It will be observed that in the preceding I have allowed the self, considered as the whole of consciousness, all the kinds of sameness upon my list except the sixth. There is, however, no objection, except that arising from oddity of expression, against allowing it this kind of sameness too. If we really mean by the self the whole of consciousness, then everything immediately perceived is a part of the self. If then, it is proper to say twomen see the same tree, one may go on to say, if one choses, that two men see a part of the one self. Such an expression could, of course, be used only in speaking of the objective part of this self, the part which those who distinguish between ego and non-ego call the not-self. It is needless to say that no one ever thinks of talking in this way. I merely mention the point for the sake of completeness in my analysis.Sec. 16.If by the self we do not understand a part or the whole of consciousness taken simply, but the one or the other of these regarded from some peculiar point of view, does it affect the question of the kinds of sameness we may attribute to it? It may be asserted, for example, that when we are thinking of the world of things immediately perceived as conditioned by its relation to a particular organism (also immediately perceived)—as duplicated by a pressure on the eyes, as annihilated by a blow on the head—we make these things mental, and properly include them under the head of self; whereas, when we abstract these same things in thought from the organism, and, so to speak, objectify them, we properly include them under the head of not-self. We are thus to regard the one thing as an element of the self or of the not-self, according to the light in which it is viewed. But it does not seem to me that if we take the word self in the sense just described, or in any analogous sense, we need alter the list of samenesses already given. We are still considering a part or the whole of consciousness, and the fact that we are viewing it in one light rather than another would not apparently influence in any way its kinds of sameness.Sec. 17.This would certainly appear to be the case if we take the wordspartandwholeof consciousness in their common acceptation, as denoting a portion or the totality of mental elements (sensations, feelings, volitions, ideas), in their various relations to each other. It remains, however, to consider a position, which,it may be claimed, is not covered by the foregoing classification of possible positions, when the words "part" and "whole" are thus understood. Suppose that one distinguishes in the Kantian fashion between theformand thematterof what appears in consciousness, and maintains that the formal element, the arrangement, or "unity" of consciousness is to be attributed to mind, or, if you please, is mind, and for "mind" I may here write "self," while the matter or content, the raw material to be elaborated and related, is to be distinguished from this as a thing apart. Can it be shown that the above given kinds of sameness have significance in regard to the self so understood? Whether we call this apartof consciousness or not will depend on our use of terms. It is not a part, as commonly understood, nor is it the whole of consciousness.Now, it has seemed to me that those who have laid most emphasis upon this formal element in consciousness have been very vague in their treatment of it. On the part of many writers there is little evidence of even an attempt at scientific exactitude. And yet it does not appear that the subject admits of treatment only in this loose and unsatisfactory way. If we can discuss it at all, there seems no reason why, with increasing knowledge, we may not expect to discuss it with accuracy and precision.If we consider this formal element of consciousness in a concrete instance, it may help us to classify our ideas concerning it. Let us imagine three points in such relations to each other that when each is connected with the other two by straight lines we have an equilateral triangle. The three points are, of course, what they are at any instant. And whatever a relation may be, if the mutual relations of these three points are capable of being considered apart from the points, as a distinct element in consciousness, there appears no reason why we shouldnot assert with equal justice that these relations are what they are at any instant. When we take note of the points we take note of the relations, and we do not confound the one with the other.And just as I may say that such a set of three points imagined or observed now is the same with another and a similar set imagined or observed at some former time, meaning by the word same to indicate similarity, and not sameness in the strict sense mentioned just above; so there appears no reason at all why I may not say that the mutual relations of the one set of points are the same with the mutual relations of the other, making here, too, the distinction between sameness in the former, stricter, sense, and sameness in this second sense of similarity. If what is contained in a consciousness at any one instant, is,ipso facto, to be distinguished from what is contained in it at any other instant, there seems equal reason for making this distinction in the material element and in the formal. It is quite true that men are not accustomed to carrying this distinction into the region of form. The whole history of the dispute as to universals is evidence of the way in which men have confounded the kinds of sameness; but I fancy that even those who would clearly recognize that red color imagined yesterday and red color imagined to-day are the same merely in being similar, or in standing in a relation of original and representative, would yet not think of distinguishing triangularity noticed yesterday from triangularity noticed to-day, and marking that they are not the same in the first and strictest sense of the word. And yet it would be hard to show why two indistinguishably similar color sensations, existing in consciousness at different times, are to be kept apart in thought and recognized as two sensations, while two occurrences of the consciousness of triangularity (I use the clumsy phrase to avoid any question-begging word), are not to be distinguished as separatein a similar way. To say that the formal element is not a thing, but an activity, does not alter the position. If an activity is enough of a thing to be talked about and distinguished from other things, we may surely recognize an activity in consciousness yesterday as numerically different from an activity in consciousness to-day.Furthermore, if, instead of taking as simple an instance of form as the relations of the three points I have been discussing, I choose to take the sum total of the relations between the material elements (here I usematerialas correlative toformal), which go to make up the life history of a material object, say a tree, why may I not speak of the formal tree as being the same at two times, meaning thereby that the group of relations co-existent at any one time may be regarded as representative of any other group belonging to the one series or of the whole series? To be sure, I am not justified by common usage in thus speaking, since common usage marks only distinctions which are practically important, and by the words "the same tree" includes both form and matter. Nevertheless, I can see no reason why, if this element of form does admit of being considered apart, it is not at least possible to find in this field the kind of sameness we have in mind when we say that we have seen on two successive days the same tree.Again, if I can speak of two simultaneous sensations of redness in one consciousness (e. g., the two halves of a red surface), as the same, meaning to indicate simply similarity, why may I not also speak of two simultaneous "experiences of triangularity" in one consciousness as the same, and keep clearly in mind here, too, that I mean only to indicate similarity? If I can speak of a sensation or a complex of sensations in one consciousness as the same with a similar sensation or group of sensations in another, and yet not forget that I am dealing with two things,why may I not do as much for two similar relations or groups of relations in two consciousnesses? If in the one case I do not confound sameness in the sense of similarity with sameness of the kind we mean when we say each thing is at each instant the same with itself, why should I do so in the other case? If, I repeat, the formal element in consciousness is enough of a thing to be distinguished from the material element and discussed, there appears no reason why it should not be open to distinctions of this kind.And when I call up in memory a triangle once seen, the memory image would seem to stand as a representative of the original in both its elements, form and matter. In neither should the representative be confounded with the original. If we may use the word same to indicate this peculiar relation of representation between two things yet recognized as two, it would seem only just to allow this distinction as much in the case of triangularity as in the case of redness or blueness.As to the sixth kind of sameness. May we grant this to the self, if by self we mean the formal element of consciousness? I have said a little way back, before taking up the distinction of formal and material, that, if we make the word self cover all the immediately known, there is nothing to prevent one's saying that two men see a part of the same self, for material objects (immediately known) would have to be regarded as such parts. And here it is evident that if we make self to cover the whole of the formal element in a consciousness, it of course includes the formal element in what we may call the objective side of consciousness—the side which is, in some sense of the words, common and impersonal. Now, we do say that two men see the same tree, and by tree, the man who distinguishes between form and matter means a certain complex containing both formal and material elements. These elements he believes he can distinguishfrom one another, and pay attention predominantly now to the one, and now to the other. Does it not seem to follow that a man may as truly be said to see the formal element as the material, and that two men who see the same tree may with justice be said to see the same shape or arrangement of parts? In other words, may we not apply the sixth sense of the word same to the formal element inconsciousnessif this element is a thing capable of treatment at all? And if this formal element in a tree seen by two men is a part of the self, why may we not say that two men see a part of the same self, even though we make self mere form? It would sound very odd to say so, of course, but that should not weigh with a philosopher, if consistency require it.Finally, if I may call an immediately perceived object the same with its supposed "external" correlate, not confounding the two, but merely marking by the word a peculiar instance of the representative relation, why may I not, if I believe that "external" things stand in "real" relations to each other truly represented by our perceptions of things and their relations—why, in this case, may I not speak of the relations, "external" and "internal," as the same, without on that account forgetting that I am pointing out a relation between two things (if I may thus speak of relations), numerically different? Are they not as different as the "matter" of consciousness and its correlate in the "outer" world?Sec. 18.In the foregoing I have endeavored to make my list of the kinds of sameness complete. I can think of nothing that has been overlooked; but as I have been trying to force a path through a thicket few have made any sustained effort to penetrate, it is quite possible my map of the ground may need emendation. I shall be very glad of any criticism which will help me to improve it. And as the many divisions made, and themany distinctions drawn, may very possibly tend to produce in one who has followed the discussion thus far, a state of mind akin to that of the "true-begotten" Gobbo, when he was obligingly directed to the Jew's house by his hopeful son, a short summary of the results obtained may serve to facilitate apprehension and intelligent criticism.What has been done is this:I began by considering the kinds of sameness of things immediately known, leaving out of consideration for the time being the sameness of the self or ego. This resulted in the following kinds:I. Any mental element or complex of mental elements may be said to be the same with itself at any instant.II. Any mental element or complex of mental elements in existence at one time may be called the same with a mental element or complex of mental elements existing at another time, to indicate that the two are similar.III. We may say that we perceive the same object (complex of mental elements) at two different times, when we do not mean that what is actually experienced on the two occasions is the same in either of the preceding senses; but only that the two experiences are terms in a certain series, the whole of which may be regarded as represented by any part. In this sense does one see the same tree on two succeeding days.IV. Any two mental elements or complexes of mental elements in consciousness at the one time may be called the same to mark the fact that they are alike.V. Any mental element or complex of mental elements may be called the same with its representative, whether this representative resemble it or not.VI. When a man has learned from experience of his own body (as a thing immediately known) that a consciousness of his bodyin a certain peculiar relation to a given object (complex of mental elements) is a presupposition to a consciousness of the object, and wishes to mark the fact that he is perceiving or imagining two human bodies in this relation to a single object, and connecting in thought with each of them a picture of the object, he may say that he is perceiving or imagining two men seeing the same object. This sense of the word same obviously expresses quite a complex thought.VII. In addition to these kinds of sameness found within the sphere of the immediately known, we obtain one kind by stepping beyond it, which, since we step beyond it, so to speak, with only one foot, may be here mentioned as belonging at least partially to the world of immediate objects. When we have come to believe that things in consciousness have their correlates in a world outside of consciousness, we may speak of the things in consciousness as the same with their "external" correlates; or, at any rate, we may talk of them as if they were the same in some sense of the word which will allow us to include the two (or three) distinct things under one name, and treat them as one. This is constantly done. The importance of remembering that we have really more than one thing to consider, it would seem scarcely necessary to emphasize. How far this is really a new kind of sameness I discussed at some length.After having marked these seven kinds of sameness as having to do with the immediately known, I proceeded to consider the kinds of sameness which may obtain in a world or worlds beyond consciousness. It was pointed out that one may look upon the "external" in three ways. One may believe in "external" things as merely bundles of "real" qualities, and may stop there: or one may believe in such bundles of "real" qualities, and in addition hold to "substance" or "substratum" as an obscure something implied by these "real" qualities: or, lastly,one may hold that the only correlate of the thing in consciousness is "noumenon," a thing not distinguishable from the "substance" above mentioned.It was then shown that a realm of "external" things, consisting of bundles of "real" qualities in a world beyond consciousness, would, since it is to the man thinking it merely a duplicate of the immediate world, admit of the existence of all the kinds of sameness above enumerated, and would not furnish any one kind which might increase the list. And with respect to the "external" as noumenon, it was stated that if the noumenal be represented to the mind at all, at least the first kind of sameness must be attributed to it, and that other kinds will be, in proportion to the degree of clearness allowed this vague and inconsistent entity. No new kind of sameness need, however, be looked for in this field. If one hold to the "external" in both kinds, he must, of course, search three distinct realms of being before he can be sure that he has not overlooked any legitimate sense of the word same. As a result of the foregoing analysis we may maintain that, whatever be his belief as to ideas, things, and noumena, his search will not result in more than the seven kinds of sameness I have given. In the assumed new fields we find mere repetition. The pure Idealist would reduce the list to six by dropping off the seventh kind altogether.Next, as to the sameness of the Self or Ego. It was pointed out that one may take the word self to mean: (1) the self in consciousness, or as phenomenon; (2) the self as bundle of "real" qualities out of consciousness; (3) the self as "substance" or "noumenon;" (4) two of these, or all of these, taken together.It was said that as the fourth sense is sufficiently discussed in examining the first three, it would not be separately considered. The three remaining senses were then taken up in reverse order.The third and the Second were found to furnish no new kind of sameness, and to be on a par with the corresponding senses of the word "not-self," except as touching the sixth kind of sameness. As respects this, it was admitted that no one would speak of two men as perceiving the same self, whether as bundle of "real" qualities or as noumenon. It was remarked, however, that this is due not to a difference in the self and not-self in themselves considered, but to a difference in their relation to other things in a consciousness.The self in consciousness, or as immediately known, was then discussed. It was stated that we may safely assume this to be either a part or the whole of consciousness, or the one or the other of these in some peculiar aspect or relation. Self, viewed as a part of consciousness, was found to furnish no new kind of sameness, and was found to admit of all the kinds discovered except the sixth; this one being inadmissible from the fact that when we make the self a part of consciousness we always make it the subjective part and not the objective. Self, viewed as the whole of consciousness, was likewise found to furnish no new kind of sameness, and it was found to admit of all the seven kinds discovered—even of the sixth, though in a modified way, since this kind can belong only to a part of the self, the objective part, which is in some sense common and impersonal. It may, to be sure, be objected that it would be contrary to common usage to speak of two men as seeing the same self in any sense of that word; but in making the self the whole of consciousness one has already abandoned the common standpoint, and one may as well be consistent in carrying out the consequences. Assuming the self to be not a part or the whole of consciousness simply, but regarded in some peculiar aspect or relation, was not found to be significant as concerns kinds of sameness.It still remained to consider a possible position; that of the man who distinguishes between the formal and the material element in consciousness, and identifies self or mind with the former. The formal element of consciousness is not a part of consciousness as the word part is commonly used, nor is it the whole of consciousness, in the ordinary acceptation of the word whole. And though this view might very well have been brought under a former head by stretching a little the meaning of the word part, yet such is its importance that I chose rather to omit it when discussing self as a part of consciousness (there using the word part in a limited sense), and to take it up later by itself.It was insisted that if the formal element in consciousness is enough of a thing to be distinguished from something else, and to be discussed, it is enough of a thing to admit of distinctions and differences much as other things do. After examination it appeared, as a matter of fact, that there is no reason why the believer in "form" should not attribute to it all of the seven kinds of sameness before described—even (in the modified way described a moment ago) the sixth kind. And it also appeared that no new kind of sameness is discoverable in this field. With this closed the search for samenesses.It will be observed that we have passed in review the self and the not-self as immediately known, the self and the not-self as bundles of "real" qualities out of consciousness, and the self and the not-self as noumenon or substance. I know of no other field in which the search may be prosecuted, unless such be invented gratuitously by increasing the "layers" of being in a way no one seems inclined to increase them. And in view of the fact that the samenesses found in any "layer" below the first seem to be only repetitions of what we find in that one, we could have no reason to hope that any such needless increase instrata could add a single new kind of sameness to those described.Sec. 19.Now that we have obtained a list of the different kinds of sameness, we may pass our eye over it with a view to discovering what the various kinds have in common, and what is the reason that we express such diverse experiences by the use of the one word. Such an examination reveals the fact that the common notion which unites them is the idea of similarity. In some cases this notion lies more in the foreground than in others, but in all cases it is present, and forms the bond of union. I will run through the list and point this out, beginning, however, with the second kind, and reserving the first for discussion after the others.II. A mere mention of the second kind of sameness is, in this connection, sufficient. Two mental experiences are there avowedly called the same to mark similarity.III. When we speak of the same object as perceived on two occasions, we do not, as has been noticed, mean that what is actually in the sense at the two different times is similar. Nevertheless, we find here, too, the notion of similarity, for the two experiences are not considered merely in themselves, but as elements in a group or series, and as each representing the whole series. When, therefore, we have the two experiences, we regard ourselves as having in them two experiences of the one series; which means, to be more explicit, that we have in mind on the two occasions two complexes which are similar, and which, when thought of together, are related to each other as the memory image and its original are related. Here the likeness lies in what is represented, not in the representatives.IV. As in the second kind of sameness, so in the fourth, the reference to similarity is unmistakable. We call qualities or things the same when they are of the one kind, when they are observed to resemble each other.V. The relation of representative and thing represented evidently implies the notion of similarity. It is quite true that we often recognize as in this relation things that we do not think of as being similar at all, and yet a little reflection will show that one thing can stand for another onlyin so faras it resembles it. The resemblance may lie in the qualities of the things in themselves considered, or it may lie in external relations of which the things are capable, or functions which they may serve. The very notion of a proxy is a something which, for the purpose in hand, may be regarded as capable of assuming the functions of another. In so far as it can do this it is like the other. Things wholly different (if things could be wholly different) could not represent each other.VI. When a man thinks of two other men as perceiving the same object, he must recognize, if he reflect, that he has in mind a picture of the object, of two human bodies in a peculiar relation to it, and two images of the object somehow connected with these bodies. He need not think of these images as wholly resembling his picture of the object or each other. He does, indeed, make them more or less like his picture of the object, but what is prominent in his mind is the thought of them as representatives, as related to and giving information concerning the object. I say concerning the object, but this phrase is ambiguous. If the man under discussion believes in "real" objects in an extra-consciousness world, he will look upon the images as representing such a "real" object; though, of course, his guarantee for this "real" object, and all his information concerning, it must be found in his picture of the object, and this, or its copy, will stand for the "real" object in any mental complex he may construct. If the man be an Idealist, accepting only what can be found in aconsciousness, he will look upon the two images as related to his picture of the object and representativeof that. In any case he must regard them as representatives, and in this sense the same with the thing they represent. The notion of similarity which is at the bottom of this idea of representative and thing represented is then implied in sameness of the sixth kind also.VII. And since those who distinguish between the immediate and the mediate objects of knowledge make the former representative of the latter, we have evidently this implied notion of similarity in the seventh kind of sameness as well as in the sixth. The mediate object is said to be knownthroughthe immediate: that is, the qualities and relations of the one are made to stand for and serve in place of the qualities and relations of the other. This they can do, of course, only in so far as the two sets of qualities and relations are similar. It is easy enough to see that this notion of similarity is present when we think of an idea or complex of ideas as representing a "real" thing beyond consciousness, and giving information concerning it. When, however, we sublimate our "real" thing into a noumenon and strip it of the determinations which, taken together, make up our idea of a thing, we destroy, if we are consistent and thorough-going, all notion of similarity between the two; but in doing this we destroy our noumenon altogether. If, for instance, we refuse to allow to our notion of a thing "any qualitative or quantitative expression whatever," we cannot think of the thing as having reality or existence, or any mark by which it is to be distinguished from nothing at all. In this case the idea is no longer representative, for it has nothing to represent. If, on the other hand, we do not wholly destroy the noumenon, but still allow it a diluted existence of an indefinite kind, in so far as it has this, and can be represented in mind at all, it resembles the idea, and just so far may the idea stand as its representative.I have already pointed out that several of those who pin their faith to "external" realities seem to apprehend at times but dimly, if at all, that the relation of phenomenon and noumenon, or of idea and "real" thing, is that of representative and thing represented, and that we have here two things and not one. Certainly they sometimes pass from one to the other without rhyme or reason, and apparently in complete unconsciousness of the fact that they have made any change at all. If, for the time being, they really take the two for one, they are not thinking of the seventh kind of sameness, but of another kind. As this is done through mere inadvertence and looseness of reasoning, and cannot be justified on their own assumptions, it is not worth while to dwell upon it farther. Where one really has in mind the seventh kind of sameness, the elements I have mentioned will be found in it.I. Finally, we come to the perplexing case that I postponed at the outset. What has sameness of the first kind in common with the rest? How can we speak of similarity when strictly one thing is in question? Not one thing in the loose sense in which we call a material object one thing in its successive states, nor one in the sense in which the memory image and its original are one, but one thing as a single element of knowledge is itself at any one instant? How can the idea of likeness hold here? Dundreary's bird flocking all by itself would seem to have found its philosophical prototype.It may be said that though the thing in question is strictly one, yet we divide it from itself in thought and then affirm it of itself. We give expression to the logical law of identity by saying that x is x. But here the difficulty meets us that, if we are really talking about only the one x, we have said quite all we have to say in merely saying x; while if, to complete our thought, we must add the second x, we have not an identical proposition,in any strict sense of the word, but a synthetic one. It is easy enough in words to divide a "thing" from "itself," since the words "thing" and "itself" are two, and may readily be distinguished. In the same way it is easy in words to affirm a thing to be and not to be at the one time. There is no law to prevent one's stringing sounds together as he may please. But if one is interested not in the mere symbols, but in that which they are supposed to represent, one must see that the expression "x is x," to be a significant proposition, must have a subject and a predicate, and affirm a relation between them. Here we have, by hypothesis, strictly one thing for subject and predicate. The proposition "x is x" must then consist of one thing and a relation between it—which is about as significant as the statement that a door may consist of one side and a relation between it. Between what? One side.[29]Every form of proposition employed to give expression to the law of identity implies this difficulty. Whether we say "x is x," or "whatever is is," or "everything is identical with itself," our proposition, taken literally, is either useless (since we have said all we have to say in mentioning the subject alone), or untrue (since we add a new element in adding the predicate).It is then sufficiently evident that the forms used to express the logical law of identity do not, taken strictly, express at all the kind of sameness with which we are now concerned, but, on the contrary, something very different. We are considering a sameness in which there is no duality whatever, but our expressions would seem to have no meaning except as indicating a relation between two. They are then significant, not asexpressingsameness of the first kind, but assuggestingit, and this they certainly serve to do. The reason for this I shall try to give in a moment.It has been said that in the other kinds of sameness we always find the notion of similarity. When, however, we distinguish two things as two and yet recognize them as similar, we must have what I may call a mixed experience of likeness and unlikeness. In any two things compared, the degrees of likeness and unlikeness may vary, and we may fix attention upon similarities or differences. In proportion to the attention given to dissimilar elements will the two objects be clearly distinguished from each other and discriminated as two. If the purpose in hand does not require a careful attention to differences, and if what is prominent in mind is the likeness of the two objects, the sense of duality may fall into the background, and the man pass readily from one object to the other with little consciousness that he has made a change. As I now look at the two ink-stands on my desk, I clearly recognize them as two and yet as of the one kind. Here I am as distinctly aware that they are two as I am that they are in some respects the same. But in some of the kinds of sameness I have described this sense of duality falls more into the shade. When I speak of seeing the same ink-stand twice, or when I call up in memory an ink-stand once seen, I am likely, unless I take particular pains to reflect upon my mental operation, to have but a dim realization of the fact that I have twodistinct things to deal with. How those who distinguish between the immediate and the mediate objects of knowledge have a tendency to forget their distinction, and to pass unconsciously from one to the other, I have dwelt upon sufficiently.Suppose, now, that from two objects which we recognize as similar and yet distinct, we abstract one by one the elements which differ. So long as there is any difference left, we still have "identity in diversity"—similarity in the ordinary sense of the term, which implies a recognition of two things as two. When, however, the last difference disappears, all sense of duality must disappear with it, for any division or distinction within what remains is inadmissible. Things which are distinguished are distinguished through some difference. A sense of duality implies a discrimination between two, and where it is impossible to discriminate duality vanishes. Similarity, as we commonly use the word, must then disappear with the disappearance of all dissimilarity between two objects. I say "between two objects" in default of a better expression, for, of course, we have at this point no longer two objects. My meaning is, however, sufficiently plain. A sense of duality implies difference, and similarity, as commonly understood, implies duality. The similarity will then take itself off with the last difference.It may be objected thata consciousness of dualityanda consciousness of similarityare only possible on the ground that I mention, but that duality and similarity themselves may really obtain when no difference between two is perceptible. But a moment's reflection will make it plain that one who speaks thus is simply supplying in himself the elements that he is supposing absent in the case of another. If he uses the words "duality" and "similarity," and they really mean anything to him, they imply all that I have said. He cannot represent to himself twothings at all without distinguishing them from each other, and he can not distinguish them from each other unless they differ in some way. If, then, he speak of two things as being two and yet completely indistinguishable, he is, taken literally, talking nonsense. He may, of course, mean the misleading phrase to be understood as indicating something not actually expressed by the words. He may mean to point out that, under certain circumstances, in which he has an experience which he calls a recognition of two objects as two and as similar, he has reason to think another mind has an experience partly like and partly unlike his own—like in as much as it contains what corresponds to that which iscommonto the two objects he has in mind; unlike in as much as it contains nothing which corresponds to the elements which make it possible for him to recognize two objects. It is this that is in his mind when he speaks of thinking of two objects as really two and yet indistinguishable to this man or that. If, however, the expression "two things may be indistinguishable" is used to indicate this experience, it should be carefully borne in mind that the proposition must not be taken literally, for the good reason that the subject and predicate are not in the one consciousness. The "two objects" are in the mind of Smith, and the "indistinguishable" element in the mind of Jones. When we speak of two men as seeing the same thing, I have shown that we are using the word same in a looser sense which should never be confounded with the stricter sense. Strictly speaking, then, the "two things" are never indistinguishable, but that which corresponds to the two things in a consciousness from which all recognition of duality is absent. That one man may have a consciousness of duality while another man has not, and that these two experiences may be related as the experiences of different minds are related when we say they are experiencing the same thing, no one would careto dispute. Should a man say that he can think of himself as unable to distinguish two things which are nevertheless two, the case, would not be materially different. The man cannot, of course, think ofthe two thingsas indistinguishable, but he may think of two things and connect with this thought the thought of himself as having an experience in which there is no consciousness of duality.But, it may be insisted, we are still only talking about consciousness; let us come to "real" things. Suppose no one able to distinguish between them, abstract all consciousness of difference, would not two "real" things remain two, however we might confound them? Can a thing in one place be a thing in another place, however closely it may resemble it, or however ignorant we may be?To this I answer that when one speaks oftwo"real" things the words only mean something to him because he has present in mind what I have said must be present if one is to have a consciousness of duality. A "thing in one place" and a "thing in another place" are to him two simply because he thinks them as differing—in place. When one has come to the conclusion that he must duplicate his experience, distinguish between the world of immediate and the world of mediate objects, and place the latter in a region "outside," there is nothing to prevent him from thinking of two "real" things as two, although all distinctions within the field of immediate objects have been obliterated. Still, in thinking these "real" things as two, he does just what he does in thinking two immediate objects as two—he recognizes difference. The twoness depends upon difference as much in the one case as in the other, and to speak of two objects in a "real" world as two and yet having no differing element would be to use words without meaning. In talking about a "real" world, if we are really to talk and not merely toutter a series of sounds, our words must be significant. To say "this or that may be in a 'real' world, though we may not be able to conceive it," would, if "this" or "that" implies a contradiction, be to say nothing. The fact is that this "external" world, as we think it, implies the notions of before and after, in this place and that, all the distinctions and differences which make it to us a world of distinct objects. Of course it follows that things in the "external" world are thought as distinct from each other, but this does not affect my statement that distinction is impossible without difference.We may, then, have a series of experiences, beginning with one in which two objects are recognized as similar and yet are very clearly distinguished as two objects, continued in others in which the sense of duality falls more and more into the background, and ending in one in which there is no consciousness of duality at all. The last of these experiences is not wholly different from the others. There is in it no experience of similarity in so far as this word is used to express identity in difference, or a relation between two. There can be no such relation unless there are two, and here there are not two. But it should be marked that this experience differs from the others, not in the element which has led us to declare two objects similar—the element which they have in common—but in that which has led us to declare them two and different. It is by adding to this last experience, so to speak, that we get the others. They contain it and more. Usage will not allow us to apply the term similarity in speaking of an experience in which two things are not distinguished, and this is proper enough; but it should never be forgotten that this experience is at the bottom of all our experiences of similarity—is, so to speak, their common core. When, therefore, I said some pages back that all the kinds of sameness under discussion contain the idea of similarity, I wasusing the word in a certain broad sense to indicate that which is the ground of all our experiences of similarity, and is also found in the first kind of sameness on the list. I preferred to use there the word similarity, because it was easy to show that this notion is really contained in six of the seven uses of the word same, and it was convenient afterward to show the connection between the first kind of sameness and the notion of similarity.And now it is not difficult to guess why we employ such expressions as we do to indicate strict identity. If I habitually use the proposition "x is y" to indicate a relation between two things having similar elements and yet regarded as distinct, and look upon the proposition as justified by the similar elements, observing that, these remaining unchanged, the dissimilar elements may be very variable without affecting the truth of the proposition, what more natural than that I should go on using the propositional form when the dissimilar elements have diminished to zero—when the proposition has become "x is x"? To be sure, no one can take such a proposition literally, any more than one can soberly believe that one divided by zero results in infinity. Such expressions have their use and value, but they must be properly understood. If one uses the expression "x is x" to emphasize the fact that one is not to pass from x to any y or z—that one is to rule out all distinction or sense of difference, the use cannot be harmful. And the use of the propositional form has this great convenience: it puts a period, so to speak, to one's thinking, and prevents one from casting about for a completion of the thought. If one merely say to me "x," I shall probably take it as a subject and busy myself to find a predicate. If he say "x is x," he says really no more than x, but he makes me fix my thoughts upon x alone.Sec. 20.In the foregoing search for the element that the kinds of sameness have in common, I have had in mind chiefly thesamenesses of things immediately known. It is not necessary to repeat the search in the field of the "external." We have but the seven kinds of sameness, and whatever may be the things that are the same in these several ways, the elements I have indicated must be present if our words are to be significant. But one thing remains for me to do in this part of my monograph, and that will not detain me long. I must distinguish between sameness and identity, or rather point out to what kinds of sameness this latter word is commonly applied.The word is often used quite loosely, but where the attempt is made to distinguish between identity and sameness in a looser sense, and to use terms with some precision, the former word serves to indicate sameness in which there is no consciousness of duality, or in which the consciousness of duality has fallen into the background and may easily be overlooked. Sameness of the first kind, for example, is spoken of as identity. This is the only kind of sameness in which there is no element of duality at all. The use of the word identity is not, however, restricted to this. Locke's inquiry concerning the identity of masses of inorganic matter, of vegetables, of animals, and of persons, has to do with sameness of the third kind on the list. In this kind of sameness there is no clear consciousness that one is dealing with more than one thing, and Locke's discussion is conducted throughout as though one were not.It may be objected that in certain other kinds there is often no clear consciousness of duality, and yet one does not think of using the term identity. This is quite true. The two kinds mentioned have been thought worthy of special discussion by logician and philosopher, and have been given a technical name. The others have not. Still, although the word is not commonly used in such cases, it would, I fancy, seem natural to use it in a direct ratio to the degree in which the sense of duality falls intothe background. Dr. Johnson would probably have been willing to say that the stone he saw himself kick was identical with the one the existence of which he wanted to prove. Bishop Berkeley could have felt only disgust at such a use of the term. Scarcely anyone, I suppose, would regard himself as speaking strictly if he called the fourth kind of sameness identity. The co-existence of the two things compared would prevent their being confounded. Without, then, attempting to assign any very exact limits to the application of a somewhat loosely used word, I may repeat my former statement that men use the word identity to mark certain kinds of sameness in which there is little or no consciousness of duality, and they are not inclined to use it to mark samenesses in which things are recognized as similar but clearly distinct.With this I end the first part of my discussion, and I confess I draw a long breath in doing so. When I sat down to write it was with the impression that I could say all that was necessary about the kinds of sameness in a much smaller number of pages; but finding it impossible to avoid misunderstandings without being more explicit and detailed, I have had to change my plan. Now, that I am through, I must confess to myself that most persons will find this hair-splitting anything but entertaining—which would be held by the inconsiderate to furnish a presumption against the truth it contains, if ancient adages go for anything. It should be remembered, however, that the old saw which puts truth in a well does not indicate that the well may not be a dry one. With this consolatory reflection I turn to the second part of my task.
It will be observed that in the preceding I have allowed the self, considered as the whole of consciousness, all the kinds of sameness upon my list except the sixth. There is, however, no objection, except that arising from oddity of expression, against allowing it this kind of sameness too. If we really mean by the self the whole of consciousness, then everything immediately perceived is a part of the self. If then, it is proper to say twomen see the same tree, one may go on to say, if one choses, that two men see a part of the one self. Such an expression could, of course, be used only in speaking of the objective part of this self, the part which those who distinguish between ego and non-ego call the not-self. It is needless to say that no one ever thinks of talking in this way. I merely mention the point for the sake of completeness in my analysis.
Sec. 16.If by the self we do not understand a part or the whole of consciousness taken simply, but the one or the other of these regarded from some peculiar point of view, does it affect the question of the kinds of sameness we may attribute to it? It may be asserted, for example, that when we are thinking of the world of things immediately perceived as conditioned by its relation to a particular organism (also immediately perceived)—as duplicated by a pressure on the eyes, as annihilated by a blow on the head—we make these things mental, and properly include them under the head of self; whereas, when we abstract these same things in thought from the organism, and, so to speak, objectify them, we properly include them under the head of not-self. We are thus to regard the one thing as an element of the self or of the not-self, according to the light in which it is viewed. But it does not seem to me that if we take the word self in the sense just described, or in any analogous sense, we need alter the list of samenesses already given. We are still considering a part or the whole of consciousness, and the fact that we are viewing it in one light rather than another would not apparently influence in any way its kinds of sameness.
Sec. 17.This would certainly appear to be the case if we take the wordspartandwholeof consciousness in their common acceptation, as denoting a portion or the totality of mental elements (sensations, feelings, volitions, ideas), in their various relations to each other. It remains, however, to consider a position, which,it may be claimed, is not covered by the foregoing classification of possible positions, when the words "part" and "whole" are thus understood. Suppose that one distinguishes in the Kantian fashion between theformand thematterof what appears in consciousness, and maintains that the formal element, the arrangement, or "unity" of consciousness is to be attributed to mind, or, if you please, is mind, and for "mind" I may here write "self," while the matter or content, the raw material to be elaborated and related, is to be distinguished from this as a thing apart. Can it be shown that the above given kinds of sameness have significance in regard to the self so understood? Whether we call this apartof consciousness or not will depend on our use of terms. It is not a part, as commonly understood, nor is it the whole of consciousness.
Now, it has seemed to me that those who have laid most emphasis upon this formal element in consciousness have been very vague in their treatment of it. On the part of many writers there is little evidence of even an attempt at scientific exactitude. And yet it does not appear that the subject admits of treatment only in this loose and unsatisfactory way. If we can discuss it at all, there seems no reason why, with increasing knowledge, we may not expect to discuss it with accuracy and precision.
If we consider this formal element of consciousness in a concrete instance, it may help us to classify our ideas concerning it. Let us imagine three points in such relations to each other that when each is connected with the other two by straight lines we have an equilateral triangle. The three points are, of course, what they are at any instant. And whatever a relation may be, if the mutual relations of these three points are capable of being considered apart from the points, as a distinct element in consciousness, there appears no reason why we shouldnot assert with equal justice that these relations are what they are at any instant. When we take note of the points we take note of the relations, and we do not confound the one with the other.
And just as I may say that such a set of three points imagined or observed now is the same with another and a similar set imagined or observed at some former time, meaning by the word same to indicate similarity, and not sameness in the strict sense mentioned just above; so there appears no reason at all why I may not say that the mutual relations of the one set of points are the same with the mutual relations of the other, making here, too, the distinction between sameness in the former, stricter, sense, and sameness in this second sense of similarity. If what is contained in a consciousness at any one instant, is,ipso facto, to be distinguished from what is contained in it at any other instant, there seems equal reason for making this distinction in the material element and in the formal. It is quite true that men are not accustomed to carrying this distinction into the region of form. The whole history of the dispute as to universals is evidence of the way in which men have confounded the kinds of sameness; but I fancy that even those who would clearly recognize that red color imagined yesterday and red color imagined to-day are the same merely in being similar, or in standing in a relation of original and representative, would yet not think of distinguishing triangularity noticed yesterday from triangularity noticed to-day, and marking that they are not the same in the first and strictest sense of the word. And yet it would be hard to show why two indistinguishably similar color sensations, existing in consciousness at different times, are to be kept apart in thought and recognized as two sensations, while two occurrences of the consciousness of triangularity (I use the clumsy phrase to avoid any question-begging word), are not to be distinguished as separatein a similar way. To say that the formal element is not a thing, but an activity, does not alter the position. If an activity is enough of a thing to be talked about and distinguished from other things, we may surely recognize an activity in consciousness yesterday as numerically different from an activity in consciousness to-day.
Furthermore, if, instead of taking as simple an instance of form as the relations of the three points I have been discussing, I choose to take the sum total of the relations between the material elements (here I usematerialas correlative toformal), which go to make up the life history of a material object, say a tree, why may I not speak of the formal tree as being the same at two times, meaning thereby that the group of relations co-existent at any one time may be regarded as representative of any other group belonging to the one series or of the whole series? To be sure, I am not justified by common usage in thus speaking, since common usage marks only distinctions which are practically important, and by the words "the same tree" includes both form and matter. Nevertheless, I can see no reason why, if this element of form does admit of being considered apart, it is not at least possible to find in this field the kind of sameness we have in mind when we say that we have seen on two successive days the same tree.
Again, if I can speak of two simultaneous sensations of redness in one consciousness (e. g., the two halves of a red surface), as the same, meaning to indicate simply similarity, why may I not also speak of two simultaneous "experiences of triangularity" in one consciousness as the same, and keep clearly in mind here, too, that I mean only to indicate similarity? If I can speak of a sensation or a complex of sensations in one consciousness as the same with a similar sensation or group of sensations in another, and yet not forget that I am dealing with two things,why may I not do as much for two similar relations or groups of relations in two consciousnesses? If in the one case I do not confound sameness in the sense of similarity with sameness of the kind we mean when we say each thing is at each instant the same with itself, why should I do so in the other case? If, I repeat, the formal element in consciousness is enough of a thing to be distinguished from the material element and discussed, there appears no reason why it should not be open to distinctions of this kind.
And when I call up in memory a triangle once seen, the memory image would seem to stand as a representative of the original in both its elements, form and matter. In neither should the representative be confounded with the original. If we may use the word same to indicate this peculiar relation of representation between two things yet recognized as two, it would seem only just to allow this distinction as much in the case of triangularity as in the case of redness or blueness.
As to the sixth kind of sameness. May we grant this to the self, if by self we mean the formal element of consciousness? I have said a little way back, before taking up the distinction of formal and material, that, if we make the word self cover all the immediately known, there is nothing to prevent one's saying that two men see a part of the same self, for material objects (immediately known) would have to be regarded as such parts. And here it is evident that if we make self to cover the whole of the formal element in a consciousness, it of course includes the formal element in what we may call the objective side of consciousness—the side which is, in some sense of the words, common and impersonal. Now, we do say that two men see the same tree, and by tree, the man who distinguishes between form and matter means a certain complex containing both formal and material elements. These elements he believes he can distinguishfrom one another, and pay attention predominantly now to the one, and now to the other. Does it not seem to follow that a man may as truly be said to see the formal element as the material, and that two men who see the same tree may with justice be said to see the same shape or arrangement of parts? In other words, may we not apply the sixth sense of the word same to the formal element inconsciousnessif this element is a thing capable of treatment at all? And if this formal element in a tree seen by two men is a part of the self, why may we not say that two men see a part of the same self, even though we make self mere form? It would sound very odd to say so, of course, but that should not weigh with a philosopher, if consistency require it.
Finally, if I may call an immediately perceived object the same with its supposed "external" correlate, not confounding the two, but merely marking by the word a peculiar instance of the representative relation, why may I not, if I believe that "external" things stand in "real" relations to each other truly represented by our perceptions of things and their relations—why, in this case, may I not speak of the relations, "external" and "internal," as the same, without on that account forgetting that I am pointing out a relation between two things (if I may thus speak of relations), numerically different? Are they not as different as the "matter" of consciousness and its correlate in the "outer" world?
Sec. 18.In the foregoing I have endeavored to make my list of the kinds of sameness complete. I can think of nothing that has been overlooked; but as I have been trying to force a path through a thicket few have made any sustained effort to penetrate, it is quite possible my map of the ground may need emendation. I shall be very glad of any criticism which will help me to improve it. And as the many divisions made, and themany distinctions drawn, may very possibly tend to produce in one who has followed the discussion thus far, a state of mind akin to that of the "true-begotten" Gobbo, when he was obligingly directed to the Jew's house by his hopeful son, a short summary of the results obtained may serve to facilitate apprehension and intelligent criticism.
What has been done is this:
I began by considering the kinds of sameness of things immediately known, leaving out of consideration for the time being the sameness of the self or ego. This resulted in the following kinds:
I. Any mental element or complex of mental elements may be said to be the same with itself at any instant.
II. Any mental element or complex of mental elements in existence at one time may be called the same with a mental element or complex of mental elements existing at another time, to indicate that the two are similar.
III. We may say that we perceive the same object (complex of mental elements) at two different times, when we do not mean that what is actually experienced on the two occasions is the same in either of the preceding senses; but only that the two experiences are terms in a certain series, the whole of which may be regarded as represented by any part. In this sense does one see the same tree on two succeeding days.
IV. Any two mental elements or complexes of mental elements in consciousness at the one time may be called the same to mark the fact that they are alike.
V. Any mental element or complex of mental elements may be called the same with its representative, whether this representative resemble it or not.
VI. When a man has learned from experience of his own body (as a thing immediately known) that a consciousness of his bodyin a certain peculiar relation to a given object (complex of mental elements) is a presupposition to a consciousness of the object, and wishes to mark the fact that he is perceiving or imagining two human bodies in this relation to a single object, and connecting in thought with each of them a picture of the object, he may say that he is perceiving or imagining two men seeing the same object. This sense of the word same obviously expresses quite a complex thought.
VII. In addition to these kinds of sameness found within the sphere of the immediately known, we obtain one kind by stepping beyond it, which, since we step beyond it, so to speak, with only one foot, may be here mentioned as belonging at least partially to the world of immediate objects. When we have come to believe that things in consciousness have their correlates in a world outside of consciousness, we may speak of the things in consciousness as the same with their "external" correlates; or, at any rate, we may talk of them as if they were the same in some sense of the word which will allow us to include the two (or three) distinct things under one name, and treat them as one. This is constantly done. The importance of remembering that we have really more than one thing to consider, it would seem scarcely necessary to emphasize. How far this is really a new kind of sameness I discussed at some length.
After having marked these seven kinds of sameness as having to do with the immediately known, I proceeded to consider the kinds of sameness which may obtain in a world or worlds beyond consciousness. It was pointed out that one may look upon the "external" in three ways. One may believe in "external" things as merely bundles of "real" qualities, and may stop there: or one may believe in such bundles of "real" qualities, and in addition hold to "substance" or "substratum" as an obscure something implied by these "real" qualities: or, lastly,one may hold that the only correlate of the thing in consciousness is "noumenon," a thing not distinguishable from the "substance" above mentioned.
It was then shown that a realm of "external" things, consisting of bundles of "real" qualities in a world beyond consciousness, would, since it is to the man thinking it merely a duplicate of the immediate world, admit of the existence of all the kinds of sameness above enumerated, and would not furnish any one kind which might increase the list. And with respect to the "external" as noumenon, it was stated that if the noumenal be represented to the mind at all, at least the first kind of sameness must be attributed to it, and that other kinds will be, in proportion to the degree of clearness allowed this vague and inconsistent entity. No new kind of sameness need, however, be looked for in this field. If one hold to the "external" in both kinds, he must, of course, search three distinct realms of being before he can be sure that he has not overlooked any legitimate sense of the word same. As a result of the foregoing analysis we may maintain that, whatever be his belief as to ideas, things, and noumena, his search will not result in more than the seven kinds of sameness I have given. In the assumed new fields we find mere repetition. The pure Idealist would reduce the list to six by dropping off the seventh kind altogether.
Next, as to the sameness of the Self or Ego. It was pointed out that one may take the word self to mean: (1) the self in consciousness, or as phenomenon; (2) the self as bundle of "real" qualities out of consciousness; (3) the self as "substance" or "noumenon;" (4) two of these, or all of these, taken together.
It was said that as the fourth sense is sufficiently discussed in examining the first three, it would not be separately considered. The three remaining senses were then taken up in reverse order.The third and the Second were found to furnish no new kind of sameness, and to be on a par with the corresponding senses of the word "not-self," except as touching the sixth kind of sameness. As respects this, it was admitted that no one would speak of two men as perceiving the same self, whether as bundle of "real" qualities or as noumenon. It was remarked, however, that this is due not to a difference in the self and not-self in themselves considered, but to a difference in their relation to other things in a consciousness.
The self in consciousness, or as immediately known, was then discussed. It was stated that we may safely assume this to be either a part or the whole of consciousness, or the one or the other of these in some peculiar aspect or relation. Self, viewed as a part of consciousness, was found to furnish no new kind of sameness, and was found to admit of all the kinds discovered except the sixth; this one being inadmissible from the fact that when we make the self a part of consciousness we always make it the subjective part and not the objective. Self, viewed as the whole of consciousness, was likewise found to furnish no new kind of sameness, and it was found to admit of all the seven kinds discovered—even of the sixth, though in a modified way, since this kind can belong only to a part of the self, the objective part, which is in some sense common and impersonal. It may, to be sure, be objected that it would be contrary to common usage to speak of two men as seeing the same self in any sense of that word; but in making the self the whole of consciousness one has already abandoned the common standpoint, and one may as well be consistent in carrying out the consequences. Assuming the self to be not a part or the whole of consciousness simply, but regarded in some peculiar aspect or relation, was not found to be significant as concerns kinds of sameness.
It still remained to consider a possible position; that of the man who distinguishes between the formal and the material element in consciousness, and identifies self or mind with the former. The formal element of consciousness is not a part of consciousness as the word part is commonly used, nor is it the whole of consciousness, in the ordinary acceptation of the word whole. And though this view might very well have been brought under a former head by stretching a little the meaning of the word part, yet such is its importance that I chose rather to omit it when discussing self as a part of consciousness (there using the word part in a limited sense), and to take it up later by itself.
It was insisted that if the formal element in consciousness is enough of a thing to be distinguished from something else, and to be discussed, it is enough of a thing to admit of distinctions and differences much as other things do. After examination it appeared, as a matter of fact, that there is no reason why the believer in "form" should not attribute to it all of the seven kinds of sameness before described—even (in the modified way described a moment ago) the sixth kind. And it also appeared that no new kind of sameness is discoverable in this field. With this closed the search for samenesses.
It will be observed that we have passed in review the self and the not-self as immediately known, the self and the not-self as bundles of "real" qualities out of consciousness, and the self and the not-self as noumenon or substance. I know of no other field in which the search may be prosecuted, unless such be invented gratuitously by increasing the "layers" of being in a way no one seems inclined to increase them. And in view of the fact that the samenesses found in any "layer" below the first seem to be only repetitions of what we find in that one, we could have no reason to hope that any such needless increase instrata could add a single new kind of sameness to those described.
Sec. 19.Now that we have obtained a list of the different kinds of sameness, we may pass our eye over it with a view to discovering what the various kinds have in common, and what is the reason that we express such diverse experiences by the use of the one word. Such an examination reveals the fact that the common notion which unites them is the idea of similarity. In some cases this notion lies more in the foreground than in others, but in all cases it is present, and forms the bond of union. I will run through the list and point this out, beginning, however, with the second kind, and reserving the first for discussion after the others.
II. A mere mention of the second kind of sameness is, in this connection, sufficient. Two mental experiences are there avowedly called the same to mark similarity.
III. When we speak of the same object as perceived on two occasions, we do not, as has been noticed, mean that what is actually in the sense at the two different times is similar. Nevertheless, we find here, too, the notion of similarity, for the two experiences are not considered merely in themselves, but as elements in a group or series, and as each representing the whole series. When, therefore, we have the two experiences, we regard ourselves as having in them two experiences of the one series; which means, to be more explicit, that we have in mind on the two occasions two complexes which are similar, and which, when thought of together, are related to each other as the memory image and its original are related. Here the likeness lies in what is represented, not in the representatives.
IV. As in the second kind of sameness, so in the fourth, the reference to similarity is unmistakable. We call qualities or things the same when they are of the one kind, when they are observed to resemble each other.
V. The relation of representative and thing represented evidently implies the notion of similarity. It is quite true that we often recognize as in this relation things that we do not think of as being similar at all, and yet a little reflection will show that one thing can stand for another onlyin so faras it resembles it. The resemblance may lie in the qualities of the things in themselves considered, or it may lie in external relations of which the things are capable, or functions which they may serve. The very notion of a proxy is a something which, for the purpose in hand, may be regarded as capable of assuming the functions of another. In so far as it can do this it is like the other. Things wholly different (if things could be wholly different) could not represent each other.
VI. When a man thinks of two other men as perceiving the same object, he must recognize, if he reflect, that he has in mind a picture of the object, of two human bodies in a peculiar relation to it, and two images of the object somehow connected with these bodies. He need not think of these images as wholly resembling his picture of the object or each other. He does, indeed, make them more or less like his picture of the object, but what is prominent in his mind is the thought of them as representatives, as related to and giving information concerning the object. I say concerning the object, but this phrase is ambiguous. If the man under discussion believes in "real" objects in an extra-consciousness world, he will look upon the images as representing such a "real" object; though, of course, his guarantee for this "real" object, and all his information concerning, it must be found in his picture of the object, and this, or its copy, will stand for the "real" object in any mental complex he may construct. If the man be an Idealist, accepting only what can be found in aconsciousness, he will look upon the two images as related to his picture of the object and representativeof that. In any case he must regard them as representatives, and in this sense the same with the thing they represent. The notion of similarity which is at the bottom of this idea of representative and thing represented is then implied in sameness of the sixth kind also.
VII. And since those who distinguish between the immediate and the mediate objects of knowledge make the former representative of the latter, we have evidently this implied notion of similarity in the seventh kind of sameness as well as in the sixth. The mediate object is said to be knownthroughthe immediate: that is, the qualities and relations of the one are made to stand for and serve in place of the qualities and relations of the other. This they can do, of course, only in so far as the two sets of qualities and relations are similar. It is easy enough to see that this notion of similarity is present when we think of an idea or complex of ideas as representing a "real" thing beyond consciousness, and giving information concerning it. When, however, we sublimate our "real" thing into a noumenon and strip it of the determinations which, taken together, make up our idea of a thing, we destroy, if we are consistent and thorough-going, all notion of similarity between the two; but in doing this we destroy our noumenon altogether. If, for instance, we refuse to allow to our notion of a thing "any qualitative or quantitative expression whatever," we cannot think of the thing as having reality or existence, or any mark by which it is to be distinguished from nothing at all. In this case the idea is no longer representative, for it has nothing to represent. If, on the other hand, we do not wholly destroy the noumenon, but still allow it a diluted existence of an indefinite kind, in so far as it has this, and can be represented in mind at all, it resembles the idea, and just so far may the idea stand as its representative.
I have already pointed out that several of those who pin their faith to "external" realities seem to apprehend at times but dimly, if at all, that the relation of phenomenon and noumenon, or of idea and "real" thing, is that of representative and thing represented, and that we have here two things and not one. Certainly they sometimes pass from one to the other without rhyme or reason, and apparently in complete unconsciousness of the fact that they have made any change at all. If, for the time being, they really take the two for one, they are not thinking of the seventh kind of sameness, but of another kind. As this is done through mere inadvertence and looseness of reasoning, and cannot be justified on their own assumptions, it is not worth while to dwell upon it farther. Where one really has in mind the seventh kind of sameness, the elements I have mentioned will be found in it.
I. Finally, we come to the perplexing case that I postponed at the outset. What has sameness of the first kind in common with the rest? How can we speak of similarity when strictly one thing is in question? Not one thing in the loose sense in which we call a material object one thing in its successive states, nor one in the sense in which the memory image and its original are one, but one thing as a single element of knowledge is itself at any one instant? How can the idea of likeness hold here? Dundreary's bird flocking all by itself would seem to have found its philosophical prototype.
It may be said that though the thing in question is strictly one, yet we divide it from itself in thought and then affirm it of itself. We give expression to the logical law of identity by saying that x is x. But here the difficulty meets us that, if we are really talking about only the one x, we have said quite all we have to say in merely saying x; while if, to complete our thought, we must add the second x, we have not an identical proposition,in any strict sense of the word, but a synthetic one. It is easy enough in words to divide a "thing" from "itself," since the words "thing" and "itself" are two, and may readily be distinguished. In the same way it is easy in words to affirm a thing to be and not to be at the one time. There is no law to prevent one's stringing sounds together as he may please. But if one is interested not in the mere symbols, but in that which they are supposed to represent, one must see that the expression "x is x," to be a significant proposition, must have a subject and a predicate, and affirm a relation between them. Here we have, by hypothesis, strictly one thing for subject and predicate. The proposition "x is x" must then consist of one thing and a relation between it—which is about as significant as the statement that a door may consist of one side and a relation between it. Between what? One side.[29]Every form of proposition employed to give expression to the law of identity implies this difficulty. Whether we say "x is x," or "whatever is is," or "everything is identical with itself," our proposition, taken literally, is either useless (since we have said all we have to say in mentioning the subject alone), or untrue (since we add a new element in adding the predicate).
It is then sufficiently evident that the forms used to express the logical law of identity do not, taken strictly, express at all the kind of sameness with which we are now concerned, but, on the contrary, something very different. We are considering a sameness in which there is no duality whatever, but our expressions would seem to have no meaning except as indicating a relation between two. They are then significant, not asexpressingsameness of the first kind, but assuggestingit, and this they certainly serve to do. The reason for this I shall try to give in a moment.
It has been said that in the other kinds of sameness we always find the notion of similarity. When, however, we distinguish two things as two and yet recognize them as similar, we must have what I may call a mixed experience of likeness and unlikeness. In any two things compared, the degrees of likeness and unlikeness may vary, and we may fix attention upon similarities or differences. In proportion to the attention given to dissimilar elements will the two objects be clearly distinguished from each other and discriminated as two. If the purpose in hand does not require a careful attention to differences, and if what is prominent in mind is the likeness of the two objects, the sense of duality may fall into the background, and the man pass readily from one object to the other with little consciousness that he has made a change. As I now look at the two ink-stands on my desk, I clearly recognize them as two and yet as of the one kind. Here I am as distinctly aware that they are two as I am that they are in some respects the same. But in some of the kinds of sameness I have described this sense of duality falls more into the shade. When I speak of seeing the same ink-stand twice, or when I call up in memory an ink-stand once seen, I am likely, unless I take particular pains to reflect upon my mental operation, to have but a dim realization of the fact that I have twodistinct things to deal with. How those who distinguish between the immediate and the mediate objects of knowledge have a tendency to forget their distinction, and to pass unconsciously from one to the other, I have dwelt upon sufficiently.
Suppose, now, that from two objects which we recognize as similar and yet distinct, we abstract one by one the elements which differ. So long as there is any difference left, we still have "identity in diversity"—similarity in the ordinary sense of the term, which implies a recognition of two things as two. When, however, the last difference disappears, all sense of duality must disappear with it, for any division or distinction within what remains is inadmissible. Things which are distinguished are distinguished through some difference. A sense of duality implies a discrimination between two, and where it is impossible to discriminate duality vanishes. Similarity, as we commonly use the word, must then disappear with the disappearance of all dissimilarity between two objects. I say "between two objects" in default of a better expression, for, of course, we have at this point no longer two objects. My meaning is, however, sufficiently plain. A sense of duality implies difference, and similarity, as commonly understood, implies duality. The similarity will then take itself off with the last difference.
It may be objected thata consciousness of dualityanda consciousness of similarityare only possible on the ground that I mention, but that duality and similarity themselves may really obtain when no difference between two is perceptible. But a moment's reflection will make it plain that one who speaks thus is simply supplying in himself the elements that he is supposing absent in the case of another. If he uses the words "duality" and "similarity," and they really mean anything to him, they imply all that I have said. He cannot represent to himself twothings at all without distinguishing them from each other, and he can not distinguish them from each other unless they differ in some way. If, then, he speak of two things as being two and yet completely indistinguishable, he is, taken literally, talking nonsense. He may, of course, mean the misleading phrase to be understood as indicating something not actually expressed by the words. He may mean to point out that, under certain circumstances, in which he has an experience which he calls a recognition of two objects as two and as similar, he has reason to think another mind has an experience partly like and partly unlike his own—like in as much as it contains what corresponds to that which iscommonto the two objects he has in mind; unlike in as much as it contains nothing which corresponds to the elements which make it possible for him to recognize two objects. It is this that is in his mind when he speaks of thinking of two objects as really two and yet indistinguishable to this man or that. If, however, the expression "two things may be indistinguishable" is used to indicate this experience, it should be carefully borne in mind that the proposition must not be taken literally, for the good reason that the subject and predicate are not in the one consciousness. The "two objects" are in the mind of Smith, and the "indistinguishable" element in the mind of Jones. When we speak of two men as seeing the same thing, I have shown that we are using the word same in a looser sense which should never be confounded with the stricter sense. Strictly speaking, then, the "two things" are never indistinguishable, but that which corresponds to the two things in a consciousness from which all recognition of duality is absent. That one man may have a consciousness of duality while another man has not, and that these two experiences may be related as the experiences of different minds are related when we say they are experiencing the same thing, no one would careto dispute. Should a man say that he can think of himself as unable to distinguish two things which are nevertheless two, the case, would not be materially different. The man cannot, of course, think ofthe two thingsas indistinguishable, but he may think of two things and connect with this thought the thought of himself as having an experience in which there is no consciousness of duality.
But, it may be insisted, we are still only talking about consciousness; let us come to "real" things. Suppose no one able to distinguish between them, abstract all consciousness of difference, would not two "real" things remain two, however we might confound them? Can a thing in one place be a thing in another place, however closely it may resemble it, or however ignorant we may be?
To this I answer that when one speaks oftwo"real" things the words only mean something to him because he has present in mind what I have said must be present if one is to have a consciousness of duality. A "thing in one place" and a "thing in another place" are to him two simply because he thinks them as differing—in place. When one has come to the conclusion that he must duplicate his experience, distinguish between the world of immediate and the world of mediate objects, and place the latter in a region "outside," there is nothing to prevent him from thinking of two "real" things as two, although all distinctions within the field of immediate objects have been obliterated. Still, in thinking these "real" things as two, he does just what he does in thinking two immediate objects as two—he recognizes difference. The twoness depends upon difference as much in the one case as in the other, and to speak of two objects in a "real" world as two and yet having no differing element would be to use words without meaning. In talking about a "real" world, if we are really to talk and not merely toutter a series of sounds, our words must be significant. To say "this or that may be in a 'real' world, though we may not be able to conceive it," would, if "this" or "that" implies a contradiction, be to say nothing. The fact is that this "external" world, as we think it, implies the notions of before and after, in this place and that, all the distinctions and differences which make it to us a world of distinct objects. Of course it follows that things in the "external" world are thought as distinct from each other, but this does not affect my statement that distinction is impossible without difference.
We may, then, have a series of experiences, beginning with one in which two objects are recognized as similar and yet are very clearly distinguished as two objects, continued in others in which the sense of duality falls more and more into the background, and ending in one in which there is no consciousness of duality at all. The last of these experiences is not wholly different from the others. There is in it no experience of similarity in so far as this word is used to express identity in difference, or a relation between two. There can be no such relation unless there are two, and here there are not two. But it should be marked that this experience differs from the others, not in the element which has led us to declare two objects similar—the element which they have in common—but in that which has led us to declare them two and different. It is by adding to this last experience, so to speak, that we get the others. They contain it and more. Usage will not allow us to apply the term similarity in speaking of an experience in which two things are not distinguished, and this is proper enough; but it should never be forgotten that this experience is at the bottom of all our experiences of similarity—is, so to speak, their common core. When, therefore, I said some pages back that all the kinds of sameness under discussion contain the idea of similarity, I wasusing the word in a certain broad sense to indicate that which is the ground of all our experiences of similarity, and is also found in the first kind of sameness on the list. I preferred to use there the word similarity, because it was easy to show that this notion is really contained in six of the seven uses of the word same, and it was convenient afterward to show the connection between the first kind of sameness and the notion of similarity.
And now it is not difficult to guess why we employ such expressions as we do to indicate strict identity. If I habitually use the proposition "x is y" to indicate a relation between two things having similar elements and yet regarded as distinct, and look upon the proposition as justified by the similar elements, observing that, these remaining unchanged, the dissimilar elements may be very variable without affecting the truth of the proposition, what more natural than that I should go on using the propositional form when the dissimilar elements have diminished to zero—when the proposition has become "x is x"? To be sure, no one can take such a proposition literally, any more than one can soberly believe that one divided by zero results in infinity. Such expressions have their use and value, but they must be properly understood. If one uses the expression "x is x" to emphasize the fact that one is not to pass from x to any y or z—that one is to rule out all distinction or sense of difference, the use cannot be harmful. And the use of the propositional form has this great convenience: it puts a period, so to speak, to one's thinking, and prevents one from casting about for a completion of the thought. If one merely say to me "x," I shall probably take it as a subject and busy myself to find a predicate. If he say "x is x," he says really no more than x, but he makes me fix my thoughts upon x alone.
Sec. 20.In the foregoing search for the element that the kinds of sameness have in common, I have had in mind chiefly thesamenesses of things immediately known. It is not necessary to repeat the search in the field of the "external." We have but the seven kinds of sameness, and whatever may be the things that are the same in these several ways, the elements I have indicated must be present if our words are to be significant. But one thing remains for me to do in this part of my monograph, and that will not detain me long. I must distinguish between sameness and identity, or rather point out to what kinds of sameness this latter word is commonly applied.
The word is often used quite loosely, but where the attempt is made to distinguish between identity and sameness in a looser sense, and to use terms with some precision, the former word serves to indicate sameness in which there is no consciousness of duality, or in which the consciousness of duality has fallen into the background and may easily be overlooked. Sameness of the first kind, for example, is spoken of as identity. This is the only kind of sameness in which there is no element of duality at all. The use of the word identity is not, however, restricted to this. Locke's inquiry concerning the identity of masses of inorganic matter, of vegetables, of animals, and of persons, has to do with sameness of the third kind on the list. In this kind of sameness there is no clear consciousness that one is dealing with more than one thing, and Locke's discussion is conducted throughout as though one were not.
It may be objected that in certain other kinds there is often no clear consciousness of duality, and yet one does not think of using the term identity. This is quite true. The two kinds mentioned have been thought worthy of special discussion by logician and philosopher, and have been given a technical name. The others have not. Still, although the word is not commonly used in such cases, it would, I fancy, seem natural to use it in a direct ratio to the degree in which the sense of duality falls intothe background. Dr. Johnson would probably have been willing to say that the stone he saw himself kick was identical with the one the existence of which he wanted to prove. Bishop Berkeley could have felt only disgust at such a use of the term. Scarcely anyone, I suppose, would regard himself as speaking strictly if he called the fourth kind of sameness identity. The co-existence of the two things compared would prevent their being confounded. Without, then, attempting to assign any very exact limits to the application of a somewhat loosely used word, I may repeat my former statement that men use the word identity to mark certain kinds of sameness in which there is little or no consciousness of duality, and they are not inclined to use it to mark samenesses in which things are recognized as similar but clearly distinct.
With this I end the first part of my discussion, and I confess I draw a long breath in doing so. When I sat down to write it was with the impression that I could say all that was necessary about the kinds of sameness in a much smaller number of pages; but finding it impossible to avoid misunderstandings without being more explicit and detailed, I have had to change my plan. Now, that I am through, I must confess to myself that most persons will find this hair-splitting anything but entertaining—which would be held by the inconsiderate to furnish a presumption against the truth it contains, if ancient adages go for anything. It should be remembered, however, that the old saw which puts truth in a well does not indicate that the well may not be a dry one. With this consolatory reflection I turn to the second part of my task.