[149]Aristot. "Metaph." i. 6, with which compare x. 1. "Further, says he, besides things sensible and the ideas, there are things mathematical coming in between the two, which differ from the things sensible, inasmuch as they are eternal and immovable, and from the ideas, inasmuch as many of them are like each other; but the idea is absolutely and only one." (Tr.'s Add.)
[149]Aristot. "Metaph." i. 6, with which compare x. 1. "Further, says he, besides things sensible and the ideas, there are things mathematical coming in between the two, which differ from the things sensible, inasmuch as they are eternal and immovable, and from the ideas, inasmuch as many of them are like each other; but the idea is absolutely and only one." (Tr.'s Add.)
[150]"In these it is equality that constitutes unity." (Tr.'s Add.)
[150]"In these it is equality that constitutes unity." (Tr.'s Add.)
[151]"Oupnekhat," vol. i. p. 202.
[151]"Oupnekhat," vol. i. p. 202.
[152]Aristot., "De anima," iii. 8. "In a certain sense the intellect is all that exists." (Tr.'s Add.)
[152]Aristot., "De anima," iii. 8. "In a certain sense the intellect is all that exists." (Tr.'s Add.)
[153]See "Die beiden Grundprobleme der Ethik," p. 11, and in several other places.
[153]See "Die beiden Grundprobleme der Ethik," p. 11, and in several other places.
[154]Weltknoten.
[154]Weltknoten.
[155]See "Die Welt, a. W. u. V." vol. ii. ch. xiv.
[155]See "Die Welt, a. W. u. V." vol. ii. ch. xiv.
[156]Aristot. "Metaph." iv. 1. "Sometimes too, learning must start, not from what is really first and with the actual beginning of the thing concerned, but from where it is easiest to learn." [Tr.'s add.]
[156]Aristot. "Metaph." iv. 1. "Sometimes too, learning must start, not from what is really first and with the actual beginning of the thing concerned, but from where it is easiest to learn." [Tr.'s add.]
[157]See "Die Welt a. W. u. V.," vol. ii. ch. iv. p. 41, 42 of the 2nd edition, and p. 44 of the 3rd.
[157]See "Die Welt a. W. u. V.," vol. ii. ch. iv. p. 41, 42 of the 2nd edition, and p. 44 of the 3rd.
[158]Kant, "Krit. d. r. Vern.," 1st edition, p. 202; 5th edition, p. 248 (English translation by M. Müller, p. 177.)
[158]Kant, "Krit. d. r. Vern.," 1st edition, p. 202; 5th edition, p. 248 (English translation by M. Müller, p. 177.)
[159]Compare "Die Welt a. W. u. V.," vol. i. p. 551et seq.of the 2nd edition (i. p. 582et seq.of 3rd edition) as to "immaterial substance," and § 52 of the present work as to "reason in general." (Editor's note.)
[159]Compare "Die Welt a. W. u. V.," vol. i. p. 551et seq.of the 2nd edition (i. p. 582et seq.of 3rd edition) as to "immaterial substance," and § 52 of the present work as to "reason in general." (Editor's note.)
[160]"Die Welt a. W. u. V.," vol. ii. ch. 12, p. 126 of the 2nd edition (p. 139 of the 3rd edition).
[160]"Die Welt a. W. u. V.," vol. ii. ch. 12, p. 126 of the 2nd edition (p. 139 of the 3rd edition).
[161]Orground.
[161]Orground.
[162]Kant, "Krit. d. r. Vern.," 1st edition, pp. 561, 562, 564; p. 590 of the 5th edition. (Pp. 483 to 486 of the English translation by M. Müller.)
[162]Kant, "Krit. d. r. Vern.," 1st edition, pp. 561, 562, 564; p. 590 of the 5th edition. (Pp. 483 to 486 of the English translation by M. Müller.)
[163]Ibid.p. 540 of 1st edition, and 641 of 5th edition. (P. 466 of English translation.)
[163]Ibid.p. 540 of 1st edition, and 641 of 5th edition. (P. 466 of English translation.)
[164]Ibid.p. 563 of the 1st and 591 of the 5th edition. (P. 485 of English translation.)
[164]Ibid.p. 563 of the 1st and 591 of the 5th edition. (P. 485 of English translation.)
[165]Empirical contingency is meant, which, with Kant, signifies as much as dependence upon other things. As to this, I refer my readers to my censure in my "Critique of Kantian Philosophy," p. 524 of the 2nd, and p. 552 of the 3rd edition.
[165]Empirical contingency is meant, which, with Kant, signifies as much as dependence upon other things. As to this, I refer my readers to my censure in my "Critique of Kantian Philosophy," p. 524 of the 2nd, and p. 552 of the 3rd edition.
[166]And this infatuation has reached such a point, that people seriously imagine themselves to have found the key to the mystery of the essence and existence of this wonderful and mysterious world in wretchedchemical affinities! Compared with this illusion of our physiological chemists, that of the alchymists who sought after the philosopher's stone, and only hoped to find out the secret of making gold, was indeed a mere trifle. [Add. to 3rd ed.]
[166]And this infatuation has reached such a point, that people seriously imagine themselves to have found the key to the mystery of the essence and existence of this wonderful and mysterious world in wretchedchemical affinities! Compared with this illusion of our physiological chemists, that of the alchymists who sought after the philosopher's stone, and only hoped to find out the secret of making gold, was indeed a mere trifle. [Add. to 3rd ed.]
[167]"Aut catechismus, aut materialismus," is their watchword. [Add. to 3rd ed.]
[167]"Aut catechismus, aut materialismus," is their watchword. [Add. to 3rd ed.]
[168]There too he will meet with people who fling about words of foreign origin, which they have caught up without understanding them, just as readily as he does himself, when he talks about "Idealism" without knowing what it means, mostly therefore using the word instead of Spiritualism (which being Realism, is the opposite to Idealism). Hundreds of examples of this kind besides otherquid pro quosare to be found in books, and critical periodicals. [Add. to 3rd ed.]
[168]There too he will meet with people who fling about words of foreign origin, which they have caught up without understanding them, just as readily as he does himself, when he talks about "Idealism" without knowing what it means, mostly therefore using the word instead of Spiritualism (which being Realism, is the opposite to Idealism). Hundreds of examples of this kind besides otherquid pro quosare to be found in books, and critical periodicals. [Add. to 3rd ed.]
[169]They ought everywhere to be shown that their belief is not believed in. [Add. to 3rd ed.]
[169]They ought everywhere to be shown that their belief is not believed in. [Add. to 3rd ed.]
[170]For revelation goes for nothing in philosophy; therefore a philosopher must before all things be an unbeliever. [Add. to 3rd ed.].
[170]For revelation goes for nothing in philosophy; therefore a philosopher must before all things be an unbeliever. [Add. to 3rd ed.].
[171]One always says the other is right, so that the public in its simplicity at last imagines them really to be right. [Add. to 3rd ed.]
[171]One always says the other is right, so that the public in its simplicity at last imagines them really to be right. [Add. to 3rd ed.]
[172]Here it is especially Ernst Reinhold's "System of Metaphysics" (3rd edition, 1854) that I have in my eye. In my "Parerga" I have explained how it comes, that brain-perverting books like this go through several editions. See "Parerga," vol. i. p. 171 (2nd edition, vol. i. p. 194).
[172]Here it is especially Ernst Reinhold's "System of Metaphysics" (3rd edition, 1854) that I have in my eye. In my "Parerga" I have explained how it comes, that brain-perverting books like this go through several editions. See "Parerga," vol. i. p. 171 (2nd edition, vol. i. p. 194).
[173]Nevertheless, by Zeus, all such gentlemen, in France as well as Germany, should be taught that Philosophy has a different mission from that of playing into the hands of the clergy. We must let them clearly see before all things that we have no faith in their faith—from this follows what we think of them. [Add. to 3rd ed.]
[173]Nevertheless, by Zeus, all such gentlemen, in France as well as Germany, should be taught that Philosophy has a different mission from that of playing into the hands of the clergy. We must let them clearly see before all things that we have no faith in their faith—from this follows what we think of them. [Add. to 3rd ed.]
[174](a) Rosenkranz, "Meine Reform der Hegelschen Philosophie," 1852, especially p. 41, in a pompous, dictatorial tone: "I have explicitly said, that Space and Time would not exist if Matter did not exist. Æther spread out within itself first constitutes real Space, and the movement of this æther and consequent real genesis of everything individual and separate, constitutes real Time." (b) L. Noack, "Die Theologie als Religionsphilosophie," 1853, pp. 8, 9. (c) V. Reuchlin-Meldegg, Two reviews of Oersted's "Geist in der Natur" in the Heidelberg Annals, Nov.-Dec., 1850, and May-June, 1854.
[174](a) Rosenkranz, "Meine Reform der Hegelschen Philosophie," 1852, especially p. 41, in a pompous, dictatorial tone: "I have explicitly said, that Space and Time would not exist if Matter did not exist. Æther spread out within itself first constitutes real Space, and the movement of this æther and consequent real genesis of everything individual and separate, constitutes real Time." (b) L. Noack, "Die Theologie als Religionsphilosophie," 1853, pp. 8, 9. (c) V. Reuchlin-Meldegg, Two reviews of Oersted's "Geist in der Natur" in the Heidelberg Annals, Nov.-Dec., 1850, and May-June, 1854.
[175]Time is the condition of thepossibilityof succession, which could neither take place, nor be understood by us and expressed in words, without Time. And Space is likewise the condition of thepossibilityof juxtaposition, and Transcendental Æsthetic is the proof that these conditions have their seat in the constitution of our head. [Add. to 3rd ed.]
[175]Time is the condition of thepossibilityof succession, which could neither take place, nor be understood by us and expressed in words, without Time. And Space is likewise the condition of thepossibilityof juxtaposition, and Transcendental Æsthetic is the proof that these conditions have their seat in the constitution of our head. [Add. to 3rd ed.]
[176]In the Scholium to the eighth of the definitions he has placed at the top of his "Principia," Newton quite rightly distinguishesabsolute, that is,empty, from relative, or filled Time, and likewise absolute from relative Space. He says, p. 11:Tempus, spatium, locum, motum, ut omnibus notissima, non definio. Notandum tamen quodVULGUS(that is, professors like those I have been mentioning)quantitates hasce non aliter quam ex relatione ad sensibilia concipiat. Et inde oriuntur præjudicia quædam, quibus tollendis convenit easdem in absolutas et relativas, veras et apparentes, mathematicas et vulgares distingui.And again (p. 12):I.Tempus absolutum, verum et mathematicum, in se et natura sua sine relatione ad externum quodvis, æquabiliter fluit, alioque nomine dicitur Duratio: relativum, apparens et vulgare est sensibilis et externa quævis Durationis per motum mensura (seu accurata seu inæquabilis) quâ vulgus vice veri temporis utitur; ut Hora, Dies, Mensis, Annus.II.Spatiam absolutum, natura sua sine relatione ad externum quodvis, semper manet similare et immobile: relativum est spatii hujus mensura seu dimensio quælibet mobilis, quæ a sensibus nostris per situm suum ad corpora definitur, et a vulgo pro spatio immobili usurpatur: uti dimensio spatii subterranei, ærei vel coelestis definita per situm suum ad terram.But even Newton never dreamt of asking how we know these two infinite entities, Space and Time; since, as he here impresses on us, they do not fall within the range of the senses; and how we know them moreover so intimately, that we are able to indicate their whole nature and rule down to the minutest detail. [Add. to 3rd ed.]
[176]In the Scholium to the eighth of the definitions he has placed at the top of his "Principia," Newton quite rightly distinguishesabsolute, that is,empty, from relative, or filled Time, and likewise absolute from relative Space. He says, p. 11:Tempus, spatium, locum, motum, ut omnibus notissima, non definio. Notandum tamen quodVULGUS(that is, professors like those I have been mentioning)quantitates hasce non aliter quam ex relatione ad sensibilia concipiat. Et inde oriuntur præjudicia quædam, quibus tollendis convenit easdem in absolutas et relativas, veras et apparentes, mathematicas et vulgares distingui.And again (p. 12):
I.Tempus absolutum, verum et mathematicum, in se et natura sua sine relatione ad externum quodvis, æquabiliter fluit, alioque nomine dicitur Duratio: relativum, apparens et vulgare est sensibilis et externa quævis Durationis per motum mensura (seu accurata seu inæquabilis) quâ vulgus vice veri temporis utitur; ut Hora, Dies, Mensis, Annus.
II.Spatiam absolutum, natura sua sine relatione ad externum quodvis, semper manet similare et immobile: relativum est spatii hujus mensura seu dimensio quælibet mobilis, quæ a sensibus nostris per situm suum ad corpora definitur, et a vulgo pro spatio immobili usurpatur: uti dimensio spatii subterranei, ærei vel coelestis definita per situm suum ad terram.
But even Newton never dreamt of asking how we know these two infinite entities, Space and Time; since, as he here impresses on us, they do not fall within the range of the senses; and how we know them moreover so intimately, that we are able to indicate their whole nature and rule down to the minutest detail. [Add. to 3rd ed.]
[177]Ecclesiasticus xxii. 8.
[177]Ecclesiasticus xxii. 8.
[178]For Kant has disclosed the dreadful truth, that philosophy must be quite a different thing from Jewish mythology. [Add. to 3rd ed.]
[178]For Kant has disclosed the dreadful truth, that philosophy must be quite a different thing from Jewish mythology. [Add. to 3rd ed.]
[179]Another instance of Michelet's ignorance is to be found in Schopenhauer's posthumous writings, see "Aus Arthur Schopenhauer's handschriftlichem Nachlass," Leipzig, A. Brockhaus, 1864, p. 327. [Editor's note.]
[179]Another instance of Michelet's ignorance is to be found in Schopenhauer's posthumous writings, see "Aus Arthur Schopenhauer's handschriftlichem Nachlass," Leipzig, A. Brockhaus, 1864, p. 327. [Editor's note.]
[180]The same reviewer (Von Reuchlin-Meldegg) when be expounds the doctrines of the philosophers concerning God in the August number of the Heidelberg Annals (1855), p. 579, says: "In Kant, God is a thing in itself which cannot be known." In his review of Frauenstädt's "Letters" in the Heidelberg Annals of May and June (1855) he says that there is no knowledgeà priori. [Add. to 3rd ed.]
[180]The same reviewer (Von Reuchlin-Meldegg) when be expounds the doctrines of the philosophers concerning God in the August number of the Heidelberg Annals (1855), p. 579, says: "In Kant, God is a thing in itself which cannot be known." In his review of Frauenstädt's "Letters" in the Heidelberg Annals of May and June (1855) he says that there is no knowledgeà priori. [Add. to 3rd ed.]
[181]C. 1. p. 899.
[181]C. 1. p. 899.
[182]p. 908.
[182]p. 908.
[183]Hofräthe.A title of honour often given for literary and scientific merit in Germany, and common among University professors. [Tr.'s note.]
[183]Hofräthe.A title of honour often given for literary and scientific merit in Germany, and common among University professors. [Tr.'s note.]
[184]"Potius de rebus ipsis judicare debemus, quam pro magno habere, de hominibus quid quisque senserit scire," says St. Augustine ("De civ. Dei," l. 19, c. 3). Under the present mode of proceeding, however, the philosophical lecture-room becomes a sort of rag-fair for old worn out, cast-off opinions, which are brought there every six months to be aired and beaten. [Add. to 3rd ed.]
[184]"Potius de rebus ipsis judicare debemus, quam pro magno habere, de hominibus quid quisque senserit scire," says St. Augustine ("De civ. Dei," l. 19, c. 3). Under the present mode of proceeding, however, the philosophical lecture-room becomes a sort of rag-fair for old worn out, cast-off opinions, which are brought there every six months to be aired and beaten. [Add. to 3rd ed.]
[185]I take this opportunity urgently to request that the public will not believe unconditionally any accounts of what I am supposed to have said, even when they are given as quotations; but will first verify the existence of these quotations in my works. In this way many a falsehood will be detected, which can however only be stamped as a direct forgery when accompanied by quotation marks (" "). [Add. to 3rd ed.]
[185]I take this opportunity urgently to request that the public will not believe unconditionally any accounts of what I am supposed to have said, even when they are given as quotations; but will first verify the existence of these quotations in my works. In this way many a falsehood will be detected, which can however only be stamped as a direct forgery when accompanied by quotation marks (" "). [Add. to 3rd ed.]
[186]"Die Welt a. W. u. V.," vol. ii., c. 18, p. 213.
[186]"Die Welt a. W. u. V.," vol. ii., c. 18, p. 213.
[187]So had I written in 1835, when the present treatise was first composed, having published nothing since 1818, before the close of which year "Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung" had appeared. For a Latin version, which I had added to the third volume of "Scriptores ophthalmologici minores,"edenteJ. Radio, in 1830, for the benefit of my foreign readers, of my treatise "On Vision and Colours" (published in 1816), can hardly be said to break the silence of that pause.
[187]So had I written in 1835, when the present treatise was first composed, having published nothing since 1818, before the close of which year "Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung" had appeared. For a Latin version, which I had added to the third volume of "Scriptores ophthalmologici minores,"edenteJ. Radio, in 1830, for the benefit of my foreign readers, of my treatise "On Vision and Colours" (published in 1816), can hardly be said to break the silence of that pause.
[188]As will be seen by the following detailed exposition, Schopenhauer attaches a far wider meaning to the word than is usually given, and regards thewill, not merely asconscious volitionenlightened by Reason and determined by motives, but as the fundamental essence of all that occurs, even where there is no choice. [Tr.]
[188]As will be seen by the following detailed exposition, Schopenhauer attaches a far wider meaning to the word than is usually given, and regards thewill, not merely asconscious volitionenlightened by Reason and determined by motives, but as the fundamental essence of all that occurs, even where there is no choice. [Tr.]
[189]Kant, "Von der wahren Schätzung der lebendigen Kräfte," § 51.
[189]Kant, "Von der wahren Schätzung der lebendigen Kräfte," § 51.
[190]Baltazar Gracian, "El Criticon," iii. 90, to whom I leave the responsibility for the anachronism.
[190]Baltazar Gracian, "El Criticon," iii. 90, to whom I leave the responsibility for the anachronism.
[191]Kant, "Krit. d. r. V." 5th edition, p. 755. (English translation by M. Müller, p. 640.)
[191]Kant, "Krit. d. r. V." 5th edition, p. 755. (English translation by M. Müller, p. 640.)
[192]Schiller, "der langen Rede kurzer Sinn." [Tr.]
[192]Schiller, "der langen Rede kurzer Sinn." [Tr.]
[193]Chapter 20, p. 263; p. 295 of the 3rd edition.
[193]Chapter 20, p. 263; p. 295 of the 3rd edition.
[194]Rosas, "Handbuch der Augenheilkunde" (1830).
[194]Rosas, "Handbuch der Augenheilkunde" (1830).
[195]Göthe, "Tag und Jahreshefte," 1812.
[195]Göthe, "Tag und Jahreshefte," 1812.
[196]This I wrote in 1836. The "Edinburgh Review" has since however greatly deteriorated, and is no longer its old self. I have even seen clerical time-serving in its pages, written down to the level of the mob.
[196]This I wrote in 1836. The "Edinburgh Review" has since however greatly deteriorated, and is no longer its old self. I have even seen clerical time-serving in its pages, written down to the level of the mob.
[197]As a being existing by itself, a thing in itself. [Add. to 3rd ed.]
[197]As a being existing by itself, a thing in itself. [Add. to 3rd ed.]
[198]In which it is lodged in the garret. [Add. to 3rd ed.]
[198]In which it is lodged in the garret. [Add. to 3rd ed.]
[199]By this Schopenhauer means the distinction betweenthe willin its widest sense, regarded as the fundamental essence of all that happens,—even where there is no choice, even where it isunconscious,—andconscious will, implying deliberation and choice, commonly calledfree-will. We must however carefully guard against confounding thisrelativefree-will, withabsolutefree-will (liberum arbitrium indifferentiæ), which Schopenhauer declares to be inadmissible. The sense in which I have used the expression 'free-will' throughout this treatise, is that ofrelativefreedom,i.e.power to choose between different motives, free of all outward restraint (Willkühr). (Tr.)
[199]By this Schopenhauer means the distinction betweenthe willin its widest sense, regarded as the fundamental essence of all that happens,—even where there is no choice, even where it isunconscious,—andconscious will, implying deliberation and choice, commonly calledfree-will. We must however carefully guard against confounding thisrelativefree-will, withabsolutefree-will (liberum arbitrium indifferentiæ), which Schopenhauer declares to be inadmissible. The sense in which I have used the expression 'free-will' throughout this treatise, is that ofrelativefreedom,i.e.power to choose between different motives, free of all outward restraint (Willkühr). (Tr.)
[200]I have shown the difference betweencausein its narrowest sense,stimulus, andmotive, at length in my "Grund-probleme der Ethik" p. 29et seq.
[200]I have shown the difference betweencausein its narrowest sense,stimulus, andmotive, at length in my "Grund-probleme der Ethik" p. 29et seq.
[201]It is especially in secretive processes that we cannot avoid recognising a certain selection of the materials fitted for each purpose, consequently afree willin the secretive organs, which must even be assisted by a certain dull sensation, and in virtue of which each secreting organ only extracts from the same blood that particular secretion which suits it and no others: for instance, the liver only absorbs bile from the blood flowing through it, sending the rest of the blood on, and likewise the salivary glands and the pancreas only secrete saliva, the kidneys only urine, &c. &c. We may therefore compare the organs of secretion to different kinds of cattle grazing on one and the same pasture-land, each of which only browses upon the one sort of herb which suits its own particular appetite. [Add. to 3rd ed.]
[201]It is especially in secretive processes that we cannot avoid recognising a certain selection of the materials fitted for each purpose, consequently afree willin the secretive organs, which must even be assisted by a certain dull sensation, and in virtue of which each secreting organ only extracts from the same blood that particular secretion which suits it and no others: for instance, the liver only absorbs bile from the blood flowing through it, sending the rest of the blood on, and likewise the salivary glands and the pancreas only secrete saliva, the kidneys only urine, &c. &c. We may therefore compare the organs of secretion to different kinds of cattle grazing on one and the same pasture-land, each of which only browses upon the one sort of herb which suits its own particular appetite. [Add. to 3rd ed.]
[202]Treviranus, "Die Erscheinungen und Gesetze des Organischen Lebens," vol. i. pp. 178-185.
[202]Treviranus, "Die Erscheinungen und Gesetze des Organischen Lebens," vol. i. pp. 178-185.
[203]E. H. Weber, "Additamenta ad E. H. Weberi tractatum de motu iridis." Lipsia, 1823.
[203]E. H. Weber, "Additamenta ad E. H. Weberi tractatum de motu iridis." Lipsia, 1823.
[204]Joh. Müller, "Handbuch der Physiologie," p. 764.
[204]Joh. Müller, "Handbuch der Physiologie," p. 764.
[205]Meckel, "A. f. d. P." vol. 5, pp. 195-198.
[205]Meckel, "A. f. d. P." vol. 5, pp. 195-198.
[206]Burdach, "Physiologie," vol. i. § 259, p. 388.
[206]Burdach, "Physiologie," vol. i. § 259, p. 388.
[207]"Transactions of the Asiatic Society of Great Britain," 1824, p. 110.
[207]"Transactions of the Asiatic Society of Great Britain," 1824, p. 110.
[208]"Asiatic Researches," vol. 8, p. 426.
[208]"Asiatic Researches," vol. 8, p. 426.
[209]Ecclesiastes, ch. 7, v. 28.
[209]Ecclesiastes, ch. 7, v. 28.
[210]In my "Parerga," § 94 of the 2nd vol. (§ 96 in the 2nd edition) belongs also to the above.
[210]In my "Parerga," § 94 of the 2nd vol. (§ 96 in the 2nd edition) belongs also to the above.
[211]Ding an sich.
[211]Ding an sich.
[212]Inbegriff.
[212]Inbegriff.
[213]Pander and d'Alton, "Ueber die Skelette der Raubthiere," 1822, p. 7.
[213]Pander and d'Alton, "Ueber die Skelette der Raubthiere," 1822, p. 7.
[214]Burdach, "Physiologie," vol. 2, § 474.
[214]Burdach, "Physiologie," vol. 2, § 474.
[215]Bopp, "Ardschuna's Reise zu Indra's Himmel, nebst anderen Episoden des Mahabharata" (Ardshuna's Journey to Indra's Heaven together with other episodes from the Mahabharata), 1824.
[215]Bopp, "Ardschuna's Reise zu Indra's Himmel, nebst anderen Episoden des Mahabharata" (Ardshuna's Journey to Indra's Heaven together with other episodes from the Mahabharata), 1824.
[216]The Matsya Parana attributes a similar origin to Brahma's four countenances. It relates that, having fallen in love with his daughter Satarupa, and gazed fixedly at her, she stepped aside to avoid his eye; he being ashamed, would not follow her movement; whereupon a new face arose on him directed towards the side where she was and, on her once more moving, the same thing occurred, and was repeated, until at last he had four faces. ("Asiatic Researches," vol. 6, p. 473.) [Add. to 3rd ed.]
[216]The Matsya Parana attributes a similar origin to Brahma's four countenances. It relates that, having fallen in love with his daughter Satarupa, and gazed fixedly at her, she stepped aside to avoid his eye; he being ashamed, would not follow her movement; whereupon a new face arose on him directed towards the side where she was and, on her once more moving, the same thing occurred, and was repeated, until at last he had four faces. ("Asiatic Researches," vol. 6, p. 473.) [Add. to 3rd ed.]
[217]I should like under this name to add a fourth to the three proofs brought forward by Kant,i.e.the proofa terrore, which the ancient saying of Petronius:primus in orbe Deos fecit timor, designates and of which Hume's incomparable "Natural History of Religion" may be considered as the critique. Understood in this sense, even the theologist Schleiermacher's attempted proof might have its truth from the feeling of dependence, though perhaps not exactly that truth which its originator imagined it to have.
[217]I should like under this name to add a fourth to the three proofs brought forward by Kant,i.e.the proofa terrore, which the ancient saying of Petronius:primus in orbe Deos fecit timor, designates and of which Hume's incomparable "Natural History of Religion" may be considered as the critique. Understood in this sense, even the theologist Schleiermacher's attempted proof might have its truth from the feeling of dependence, though perhaps not exactly that truth which its originator imagined it to have.
[218]Socrates propounded it already in detail in Xenophon. ("Mem." i. 4.) [Add. to 3rd ed.]
[218]Socrates propounded it already in detail in Xenophon. ("Mem." i. 4.) [Add. to 3rd ed.]
[219]Priestley, "Disqu. on Matter and Spirit," sect. 16, p. 188.
[219]Priestley, "Disqu. on Matter and Spirit," sect. 16, p. 188.
[220]Part 7, and in other places.
[220]Part 7, and in other places.
[221]See "Die Welt als W. u. V." vol. i. p. 597. (Vol. i. p. 631 of the 3rd ed.)
[221]See "Die Welt als W. u. V." vol. i. p. 597. (Vol. i. p. 631 of the 3rd ed.)
[222]The point at which the life-spark is kindled. [Tr.]
[222]The point at which the life-spark is kindled. [Tr.]
[223]Nor can amundus intelligibilisprecede amundus sensibilis; since it receives its material from the latter alone. It is not an intellect which has brought forth Nature; it is, on the contrary, Nature which has brought forth the intellect. [Add. to 3rd ed.]
[223]Nor can amundus intelligibilisprecede amundus sensibilis; since it receives its material from the latter alone. It is not an intellect which has brought forth Nature; it is, on the contrary, Nature which has brought forth the intellect. [Add. to 3rd ed.]
[224]This is expanded, vol. iv. pp. 825-843.
[224]This is expanded, vol. iv. pp. 825-843.
[225]I have seen (Zooplast. Cab. 1860) a humming-bird (colibri) with a beak as long as the whole bird, head and tail included. This bird must certainly have had to fetch out its food from a considerable depth, were it only from the calyx of a flower (Cuvier, "Anat. Comp." vol. iv. p. 374); otherwise it would not have given itself the luxury, or submitted to the encumbrance, of such a beak.
[225]I have seen (Zooplast. Cab. 1860) a humming-bird (colibri) with a beak as long as the whole bird, head and tail included. This bird must certainly have had to fetch out its food from a considerable depth, were it only from the calyx of a flower (Cuvier, "Anat. Comp." vol. iv. p. 374); otherwise it would not have given itself the luxury, or submitted to the encumbrance, of such a beak.
[226]Galenus, "De Usu Partium Anim.," i. 1.
[226]Galenus, "De Usu Partium Anim.," i. 1.
[227]Lucretius, v. pp. 1032-1039.
[227]Lucretius, v. pp. 1032-1039.
[228]Aristot., "De Part. Animal.," iv. 6: "They have a weapon because they have passion." [Tr.]
[228]Aristot., "De Part. Animal.," iv. 6: "They have a weapon because they have passion." [Tr.]
[229]Ibid.c. 12: "Nature makes the tools for the work, not the work for the tools." [Tr.]
[229]Ibid.c. 12: "Nature makes the tools for the work, not the work for the tools." [Tr.]
[230]De Lamarck, "Philosophie Zoologique," vol. i. c. 7, and "Histoire Naturelle des Animaux sans Vertèbres," vol. i. Introd. pp. 180-212.
[230]De Lamarck, "Philosophie Zoologique," vol. i. c. 7, and "Histoire Naturelle des Animaux sans Vertèbres," vol. i. Introd. pp. 180-212.
[231]Urthier.
[231]Urthier.
[232]Animated by the feeling of this truth, Robert Owen, after passing in review the numerous and often very large Australian fossilemarsupialia—sometimes as big as the rhinoceros—came as early as 1842 to the conclusion, that a large beast of prey must have contemporaneously existed. This conclusion was afterwards confirmed, for in 1846 he received part of the fossile skull of a beast of prey of the size of the lion, which he namedthylacoleo,i.e.lion with a pouch, since it is also a marsupial. (See the "Times" of the 19th of May, 1866, where there is an article on "Palæontology," with an account of Owen's lecture at the Government School of Mines.) [Add. to 3rd ed.]
[232]Animated by the feeling of this truth, Robert Owen, after passing in review the numerous and often very large Australian fossilemarsupialia—sometimes as big as the rhinoceros—came as early as 1842 to the conclusion, that a large beast of prey must have contemporaneously existed. This conclusion was afterwards confirmed, for in 1846 he received part of the fossile skull of a beast of prey of the size of the lion, which he namedthylacoleo,i.e.lion with a pouch, since it is also a marsupial. (See the "Times" of the 19th of May, 1866, where there is an article on "Palæontology," with an account of Owen's lecture at the Government School of Mines.) [Add. to 3rd ed.]
[233]Kirby and Spence, "Introduction to Entomology," vol. i. p. 355. [Add. to 3rd ed.]
[233]Kirby and Spence, "Introduction to Entomology," vol. i. p. 355. [Add. to 3rd ed.]
[234]Blumenbach, "De hum. gen. variet. nat." p. 50. Sömmering, "On the Negro," p. 8.
[234]Blumenbach, "De hum. gen. variet. nat." p. 50. Sömmering, "On the Negro," p. 8.
[235]That the lowest place should be given to the rodents, seems however to proceed fromà priorirather than fromà posterioriconsiderations: that is to say, from the circumstance, that their brain has extremely faint or small convolutions; so that too much weight may have been given to this point. In sheep and calves the convolutions are numerous and deep, yet how is it with their intelligence? The mechanical instincts of the beaver are again greatly assisted by its understanding, and even rabbits show remarkable intelligence (see Leroy's beautiful work: "LettresPhilosophiques sur l'Intelligence des Animaux," lettre 3, p. 149). Even rats give proof of quite uncommon intelligence, of which some remarkable instances may be found in the "Quarterly Review," No. 201, Jan.-March, 1857, in a special article entitled "Rats."
[235]That the lowest place should be given to the rodents, seems however to proceed fromà priorirather than fromà posterioriconsiderations: that is to say, from the circumstance, that their brain has extremely faint or small convolutions; so that too much weight may have been given to this point. In sheep and calves the convolutions are numerous and deep, yet how is it with their intelligence? The mechanical instincts of the beaver are again greatly assisted by its understanding, and even rabbits show remarkable intelligence (see Leroy's beautiful work: "LettresPhilosophiques sur l'Intelligence des Animaux," lettre 3, p. 149). Even rats give proof of quite uncommon intelligence, of which some remarkable instances may be found in the "Quarterly Review," No. 201, Jan.-March, 1857, in a special article entitled "Rats."
[236]The most intelligent birds are also birds of prey, wherefore many of them, especially falcons, are highly susceptible of training. [Add. to 3rd ed.]
[236]The most intelligent birds are also birds of prey, wherefore many of them, especially falcons, are highly susceptible of training. [Add. to 3rd ed.]
[237]That the negroes should have become the special victims of the slave-trade, is evidently a consequence of the inferiority of their intelligence compared with that of other human races; though this by no means justifies the fact. [Add. to 3rd ed.]
[237]That the negroes should have become the special victims of the slave-trade, is evidently a consequence of the inferiority of their intelligence compared with that of other human races; though this by no means justifies the fact. [Add. to 3rd ed.]
[238]As is likewise his capacity for escaping from his pursuers; for in this respect all the four-footed mammalia surpass him. [Add. to 3rd ed.]
[238]As is likewise his capacity for escaping from his pursuers; for in this respect all the four-footed mammalia surpass him. [Add. to 3rd ed.]
[239][See Third Book of the W. a. W. u. V.; later also, in my "Parerga," vol. ii. §§ 50-57 and § 206. (§§ 51-58, and § 210 of the 2nd edition.)]
[239][See Third Book of the W. a. W. u. V.; later also, in my "Parerga," vol. ii. §§ 50-57 and § 206. (§§ 51-58, and § 210 of the 2nd edition.)]
[240]"Principes de Philosophie Zoologique," 1830.
[240]"Principes de Philosophie Zoologique," 1830.
[241]"Parerga," vol. ii. § 91; § 93 of the 2nd edition.
[241]"Parerga," vol. ii. § 91; § 93 of the 2nd edition.
[242]See Aristotle, "De Partibus Animalium," iii. c. 2sub finem: πῶς δὲ τῆς αναγκαίας φύσεως κ. τ. λ.
[242]See Aristotle, "De Partibus Animalium," iii. c. 2sub finem: πῶς δὲ τῆς αναγκαίας φύσεως κ. τ. λ.
[243]The appearance of every animal therefore presents a totality, a unity, a perfection and a rigidly carried out harmony in all its parts which is so entirely based upon a single fundamental thought, that even the strangest animal shape seems to the attentive observer as if it were the only right, nay, only possible form of existence, and as if there could be no other than just this very one. The expression "natural" used to denote that a thing is a matter of course, and that it cannot be otherwise, is in its deepest foundation based upon this. Göthe himself was struck by this unity when contemplating whelks and crabs at Venice, and it caused him to exclaim: "How delightful, how glorious is a living thing! how well adapted for its condition; how true, how real!" ("Life," vol. iv. p. 223). No artist therefore, who has not made it his business to study such forms for years and to penetrate into their meaning and comprehension, can rightly imitate them. Without this study his work will seem as if it were pasted together: the parts no doubt will be there, but the bond which unites them and gives them cohesion, the spirit, the idea, which is the objectivity of the primary act of the will presenting itself as this or that particular species, will be wanting. [Add. to 3rd ed.]
[243]The appearance of every animal therefore presents a totality, a unity, a perfection and a rigidly carried out harmony in all its parts which is so entirely based upon a single fundamental thought, that even the strangest animal shape seems to the attentive observer as if it were the only right, nay, only possible form of existence, and as if there could be no other than just this very one. The expression "natural" used to denote that a thing is a matter of course, and that it cannot be otherwise, is in its deepest foundation based upon this. Göthe himself was struck by this unity when contemplating whelks and crabs at Venice, and it caused him to exclaim: "How delightful, how glorious is a living thing! how well adapted for its condition; how true, how real!" ("Life," vol. iv. p. 223). No artist therefore, who has not made it his business to study such forms for years and to penetrate into their meaning and comprehension, can rightly imitate them. Without this study his work will seem as if it were pasted together: the parts no doubt will be there, but the bond which unites them and gives them cohesion, the spirit, the idea, which is the objectivity of the primary act of the will presenting itself as this or that particular species, will be wanting. [Add. to 3rd ed.]
[244]It is a great truth which Bruno expresses ("De Immenso et Innumerabili," 8, 10): "Ars tractat materiam alienam: natura materiam propriam. Ars circa materiam est; natura interior materiæ." He treats this subject much more fully, "Della Causa," Dial. 3, p. 252et seqq.Page 255 he declares theforma substantialisto be the form of every product of Nature, which is the same as thesoul. [Add. to 3rd ed.]
[244]It is a great truth which Bruno expresses ("De Immenso et Innumerabili," 8, 10): "Ars tractat materiam alienam: natura materiam propriam. Ars circa materiam est; natura interior materiæ." He treats this subject much more fully, "Della Causa," Dial. 3, p. 252et seqq.Page 255 he declares theforma substantialisto be the form of every product of Nature, which is the same as thesoul. [Add. to 3rd ed.]
[245]Thus the saying of the Schoolmen is verified: "Materia appetit formam." See "Die Welt a. W. u. V." 3rd edition, vol. ii. p. 352. [Add. to 3rd ed.]
[245]Thus the saying of the Schoolmen is verified: "Materia appetit formam." See "Die Welt a. W. u. V." 3rd edition, vol. ii. p. 352. [Add. to 3rd ed.]
[246]Compare "Die Welt a. W. u. V." 3rd edition, vol. II. p. 375. [Add. to 3rd ed.]
[246]Compare "Die Welt a. W. u. V." 3rd edition, vol. II. p. 375. [Add. to 3rd ed.]
[247]Vol. i. p. 245. 1826.
[247]Vol. i. p. 245. 1826.
[248]Repeated in the "Times" of June 2nd, 1841.
[248]Repeated in the "Times" of June 2nd, 1841.
[249]Vol. v. p. 171. Paris, 1826.
[249]Vol. v. p. 171. Paris, 1826.
[250]C. H. Schultz, "Sur la Circulation dans les Plantes," a prize-essay, 1839.
[250]C. H. Schultz, "Sur la Circulation dans les Plantes," a prize-essay, 1839.
[251]F. J. Meyen, "Neues System der Pflanzenphysiologe" (1839), vol. iii. p. 585.
[251]F. J. Meyen, "Neues System der Pflanzenphysiologe" (1839), vol. iii. p. 585.
[252]These have been translated for the "Bibliothèque Britannique, Section des Sciences et Arts," vol. lii.
[252]These have been translated for the "Bibliothèque Britannique, Section des Sciences et Arts," vol. lii.
[253]Treviranus, "Die Erscheinungen und Gesetze des Organischen Lebens" (Phenomena and Laws of Organic Life), vol. i. p. 173.
[253]Treviranus, "Die Erscheinungen und Gesetze des Organischen Lebens" (Phenomena and Laws of Organic Life), vol. i. p. 173.
[254]Brandis, "On Life and Polarity," 1836, p. 88, says: "The roots of rock-plants seek nourishing mould in the most delicate crevices of rocks. These roots cling to a nourishing bone in dense clusters. I saw a root whose growth was intercepted by the sole of an old shoe: it divided itself into as many fibres as the shoe-sole had holes—those by which it had been stitched together—but as soon as these fibres had overcome the obstruction and grown through the holes, they united again to a common stem." And p. 87: "If Sprengel's observations are confirmed, even mediate relations are perceived (by plants) in order to obtain this end (fructification): that is to say, the anthers of thenigellabend down in order to put the pollen on the bees' backs, and the pistils bend in like manner to receive it from the bees." [Add. to 3rd ed.]
[254]Brandis, "On Life and Polarity," 1836, p. 88, says: "The roots of rock-plants seek nourishing mould in the most delicate crevices of rocks. These roots cling to a nourishing bone in dense clusters. I saw a root whose growth was intercepted by the sole of an old shoe: it divided itself into as many fibres as the shoe-sole had holes—those by which it had been stitched together—but as soon as these fibres had overcome the obstruction and grown through the holes, they united again to a common stem." And p. 87: "If Sprengel's observations are confirmed, even mediate relations are perceived (by plants) in order to obtain this end (fructification): that is to say, the anthers of thenigellabend down in order to put the pollen on the bees' backs, and the pistils bend in like manner to receive it from the bees." [Add. to 3rd ed.]
[255]In this connection I may mention an analysis of an entirely different kind, given by the French Academician Babinet in an article in which he treats of the seasons on the planets. It is contained in the No. of the 15th January, 1856, of the "Revue des Deux Mondes," and I will give the chief substance of it here in translation. The object of it is to refer to its direct cause the well-known fact, that cereals only thrive in temperate climates. "If grain did not necessarily perish in winter, if it were perennial, it would not bear ears, and there would be no harvest. In the hotter portions of Africa, Asia and America, where no winter kills the grain, these plants grow like grass with us: they multiply by means of shoots, remain always green, and neither form ears nor run to seed. In cold climates, on the contrary, the organism of these plants seems by some inconceivable miracle to feel, as it were by anticipation, the necessity of passing through the seed-phase in order to escape dying off in the winterseason"(L'organisme de la plante, par un inconcevable miracle,semble préssentir lanécessitéde passer par l'état de graine, pour ne pas périr complètement pendant la saison rigoureuse). In a similar way, districts which have a "droughty season,"—that is to say a season in which all plants are parched up with drought—"tropical countries, for instance Jamaica, produce grain; because there the plant, moved by the same organic presentiment (par le mêmepressentiment organique), in order to multiply, hastens to bear seed at the approach of the season in which it would have to dry up." In the fact which this author describes as an inconceivable miracle, we recognise a manifestation of the plant's will in increased potency, since here it appears as the will of the species, and makes preparations for the future in a similar way to animal instinct, without being guided by knowledge of that future in doing so. Here we see plants in warmer climates dispensing with a complicated process to which a cold climate alone had obliged them. In similar instances animals do precisely the same thing, especially bees. Leroy in his admirable work "Lettres Philosophiques sur l'Intelligence des Animaux" (3rd letter, p. 231) relates, that some bees which had been taken to South America continued at first to gather honey as usual and to build their cells just as when they were at home; but that when they gradually became aware that plants blossom there all the year round, they left off working. The animal world supplies a fact analogous to the above mentioned change in the mode of multiplying in cereals. This is the abnormal mode of propagation for which theaphideshave long been noted. The femaleaphide, as is well known, propagates for 10-12 generations without any pairing with the male, and by a variety of the ovoviviparous process. This goes on all summer; but in autumn the males appear, impregnation takes place, and eggs are laid as winter quarters for the whole species, since it is only in this shape that it is able to outlive the winter. (Add. to 3rd ed.)
[255]In this connection I may mention an analysis of an entirely different kind, given by the French Academician Babinet in an article in which he treats of the seasons on the planets. It is contained in the No. of the 15th January, 1856, of the "Revue des Deux Mondes," and I will give the chief substance of it here in translation. The object of it is to refer to its direct cause the well-known fact, that cereals only thrive in temperate climates. "If grain did not necessarily perish in winter, if it were perennial, it would not bear ears, and there would be no harvest. In the hotter portions of Africa, Asia and America, where no winter kills the grain, these plants grow like grass with us: they multiply by means of shoots, remain always green, and neither form ears nor run to seed. In cold climates, on the contrary, the organism of these plants seems by some inconceivable miracle to feel, as it were by anticipation, the necessity of passing through the seed-phase in order to escape dying off in the winterseason"(L'organisme de la plante, par un inconcevable miracle,semble préssentir lanécessitéde passer par l'état de graine, pour ne pas périr complètement pendant la saison rigoureuse). In a similar way, districts which have a "droughty season,"—that is to say a season in which all plants are parched up with drought—"tropical countries, for instance Jamaica, produce grain; because there the plant, moved by the same organic presentiment (par le mêmepressentiment organique), in order to multiply, hastens to bear seed at the approach of the season in which it would have to dry up." In the fact which this author describes as an inconceivable miracle, we recognise a manifestation of the plant's will in increased potency, since here it appears as the will of the species, and makes preparations for the future in a similar way to animal instinct, without being guided by knowledge of that future in doing so. Here we see plants in warmer climates dispensing with a complicated process to which a cold climate alone had obliged them. In similar instances animals do precisely the same thing, especially bees. Leroy in his admirable work "Lettres Philosophiques sur l'Intelligence des Animaux" (3rd letter, p. 231) relates, that some bees which had been taken to South America continued at first to gather honey as usual and to build their cells just as when they were at home; but that when they gradually became aware that plants blossom there all the year round, they left off working. The animal world supplies a fact analogous to the above mentioned change in the mode of multiplying in cereals. This is the abnormal mode of propagation for which theaphideshave long been noted. The femaleaphide, as is well known, propagates for 10-12 generations without any pairing with the male, and by a variety of the ovoviviparous process. This goes on all summer; but in autumn the males appear, impregnation takes place, and eggs are laid as winter quarters for the whole species, since it is only in this shape that it is able to outlive the winter. (Add. to 3rd ed.)
[256]Plat. "Tim." p. 403. Bip.
[256]Plat. "Tim." p. 403. Bip.
[257]"Die Welt a. W. u. V." vol. ii. chap. 23.
[257]"Die Welt a. W. u. V." vol. ii. chap. 23.
[258]Compare "Die Welt a. W. u. V." vol. ii. chap. 22: "Objective View of the Intellect."
[258]Compare "Die Welt a. W. u. V." vol. ii. chap. 22: "Objective View of the Intellect."
[259]Plan.
[259]Plan.
[260]Between two kinds of food, both equallyRemote and tempting, first a man might dieOf hunger, ere he one could freely chuse. (Cary's Tr.)
Between two kinds of food, both equallyRemote and tempting, first a man might dieOf hunger, ere he one could freely chuse. (Cary's Tr.)
Between two kinds of food, both equallyRemote and tempting, first a man might dieOf hunger, ere he one could freely chuse. (Cary's Tr.)
Between two kinds of food, both equallyRemote and tempting, first a man might dieOf hunger, ere he one could freely chuse. (Cary's Tr.)
Between two kinds of food, both equally
Remote and tempting, first a man might die
Of hunger, ere he one could freely chuse. (Cary's Tr.)
[261]Herschel, "Treatise on Astronomy," chap. 7, § 371 of the 1st edition, 1833.
[261]Herschel, "Treatise on Astronomy," chap. 7, § 371 of the 1st edition, 1833.
[262]Even Copernicus had said the same thing long before "Equidem existimo Gravitatem non aliud esse quam appetentiam quandam naturalem, partibus inditam a divina providentia opificis universorum, ut in unitatem integritatemque suam se conferant, in formam Globi coeuntes. Quam affectionem credibile est etiam Soli, Lunæ cæterisque errantium fulgoribus, inesse, ut ejus efficacia, in ea qua se repraesentant rotunditate permaneant; quæ nihilominus multis modis suos efficiunt circuitus" ("Nicol. Copernici revol." Lib. I, Cap. IX. Compare "Exposition des Découvertes de M. le Chevalier Newton par M. Maclaurin; traduit de l'Anglois par M. Lavirotte," Paris, 1749, p. 45). Herschel evidently saw, that if we hesitate to explain gravity, as Descartes did, by an impulse from outside, we are absolutely driven to admit a will inherent in bodies,Non datur tertium. [Add. to 3rd ed.]
[262]Even Copernicus had said the same thing long before "Equidem existimo Gravitatem non aliud esse quam appetentiam quandam naturalem, partibus inditam a divina providentia opificis universorum, ut in unitatem integritatemque suam se conferant, in formam Globi coeuntes. Quam affectionem credibile est etiam Soli, Lunæ cæterisque errantium fulgoribus, inesse, ut ejus efficacia, in ea qua se repraesentant rotunditate permaneant; quæ nihilominus multis modis suos efficiunt circuitus" ("Nicol. Copernici revol." Lib. I, Cap. IX. Compare "Exposition des Découvertes de M. le Chevalier Newton par M. Maclaurin; traduit de l'Anglois par M. Lavirotte," Paris, 1749, p. 45). Herschel evidently saw, that if we hesitate to explain gravity, as Descartes did, by an impulse from outside, we are absolutely driven to admit a will inherent in bodies,Non datur tertium. [Add. to 3rd ed.]