PREFACE.Evenif Bacon’sNovum Organonhad possessed the character to which it aspired as completely as was possible in its own day, it would at present need renovation: and even if no such book had ever been written, it would be a worthy undertaking to determine the machinery, intellectual, social and material, by which human knowledge can best be augmented. Bacon could only divine how sciences might be constructed; we can trace, in their history, how their construction has taken place. However sagacious were his conjectures, the facts which have really occurred must give additional instruction: however large were his anticipations, the actual progress of science since his time has illustrated them in all their extent. And as to the structure and operation of theOrganby which truth is to be collected from nature,—that is, the Methods by which science is to be promoted—we know that, though Bacon’s general maxims are sagacious and animating, his particular precepts failed in his hands, and are now practically useless. This, perhaps, was not wonderful, seeing that they were, as I have said, mainly derived from conjectures respecting knowledge and the progress of knowledge; but ativthe present day, when, in several provinces of knowledge, we have a large actual progress of solid truth to look back upon, we may make the like attempt with the prospect of better success, at least on that ground. It may be a task, not hopeless, to extract from the past progress of science the elements of an effectual and substantial method of Scientific Discovery. The advances which have, during the last three centuries, been made in the physical sciences;—in Astronomy, in Physics, in Chemistry, in Natural History, in Physiology;—these are allowed by all to be real, to be great, to be striking; may it not be that the steps of progress in these different cases have in them something alike? May it not be that in each advancing movement of such knowledge there is some common principle, some common process? May it not be that discoveries are made by anOrganwhich has something uniform in its working? If we can shew that this is so, we shall have theNew Organ, which Bacon aspired to construct,renovatedaccording to our advanced intellectual position and office.It was with the view of opening the way to such an attempt that I undertook that survey of the past progress of physical knowledge, of which I have given the results in theHistory of the Sciences, and theHistory of Scientific Ideas1; the former containing the history of the sciences, so far as it depends onvobservedFacts; the latter containing the history of thoseIdeasby which such Facts are bound into Theories.1Published in two former editions as part of thePhilosophy of the Inductive Sciences(b. i–x.).It can hardly happen that a work which treats of Methods of Scientific Discovery, shall not seem to fail in the positive results which it offers. For an Art of Discovery is not possible. At each step of the investigation are needed Invention, Sagacity, Genius,—elements which no art can give. We may hope in vain, as Bacon hoped, for an Organ which shall enable all men to construct Scientific Truths, as a pair of compasses enables all men to construct exact circles2. This cannot be. The practical results of the Philosophy of Science must be rather classification and analysis of what has been done, than precept and method for future doing. Yet I think that the methods of discovery which I have to recommend, though gathered from a wider survey of scientific history, both as to subjects and as to time, than (so far as I am aware) has been elsewhere attempted, are quite as definite and practical as any others which have been proposed; with the great additional advantage of being the methods by which all great discoveries in science have really been made. This may be said, for instance, ofthe Method of Gradationandthe Method of Natural Classification, spoken ofb. iii. c. viii; and in a narrower sense, ofthe Method of Curves,the Method ofviMeans,the Method of Least Squaresandthe Method of Residues, spoken of inchap. vii.of the same Book. Also the Remarks on theUse of Hypothesesand on theTests of Hypotheses(b. ii. c. v.) point out features which mark the usual course of discovery.2Nov. Org.lib. i. aph. 61.But one of the principal lessons resulting from our views is undoubtedly this:—that different sciences may be expected to advance by different modes of procedure, according to their present condition; and that in many of these sciences, an Induction performed by any of the methods which have just been referred to is not the next step which we may expect to see made. Several of the sciences may not be in a condition which fits them for such aColligation of Facts; (to use the phraseology to which the succeeding analysis has led me). The Facts may, at the present time, require to be more fully observed, or the Idea by which they are to be colligated may require to be more fully unfolded.But in this point also, our speculations are far from being barren of practical results. The examination to which we have subjected each science, gives us the means of discerning whether what is needed for the further progress of the science, has its place in the Observations, or in the Ideas, or in the union of the two. If observations be wanted, the Methods of Observation, given inb. iii. c. ii.may be referred to. If those who are to make the next discoveries need, for that purpose, a developement of their Ideas, the modes in which such a developement has usually takenviiplace are treated of in Chaptersiii.andiv.of that Book.No one who has well studied the history of science can fail to see how important a part of that history is the explication, or as I might call it, theclarificationof men’s Ideas. This, the metaphysical aspect of each of the physical sciences, is very far from being, as some have tried to teach, an aspect which it passes through at an early period of progress, and previously to the stage of positive knowledge. On the contrary, the metaphysical movement is a necessary part of the inductive movement. This, which is evidently so by the nature of the case, was proved by a copious collection of historical evidences, in theHistory of Scientific Ideas. The ten Books of that History contain an account of the principal philosophical controversies which have taken place in all the physical sciences, from Mathematics to Physiology. These controversies, which must be calledmetaphysicalif anything be so called, have been conducted by the greatest discoverers in each science, and have been an essential part of the discoveries made. Physical discoverers have differed from barren speculators, not by havingnometaphysics in their heads, but by havinggoodmetaphysics in their heads while their adversaries had bad; and by binding their metaphysics to their physics, instead of keeping the two asunder. I trust that theHistory of Scientific Ideasis of some value, even as a record of a number of remarkable controversies; but I conceive that it also contains an indisputable proof that thereviiiis, in progressive science, a metaphysical as well as a physical element;—ideas as well as facts;—thoughts as well as things. Metaphysics is the process of ascertaining that thought is consistent with itself: and if it be not so, our supposed knowledge is not knowledge.InChapter vi.of the Second Book, I have spoken ofthe Logic of Induction. Several writers3have quoted very emphatically my assertion that the Logic of Induction does not exist in previous writers: using it as an introduction to Logical Schemes of their own. They seem to have overlooked the fact that at the same time that I noted the deficiency, I offered a scheme which I think fitted to supply this want. And I am obliged to say that I do not regard the schemes proposed by any of those gentlemen as at all satisfactory for the purpose. But I must defer to a future occasion any criticism of authors who have written on the subjects here treated. A critical notice of such authors formed the Twelfth Book of the former edition of thePhilosophy of the Sciences. I have there examined the opinions concerning the Nature of Real Knowledge and the mode of acquiring it, which have been promulgated in all ages, from Plato and Aristotle, to Roger Bacon, to Francis Bacon, to Newton, to Herschel. Such a survey, with the additions which I should now have to make to it, may hereafter be put forth as a separate book: but Iixhave endeavoured to confine the present volume to such positive teaching regarding Knowledge and Science as results from the investigations pursued in the other works of this series. But with regard to this matter, of theLogic of Induction, I may venture to say, that we shall not find anything deserving the name explained in the common writers on Logic, or exhibited under the ordinary Logical Forms.Thatin previous writers which comes the nearest to the notice of such a Logic as the history of science has suggested and verified, is the striking declaration of Bacon in two of his Aphorisms (b. i. aph. civ. cv.).3ApeltDie Theorie der Induction: GratryLogique.“There will be good hopes for the Sciences then, and not till then, when by a truescaleor Ladder, and by successive steps, following continuously without gaps or breaks, men shall ascend from particulars to the narrower Propositions, from those to intermediate ones, rising in order one above another, and at last to the most general.“But in establishing such propositions, we must devise some otherForm of Inductionthan has hitherto been in use; and this must be one which serves not only to prove and discoverPrinciples, (as very general Propositions are called,) but also the narrower and the intermediate, and in short, all true Propositions.”And he elsewhere speaks of successiveFloorsof Induction.All the truths of an extensive science form a Series of such Floors, connected by such Scales or Ladders; and a part of the Logic of Induction consists, as Ixconceive, in the construction of aSchemeof such Floors. Converging from a wide basis of various classes of particulars, at last to one or a few general truths, these schemes necessarily take the shape of a Pyramid. I have constructed such Pyramids for Astronomy and for Optics4; and the illustrious Von Humboldt in speaking of the former subject, does me the honour to say that my attempt in that department is perfectly successful5. The Logic of Induction contains other portions, which may be seen in the following work,b. ii. c. vi.4See the Tables at the end of book ii.5Cosmos, vol. ii. n. 35.I have made large additions to the present edition, especially in what regards the Application of Science, (b. iii. c. ix.) and the Language of Science. The former subject I am aware that I have treated very imperfectly. It would indeed, of itself, furnish material for a large work; and would require an acquaintance with practical arts and manufactures of the most exact and extensive kind. But even a general observer may see how much more close the union of Art with Science is now than it ever was before; and what large and animating hopes this union inspires, both for the progress of Art and of Science. On another subject also I might have dilated to a great extent,—what I may call (as I have just now called it) thesocialmachinery for the advancement of science. There can be no doubt that at certain stages of sciences,xiSocieties and Associations may do much to promote their further progress; by combining their observations, comparing their views, contributing to provide material means of observation and calculation, and dividing the offices of observer and generalizer. We have had in Europe in general, and especially in this country, very encouraging examples of what may be done by such Associations. For the present I have only ventured to propound one Aphorism on the subject, namely this; (Aph. LV.) That it is worth considering whether a continued and connected system of observation and calculation, like that of Astronomy, might not be employed in improving our knowledge of other subjects; as Tides, Currents, Winds, Clouds, Rain, Terrestrial Magnetism, Aurora Borealis, composition of crystals, and the like. In saying this, I have mentioned those subjects which are, as appears to me, most likely to profit by continued and connected observations.I have thrown the substance of my results into Aphorisms, as Bacon had done in hisNovum Organum. This I have done, not in the way of delivering dogmatic assertions or oracular sentences; for the Aphorisms are all supported by reasoning, and were, in fact, written after the reasoning, and extracted from it. I have adopted this mode of gathering results into compact sentences, because it seems to convey lessons with additional clearness and emphasis.I have only to repeat what I have already said; that this task of adapting theNovum Organumto thexiipresent state of Physical Science, and of constructing aNewer Organwhich may answer the purposes at which Bacon aimed, seems to belong to the present generation; and being here founded upon a survey of the past history and present condition of the Physical Sciences, will I hope, not be deemed presumptuous.Trinity Lodge,1November, 1858.
PREFACE.
Evenif Bacon’sNovum Organonhad possessed the character to which it aspired as completely as was possible in its own day, it would at present need renovation: and even if no such book had ever been written, it would be a worthy undertaking to determine the machinery, intellectual, social and material, by which human knowledge can best be augmented. Bacon could only divine how sciences might be constructed; we can trace, in their history, how their construction has taken place. However sagacious were his conjectures, the facts which have really occurred must give additional instruction: however large were his anticipations, the actual progress of science since his time has illustrated them in all their extent. And as to the structure and operation of theOrganby which truth is to be collected from nature,—that is, the Methods by which science is to be promoted—we know that, though Bacon’s general maxims are sagacious and animating, his particular precepts failed in his hands, and are now practically useless. This, perhaps, was not wonderful, seeing that they were, as I have said, mainly derived from conjectures respecting knowledge and the progress of knowledge; but ativthe present day, when, in several provinces of knowledge, we have a large actual progress of solid truth to look back upon, we may make the like attempt with the prospect of better success, at least on that ground. It may be a task, not hopeless, to extract from the past progress of science the elements of an effectual and substantial method of Scientific Discovery. The advances which have, during the last three centuries, been made in the physical sciences;—in Astronomy, in Physics, in Chemistry, in Natural History, in Physiology;—these are allowed by all to be real, to be great, to be striking; may it not be that the steps of progress in these different cases have in them something alike? May it not be that in each advancing movement of such knowledge there is some common principle, some common process? May it not be that discoveries are made by anOrganwhich has something uniform in its working? If we can shew that this is so, we shall have theNew Organ, which Bacon aspired to construct,renovatedaccording to our advanced intellectual position and office.
It was with the view of opening the way to such an attempt that I undertook that survey of the past progress of physical knowledge, of which I have given the results in theHistory of the Sciences, and theHistory of Scientific Ideas1; the former containing the history of the sciences, so far as it depends onvobservedFacts; the latter containing the history of thoseIdeasby which such Facts are bound into Theories.
1Published in two former editions as part of thePhilosophy of the Inductive Sciences(b. i–x.).
It can hardly happen that a work which treats of Methods of Scientific Discovery, shall not seem to fail in the positive results which it offers. For an Art of Discovery is not possible. At each step of the investigation are needed Invention, Sagacity, Genius,—elements which no art can give. We may hope in vain, as Bacon hoped, for an Organ which shall enable all men to construct Scientific Truths, as a pair of compasses enables all men to construct exact circles2. This cannot be. The practical results of the Philosophy of Science must be rather classification and analysis of what has been done, than precept and method for future doing. Yet I think that the methods of discovery which I have to recommend, though gathered from a wider survey of scientific history, both as to subjects and as to time, than (so far as I am aware) has been elsewhere attempted, are quite as definite and practical as any others which have been proposed; with the great additional advantage of being the methods by which all great discoveries in science have really been made. This may be said, for instance, ofthe Method of Gradationandthe Method of Natural Classification, spoken ofb. iii. c. viii; and in a narrower sense, ofthe Method of Curves,the Method ofviMeans,the Method of Least Squaresandthe Method of Residues, spoken of inchap. vii.of the same Book. Also the Remarks on theUse of Hypothesesand on theTests of Hypotheses(b. ii. c. v.) point out features which mark the usual course of discovery.
2Nov. Org.lib. i. aph. 61.
But one of the principal lessons resulting from our views is undoubtedly this:—that different sciences may be expected to advance by different modes of procedure, according to their present condition; and that in many of these sciences, an Induction performed by any of the methods which have just been referred to is not the next step which we may expect to see made. Several of the sciences may not be in a condition which fits them for such aColligation of Facts; (to use the phraseology to which the succeeding analysis has led me). The Facts may, at the present time, require to be more fully observed, or the Idea by which they are to be colligated may require to be more fully unfolded.
But in this point also, our speculations are far from being barren of practical results. The examination to which we have subjected each science, gives us the means of discerning whether what is needed for the further progress of the science, has its place in the Observations, or in the Ideas, or in the union of the two. If observations be wanted, the Methods of Observation, given inb. iii. c. ii.may be referred to. If those who are to make the next discoveries need, for that purpose, a developement of their Ideas, the modes in which such a developement has usually takenviiplace are treated of in Chaptersiii.andiv.of that Book.
No one who has well studied the history of science can fail to see how important a part of that history is the explication, or as I might call it, theclarificationof men’s Ideas. This, the metaphysical aspect of each of the physical sciences, is very far from being, as some have tried to teach, an aspect which it passes through at an early period of progress, and previously to the stage of positive knowledge. On the contrary, the metaphysical movement is a necessary part of the inductive movement. This, which is evidently so by the nature of the case, was proved by a copious collection of historical evidences, in theHistory of Scientific Ideas. The ten Books of that History contain an account of the principal philosophical controversies which have taken place in all the physical sciences, from Mathematics to Physiology. These controversies, which must be calledmetaphysicalif anything be so called, have been conducted by the greatest discoverers in each science, and have been an essential part of the discoveries made. Physical discoverers have differed from barren speculators, not by havingnometaphysics in their heads, but by havinggoodmetaphysics in their heads while their adversaries had bad; and by binding their metaphysics to their physics, instead of keeping the two asunder. I trust that theHistory of Scientific Ideasis of some value, even as a record of a number of remarkable controversies; but I conceive that it also contains an indisputable proof that thereviiiis, in progressive science, a metaphysical as well as a physical element;—ideas as well as facts;—thoughts as well as things. Metaphysics is the process of ascertaining that thought is consistent with itself: and if it be not so, our supposed knowledge is not knowledge.
InChapter vi.of the Second Book, I have spoken ofthe Logic of Induction. Several writers3have quoted very emphatically my assertion that the Logic of Induction does not exist in previous writers: using it as an introduction to Logical Schemes of their own. They seem to have overlooked the fact that at the same time that I noted the deficiency, I offered a scheme which I think fitted to supply this want. And I am obliged to say that I do not regard the schemes proposed by any of those gentlemen as at all satisfactory for the purpose. But I must defer to a future occasion any criticism of authors who have written on the subjects here treated. A critical notice of such authors formed the Twelfth Book of the former edition of thePhilosophy of the Sciences. I have there examined the opinions concerning the Nature of Real Knowledge and the mode of acquiring it, which have been promulgated in all ages, from Plato and Aristotle, to Roger Bacon, to Francis Bacon, to Newton, to Herschel. Such a survey, with the additions which I should now have to make to it, may hereafter be put forth as a separate book: but Iixhave endeavoured to confine the present volume to such positive teaching regarding Knowledge and Science as results from the investigations pursued in the other works of this series. But with regard to this matter, of theLogic of Induction, I may venture to say, that we shall not find anything deserving the name explained in the common writers on Logic, or exhibited under the ordinary Logical Forms.Thatin previous writers which comes the nearest to the notice of such a Logic as the history of science has suggested and verified, is the striking declaration of Bacon in two of his Aphorisms (b. i. aph. civ. cv.).
3ApeltDie Theorie der Induction: GratryLogique.
“There will be good hopes for the Sciences then, and not till then, when by a truescaleor Ladder, and by successive steps, following continuously without gaps or breaks, men shall ascend from particulars to the narrower Propositions, from those to intermediate ones, rising in order one above another, and at last to the most general.
“But in establishing such propositions, we must devise some otherForm of Inductionthan has hitherto been in use; and this must be one which serves not only to prove and discoverPrinciples, (as very general Propositions are called,) but also the narrower and the intermediate, and in short, all true Propositions.”
And he elsewhere speaks of successiveFloorsof Induction.
All the truths of an extensive science form a Series of such Floors, connected by such Scales or Ladders; and a part of the Logic of Induction consists, as Ixconceive, in the construction of aSchemeof such Floors. Converging from a wide basis of various classes of particulars, at last to one or a few general truths, these schemes necessarily take the shape of a Pyramid. I have constructed such Pyramids for Astronomy and for Optics4; and the illustrious Von Humboldt in speaking of the former subject, does me the honour to say that my attempt in that department is perfectly successful5. The Logic of Induction contains other portions, which may be seen in the following work,b. ii. c. vi.
4See the Tables at the end of book ii.
5Cosmos, vol. ii. n. 35.
I have made large additions to the present edition, especially in what regards the Application of Science, (b. iii. c. ix.) and the Language of Science. The former subject I am aware that I have treated very imperfectly. It would indeed, of itself, furnish material for a large work; and would require an acquaintance with practical arts and manufactures of the most exact and extensive kind. But even a general observer may see how much more close the union of Art with Science is now than it ever was before; and what large and animating hopes this union inspires, both for the progress of Art and of Science. On another subject also I might have dilated to a great extent,—what I may call (as I have just now called it) thesocialmachinery for the advancement of science. There can be no doubt that at certain stages of sciences,xiSocieties and Associations may do much to promote their further progress; by combining their observations, comparing their views, contributing to provide material means of observation and calculation, and dividing the offices of observer and generalizer. We have had in Europe in general, and especially in this country, very encouraging examples of what may be done by such Associations. For the present I have only ventured to propound one Aphorism on the subject, namely this; (Aph. LV.) That it is worth considering whether a continued and connected system of observation and calculation, like that of Astronomy, might not be employed in improving our knowledge of other subjects; as Tides, Currents, Winds, Clouds, Rain, Terrestrial Magnetism, Aurora Borealis, composition of crystals, and the like. In saying this, I have mentioned those subjects which are, as appears to me, most likely to profit by continued and connected observations.
I have thrown the substance of my results into Aphorisms, as Bacon had done in hisNovum Organum. This I have done, not in the way of delivering dogmatic assertions or oracular sentences; for the Aphorisms are all supported by reasoning, and were, in fact, written after the reasoning, and extracted from it. I have adopted this mode of gathering results into compact sentences, because it seems to convey lessons with additional clearness and emphasis.
I have only to repeat what I have already said; that this task of adapting theNovum Organumto thexiipresent state of Physical Science, and of constructing aNewer Organwhich may answer the purposes at which Bacon aimed, seems to belong to the present generation; and being here founded upon a survey of the past history and present condition of the Physical Sciences, will I hope, not be deemed presumptuous.
Trinity Lodge,
1November, 1858.