LINGUISTIC.All that I have to record under this head is an observation of my own, made within the last few years, which seems hitherto to have escaped notice. Yet, that it is worthy of consideration, is attested by Seneca's utterance:[273]Mira in quibusdam rebus verborum proprietas est, et consuetudo sermonis antiqui quædam efficacissimis notis signat.Lichtenberg too says: "If one thinks much oneself, one finds a good deal of wisdom deposited in language. It is hardly likely that we have laid it all there ourselves, but rather that a great deal of wisdom really lies there."In many, perhaps in all, languages, the action even of those bodies which are without intellect, nay of inanimate bodies, is expressed by the wordsto will, so that the existence of a will in these bodies is thus taken for granted; but they are never credited with a faculty for knowing, representing, perceiving or thinking: I know of no expression which conveys this.Seneca, when speaking of lightning shot down from heaven, says:[274]"In his, ignibus accidit, quod arboribus: quarum cacumina, si tenera sunt, ita deorsum trahi possunt, ut etiam terram attingant; sed quum permiseris, in locum suum exsilient. Itaque non est quod eum spectes cujusque rei habitum, qui illi nonex voluntateest. Si ignem permittis ire quo velit, cœlum repetet." In a moregeneral sense Pliny says:nec quærenda in ulla parte naturæ ratio, sed voluntas.[275]Nor do we find Greek less fertile in instances. Aristotle, when explaining gravity, says: μικρὸν μὲν μόριον τῆς γῆς, ἐὰν μετεωρισθὲν ἀφεθῇ, φέρεται, καὶ μένειν οὐκ ἐθέλει (parva quædam terræ pars, si elevata dimittitur, neque vult manere).[276]And: Δεῖ δὲ ἕκαστον λέγειν τοιοῦτον εἶναι, ὃ φύσειβούλεταιεἶναι, καὶ ὃ ὑπάρχει, ἀλλὰ μὴ ὃ βίᾳ καὶ παρὰ φύσιν (unumquodque autem tale dicere oportet, quale naturâ suâ esse vult, et quod est; sed non id quod violentiâ et præter naturam est).[277]Of great and more than merely linguistic importance is what Aristotle says in his "Ethica magna,"[278]where not only animals, but inanimate beings (fire striving upwards and earth downwards) are explicitly in question, and he asserts that they may be obliged to do something contrary to their nature or their will: παρὰ φύσιν τι, ἢ παρ' ἃβούλονταιποιεῖν,—and therefore rightly places παρ' ἃ βούλονται as a paraphrase of παρὰ φύσιν.—Anacreon, in his 29th Ode, εἰς Βάθυλλον, in ordering the portrait of his lady-love, says of her hair: Ἕλικας δ' ἐλευθέρους μοι πλοκάμων, ἄτακτα συνθείς, ἄφες, ὡςθέλωσι, κεῖσθαι (capillorum cirros incomposite jungens, sine utut volunt jacere).[279]In German, Bürger says: "hinabwillder Bach, nicht hinan" (the brookwillgo downwards not upwards). In daily life we constantly hear: "the water boils, itwillrun over,"—"the glasswillbreak,"—"the ladderwillnot stand;"—"le feu neveutpas brûler."—"la corde, une fois tordue, veuttoujours se retordre."—In English, the verb 'towill' is even the auxiliary of the future of all the other verbs, thus expressing the notion, that there lies a will at the bottom of every action. In English moreover, the endeavours of all inanimate and unconscious things, are expressly designated by the wordwant, which denotes every sort of human desire or endeavour: "the waterwantsto get out,"—"the steamwantsto find an issue."—In Italian too we have "vuolpiovere;" "quest' orologio nonvuolandare."—The conception of willing is besides so deeply rooted in this last language, that it seems to indicate everything that is requisite or necessary: "civuolun contrappeso;" "civuolpazienza."A very striking instance of this is to be found even in Chinese—a language which differs fundamentally from all those belonging to the Sanskrit family—it is in the commentary to the Y-King,[280]accurately rendered by Peter Regis as follows: "Yang, seu materia cœlestis, vultrursus ingredi, vel(ut verbis doctoris Tsching-tse utar) vultrursus esse in superiore loco; scilicet illius naturæ ratio ita fert, seu innatalex."The following passage from Liebig[281]has decidedly much more than a linguistic signification, for it expresses an intimate feeling and comprehension of the way in which a chemical process takes place. "Aldehyd arises, which with the sameavidityas sulphurous acid, combines directly with oxygen to form acetic acid."—And again:[282]"Aldehyd, which absorbs oxygen from the air withgreat avidity." As Liebig uses this expression twice in speaking of the same phenomenon, it can hardly be by chance, but rather because it was the only adequate expression for the thing.[283]That most immediate stamp of our thoughts, language, shows us therefore, that every inward impulse must necessarily be conceived as volition; but it by no means ascribes knowledge to things as well. The agreement on this point between all languages, perhaps without a single exception, proves that here we have to do with no mere figure of speech, but that the verbal expression is determined by a deeply-rooted feeling of the inner nature of things.
All that I have to record under this head is an observation of my own, made within the last few years, which seems hitherto to have escaped notice. Yet, that it is worthy of consideration, is attested by Seneca's utterance:[273]Mira in quibusdam rebus verborum proprietas est, et consuetudo sermonis antiqui quædam efficacissimis notis signat.Lichtenberg too says: "If one thinks much oneself, one finds a good deal of wisdom deposited in language. It is hardly likely that we have laid it all there ourselves, but rather that a great deal of wisdom really lies there."
In many, perhaps in all, languages, the action even of those bodies which are without intellect, nay of inanimate bodies, is expressed by the wordsto will, so that the existence of a will in these bodies is thus taken for granted; but they are never credited with a faculty for knowing, representing, perceiving or thinking: I know of no expression which conveys this.
Seneca, when speaking of lightning shot down from heaven, says:[274]"In his, ignibus accidit, quod arboribus: quarum cacumina, si tenera sunt, ita deorsum trahi possunt, ut etiam terram attingant; sed quum permiseris, in locum suum exsilient. Itaque non est quod eum spectes cujusque rei habitum, qui illi nonex voluntateest. Si ignem permittis ire quo velit, cœlum repetet." In a moregeneral sense Pliny says:nec quærenda in ulla parte naturæ ratio, sed voluntas.[275]Nor do we find Greek less fertile in instances. Aristotle, when explaining gravity, says: μικρὸν μὲν μόριον τῆς γῆς, ἐὰν μετεωρισθὲν ἀφεθῇ, φέρεται, καὶ μένειν οὐκ ἐθέλει (parva quædam terræ pars, si elevata dimittitur, neque vult manere).[276]And: Δεῖ δὲ ἕκαστον λέγειν τοιοῦτον εἶναι, ὃ φύσειβούλεταιεἶναι, καὶ ὃ ὑπάρχει, ἀλλὰ μὴ ὃ βίᾳ καὶ παρὰ φύσιν (unumquodque autem tale dicere oportet, quale naturâ suâ esse vult, et quod est; sed non id quod violentiâ et præter naturam est).[277]Of great and more than merely linguistic importance is what Aristotle says in his "Ethica magna,"[278]where not only animals, but inanimate beings (fire striving upwards and earth downwards) are explicitly in question, and he asserts that they may be obliged to do something contrary to their nature or their will: παρὰ φύσιν τι, ἢ παρ' ἃβούλονταιποιεῖν,—and therefore rightly places παρ' ἃ βούλονται as a paraphrase of παρὰ φύσιν.—Anacreon, in his 29th Ode, εἰς Βάθυλλον, in ordering the portrait of his lady-love, says of her hair: Ἕλικας δ' ἐλευθέρους μοι πλοκάμων, ἄτακτα συνθείς, ἄφες, ὡςθέλωσι, κεῖσθαι (capillorum cirros incomposite jungens, sine utut volunt jacere).[279]In German, Bürger says: "hinabwillder Bach, nicht hinan" (the brookwillgo downwards not upwards). In daily life we constantly hear: "the water boils, itwillrun over,"—"the glasswillbreak,"—"the ladderwillnot stand;"—"le feu neveutpas brûler."—"la corde, une fois tordue, veuttoujours se retordre."—In English, the verb 'towill' is even the auxiliary of the future of all the other verbs, thus expressing the notion, that there lies a will at the bottom of every action. In English moreover, the endeavours of all inanimate and unconscious things, are expressly designated by the wordwant, which denotes every sort of human desire or endeavour: "the waterwantsto get out,"—"the steamwantsto find an issue."—In Italian too we have "vuolpiovere;" "quest' orologio nonvuolandare."—The conception of willing is besides so deeply rooted in this last language, that it seems to indicate everything that is requisite or necessary: "civuolun contrappeso;" "civuolpazienza."
A very striking instance of this is to be found even in Chinese—a language which differs fundamentally from all those belonging to the Sanskrit family—it is in the commentary to the Y-King,[280]accurately rendered by Peter Regis as follows: "Yang, seu materia cœlestis, vultrursus ingredi, vel(ut verbis doctoris Tsching-tse utar) vultrursus esse in superiore loco; scilicet illius naturæ ratio ita fert, seu innatalex."
The following passage from Liebig[281]has decidedly much more than a linguistic signification, for it expresses an intimate feeling and comprehension of the way in which a chemical process takes place. "Aldehyd arises, which with the sameavidityas sulphurous acid, combines directly with oxygen to form acetic acid."—And again:[282]"Aldehyd, which absorbs oxygen from the air withgreat avidity." As Liebig uses this expression twice in speaking of the same phenomenon, it can hardly be by chance, but rather because it was the only adequate expression for the thing.[283]That most immediate stamp of our thoughts, language, shows us therefore, that every inward impulse must necessarily be conceived as volition; but it by no means ascribes knowledge to things as well. The agreement on this point between all languages, perhaps without a single exception, proves that here we have to do with no mere figure of speech, but that the verbal expression is determined by a deeply-rooted feeling of the inner nature of things.