FOOTNOTES:

I am, with respect,Yours faithfully,(Signed) JOHN MALCOLM.

P.S. I have, since writing the above, seen some of the senior officers, who assure me that they and their brother officers are as jealous of my honour as they would be of their own; and that if I think it necessary to go to Madras, they will pledge themselves for the orderly and dutiful conduct of the whole till my return, unless in the very unlikely case of other stations rising in arms, which they will do every thing in their power to prevent, by representing to them the pledge they have made, which they will assure them is voluntary, and has been made without the slightest promise from me. I have, indeed, cautiously avoided any communication that could lead them to believe I entertained an opinion that Government would make any concession; and the same language is held, in the private letters I have communicated to them, with regard to the actual situation of the army at this moment.

I feel now much more assured of the continued subordination of this garrison during the period of my absence than if I was present.

TO LIEUTENANT-COLONEL BARCLAY.

Masulipatam, 21st July, 1809.

My dear Barclay,

An account has just arrived of the opposition of the 2d of the 10th to obey the orders of Government. This has caused little sensation in the garrison, and is not expected to be followed by any movement at Hyderabad; and I feel confident now, that nothing but one of the divisions marching will make this deluded garrison stir a step further. I shall be with you on the 26th. I wish I could fly, as I am assured I can give Sir George Barlow the most complete information regarding the whole character of this wide disaffection.

Yours sincerely,(Signed) JOHN MALCOLM.

Private Letter from Lieutenant-ColonelMalcolmto Lieutenant-ColonelMcLeod,dated Masulipatam,20th July, 1809.

Dear McLeod,

I have received your kind letter of the 8th instant; but fear your hopes of my success will be disappointed. The voice of passion is alone heard; and every man that speaks with temper and reason is condemned and calumniated.

The crisis, in fact, if not arrived, appears now near at hand, when every officer in the Company's service must determine whether he will maintain his allegiance to the Government he serves, to his King and Country, or decidedly throw it off; and assuredly there is no individual who claims a title to any spirit of independence, who willnot exercise his judgment upon a question which must so deeply involve all his future prospects and happiness.

If ever there was a moment in which it was important for men to look at those consequences which are likely to ensue from one step more in their course, it is the present; and it is assuredly worth while to pause for a moment, and examine coolly the nature of our grievances, and the length we are justified in going to obtain redress of them, and the probable consequences to ourselves and to our country of throwing off our allegiance to the state.

There were accounts by the last dispatches that the existence of grievances in this army was already a topic of public discussion. General McDowall and Colonel Capper have no doubt arrived before this in England, and they would be soon followed by Colonel St. Leger, and the other suspended officers. Is it not evident, that, with all the aggrieved parties in England, the public records which must be transmitted there, and the voluminous private correspondence which every ship, since those transactions took place, has carried home, that every one of the topics of complaint will be a subject of warm discussion; and will not the agitation they have created in the army be brought fully forward? And have we not reason to conclude, from all these circumstances, that an early settlement of these questions will be made by those authorities, by whom they must at all events be ultimately judged, unless this country should permanently throw off its allegiance and obedience to England? As far as we can judge from the past, there appears reason to anticipate a fair and liberal decision from the controlling authorities at home, who have certainly hitherto judged questions of this nature with great attention to both the feelings and the interests of the Indian army. With this prospect, can we be justified in resorting to such desperate extremes, because we are discontented with the acts of a temporary local Government, and not only involving ourselves in ruin, but injuring, in the deepest manner, our country, at a moment when it isthe duty of every man, who has a spark of patriotism in his breast, to support her against the numerous and powerful enemies by whom she is assailed.

But we proceed, it is said, in the certainty that Government must see those evils, and that it will give way, in order to avert them; and that, indeed, it has no power, if it wished, to oppose our spirited and united demand of a full redress of grievances. Let us examine those points. Government may see great evils in our resistance of its authority, but it may perceive still greater in yielding to the peremptory demands of an armed body confederated for the purpose of intimidating it into concession. It is the extreme of the pressure, in cases of this nature, which too often causes the resistance; and as to its power of opposing any attack upon its authority, it is perhaps much greater than we at this moment calculate. There can be no doubt of the fidelity of all the King's troops to Government. It has a large body, not less than ten thousand disciplined infantry, four thousand horse, and sixteen thousand peons, belonging to the Mysore Government, all perfectly at its devotion: and it will, whenever a rupture takes place, gain, through the influence of some of the older officers, many of the native battalions. It will raise more troops. It will be compelled to promote officers from King's regiments; to give commissions to serjeants; to raise young men at once to rank, and reward with promotion all who leave their brother officers before a certain date: after which, those in arms against its authority will be proclaimed rebels; and their men, both Europeans and natives, tempted to desert and betray them by every inducement and encouragement that can be offered. All the means of Government, whatever they are, will be organized and regular; and with such it will probably triumph: but, alas! its triumph will be over its own strength. It will be in the destruction of those who are its support and glory; and, as such, must be ten times more mournful than the most signal defeat from a foreign enemy.

Let us view the other side. When men had once passed the Rubicon, and commenced opposition to Government, what would be their plans? They must be settled by distant and probably divided committees: and every young officer would feel, in such a situation of affairs, a right to examine the actions of his superiors: and could any man, under such circumstances, when the chain of discipline was broken, rely on the order and fidelity of his troops? What could be offered to induce them to resist the temptations held out by Government? And if they did not desist, would they be equal to encounter the army of the state? But say they are superior; that they were led on to victory, and all our mad passions were gratified: at what point would we arrive? Could we expect our King and Country to receive us again into favour, when our hands were red with the blood of British subjects, that we had led and assisted the natives of India to shed? And could we expect those natives would allow a few officers to continue their rule over them, after they had been taught to contemn the authority and slaughter the soldiers of the British Government? But it is stated, that we have gone so far, that to retreat would be to expose ourselves to shame and degradation. Gracious God! What an argument is this? Would men, recollecting themselves on the verge of guilt, and stopping, under the action of loyal and patriotic motives, in a career to which they had been led by strong feelings of injury, be subject of reproach or disgrace? Would it not raise their reputation higher than ever, and entitle them to look for a redress of their grievances, with a proud confidence, to that Country to which they had so strongly proved their attachment? Could it fail of exciting feelings even in the local Government, which must lead to those very conciliatory acts, which will be in vain expected, if sought with the bayonet?

This is the picture which presents itself to my mind of the scene now before us. I contemplate it with horror. And you may judge my present feelings, when I declareto God, that though I must part with those of my brother officers who are so deluded as to rush into an open warfare with the Government they serve, and their Country, I shall, I am satisfied, be happier if I fall by the first ball that is fired in this horrid and unnatural contest, than if I lived to see it terminated.

I see no possible mode in which the impending evils can be averted, but by the action of the good and loyal feelings of the majority of the officers of the army; and of this action I do not yet despair. I must, indeed, to the last continue to hope that this noble spirit will show itself, and snatch us from the gulf of destruction. I am now busy with an inquiry into past proceedings at this place, with the report of which I shall proceed in a few days to Madras; and may God grant my efforts may be useful in averting the shocking calamities that are impending!

At all events, I shall have fulfilled my duty to my brother officers, to Government, and to my Country; and that reflection will, under every event, be a consolation during my existence.

I am yours sincerely,(Signed) JOHN MALCOLM.

N. B. An extract from a letter from Hyderabad, dated the 12th of August, 1809, from Lieutenant Watson of the artillery, to Major Morrison, at Madras, will show the effect this letter produced among the most violent at that station.

"In these troubled times it requires the full exercise of a man's judgment upon a question which must so deeply involve all his future prospects and happiness. Colonel Malcolm has written at this crisis a very able and elegant letter, to which a liberal consideration, I am happy to say, has been given."

And the following passage from a letter lately receivedfrom Lieutenant Little, at Madras, conveys a testimony, which, though probably exaggerated, is a strong corroboration of this fact.

"You may recollect, during the late unhappy disturbances at this place, having wrote a long letter to Colonel McLeod, pointing out the melancholy consequences that would finally ensue if the army continued to persist in their opposition to Government. A copy of this letter was sent to Captain Carfrae, at Hyderabad, and by him shown to the force; the greatest part of whom, a short time afterwards, declared to Major Agnew, that they were chiefly influenced by this letter to sign the test of obedience to Government."

FOOTNOTES:[69]I have not complete evidence of this fact.[70]This chiefly alludes to the officers of the corps.[71]This was afterwards discovered to be a forgery.[72]I mean not in two or three weeks.[73]Taylor is an excellentsteadyofficer, has great weight with the regiment, (particularly the men); andthoughhe signed some papers, is, I feel satisfied, true to his country and the Government.[74]There are two distinct measures now in progress; one,an appeal to Bengal; and the other,a planto obtain, by operation of a combined nature, if they cannot by remonstrance, the repeal of the orders of the 1st of May.[75]I sent Colonel Barclay a copy of my speech to the regiment on the 15th of July; and yetI am accusedby the Government of Fort St. George of not making this communication.

[69]I have not complete evidence of this fact.

[69]I have not complete evidence of this fact.

[70]This chiefly alludes to the officers of the corps.

[70]This chiefly alludes to the officers of the corps.

[71]This was afterwards discovered to be a forgery.

[71]This was afterwards discovered to be a forgery.

[72]I mean not in two or three weeks.

[72]I mean not in two or three weeks.

[73]Taylor is an excellentsteadyofficer, has great weight with the regiment, (particularly the men); andthoughhe signed some papers, is, I feel satisfied, true to his country and the Government.

[73]Taylor is an excellentsteadyofficer, has great weight with the regiment, (particularly the men); andthoughhe signed some papers, is, I feel satisfied, true to his country and the Government.

[74]There are two distinct measures now in progress; one,an appeal to Bengal; and the other,a planto obtain, by operation of a combined nature, if they cannot by remonstrance, the repeal of the orders of the 1st of May.

[74]There are two distinct measures now in progress; one,an appeal to Bengal; and the other,a planto obtain, by operation of a combined nature, if they cannot by remonstrance, the repeal of the orders of the 1st of May.

[75]I sent Colonel Barclay a copy of my speech to the regiment on the 15th of July; and yetI am accusedby the Government of Fort St. George of not making this communication.

[75]I sent Colonel Barclay a copy of my speech to the regiment on the 15th of July; and yetI am accusedby the Government of Fort St. George of not making this communication.

TheJournalof Lieutenant-ColonelMalcolm,at Masulipatam, from the 4th to the 22d ofJuly 1809.

4th July.Landed from the Victor sloop of war at 10 o'clock A. M. Was received by several officers, Major Storey, Captain Andrews, Captain Cotgreve, and some others, at the pier-head. As I went in at the Fort gate the European sentry stopped me, apparently to take my sword, but was ordered to desist by one of the officers. As I went to Captain Andrews' quarters I showed the orders appointing me to the command of the regiment and the garrison, as well as those for the military committee. Captain A. said he hoped I would not insist on taking the command, in the situation affairs were then in. I said I must, and desired the fort-adjutant to be sent for, to publish the orders. After we arrived at Captain A.'s house we were joined by several officers. Among others were Major Hazlewood, 24th, Captain Kelly of the 19th, and Messrs. Forbes, Nixon, and Lieutenant Spankie, of the European regiment. A long, desultory, and warm discussion took place, in which I stated all those arguments that I thought could moderate their minds and bring them to a better feeling. I particularly insisted on the consequences that must attend any of those desperate measures they had intended; and entreated them not to rush into a course which was likely to be so ruinous to themselves, and to have such dangerous consequence to their countryat a moment when every man should feel it his duty to die, rather than promote, by any act, the designs of her numerous and implacable enemies. I called to their recollection, that the inquiry that was instituted was quite of a military nature, and such as they had themselves required; and that to oppose my authority, or to object to this investigation, was at once to declare war with Government. I added to this declaration an assurance, that no proceeding that was not in consistence with military usage would result from the investigation. Their answers were, for the first two hours of this discussion, made under the strong influence of passion. They had already, they said, taken their line: they knew they had gone too far to retract; and they were certain of support from the whole army, to whom they had pledged themselves. They had first expected, they said, force would be employed; and their preparations had been made in concert with the Hyderabad force to meet that emergency. They could, they said, show me the plan. I replied, with great warmth, I did not desire to see it. Such were my feelings, that I would not for the world have the guilt of such knowledge upon my mind. They recounted at great length, and with much heat, all the grievances they shared with others, and those that particularly related to the European regiment, which had been, they said, calumniated and stigmatized; one officer removed, and another banished, without a hearing: and when they remonstrated, they were told from head-quarters theywere to be disbanded: and, after this communication, they were driven to mutiny by a large party (100 men) being ordered, professedly as a punishment, to act as marines on board his Majesty's ships. I told them, I was aware that much misrepresentation had taken place, and they might have some reason to complain; but the merits of the case could never be known without a full and temperate investigation: and it was on that account the committee was ordered,even before the Government insisted on themarines embarking[76]. They had therefore, as a body of officers, their choice, either to recognise my authority and allow this proceeding to take its course, or to place themselves at once in opposition to Government: there was no medium. They wished me to promise an amnesty for all that had been done here; or, at least, that I would recommend one. I said I would do neither; I would do my duty, and what I was ordered. I had thought it, I added, no departure from my duty to speak to them in the manner I had done, and should be happy if any thing I had said brought them to reason and reflection. They retired to another room; and I was informed by Major Hazlewood, that I had wrought such a change in them, that he hoped they would abandon the violent resolution they had taken.

They soon returned, and said they had done so, and submitted to my authority. Government had, they said, by the act of selecting me, taken the only step that could have stopped for an instant the course of operations which they, in concert with the whole of the Company's army, had resolved instantly to commence, in order to obtain redress of their intolerable grievances: and they desired me to understand, that it was consideration for a brother officer, who held that high place in their esteem, which he did in that of the whole army, that induced them to lay aside for the present all their schemes, and to yield him their obedience: and, as a proof of the truth of this sentiment, they declared I was the only officer of rank in India they would have admitted into the garrison; and that it had been resolved to have shut the gates on the Commander-in-Chief, had he arrived, as was once expected. I was too well satisfied with the substance of their submission to authority, to quarrel about the form of it. I instantlyordered the sentries to be taken off Lieutenant-Colonel Innes, and waited upon that officer, who I found (as was to be expected) much irritated at what had occurred: but I discovered, from his communications, too much cause for those excesses that had taken place. He is, I make no doubt, a good and a conscientious man; but his imprudence, combined with the impressions he brought from Madras, and the unguarded private communications he has since received, and made public, from a very high authority, were calculated to goad men into mutiny in common times, and could not fail of producing that effect at a moment like the present, when the whole of the Company's army is in a state of open disaffection to Government. I explained to Lieutenant-Colonel Innes the reasons that had led to my appointment, and advised him to be moderate and guarded, which he promised me he would.

I dined this evening with the mess of the regiment. There were a great number of gentlemen of other corps present. Their usual toast of "the friends of the army" was given with three times three, and I joined in it, with an observation, "that it was a very general toast, as I was assured it included most men both in India and England." After we had sat some time, and had a number of songs, a gentleman sung a sea-song, in which the expression "common cause" was frequently repeated. This was caught at by some of the younger officers, who were heated; and, at their motion, the whole rose to drink the "common cause." As I could not mistake the meaning they attached to this toast, I felt for a moment embarrassed, but, rising and filling a bumper, I immediately repeated, in as loud and as warm a manner as I could, "the common cause of our Country;" and my amendment was received and drank with acclamation. I soon afterwards left their table, and heard, as I retired, my health toasted with three times three. Thus closed the most anxious day I ever passed in my life. May my efforts be successful in reclaiming these men from the errors into which they have plunged!

5th July.I had a visit from several of the gentlemen I saw yesterday, at Mr. Savage's Gardens, (my place of residence). They seem yet to be uneasy and unsettled in their minds. They showed me several papers from different stations in the army, by most of which they were called upon to act instantly, and with a decided spirit: the strongest assurances given them of support and co-operation. Arrack for the Europeans had, I found, been sent to Gundoor, the first march towards Hyderabad; and every thing was prepared to move as to-day. They again repeated their wish for some general assurance of not suffering for what had passed; and this was accompanied by some hints on the line they might be forced to pursue regarding me; though they expressed the concern with, which they would have resort to such an extreme. I smiled, and said, they could not expect, from the knowledge they had of my character, that any motive on earth would ever induce me to deceive them, or to evade my duty; that to give them a promise of amnesty that I was not authorized to give them, would be deceit; and to be deterred from doing what I conscientiously thought my duty, from any fear of consequences, was, they must be satisfied, altogether unworthy of that reputation I had hitherto supported. They went away (after showing me some further papers, which they had just received, of the same character I had seen before) apparently satisfied with my answer. They communicated to me a report that had been drawn out of my conversation of yesterday, which they meant, they said, to send to Hyderabad, &c. and begged I would correct it, lest they should have misstated any of my observations. I thanked them for their candour, and corrected the paper; the circulation of which appeared to me calculated to do good.

The senior officers in this garrison are impelled to throw off their allegiance from a consciousness of having alreadygone too far, and seeing their only hope of individual safety in all being equally involved in the deepest guilt; while their juniors are flattered by the importance which they obtain in times of anarchy and trouble, and see nothing but distinction in being the first to step forward in what they deem the general cause of the army. I have written Sir G. Barlow my full sentiments on the present unprecedented and alarming situation of affairs.

6th July.I went into the Fort to-day, and saw the regiment under arms. I also visited the hospital and barracks. I had afterwards a long and serious conversation with an officer (A.), who spoke not his own sentiments, he said, but those of the garrison, when he entreated from me a pledge that I would not oppose any proceedings this garrison might feel itself forced to take, in co-operation with other parts of the army. I smiled at this proposition, which, as I told the gentleman, required a concession which it was altogether unworthy of me to make; and that the gentlemen who had desired him to make it would be sensible that it was so, if they gave it a second thought. I added, "I shall, however, put your minds at rest, if you will put mine." I will take no step relative to the officers of this garrison, except in a fair, open, manly manner; and I expect, in return, they will make no secret attempts, or underhand efforts, to injure or oppose my authority. He went away, after assuring me that he was convinced what I had stated would give satisfaction, and that the officers under my command would be solicitous to show me they were deserving of that temper and consideration with which I treated them. I spoke to a number of officers to-day, and circulated a number of my private letters among them. This mark of confidence would, I knew, please; and the sentiments expressed in these papers were calculated to bring them back to reason and reflection. I wrote again fully to Sir George Barlow.

7th July.I went early into the Fort. From conversations I had with several officers, I found that I had succeededin my efforts to restore the temper of the garrison; that they felt grateful for the moderation which I had shown; and some were sorry they had been so warm in their expressions at their first interview. I saw this day a communication from Hyderabad, and one from Jaulnah; both of which forces were prepared to support the garrison in the event of their acting in opposition to Government.

8th July.Nothing particular occurred this day. Some further communications from the westward were shown to me; one of which strongly recommended Masulipatam being kept, and not abandoned; and a force of two battalions of sepoys and one regiment of cavalry were promised to support the garrison, and the corps of the district, all of whom they appeared to think would join. I entered at great length this day into the whole subject with M. H., who, I knew, was in intimate communication with all the senior officers, and had some influence even with the junior. I pointed out to this officer what must be the consequence of the whole or any part of the Company's army plunging down that precipice, on the brink of which they were now standing. I exposed the falseness of that confidence on which numbers were proceeding; how they would be deserted by their brethren and their men, when Government was compelled to declare them in rebellion. I pointed out how wretched their means, how unconnected their plans; and demanded, if even they had double the numbers, if he thought, after the chain of discipline was once broken, and when they were commanded by committees, and every boy thought he possessed the right to question the authority of his superior, whether it was possible to oppose the organized army that must, under all circumstances, remain with Government, and which must every day gain strength from their ranks? The whole of the king's army was, I said, decidedly with Government: and if the last step was taken, many of the Company's officers, and those probably who had the most influence with the native troops, would range on the side of authority. I knew this, I said, to befact, because I had letters, fully expressive of their sentiments, from some of the best and most popular officers in the army. I was myself, I said, of that opinion, and proud to state it. I had been in this army since I was twelve years of age; and such was my regard for my brother officers, that I would give my life to see the present unfortunate disputes happily adjusted: but if any circumstances whatever led these officers to rise in rebellion against their King and Country, and such they would do the moment they threw off their allegiance to the legal constituted authority in India, I must stand in the opposite rank: and I was convinced so many would be found of the same sentiments, that Government must triumph, though I allowed such a triumph would be one over its own strength, and consequently more mournful than the most signal defeat from a foreign enemy. I added, that I would, for the sake of argument, suppose, what I conceived impossible, that Government was destroyed in the conflict, what would be the consequence of this victory to a few officers who had led the natives of India to the murder of their countrymen and to the destruction of the British Government? Would these natives allow them to live and rule over them? Or would they not be tempted to practise, for the last time, the lesson they had been taught, and get rid at once of a race whose rule they had been taught to consider as oppressive and tyrannical? Supposing they did not, would the King and people of England be ready to make peace with men whose hands were red with the blood of their countrymen? Would they not rather, if they did not abandon this quarter of India altogether, attempt its reconquest? And to what consequence would that lead? You say, I added, that your grievances are intolerable, and that if you abandon your attempts to obtain redress the coast army will be disgraced, while, if you persist with firmness and spirit, Government (which must be aware of all the consequences I have stated) must give way. To this I answer: No grievances of the description this army nowhas, can warrant its having recourse to arms, because they are such as must come under the cognizance of the controlling and legislative authorities in England, who are alone competent to notice and redress them: and this army, so far from being degraded by a moderate proceeding at a moment like the present, would raise its reputation higher than ever; because it would prove to all the world that it possessed a spirit of the highest loyalty and patriotism; and that when a variety of circumstances had combined to throw it into a flame, the action of these feelings had subdued every other, and it was contented rather to suffer, till the superior authorities in England could judge all those questions on which it thought itself aggrieved, than endanger the general interest of the country. Would such sentiments, I asked, redound to the disgrace or to the honour of this army? With respect, I observed, to the probability of Government giving way, if assailed with unanimity, firmness, and spirit, there was, I feared, a great and dangerous error. Government could not give way, as it was termed, beyond a certain point, without destroying itself; and it had better fall by any hands than its own. It was the very pressure, I added, that was brought against it, that forced it to resistance: and, besides, what were the points which it was required to yield? In the present agitated period of the army, every committee, every individual, had a different opinion; and if it were possible to collect the general sense of the army, I believe, in their present irritated state, concessions would be required that would amount to the virtual abolition of the existing local Government of this Presidency. It was no doubt, I observed, the duty of Government to take every step that it could take with dignity to restore temper, and to compose men's minds; but I, for one, would never blame it for refusing its consent to its own death; and such I should consider any act that made a substantial sacrifice of its strength or authority. From the answer of the gentleman to whom these observations were made, I could perceive that heand many others had been led on from step to step, without contemplating the extreme which was now so likely. It was also evident that the younger part of the army were no longer manageable: they had run away with the rest, who considered themselves too deeply pledged to retreat; and they appeared afraid of the instant obloquy that was cast on every person who withdrew himself.

9th July.As this was Sunday I went to a dressed parade of the regiment, and afterwards visited the hospital and barracks. Nothing particular occurred to-day: all the officers I saw seemed to have returned to good temper; and I can have no fear of this garrison breaking out into any extreme unless the example is given by other parts of the army.

10th July.I went early into the Fort. A singular instance occurred to-day, to show how little men reflect whose minds are in a state of agitation. I was told, before I went to the Fort, that accounts had been received of every thing in Madras being in a state of confusion, and that some great event had happened there. When in the Fort, the letter that gave rise to this belief was shown me. It was dated Hyderabad the 5th July; and said a letter had that moment been received from Madras reporting the confusion which had arisen at that place; and stating that his correspondent, no doubt, "had heard of the remarkable event that had occurred to give rise to it." The moment I saw this communication I pointed out the date; and observed it was an evident allusion to what had occurred at Masulipatam on the 25th June, which had reached Madras the 30th; and the bustle it created had been termed confusion, and sent round again,viaHyderabad, to Masulipatam. This was so clearly the fact, that the only astonishment that was left, was how it had not struck somebody before. By letters from Hyderabad it appears they make no secret of their proceedings. One corresponding officer writes, who says he had received a most extraordinary communication, from good authority, that the officers of theBengal army had sent in a Memorial to Lord Minto, praying the removal of Sir G. H. Barlow. I laughed at this unfounded assertion, and assured the person who told me, it was one of a thousand reports circulated to inflame their feelings and mislead their judgment. They have received great confidence from the address of the Bombay army[77], which promises their warmest support in any measures they may take in consequence of what they deem the unjust and arbitrary order of the 1st of May.

By a letter from the committee at Hyderabad received to-day, this garrison are advised to defend Masulipatam if they can. A junction is proposed at Ongole or Condapilly. From the former station being mentioned, it would appear as if a forward movement upon Madras had been contemplated by some of the most violent.

11th July.I was with the officers of the regiment almost all this day, and dined at the mess, of which I have become a member. Our dinner was pleasant, and like that of a private party of gentlemen. I have been particularly pleased to observe, that although they communicate to me in confidence when I require it, no officer of the garrison ever begins, when I am present, any conversation on the present situation of the army; and when I speak to them upon it (as I frequently do), they are much more moderate than they were. I have seen some of the principal natives of this place, and find the events of the 25th ultimo caused a very serious alarm, which was not dissipated before my arrival. The defenceless inhabitants ascribe more influence to me than I possess, and think nothing wrong can occur as long as I remain.

12th July.Very severe rains. I did not go into the Fort, and heard nothing of consequence from any quarter.

13th July.Went into the Fort, inquired particularly from the adjutant of the regiment, and found, from his report, that the privates not only conceived they were to be dispersed and disbanded when the order came for them to go as marines, but a report was even current in the barracks, that they were going to Botany Bay. They were, he assured me, now fully satisfied of the misrepresentations that had been made to them; and he believed no discontent remained in the corps excepting that which had long existed among the men enlisted for life; and which, they had hopes, would have been altered before this, as Captain Andrews had published an order, more than a twelvemonth ago, with a view of quieting their minds; in which he stated, that Government had referred the question to England. I desired Mr. Nixon to tell the sergeants that I should inquire into this point, and do any thing in my power towards obtaining them information of what had been done upon the subject.

14th July.I this morning inspected Captain Gibson's company of artillery, and was highly pleased with their appearance. I addressed them on parade, and told them the gratification I had received from their steadiness under arms, and correct movements; adding my conviction, that they would maintain, under all circumstances, the high reputation they had acquired during the late Mahratta war. No tappal[78]for the last three days, owing to the rain.

15th July.A regimental court martial sat yesterday on four men, and the regiment was under arms at half past six, to see the sentences carried into execution. I judged this a favourable opportunity of addressing the corps; and, after the crimes and sentences of the prisoners had been read, I made the following short speech:

"Regiment! As this is the first time I have met you upon such an occasion, I forgive these men: but I desire you will not mistake the motives of this act of lenity. It is my intention, as it is my duty, to enforce the strictest discipline: and I must punish those that merit it, not only to maintain the character of the corps, but to enable me to grant indulgences to the good men of it, which I never can do unless I punish the bad: but I trust, from what I have seen of your conduct, I shall have little occasion to exercise severity. It is, indeed, you must all feel, most incumbent upon you to preserve the utmost regularity and order at the present period. A late occurrence in the regiment, which has, I am satisfied, been solely produced by misapprehension and misrepresentation, is on the point of becoming a subject of investigation before a military court, who will inquire into the causes by which it was produced. I shall therefore say nothing on that subject: but I consider it my duty to declare to you at this moment[79],that it never was in the contemplation of Government to disband or disperse this corps, and that it never meant to employ any officer or man ofthe regiment in any manner or upon any service but such as was suited to the honour and character of British soldiers, and which it, of course, conceived both officers and men would be forward to proceed upon. It was, soldiers, from a full conviction that a serious misunderstanding alone of the intentions of Government could have caused what has passed, that made me receive with pride and gratification my nomination to the command of this regiment: and I am convinced, from what I have already seen, that I shall (whenever I quit that station) have to make a report which will add, if possible, to the high reputation which the corps already enjoys; and satisfy all, that as it is the first in rank of the infantry of this establishment, it is also first in fidelity, loyalty, and attachment to the Government it serves, and to its King and Country."

This address appeared to be received by both officers and men of the corps with satisfaction; and I make no doubt of its effect. I was withheld, by many and serious considerations, from haranguing the men, or publishing any explanatory order to them, on my first arrival. Such would, in the agitated state of the whole garrison, have been completely misconstrued, and would probably have produced the very opposite effect from what was intended.

16th July.I dined yesterday with the mess of the 1st battalion 19th regiment N. I., and sat till a late hour. No toasts were given; and not a word relating to the present situation of affairs escaped the lips of any man present. I could not but be pleased with such good feeling, and felt gratified at this mark of personal respect. The evening passed in the utmost hilarity and good humour.

17th July.Some of the officers of the garrison waited upon me to-day with letters of a most violent tenor that they had received from Hyderabad and other stations, in which they were reproached with weakness for having admitted me. I was described in some of these letters as a consummate politician, and consequently as the most dangerous man Government could have sent among them. The garrison were told I wouldtamper with their men, cajole them, and in the end ruin the general cause. I was happy to find the sentiments of the gentlemen who waited upon me were not in unison with those of their correspondents; but they hinted their fears of the violence of the younger officers of the garrison, who, they said, had been hurt at the speech I made to the men on the 15th, which they thought was calculated to excite the men against their officers. I appealed to an old officer of the regiment, who was present, Whether he thought the speech had any such tendency? He said it certainly had not struck him as in the least objectionable. I observed, that the testimony of an officer like him should satisfy others; and if it did not,I could not help it; for in such times a man could not put his foot over the threshhold without a misconstruction of the manner in which it was done. The officers who waited on me this day gave me a paper, the purport of which was to learn what assurances I could give them of a disposition of the Government of Madras to redress their grievances; and, in the event of my declining, to inform them what I thought the intentions of Government were. It was signified, that if I did not, the confidence of the garrison would be withdrawn from me, and they would consider themselves released from all promises they made. I told them I could make no communication of the nature they required, and that they might act as they thought proper: I should, under all circumstances, do my duty to the Government I served.

18th July.This morning M. H. waited upon me, and showed me a communication from the established committee at Hyderabad to this garrison, which called upon them to demand from me an assurance that the orders of the 1st of May would be repealed; and, if that was refused, instructed them to throw off the authority of Government, and make me leave Masulipatam. I went over all the grounds I had done before with this officer; and told him, that if the garrison was so lost to all sense of duty and propriety as to act upon this instruction, I must judge for myself, and take those steps which the emergency demanded. He said, the senior officers, who had sent him, were not disposed to attend to the call made upon them by the Hyderabad Committee; but they, he added, had now little or no control over their juniors, who were decidedly for having recourse to immediate violence. I asked him to what lengths men (who had still some reflection) meant to allow themselves to be borne away with the tide? The hour, I added, was come, when they must decide. I then pointed out the ground on which I thought they might, without injury to their honour, make a stand, and rescue the deluded young men of the army, as well as themselves, fromdestruction. I expressed my conviction of the men remaining with the senior officers, and that the young men must be reclaimed to reason, or at least be prevented from becoming rebels, if those who were their seniors acted with a becoming spirit. This conference lasted two hours, and M. H. went to communicate with the rest. There was, I understood, a warm discussion for several hours; after which, two of the senior officers waited upon me, and said they had with difficulty prevented the rest from coming to extremes that day; but they had at last agreed to wait six days (till the 24th), when, if they heard nothing favourable to their hopes, they meant to take such steps as they thought calculated to forward the objects they had in view. They at the same time said they had, in consequence of the opinion of their brother officers at other stations, determined to admit no investigation into their past conduct. I observed, that if these were their resolutions we must come to issue at once, and I must take those steps I judged best to counteract their measures, as I considered their proposition of adhering to their duty for a limited period of six days, was nothing less than an open defiance; and their refusal to admit investigation was a measure of the same stamp. I had meant, I said, in conformity with authority I had received from Government, to have entered into the investigation immediately (before the arrival of my colleagues); and I had entertained an intention of proceeding to Madras with the report, in the conviction that this garrison would have remained steady in its duty: but I must now, I added, abandon all such plans, and meet with that firmness which it was my duty to meet it, that dreadful emergency which this garrison had so rashly precipitated. I then read them a letter to Colonel McLeod[80], pointing out all the horrors of the crisis to which they were rushing. They appeared forcibly struck with what I said and read, and expressed their hope that their brother officers would alter their resolution, and not impede the course of proceeding which I intended to pursue. It might, they said, afford some ray of hope of the present distractions being ended; for though they knew my sentiments differed widely from theirs, and that I was devoted to my duty to Government, they were also sensible that I had warm feeling for the situation of my brother officers. I went, immediately after this interview, to dine at the mess of the regiment, and (strange inconsistency!) received every mark of respect and kindness from men who had been debating all the morning whether they should enter into a contest with me for the authority of the garrison!

19th July.I went into the Fort early this morning, and called upon Colonel Innes to give me a full statement of all that had passed relative to the origin of those discontents that terminated in the mutiny of the 25th ultimo[81]. I also called upon Major Storey, Captain Andrews, and Mr. Nixon, the adjutant of the regiment, to give me every information they had relative to these transactions. I was waited upon, soon after I went to the Fort, by two of the senior officers, who were, they said, desired by all to state that a general confidence and respect for my character had induced the garrison to change their resolutions, and that they hoped I would follow the course of inquiry I intended; and, after making the investigation, proceed, if I thought it advisable, to Madras. They would, they said, during my absence be as jealous of my honour as of their own, and promise not to depart in the slightest degree from the path of duty and order, unless a rise in other stations was to take place; of which, they said, they thought there was no probability, particularly as they would write to inform them of the pledge they had made, and entreat them not to make any call upon them before my return to my command. I told them I felt obliged by this mark of their regard and confidence; but I would not receive it, if I thought it was made under any idea or expectation that I would be the advocate of their cause, or that of the army. They disclaimed any such idea. I would, they knew, from what they had seen, do my duty in the manner I thought best. I was gratified with the pledge I received; which, as M. H. afterwards privately observed, gave me a stronger tie on the officers while I was absent than I could have had during the same period, if present. The reasons which led me to resolve on going to Madras were fully stated to Sir George Barlow in a letter under this date.

Accounts were received this evening of the assembly of a force at Madras. I anticipated the feeling this would make, and stated to an officer present, when I received the letter, my conviction, that it was in consequence of the many, and perhaps exaggerated, reports of intended mutinies that had been consequent to that of Masulipatam.

20th July.General Pater arrived. I went to meet him, gave him a return of the garrison, and made a full and confidential report of all past proceedings. I found that the officers of standing, to whom I had spoken so much on the danger of allowing young men to take such a lead in the present discussions, had taken advantage of the good disposition of the moment, as to carry a resolution, that the garrison committee, which were mobbish meetings of the whole of the officers, should be abolished, and the proceedings to be entirely carried on by the eleven senior officers, by whose judgment all questions were in future to be decided, and who were entirely to act for themselves, and not to follow the instructions of other committees, or be influenced by the voice of any person not a member of the committee. This measure I considered as the first great step towards a return to reason and temper. I received an invitation from the garrison to dine with them on the 22d. All the gentlemen, civil and military, were invited to meet.

21st July.All was quiet. I received this day themost unequivocal proofs of the desire of some of the senior officers to return to the right path, if furnished with any ground on which they could absolve themselves from the deep pledges they had made, and assert their right to control their juniors.

22d July.General Pater looked at the regiment on parade, and afterwards went, accompanied by his staff, to breakfast with Lieutenant-Colonel Innes.

Captain Gibson of the artillery informed me, that though he had received his leave to go to Madras, he would remain, if I advised him, at Masulipatam. I spoke with General Pater; and it was his opinion, as it was mine, that Captain Gibson should proceed. If he had been ordered to stay after his leave was made public, it would have excited suspicion, without any adequate benefit. Whether conciliatory or coercive measures were adopted, Captain Moorhouse, who succeeded to the command of the company of artillery, appeared equally, if not better, suited to the charge at that crisis. He was a brave, excellent officer, and had never for a moment even swerved from his duty; and his character was respected even by the most violent of the disaffected. Captain Gibson, on the contrary, having for a short time joined in their schemes, had, when he (very meritoriously) checked himself in his career of guilt, been considered a deserter from their cause, and had become an object of their marked hatred and resentment. General Pater dined with the officers of the garrison; and the best feeling possible was shown at this entertainment. After dinner I proceeded by post to Madras.


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