each science contemplates; but upon a more137natural and fundamental element;—namely, theIdeaswhich each science involves. The Ideas regulate and connect the facts, and are the foundations of the reasoning, in each science: and having in another work more fully examined theseIdeas, we are now prepared to state here the classification to which they lead. If we have rightly traced each science to the Conceptions which are really fundamentalwith regard to it, and which give rise to the first principles on which it depends, it is not necessary for our purpose that we should decide whether these Conceptions are absolutely ultimate principles of thought, or whether, on the contrary, they can be further resolved into other Fundamental Ideas. We need not now suppose it determined whether or notNumberis a mere modification of the Idea of Time, andForcea mere modification of the Idea of Cause: for however this may be, our Conception of Number is the foundation of Arithmetic, and our Conception of Force is the foundation of Mechanics. It is to be observed also that in our classification, each Science may involve, not only the Ideas or Conceptions which are placed opposite to it in the list, but also all whichprecedeit. Thus Formal Astronomy involves not only the Conception of Motion, but also those which are the foundation of Arithmetic and Geometry. In like manner. Physical Astronomy employs the Sciences of Statics and Dynamics, and thus, rests on their foundations; and they, in turn, depend upon the Ideas of Space and of Time, as well as of Cause.
3. We may further observe, that this arrangement of Sciences according to the Fundamental Ideas which they involve, points out the transition from those parts of human knowledge which have been included in our History and Philosophy, to other regions of speculation into which we have not entered. We have repeatedly found ourselves upon the borders of inquiries of a psychological, or moral, or theological nature. Thus the History of Physiology28led us to the consideration138of Life, Sensation, and Volition; and at these Ideas we stopped, that we might not transgress the boundaries of our subject as then predetermined. It is plain that the pursuit of such conceptions and their consequences, would lead us to the sciences (if we are allowed to call them sciences) which contemplate not only animal, but human principles of action, to Anthropology, and Psychology. In other ways, too, the Ideas which we hare examined, although manifestly the foundations of sciences such as we have here treated of also plainly pointed to speculations of a different order; thus the Idea of a Final Cause is an indispensable guide in Biology, as we have seen; but the conception of Design as directing the order of nature, once admitted, soon carries us to higher contemplations. Again, the Class of Palætiological Sciences which we were in theHistoryled to construct, although we there admitted only one example of the Class, namely Geology, does in reality include many vast lines of research; as the history and causes of the division of plants and animals, the history of languages, arts, and consequently of civilization. Along with these researches, comes the question how far these histories point backwards to a natural or a supernatural origin; and the Idea of a First Cause is thus brought under our consideration. Finally, it is not difficult to see that as the Physical Sciences have their peculiar governing Ideas, which support and shape them, so the Moral and Political Sciences also must similarly have their fundamental and formative Ideas, the source of universal and certain truths, each of their proper kind. But to follow out the traces of this analogy, and to verify the existence of those Fundamental Ideas in Morals and Politics, is a task quite out of the sphere of the work in which we are here engaged.
28Hist. Ind. Sc.b. xvii. c. v. sect. 2.
4. We may now place before the reader our Classification of the Sciences. I have added to the list of Sciences, a few not belonging to our present subject, that the nature of the transition by which we are to extend our philosophy into a wider and higher region may be in some measure perceived.139
The Classification of the Sciences is given over leaf.
A few remarks upon it offer themselves.
ThePureMathematical Sciences can hardly be calledInductiveSciences. Their principles are not obtained by Induction from Facts, but are necessarily assumed in reasoning upon the subject matter which those sciences involve.
The Astronomy of the Ancients aimed only at explaining the motions of the heavenly bodies, as amechanism. Modern Astronomy, explains these motions on the principles of Mechanics.
The termPhysics, when confined to a peculiar class of Sciences, is usually understood to exclude the Mechanical Sciences on the one side, and Chemistry on the other; and thus embraces the Secondary Mechanical and Analytico-Mechanical Sciences. But the adjectivePhysicalapplied to any science and opposed toFormal, as in Astronomy and Optics, implies those speculations in which we consider not only the Laws of Phenomena but their Causes; and generally, as in those cases, their Mechanical Causes.
The termMetaphysicsis applied to subjects in which the Facts examined are emotions, thoughts and mental conditions; subjects not included in our present survey.140