Envoys Extraordinary.
Envoys extraordinary are public ministers who do not possess the right of presentation which attaches alone to the title of ambassador, but they enjoy the same security and immunity under the law of nations. They do not make a state entry into a foreign capital in the manner of ambassadors, but are presented in audiences to the King by the diplomatic usher, who fetches them from their private residence in one of the King’s coaches; they speak to his Majesty standing and uncovered, the King himself being seated and covered. The Emperor on the other hand receives the envoys of the King standing and covered, and remains in this condition throughout the entire audience, the envoy alone of all those present standing uncovered.... The title of plenipotentiary is sometimes given to envoys as well as to ambassadors according to the occasion. For instance, the ministers whom the King maintains at the Diet of Ratisbon receive the title of plenipotentiary although they are not ambassadors. Residents are also public ministers, but this title has beensomewhat degraded since the distinction was drawn both at the French Court and at the Court of the Emperor between them and envoys, with the result that nearly all foreign negotiators in France who bore the title of resident have relinquished it by order of their masters, and have assumed that of envoy extraordinary. None the less the title is still found in Rome and in other courts and republics where the residents are treated as envoys.
Secret Envoys.
There are certain secret envoys who are only received in private audiences but enjoy the same immunity as public envoys, and from the moment in which they present their credentials are recognised as public ministers. There are also secretaries and agents attached to the court for various forms of public business, but they are not received in audience by the King in France; they do all their business with the Secretary of State or the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and though themselves not recorded as ministers have also enjoyed the protection and immunity under international law which is accorded to foreign ambassadors. No subject of the King can be received as minister or representative of a foreign prince, nor can they conduct his affairs in France except as agents of the Secretary of State, the only exception being the ambassador from Malta, who is usually a FrenchMember of the Order, and to whom the King accords the right to remain covered in public audience as representative of the Grand Master of the Order, who himself is recognised as possessing sovereign rights.
Agents of Small States.
Only princes and sovereign states have the right to clothe their messengers with the character of ambassador, envoy, or resident. The agents of small states or of the free states are called deputies; they are not public ministers, and they are subject to the jurisdiction of the country like any private citizen; they do not enjoy immunity under the law of nations, though by custom deputies from provinces and from free cities are accorded immunity and security in practice during their deputation as a proof of the good faith of the prince in negotiation. In the same manner private citizens provided with passports may travel free from molestation. There are certain states in Italy which, though neither sovereign Powers nor subject to another sovereign, have yet conserved the right to send deputies with the title of ambassador to the sovereign under whose sway they live. These are the cities of Bologna and Ferrara, which send diplomatic deputations to the Pope in this manner, and the city of Messina, which retained the right of sending ambassadors to the King of Spain before the last rising. There are similarlyseveral Spanish cities which do not now retain this right. These ambassadors of states or subject provinces resemble in some manner those whom the Roman people used to receive from their own free provinces, from the cities and colonies subject to Roman rule, to whom the name ofLegatiwas given, a name which still occurs in all Latin diplomatic documents. There are certain free cities, such as Hamburg and Lübeck, which send commissaries to certain princes; but as a rule they are merely commercial agents engaged upon such matters of business as the purchase and sale of merchandise and the conditions of letters of exchange.
Precedence.
Now although the position of an ambassador extraordinary is something more honourable than that of the ambassador ordinary they are practically treated alike if there is an equality between the princes whom they represent. The title of extraordinary gives no other superiority over the ambassador ordinary except in pure matters of precedence. Envoys extraordinary and residents stand in somewhat of the same relation, that is to say, that the resident of a prince of higher rank takes precedence over an envoy extraordinary of a prince of lesser rank. It is not, however, the same between ambassadors and envoys. The envoy of a crowned head must yield the place of honour to the ambassador of a lesser sovereign as in the followingexample. An envoy of the Emperor at the French Court some years ago took his seat at a public entertainment in the place which was reserved for the ambassador ordinary of the Duke of Savoy, and asserted his right to it on the ground of the difference in rank between their respective masters; but the dispute was decided in favour of the ambassador as holding superior rank without regard to the difference in the rank of their respective princes; and the envoy of the Emperor was obliged to leave the position which he had taken and yield it to the ambassador of Savoy.
The Title of Excellency.
The title of excellency has been given to ambassadors extraordinary and ordinary, but it is not accorded to envoys unless they claim it on some other ground, as, for instance, that they are ministers of state or senators, or other high officers at a royal court. This title of excellency is not in common use at the French Court, as it is in Spain, Italy, and Germany, and the kingdoms of the north, and you will only find foreigners in France addressing the King’s ministers or other officers of the court with that title. But foreign negotiators of all kinds are addressed by that title as a mark of courtesy to the rank which they hold.
Legates, Nuncios, and Internuncios.
The Court of Rome has three different degrees of titles by which to mark the rank of her ministers in foreign courts. The first is that ofLegato a latere,the second is that of Ordinary or Extraordinary Nuncio, and the third is the Internuncio. The first of these is always a cardinal, to whom as a rule the Pope gives very wide powers both for the affairs of papal diplomacy and for the administration of dispensations and other privileges of the Holy See. They are received at all Catholic Courts with extraordinary honours: in France at their presentation they are attended by the princes of the blood; they remain seated and covered in audience with the King, whereas both ambassadors and even papal nuncios speak to him standing. These legates have a further honour accorded neither to nuncios nor ambassadors in France, namely the right to eat at the King’s table at the banquet of reception given by his Majesty in their honour. The Cross is carried before them to mark their ecclesiastical jurisdiction, which, however, is strictly limited in France, and is recognised in certain specified cases for the verification of Papal Bulls at the Parliament of Paris, to which they must present them before attempting to put them into force. Nuncios both ordinary and extraordinary are usually prelates of the rank of archbishop or bishop. They are received and presented by a prince of the royal blood at their first and final audiences with the King, no difference being made between the nuncio extraordinary and the nuncio ordinary except that the former takesprecedence of the latter if there are two present in the same Chamber. None the less the prelates of the Court of Rome prefer the title of nuncio ordinary at the Courts of France, Spain, and of the Emperor, because it is a shorter and a surer road to the cardinal’s hat, which is the goal of their aspirations. As regards their appointment, when the Pope desires to send a nuncio ordinary to the French Court, he presents the French ambassador in Rome with a list of several dignitaries of the Church, from which the King may exclude those who are not agreeable to him. The papal nuncios in France give their hand to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, but not to bishops or archbishops received on ceremonial visits. They have no ecclesiastical jurisdiction in France in the sense in which they possess it in Vienna, in Spain, in Portugal, in Poland, and in many other Catholic states, where they are recognised as valid judges in various cases, and have the power of dispensation in the same way as the archbishops or the diocesan bishop. In France they are only entitled to receive the confession of faith of those whom the King has nominated to bishoprics and to inquire regarding their life and habits.
Diplomatic Privileges.
Ambassadors, envoys, and residents all possess the right to exercise freely the religion of their King, and to admit to such ordinances their ownnationals living in the foreign country. In matters of law diplomatists of rank are not subject to the jurisdiction of the judges of that foreign country where they reside, and both they and their household enjoy what is called extra-territoriality, their embassy being regarded as it were the house of the King himself, and as being an asylum for his nationals. But this privilege carries its corresponding duty. No blame can be too severe for those ministers abroad who abuse this right of asylum in sheltering under their roof evilly disposed persons, either those condemned to death for crime, or those who are engaged upon any business which renders them unworthy of the protection of the King. The sagacious diplomat will not compromise the authority of his master for any such odious reason as the attempt to confer immunity upon a criminal. It must suffice for him that his own right of asylum is kept inviolate, and he must never employ it except on extraordinary occasions in his master’s service, and never indeed for his own private profit. On the other hand, the King must expressly forbid his judges, bailiffs, or private citizens to violate the law of nations in the person of a foreign envoy, who is always recognised as under the protection of international law. And wherever insult is offered to a foreign envoy, the prince himself must repair it without fail in the samemanner in which he would expect return for a like insult to his own minister abroad.
Abuse of Immunity.
It sometimes occurs that ministers abuse the right of free passage, which they possess for their own provisions and the equipment necessary for their establishment, to carry on a clandestine trade from which they draw large profits by lending their name to fraud. This kind of profit is utterly unworthy of the public minister, and makes his name stink in the nostrils of the King to whom he is sent as well as to his own prince. A wise minister may be well content to enjoy the large privileges to which he is entitled in every foreign country without attempting to abuse them for his own private profit, or by countenancing any fraud which is committed under the protection of his name. The Spanish Government was obliged a few years ago severely to regulate these privileges for all foreign envoys residing in Madrid, and the Republic of Genoa found it necessary to adopt the same somewhat humiliating precautions in order to prevent diplomatists from engaging in illicit traffic. The privileges conferred by the law of nations upon envoys abroad permit full freedom in their proper duty of labouring to discover all that passes in the council-chamber of his Majesty, and to take steps to form close relations with those best able to supply this information, but they are not to beinterpreted as covering any attempt to form a conspiracy against the public peace; for the same international right which covers the person of a diplomatist must also be held to cover the peace and security of the kingdom to which he is accredited. Therefore the diplomatist will be on his guard against any action which may seem to lend the authority of his name or office to revolutionary plots or to other hostile acts against the peace of the realm. Should he neglect this precaution, he may find himself treated as an enemy.
Henry IV. and the Duke of Savoy.
Charles Emanuel the first Duke of Savoy maintained certain connections in France with some of the principal peers at the Court of HenryIV., and engaged with them in plots and cabals. He attended the French Court under the pretext of paying his respects to the King, but in reality with the intention of spreading his own influence and fortifying his own designs, which were to prevent HenryIV.from forcing him to restore the Marquisate of Saluse which he had usurped. The King discovered the Duke’s intrigue, and held a cabinet meeting on the matter. The Council was of opinion that the Duke had come under a false show of friendship in order to disturb the peace of the realm, that the King was therefore fully within his rights in laying hands upon him as upon an enemy, that in consequence of his own acts theDuke could claim no immunity, and that therefore the King would be justified in preventing him from leaving France until he had restored the marquisate in question. But the King did not agree with his ministers, but said: ‘The Duke came to visit me on my parole. If he has failed in his duty I do not wish to imitate so evil an example, and I have so fine a precedent in my own house that I am compelled to follow it rather than to follow the Duke.’ In this he spoke of FrancisI., who in a similar case gave the Emperor CharlesV.a free passage through France without insisting that he should relinquish the Duchy of Milan; and although several of the King’s counsellors at that time were of opinion that he should profit by the opportunity to compel the Emperor to restore the duchy, which indeed he had several times promised to do, FrancisI.preferred to maintain his own honour above every other interest. HenryIV.acted on the same principle; he permitted the Duke of Savoy to depart unmolested after heaping honours and entertainments upon him, but the moment the Duke had returned to his own Court the King demanded the restitution of the Marquisate of Saluse according to his promise. The Duke refused, whereupon the King invaded Savoy, occupied the whole duchy, and compelled him to keep his word, not only to the extent of the marquisate but of several other partswhich he was compelled to cede to the King by a treaty concluded at Lyons, on the 17th January 1601.
Reparation for Abuse of Immunity.
Those who think that one may lay forcible hands upon a sovereign who has broken his word will easily persuade themselves that in a similar case no international law can protect the person of a mere minister; but those who are really well instructed in the law of nations and in the question of sovereign rights are of opinion that a foreign envoy being subject to the laws of the country where he lives it is not possible to put into motion against him the machinery of domestic justice, that the only redress for wrongs done by him is an appeal to his master, and that if his master refuses reparation the responsibility must lie with him and not on his minister abroad who merely executes his order. This privilege, be it remembered, extends not merely to the ambassadors themselves but often to their servants, as is illustrated in the following example.
The Merargue Conspiracy.
King HenryIV., whom one may take as a model for princes, was warned by the Duke de Guise of the Merargue Conspiracy in which a Provençal squire named Merargue had entered into an arrangement with Dom Balthazar de Zuniga, the Spanish ambassador, to hand over the city of Marseilles to the Spaniards at a moment of profound peace. TheKing arrested not only Merargue, but also the private secretary to the Spanish ambassador, a man named Bruneau. Both were convicted of conspiracy. Merargue was executed, and the King handed over the private secretary to his own ambassador, saying that he would be glad to see Bruneau sent across the frontier, though he himself reserved the right to demand satisfaction from the Spanish King for Bruneau’s misdemeanour.
Immunity a Function of Sovereignty.
Now if princes had the right to proceed against foreign envoys at their courts, the latter would never feel themselves secure, because then it would be easy to get rid of any of them on flimsy pretexts, and the precedent once set up in a good case would surely be followed in many cases where nothing but idle suspicion could be brought against the envoy in question. This indeed would be the end of all diplomacy. Of course it is true that a minister who breaks faith cannot expect others to keep faith with him, especially if he is engaged upon conspiracies or any of those practices against the prince and safety of the realm of which I have spoken. But even in such a case the wise prince will not break the law of nations, which should always be respected. He will rather use his good offices at the court whence the erring envoy came in order to have him withdrawn. At the same time it is always permissible to place a watch upon a faithlessambassador, in order to hinder him in practices which would otherwise do harm to the state, and of course on the other part a wise ambassador will certainly avoid falling into such intrigues, for the very protection which he enjoys under the law of nations is a guarantee of his person and of his good behaviour. Benefits under it are reciprocal, and the reciprocal duties which it imposes should be scrupulously observed. If they are not, no law of nations can guarantee an intriguing ambassador for ever against the fury of the populace once they are aroused by suspicion.
Its Abuse undermines True Diplomacy.
On all these grounds the minister is to be pitied who receives commands from his master to form cabals in a foreign state, and he will need all his skill and courage to carry out such commands without being trapped in the process. It has been truly said that there is no service which a prince may not expect from good subjects and faithful ministers, but such obedience cannot be held to cover any action against the laws of God or of justice, which do not countenance for one moment attempts on the life of a prince, or against the security of the state, or any other unfriendly act committed under cover of the protecting title of ambassador. A good ambassador will always discourage plans of this kind, and if his master persists in them he may and should demand his recall, and retire into obscurity,jealously guarding his sovereign’s evil secret. In justice to most reigning sovereigns it must be said that few of them engage in designs of this kind. The vast majority of intrigues and cabals are made in their name in foreign states, or are suggested to them by their ministers or by astute diplomatists, who undertake to carry them out, and through them to confer great benefits upon the prince himself. But these diplomatists are often the first to fall into traps set by their own hand, and are then objects of pity to no man. Numerous examples of this kind can be quoted, and I think no one will challenge the truth of my observation when I say that in nine cases out of ten diplomatists who give such advice are actuated more by personal ambition or petty spite than by the true interests of the nation they serve.
Secret Service No Abuse of Immunity.
But let me not be misunderstood, there is all the difference between the attempt to debauch the subjects of a sovereign prince in order to ensnare them in conspiracy against him, and the legitimate endeavour to use every opportunity for acquiring information. The latter practice has always been permissible, and indeed is a necessary part of diplomacy. No criticism can fall upon a foreign envoy who successfully adopts the practice; the only culprit in such a case is the citizen of a foreign state who from corrupt motives sells informationabroad. Apart from considerations of international law the interest of the public peace demands the preservation of the privileges of foreign envoys, for otherwise wars would be even more frequent than they are, because no prince would permit insults to his ministers to go unavenged. They are rightly resented, and the prince may pay heavily in his own peace of mind and the repose of his subjects for a moment of passion. He need do no more, however, than demand satisfaction for the bad conduct of any foreign envoy, and if he has just cause of complaint he will probably receive it. In any case the dismissal or recall of an ambassador will be read as a pointed lesson to all his colleagues in diplomacy, who will then understand that the price of evil conduct is the humiliation of dismissal.
The Credentials of an Ambassador.
When an ambassador is sent to a foreign court, his master gives him a letter addressed to the foreign prince requesting him to give the same credence to the bearer of the letter as to its writer. This despatch is called a letter of credence, which thus establishes the identity of its bearer and stands as the hall-mark of his office. In France there are two sorts of letters of credence: one calledLettre de Cachet, which is despatched and countersigned by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and sometimes also calledLettre de la Chancellerie. Theother is written by the hand of one of the royal private secretaries, and signed by the King himself; it is countersigned by any minister, and is usually handed direct in private audience to the foreign prince to whom it is addressed. The former type of letter is presented in ceremonial public audience. When a negotiator is appointed by his prince to a free state or an assembly, which for this purpose is treated as though it were a court, he does not receive letters of credence, but his character and identity are fully established in his full powers, which he must exchange with ministers on arriving. The document known as full powers is an authorisation by the prince to his representative abroad to undertake all kinds of public business, the results of which the sovereign himself agrees to accept by the proxy of his minister; but as a rule in such full powers the particular matter under discussion is carefully specified, and the authority to act is confined to it.
Full Powers.
There are two kinds of full powers: one deriving directly from the sovereign and the other from his deputies, that is to say, his ministers of state who have sufficient authority to nominate plenipotentiaries in his absence. Such powers are particularly desirable where the states lie far apart from one another. In such negotiations as those between the Court of Madrid and the Low Countries, or thedifferent Italian states, the advantage of this procedure is obvious.... Passports are of course merely letters which establish the identity and good faith of the person as distinct from the representative of state, and they are given even in time of war in order to secure a safe passage between countries at war for ministers engaged upon negotiation which may lead to peace....
Instructions.
The instruction is a written document containing a statement of the principal intentions of the prince or the state; it is to be regarded as a general aid to memory and a general guide to conduct. It is secret and must be retained under the control of him who receives it, though of course there are occasions on which he will receive the command to communicate specific portions of it to a foreign minister or a foreign prince. Such communication is regarded as a rule as a mark of special confidence, but on the other hand it often happens that two instructions are given, one the ostensible, that is to say it is drawn up in such terms that it can be shown to other princes, and the other secret, which contains the true and final intentions of the prince himself. But even the latter type of instruction is subject to alteration by the daily despatches which the negotiator receives from home, and which ought to be read as so many new instructions drawn up in accordance with the reports which he has transmittedto his own court. It follows therefore that the manner of reports which a negotiator despatches to his home government will have a large influence upon the type of instruction which he receives from time to time.
Oral Instructions.
The Minister of Foreign Affairs may prefer not to put the instructions and intentions of his royal master into writing but to deliver them orally, because then he has a greater freedom of interpretation according to circumstances as they arise, than he would have if he were bound by the written word. There is further a danger that such instructions when committed to paper may be wittingly or unwittingly left in the hands of some foreign diplomatist belonging to the opposite party. The risks thus incurred are too obvious to need any emphasis of mine. Whereas if the instructions be left in oral form, they can at least be repudiated if a dangerous situation were to arise from their being made known to an enemy prince. There are of course occasions where it is impossible not to commit to writing instructions given to a plenipotentiary, but it is a good rule in all negotiation to delay the issue of formal and binding instructions to as late a date in the negotiations as possible, so that the general lines upon which it is likely to proceed may be present to the mind of the minister who draws them up for the guidance of the ambassador.
It is not permissible without a serious violation of the law of nations to compel a minister to show his instructions in order to prove his good faith, nor is it permissible for a minister to communicate it in any form without an express command from his master, for he can fully rely on his letter of credence to establish both his identity and his good faith; besides which he is equipped with full powers in which the business of his negotiation is always fully described.
Discretionary Freedom.
Now such instructions may be as judicious and astute as can be imagined, but their use will lie in the wise interpretation by the diplomatist himself; and, as I have pointed out, the really able negotiator will always know how best to execute his master’s commands so that the instructions received from him may be drawn up on information which is both up-to-date and adequate. Thus it is that while the final responsibility for all success or failure in diplomacy would seem to rest upon the King and his ministers at home, it is none the less true that since these ministers can only act upon information from abroad, the influence which an enlightened diplomatist can exercise upon the actions and designs of the home government is very large. Incapable men acting abroad will make nothing even of the most brilliant instructions; capable men by the accuracy and sagacity of theirreports and suggestions can do much to improve even the most mediocre instructions, and therefore the responsibility for diplomatic action is in reality shared in about equal degree between the home government and its servants abroad. The home government cannot know when the opportunity for appropriate action will arise, and therefore the reports on foreign situations which are transmitted in despatches from diplomats abroad ought to be so designed as to present as far as possible an intelligent description of events.
Value of the Trained Mind.
What an astonishing diversity and inequality there is in the conduct of men. No one, not even a minister of state, would think of building a house without the assistance of the best architect and the best workmen whom he could find; but it is the commonest occurrence to find that those who are charged with the transaction of very important state business, upon which the weal or woe of the whole realm depends, never think of entrusting it to trained minds, but give it to the first comer, whether he be a cunning architect or a mere hewer of stone. Therefore ministers and other persons in authority are culpable in a high degree if they do not secure for the foreign service of the state the most capable and sagacious men. For the errors in diplomacy sometimes bring more calamitous results than mistakes in other walks of life, andunless the negotiator can intelligently discern the coming event, he may plunge himself, his master, and his native land in irretrievable disaster.
Incompetence the Parent of Disaster.
It is a crime against the public safety not to uproot incapacity wherever it is discovered, or to allow an incompetent diplomatist to remain one moment longer than necessary in a place where competency is sorely needed. Faults in domestic policy are often more easily remedied than mistakes in foreign policy. There are many factors in foreign affairs which lie beyond the control of the ministers of any given state, and all foreign action requires greater circumspection, greater knowledge, and far greater sagacity than is demanded in home affairs. Therefore the government cannot exercise too great a care in its choice of men to serve abroad. In making such a choice the Foreign Minister must set his face like a flint against all family influence and private pressure, for nepotism is the damnation of diplomacy. He is in some sense the guarantor to his Majesty of those whom he presents as diplomatists. Their good success will do him honour, their failure will fall with redoubled force upon his head, and may require herculean efforts by him in order to repair the damage it has caused. Hence it is of the first interest, both for the Foreign Minister himself and for the well-being of the state, to see that the highpublic offices of diplomacy are not filled by the intrigues and personal cabals which reign at every court, and which often place in the King’s hands unworthy instruments of his policy.
The Diplomatist prepares Himself for a Foreign Mission.
Now when a diplomatist has been appointed to a foreign post his first care should be to ask for the despatches of his predecessor in order that he may inform himself exactly of the state of affairs with which he will have to deal. He will thus be able to pick up the thread and to make use both of the knowledge and of the different personal relationships which have gathered round the embassy during his predecessor’s term of office. And as all public affairs are like a great network, one linked with another, it is of the first importance that a diplomatist proceeding to a foreign post should be a complete master of recent history both in regard to his own state and in regard to the relations which exist between the country of his new service and all neighbouring countries. Therefore, when the newly appointed diplomatist has read with care the despatches of his predecessor, he should make notes upon them, endeavouring to foresee the difficulties which he will meet both in such trivial matters as a novel ceremonial, or in the more weighty business of state, so that he may be able to discuss them with his own Foreign Minister, and thus receive what enlightenment he can.
He must study his own Foreign Office.
Now, no matter how far-seeing a minister may be, it is impossible for him to foresee everything or to give such ample and at the same time precise instructions to his negotiators as to guide them in all circumstances which may arise. It is therefore of the first importance that the newly appointed diplomatist travelling to a far country should devote all his time before his departure to the discovery of the real intentions and designs of his own Foreign Office. In a word, he should saturate his mind with the thoughts of his master. He should not only consult those who have discharged diplomatic duties at the foreign court to which he is about to proceed, but should make it his especial care to keep touch with those who have lived in the country in any quality whatsoever, and to acquire from them all the knowledge which they may possess. Even the humblest of such persons may be able to give him information which will help him to regulate his conduct abroad. And before his departure he should certainly strike up an acquaintance with the ambassador representing the country to which he is about to proceed, in order that he may get from him private letters of recommendation, and further, in order that he may persuade him of his own earnest desire to do all in his power to establish good relations between the two states. He should let it be known to the foreign ambassador in questionthat he will lose no opportunity of bearing witness to the success of his mission and to the esteem which he has won at home. In so doing he will be able rapidly to acquire new and powerful friends in his new sphere of labour. For it is a commonplace of human experience that men will do as they are done by: reciprocity is the surest foundation of friendship.
Choice of a Staff.
The careful diplomatist will pay the same attention to the choice of his domestics as to more important subjects. Those about him must do him credit. A well-ordered household served by reliable and well-mannered persons is a good advertisement, both of the ambassador and of the country whence he comes, and in order that they may have no excuse for ill-regulated conduct, he should set a high example before them in his own person. His choice of a private secretary is perhaps the most important of all, for if he be light-headed, frivolous or indiscreet, he may do his master irreparable harm; and if he be a person liable to get into debt, his embarrassment may be the cause of very serious trouble. Some years ago the private secretary of a French ambassador sold the private cipher of the embassy for a large sum in order to wipe out his debts. Thus the ambassador’s despatches were intercepted and read, with very grave results upon the relations between the two countries, in spite ofthe fact that the obvious interest of both lay in the same direction. The necessity for having faithful and able men as secretaries has given rise to the belief that it would be very useful to establish them in rank as a part of the public service of the King, and thus to restore a custom which was abolished some time ago in France. It would be a desirable practice, for thereby a large body of men might be trained in the diplomatic service of the Crown from whom ambassadors and envoys could be drawn. This is the practice in several foreign countries, and there is no doubt that it leads to the improvement of the whole diplomatic service. For if the secretaries and attachés are selected and paid by the King’s government they will tend to acquire a careful efficiency andesprit de corpswhich will be the best protection for his secrets. And it is obvious that as long as the choice of such persons is left to the personal decision of the ambassador alone there is always a risk that he will not be able to offer a sufficient sum to command the services of good men. Thus the adequate payment and proper official recognition of such junior diplomatists is a necessary part of any true reform of the foreign service, and it would certainly be a great relief to most ambassadors to take the responsibility of choice off their shoulders as well as the burden of paying secretaries for their services. The state will certainlybe well repaid if such a policy as I suggest be adopted, for diplomacy will then become the school in which good workmen will rapidly learn the use of their tools.
First Steps at the Foreign Court.
On arrival at a foreign court a negotiator should make himself and his mission known to the proper authorities at the earliest possible moment, and request a private audience with the prince in order that he may establish contact immediately, and thus prepare the way for good relations between his master and the foreign sovereign. When he has taken the necessary steps for this purpose he should be in no hurry to embark upon any important steps but should rather study theterrain. For this purpose he should remain a watchful, silent observer of the habits of the court and of the government, and if he be in a country where the prince is really the ruler, he should study with the greatest assiduity the whole life and habits of the latter; for policy is not merely a matter of high impersonal design, it is a vast complexity in which the inclinations, the judgments, the virtues and the vices of the prince himself will play a large part. Occasions will constantly arise in which the adroit negotiator who has equipped himself with this knowledge will be able to use it with the highest possible effect. And he should test his own conclusions by comparing notes discreetlywith other foreign negotiators of the same court, especially if they have had a long residence there. Up to a certain point co-operation between foreign ambassadors is not only permissible but desirable and necessary. And since no prince, not even the most autocratic, discharges the duties of government entirely by himself without confiding in one or more favoured ministers, the negotiator should make it his business to know much of the ministers and confidants surrounding the King who have his fullest confidence, for in the same manner as described above personal qualities, opinions, passions, likes, and dislikes are all relevant subjects of study, and should be carefully observed by every negotiator who means business.
Relations with Colleagues.
When a foreign envoy arrives at a court and has been received by the prince, he should inform all the other members of the Corps Diplomatique either by a squire of his suite or by a secretary. They will then pay him their first visit, but he will receive no visits until he has gone through the formality of announcing to each in turn his own arrival; and at a court where there are ambassadors of several kings, each on arrival should pay his respects first of all to the French ambassador, who everywhere takes first rank. The Spaniards, who adopted every form of chicane for a whole century in order to avoid the recognition of French precedence,which for that matter is an immemorial right of the French King, finally recognised it by the public declaration, made by PhilipIV.to his Majesty in 1662 by the Marquis de la Fuente, the Spanish ambassador in Paris, which arose out of the violent dispute in London between the Count d’Estrade and the Baron de Vatville, after which no Spanish ambassador would consent to be present at any ceremony attended by the French ambassador. Various other attempts have been made to dispute French supremacy, but with no result....
Report of First Impressions.
After he has fully informed himself of all such matters and placed himself in such a position as to know immediately whether the prince has changed his mind or transferred his confidence from one servant to another, he should set all these things down faithfully in a despatch to his home government, presenting a full picture of the court as he sees it, and at the same time setting down the conclusions which he has drawn from his observations. He should not fail to indicate the methods by which he proposes to act, or the means he proposes to use, in order to carry out the commands which he has received. At the same time he will not fail to keep his own knowledge up to date, and to use it for finding and keeping open every possible avenue of approach to the prince to whom he is accredited, or to his ministers and favourites. There is nodoubt that the surest and best way in which the negotiator can establish good relations is to prove to both courts that their union is of great mutual advantage. It is the essential design of diplomacy to confer such a mutual advantage, and to carry policy to success by securing the co-operation in it of those who might otherwise be its opponents. Success won by force or by fraud stands upon a weak foundation. Diplomatic success, on the other hand, won by methods which confer reciprocal benefits on both parties, must be regarded not only as firmly founded, but as the sure promise of other successes to come. I am not so foolish as to suppose, however, that this method can be applied in every situation. There are times when it is necessary for the negotiator to exploit the hatreds, passions, and jealousies of those with whom he deals, and therefore occasion will arise when it is easier and more fruitful to appeal to prejudice rather than to any estimate of the true and permanent interests of those concerned. As we have observed above, both kings and nations often plunge into reckless courses of policy under the impulse of passion, and as a rule throw overboard all consideration of their veritable interests.
Character and Whims of the Foreign Prince.
The high elevation of crowned heads does not prevent them from being human; and indeed in some ways it lays them open to certain weaknessesof which lesser men by reason of their position are largely free. There is a certain pride of position, a certain arrogant self-esteem, which is only to be found in highly placed persons, and which is most marked in kings and ministers. On this account, and on account of the actual power their exalted position puts into their hands, kings are open to persuasion and flattery in a way in which men of lower degree cannot be approached. This consideration must ever be in the mind of the good negotiator, who should therefore strive to divest himself of his own feelings and prejudices, and place himself in the position of the King so that he may understand completely the desires and whims which guide his actions. And when he has done so he should say to himself: ‘Now, if I were in the place of this prince, wielding his power, subject to his passions and prejudices, what effect would my mission and my arguments have upon me?’ The more often he thus puts himself in the position of others, the more subtle and effective will his arguments be. And it is of course not only in matters of opinion that this use of the imagination is valuable, it is more particularly in all those personal aspects where the power to give pleasure by flattery or any other means is effective.
The Use of Compliments.
No one will forget that crowned heads, and even their ministers themselves, are accustomed frombirth to the submission of those around them, to receive their respect and praise. This unbroken experience of the obedience of others is apt to make them very sensitive to criticism, and unwilling to listen to contradiction. There are few princes to whom it is easy to speak the truth, and since it is not part of the business of the negotiator except on rare occasions to speak home truths at a foreign court, he will avoid as far as possible everything which may wound the royal pride which is the natural result of the manner in which princes are reared. On the other hand, he will never give empty praise nor applaud a reprehensible act, and where praise is given as it is deserved, the negotiator must know how to clothe it in chaste and dignified language. And since princes are accustomed to hear their praise sung constantly, they become connoisseurs in praise and good judges of a timely compliment. It is the higher art of the subtle courtier to know how to deliver a well-turned compliment to his King, and above all, if the King is endowed with real intelligence, never to praise him for qualities which he does not possess. Any fool can earn the esteem of a prince who is also a fool by indiscriminate praise. Wise men will rely on their own merits and on the good sense of the King wherever they have the good fortune to serve a monarch so endowed. To praise a King forthose things which are inherent in his position, such as riches, spacious mansions, and fine clothes, is merely stupidity. A King who is worth praising will only value your praise if it is given to qualities which he knows to be praiseworthy. In this matter the negotiator must be sufficiently worldly-wise always to remember that the good favour of the ladies of the court is to be won by different means than that of his Majesty or the ministers. And since, as I have pointed out elsewhere, the approach to the King and his ministers may perhaps be most easily made through feminine influence, the negotiator will study carefully the character and weaknesses of all the ladies at the court so as to keep these useful and attractive avenues open for his use.