VIII

It is true indeed that contest and strife arising from the opposition presented by external things prevent us from finding pleasure in those same things. For no man finds a pleasure in the things against which he fights. But he does find a pleasure, other things being equal, in the actual attainment of a thing for which he has striven; thus S. Augustine says[388]: "The greater the danger in the battle, the greater the joy in the triumph." And in contemplation the strife and the combat do not arise from any opposition on the part of the truth which we contemplate, but from our deficientunderstanding and from the corruptible nature of our bodies which ever draw us down to things beneath us:The corruptible body is a load upon the soul, and the earthly habitation presseth down the mind that museth upon many things.[389]Hence it is that when a man attains to the contemplation of truth he loves it still more ardently; but at the same time he more than ever hates his own defects and the sluggishness of his corruptible body, so that with the Apostle he cries out:Unhappy man that I am! Who shall deliver me from the body of this death?[390]Hence, too, S. Gregory says: "When God is known by our desires and our understanding, He causes all pleasures of the flesh to wither up within us."[391]

3. But again, delight follows upon a perfect work.[392]But contemplation on this earth is imperfect, according to the words of the Apostle:We see now through a glass in a dark manner.[393]Hence it would seem that the contemplative life does not afford delight.

It is indeed true that the contemplation of God during this life is imperfect compared with our contemplation of Him in our eternal home; and in the same way it is true that the delights of contemplation here on earth are imperfect compared with the delights of contemplation in that home, of which latter joysthe Psalmist says:Thou shalt make them drink of the torrent of Thy pleasure.[394]Yet, none the less, the contemplation of Divine things here on earth is, although imperfect, far more perfect than any other subject of contemplation howsoever perfect it may be, and this by reason of the excellence of what we contemplate. Whence the Philosopher says[395]: "It may indeed be the case that with regard to such noble existences and Divine substances we have to be content with insignificant theories, yet even though we but barely touch upon them, none the less so ennobling is such knowledge that it affords us greater delight than any other which is accessible to us." Hence, too, S. Gregory says: "The contemplative life has its most desirable sweetness which uplifts the soul above itself, opens the way to heavenly things, and makes spiritual things plain to the eyes of the soul."

4. Lastly, bodily injuries are a hindrance to delight. But contemplation is productive of bodily injuries, for we read in Genesis[396]that Jacob, after sayingI have seen God face to face, ... halted on his foot ... because He touched the sinew of his thigh and it shrank. Whence it would seem that the contemplative life is not pleasurable.

But after that contemplation Jacob halted on one foot because, as S. Gregory says, "it must needs be that as the love of this worldgrows weaker, so a man grows stronger in his love of God," and consequently, "when once we have known the sweetness of God, one of our feet remains sound while the other halts; for a man who halts with one foot leans only on the one that is sound."[397]

"Tu esto nostrum gaudiumQui es futurus Præmium.Sit nostra in Te gloriaPer cuncta semper sæcula!"

S. Gregory:Between the delights of the body and those of the heart there is ever this difference that the delights of the body are wont, when we have them not, to beget a keen yearning for them; but when we have them and eat our fill, they straightway beget disgust for them, for we are sated therewith. Spiritual joys, on the contrary, when we have them not are a weariness, but when we have them we desire them still more, and the more we feed upon them the more we hunger after them. In the case of the former, the yearning for them was a pleasure, trial of them brought disgust. In the case of the latter, in desire we held them cheap, trial of them proved a source of pleasure. For spiritual joys increase the soul's desire of them even while they sate us, for the more their savour is perceived, the more we know what it is we ought eagerly to love. Whence it comes to pass that when we have them not we cannot love them, for their savour is unknown to us. For how can a man love what he is ignorant of? Wherefore the Psalmist admonishes us, saying:O taste and seethat the Lord is sweet![398]As though he would say to us in plain terms: You know not His sweetness if ye have never tasted it; touch, then, the Food of Life with the palate of your soul that so, making proof of Its sweetness, ye may be able to love It.

These joys man lost when he sinned in Paradise; he went out when he closed his mouth to the Food of Eternal Sweetness. Whence we too, who are born amidst the toils of this pilgrimage, come without relish to this Food; we know not what we ought to desire, and the sickness of our disgust grows the more the further our souls keep away from feeding upon that Sweetness; and less and less does our soul desire those interior joys the longer it has grown accustomed to do without them. We sicken, then, by reason of our very disgust, and we are wearied by the long-drawn sickness of our hunger (Hom.XXXVI.,On the Gospels).

The Lord saidMary hath chosen the best part which shall not be taken away from her[399]because, as S. Gregory says: "Contemplation begins here below that it may be perfected in our heavenly home."

A thing may be termed "lasting" in two ways: from its very nature, or as far as we are concerned. As far as its nature is concerned, the contemplative life is lasting in two ways: for first of all it is concerned with incorruptible and unchangeable things,and in the second place there is nothing which is its contrary: for, as Aristotle says[400]: "To the pleasure which is derived from thought there is no contrary."

And also as far as we are concerned the contemplative life is lasting; and this both because it comes under the action of the incorruptible portion of our soul—namely, our intellect—and so can last after this life; and also because in the work of the contemplative life there is no bodily toil, and we can consequently apply ourselves more continuously to such work, as also the Philosopher remarks.[401]

Some, however, argue that the contemplative life is not lasting, thus:

1. The contemplative life essentially concerns the intellect. But all the intellectual perfections of this life will bemade void, as we read:Whether prophecies shall be made void, or tongues shall cease, or knowledge shall be destroyed.[402]

But the fashion of contemplation here and in our Father's home is not the same; and the contemplative life is said "to last" by reason of charity, which is both its principle and its end; wherefore S. Gregory says: "The contemplative life begins here below that it may be perfected in our heavenly home, for the fire of love which begins to burn here below, when it sees Him Whom it loves, burns yet more strongly with love of Him."

2. Again, men but taste the sweetness of contemplation here, snatching at it, as it were, and in passing: whence S. Augustine says: "Thouintroducest me to a most unwonted affection within me, to an unspeakable sweetness; yet I fall back again as though dragged down by a grievous weight!"[403]And S. Gregory, expounding those words of Job,When a spirit passed before me, says: "The mind does not long remain steadfastly occupied with the sweetness of intimate contemplation, for it is recalled to itself, stricken back by the immensity of that Light." The contemplative life, then, is not lasting.

It is true indeed that no action can remain long at the pitch of its intensity. And the goal of contemplation is to attain to the uniformity of Divine contemplation, as Denis the Areopagite says.[404]Hence, although in this sense contemplation cannot last long, yet it can last long as regards its other acts.

3. Lastly, what is not natural to a man cannot be lasting. "But the contemplative life," as the Philosopher says, "is beyond man."[405]

But the Philosopher says that the contemplative life is "beyond man" in the sense that it belongs to us according to what is Divine in us—namely, our intellect; for our intellect is incorruptible and impassible in itself, and consequently its action can be more lasting.

S. Augustine:This day sets before us the great mystery of our eternal beatitude. For that lifewhich this day signifies will not pass away as to-day is to pass away. Wherefore, brethren, we exhort and beseech you by the Name of our Lord Jesus Christ by Whom our sins are forgiven, by Him Who willed that His Blood should be our ransom, by Him Who has deigned that we who are not deserving to be called His slaves should yet be called His brethren—we beseech you that your entire aim, that which gives you your very name of "Christian," and by reason of which you bear His Name upon your foreheads and in your hearts, may be directed solely to that life which we are to share with the Angels; that life where is to be unending repose, everlasting joy, unfailing happiness, rest without disturbance, joy without sadness, no death. What that life is none can know save those who have made trial of it; and none can make trial of it save those who have faith (Sermon, CCLIX.,On Low Sunday).

"And thou shalt say in that day: I will give thanks to Thee, O Lord, for Thou wast angry with me: Thy wrath is turned away, and Thou hast comforted me. Behold, God is my Saviour. I will deal confidently, and will not fear: because the Lord is my strength, and my praise, and He is become my salvation. You shall draw waters with joy out of the Saviour's fountains: And you shall say in that day: Praise ye the Lord, and call upon His Name: make His works known among the people: remember that His Name is high. Sing ye to the Lord, for He hath done great things: shew this forth in all the earth. Rejoice, and praise, O thou habitation of Sion: for great is He that is in the midst of thee, the holy One of Israel."[406]

[316]Moralia in Job, vi. 18.

[317]Hom.XIV.,On Ezechiel.

[318]Metaphysics, ii. 3.

[319]Moralia in Job, vi. 18; andHom.XIV.,On Ezechiel.

[320]On Ezechiel, loc. cit.

[321]Hom.XIV.,On Ezechiel.

[322]Isa. xxxiii. 13-17.

[323]Ps. xli. 1-6.

[324]Moralia in Job, vi. 18.

[325]Ethics, II., iv. 3.

[326]Ibid., X., viii. 1.

[327]Hom.XIV.,On Ezechiel.

[328]Rom. xiii. 10.

[329]S. Matt. v. 8.

[330]Heb. xii. 14.

[331]Isa. xxxii. 17.

[332]Hom.XIV.,On Ezechiel.

[333]Gen. xxix. 17.

[334]De Officiis, i. 43, 45, 46.

[335]Wisd. viii. 2.

[336]Soliloquies, i. 10.

[337]Jer. xiv. 8, 9.

[338]Of the Divine Names, vii. 2.

[339]On Contemplation, i. 3 and 4.

[340]De Trinitate, xiv. 7.

[341]De Consideratione, ii. 2.

[342]De Anima, II., i. 2.

[343]Loc. cit., i. 4.

[344]2 Cor. iii. 18.

[345]De Trinitate, xv. 8.

[346]De Consideratione, v. 14.

[347]De Fide Orthodoxa, ii. 15.

[348]S. Luke x. 39.

[349]Wisd. vii. 7.

[350]2 Cor. v. 6-7.

[351]Hab. ii. 4.

[352]Ps. cxliii. 15.

[353]1 Tim. i. 5.

[354]Ps. lxxii. 21-28.

[355]Moralia in Job, vi. 28.

[356]On the Trinity, i. 8.

[357]Ethics, X., vii. 2.

[358]Rom. i. 20.

[359]De Vera Religione, xxix.

[360]Ps. cxlii. 5, 6.

[361]De Consideratione, v. 14.

[362]Of Contemplation, i. 6.

[363]1 John iii. 2.

[364]Ps. xxvi. 4.

[365]Ps. xxxv. 9, 10.

[366]Phil. iv. 7; Rom. viii. 26.

[367]Isa. xxv. 8, 9.

[368]Hom.XIV.,On Ezechiel.

[369]De Genesi ad Litt., xii. 27.

[370]Gen. xxxii. 30.

[371]Epistola I., to Caius the Monk.

[372]Hom.XIV.,On Ezechiel.

[373]TheGlossa Ordinaria, taken from S. Gregory'sMoralia in Job, xxiv. 5.

[374]Moralia, vi. 27.

[375]De Anima, III., vii. 3.

[376]Dialogues, ii. 35.

[377]Isa. xxvi. 3, 4, 8, 9.

[378]Of the Divine Names, IV., i. 7.

[379]De Anima, III., vii. 1 and 2.

[380]Physica, VIII., vii. 2.

[381]viii. 16.

[382]Of Contemplation, i. 5.

[383]Job xvi. 20, 23.

[384]Hom.XIV.,On Ezechiel.

[385]Ps. xxxiii. 9.

[386]Hom.XIV.,On Ezechiel.

[387]Ibid.

[388]Conf., viii. 3.

[389]Wisd. ix. 15.

[390]Rom. vii. 24.

[391]Hom.XIV.,On Ezechiel.

[392]Ethics, X., iv. 6.

[393]1 Cor. xiii, 12.

[394]Ps. xxxv. 9.

[395]De Partibus Animalium, i. 5.

[396]xxxii. 30-32.

[397]Hom.XIV.,On Ezechiel.

[398]Ps. xxxiii. 9.

[399]S. Luke x. 42.

[400]Topics, I., xiii. 5.

[401]Ethics, X., vii. 2.

[402]1 Cor. xiii. 8.

[403]Conf., x. 40.

[404]Of the Divine Names, IV., i. 7; andOf the Heavenly Hierarchy, iii.

[405]Ethics, X., vii. 8.

[406]Isa. xii. 1-6.

I. Do all Acts of the Moral Virtues come under the Active Life?

II. Does Prudence pertain to the Active Life?

III. Does Teaching belong to the Active or to the Contemplative Life?

IV. Does the Active Life continue after this Life?

S. Isidore says[407]: "In the active life all the vices are first of all to be removed by the practice of good works, so that in the contemplative life a man may, with now purified mental gaze, pass to the contemplation of the Divine Light." But all the vices can only be removed by the acts of the moral virtues. Consequently the acts of the moral virtues belong to the active life.

As we have said already,[408]the active and the contemplative lives are distinguished by the different occupations of men who are aiming at different ends, one being the consideration of Truth—the goal of the contemplative life; the other externalworks with which the active life is occupied. But it is clear that the moral virtues are not especially concerned with the contemplation of truth but with action; thus the Philosopher says[409]: "For virtue, knowledge is of little or no avail." It is therefore manifest that the moral virtues essentially belong to the active life; and in accordance with this the Philosopher[410]refers the moral virtues to active happiness.

Some, however, maintain that all the acts of the moral virtues do not belong to the active life, thus:

1. The active life seems to consist solely in those things which have to do with our neighbour; for S. Gregory says[411]: "The active life means breaking bread to the hungry;" and at the close, after enumerating many things which have to do with our neighbour, he adds: "And to provide for each according as they have need." But not by all the acts of the moral virtues are we brought into contact with others, but only by justice and its divisions. Consequently all the acts of the moral virtues do not belong to the active life.

But the chief of the moral virtues is justice, and by it a man is brought into contact with his neighbour, as the Philosopher proves.[412]We describe, then, the active life by those things by means of which we are brought into contact with our neighbour; yet we do not thereby mean that the active life consists solely in these things, but chiefly in them.

2. Again, S. Gregory says[413]: "By Lia, who was blear-eyed but fruitful, is signified the active life which sees less clearly, since occupied with works; but when, now by word, now by example, it arouses its neighbour to imitation, it brings forth many children in good works." But all this seems rather to come under charity, by which we love our neighbour, than under the moral virtues. Consequently the acts of the moral virtues seem not to belong to the active life.

But a man can, by acts of all the moral virtues, lead his neighbour to good works by his example; and this S. Gregory here attributes to the active life.

3. Lastly, the moral virtues dispose us to the contemplative life. But disposition to a thing and the perfect attainment of that thing come under the same head. Consequently the moral virtues do not belong to the active life.

But just as a virtue which is directed towards the end of another virtue passes over, in some sort, into the species of that latter virtue, so also when a man uses those things which belong to the active life precisely as disposing him to contemplation, then those things which he so uses are comprised under the contemplative life. But for those who devote themselves to the works of the moral virtues as being good in themselves and not as dispositive towards the contemplative life, themoral virtues belong to the active life. Although at the same time it might be said that the active life is a disposition to the contemplative life."O death, how bitter is the remembrance of thee to a man that hath peace in his possessions, to a man that is at rest, and whose ways are prosperous in all things, and that is yet able to take meat! O death, thy sentence is welcome to the man that is in need, and to him whose strength faileth, who is in a decrepit age, and that is in care about all things, and to the distrustful that loseth patience! Fear not the sentence of death. Remember what things have been before thee, and what shall come after thee: this sentence is from the Lord upon all flesh. And what shall come upon thee by the good pleasure of the Most High whether ten, or a hundred, or a thousand years."[414]

"O death, how bitter is the remembrance of thee to a man that hath peace in his possessions, to a man that is at rest, and whose ways are prosperous in all things, and that is yet able to take meat! O death, thy sentence is welcome to the man that is in need, and to him whose strength faileth, who is in a decrepit age, and that is in care about all things, and to the distrustful that loseth patience! Fear not the sentence of death. Remember what things have been before thee, and what shall come after thee: this sentence is from the Lord upon all flesh. And what shall come upon thee by the good pleasure of the Most High whether ten, or a hundred, or a thousand years."[414]

The Philosopher says[415]that prudence pertains to active happiness, and to this pertain the moral virtues.

As we have said above, when one thing is directed towards the attainment of another thing as its end, it—and this especially holds good in morals—is, so to speak, drawn into the species of that towards which it is thus directed, thus: "He who commits adultery in order to steal" says the Philosopher,[416]"is rather a thief than an adulterer."Now it is clear that that knowledge which is prudence is directed to the acts of the moral virtues as its end, for prudence is "the right mode of procedure in our actions;"[417]hence, too, the ends of the moral virtues are the principles of prudence, as the Philosopher also says in the same work.[418]In the same way, then, as we said above that in the case of a man who directs them to the repose of contemplation, the moral virtues pertain to the contemplative life, so also the knowledge which is prudence, and which is by its very nature directed to the operations of the moral virtues, directly pertains to the active life—that is, of course, on the supposition that prudence is understood in the strict sense in which the Philosopher speaks of it.

If, however, prudence be understood in a broad sense—namely, as embracing all kinds of human knowledge—then prudence pertains, at least in certain of its aspects, to the contemplative life; thus Cicero says[419]: "The man who can see a truth the most clearly and quickly, and explain the reason of it, is rightly regarded as most prudent and most wise."

But some maintain that prudence does not pertain to the active life, thus:

1. Just as the contemplative life pertains to the cognoscitive powers, so does the active life pertain to the appetitive powers. But prudence does not pertain to the appetitive powers butrather to the cognoscitive. Consequently it does not pertain to the active life.

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