CONTENTS.PART I.THE KINDS OF SAMENESS.PAGE.Sec. 1.Object of the Monograph,5" 2.Sameness in Sense First, or Strict Identity,6" 3.Sameness in Sense Second,6" 4.Sameness in Sense Third,6" 5.Sameness in Sense Fourth,11" 6.Sameness in Sense Fifth,12" 7.Sameness in Sense Sixth,14" 8.Sameness in Sense Seventh,16" 9.The Samenesses of "External" Things,31" 10.Ambiguity of the Word "Self,"34" 11.The Samenesses of the Self,35" 12.Samenesses of the Self as Noumenon or Substance,35" 13.Samenesses of the "Real" Self out of Consciousness,37" 14.Samenesses of the Self in Consciousness,38" 15.Samenesses of the Self in Consciousness (continued),42" 16.Samenesses of the Self in Consciousness (continued),43" 17.The Self as "Form," and its Samenesses,43" 18.Summary of Results of the Foregoing Analysis,48" 19.The Element Common to the Kinds of Sameness,54" 20.Use of the Word Identity,64PART II.HISTORICAL AND CRITICAL.Sec. 21.The Error of Heraclitus,67" 22.The Climax of Cratylus,68" 23.The Parmenidean Argument for the Eternity of "Being,"68" 24.Gorgias and Samenesses Fifth and Sixth,69" 25.Plato and the Eleatic "One,"70" 26.Aristotle's Treatment of Samenesses,82" 27.The Confusions of Pyrrho, and Their Results84" 28.Sameness and the Dispute concerning Universals,88" 29.Descartes' Confusion of Samenesses,98" 30.Spinoza's Argument to Prove every Substance Infinite,108" 31.Locke's Confusion of Sense First and Sense Seventh,111" 32.Berkeley's Error concerning Sense Sixth,120" 33.John Stuart Mill on the Kinds of Sameness,122" 34.The Spencerian "Unknowable," and Samenesses Seventh and Second,124" 35.The Confusions at the Basis of Dr. McCosh's "Realism,"134" 36.Sameness and the Infinite Divisibility of Space,143" 37.Conclusion,152
[1]Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Bk. 2, Chap. 27, § 3.[2]Essay Concerning Human Understanding. Bk. 2, Chap. 2, § I, and Bk. 2, Chap. 23, § 1.et seq.[3]Kritik der reinen Vernunft.—"Von dem Grunde der Unterscheidung allerGegenständeüberhaupt inPhænomenaundNoumena." Kant's Sämmtliche Werke, herausgegeben von Hartenstein. Leipzig, 1867, 3er Band, s. 209,et seq.See also, Kritik der Praktischen Vernunft; Vorrede; and the discussion: "Wie eine Erweiterung der reinen Vernunft in praktischer Absicht, ohne damit ihr Erkenntniss als speculativ, zugleich zu erweitern, zu denken möglich sei?" I Th. II B. II Hptst.; same edition, 5er Bd., s. 5, 140. I am not concerned here with the inner contradiction of the Kantian system. The notion of noumena predominantly in Kant's mind, was, I think, about as I have stated. He would not, of course, have denied "reality" to phenomena, but his misconception of Berkeley, and the satisfaction with which he settles down to the noumenal in the Critique of the Practical Reason, show that he felt toward the "blos Erscheinung" very much as Locke felt toward mere ideas. Cf. "Essay," Bk. 4, Chap. 11, § 7.[4]There is, of course, no reason why he may not add as many more classes as he pleases, and justify the additions as he justifies this. Men do not do this, as a matter of fact, but that is no reason.[5]Ueberweg. See Krauth's Ed. of Berkeley's "Principles," Phila., 1874, p. 343.[6]"Essay", Bk. 2, Chap. 23, § 1.[7]"Essay," Bk. 4, Chap. 2, § 14; Bk. 4, Chap. 4 and Chap. 11.[8]Ibid., Bk. 2, Chap. 12, § 6; Bk. 2, Chap. 23, § 1, with note (Phila., 1846, p. 183,et seq.).[9]See note to § 1, Chap. 23, Bk. 2.[10]Bk. 4, Chap. 11,et passim.[11]"I confess there is another idea, which would be of general use for mankind to have, as it is of general talk, as if they had it; and that is the idea of substance, which we neither have, nor can have, by sensation or reflection." Bk. 1, Chap. 4, § 18 of the "Essay."[12]"Essay," Bk. 4, Chaps. 3, 4 and 11.[13]Lectures on Metaph., VIII, N. Y., 1880, p. 102.[14]Herbert Spencer, "First Principles." Part I, Chap. V, § 31, N. Y., 1888, p. 108.[15]"First Principles." Part I, Chap. V, § 27.[16]Part II, Chap. I, § 35.[17]Part I, Chap. IV, § 26.[18]I have already pointed out the vagueness in this word.[19]First Principles. Part I, Chap. 4, § 26. N. Y., 1888, p. 91.[20]Ibid.Chap. 4, § 24; Chap. 5, §§ 31, 32,et passim.[21]Ibid.Chap. 5, § 31,et passim.[22]Ibid.Chap. 4, § 24.[23]Ibid.Chap. 5, § 32,et passim.[24]Compare Bk. 4, Ch. 9, § 3 of the "Essay," with Bk. 4, Ch. 11, §§ 1, 4, 7, 8, and 9.[25]Lectures on Metaphysics, VIII, N. Y., 1880, p. 97.[26]"Analogy," Part 1. Chap. I.[27]Lectures on Metaphysics, XXV., N. Y., 1880, p. 356. Hamilton's utterances concerning "reality" are incoherent, and inconsistent. I do him no injustice, however, if I give the above as "one of his views."[28]Owing to the ambiguity already pointed out as existing in terms which stand for our objects of knowledge and our knowledge of these objects, it would seem almost impossible to avoid misconception without unendurable reiteration. In the above paragraph, by the words "body," "object," "self," etc., I always refer to things immediately known.[29]This abnormal door has its parallel in the now discreditedcausa sui. Note the following from Descartes: "De même, lorsque nous disons que Dieu est par soi, nous pouvons aussi à la vérité entendre cela négativement, comme voulant dire qu'il n'a point de cause; mais si nous avons auparavant recherché la cause pourquoi il est ou pourquoi il ne cesse point d'être, et que, considérant l'immense et incompréhensible puissance qui est contenue dans son idée, nous l'ayons reconnue si pleine et si abondante qu'en effet elle soit la vraie cause pourquoi il est, et pourquoi il continue ainsi toujours d'être, et qu'il n'y en puisse avoir d'autre que celle-là, nous disons que Dieu estpar soi, non plus négativement, mais au contraire très positivement. Car, encore qu'il n'est pas besoin de dire qu'il est la cause efficiente de soi-même, de peur que peut-être on n'entre en dispute du mot; néanmoins, parce quenousvoyons que ce qui fait qu'il est par soi, ou qu'il n'a point de cause différente de soi-même, ne procède pas du néant, mais de la réelle et véritable immensité de sa puissance, il nous est tout a fait loisible de penser qu'il fait en quelque façon la même chose a l'égard de soi-même que la cause efficiente à l'égard de son effet, et partant qu'il est par soi positivement."—Réponses auxPremièresObjections.[30]Aristotle, Metaph., Bk. III, c. 5, § 7.[31]Aristotle, Metaph. III, c. 5, § 7.[32]Ueberweg. Hist. of Philos., Vol. I, § 19, N. Y., 1877, p. 57.[33]Ueberweg. Hist. of Philos., Vol. I, § 29, p. 77.[34]The Dialogues of Plato. N. Y., 1878. Vol. III, p. 255.[35]The text of Stallbaum (1848) does not harmonize with this. The version I quote leaves out ἐν, and reads τὸ αὐτό in the nominative.[36]Metaph. XII, c. 4.[37]Metaph. III, c. 5, § 10; c. 6, § 3.[38]Ibid.III, c. 2, § 6; IV, c. 6, § 1, and c. 9, § 1.[39]Ibid.IV, c. 9, § 1, and c. 6.[40]Ibid.III, c. 5, § 10; X, c. 6, § 6.[41]Metaph. X, c. 6, § 2.[42]Ibid.IV, c. 9.[43]Diogenes Laërtius. IX, 9.[44]Ibid.loc. cit.[45]Ibid.loc. cit.[46]See my "Conception of the Infinite," Ch. VI (J. B. Lippincott Co., Philadelphia). It is but fair to state that my criticism of Realism in this volume is directed against the "ante rem" Realism. I did not have the Moderate Realism in mind, and what I said will not apply to it.[47]Hauréau.Philos. Scholastique.Paris, 1872. I, p. 281.[48]Historia Calamitatum, quoted by Hauréau. I, p. 324.[49]Species est tota substantia individuorum, totaque species eademque in singulis reperitur individuis: itaque species una est substantia, ejus vero individua multæ personæ, et hæ multæ personæ sunt illa una substantia.(Sentent., p. I, c. III.)—Quoted by Hauréau, I, p. 328.[50]Hauréau, I, 380-381. The argument is taken from theDe Intellectibus.[51]Méditation Deuxième.—Ed. Simon, Paris, 1860, pp. 76-78.In this extract the author attempts to distinguish between what is thought and what is perceived by the senses or imagined. Had he remained within the sphere of the immediately known, one could not have objected to such a distinction. Sameness in sense third is something highly complex, implying that elaboration of mental elements which we call thought. It is quite just to distinguish the notion "a bit of wax" from any single sense experience or picture of the imagination. In doing this Descartes was searching for sameness in sense third. But when he leaves the sphere of consciousness, and assumes that what remains the same in the bit of wax is something distinct from the sum total of experiences, as men are distinct from their garments, he falls into error. It is against this that the criticism in the text is directed.[52]Méditation Troisième, pp. 83-85.[53]"Essay towards a New Theory of Vision." Sec. 44. Works: ed. Fraser. Oxford 1871. Vol. I, p. 53.[54]Ibid., § 45.[55]Substantia unius attributi non nisi unica existit, et ad ipsius naturam pertinet existere. Erit ergo de ipsius natura vel finita vel infinita existere. At non finita. Nam deberet terminari ab alia eiusdem naturæ, quæ etiam necessario deberet existere; adeoque darentur duæ substantiæ eiusdem attributi, quod est absurdum. Existit ergo infinita; q. e. d.—Ethices, Pars prima; VIII. Omnis substantia est necessario infinita.Leipzig, 1875, p. 84.[56]Locke's Essays, Philadelphia, 1846, p. 415,et seq.[57]"A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge," §§ 123-132. Ed. Fraser, Vol. I, pp. 220-225.[58]§§ 45-48, pp. 178-180.[59]"Principles," §3, p. 157.[60]"A System of Logic," Book I, Chap. III, § 11, N. Y., 1882, p. 62.[61]"First Principles," Part 1, Chap. IV, § 26, N. Y., 1888, pp. 93-97.[62]"First Principles." Chap. V, § 27, p. 99.[63]"Principles of Psychology," Part VII, Chap. VI, N. Y., 1883, Vol. II, p. 369.[64]"First Principles," Part I, Chap. III, § 15, ed. cit. p. 49.[65]"First Principles," Part I, Chap. V, § 31, p. 108.[66]Part II, Book I, Chap. II.[67]N. Y., 1889, pp. 62-63.[68]Pp. 68-69.[69]P. 70.[70]Pp. 71 and 72.[71]Chap. III, p. 75.[72]"Seeing and Thinking," London, Macmillan & Co., 1879.[73]Professor Clifford has used the wordnumberin two senses, a quantitative and a qualitative. By number in the latter sense he means simplyunlimited units.[74]Ueberweg, Hist. of Philos., Vol. I, § 20. N. Y., 1877, pp. 57-58.
[1]Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Bk. 2, Chap. 27, § 3.
[2]Essay Concerning Human Understanding. Bk. 2, Chap. 2, § I, and Bk. 2, Chap. 23, § 1.et seq.
[3]Kritik der reinen Vernunft.—"Von dem Grunde der Unterscheidung allerGegenständeüberhaupt inPhænomenaundNoumena." Kant's Sämmtliche Werke, herausgegeben von Hartenstein. Leipzig, 1867, 3er Band, s. 209,et seq.See also, Kritik der Praktischen Vernunft; Vorrede; and the discussion: "Wie eine Erweiterung der reinen Vernunft in praktischer Absicht, ohne damit ihr Erkenntniss als speculativ, zugleich zu erweitern, zu denken möglich sei?" I Th. II B. II Hptst.; same edition, 5er Bd., s. 5, 140. I am not concerned here with the inner contradiction of the Kantian system. The notion of noumena predominantly in Kant's mind, was, I think, about as I have stated. He would not, of course, have denied "reality" to phenomena, but his misconception of Berkeley, and the satisfaction with which he settles down to the noumenal in the Critique of the Practical Reason, show that he felt toward the "blos Erscheinung" very much as Locke felt toward mere ideas. Cf. "Essay," Bk. 4, Chap. 11, § 7.
[4]There is, of course, no reason why he may not add as many more classes as he pleases, and justify the additions as he justifies this. Men do not do this, as a matter of fact, but that is no reason.
[5]Ueberweg. See Krauth's Ed. of Berkeley's "Principles," Phila., 1874, p. 343.
[6]"Essay", Bk. 2, Chap. 23, § 1.
[7]"Essay," Bk. 4, Chap. 2, § 14; Bk. 4, Chap. 4 and Chap. 11.
[8]Ibid., Bk. 2, Chap. 12, § 6; Bk. 2, Chap. 23, § 1, with note (Phila., 1846, p. 183,et seq.).
[9]See note to § 1, Chap. 23, Bk. 2.
[10]Bk. 4, Chap. 11,et passim.
[11]"I confess there is another idea, which would be of general use for mankind to have, as it is of general talk, as if they had it; and that is the idea of substance, which we neither have, nor can have, by sensation or reflection." Bk. 1, Chap. 4, § 18 of the "Essay."
[12]"Essay," Bk. 4, Chaps. 3, 4 and 11.
[13]Lectures on Metaph., VIII, N. Y., 1880, p. 102.
[14]Herbert Spencer, "First Principles." Part I, Chap. V, § 31, N. Y., 1888, p. 108.
[15]"First Principles." Part I, Chap. V, § 27.
[16]Part II, Chap. I, § 35.
[17]Part I, Chap. IV, § 26.
[18]I have already pointed out the vagueness in this word.
[19]First Principles. Part I, Chap. 4, § 26. N. Y., 1888, p. 91.
[20]Ibid.Chap. 4, § 24; Chap. 5, §§ 31, 32,et passim.
[21]Ibid.Chap. 5, § 31,et passim.
[22]Ibid.Chap. 4, § 24.
[23]Ibid.Chap. 5, § 32,et passim.
[24]Compare Bk. 4, Ch. 9, § 3 of the "Essay," with Bk. 4, Ch. 11, §§ 1, 4, 7, 8, and 9.
[25]Lectures on Metaphysics, VIII, N. Y., 1880, p. 97.
[26]"Analogy," Part 1. Chap. I.
[27]Lectures on Metaphysics, XXV., N. Y., 1880, p. 356. Hamilton's utterances concerning "reality" are incoherent, and inconsistent. I do him no injustice, however, if I give the above as "one of his views."
[28]Owing to the ambiguity already pointed out as existing in terms which stand for our objects of knowledge and our knowledge of these objects, it would seem almost impossible to avoid misconception without unendurable reiteration. In the above paragraph, by the words "body," "object," "self," etc., I always refer to things immediately known.
[29]This abnormal door has its parallel in the now discreditedcausa sui. Note the following from Descartes: "De même, lorsque nous disons que Dieu est par soi, nous pouvons aussi à la vérité entendre cela négativement, comme voulant dire qu'il n'a point de cause; mais si nous avons auparavant recherché la cause pourquoi il est ou pourquoi il ne cesse point d'être, et que, considérant l'immense et incompréhensible puissance qui est contenue dans son idée, nous l'ayons reconnue si pleine et si abondante qu'en effet elle soit la vraie cause pourquoi il est, et pourquoi il continue ainsi toujours d'être, et qu'il n'y en puisse avoir d'autre que celle-là, nous disons que Dieu estpar soi, non plus négativement, mais au contraire très positivement. Car, encore qu'il n'est pas besoin de dire qu'il est la cause efficiente de soi-même, de peur que peut-être on n'entre en dispute du mot; néanmoins, parce quenousvoyons que ce qui fait qu'il est par soi, ou qu'il n'a point de cause différente de soi-même, ne procède pas du néant, mais de la réelle et véritable immensité de sa puissance, il nous est tout a fait loisible de penser qu'il fait en quelque façon la même chose a l'égard de soi-même que la cause efficiente à l'égard de son effet, et partant qu'il est par soi positivement."—Réponses auxPremièresObjections.
[30]Aristotle, Metaph., Bk. III, c. 5, § 7.
[31]Aristotle, Metaph. III, c. 5, § 7.
[32]Ueberweg. Hist. of Philos., Vol. I, § 19, N. Y., 1877, p. 57.
[33]Ueberweg. Hist. of Philos., Vol. I, § 29, p. 77.
[34]The Dialogues of Plato. N. Y., 1878. Vol. III, p. 255.
[35]The text of Stallbaum (1848) does not harmonize with this. The version I quote leaves out ἐν, and reads τὸ αὐτό in the nominative.
[36]Metaph. XII, c. 4.
[37]Metaph. III, c. 5, § 10; c. 6, § 3.
[38]Ibid.III, c. 2, § 6; IV, c. 6, § 1, and c. 9, § 1.
[39]Ibid.IV, c. 9, § 1, and c. 6.
[40]Ibid.III, c. 5, § 10; X, c. 6, § 6.
[41]Metaph. X, c. 6, § 2.
[42]Ibid.IV, c. 9.
[43]Diogenes Laërtius. IX, 9.
[44]Ibid.loc. cit.
[45]Ibid.loc. cit.
[46]See my "Conception of the Infinite," Ch. VI (J. B. Lippincott Co., Philadelphia). It is but fair to state that my criticism of Realism in this volume is directed against the "ante rem" Realism. I did not have the Moderate Realism in mind, and what I said will not apply to it.
[47]Hauréau.Philos. Scholastique.Paris, 1872. I, p. 281.
[48]Historia Calamitatum, quoted by Hauréau. I, p. 324.
[49]Species est tota substantia individuorum, totaque species eademque in singulis reperitur individuis: itaque species una est substantia, ejus vero individua multæ personæ, et hæ multæ personæ sunt illa una substantia.(Sentent., p. I, c. III.)—Quoted by Hauréau, I, p. 328.
[50]Hauréau, I, 380-381. The argument is taken from theDe Intellectibus.
[51]Méditation Deuxième.—Ed. Simon, Paris, 1860, pp. 76-78.
In this extract the author attempts to distinguish between what is thought and what is perceived by the senses or imagined. Had he remained within the sphere of the immediately known, one could not have objected to such a distinction. Sameness in sense third is something highly complex, implying that elaboration of mental elements which we call thought. It is quite just to distinguish the notion "a bit of wax" from any single sense experience or picture of the imagination. In doing this Descartes was searching for sameness in sense third. But when he leaves the sphere of consciousness, and assumes that what remains the same in the bit of wax is something distinct from the sum total of experiences, as men are distinct from their garments, he falls into error. It is against this that the criticism in the text is directed.
[52]Méditation Troisième, pp. 83-85.
[53]"Essay towards a New Theory of Vision." Sec. 44. Works: ed. Fraser. Oxford 1871. Vol. I, p. 53.
[54]Ibid., § 45.
[55]Substantia unius attributi non nisi unica existit, et ad ipsius naturam pertinet existere. Erit ergo de ipsius natura vel finita vel infinita existere. At non finita. Nam deberet terminari ab alia eiusdem naturæ, quæ etiam necessario deberet existere; adeoque darentur duæ substantiæ eiusdem attributi, quod est absurdum. Existit ergo infinita; q. e. d.—Ethices, Pars prima; VIII. Omnis substantia est necessario infinita.Leipzig, 1875, p. 84.
[56]Locke's Essays, Philadelphia, 1846, p. 415,et seq.
[57]"A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge," §§ 123-132. Ed. Fraser, Vol. I, pp. 220-225.
[58]§§ 45-48, pp. 178-180.
[59]"Principles," §3, p. 157.
[60]"A System of Logic," Book I, Chap. III, § 11, N. Y., 1882, p. 62.
[61]"First Principles," Part 1, Chap. IV, § 26, N. Y., 1888, pp. 93-97.
[62]"First Principles." Chap. V, § 27, p. 99.
[63]"Principles of Psychology," Part VII, Chap. VI, N. Y., 1883, Vol. II, p. 369.
[64]"First Principles," Part I, Chap. III, § 15, ed. cit. p. 49.
[65]"First Principles," Part I, Chap. V, § 31, p. 108.
[66]Part II, Book I, Chap. II.
[67]N. Y., 1889, pp. 62-63.
[68]Pp. 68-69.
[69]P. 70.
[70]Pp. 71 and 72.
[71]Chap. III, p. 75.
[72]"Seeing and Thinking," London, Macmillan & Co., 1879.
[73]Professor Clifford has used the wordnumberin two senses, a quantitative and a qualitative. By number in the latter sense he means simplyunlimited units.
[74]Ueberweg, Hist. of Philos., Vol. I, § 20. N. Y., 1877, pp. 57-58.
TRANSCRIBER'S NOTE:
Inconsistencies in hyphenation and punctuation have not been corrected.
Transcriber's Corrections: