CHAPTER VIIWAR ESTABLISHMENTS
The previous chapters, describing the Units of the various Arms, and their grouping into the larger Formations, give only the broad lines of the organization of the Army. The detailed composition orEstablishmentof each Unit is shown in a table giving the numbers of Officers and Non-Commissioned Officers by their ranks, of men according to their various functions, and of horses—riding, draught, and pack. These numbers make up what is termed theStrengthof the Unit. Similarly, there are laid down Establishments for the larger Formations, which are given in tables showing the Head-Quarters, the numbers of Units of fighting troops and the Administrative Services, and the total numbers of personnel and animals, according to their various categories.
It is convenient to add to these Establishments a statement of theTransportof each Unit or Formation, showing the guns, wagons, and carts, of all descriptions, with the drivers and animals required.
The Strength given in Establishments representsthe total numbers of men and animals drawing rations daily in the field, and may be termed theRation Strength. It is often summed up as so many “officers” and “other ranks” (or so many of “all ranks”) and horses. TheFighting Strengthmeans the number of men actually available for fighting, and the number of guns horsed and manned. The Fighting Strength is generally reckoned as so manyrifles, or men fighting on foot, so manysabres, or mounted fighting men, and so manyguns. The number of men with the guns is not included in the fighting strength, nor are officers, Staff Sergeants, or Drivers. But all Cavalry officers, even the Commanders and Staff, might strictly be counted as “sabres,” as they actually fight with the same arm as the men, which Infantry officers do not.
It will be observed that in the larger Formations there is a great discrepancy between theTotal Strengthand theFighting Strength. This is due to the numbers of men employed for non-combatant functions, or in the auxiliary services, and of horses required for transport. Thus, in a German Army Corps the total strength is 41,000 men, 14,000 horses, and 2,400 vehicles; while the fighting strength is 25,000 rifles, 1,200 sabres, and 126 guns. In the British Cavalry Division the total strength is nearly 10,000 men and horses, and 550 vehicles; while the fighting strength is under 6,000 sabres, with 24 machine guns and 24 guns.
Tables of War Establishments furnish a complete statement of the Organization for war. On them are founded the necessary calculations formobilizing the peace army, for its transport by sea or rail to the theatre of war, and for its supply with food, ammunition, clothing, and stores.
Themobilizationof a Unit for war may be defined as providing it with the men and animals required to complete its War Establishment, and with itsWar Outfit, or the matériel of all kinds with which it has to be furnished for War. This War Outfit is in the British Service considered under the following heads:
(a) ThePersonal Kitof each soldier—that is, hisclothingand smallnecessaries.(b)War Equipment, which ispersonalorregimental.Personal Equipmentcomprises the Arms and Ammunition carried, and the Accoutrements worn, by each soldier.Regimental Equipmentcomprises guns, reserve of ammunition, vehicles, harness, saddlery, stationery, butchery and cooking utensils.(c)Regimental Suppliesof food and forage.(d) TheMedical and Veterinary Equipmentallotted to the Unit.
(a) ThePersonal Kitof each soldier—that is, hisclothingand smallnecessaries.
(b)War Equipment, which ispersonalorregimental.
Personal Equipmentcomprises the Arms and Ammunition carried, and the Accoutrements worn, by each soldier.
Regimental Equipmentcomprises guns, reserve of ammunition, vehicles, harness, saddlery, stationery, butchery and cooking utensils.
(c)Regimental Suppliesof food and forage.
(d) TheMedical and Veterinary Equipmentallotted to the Unit.
These Establishments are laid down for the most important, or the most likely, wars which the nation may have to wage. They represent the normal requirements, which are those of a campaign in a civilized country, and in a temperate climate. The tables would be altered in the case of war under other conditions, such as in hot or cold climates or seasons, in mountain warfare, infighting savages, in quelling civil insurrection, or when a force is designed for special and limited operations, such as a raid, or the capture of an oversea fortress.
Instances of such improvised organization may be found in most British campaigns of the past two centuries, and of late years in the Expeditionary Forces sent by France to Madagascar, by the United States to Cuba, and by Germany to South-West Africa.
War Establishments by no means represent the real strength during a war. It may happen that the Army engages in the war without its war establishment being completed. But even if each unit were at its correct war establishment when entering on the campaign, this will not long represent its actual strength. Sick and stragglers waste the ranks daily. After fighting, the missing, wounded, and dead have to be deducted. From time to time reinforcements are added in irregular numbers.
Besides the wastage of units, the whole force at the front is apt to become reduced by detachments being taken to guard communications, to escort prisoners or convoys, to garrison fortresses, or to undertake sieges. Napoleon considered that out of every 8 men in an army, only 5 could be counted on as available for the decisive battle of the war.
It is, however, essential for every Commander to be kept informed of the state of his Command for fighting purposes, which the Establishments donot show. This information is supplied by every Commanding Officer of a Unit in a document called aState, rendered, as a rule, daily. TheStateshows the fighting condition of the unit, its strength in officers, men, horses, and guns, the amount of ammunition in hand, as well as any other points affecting its fighting efficiency. A State may be rendered by telegraph, or even verbally, to ensure its prompt arrival.
Returnsof strength are also made by every Commanding Officer. These differ fromStatesin being rendered at longer intervals, so that they can be more deliberately and accurately made out. They are used for purposes of record and accounting.
The importance of keeping up the effective strength of the Army cannot be exaggerated. Drafts of reinforcements should be prepared at the outset, and the supply continuously maintained. There is no principle of organization more clear than the necessity of keeping the existing units up to strength, and not reinforcing with new units, even if the numbers added to the Army be the same in both cases. New units are not so efficient as the weak old ones reinforced by fresh men. They will soon become mere skeletons like the old units, after which the Army will consist of a great number of very weak units—a state of things very detrimental to Command and force of action.
The wastage of war falls mainly on the Infantry, whose losses in battle and sufferings on the marchexceed those of other Arms. Far more losses are incurred on the march than in the fighting. Marching is the rule of the soldier’s life in war, fighting the exception. Infantry wastes away like snow in the sun, as it marches; footsore men fall out, and fatigue and privations cause illness. The statistics of the diminution of the two finest of the Prussian Corps in 1870 are most striking. The Third Corps, which fought so well at Spicheren on the 6th August, and magnificently at Vionville on the 16th, losing in these battles 350 men per battalion, dropped 200 per battalion on the road. The Guards, who entered France with 30,000 Infantry, had only 13,000 rifles after Sedan, a month later, and 8,000 when they reached Paris, their loss in battle being only 8,350. The battalions therefore had lost 300 men on the road, apart from fighting, during the first six weeks of the war.
In a hard campaign it seems likely, therefore, that a loss of at least 100 men per battalion per month must be expected during hard marches, besides losses in fighting which may amount to more. Some Prussian Regiments lost from 300 to 500 men per battalion during one day’s fighting in 1870.
The strength of Head-Quarters of Commands, and of Administrative Services, remains fairly constant during a campaign, as does the number of guns. Mounted men waste less than Infantry, as they do not become footsore, and do not carry the weight of their equipment, which rests on the horse.
To remedy the wastage of war, the British organization provides for each Unit proceeding to the theatre of operations a Reserve, extra to itsEstablishment, amounting to 10 per cent. of its number of rank and file. These men are at first retained at the Base, so as to be readily available, and are called the “First Reinforcements.” It is calculated that subsequent reinforcements, amounting to some 60 per cent. of the total strength of the Force, but mainly required for the Infantry, are likely to be sufficient to replace the wastage of the first year of a war. For the British Expeditionary Force of 153,000 in the Field the strength of First Reinforcements is 14,000 and that of subsequent Reinforcements will probably be about 2,700 officers and 75,000 men.
It might be considered that the larger formations of all Arms need not be permanently organized, but might be improvised for War. This was formerly the system in all armies, and persisted in the British Service until a few years ago; while in the United States there is even now no higher unit than the Regiment. But improvised bodies of troops are not so efficient as permanent formations. This could be shown by many examples from history. The force defeated at Majuba was formed of Companies of several Regiments, and in 1870 the working of the German Cavalry Divisions, which were formed only on mobilization, left much to be desired.
There are several advantages in assembling troops, in permanent Commands. In the first place, the training together of all Arms, and of their various units, creates confidence throughout the force.It can be easily seen how they will learn to know each other’s methods of action, and to rely on their mutual co-operation. For instance, it has been found how much better Artillery supports the other troops of its own Division, whom it has been accustomed to work with.
In the second place, where Staff Officers work constantly together, and understand each other, their work will be better and more rapidly done. Also, when troops are accustomed to work with the same Staff, Orders can be short and concise, and therefore more quickly drafted, and better understood. All this saves time, and much increases the mobility on which depends success in manœuvring.
In the third place, it is most desirable that the Chief should know his Staff and still more his Subordinate Commanders. He will thus be able to apportion to each officer a task suited to his qualifications. This tends to efficiency in Command.
The Administration, too, of improvised units always leaves much to be desired. The Administrative Services of each portion may be permanent and adequate, but additional ones will be required for the new Unit, as well as improvised Head-Quarters. MacMahon’s failure at Wörth was partly due to his having to command a detached Army with only the Staff of his own Army Corps.
The organization of a force regulates the conditions of its command and administration, andshould be altered during the war only if it be absolutely necessary to do so. Any alteration interrupts the accustomed channel for Orders, necessitates changes in Commanders and Staff, and disorganizes the system of Supply. An improvised unit, it has already been shown, is never so efficient as a permanent one, and to form one will rob some existing units to provide the new Commander and Staff. Change in organization, therefore, makes control less effective, and tends to confusion in administration, and to general diminution of efficiency in the Force.
At the same time, the original organization must not be regarded as immutable, if the Commander-in-Chief considers it necessary to alter it. This is definitely laid down in Field Service Regulations, Part ii., sect. 8, pars. 6 to 10. A redistribution may become imperative for reasons of Strategy or Command, but fewer occasions for this necessity will arise if the original organization has been well thought out, so as to meet all requirements which can be foreseen. In the South African War the organization by Army Corps was given up at the beginning, and has never been revived. But in this connection it may be submitted that the frequent formation of improvised sub-commands for special purposes was responsible for loss of force in their leading, which sometimes entailed failure, as in the case of De Wet’s escape.
It is a rule that units should, if possible, be kept intact when forming detachments like Advanced Guards, or those for special operations, which should not be formed out of fragments of severalunits, like the force defeated at Majuba Hill in 1881.
In planning the movements of a force it is desirable to keep the Sub-Commands in the same relative position throughout. Thus, a corps originally on the right of another should not get to the left of it, nor one in rear pass another in front of it. This will avoid useless marching and delays, and confusion in the trains in rear.
This may be summed up as the principle of maintaining the originalOrdre de Bataille. This expression, which originally meant the “battle array,” or order in which the Army was drawn up for battle, is sometimes used to denote the strategical array, or the composition and distribution of the various formations which make up the Army. TheOrdre de Bataillehas no longer any reference to their relative positions on the battle ground, which necessarily change with the circumstances of each engagement. But this document is still indispensable for an army. No Orders can be drafted except by referring to it, and without it the direction and control of an army would be impossible. A knowledge of theOrdre de Batailleof the enemy—that is, of the composition and distribution of the Subordinate Commands of his army—is obviously of the first importance in planning movements and combinations against him. It can generally be arrived at from a study of his peace organization and his railway facilities for concentration, correctedby any information procurable as to the position of his troops. This information may come from various sources, such as newspaper reports of the progress of his concentration, captured documents and letters, deserters, and spies. After an action, the insignia on the uniforms of dead, wounded, and prisoners, the lettering of captured guns, wagons, and baggage, give valuable hints as to the units engaged. It is open to question whether such information might not be withheld from the enemy.
In the Manchurian War the Japanese carefully avoided helping the enemy by indicating units on uniforms, and instructed their men, when wounded or captured, to refrain from stating their Corps. They increased the strength of their Divisions, altered the number of Divisions composing each Army, and even formed an additional Army out of time-expired reserves, without the facts leaking out. This greatly hindered the Russians from estimating the Japanese strength in the different sections of the great battles.
Napoleon made a practice of allotting larger numbers to the Army Corps and Divisions commanded by his best Generals, and this irregularity was increased by his constantly raising additional battalions and squadrons to meet special exigencies, and by incorporating foreign contingents in his armies. The result was, the FrenchOrdre de Bataillewas so irregular as to make anya prioricalculation of strength on the part of his enemies of doubtful value.
The difficulty consequently found by the historianin calculating the strengths, and following the movements, of the French Armies in the Napoleonic Wars is a measure of that which his enemy’s Staff must have met in arriving at a definite idea of the strength and disposition of the French Forces at any given moment.
It is plain that the modern aim of making organization so logical and methodical that the Staff can more easily plan operations, and write correct Orders, had little weight with Napoleon. He was himself his own Chief of the General Staff, and had a memory which no complexity could confuse. It may be a question whether modern symmetry of organization may not be really injurious to success, because highly informing to the enemy. Simplicity and symmetry are obviously useful in saving difficulties to the Staff; but this advantage may be bought too dearly, and a complicated and illogical organization might be the best for war, so as to prevent the enemy acquiring information.