CHAPTER V.Additional Remarks on Aristotle.1.ONE of the most conspicuous points in Aristotle's doctrines as bearing upon the philosophy of Science is his account of that mode of attaining truth which is calledInduction; for we are accustomed to consider Induction as the process by which our Sciences have been formed; and we call them collectively theInductive Sciences. Aristotle often speaks of Induction, as for instance, when he says that Socrates introduced the frequent use of it. But the cardinal passage on this subject is in hisAnalytics, in which he compares Syllogism and Induction as two modes of drawing conclusions[20]. He there says that all belief arises either from Syllogism or from Induction: and adds that Induction is, when by means of one extreme term we infer the other extreme to be true of the middle term. The example which he gives is this: knowing that particular animals are long-lived, as elephant, horse, mule; and finding that these animals agree in having no gall-bladder; we infer, byInduction, thatallanimals which have no gall-bladder are long-lived. This may be done, he says, if the middle and the second extreme are convertible: as the following formal statement may show.Elephant, horse, mule, &c. are long-lived.Elephant, horse, mule, &c. are all gall-less.If we might convert this proposition, and sayAll gall-less animals are as elephant, horse, mule, &c.:we might infersyllogisticallythatAll gall-less animals are long-lived.And though we cannot infer this syllogistically, we infer it by Induction, when we have a sufficient amount of instances[21].I have already elsewhere given this account of Induction, as a process employed in the formation of our knowledge[22]. What I have now to remark concerning Aristotle is, that it does not appear to have occurred to him, that in establishing such a proposition as that which he gives as his instance, the main difficulty is thediscoveryof amiddle termwhich will allow us to frame such a proposition as we need. The zoologist who wanted to know what kind of animals are long-lived, might guess long before he guessed that the absence of the gall-bladder supplied the requisite middle term; (if the proposition were true; which it is not.) And in like manner in other cases, it is difficult to find a middle term, which enables us to collect a proposition by Induction. And herein consists the imperfection of his view of the subject; which considers the main point to be the proof of the proposition when the conceptions aregiven, whereas the main point really is, thediscoveryof conceptions which will make a true proposition possible.2. Since the main characteristic of the steps which have occurred in the formation of the physical sciences, is not merely that they are propositions collected by Induction, but by the introduction of anewconception; it has been suggested that it is not a characteristic designation of these Sciences to call themInductive Sciences. Almost every discovery involves in it the introduction of a new conception, as the element of a new proposition; and the novelty of the conception is more characteristic of the stages of discovery than the inductive application of it. Hence asbearing upon the Philosophy of Discovery, the statements of Aristotle concerning Induction, though acute and valuable, are not so valuable as they might seem. Even Francis Bacon, it has been asserted, erred in the same way (and of course with less excuse) in asserting Induction, of a certain kind, to be the great instrument for the promotion of knowledge, and in overlooking the necessity of theInventionwhich gives Induction its value.3. The invention or discovery of a conception by which many facts of observation are conjoined so as to make them the materials of a proposition, is called in Plato, as we have seen,finding the One in the Many.In the passage quoted from theLater Analytics, Aristotle uses the same expression, and speaks very justly respecting the formation of knowledge. Indeed theTitlesof the chapters of this and many parts of Aristotle's works would lead us to expect just such a Philosophy of Discovery as is the object of our study at present. Thus we have,Anal. Post.B.II.chap. 13: "How we are to hunt (θηρεύειν) the predications of a Definition." Chap. 14: "Precepts for the invention of Problems and of a Middle Term:" and the like. But when we come to read these chapters, they contain little that is of value, and resolve themselves mostly into permutations of Aristotle's logical phraseology.4. The part of the Aristotelian philosophy which has most permanently retained its place in modern Sciences is a part of which a use has been made quite different from that which was originally contemplated. The "Five words" which are explained in the Introduction to Aristotle'sCategories: namely, the wordsGenus,Species,Difference,Property,Accident, were introduced mainly that they might be used in the propositions of which Syllogisms consist, and might thus be the elements of reasoning. But it has so happened that these words are rarely used in Sciences of Reasoning, but are abundantly and commonly used inthe Sciences of Classification, as I have explained in speaking of the Classificatory Sciences[23].5. Of Aristotle's actual contributions to the Physical Sciences I have spoken in the History of those Sciences[24]. I have[25]stated that he conceived the globular form of the earth so clearly and gave so forcibly the arguments for that doctrine, that we may look upon him as the most effective teacher of it. Also in the Appendix to that History, published in the third edition, I have given Aristotle's account of the Rainbow, as a further example of his industrious accumulation of facts, and of his liability to error in his facts.6. We do not find Aristotle so much impressed as we might have expected by that great monument of Grecian ingenuity, the theory of epicycles and excentrics which his predecessor Plato urged so strongly upon the attention of his contemporaries. Aristotle proves, as I have said, the globular form of the earth by good and sufficient arguments. He also proves by arguments which seem to him quite conclusive[26], that the earth is in the center of the universe, and immoveable. As to the motions of the rest of the planets, he says little. The questions of their order, and their distances, and the like, belong, he says, to Astrology[27]. He remarks only that the revolution of the heaven itself, the outermost revolution, is simple and the quickest of all: that the revolutions of the others are slower, each moving in a direction opposite to the heaven in its own circle: and that it is reasonable that those which are nearest to the first revolution should take the longest time in describing their own circle, and those that are furthest off, the least time, and the intermediate ones in the order of their distances, "as also the mathematicians show."In theMetaphysics[28]he enumerates the circular movements which had been introduced by the astronomers Eudoxus and Calippus for the explanation of the phenomena presented by the sun, moon and planets. These, he says, amount to fifty-five; and this, he says, must be the number of essences and principles which exist in the universe.7. In the Sciences of Classification, and especially in the classification of animals, higher claims have been made for Aristotle, which I have discussed in the History[29]. I have there attempted to show that Aristotle's classification, inasmuch as it enumerates all the parts of animals, may be said to contain thematerialsof every subsequent classification: but that it cannot be said to anticipate any modern system, because the different grades of classification are not madesubordinateto one another as asystemof classification requires. I have the satisfaction of finding Mr. Owen agreeing with me in these views[30].8. Francis Bacon's criticism on Aristotle which I have quoted in the Appendix to the History[31], is severe, and I think evidently the result of prejudice. He disparages Aristotle in comparison with the other philosophers of Greece. 'Their systems,' he says, 'had some savour of experience, and nature, and bodily things; while the Physics of Aristotle, in general, sound only of Logical Terms.'Nor let anyone be moved by this: that in his booksOf Animals, and in hisProblems, and in others of his tracts, there is often a quoting of experiments. For he had made up his mind beforehand; and did not consult experience in order to make right propositions and axioms, but when he had settled his system to his will, he twisted experience round and made her bend to his system.'I do not think that this can be said with any truth. I know no instances in which Aristotle has twisted experience round, and made her bend to his system. InhisProblems, he is so far from giving dogmatical solutions of the questions proposed, that in most cases, he propounds two or three solutions as mere suggestions and conjectures. And both in his History of Animals, as I have said, and in others of his works, the want of system gives them an incoherent and tumultuary character, which even a false system would have advantageously removed; for, as I have said elsewhere, it is easier to translate a false system into a true one, than to introduce system into a mass of confusion.9. It is curious that a fundamental error into which Aristotle fell in his view of the conditions which determine the formation of Science is very nearly the same as one of Francis Bacon's leading mistakes. Aristotle says, that Science consists in knowing thecausesof things, as Bacon aims at acquiring a knowledge of theformsoressencesof things and their qualities. But the history of all the sciences teaches us that sciences do not begin with such knowledge, and that in few cases only do they ever attain to it. Sciences begin by a knowledge of thelawsofphenomena, and proceed by the discovery of the scientific ideas by which the phenomena are colligated, as I have shown in other works[32]. The discovery of causes is not beyond the human powers, as some have taught. Those who thus speak disregard the lessons taught by the history of Physical Astronomy, of Geology, of Physical Optics, Thermotics and other sciences. But the discovery of causes, and of the essential forms of qualities, is a triumph reserved for the later stages of each Science, when the knowledge of the laws of phenomena has already made great progress. It was not to be expected that Aristotle would discern this truth, when, as yet, there was no Science extant in which it had been exemplified. Yet in Astronomy, the theory of epicycles and excentrics had immense value, and even has still, as representing the laws of phenomena; while the attempt to find init, as Aristotle wished to do, the ultimate causes of the motions of the universe, could only mislead. The Aristotelian maxim, which sounds so plausible, and has been so generally accepted, that "to know truly is to know the causes of things," is a bad guide in scientific research. Instead of it we might substitute this: that "though we may aspire to know at lastwhythings are, we must be content for a long time with knowinghowthey are."10. Hence if we are asked whether Plato or Aristotle had the truer views of the nature and property of Science, we must give the preference to Plato; for though his notion of a real Intelligible World, of which the Visible world was a fleeting and changeable shadow, was extravagant, yet it led him to seek to determine the forms of the Intelligible Things, which are really the laws of visible phenomena; while Aristotle was led to pass lightly over such laws, because they did not at once reveal the causes which produced the phenomena.11. Aristotle, throughout his works, takes numerous occasions to argue against Plato's doctrine of Ideas. Yet these Ideas, so far as they were the Intelligible Forms of Visible Things, were really fit objects of philosophical research; and the search after them had a powerful influence in promoting the progress of Science. And we may see in the effect of this search the answer to many of Aristotle's strongest arguments. For instance, Aristotle says that Plato, by way of explaining things, adds to them as many Ideas, and that this is just as if a man having to reckon a large number, were to begin by adding to it another large number. It is plain that to this we may reply, that the adopting the Ideas of Cycles, along with the motions of the Planets, does really explain the motions; and that the Cycles are not simply added to the phenomena, but include and supersede the phenomena: a finite number of Cycles include and represent an infinite number of separate phenomena.To Aristotle's argument that Ideas cannot be the Causes or Principles of Things, we should reply, thatthough they cannot be this, they may nevertheless be, and must be, the Conditions and Principles of our Knowledge, which is what we want them to be.I have given an account of the main features of Aristotle's philosophy, so far as it concerns the Physical Sciences, in the History of the Inductive Sciences, BookI.
1.ONE of the most conspicuous points in Aristotle's doctrines as bearing upon the philosophy of Science is his account of that mode of attaining truth which is calledInduction; for we are accustomed to consider Induction as the process by which our Sciences have been formed; and we call them collectively theInductive Sciences. Aristotle often speaks of Induction, as for instance, when he says that Socrates introduced the frequent use of it. But the cardinal passage on this subject is in hisAnalytics, in which he compares Syllogism and Induction as two modes of drawing conclusions[20]. He there says that all belief arises either from Syllogism or from Induction: and adds that Induction is, when by means of one extreme term we infer the other extreme to be true of the middle term. The example which he gives is this: knowing that particular animals are long-lived, as elephant, horse, mule; and finding that these animals agree in having no gall-bladder; we infer, byInduction, thatallanimals which have no gall-bladder are long-lived. This may be done, he says, if the middle and the second extreme are convertible: as the following formal statement may show.
Elephant, horse, mule, &c. are long-lived.Elephant, horse, mule, &c. are all gall-less.
If we might convert this proposition, and say
All gall-less animals are as elephant, horse, mule, &c.:
we might infersyllogisticallythat
All gall-less animals are long-lived.
And though we cannot infer this syllogistically, we infer it by Induction, when we have a sufficient amount of instances[21].
I have already elsewhere given this account of Induction, as a process employed in the formation of our knowledge[22]. What I have now to remark concerning Aristotle is, that it does not appear to have occurred to him, that in establishing such a proposition as that which he gives as his instance, the main difficulty is thediscoveryof amiddle termwhich will allow us to frame such a proposition as we need. The zoologist who wanted to know what kind of animals are long-lived, might guess long before he guessed that the absence of the gall-bladder supplied the requisite middle term; (if the proposition were true; which it is not.) And in like manner in other cases, it is difficult to find a middle term, which enables us to collect a proposition by Induction. And herein consists the imperfection of his view of the subject; which considers the main point to be the proof of the proposition when the conceptions aregiven, whereas the main point really is, thediscoveryof conceptions which will make a true proposition possible.
2. Since the main characteristic of the steps which have occurred in the formation of the physical sciences, is not merely that they are propositions collected by Induction, but by the introduction of anewconception; it has been suggested that it is not a characteristic designation of these Sciences to call themInductive Sciences. Almost every discovery involves in it the introduction of a new conception, as the element of a new proposition; and the novelty of the conception is more characteristic of the stages of discovery than the inductive application of it. Hence asbearing upon the Philosophy of Discovery, the statements of Aristotle concerning Induction, though acute and valuable, are not so valuable as they might seem. Even Francis Bacon, it has been asserted, erred in the same way (and of course with less excuse) in asserting Induction, of a certain kind, to be the great instrument for the promotion of knowledge, and in overlooking the necessity of theInventionwhich gives Induction its value.
3. The invention or discovery of a conception by which many facts of observation are conjoined so as to make them the materials of a proposition, is called in Plato, as we have seen,finding the One in the Many.
In the passage quoted from theLater Analytics, Aristotle uses the same expression, and speaks very justly respecting the formation of knowledge. Indeed theTitlesof the chapters of this and many parts of Aristotle's works would lead us to expect just such a Philosophy of Discovery as is the object of our study at present. Thus we have,Anal. Post.B.II.chap. 13: "How we are to hunt (θηρεύειν) the predications of a Definition." Chap. 14: "Precepts for the invention of Problems and of a Middle Term:" and the like. But when we come to read these chapters, they contain little that is of value, and resolve themselves mostly into permutations of Aristotle's logical phraseology.
4. The part of the Aristotelian philosophy which has most permanently retained its place in modern Sciences is a part of which a use has been made quite different from that which was originally contemplated. The "Five words" which are explained in the Introduction to Aristotle'sCategories: namely, the wordsGenus,Species,Difference,Property,Accident, were introduced mainly that they might be used in the propositions of which Syllogisms consist, and might thus be the elements of reasoning. But it has so happened that these words are rarely used in Sciences of Reasoning, but are abundantly and commonly used inthe Sciences of Classification, as I have explained in speaking of the Classificatory Sciences[23].
5. Of Aristotle's actual contributions to the Physical Sciences I have spoken in the History of those Sciences[24]. I have[25]stated that he conceived the globular form of the earth so clearly and gave so forcibly the arguments for that doctrine, that we may look upon him as the most effective teacher of it. Also in the Appendix to that History, published in the third edition, I have given Aristotle's account of the Rainbow, as a further example of his industrious accumulation of facts, and of his liability to error in his facts.
6. We do not find Aristotle so much impressed as we might have expected by that great monument of Grecian ingenuity, the theory of epicycles and excentrics which his predecessor Plato urged so strongly upon the attention of his contemporaries. Aristotle proves, as I have said, the globular form of the earth by good and sufficient arguments. He also proves by arguments which seem to him quite conclusive[26], that the earth is in the center of the universe, and immoveable. As to the motions of the rest of the planets, he says little. The questions of their order, and their distances, and the like, belong, he says, to Astrology[27]. He remarks only that the revolution of the heaven itself, the outermost revolution, is simple and the quickest of all: that the revolutions of the others are slower, each moving in a direction opposite to the heaven in its own circle: and that it is reasonable that those which are nearest to the first revolution should take the longest time in describing their own circle, and those that are furthest off, the least time, and the intermediate ones in the order of their distances, "as also the mathematicians show."
In theMetaphysics[28]he enumerates the circular movements which had been introduced by the astronomers Eudoxus and Calippus for the explanation of the phenomena presented by the sun, moon and planets. These, he says, amount to fifty-five; and this, he says, must be the number of essences and principles which exist in the universe.
7. In the Sciences of Classification, and especially in the classification of animals, higher claims have been made for Aristotle, which I have discussed in the History[29]. I have there attempted to show that Aristotle's classification, inasmuch as it enumerates all the parts of animals, may be said to contain thematerialsof every subsequent classification: but that it cannot be said to anticipate any modern system, because the different grades of classification are not madesubordinateto one another as asystemof classification requires. I have the satisfaction of finding Mr. Owen agreeing with me in these views[30].
8. Francis Bacon's criticism on Aristotle which I have quoted in the Appendix to the History[31], is severe, and I think evidently the result of prejudice. He disparages Aristotle in comparison with the other philosophers of Greece. 'Their systems,' he says, 'had some savour of experience, and nature, and bodily things; while the Physics of Aristotle, in general, sound only of Logical Terms.
'Nor let anyone be moved by this: that in his booksOf Animals, and in hisProblems, and in others of his tracts, there is often a quoting of experiments. For he had made up his mind beforehand; and did not consult experience in order to make right propositions and axioms, but when he had settled his system to his will, he twisted experience round and made her bend to his system.'
I do not think that this can be said with any truth. I know no instances in which Aristotle has twisted experience round, and made her bend to his system. InhisProblems, he is so far from giving dogmatical solutions of the questions proposed, that in most cases, he propounds two or three solutions as mere suggestions and conjectures. And both in his History of Animals, as I have said, and in others of his works, the want of system gives them an incoherent and tumultuary character, which even a false system would have advantageously removed; for, as I have said elsewhere, it is easier to translate a false system into a true one, than to introduce system into a mass of confusion.
9. It is curious that a fundamental error into which Aristotle fell in his view of the conditions which determine the formation of Science is very nearly the same as one of Francis Bacon's leading mistakes. Aristotle says, that Science consists in knowing thecausesof things, as Bacon aims at acquiring a knowledge of theformsoressencesof things and their qualities. But the history of all the sciences teaches us that sciences do not begin with such knowledge, and that in few cases only do they ever attain to it. Sciences begin by a knowledge of thelawsofphenomena, and proceed by the discovery of the scientific ideas by which the phenomena are colligated, as I have shown in other works[32]. The discovery of causes is not beyond the human powers, as some have taught. Those who thus speak disregard the lessons taught by the history of Physical Astronomy, of Geology, of Physical Optics, Thermotics and other sciences. But the discovery of causes, and of the essential forms of qualities, is a triumph reserved for the later stages of each Science, when the knowledge of the laws of phenomena has already made great progress. It was not to be expected that Aristotle would discern this truth, when, as yet, there was no Science extant in which it had been exemplified. Yet in Astronomy, the theory of epicycles and excentrics had immense value, and even has still, as representing the laws of phenomena; while the attempt to find init, as Aristotle wished to do, the ultimate causes of the motions of the universe, could only mislead. The Aristotelian maxim, which sounds so plausible, and has been so generally accepted, that "to know truly is to know the causes of things," is a bad guide in scientific research. Instead of it we might substitute this: that "though we may aspire to know at lastwhythings are, we must be content for a long time with knowinghowthey are."
10. Hence if we are asked whether Plato or Aristotle had the truer views of the nature and property of Science, we must give the preference to Plato; for though his notion of a real Intelligible World, of which the Visible world was a fleeting and changeable shadow, was extravagant, yet it led him to seek to determine the forms of the Intelligible Things, which are really the laws of visible phenomena; while Aristotle was led to pass lightly over such laws, because they did not at once reveal the causes which produced the phenomena.
11. Aristotle, throughout his works, takes numerous occasions to argue against Plato's doctrine of Ideas. Yet these Ideas, so far as they were the Intelligible Forms of Visible Things, were really fit objects of philosophical research; and the search after them had a powerful influence in promoting the progress of Science. And we may see in the effect of this search the answer to many of Aristotle's strongest arguments. For instance, Aristotle says that Plato, by way of explaining things, adds to them as many Ideas, and that this is just as if a man having to reckon a large number, were to begin by adding to it another large number. It is plain that to this we may reply, that the adopting the Ideas of Cycles, along with the motions of the Planets, does really explain the motions; and that the Cycles are not simply added to the phenomena, but include and supersede the phenomena: a finite number of Cycles include and represent an infinite number of separate phenomena.
To Aristotle's argument that Ideas cannot be the Causes or Principles of Things, we should reply, thatthough they cannot be this, they may nevertheless be, and must be, the Conditions and Principles of our Knowledge, which is what we want them to be.
I have given an account of the main features of Aristotle's philosophy, so far as it concerns the Physical Sciences, in the History of the Inductive Sciences, BookI.