CHAPTER VI
THE DEVIL'S ADVOCATE
Intelligence and enterprise of the Germans149They are nevertheless devoted to their own institutions150German system is not reactionary but the reverse151Experts are honoured and trusted151German esteem for men of learning152And for the military caste153And for their Kaiser155German contempt for party government156And for the character of British official news157And for the failure of the British Government to trust the people160And for its fear of asking the people to make sacrifices161And for the voluntary system162Their pride in the successes of German arms163And in the number and spirit of their new levies163Which they contrast with British recruiting164The methods of which they despise165What is meant by 'a popular basis' of government?166
CHAPTER VII
THE CONFLICTS OF SYSTEMS AND IDEAS
Two issues between England and Germany167Democracy cannot endure unless capable of self-defence168Democracy good and bad169Self-criticism may be carried too far171The two dangers of democracy—GermanArmsand GermanIdeas173Fundamental opposition between the spirit of German policy and our own173German people have not accepted the moral ideas of their priesthood174Recantation among 'the brethren' themselves on outbreak of war175The cult of war176
PART III
THE SPIRIT OF BRITISH POLICY
CHAPTER I
A REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD (JANUARY 1901-JULY 1914)
In this war Democracy is fighting for its existence181Against highly organised materialism183The opening of the twentieth century186Spirit of constitutional change188Disappearance of great figures from the scene189Change in character of the House of Commons192Dearth of leadership194Consequent demoralisation of parties195And widespread anxiety196Pre-eminence of Mr. Asquith197His Parliamentary supremacy198His maxim—wait-and-see199Character of his oratory199Increasing prominence of lawyers in politics200Their influence on Parliamentary institutions and national policy201Mr. Asquith's limitations203
CHAPTER II
THREE GOVERNING IDEAS
Situation at the death of Queen Victoria207Comfort and security are not synonymous208Two problems absorbed public attention209Social and Constitutional Reform209A third problem, security, was overlooked210Social Reform intrinsically the most important211The urgent need of peace212Earnestness of public opinion212How it was baulked by circumstances213Limitations of popular judgment214Want of leadership216Strangulation of sincerity by party system218The artificial opposition of three great ideas221
CHAPTER III
POLICY AND ARMAMENTS
The aim of British policy223Organised and unorganised defences223Policy depends on armaments, armaments on policy225Difficulty of keeping these principles in mind226Diplomacy to-day depends more than ever on armaments228The sad example of China229Policy should conform to national needs230Dangers threatening British security (1901-1914)231The Committee of Imperial Defence232Reasons of its comparative failure234Parliament and the people were left uneducated235Naval preparations were adequate236Military preparations were absurdly inadequate237Our Foreign policy rested on an entirely false assumption as regards the adequacy of our Army238
CHAPTER IV
THE BALANCE OF POWER
Security required that we should take account of Europe241German aim—the suzerainty of Western Europe243Maintenance of theBalance of Power244This is the unalterable condition of British security245This need produced the Triple Entente247Splendid isolation no longer compatible with security249Meaning of a defensive war249Defence of north-eastern frontier of France essential to British security250
CHAPTER V
THE MILITARY SITUATION (AUGUST 1911)
The British 'Expeditionary Force'252Numbers as a test of adequacy253Relations of Italy with Germany and Austria in event of war254Troops for defence of coasts and neutral frontiers256Germany must hold Russia in check with superior numbers256Germany would then endeavour to crush France257Having a superiority of 500,000 men available for this purpose257Why neutrality of Holland was a German interest258Why neutrality of Belgium was an obstacle to Germany259Inadequacy of our own Army to turn the scales260Our armaments did not correspond with our policy261Ministerial confidence in the 'voluntary system'261Three periods of war—theonset, thegrip, and thedrag263In 1870 theonsetdecided the issue264By 1914 the power of swift attack had increased265Forecasts confirmed by experience (Aug.-Sept. 1914)266Immense value of British sea-power266No naval success, however, can win a European war267Naval supremacy not the only essential to British security268
CHAPTER VI
THE MILITARY SITUATION (AUGUST 1914)
Changes between August 1911 and August 1914269Sensational German increases in 1913 took full effect within a year270Inability of France to counter this effort unaided270French increase could not take effect till 1916271Russian and Austrian increases272No attempt to increase British Army though it is below strength273Balkan wars (1912-1913)273Their effect onBalance of Power274Reasons why they did not lead to general conflagration275Germany's two dates: June 1914-June 1916275
CHAPTER VII
A TRAGEDY OF ERRORS
Why should we suspect Germany of evil intentions?277The German Fleet was a challenge to British security278Candour of German publicists278British Government finds comfort in official assurances of Berlin279Disregarded warnings279First Warning279(1905-1906) Morocco incident279After which British naval programme was reduced280Second Warning281(1908-1909) Secret acceleration and increase of German naval programme281Imperial Defence Conference281Third Warning282(1910) German sincerity under suspicion282The Constitutional Conference283Secret de Polichinelle283Failure of British Government to trust the people284Fourth Warning285(1911) The Agadir incident285Mr. Lloyd George's speech285Consequences of various kinds286Fifth Warning287(1912) Lord Haldane's rebuff287Menacing nature of German proposals288Dangers of amateur diplomacy289German love of irregular missions290Sixth Warning294(1913) German Army Bill and War Loan294British Government ignore the danger295Neglect military preparations297Shrink from speaking plainly to the people298Difficulties of Sir Edward Grey298Enemies in his own household299Radical attacks on Foreign Secretary and First Lord of Admiralty fomented by Germany299Attitude of a leaderless Cabinet300Parallelogram of fears determines drift of policy301Evil effects of failure to educate public opinion302Danger of breaking the Liberal party303Occasional efficacy of self-sacrifice303War not inevitable had England been prepared304
PART IV
DEMOCRACY AND NATIONAL SERVICE
CHAPTER I
THE BRITISH ARMY AND THE PEACE OF EUROPE
Public opinion puzzled by military problems309The nation's growing anxiety and distrust (1909-1914)310Army affairs a shuttlecock in the political game312'The blood taxes'313The nation realised it had not been treated with candour313Powerful British Army the best guarantee for European peace314Alone among European nations Britain had not an army commensurate to her population, policy, and resources316
CHAPTER II
THE COMPOSITION OF THE BRITISH ARMY
TheRegular Army317Three classes of reserves318TheArmy Reserve318TheSpecial Reserve319TheTerritorial Army320The numbers of trained soldiers immediately available for war321These were inadequate to redress the balance against the Triple Entente322In theonsetperiod untrained and half-trained troops were of no use322Shortage of officers capable of training raw troops323Lord Haldane's failure to carry out his own principles324Moral effect of our support of France at Agadir crisis326Adverse changes between 1911 and 1914326Size of British striking force necessary as complete were of against a coolly calculated war327Reserves required behind this striking force328South African War no precedent for a European war330
CHAPTER III
LORD ROBERTS'S WARNINGS
The Manchester speech (October 22, 1912)332Liberal denunciation and Unionist coolness332Attack concentrated on three passages333Two of these have been proved true by events334The other was misinterpreted by its critics335Liberal criticism336Unionist criticism341Ministerial rebukes343No regret has ever been expressed subsequently for any of these attacks347
CHAPTER IV
LORD KITCHENER'S TASK
All Lord Roberts's warnings were proved true350Many people nevertheless still believed that the voluntary system was a success351Lord Kitchener as Secretary of State for War353His previous record of success354His hold on public confidence354His grasp of the simple essentials355His determination to support France and make a New Army355His remarkable achievements356His want of knowledge of British political and industrial conditions356His colleagues, however, understood these thoroughly357
CHAPTER V
MATERIAL OF WAR
Industrial congestion at the outbreak of war358Need for looking far ahead and organising production of war material359The danger of labour troubles360Outcry about shortage of supplies360Official denials were disbelieved361
CHAPTER VI
METHODS OF RECRUITING
The first need was men364A call for volunteers the only way of meeting it364The second need was a system to provide men as required over the period of the war365No system was devised365The Government shrank from exercising its authority366Trusted to indirect pressure366And sensational appeals367They secured a new army of the highest quality368But they demoralised public opinion by their methods369Public opinion at the outbreak of war was admirable372It was ready to obey orders373No orders came374The triumph of the voluntary system376From the point of view of a Belgian or a Frenchman the triumph is not so clear377The voluntary system is inadequate to our present situation379Folly of waiting for disaster to demonstrate the necessity of National Service380
CHAPTER VII
PERVERSITIES OF THE ANTI-MILITARIST SPIRIT
British methods of recruiting in normal times382The Conscription of Hunger382The cant of the voluntary principle384The 'economic' fallacy385The fallacy of underrating the moral of conscript armies387The army which we call 'voluntary' our enemies call 'mercenary'389'Mercenary' describes not the British Army but the British People389The true description of the British Army is 'Professional'390The theory of the British Army391That officers should pay for the privilege of serving391That the rank and file should contract for a term of years392Under pressure of want392At pay which is below the market rate392This contract is drastically enforced393With the full approval of anti-militarist opinion393Inconsistencies of the anti-militarists394Their crowning inconsistency395Other industries put pressure on society396Why should not a professional army?396The example of Rome397A professional army when it first interferes in politics usually does so as a liberator397Then military despotism follows speedily399A fool's paradise399
CHAPTER VIII
SOME HISTORICAL REFLECTIONS
Bugbears401Conflict of 'opinion' with 'the facts'402An army is no defence unless it is available for service abroad402The Industrial Epoch (1832-1886)403Its grudging attitude towards the Army403Honour paid by conscript nations to their armies406Democracy cannot subsist without personal service406During the Industrial Epoch exemption from Personal Service was regarded as the essence of Freedom408War was regarded as an anachronism409Since 1890 there has been a slow but steady reaction from these ideas410Volunteer movement and Territorial Army compared411Effect of the Soudan campaign and South African War411Effect of more recent events412Have we passed out of a normal condition into an abnormal one, or the reverse?412Germany's great grievance against Britain: we thought to hold our Empire without sacrifices413The Freiherr von Hexenküchen's views—(1) On our present case of conscience416(2) On our voluntary system416The American Civil War417Lincoln insisted on conscription (1863)418His difficulties418Results of his firmness419Difference in our own case419Our need for conscription is much greater419It is also far easier for our Government to enforce it420
CHAPTER IX
THE CRUCIBLE OF WAR
The objects of this book421Criticism of naval and military strategy is no part of its purpose422Nor the ultimate political settlement of Europe424Nor an inquisition into 'German atrocities'424But the basis of Germany's policy must be understood425And what we are fighting for and against425The causes of German strength427The causes of British weakness427Illusions as to the progress of the war428The real cause of our going to war430Democracy is not by its nature invincible431Leadership is our chief need433The folly of telling half-truths to the People435
ThenApollyonstrodled quite over the whole breadth of the way, and said, I am void of fear in this matter, prepare thyself to die; for I swear by my infernal Den, that thou shalt go no further; here will I spill thy soul.
And with that he threw a flaming Dart at his breast, butChristianhad a shield in his hand, with which he caught it, and so prevented the danger of that.
Then didChristiandraw, for he saw 'twas time to bestir him: andApollyonas fast made at him, throwing Darts as thick as Hail; by the which, notwithstanding all thatChristiancould do to avoid it,Apollyonwounded him in hishead, hishand, andfoot: this madeChristiangive a little back;Apollyontherefore followed his work amain, andChristianagain took courage, and resisted as manfully as he could. This sore Combat lasted for above half a day, even tillChristianwas almost quite spent; for you must know thatChristian, by reason of his wounds, must needs grow weaker and weaker.
ThenApollyonespying his opportunity, began to gather up close toChristian, and wrestling with him, gave him a dreadful fall; and with thatChristian'ssword flew out of his hand. Then saidApollyon, I am sure of thee now: and with that he had almost pressed him to death, so thatChristianbegan to despair of life. But as God would have it, while Apollyon was fetching of his last blow, thereby to make a full end of this good man,Christiannimbly reached out his hand for his Sword, and caught it, saying,Rejoice not against me, O mine enemy! when I fall I shall arise; and with that gave him a deadly thrust, which made him give back, as one that had received his mortal wound:Christianperceiving that, made at him again, saying,Nay, in all these things we are more than conquerors through him that loved us. And with thatApollyonspread forth his dragon's wings, and sped him away, thatChristianfor a season saw him no more.
In this Combat no man can imagine, unless he had seen and heard as I did, what yelling and hideous roaring,Apollyonmade all the time of the fight; he spake like a Dragon....
The Pilgrim's Progress.
It is a considerable number of years since the most distinguished Tory statesman of his time impressed upon his fellow-countrymen as a maxim of policy, thatPeace is the greatest of British interests. There was an unexpectedness about Lord Salisbury's words, coming as they did from the leader of a party which had hitherto lain under suspicion of jingoism, which gave the phrase almost the colour of an epigram. The truth of the saying, however, gradually became manifest to all men; and thereupon a new danger arose out of this very fact.
As a nation we are in some ways a great deal too modest; or it may be, looking at the matter from a critical standpoint, too self-centred. We have always been inclined to assume in our calculations that we ourselves are the only possible disturbers of the peace, and that if we do not seek war, or provoke it, no other Power will dream of forcing war upon us. This unfortunately has rarely been the case; and those persons who, in recent times, have refused most scornfully to consider the lessons of past history, have now at last learned from a sterner schoolmaster the falseness of their favourite doctrine.
The United Kingdom needed and desired peace, sothat it might proceed undistracted, and with firm purpose, to set its house in order. The Dominions needed peace, so that they might have time to people their fertile but empty lands, to strike deep roots and become secure. To the Indian Empire and the Dependencies peace was essential, if a system of government, which aimed, not unsuccessfully, at giving justice and fostering well-being, was to maintain its power and prestige unshaken. The whole British race had nothing material to gain by war, but much to lose, much at any rate which would be put in jeopardy by war. In spite of all these weighty considerations which no man of sense and knowledge will venture to dispute, we should have been wiser had we taken into account the fact, that they did not apply to other nations, that in the main they affected ourselves alone, and that our case was no less singular than, in one sense at all events, it was fortunate.
We did not covet territory or new subjects. Still less were we likely to engage in campaigns out of a thirst for glory. In the latter particular at least we were on a par with the rest of the world. The cloud of anxiety which for ten or more years has brooded over the great conscript nations, growing steadily darker, contained many dangers, but among these we cannot reckon such antiquated motives as trivial bravado, light-hearted knight-errantry, or the vain pursuit of military renown.
What is called in history books 'an insult' seemed also to have lost much of its ancient power for plunging nations into war. The Chancelleries of Europe had grown cautious, and were on the watch against being misled by the emotions of the moment. A sensational but unintended injury was not allowed to drive usinto war with Russia in 1904, and this precedent seemed of good augury. Moreover, when every statesman in Europe was fully alive to the electric condition of the atmosphere, a deliberate insult was not very likely to be offered from mere ill-manners or in a fit of temper, but only if there were some serious purpose behind it, in which case it would fall under a different category.
Fear was a great danger, and everybody knew it to be so—fear lest this nation, or that, might be secretly engaged in strengthening its position in order to crush one of its neighbours at some future date, unless that neighbour took time by the forelock and struck out forthwith. Among the causes which might bring about a surprise outbreak of war this was the most serious and probable. It was difficult to insure against it. But though perilous in the extreme while it lasts, panic is of the nature of an epidemic: it rages for a while and passes away. It had been raging now with great severity ever since 1909,[1] and by midsummer 1914 optimists were inclined to seek consolation in the thought that the crisis must surely be over.
DANGERS TO PEACE
More dangerous to peace in the long run even than fear, were certain aims and aspirations, which from one standpoint were concrete and practical, but regarded from another were among the cloudiest of abstractions—'political interests,' need of new markets, hunger for fresh territory to absorb the outflow of emigrants, and the like; on the other hand, those hopes and anxieties which haunt theimaginations of eager men as they look into the future, and dream dreams and see visions of a grand national fulfilment.
If the British race ever beheld a vision of this sort, it had been realised already. We should have been wise had we remembered that this accomplished fact, these staked-out claims of the British Empire, appeared to fall like a shadow across visions seen by other eyes, blotting out some of the fairest hopes, and spoiling the noble proportions of the patriot's dream.
There is a region where words stumble after truth, like children chasing a rainbow across a meadow to find the pot of fairy gold. Multitudinous volumes stuffed with the cant of pacifism and militarism will never explain to us the nature of peace and war. But a few bars of music may sometimes make clear things which all the moralists, and divines, and philosophers—even the poets themselves for the most part, though they come nearer to it at times than the rest—have struggled vainly to show us in their true proportions. The songs of a nation, its national anthems—if they be truly national and not merely some commissioned exercise—are better interpreters than state papers. A man will learn more of the causes of wars, perhaps even of the rights and wrongs of them, by listening to the burst and fall of the French hymn, the ebb and surge of the Russian, in Tschaikovsky's famous overture, than he ever will from books or speeches, argument or oratory.
IMPOTENCE OF LOGIC
Yet there are people who think it not impossible to prove to mankind by logical processes, that the loss which any great nation must inevitably sustain through war, will far outweigh any advantages whichcan ensue from it, even if the arms of the conqueror were crowned with victories greater than those of Caesar or Napoleon. They draw us pictures of the exhaustion which must inevitably follow upon such a struggle conducted upon the modern scale, of the stupendous loss of capital, destruction of credit, paralysis of industry, arrest of progress in things spiritual as well as temporal, the shock to civilisation, and the crippling for a generation, probably for several generations, possibly for ever, of the victorious country in its race with rivals who have wisely stood aside from the fray. These arguments may conceivably be true, may in no particular be over-coloured, or an under-valuation, either of the good which has been attained by battle, or of the evils which have been escaped. But they would be difficult to establish even before an unbiassed court, and they are infinitely more difficult to stamp upon popular belief.
It is not sufficient either with statesmen or peoples to set before them a chain of reasoning which is logically unanswerable. Somehow or other the new faith which it is desired to implant, must be rendered independent of logic and unassailable by logic. It must rise into a higher order of convictions than the intellectual before it can begin to operate upon human affairs. For it is matched against opinions which have been held and acted upon so long, that they have become unquestionable save in purely academic discussions. At those decisive moments, when action follows upon thought like a flash, conclusions which depend upon a train of reasoning are of no account: instinct will always get the better of any syllogism.
So when nations are hovering on the brink of war, it is impulse, tradition, or some stuff of the imagination—misused deliberately, as sometimes happens, by crafty manipulators—which determines action much more often than the business calculations of shopkeepers and economists. Some cherished institution seems to be threatened. Some nationality supposed—very likely erroneously—to be of the same flesh and blood as ourselves, appears—very likely on faulty information—to be unjustly oppressed. Two rival systems of civilisation, of morals, of religion, approach one another like thunder-clouds and come together in a clash. Where is the good at such times of casting up sums, and exhibiting profit-and-loss accounts to the public gaze? People will not listen, for in their view considerations of prosperity and the reverse are beside the question. Wealth, comfort, even life itself, are not regarded; nor are the possible sufferings of posterity allowed to count any more than the tribulations of to-day. In the eyes of the people the matter is one of duty not of interest. When men fight in this spirit the most lucid exposition of material drawbacks is worse than useless; for the national mood, at such moments, is one of self-sacrifice. The philosopher, or the philanthropist, is more likely to feed the flames than to put them out when he proves the certainty of loss and privation, and dwells upon the imminent peril of ruin and destruction.
The strength of the fighter is the strength of his faith. Each new Gideon who goes out against the Midianites fancies that the sword of the Lord is in his hand. He risks all that he holds dear, in order that he may pull down the foul images of Baal and build up an altar to Jehovah, in order that his racemay not be shorn of its inheritance, in order that it may hold fast its own laws and institutions, and not pass under the yoke of the Gentiles. This habit of mind is unchanging throughout the ages. What moved men to give their lives at Marathon moved them equally, more than a thousand years later, to offer the same sacrifice under the walls of Tours. It is still moving them, after yet another thousand years and more have passed away, in the plains of Flanders and the Polish Marshes.
THE MOTIVES OF NATIONS