TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE.In venturing to lay the present translation[1]before the public, I am aware of the great difficulties of my task, and indeed can hardly hope to do justice to the Author. In fact, had it not been for the considerations I am about to state, I might probably never have published what had originally been undertaken in order to acquire a clearer comprehension of these essays, rather than with a view to publicity.The two treatises which form the contents of the present volume have so much importance for a profound and correct knowledge of Schopenhauer's philosophy, that it may even be doubted whether the translation of his chief work, "Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung," can contribute much towards the appreciation of his system without the help at least of the "Vierfache Wurzel des Satzes vom zureichenden Grunde." Schopenhauer himself repeatedly and urgently insists upon a previous thorough knowledge of Kant's philosophy, as the basis, and of his own "Fourfold Root," as the key, to his own system, asserting that knowledge to be the indispensable condition for a right comprehension of his meaning. So far as I am aware, neither the "Fourfold Root" nor the "Will in Nature" have as yet found a translator; therefore, considering the dawning interest which has begun to make itself felt for Schopenhauer's philosophy in England and in America, and the fact thatno more competent scholar has come forward to do the work, it may not seem presumptuous to suppose that this version may be acceptable to those who wish to acquire a more than superficial knowledge of this remarkable thinker, yet whose acquaintance with German does not permit them to read his works in the original.Now although some portions of both the Essays published in the present volume have of course become antiquated, owing to the subsequent development of the empirical sciences, while others—such as, for instance, Schopenhauer's denunciation of plagiarism in the cases of Brandis and Rosas in the beginning of Physiology and Pathology[2]—can have no interest for the reader of the present day, I have nevertheless given them just as he left them and refrained from all suppression or alteration. And if, on the whole, the "Will in Nature" may be less indispensable for a right understanding of our philosopher's views than the "Fourfold Root," being merely a record of the confirmations which had been contributed during his lifetime by the various branches of Natural Science to his doctrine, thatthe thing in itself is the will, the Second Essay has nevertheless in its own way quite as much importance as the First, and is, in a sense, its complement. For they both throw light on Schopenhauer's view of the Universe in its double aspect as Will and as Representation, each being as it werea résuméof the exposition of one of those aspects. My plea for uniting them in one volume, in spite of the difference of their contents and the wide lapse of time (seventeen years) which lies between them, must be, that they complete each other, and that their great weight and intrinsic value seem to point them out as peculiarly fitted to be introduced to the English thinker.In endeavouring to convey the Author's thoughts as heexpresses them, I have necessarily encountered many and great difficulties. His meaning, though always clearly expressed, is not always easy to seize, even for his countrymen; as a foreigner, therefore, I may often have failed to grasp, let alone adequately to render, that meaning. In this case besides, the responsibility for any want of perspicuity cannot be shifted by the translator on to the Author; since the consummate perfection of Schopenhauer's prose is universally recognised, even by those who reject, or at least who do not share, his views. An eminent German writer of our time has not hesitated to rank him immediately after Lessing and Göthe as the third greatest German prose-writer, and only quite recently a German professor, in a speech delivered with the intent of demolishing Schopenhauer's philosophy, was reluctantly obliged to admit that his works would remain on account of their literary value. Göthe himself expressed admiration for the clearness of exposition in Schopenhauer's chief work and for the beauty of his style.The chief obstacle I have encountered in translating these Essays, did not therefore consist in the obscurity of the Author's style, nor even in the difficulty of finding appropriate terms wherewith to convey his meaning; although at times certainly the want of complete precision in our philosophical terminology made itself keenly felt and the selection was often far from easy: it lay rather in the great difference in the way of thinking and of expressing their thoughts which lies between the two nations. The regions of German and English thought are indeed separated by a gulf, which at first seems impassable, yet which must be bridged over by some means or other, if a right comprehension is to be achieved. The German writer loves to develop synthetically a single thought in a long period consisting of various members; he proceeds steadily to unravel the seemingly tangled skein, while he keeps the reader ever on the alert, making him assist actively in the process and never lettinghim lose sight of the main thread. The English author, on the contrary, anxious before all things to avoid confusion and misunderstanding, and ready for this end not only to sacrifice harmony of proportion in construction, but to submit to the necessity of occasional artificial joining, usually adopts the analytical method. He prefers to divide the thread of his discourse into several smaller skeins, easier certainly to handle and thus better suiting the convenience of the English thinker, to whom long periods are trying and bewildering, and who is not always willing to wait half a page or more for the point of a sentence or the gist of a thought. Wherever it could be done without interfering seriously with the spirit of the original, I have broken up the longer periods in these essays into smaller sentences, in order to facilitate their comprehension. At times however Schopenhauer recapitulates a whole side of his view of the Universe in a single period of what seems intolerable length to the English reader: as, for instance, therésumécontained in the Introduction to his "Will in Nature,"[3]which could not be divided without damage to his meaning. Here therefore it did not seem advisable to sacrifice the unity and harmony of his design and to disturb both his form and his meaning, in order to minister to the reader's dislike for mental exertion; in keeping the period intact I have however endeavoured to make it as easy to comprehend as possible by the way in which the single parts are presented to the eye.As regards the terms chosen to convey the German meaning, I can hardly hope to have succeeded in every case in adequately rendering it, still less can I expect to have satisfied my English readers. Several words of frequent occurrence and of considerable importance for the right understanding of the original, have been used atdifferent times by different English philosophers in senses so various, that, until our philosophical terminology has by universal consent attained far greater precision than at present, it must always be difficult for the writer or translator to convey to the reader's mind precisely the same thought that was in his own. To prevent unnecessary confusion however, by leaving too much to chance, I will here briefly state those terms which give most latitude for misapprehension, explaining the sense in which I employ them and also the special meaning attached to some of them by Schopenhauer, who often differs in this from other writers. They are as follows.(a.)Anschauung(anschauen, literally 'to behold') I have rendered differently, according to its double meaning in German. When used to designate the mental act by which an object is perceived, as the cause of a sensation received, it is rendered byperception. When used to lay stress uponimmediate, as opposed toabstractrepresentation, it is rendered byintuition. This last occurs however more often in the adjective form.(b.)Vorstellung(vorstellen, literally 'to place before') I render byrepresentationin spite of its foreign, unwelcome sound to the English ear, as being the term which nearest approaches the German meaning. The faculty of representation is defined by Schopenhauer himself as "an exceedingly complicated physiological process in the brain of an animal, the result of which is the consciousness of apicturethere."(c.)Auffassung(auffassen, literally 'to catch up') has so many shades of meaning in German that it has to be translated in many different ways according to the relation in which it stands in the context. It signifiesapprehension,comprehension,perception,viewingandgrasping.(d.)Wahrnehmung(wahrnehmen, fromwahr, true, andnehmen, to take), is translated byapprehensionorperception,according to the degree of consciousness which accompanies it.But the two words which have proved most difficult to translate, have beenVernehmenandWillkühr.(e.)Vernehmenmeans, to distinguish by the sense of hearing. This word conveys a shade of thought which it is almost impossible to render in English, because we have no word by which to distinguish, from mere sensuous hearing, a sort of hearing which implies more than hearing and less than comprehension. The Frenchentendrecomes nearer to it than ourhearing, but implies more comprehension thanvernehmen.(f.) As toWillkühr(arbitrium, literally 'will-choice'), after a great deal of consideration I have chosen (relative)free-willas the nearest approach to the German sense, or at any rate, to that in which Schopenhauer uses it.Willkührmeans in fact what is commonly understood as free-will;i.e.will with power of choice, will determined by motives and unimpeded by outward obstacles:arbitriumas opposed tovoluntas: conscious will as opposed to blind impulse. This relative free-will however is quite distinct fromabsolute free-will(liberum arbitrium indifferentiæ) in a metaphysical sense,i.e.will in its self-dependency. When its arbitrary character is specially emphasized, we callWillkühr,caprice, but this is not the usual meaning given to it by Schopenhauer.Besides the meaning of these German words, I have still to define the sense in which I have used the termideain this translation; for this word has greatly changed its meaning at different times and with different authors, and is even now apt to confuse and mislead. Schopenhauer has himself contributed in one way to render its signification less clear; since, in spite of his declaration in the "Fourfold Root"[4]to the effect, that he never uses the wordideainany other than its original (Platonic) sense, he has himself employed it to translateVorstellung, in a specimen he gives of a rendering of a passage in Kant's "Prolegomena" in a letter addressed to Haywood, published in Gwinner's "Biography of Schopenhauer." This he probably did because some eminent English and French philosophers had taken the word in this sense, thinking perhaps that Kant's meaning would thus be more readily understood. As however he uses the word 'idea' everywhere else exclusively in its original (Platonic) sense, I have preferred to avoid needless confusion by adhering to his own declaration and definition. Besides, many English writers of note have protested against any other sense being given to it, and modern German philosophers have more and more returned to the original meaning of the term.Some readers may take exception at such expressions asà priority,motivation,aseity; for they are not, strictly speaking, English words. These terms however belong to Schopenhauer's own characteristic terminology, and have a distinct and clearly defined meaning; therefore they had to be retained in all cases in which they could not be evaded, in order not to interfere with the Author's intention: a necessity which the scholar will not fail to recognise, especially when I plead in my defence that fidelity and accuracy have been my sole aim in this work.If moreover Carlyle's words, "He who imports into his own country any true delineation, any rationally spoken word on any subject, has done well," are true, I may also be absolved from censure, if I lay before the public this version of some important utterances of a great thinker, in the hope that it may be an assistance in, and an incitement to, a deeper study of all Schopenhauer's works.The Translator.May, 1888.
In venturing to lay the present translation[1]before the public, I am aware of the great difficulties of my task, and indeed can hardly hope to do justice to the Author. In fact, had it not been for the considerations I am about to state, I might probably never have published what had originally been undertaken in order to acquire a clearer comprehension of these essays, rather than with a view to publicity.
The two treatises which form the contents of the present volume have so much importance for a profound and correct knowledge of Schopenhauer's philosophy, that it may even be doubted whether the translation of his chief work, "Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung," can contribute much towards the appreciation of his system without the help at least of the "Vierfache Wurzel des Satzes vom zureichenden Grunde." Schopenhauer himself repeatedly and urgently insists upon a previous thorough knowledge of Kant's philosophy, as the basis, and of his own "Fourfold Root," as the key, to his own system, asserting that knowledge to be the indispensable condition for a right comprehension of his meaning. So far as I am aware, neither the "Fourfold Root" nor the "Will in Nature" have as yet found a translator; therefore, considering the dawning interest which has begun to make itself felt for Schopenhauer's philosophy in England and in America, and the fact thatno more competent scholar has come forward to do the work, it may not seem presumptuous to suppose that this version may be acceptable to those who wish to acquire a more than superficial knowledge of this remarkable thinker, yet whose acquaintance with German does not permit them to read his works in the original.
Now although some portions of both the Essays published in the present volume have of course become antiquated, owing to the subsequent development of the empirical sciences, while others—such as, for instance, Schopenhauer's denunciation of plagiarism in the cases of Brandis and Rosas in the beginning of Physiology and Pathology[2]—can have no interest for the reader of the present day, I have nevertheless given them just as he left them and refrained from all suppression or alteration. And if, on the whole, the "Will in Nature" may be less indispensable for a right understanding of our philosopher's views than the "Fourfold Root," being merely a record of the confirmations which had been contributed during his lifetime by the various branches of Natural Science to his doctrine, thatthe thing in itself is the will, the Second Essay has nevertheless in its own way quite as much importance as the First, and is, in a sense, its complement. For they both throw light on Schopenhauer's view of the Universe in its double aspect as Will and as Representation, each being as it werea résuméof the exposition of one of those aspects. My plea for uniting them in one volume, in spite of the difference of their contents and the wide lapse of time (seventeen years) which lies between them, must be, that they complete each other, and that their great weight and intrinsic value seem to point them out as peculiarly fitted to be introduced to the English thinker.
In endeavouring to convey the Author's thoughts as heexpresses them, I have necessarily encountered many and great difficulties. His meaning, though always clearly expressed, is not always easy to seize, even for his countrymen; as a foreigner, therefore, I may often have failed to grasp, let alone adequately to render, that meaning. In this case besides, the responsibility for any want of perspicuity cannot be shifted by the translator on to the Author; since the consummate perfection of Schopenhauer's prose is universally recognised, even by those who reject, or at least who do not share, his views. An eminent German writer of our time has not hesitated to rank him immediately after Lessing and Göthe as the third greatest German prose-writer, and only quite recently a German professor, in a speech delivered with the intent of demolishing Schopenhauer's philosophy, was reluctantly obliged to admit that his works would remain on account of their literary value. Göthe himself expressed admiration for the clearness of exposition in Schopenhauer's chief work and for the beauty of his style.
The chief obstacle I have encountered in translating these Essays, did not therefore consist in the obscurity of the Author's style, nor even in the difficulty of finding appropriate terms wherewith to convey his meaning; although at times certainly the want of complete precision in our philosophical terminology made itself keenly felt and the selection was often far from easy: it lay rather in the great difference in the way of thinking and of expressing their thoughts which lies between the two nations. The regions of German and English thought are indeed separated by a gulf, which at first seems impassable, yet which must be bridged over by some means or other, if a right comprehension is to be achieved. The German writer loves to develop synthetically a single thought in a long period consisting of various members; he proceeds steadily to unravel the seemingly tangled skein, while he keeps the reader ever on the alert, making him assist actively in the process and never lettinghim lose sight of the main thread. The English author, on the contrary, anxious before all things to avoid confusion and misunderstanding, and ready for this end not only to sacrifice harmony of proportion in construction, but to submit to the necessity of occasional artificial joining, usually adopts the analytical method. He prefers to divide the thread of his discourse into several smaller skeins, easier certainly to handle and thus better suiting the convenience of the English thinker, to whom long periods are trying and bewildering, and who is not always willing to wait half a page or more for the point of a sentence or the gist of a thought. Wherever it could be done without interfering seriously with the spirit of the original, I have broken up the longer periods in these essays into smaller sentences, in order to facilitate their comprehension. At times however Schopenhauer recapitulates a whole side of his view of the Universe in a single period of what seems intolerable length to the English reader: as, for instance, therésumécontained in the Introduction to his "Will in Nature,"[3]which could not be divided without damage to his meaning. Here therefore it did not seem advisable to sacrifice the unity and harmony of his design and to disturb both his form and his meaning, in order to minister to the reader's dislike for mental exertion; in keeping the period intact I have however endeavoured to make it as easy to comprehend as possible by the way in which the single parts are presented to the eye.
As regards the terms chosen to convey the German meaning, I can hardly hope to have succeeded in every case in adequately rendering it, still less can I expect to have satisfied my English readers. Several words of frequent occurrence and of considerable importance for the right understanding of the original, have been used atdifferent times by different English philosophers in senses so various, that, until our philosophical terminology has by universal consent attained far greater precision than at present, it must always be difficult for the writer or translator to convey to the reader's mind precisely the same thought that was in his own. To prevent unnecessary confusion however, by leaving too much to chance, I will here briefly state those terms which give most latitude for misapprehension, explaining the sense in which I employ them and also the special meaning attached to some of them by Schopenhauer, who often differs in this from other writers. They are as follows.
(a.)Anschauung(anschauen, literally 'to behold') I have rendered differently, according to its double meaning in German. When used to designate the mental act by which an object is perceived, as the cause of a sensation received, it is rendered byperception. When used to lay stress uponimmediate, as opposed toabstractrepresentation, it is rendered byintuition. This last occurs however more often in the adjective form.
(b.)Vorstellung(vorstellen, literally 'to place before') I render byrepresentationin spite of its foreign, unwelcome sound to the English ear, as being the term which nearest approaches the German meaning. The faculty of representation is defined by Schopenhauer himself as "an exceedingly complicated physiological process in the brain of an animal, the result of which is the consciousness of apicturethere."
(c.)Auffassung(auffassen, literally 'to catch up') has so many shades of meaning in German that it has to be translated in many different ways according to the relation in which it stands in the context. It signifiesapprehension,comprehension,perception,viewingandgrasping.
(d.)Wahrnehmung(wahrnehmen, fromwahr, true, andnehmen, to take), is translated byapprehensionorperception,according to the degree of consciousness which accompanies it.
But the two words which have proved most difficult to translate, have beenVernehmenandWillkühr.
(e.)Vernehmenmeans, to distinguish by the sense of hearing. This word conveys a shade of thought which it is almost impossible to render in English, because we have no word by which to distinguish, from mere sensuous hearing, a sort of hearing which implies more than hearing and less than comprehension. The Frenchentendrecomes nearer to it than ourhearing, but implies more comprehension thanvernehmen.
(f.) As toWillkühr(arbitrium, literally 'will-choice'), after a great deal of consideration I have chosen (relative)free-willas the nearest approach to the German sense, or at any rate, to that in which Schopenhauer uses it.Willkührmeans in fact what is commonly understood as free-will;i.e.will with power of choice, will determined by motives and unimpeded by outward obstacles:arbitriumas opposed tovoluntas: conscious will as opposed to blind impulse. This relative free-will however is quite distinct fromabsolute free-will(liberum arbitrium indifferentiæ) in a metaphysical sense,i.e.will in its self-dependency. When its arbitrary character is specially emphasized, we callWillkühr,caprice, but this is not the usual meaning given to it by Schopenhauer.
Besides the meaning of these German words, I have still to define the sense in which I have used the termideain this translation; for this word has greatly changed its meaning at different times and with different authors, and is even now apt to confuse and mislead. Schopenhauer has himself contributed in one way to render its signification less clear; since, in spite of his declaration in the "Fourfold Root"[4]to the effect, that he never uses the wordideainany other than its original (Platonic) sense, he has himself employed it to translateVorstellung, in a specimen he gives of a rendering of a passage in Kant's "Prolegomena" in a letter addressed to Haywood, published in Gwinner's "Biography of Schopenhauer." This he probably did because some eminent English and French philosophers had taken the word in this sense, thinking perhaps that Kant's meaning would thus be more readily understood. As however he uses the word 'idea' everywhere else exclusively in its original (Platonic) sense, I have preferred to avoid needless confusion by adhering to his own declaration and definition. Besides, many English writers of note have protested against any other sense being given to it, and modern German philosophers have more and more returned to the original meaning of the term.
Some readers may take exception at such expressions asà priority,motivation,aseity; for they are not, strictly speaking, English words. These terms however belong to Schopenhauer's own characteristic terminology, and have a distinct and clearly defined meaning; therefore they had to be retained in all cases in which they could not be evaded, in order not to interfere with the Author's intention: a necessity which the scholar will not fail to recognise, especially when I plead in my defence that fidelity and accuracy have been my sole aim in this work.
If moreover Carlyle's words, "He who imports into his own country any true delineation, any rationally spoken word on any subject, has done well," are true, I may also be absolved from censure, if I lay before the public this version of some important utterances of a great thinker, in the hope that it may be an assistance in, and an incitement to, a deeper study of all Schopenhauer's works.
The Translator.
May, 1888.