Appendix. Critical Notices.

Appendix. Critical Notices.In this Appendix we shall add a brief critical examination of certain recent works on points connected with our previous subjects. These criticisms will complete the discussion in these various directions, so far as space will allow here. The largest part of what follows has been printed already, either in the“Christian Examiner,”or in the“Monthly Journal of the American Unitarian Association.”§ 1. On the Defence of Nescience in Theology, by Herbert Spencer and Henry L. Mansel.Mr. Herbert Spencer, in his book called“First Principles,”lays down the doctrine of theological nescience, as the final result of religious inquiry. In his chapter on“Ultimate Religious Ideas”he argues thus: The religious problem is, Whence comes the universe? In answer to this question only three statements are possible. It is self-existent. It was self-created. It was created by external agency. Now, none of these, says Spencer, is tenable. For, (1.) Self-existence means simply an existence without a beginning, and it is not possible to conceive of this. The conception of infinite past time is an impossibility. (2.) Self-creation is Pantheism. We can conceive, somewhat, of self-evolution, but not of a potential universe passing into an actual one. (3.) The theistic hypothesis is equally inconceivable. For this is to suppose the world made as a workman makes a piece of furniture. We can conceive of this last, because[pg 442]the workman has the material given; he only adds form to the substance. To produce matter out of nothing is the real difficulty. No simile enables us to conceive of this production of matter out of nothing. Again, says Spencer, space is something, the non-existence of which is inconceivable; hence the creation of space is inconceivable. And lastly, says Spencer, if God created the universe, the question returns, Whence came God? The same three answers recur. God was self-existent, or he was self-created, or he was createdab extra. The last theory is useless. For it leads to an endless series of potential existences. So the theist returns to self-existence; which, however, says Spencer, is as inconceivable as a self-existent universe, involving the inconceivable idea of unlimited duration.Nevertheless, continues Spencer, we are compelled to regard phenomena as effects of some cause. We must believe in a cause of that cause, till we reach afirst cause. The First Cause must be infinite and absolute. He then follows Mansel in showing the contradiction between the two ideas.But total negation is not the result,—only nescience. Atheism, Pantheism, and Theism agree in one belief, namely, that of a problem to be solved. An unknown God is the highest result of theology and of philosophy.“If religion and science are to be reconciled, the basis of the reconciliation must be their deepest, widest, and most certain of all facts—that the power which the universe manifests is utterly inscrutable.”Thus Mr. Spencer proposes to take back human thought eighteen centuries, and ignoring the conquests of Christian faith in civilization, theology, and morals, carries us to Athens, in the time of Paul, to worship at the altar of an unknown God. He makes a solitude in the soul, and calls it peace. He makes peace between religion and science, by commanding the first to surrender at discretion to the other. Science knows nothing of God; therefore theology must know nothing of God. But not so. Let each impart to the other that which it possesses, and which the other lacks. Let science enlarge theology with the idea of law, and theology inform science with the idea of a living God.It is not difficult to detect the fallacies in this argument of Spencer for religious nescience. His notion of conception is that of a purely sensible image. He assumes that we have no knowledge but sensible knowledge, and then easily infers that we do not know[pg 443]God. We can conceive, he says, of a rock on which we are standing, but not of the whole earth. No great magnitudes, he declares, can be conceived. The conception of infinite time is, therefore, an impossibility.But it is clear to any one, not bound hand and foot by the assumptions of sensationalism, that it is just as easy to conceive of the whole globe of earth, as of the piece of it which we see. We cannot havea visual imageof the whole earth, indeed, but the mental conception of the globe is as distinct as that of the stone we throw from our hand. And so far from the conception of infinite duration being an impossibility, not to conceive of time and space as infinite is the impossibility. It is impossible to imagine or conceive of the beginning of time, or the commencement of space.Looking at his trilemma concerning the universe, namely, that it was either, (1.) Self-existent, (2.) Self-created, or, (3.) Created by an external power, we say,—1. The real objection to a self-existent universe, is not that we cannot conceive of existence without beginning. Nothing is easier than to conceive of an everlasting, unchanging universe, without beginning or end. It is not existence, but change, that suggests cause. Phenomena, events, require us to believe in some power which produces them. Now, the events which take place in the universe suggest an intelligent, absolute, and central cause, that is, a cause combining supreme wisdom, power, and goodness. A self-existent universe is not inconceivable, but it is incredible.2. Self-creation, he objects, is Pantheism. But this is no reason for denying it, since Pantheism may, for all we see at this stage of the argument, be the true explanation of the universe. The real objection to the hypothesis of a self-created universe (or of a self-created God), is that it involves the contradiction of something which exists and which does not exist at the same moment; at the moment of self-creation, the universe must exist in order to create, but must be non-existent in order to be created. A self-created universe, then, is not incredible because it involves Pantheism, but because it involves a contradiction.3. He objects to the Theistic hypothesis, that we cannot conceive of the production of matter (more strictly, of substance) out of nothing. He adds that no simile can enable us to imagine it.But I can produce, out of nothing, something visible, tangible, and audible. There is no motion and no sound. I move my arm[pg 444]by the power of will, and I produce both sound and motion. The motion of a body in space is a material phenomenon; for whatever is perceived by the senses is material. We do then constantly perceive material phenomena created out of nothing, by human will.His argument against the Theist, that space could not have been created by God, since its non-existence is inconceivable, is much more plausible. But suppose we grant that space, supposed to be a real existence, was not created in time. Does it follow from that, that it does not proceed from God? Not being an event in time, it does not require a cause; but being conceived of as a reality, it may have eternally proceeded from the divine will, and so not be independent of the Creator.And as regards his trilemma concerning Deity, that also fails in the failure of his thesis that eternal duration is inconceivable. His argument against the self-existent Deity, only rests on that assumption which we have shown to be untenable.But Mr. Spencer, who is not a theologian, is at this point reënforced by Mr. Mansel, on whose former work,“The Limits of Religious Thought,”we proceed to offer some criticism. This also is an argument for nescience in theology, in the presumed interests of revelation. Mr. Martineau has ably shown the weakness and the dangerous tendency of this whole argument of Mansel, in an article to which we earnestly refer our readers.The work of Mr. Mansel is a desperate attempt to save Orthodox doctrines from the objections of reason, not by replying to those objections and pointing out their fallacy, but by showing that similar objections can be brought against all religious belief. For example, when reason objects to the Trinity, that it is a contradiction, Mr. Mansel does not attempt to show that it isnota contradiction, but argues that our belief in God is another contradiction of the same kind. His inference therefore is, that as we believe in God, notwithstanding the contradiction, we ought to believe in the Trinity also, notwithstanding the contradiction. If we believe one, we may believe both.But this is a dangerous argument; since it is evident that one might reply, that there remains another alternative; which is, to believeneither. If Mr. Mansel succeeds in convincing his readers, the result may be a belief in the Trinity, or it may be a disbelief in God altogether; one of two things—either a return to Orthodoxy, or a departure from all religion. Either they will renounce[pg 445]reason in order to retain religion, or they will renounce religion in order to retain reason.At the very best, also, the help which this argument offers us is to be paid for somewhat dearly. It proposes to save Orthodoxy by giving up the use of reason in religion. Mr. Mansel would say,“by giving up the unlimited use of reason;”but, as we shall presently see, this comes very much to the same thing at last.What, then, is the nature of Mr. Mansel's argument? It is an argument founded upon Sir William Hamilton's philosophy of the Unconditioned. Now, this has been generally considered the weak side of Hamilton's system. According to him, the unconditioned is inconceivable: in other words, of the Absolute and Infinite we have no conception at all. But this denies to man the power of conceiving of God, and so leads directly to Atheism. This charge has already been brought against Hamilton's philosophy, in various quarters; for example, in the“North British Review ”for May, 1835. But we will not here attempt any examination of Hamilton's theory, but confine ourselves to Mr. Mansel.The argument of Mansel is this (p. 75):“To conceive the Deity as he is, we must conceive him as First Cause, as Absolute, and as Infinite. By the First Cause is meant that which produces all things, and is itself produced of none; by the Absolute is meant that which exists in and by itself, having no necessary relation to any other being; by the Infinite is meant that which is free from all possible limitation.”Having thus defined the Deity as the First Cause, the Absolute, and the Infinite, Mansel goes on to show that these ideas are mutually contradictory and destructive. A First Cause necessarily supposes effects, and therefore cannot be absolute: nor can the Infinite be a person; for personality is a limitation. By a course of such arguments as these, Mansel endeavors to show that the reason is as incapable of conceiving God as it is of conceiving the Trinity, the Atonement, or any other Orthodox doctrine; and since we do not renounce our belief in God because of these contradictions, neither ought we, because of similar contradictions, to renounce our belief in the Trinity.Such is the substance of Mansel's statement, though the arguments by which it is proved are varied with great ingenuity and to great extent. This course of thought is by no means original, either with Mr. Mansel or Sir William Hamilton. A far greater thinker than either of them (Immanuel Kant) had long before[pg 446]shown the logical contradictions of the understanding in what he called the Antinomies of the pure reason. But the important question is, If the reason contradicts itself thus in its conception of Deity, how are we to obtain a ground for our belief in God? Mansel answers,“Through revelation; that is, through the direct declarations of Scripture.”This he calls faith. We are to believe in a personal God on the ground of a Bible confirmed by miracles.This result is so strange, that it may well seem incredible. Yet we cannot think that we have misrepresented the tendency of the argument; though, of course, we have given no ideas of the acuteness and flexibility of the reasoning, the extent of the knowledge, and mastery of logic, in this work. That such a position should be taken by a religious man, in the supposed interest of Christianity, is sufficiently strange; for it seems to us equally untenable in its grounds, unfounded in its statements, empty of insight, destructive in its results. We will add, very briefly, a few of the criticisms which occur to us.The first thing which strikes us in the argument is, that everywhere it deals with words rather than with things. The whole object of the discussion concerns the meaning of terms, and it deals throughout with the relation of words to other words. It is an acute philological argument. We feel ourselves to be arguing about forms, and not about substances. Now, such arguments may confuse, but they cannot convince. We do not know, perhaps, what to say in reply; but we remain unsatisfied. One not used to logic may listen to an argument which shall conclusively prove that white is black; that nothing is greater than something; that a man who jumps from the top of the house can never reach the ground; but, though the thing is proved, he is not convinced. So, when Mr. Mansel proves to us that we cannot conceive of a Being who is at the same time Infinite and Personal, we are unable, perhaps, to reply to the argument; but we know it to be false, since we actually have the two conceptions in our mind.Wedoconceive of the Deity as an infinite personality. Of what use to tell us that wecannothave an idea, when we know that wedohave it?Mansel tells us that we cannot think the idea of the Infinite and Absolute. He says (p. 110),“The Absolute and the Infinite are thus, like the Inconceivable and Imperceptible, names indicating, not an object of thought or of consciousness at all, but the mere absence of the conditions under which consciousness is possible.”[pg 447]But, then, they are only words, with no meaning attached; and, if so, how can we argue about them at all? All argument must cease when we come to an unmeaning phrase; therefore the existence of Mr. Mansel's argument proves the falsehood of his assertion. Since he argues about the Infinite, it is evident that he has the idea of the Infinite in his mind.Mr. Mansel agrees in principle wholly with the Atheists; for the Atheists do not say that God does not exist, or that God cannot exist, but that we cannot know that he exists. So says Mr. Holyoake, a leading modern Atheist. This is what Mansel also asserts, only he goes farther than they, contending that the very idea of God is impossible to the human reason. It is true that he believes in God on grounds of revelation, which the Atheists do not; but he agrees with them in setting aside all natural and reasonable knowledge of Deity.But how is it possible to obtain an idea of God from revelation, if we are before destitute of such an idea? When Paul preached to the Athenians, he addressed them as having already a true, though an imperfect, idea of God.“Whom, therefore, ye ignorantly worship, him declare I unto you.”But, if they had not already an idea of God, how could he have given them such an idea? Suppose that he works a miracle, and says,“This miracle proves that God has sent me to teach you.”But, by the supposition, they know nothing about God; consequently, they have nothing by which to test the truth of a revelation professing to come from him. Neither miracles, nor the nature of the truth taught, nor the character of the teacher, avail anything as evidence of a revelation from a Being of whom we know nothing. Without a previous knowledge of God, only immediate revelation is possible.Mr. Mansel, therefore, is one who, without a foundation, builds a house on the sand. He attempts to erect faith in God after taking away the foundation of reason. The apostles built revealed religion upon natural religion, revealed theology upon natural theology, according to the rule,“That is not first which is spiritual, but that which is natural; afterward that which is spiritual.”Christ said,“Ye believe in God: believe also in me.”Mr. Mansel reverses all this, and makes Christ say,“Ye believe in me: believe also in God.”But, even if it were possible to ascend to belief in God through belief in Christ, we must ask, Is not belief thought? If the mind cannotthinkthe Infinite, how can it believe the Infinite? Must we not apprehend a proposition before we can believe it? Does[pg 448]not the conception of a thing logically precede the belief of it? If it is impossible to apprehend the Absolute, if this is only an empty name, how is it possible to believe in the Absolute on grounds of revelation, or on any other grounds? A miracle cannot communicate to the mind an idea which is beyond its power of conception.Mr. Mansel declares that our religious knowledge isregulative, but notspeculative.He lays great stress on this distinction: by which he means that we have ideas of the Deity sufficient to guide our practice, but not to satisfy our intellect; which tell us, not what God is in himself, but how hewillsthat we should think of him. According to this view, all revelation is overturned, just as all natural religion has been previously overturned. Revelation does not reveal God on this theory. We have no knowledge of God in the gospel, any more than we had in nature. Instead of knowledge, we have only law. But this seems to despoil Christianity of its vital force. Christ says,“This is life eternal, toknowthee, the only true God.”But Mr. Mansel tells us that such knowledge of God is impossible. Therefore, instead of the gospel, he gives us the law; for it is certain that hisregulativetruths are simply moral precepts, addressed to the will, not to the intellect; capable of being obeyed, but not of being understood.The radical error of Mansel seems to be this,—that his mind works only in the logical region belonging to the understanding, and is ignorant of those higher truths which are beheld by the reason. He has tried to find God by logical processes, and, of course, has failed. He therefore concludes that God cannot be known by the intellect. He has fully demonstrated that God cannot be comprehended by the logical understanding; and in this he has done a good work. But he has not shown that God cannot be known by the intuitive reason. The understanding comprehends: the reason apprehends. The understanding perceives the form: reason takes holds of the substance. The understanding sees how things are related to each other: the reason sees how things are in themselves. The understanding cannot, therefore, see the infinite and absolute; cannot apprehend substance or cause; knows nothing of the eternal. But the reason is as certain of cause as of effect; knows eternity as really as it knows time; it is as sure of the existence of spirit as it is of matter; and sees the infinite to be as real as the finite. Therefore,[pg 449]though we cannot comprehend God by logic, we can apprehend him by reason. We can be as sure of his being as we are of our own, and we are not obliged to explain away all those profound scriptures which teach us that the object and end of our being is to know God.Since, therefore, Mr. Mansel's argument, with all its acuteness, learning, and honesty, tends directly to Atheism; since, by overturning the foundation of Christianity, it overturns Christianity itself; since it substitutes mere moral laws in place of the vital forces of the gospel,—it is no wonder that its positions have been rejected with much unanimity by the most eminent Orthodox scholars. Its defence of Orthodoxy costs too much. Leading thinkers of very different schools—for example, Mr. Brownson, the Roman Catholic, in his“Quarterly Review;”Professor Hickok, the Presbyterian, in the“Bibliotheca Sacra;”and Mr. Maurice, of the Church of England, in an able pamphlet—have opposed with great force the arguments and conclusions of this volume. It is true that some Orthodox divines consider that Mr. Mansel hasdemonstratedthat the human consciousness is unequal to the speculative conception of a Being at once absolute, infinite, and personal, and seem gladly to have the aid of this book in defending the Trinity. But the more distinguished and experienced thinkers mentioned above are cautious of accepting the help of so dangerous an ally.§ 2. On the Defence of Verbal Inspiration by Gaussen.Following the declaration of the apostle Paul, that“the letter killeth,”we have, in the text of this volume, set aside all the theories of the Bible which assume its absolute and literal infallibility. But within a few years, a work in defence of this doctrine has been published abroad, by an excellent man, M. Gaussen, of Geneva, and translated and republished in America by Rev. Dr. Kirk, of Boston. Such a work, coming from such sources, deserves some examination. We shall, therefore, show the course of argument followed in this book, and the reasons which lead us to consider its conclusions unsound, and its reasoning inadequate.Inspiration, as defined by Gaussen, is“that inexplicable power which the divine Spirit formerly exercised over the authors of the Holy Scriptures, to guide them even in the employment of the words they were to use, and to preserve them from all error, as well as from every omission.“We aim,”says he,“to establish, by the word of God, that the[pg 450]Scriptures are from God—that all the Scriptures are from God—and that every part of the Scripture is from God.”Let us consider the arguments in support of this kind of inspiration, and the objections to them.Argument I. Plenary Inspiration is necessary, that we may know with certainty what we ought to believe.Great stress is laid upon this supposednecessity, both by Gaussen and Kirk.“The book so written,”say they,“is the Word of God, and binds the conscience of the world; and nothing else does so bind it, even though it were the writings of Paul and Peter.“With the Infidel, whether he be Christian in name or otherwise, the sharp sword of a perfect inspiration will be found, at last, indispensable. If the ground is conceded to him that there is a single passage in the Bible that is not divine, then we are disarmed; for he will be sure to apply this privilege to the very passages which most fully oppose his pride, passion, and error. How is the conscience of a wicked race to be bound down by a chain, one link of which is weak?”Reply to Argument I.—It is no way to prove a theorytrueto assume itsnecessity. The only legitimate proof of a theory is by an induction of facts. This method of beginning by a supposed necessity, this looking first at consequences, has always been fruitful of false and empty theories. The great advance in modern science has come from substituting the inductive for the ideological method. Find what the facts say, and the consequences will take care of themselves. An argument from consequences is usually only an appeal to prejudices.Again: This argument is fatal to the arguments drawn from the Scriptures themselves. In arguing from the Scripture to prove that every passage is divine, we have, of course, no right to assume that every passage is divine, for that is the very thing to be proved. Then the texts which we quote to prove our position may themselves not be divine, and if we grant that,“we are disarmed.”For, according to this argument, nothing can be proved conclusively from Scripture except we believe in plenary inspiration—then plenary inspiration itself cannot be proved from Scripture. But Gaussen admits that this doctrine can be proved“only by the Scriptures;”therefore (according to this argument) it cannot be proved at all.If, therefore, the doctrine of plenary inspiration is necessary“to[pg 451]bind the conscience of the world,”it is a doctrine incapable of proof. If, on the other hand, it can be proved, it is then clearly not necessary“to bind the conscience of the world.”But again. This theory of plenary inspiration doesnotbind the consciences of men. If men are naturally disposed (as Messrs. Gaussen and Kirk maintain) to deny and disbelieve the doctrines and statements of the Bible, they have ample opportunity of doing so, notwithstanding their belief in this theory. For, after admitting that the words of Scripture, just as they stand, are perfectly true and given by God, the question comes, What do they mean? For instance, I wish, we will suppose, to deny the doctrine of the Deity of Christ. Now, you quote to me the text Rom. 9:5.“Of whom, as concerning the flesh, Christ came, who is over all, God, blessed forever,”—which is the strongest text in the Bible in support of that doctrine. Now, though I believe in the doctrine of plenary inspiration, I am not obliged to accept this passage as proof of the Deity of Christ. For I can, 1. Assert that the verse is an interpolation; 2. Assert that it is wrongly pointed; 3. Assert that it is mistranslated; 4. Assert that Christ is called God in an inferior sense, as God over the Church. And, as a matter of fact, these are the arguments always used, even by those who deny the doctrine of a plenary inspiration. They seldom or never accuse the writer of a mistake, but always rely on a supposed mistranslation, or misinterpretation, in order to avoid the force of a passage. Hence, also, we find believers in this doctrine of plenary inspiration, differing in opinion on a thousand matters, and with no probability of ever coming to an agreement.Argument II. Several Passages of the New Testament plainly teach the Doctrine of the Plenary Inspiration of the Bible.The passages quoted by Gaussen, and mainly relied upon, are 2 Tim. 3:16.“All Scripture is given by inspiration,”&c.; 2 Peter 1:27,“Holy men of God spake as they were moved,”&c. Besides these, he refers to many passages in the Old and New Testaments, but his chief stress is laid on these.Reply to Argument II.—It is well known that both these passages refer only to the Old Testament Scriptures. It is well known that the first may be translated so as to read,“All Scripture, given by inspiration, is profitable,”&c. But it is reply enough to both these passages, to say, that neither of them indicates what kind of inspiration is intended. They assert an inspiration,[pg 452]which we also maintain. But they donotassert a verbal inspiration, nor one which makes the Scripturesinfallible, but simply one which makes themprofitable.The stress laid on the passage 2 Tim. 3:16,“All Scripture,”&c., is itself an argument against the theory of plenary inspiration. The most which can be made of this text, byanypunctuation or translation, is, that all the Scripture is written by inspired men. What was the degree or kind of their inspiration, is not in the least indicated. It might have been verbal, it might have been the inspiration of suggestion, or of superintendence, or the general inspiration of all Christians.Gaussen's only argument on this point is,“that it is thewritingwhich is said to be inspired, and writing must be in words; hence the inspiration must be verbal.”To this we must reply, that inspired writing can only mean what is written by inspired men. The writing itself cannot be inspired. This argument is too flimsy to be dwelt upon.But further still. There is another argument which lies against every attempt to prove plenary inspiration out of the Scripture.Every such attempt is necessarily reasoning in a circle.Gaussen and Kirk have labored earnestly to reply to this argument, but in vain. The answer they make is,“We are not reasoning with Infidels, but with Christians. We address men who respect the Scriptures, and who admit their truth. The Scriptures are inspired, we affirm, because, being authentic and true, they declare themselves inspired; and the Scriptures are plenarily inspired, because, being inspired, they say that they are so totally, and without any exception.”But we answer Messrs. Gaussen and Kirk thus:“You are indeed reasoning with Christians, not with Deists; but you are reasoning with Christians who do not believe thatevery passageof Scripture is infallibly inspired. To prove your doctrine from any particular passages or verbal expressions, you must prove that those particular passages and expressions are not themselves errors. You yourselves assert that this cannot be done, except we believe these passages to be infallibly inspired. Therefore you must assume infallible inspiration in order to prove infallible inspiration. In other words, you beg the question instead of arguing it.”In this vicious circle the advocates of a verbal inspiration of infallibility are necessarily imprisoned whenever they attempt to[pg 453]argue from the words of Scripture. They contend that one must believe their theory in order to be sure that any passage is absolutely true, and then they quote passages to prove their theory, as if they were absolutely true.Argument III. The theory of plenary inspiration is simple, precise, intelligible, and easy to be applied.We admit this to be true. It has this merit in common with the opposite theory of no inspiration. Both are simple, precise, and very easy of application. But simplicity is not always a sign of truth. The facts of nature and life are more apt to be complex than simple. Theories distinguished by their simplicity most commonly ignore or omit a part of the facts. Simplistic theories are generally one-sided and partial. Materialism, Atheism, Idealism, Fatalism, are all very simple theories, and explain all difficulties with a marvellous rapidity. This makes them, at first, attractive to the intellect, which always loves clear and distinct views; but afterwards, when it is seen that they obtain clearness by means of shallowness they are found unsatisfactory.Argument IV. The quotations from the Old Testament, by Jesus and his apostles, show that they regarded its language as infallibly inspired.This argument, upon which great stress is laid, both by Prof. Gaussen and Dr. Kirk, though plausible at first sight, becomes wholly untenable on examination.Thus, in the temptation of Jesus, in his reply to the tempter, he says,“Thou shalt not live by bread alone;”the whole force of the argument depending on the single wordalone.Replying to the Sadducees, who denied the resurrection, he says,“Have ye not read that God says, Iamthe God of Abraham, and of Isaac, and of Jacob? God is not the God of the dead, but of the living.”Then the whole stress of the argument rests on the use of the verb in the present tense,“I am.”Arguing with the Pharisees,“How did David, by the Spirit, call himLord, saying, The Lord said to my Lord,”&c.? Here the argument depends on the use of the single wordLord.Many more instances could be produced of the same kind; and Gaussen contends, that when Jesus and his apostles thus rest their argument on the force of a single word of the Old Testament, they must have believed that the very words were given by inspiration. For otherwise the writers might not have chosen the right word to express their thought in each particular case. And unless the[pg 454]Jews had also believed in the verbal inspiration of their Scriptures, they would have replied that these particular words might have been errors.Reply to this Argument.—Plausible as this argument may seem, it turns out to be wholly empty and worthless. Whenever any writer is admitted to be an authority, then his words become authoritative, and arguments are necessarily based on single words and expressions. In all such cases, we assume that he chose the best words by which to convey his thought, and yet we do not ascribe to him any inspiration or infallibility.Thus, go into our courts of law, and you will hear the language of the United States constitution, of the acts of legislature, of previous decisions of the courts, argued from, word by word. Counsel argue by the hour upon the force and weight of single words in the authorities. Judges in their charges instruct the jury to determine the life and death of the criminal according to the letter of the law. And this they do necessarily, according to the rule,“Cum recedit a litera, judex transit in legislatorem.”But will any one maintain that the counsel and court believe that the legislature was infallibly inspired to choose the very language which would convey their meaning?In this very argument for plenary inspiration, Gaussen and his associates rest their argument on the single word“all,”in the text,“All Scripture is given by inspiration,”&c. Yet, say they, we are not assuming that this text is plenarily inspired, for that, we admit, would be begging the question. If, then, Mr. Gaussen can argue from the force of the single wordall, without assuming the doctrine of plenary inspiration, why could not Jesus and his apostles argue from single words, without assuming the doctrine of plenary inspiration?There is, however, a passage in Paul (Gal. 3:16), in which the apostle quotes a text from the Old Testament, and lays the whole stress of his argument on two letters.“He says not,‘And to seeds’σπέρμασιν, as of many, but as of one,‘And to thy seed’σπερματι.”According to Gaussen's argument, Paul must have believed in the inspiration of the letters. But Gaussen is careful not to adduce this instance, which seems at first so much in his favor. For, in fact, both in Hebrew and Greek, as in English,“seed”is a collective noun, and does meanmanyin the singular. The argument of Paul, therefore, falls through; and it is evident that he is no example to be imitated here, in laying stress[pg 455]on one or two letters. Most modern interpreters admit that he made a mistake; and so, among the ancients, did Jerome, who nevertheless, said the argument“was good enough for the foolish Galatians.”Having thus replied, very briefly, but we believe sufficiently, to the main arguments in support of this theory, we say, in conclusion, that it cannot be true, for the following reasons, which we simply state, and do not now attempt to unfold.1. The New Testament writers nowhere claim to be infallibly inspired to write. If they had been infallibly inspired to write the Gospels and Epistles, they certainly ought to have announced this important fact. Instead of which Luke gives as his reason for writing, not that God inspired him to write, but that“inasmuch as others have taken in hand”to write, it seemed good to him also to do the same, and that for the benefit of Theophilus. John and Paul assert the truth of what they say, but not on account of their being inspired to write, but because they are disciples and apostles.2. The differences in the accounts of the same transactions show that their inspiration was not verbal.These differences appear on every page of any Harmony of the New Testament. They are numerous but unimportant; they go to prove the truth of the narrative, and give probability to the main Gospel statements. But they utterly disprove the theory of plenary inspiration.3. Paul declares that some things which he says are“of the Lord,”other things“of himself;”that in regard to some things he was inspired, in regard to others, not.4. Every writer in the New Testament has a style of his own, and there is no appearance of his being merely an amanuensis.5. While the New Testament writers lay no claim to any such inspiration as this theory assumes, they do claim for themselves and for all other Christians another kind of inspiration, which is sufficient for all the facts, and which gives them ample authority over our faith and life, and makes them independent sources of Christian truth.This view we have already sufficiently considered in our chapter on inspiration.§ 3. Defence of the Doctrine that Sin is a Nature, by Professor Shedd.In the“Christian Review”for 1852 appeared an article of great power, written by a gentleman who has since become eminent as a thinker and writer—Professor W. G. T. Shedd. The title of[pg 456]the article was calculated to attract attention, as a bold attempt to defend an extreme position of Calvinism—“Sin a Nature, and that Nature Guilt.”The article was so rational and clear that we consider it as being even now the best statement extant of this thorough-going Calvinism, and therefore devote a few pages here to its examination.87After some introductory remarks, which it is not necessary to notice, the writer lays down his first position, that sin is a nature. His statement is, that we all sin necessarily and continually in consequence ofour nature, i.e., the character born with us, original and innate.The proofs of this position are, 1. The language of St. Paul (Eph. 2:3),“We were by nature the children of wrath, even as others.”2. That we are compelled by the laws of our mind to refer volitions to a nature, as qualities to a substance. We cannot stop in the outward act of sin, but by a mental instinct look inward to the particular volition from which the sin came. Nor can the mind stop with this particular volition. There is a steady and uniform state of character, which particular volitions cannot explain. The instinct of reason causes us to look back for one common principle and source, which shall give unity to the subject; and, having attained a view both central and simple, it is satisfied. As our mind compels us to refer all properties to a substance in which they inhere, so it compels us to refer all similar volitions to a simple nature. When we see exercises of the soul, we as instinctively refer them to a nature in that soul, as we refer the properties of a body to the substance of that body. 3. Christian experience proves that sin is a nature. The Christian, especially as his experience deepens, is troubled, not so much by his separate sinful actions and volitions, as by the sinful nature which they indicate, and out of which they spring. We are compelled to believe, as we look inward, that there is a principle of evil within us, below those separate transgressions of which we are conscious. There is a diseased condition of the soul, which these transgressions, indicate. There are secret faults from which we pray to be cleansed. 4. The history of Christian doctrine shows that the Church has in all ages believed in a sinful nature, as distinguished from conscious transgressions.These are the proofs of the first position, that sin is a nature.[pg 457]We have stated them concisely, but with sufficient distinctness and completeness. Let us now examine their validity.The first argument is the text in Ephesians,“We were by nature children of wrath,”ἦμεν τέκνα φύσει ὀργῆς. The word φύσις, the writer contends,“always denotes something original and innate, in contradistinction to something acquired by practice or habit.”This text, we know, is the proof-text of original sin, and is considered by many commentators as teaching that man's nature is wholly corrupt. But plainly this is going too far. Granting the full meaning claimed for the word φύσις, the text only asserts that there is something in man's nature which exposes him to the divine displeasure by being the source of sin. It does not assert the corruption of the whole nature, nor preclude the supposition that we are born with tendencies to good, no less than to evil. That we are so, the writer is bound by his own statement to admit; for if this Greek word“always denotes something original and innate,”it denotes this in Rom. 2:14,88which declares that the Gentiles“do by nature the things contained in the law.”According to this passage in Romans, if there be such a thing as natural depravity, it is not total; and if there be such a thing as total depravity, it is not natural. Those who wish to maintain both doctrines can only do it by admitting two different kinds of sinfulness in man, one of which is natural, but not total; the other total, but not natural—a distinction which we esteem a sound one. According to this passage in Rom 2:14, we must understand φύσις as referring to the good side of man's nature, and the same word in Eph. 2:3 as referring to the corrupt side of man's moral nature. The first refers to the“law of the mind;”the second, to the other“law in the members”(Rom. 7:23). But there is another passage (Gal. 2:15), which asserts that the Jews by nature are not sinners, like the heathen. Now, as we can hardly suppose that the original instincts and innate tendencies of the Jewish child were radically good from birth, and essentially different from those of the heathen, and as such a supposition would contradict the whole argument of Paul in Rom. ch. 2, it is[pg 458]evident that φύσις in Gal. 2:15 does not denote something original and innate. The meaning of this verse probably is, that the Jew from birth up, and by the mere fact of being born a Jew, came under the influences of a religious education, which preserved him from many forms of heathen depravity. The word, therefore, means in that passage, not a Jew by nature, but a Jew by birth; and, if so, we are at liberty, if we choose, to ascribe the same meaning to the word in Ephesians, and to understand the text to teach that we were by birth placed under circumstances which tended necessarily to deprave the character.This passage, therefore, quoted by the writer, does not teach entire depravity by nature, but a partial depravity, either found in the hereditary tendencies and instincts, or acquired by means of the evil circumstances surrounding the child from his birth.The second argument of the writer is, that the laws of mind compel us to refer sinful volitions to a sinful nature, as they compel us to refer qualities to a substance.We admit that, where we see uniform and constant habits of action, we are compelled to refer these to a permanent character or state of being. If a man once in his life becomes intoxicated, we do not infer any habit of intemperance, or any vicious tendency; but if he is habitually intemperate, we are compelled, as the writer justly asserts, to look beneath the separate single actions for one common principle and source. But in assuming that this source is a nature brought with us into the world, the writer seems to us to jump to a conclusion. It may be an acquired character, not an original nature. It may be an induced state of disease either of body or mind, a depravity which has commenced this side of childhood. We know that there are acquired habits both of mind and of body; otherwise, not only would it be impossible for a man to grow worse, but it would also be impossible for him to grow better, and there would be an end to all improvement and progress. Such an acquired character introduces unity into the subject of investigation, as completely as does an original nature, and therefore satisfies all the wants of the mind.A precisely similar answer may be made to the writer's third argument, drawn from Christian experience. He is perfectly right, we think, in saying that the Christian is troubled, not merely, nor chiefly, by the recollection of single acts and volitions of evil, but in the evidence which they seem to give of a sinful state of mind and heart. He is right in considering any theory of[pg 459]moral evil shallow and inadequate which only takes into account sinful actions and sinful volitions. What earnest man, who has seriously set about correcting a fault, or improving his character, but has been obliged to say,“To will is present with me; but how to perform that which I will, I find not”? Every earnest effort shows us more plainly how deep the roots of evil run below the surface. We find alawin the members warring against the law of the mind, and bringing us into captivity to the law of sin. This is the description which Paul gives of it. It is alaw; that is, something regular, constant, permanent—a steady stress, a bias towards evil. The apostle, however, differs from the writer in placing this law, not in the will, but in the members; and also in stating that there is another law,—that of the mind,—which has a tendency towards good. In the unregenerate we understand him to teach that the law of evil is the stronger, and holds the man, the personal will, captive. In the regenerate, the reverse is the case. Nor does Paul teach that this sinful tendency is guilt. It is not“Oguiltyman that I am!”but“Owretchedman that I am!”Now, while we agree with the writer in rejecting as superficial and inadequate any theory of evil, whether emanating from our own denomination or from any other, which does not recognize this evil state or tendency lying below the volitions, we differ from him in that we think it not always a nature, but a character. He has not proved, nor begun to prove, that this dark ground of evil in man is always innate or original. It may or may not be; but the argument from Christian experience shows nothing of the sort.The writer's fourth and remaining argument is, that the Church has, in all ages, believed in a sinful nature, as distinguished from conscious transgressions. If this were so, we admit that it should have weight in the inquiry; but we deny the fact so far, at least, as the sinful nature is concerned.89[pg 460]The writer proceeds thus:“Assuming, then, that the fact of a sinful nature has been established, we pass to the second statement of St. Paul, that man is by nature a child of wrath. We pass from his statement that sin, in its ultimate form, is a nature, to his statement that this nature is guilt.”If we have done justice to the writer's arguments,—and it has been our object to state them fairly, though briefly,—we submit that the fact of a sinful nature has not been established by them. He has shown that in man there is a tendency to evil running below the conscious, distinct volitions—that there is a permanent character, good or evil, which manifests itself, and becomes first apparent to ourselves, or to others, in these separate, spiritual exercises or actions. But that this stress either to good or evil, this law either of the mind or members, is original and inborn, is yet to be proved. Let us then consider the second point, namely, whether this character or nature, whichever it may be, is also guilt.As the writer's first argument to prove a sinful nature was drawn from the Greek word φύσις, so his first argument to prove that nature guilt is derived from the Greek word ὀργή in the same passage.“The apostle teaches,”he says,“that sinful man is a child of wrath. Now, none but a guilty being can be the object of the righteous and holy displeasure of God.”But this word, translatedwrath, is confessedly used in other senses besides that of the divine anger or displeasure. It may mean the sufferings or punishments which come as the result of sin, in which sense it is used in Matt. 3:7,“Who hath warned you to flee from the wrath to come?”and other places. This word is used in the passage just quoted for some future evil; in John 3:36, for a present evil—“The wrath of God abides on him;”and in 1 Thess. 2:16, for a past evil—“For the wrath is come [lit.hascome] on them to the uttermost.”It may mean the subjective feeling of guilt; the sense that we deserve the divine displeasure, which is removed by the assurance of forgiveness. It may mean the state of alienation from God, which results by a law of the conscience from this sense of guilt—an alienation removed by the divine act by which God reconciles the sinner to himself. And the radical meaning, from which these secondary meanings flow, may be the essential antagonism existing between the holy nature of God and all evil. But whatever it means, it cannot intend anything like human anger. In the divine wrath there is neither selfishness nor passion; and it must consist with an infinite love towards its object. The word, therefore, as used in Eph. 2:3, does not convey the[pg 461]idea of guilt,a vi terminis. It may mean as well, that this sinful tendency in man, manifesting itself in sinful actions, produces a state of estrangement or alienation between man and God. How far this is a guilty alienation, and how far it is evil and sorrowful, is not to be learned from the term itself.But the main proof of the writer in support of his second position is found in the assertion, that this sinful tendency in man, out of which evil acts continually flow, is not a tendency of the physical nature, but of the will itself. He distinguishes the will proper from the mere faculty of single choices, and considers it to be a deeper power lying at the very centre of the soul, which determines the whole man with reference to some great and unlimited end of living. It is, in fact, the man himself—the person. For man, he asserts, is not essentially intellect or feeling; but is essentially and at bottom a will, a self-determining creature.“His other faculties of knowing and feeling are grafted into this stock and root; and hence he is responsible from centre to circumference.”He then affirms the will, thus defined, to be the responsible and guilty author of the sinful nature; being nothing more nor less than its constant and total determination to self as the ultimate end of living. This voluntary power, which is the man himself, has turned away from God and directed itself to self as an ultimate end; and this state of the will is the sinful nature of man.We have no disposition to quarrel with the psychology of this statement. We admit man to be essentially will, in the sense here described. He is essentially activity; an activity limited externally, by special organization and circumstances,—limited internally, by quantity of force, and knowledge.Nor, again, do we deny that in the unregenerate state the will of man is directed to self rather than to God as its ultimate end; and that this is guilt, and in a certain sense total guilt. No man can serve two masters. If he is obedient to one, he is necessarily disobedient to the other. This disobedience may, or may not, appear in act; but it is there in state. He whose ultimate end is self-gratification is always ready to sacrifice the will of God to his own. He whose ultimate end is God is always ready to sacrifice his own will. In this sense, the unregenerate man may be said to be wholly sinful; and he who is born of God, not to commit sin.Thus much we grant; and the admission is a large one. But we must now object to the writer, that this is but one side of the question; and that he has omitted to see the other side. The[pg 462]sources of evil are not so simple as he seems to suppose; for man is a very complex being, and the world in which he lives is a very complex world. We therefore would inquire,—What proof have we that this guilty direction of the will is anature, in the sense claimed, i.e., something innate or original? Why may not the will have been turned gradually in this direction as we grow up, by enticements of pleasure; and why might not the will, in like manner, by means of wise culture, have been gradually directed to God?Again: what proof have we that we are so whollyunconsciousof this direction of the will, as our author contends? That a great many of the acts of the will are unconscious acts, like the separate movements of the finger in a skilful pianist, or lifting of the feet in walking, we admit; and we are not responsible for these separate acts, but for thepreceding choice, by means of which we determine to play the tune, or walk the mile. In like manner, the direction of the soul to self rather than to God may be moral evil; but is not moral guilt, until we become conscious of it, in a greater or less degree. Then, when partially or wholly awakened to the evil direction of the soul, if we allow ourselves to neglect this discovery, to turn away from the fact and forget it, on that conscious act presses the whole burden of guilt, and not on the unconscious volitions which may result from it. We say, therefore, in opposition to the writer, that though there may be depravity without consciousness of the depraved state, there cannot be guilt without consciousness of the evil choice, or, as the apostle says,“Sin is not imputed where there is no law.”Again: we totally dissent from the statement that this deep-lying will in man is unable to obey the commands,“Turn ye, turn ye from your evil way, for why will ye die?”—“Repent and be converted, that your sins may be blotted out,”—“Make you a new heart and a new spirit,”—“Choose you this day whom you will serve,”—“Believe in the Lord Jesus Christ and be saved.”The writer says, that“such a power as this, including so much, and running so deep, which is a determination of the whole soul, cannot, from the very nature of the case, be such a facile and easily managed power as that by which we resolve to do some particular thing in every-day life.”True: notsoeasily managed; but can it not be managed at all? It may requiremoreself-examination to understand what the direction of the will is, and more concentration of thought and will, and more leaning on God's help; but[pg 463]withall these are we able or not able to turn to God? He says, the great main tendency of the will to self and sin as an ultimate end, though having a free and criminal origin,“is not to be reversed so easily.”True, again; but why notlesseasily? The writer speaks of the sinful will as a“total determination of itself to self;”and asks“how the power that is to reverse all this process can possibly come out of the will thus shut up, and entirely swallowed in the process. How is the process to destroy itself?”But what! Has man becomea process? He is essentially will, but is this will blind mechanism? Has it not, according to our author's own theory, intelligence, conscience, affection, rooted into it? The moment that the writer begins to speak of the will, as unable to change its direction, he is compelled to conceive of it materially and mechanically, and not as the moral, responsible soul. He says,“The human will becomes a current that becomes unmanageable simply because of its own momentum.”And therefore, again, he is obliged to conceive of the whole voluntary power as lost, and lost before man was born; and he reduces all our real freedom to the original act of the will previous to birth, which took place when we were present in Adam's soul, and committed the first transgression with him.This is plainly the denial of all human freedom since the fall of Adam. We bring into the world, according to the writer, a will wholly and inevitably bent to evil. We have no consciousness of this tendency, and if we were conscious of it we have no power to change it; but we yet are responsible for it, and guilty because of it, inasmuch as we began this state ourselves when all our souls were mystically present in the soul of Adam. Of this theory, we merely say now, that, if it be true, man is notnowguilty of any sin which he commits in his mortal life; for he is not now a free being. He is only responsible for the sin which he freely committed in Adam. He is no more responsible when we suppose his sin to proceed from his will, than when we suppose it to proceed from a depraved sensuous nature, or from involuntary ignorance, for he is no more free in the one case than in the other. He may be an infinitely depraved and infinitely miserable being, but he can in no true sense be called aguiltybeing. Again we say, if this theory be true, it is an awful theory, and one which we cannot possibly reconcile with the justice or goodness, and still less with the fatherly character, of God. That God should so have constituted human nature that all the millions of the human[pg 464]race should have had this fatal opportunity of destroying themselves utterly, by one simultaneous act, in Adam, is, to say the least, anawfultheory to propound concerning our heavenly Father. We might put Christ's argument to any man not hardened by theological study, as it seems to us, with irresistible force.“What man is there amongyou,being a father,”who could do anything of this sort? But we know too well that all such appeals fall harmless from the sevenfold shield of a systematized theology.Therefore we will only say further, concerning this theory, that, as beingapparentlyin direct conflict with the divine attributes as taught in the New Testament; as making man a mere process deprived of real freedom; as proving man not guilty for any sin committed in this life; and as thereby deadening the sense of responsibility, and showing that we cannot possibly obey the command,“Repent and turn to God,”—this theory of a sin committed in Adamought to have the amplest proofbefore we believe it. We admit that it may be true, though opposed to all our ideas of God, man, and duty. But being thus opposed, it ought to be sustained by the most unanswerable arguments. If Jesus and his apostles have told us so plainly, we will believe it if we can. How is it, then? Not a word on the subject in the four Gospels. Not a text from the lips of Jesus which can be pretended to lay down any such theory. He does not even mention the name of Adam once in the Gospels, nor allude to him, except when speaking of marriage. This theory rests, not on anything contained in the Gospels, book of Acts, or Epistles of Peter, James, or John, but on two texts in two Epistles of Paul (Rom. 5:14; 1 Cor. 15:22). In the latter passage Paul says not a word of Adam's sin, but only of his death,—the whole chapter treating, not of sin, but of death and the resurrection. This passage, therefore, can hardly be considered a plain statement of the theory. The other, in Romans, is confessedly so far from plain, that it is difficult to make it agree with any theory; but the most evident meaning, to one who has no theory to support, is, that sin began with Adam, and the consequences of sin, which are moral and physical evil, began also with him; and as he thus set in motion a series of evil tendencies which we find in our organization, and which Paul elsewhere calls the law of the members, and a series of evil circumstances which we find around us in the world, both of which are the occasion of sin, we may trace back[pg 465]to him the commencement of human disobedience. If the passage teaches anything more than this, it certainly does not teach it plainly or explicitly.

Appendix. Critical Notices.In this Appendix we shall add a brief critical examination of certain recent works on points connected with our previous subjects. These criticisms will complete the discussion in these various directions, so far as space will allow here. The largest part of what follows has been printed already, either in the“Christian Examiner,”or in the“Monthly Journal of the American Unitarian Association.”§ 1. On the Defence of Nescience in Theology, by Herbert Spencer and Henry L. Mansel.Mr. Herbert Spencer, in his book called“First Principles,”lays down the doctrine of theological nescience, as the final result of religious inquiry. In his chapter on“Ultimate Religious Ideas”he argues thus: The religious problem is, Whence comes the universe? In answer to this question only three statements are possible. It is self-existent. It was self-created. It was created by external agency. Now, none of these, says Spencer, is tenable. For, (1.) Self-existence means simply an existence without a beginning, and it is not possible to conceive of this. The conception of infinite past time is an impossibility. (2.) Self-creation is Pantheism. We can conceive, somewhat, of self-evolution, but not of a potential universe passing into an actual one. (3.) The theistic hypothesis is equally inconceivable. For this is to suppose the world made as a workman makes a piece of furniture. We can conceive of this last, because[pg 442]the workman has the material given; he only adds form to the substance. To produce matter out of nothing is the real difficulty. No simile enables us to conceive of this production of matter out of nothing. Again, says Spencer, space is something, the non-existence of which is inconceivable; hence the creation of space is inconceivable. And lastly, says Spencer, if God created the universe, the question returns, Whence came God? The same three answers recur. God was self-existent, or he was self-created, or he was createdab extra. The last theory is useless. For it leads to an endless series of potential existences. So the theist returns to self-existence; which, however, says Spencer, is as inconceivable as a self-existent universe, involving the inconceivable idea of unlimited duration.Nevertheless, continues Spencer, we are compelled to regard phenomena as effects of some cause. We must believe in a cause of that cause, till we reach afirst cause. The First Cause must be infinite and absolute. He then follows Mansel in showing the contradiction between the two ideas.But total negation is not the result,—only nescience. Atheism, Pantheism, and Theism agree in one belief, namely, that of a problem to be solved. An unknown God is the highest result of theology and of philosophy.“If religion and science are to be reconciled, the basis of the reconciliation must be their deepest, widest, and most certain of all facts—that the power which the universe manifests is utterly inscrutable.”Thus Mr. Spencer proposes to take back human thought eighteen centuries, and ignoring the conquests of Christian faith in civilization, theology, and morals, carries us to Athens, in the time of Paul, to worship at the altar of an unknown God. He makes a solitude in the soul, and calls it peace. He makes peace between religion and science, by commanding the first to surrender at discretion to the other. Science knows nothing of God; therefore theology must know nothing of God. But not so. Let each impart to the other that which it possesses, and which the other lacks. Let science enlarge theology with the idea of law, and theology inform science with the idea of a living God.It is not difficult to detect the fallacies in this argument of Spencer for religious nescience. His notion of conception is that of a purely sensible image. He assumes that we have no knowledge but sensible knowledge, and then easily infers that we do not know[pg 443]God. We can conceive, he says, of a rock on which we are standing, but not of the whole earth. No great magnitudes, he declares, can be conceived. The conception of infinite time is, therefore, an impossibility.But it is clear to any one, not bound hand and foot by the assumptions of sensationalism, that it is just as easy to conceive of the whole globe of earth, as of the piece of it which we see. We cannot havea visual imageof the whole earth, indeed, but the mental conception of the globe is as distinct as that of the stone we throw from our hand. And so far from the conception of infinite duration being an impossibility, not to conceive of time and space as infinite is the impossibility. It is impossible to imagine or conceive of the beginning of time, or the commencement of space.Looking at his trilemma concerning the universe, namely, that it was either, (1.) Self-existent, (2.) Self-created, or, (3.) Created by an external power, we say,—1. The real objection to a self-existent universe, is not that we cannot conceive of existence without beginning. Nothing is easier than to conceive of an everlasting, unchanging universe, without beginning or end. It is not existence, but change, that suggests cause. Phenomena, events, require us to believe in some power which produces them. Now, the events which take place in the universe suggest an intelligent, absolute, and central cause, that is, a cause combining supreme wisdom, power, and goodness. A self-existent universe is not inconceivable, but it is incredible.2. Self-creation, he objects, is Pantheism. But this is no reason for denying it, since Pantheism may, for all we see at this stage of the argument, be the true explanation of the universe. The real objection to the hypothesis of a self-created universe (or of a self-created God), is that it involves the contradiction of something which exists and which does not exist at the same moment; at the moment of self-creation, the universe must exist in order to create, but must be non-existent in order to be created. A self-created universe, then, is not incredible because it involves Pantheism, but because it involves a contradiction.3. He objects to the Theistic hypothesis, that we cannot conceive of the production of matter (more strictly, of substance) out of nothing. He adds that no simile can enable us to imagine it.But I can produce, out of nothing, something visible, tangible, and audible. There is no motion and no sound. I move my arm[pg 444]by the power of will, and I produce both sound and motion. The motion of a body in space is a material phenomenon; for whatever is perceived by the senses is material. We do then constantly perceive material phenomena created out of nothing, by human will.His argument against the Theist, that space could not have been created by God, since its non-existence is inconceivable, is much more plausible. But suppose we grant that space, supposed to be a real existence, was not created in time. Does it follow from that, that it does not proceed from God? Not being an event in time, it does not require a cause; but being conceived of as a reality, it may have eternally proceeded from the divine will, and so not be independent of the Creator.And as regards his trilemma concerning Deity, that also fails in the failure of his thesis that eternal duration is inconceivable. His argument against the self-existent Deity, only rests on that assumption which we have shown to be untenable.But Mr. Spencer, who is not a theologian, is at this point reënforced by Mr. Mansel, on whose former work,“The Limits of Religious Thought,”we proceed to offer some criticism. This also is an argument for nescience in theology, in the presumed interests of revelation. Mr. Martineau has ably shown the weakness and the dangerous tendency of this whole argument of Mansel, in an article to which we earnestly refer our readers.The work of Mr. Mansel is a desperate attempt to save Orthodox doctrines from the objections of reason, not by replying to those objections and pointing out their fallacy, but by showing that similar objections can be brought against all religious belief. For example, when reason objects to the Trinity, that it is a contradiction, Mr. Mansel does not attempt to show that it isnota contradiction, but argues that our belief in God is another contradiction of the same kind. His inference therefore is, that as we believe in God, notwithstanding the contradiction, we ought to believe in the Trinity also, notwithstanding the contradiction. If we believe one, we may believe both.But this is a dangerous argument; since it is evident that one might reply, that there remains another alternative; which is, to believeneither. If Mr. Mansel succeeds in convincing his readers, the result may be a belief in the Trinity, or it may be a disbelief in God altogether; one of two things—either a return to Orthodoxy, or a departure from all religion. Either they will renounce[pg 445]reason in order to retain religion, or they will renounce religion in order to retain reason.At the very best, also, the help which this argument offers us is to be paid for somewhat dearly. It proposes to save Orthodoxy by giving up the use of reason in religion. Mr. Mansel would say,“by giving up the unlimited use of reason;”but, as we shall presently see, this comes very much to the same thing at last.What, then, is the nature of Mr. Mansel's argument? It is an argument founded upon Sir William Hamilton's philosophy of the Unconditioned. Now, this has been generally considered the weak side of Hamilton's system. According to him, the unconditioned is inconceivable: in other words, of the Absolute and Infinite we have no conception at all. But this denies to man the power of conceiving of God, and so leads directly to Atheism. This charge has already been brought against Hamilton's philosophy, in various quarters; for example, in the“North British Review ”for May, 1835. But we will not here attempt any examination of Hamilton's theory, but confine ourselves to Mr. Mansel.The argument of Mansel is this (p. 75):“To conceive the Deity as he is, we must conceive him as First Cause, as Absolute, and as Infinite. By the First Cause is meant that which produces all things, and is itself produced of none; by the Absolute is meant that which exists in and by itself, having no necessary relation to any other being; by the Infinite is meant that which is free from all possible limitation.”Having thus defined the Deity as the First Cause, the Absolute, and the Infinite, Mansel goes on to show that these ideas are mutually contradictory and destructive. A First Cause necessarily supposes effects, and therefore cannot be absolute: nor can the Infinite be a person; for personality is a limitation. By a course of such arguments as these, Mansel endeavors to show that the reason is as incapable of conceiving God as it is of conceiving the Trinity, the Atonement, or any other Orthodox doctrine; and since we do not renounce our belief in God because of these contradictions, neither ought we, because of similar contradictions, to renounce our belief in the Trinity.Such is the substance of Mansel's statement, though the arguments by which it is proved are varied with great ingenuity and to great extent. This course of thought is by no means original, either with Mr. Mansel or Sir William Hamilton. A far greater thinker than either of them (Immanuel Kant) had long before[pg 446]shown the logical contradictions of the understanding in what he called the Antinomies of the pure reason. But the important question is, If the reason contradicts itself thus in its conception of Deity, how are we to obtain a ground for our belief in God? Mansel answers,“Through revelation; that is, through the direct declarations of Scripture.”This he calls faith. We are to believe in a personal God on the ground of a Bible confirmed by miracles.This result is so strange, that it may well seem incredible. Yet we cannot think that we have misrepresented the tendency of the argument; though, of course, we have given no ideas of the acuteness and flexibility of the reasoning, the extent of the knowledge, and mastery of logic, in this work. That such a position should be taken by a religious man, in the supposed interest of Christianity, is sufficiently strange; for it seems to us equally untenable in its grounds, unfounded in its statements, empty of insight, destructive in its results. We will add, very briefly, a few of the criticisms which occur to us.The first thing which strikes us in the argument is, that everywhere it deals with words rather than with things. The whole object of the discussion concerns the meaning of terms, and it deals throughout with the relation of words to other words. It is an acute philological argument. We feel ourselves to be arguing about forms, and not about substances. Now, such arguments may confuse, but they cannot convince. We do not know, perhaps, what to say in reply; but we remain unsatisfied. One not used to logic may listen to an argument which shall conclusively prove that white is black; that nothing is greater than something; that a man who jumps from the top of the house can never reach the ground; but, though the thing is proved, he is not convinced. So, when Mr. Mansel proves to us that we cannot conceive of a Being who is at the same time Infinite and Personal, we are unable, perhaps, to reply to the argument; but we know it to be false, since we actually have the two conceptions in our mind.Wedoconceive of the Deity as an infinite personality. Of what use to tell us that wecannothave an idea, when we know that wedohave it?Mansel tells us that we cannot think the idea of the Infinite and Absolute. He says (p. 110),“The Absolute and the Infinite are thus, like the Inconceivable and Imperceptible, names indicating, not an object of thought or of consciousness at all, but the mere absence of the conditions under which consciousness is possible.”[pg 447]But, then, they are only words, with no meaning attached; and, if so, how can we argue about them at all? All argument must cease when we come to an unmeaning phrase; therefore the existence of Mr. Mansel's argument proves the falsehood of his assertion. Since he argues about the Infinite, it is evident that he has the idea of the Infinite in his mind.Mr. Mansel agrees in principle wholly with the Atheists; for the Atheists do not say that God does not exist, or that God cannot exist, but that we cannot know that he exists. So says Mr. Holyoake, a leading modern Atheist. This is what Mansel also asserts, only he goes farther than they, contending that the very idea of God is impossible to the human reason. It is true that he believes in God on grounds of revelation, which the Atheists do not; but he agrees with them in setting aside all natural and reasonable knowledge of Deity.But how is it possible to obtain an idea of God from revelation, if we are before destitute of such an idea? When Paul preached to the Athenians, he addressed them as having already a true, though an imperfect, idea of God.“Whom, therefore, ye ignorantly worship, him declare I unto you.”But, if they had not already an idea of God, how could he have given them such an idea? Suppose that he works a miracle, and says,“This miracle proves that God has sent me to teach you.”But, by the supposition, they know nothing about God; consequently, they have nothing by which to test the truth of a revelation professing to come from him. Neither miracles, nor the nature of the truth taught, nor the character of the teacher, avail anything as evidence of a revelation from a Being of whom we know nothing. Without a previous knowledge of God, only immediate revelation is possible.Mr. Mansel, therefore, is one who, without a foundation, builds a house on the sand. He attempts to erect faith in God after taking away the foundation of reason. The apostles built revealed religion upon natural religion, revealed theology upon natural theology, according to the rule,“That is not first which is spiritual, but that which is natural; afterward that which is spiritual.”Christ said,“Ye believe in God: believe also in me.”Mr. Mansel reverses all this, and makes Christ say,“Ye believe in me: believe also in God.”But, even if it were possible to ascend to belief in God through belief in Christ, we must ask, Is not belief thought? If the mind cannotthinkthe Infinite, how can it believe the Infinite? Must we not apprehend a proposition before we can believe it? Does[pg 448]not the conception of a thing logically precede the belief of it? If it is impossible to apprehend the Absolute, if this is only an empty name, how is it possible to believe in the Absolute on grounds of revelation, or on any other grounds? A miracle cannot communicate to the mind an idea which is beyond its power of conception.Mr. Mansel declares that our religious knowledge isregulative, but notspeculative.He lays great stress on this distinction: by which he means that we have ideas of the Deity sufficient to guide our practice, but not to satisfy our intellect; which tell us, not what God is in himself, but how hewillsthat we should think of him. According to this view, all revelation is overturned, just as all natural religion has been previously overturned. Revelation does not reveal God on this theory. We have no knowledge of God in the gospel, any more than we had in nature. Instead of knowledge, we have only law. But this seems to despoil Christianity of its vital force. Christ says,“This is life eternal, toknowthee, the only true God.”But Mr. Mansel tells us that such knowledge of God is impossible. Therefore, instead of the gospel, he gives us the law; for it is certain that hisregulativetruths are simply moral precepts, addressed to the will, not to the intellect; capable of being obeyed, but not of being understood.The radical error of Mansel seems to be this,—that his mind works only in the logical region belonging to the understanding, and is ignorant of those higher truths which are beheld by the reason. He has tried to find God by logical processes, and, of course, has failed. He therefore concludes that God cannot be known by the intellect. He has fully demonstrated that God cannot be comprehended by the logical understanding; and in this he has done a good work. But he has not shown that God cannot be known by the intuitive reason. The understanding comprehends: the reason apprehends. The understanding perceives the form: reason takes holds of the substance. The understanding sees how things are related to each other: the reason sees how things are in themselves. The understanding cannot, therefore, see the infinite and absolute; cannot apprehend substance or cause; knows nothing of the eternal. But the reason is as certain of cause as of effect; knows eternity as really as it knows time; it is as sure of the existence of spirit as it is of matter; and sees the infinite to be as real as the finite. Therefore,[pg 449]though we cannot comprehend God by logic, we can apprehend him by reason. We can be as sure of his being as we are of our own, and we are not obliged to explain away all those profound scriptures which teach us that the object and end of our being is to know God.Since, therefore, Mr. Mansel's argument, with all its acuteness, learning, and honesty, tends directly to Atheism; since, by overturning the foundation of Christianity, it overturns Christianity itself; since it substitutes mere moral laws in place of the vital forces of the gospel,—it is no wonder that its positions have been rejected with much unanimity by the most eminent Orthodox scholars. Its defence of Orthodoxy costs too much. Leading thinkers of very different schools—for example, Mr. Brownson, the Roman Catholic, in his“Quarterly Review;”Professor Hickok, the Presbyterian, in the“Bibliotheca Sacra;”and Mr. Maurice, of the Church of England, in an able pamphlet—have opposed with great force the arguments and conclusions of this volume. It is true that some Orthodox divines consider that Mr. Mansel hasdemonstratedthat the human consciousness is unequal to the speculative conception of a Being at once absolute, infinite, and personal, and seem gladly to have the aid of this book in defending the Trinity. But the more distinguished and experienced thinkers mentioned above are cautious of accepting the help of so dangerous an ally.§ 2. On the Defence of Verbal Inspiration by Gaussen.Following the declaration of the apostle Paul, that“the letter killeth,”we have, in the text of this volume, set aside all the theories of the Bible which assume its absolute and literal infallibility. But within a few years, a work in defence of this doctrine has been published abroad, by an excellent man, M. Gaussen, of Geneva, and translated and republished in America by Rev. Dr. Kirk, of Boston. Such a work, coming from such sources, deserves some examination. We shall, therefore, show the course of argument followed in this book, and the reasons which lead us to consider its conclusions unsound, and its reasoning inadequate.Inspiration, as defined by Gaussen, is“that inexplicable power which the divine Spirit formerly exercised over the authors of the Holy Scriptures, to guide them even in the employment of the words they were to use, and to preserve them from all error, as well as from every omission.“We aim,”says he,“to establish, by the word of God, that the[pg 450]Scriptures are from God—that all the Scriptures are from God—and that every part of the Scripture is from God.”Let us consider the arguments in support of this kind of inspiration, and the objections to them.Argument I. Plenary Inspiration is necessary, that we may know with certainty what we ought to believe.Great stress is laid upon this supposednecessity, both by Gaussen and Kirk.“The book so written,”say they,“is the Word of God, and binds the conscience of the world; and nothing else does so bind it, even though it were the writings of Paul and Peter.“With the Infidel, whether he be Christian in name or otherwise, the sharp sword of a perfect inspiration will be found, at last, indispensable. If the ground is conceded to him that there is a single passage in the Bible that is not divine, then we are disarmed; for he will be sure to apply this privilege to the very passages which most fully oppose his pride, passion, and error. How is the conscience of a wicked race to be bound down by a chain, one link of which is weak?”Reply to Argument I.—It is no way to prove a theorytrueto assume itsnecessity. The only legitimate proof of a theory is by an induction of facts. This method of beginning by a supposed necessity, this looking first at consequences, has always been fruitful of false and empty theories. The great advance in modern science has come from substituting the inductive for the ideological method. Find what the facts say, and the consequences will take care of themselves. An argument from consequences is usually only an appeal to prejudices.Again: This argument is fatal to the arguments drawn from the Scriptures themselves. In arguing from the Scripture to prove that every passage is divine, we have, of course, no right to assume that every passage is divine, for that is the very thing to be proved. Then the texts which we quote to prove our position may themselves not be divine, and if we grant that,“we are disarmed.”For, according to this argument, nothing can be proved conclusively from Scripture except we believe in plenary inspiration—then plenary inspiration itself cannot be proved from Scripture. But Gaussen admits that this doctrine can be proved“only by the Scriptures;”therefore (according to this argument) it cannot be proved at all.If, therefore, the doctrine of plenary inspiration is necessary“to[pg 451]bind the conscience of the world,”it is a doctrine incapable of proof. If, on the other hand, it can be proved, it is then clearly not necessary“to bind the conscience of the world.”But again. This theory of plenary inspiration doesnotbind the consciences of men. If men are naturally disposed (as Messrs. Gaussen and Kirk maintain) to deny and disbelieve the doctrines and statements of the Bible, they have ample opportunity of doing so, notwithstanding their belief in this theory. For, after admitting that the words of Scripture, just as they stand, are perfectly true and given by God, the question comes, What do they mean? For instance, I wish, we will suppose, to deny the doctrine of the Deity of Christ. Now, you quote to me the text Rom. 9:5.“Of whom, as concerning the flesh, Christ came, who is over all, God, blessed forever,”—which is the strongest text in the Bible in support of that doctrine. Now, though I believe in the doctrine of plenary inspiration, I am not obliged to accept this passage as proof of the Deity of Christ. For I can, 1. Assert that the verse is an interpolation; 2. Assert that it is wrongly pointed; 3. Assert that it is mistranslated; 4. Assert that Christ is called God in an inferior sense, as God over the Church. And, as a matter of fact, these are the arguments always used, even by those who deny the doctrine of a plenary inspiration. They seldom or never accuse the writer of a mistake, but always rely on a supposed mistranslation, or misinterpretation, in order to avoid the force of a passage. Hence, also, we find believers in this doctrine of plenary inspiration, differing in opinion on a thousand matters, and with no probability of ever coming to an agreement.Argument II. Several Passages of the New Testament plainly teach the Doctrine of the Plenary Inspiration of the Bible.The passages quoted by Gaussen, and mainly relied upon, are 2 Tim. 3:16.“All Scripture is given by inspiration,”&c.; 2 Peter 1:27,“Holy men of God spake as they were moved,”&c. Besides these, he refers to many passages in the Old and New Testaments, but his chief stress is laid on these.Reply to Argument II.—It is well known that both these passages refer only to the Old Testament Scriptures. It is well known that the first may be translated so as to read,“All Scripture, given by inspiration, is profitable,”&c. But it is reply enough to both these passages, to say, that neither of them indicates what kind of inspiration is intended. They assert an inspiration,[pg 452]which we also maintain. But they donotassert a verbal inspiration, nor one which makes the Scripturesinfallible, but simply one which makes themprofitable.The stress laid on the passage 2 Tim. 3:16,“All Scripture,”&c., is itself an argument against the theory of plenary inspiration. The most which can be made of this text, byanypunctuation or translation, is, that all the Scripture is written by inspired men. What was the degree or kind of their inspiration, is not in the least indicated. It might have been verbal, it might have been the inspiration of suggestion, or of superintendence, or the general inspiration of all Christians.Gaussen's only argument on this point is,“that it is thewritingwhich is said to be inspired, and writing must be in words; hence the inspiration must be verbal.”To this we must reply, that inspired writing can only mean what is written by inspired men. The writing itself cannot be inspired. This argument is too flimsy to be dwelt upon.But further still. There is another argument which lies against every attempt to prove plenary inspiration out of the Scripture.Every such attempt is necessarily reasoning in a circle.Gaussen and Kirk have labored earnestly to reply to this argument, but in vain. The answer they make is,“We are not reasoning with Infidels, but with Christians. We address men who respect the Scriptures, and who admit their truth. The Scriptures are inspired, we affirm, because, being authentic and true, they declare themselves inspired; and the Scriptures are plenarily inspired, because, being inspired, they say that they are so totally, and without any exception.”But we answer Messrs. Gaussen and Kirk thus:“You are indeed reasoning with Christians, not with Deists; but you are reasoning with Christians who do not believe thatevery passageof Scripture is infallibly inspired. To prove your doctrine from any particular passages or verbal expressions, you must prove that those particular passages and expressions are not themselves errors. You yourselves assert that this cannot be done, except we believe these passages to be infallibly inspired. Therefore you must assume infallible inspiration in order to prove infallible inspiration. In other words, you beg the question instead of arguing it.”In this vicious circle the advocates of a verbal inspiration of infallibility are necessarily imprisoned whenever they attempt to[pg 453]argue from the words of Scripture. They contend that one must believe their theory in order to be sure that any passage is absolutely true, and then they quote passages to prove their theory, as if they were absolutely true.Argument III. The theory of plenary inspiration is simple, precise, intelligible, and easy to be applied.We admit this to be true. It has this merit in common with the opposite theory of no inspiration. Both are simple, precise, and very easy of application. But simplicity is not always a sign of truth. The facts of nature and life are more apt to be complex than simple. Theories distinguished by their simplicity most commonly ignore or omit a part of the facts. Simplistic theories are generally one-sided and partial. Materialism, Atheism, Idealism, Fatalism, are all very simple theories, and explain all difficulties with a marvellous rapidity. This makes them, at first, attractive to the intellect, which always loves clear and distinct views; but afterwards, when it is seen that they obtain clearness by means of shallowness they are found unsatisfactory.Argument IV. The quotations from the Old Testament, by Jesus and his apostles, show that they regarded its language as infallibly inspired.This argument, upon which great stress is laid, both by Prof. Gaussen and Dr. Kirk, though plausible at first sight, becomes wholly untenable on examination.Thus, in the temptation of Jesus, in his reply to the tempter, he says,“Thou shalt not live by bread alone;”the whole force of the argument depending on the single wordalone.Replying to the Sadducees, who denied the resurrection, he says,“Have ye not read that God says, Iamthe God of Abraham, and of Isaac, and of Jacob? God is not the God of the dead, but of the living.”Then the whole stress of the argument rests on the use of the verb in the present tense,“I am.”Arguing with the Pharisees,“How did David, by the Spirit, call himLord, saying, The Lord said to my Lord,”&c.? Here the argument depends on the use of the single wordLord.Many more instances could be produced of the same kind; and Gaussen contends, that when Jesus and his apostles thus rest their argument on the force of a single word of the Old Testament, they must have believed that the very words were given by inspiration. For otherwise the writers might not have chosen the right word to express their thought in each particular case. And unless the[pg 454]Jews had also believed in the verbal inspiration of their Scriptures, they would have replied that these particular words might have been errors.Reply to this Argument.—Plausible as this argument may seem, it turns out to be wholly empty and worthless. Whenever any writer is admitted to be an authority, then his words become authoritative, and arguments are necessarily based on single words and expressions. In all such cases, we assume that he chose the best words by which to convey his thought, and yet we do not ascribe to him any inspiration or infallibility.Thus, go into our courts of law, and you will hear the language of the United States constitution, of the acts of legislature, of previous decisions of the courts, argued from, word by word. Counsel argue by the hour upon the force and weight of single words in the authorities. Judges in their charges instruct the jury to determine the life and death of the criminal according to the letter of the law. And this they do necessarily, according to the rule,“Cum recedit a litera, judex transit in legislatorem.”But will any one maintain that the counsel and court believe that the legislature was infallibly inspired to choose the very language which would convey their meaning?In this very argument for plenary inspiration, Gaussen and his associates rest their argument on the single word“all,”in the text,“All Scripture is given by inspiration,”&c. Yet, say they, we are not assuming that this text is plenarily inspired, for that, we admit, would be begging the question. If, then, Mr. Gaussen can argue from the force of the single wordall, without assuming the doctrine of plenary inspiration, why could not Jesus and his apostles argue from single words, without assuming the doctrine of plenary inspiration?There is, however, a passage in Paul (Gal. 3:16), in which the apostle quotes a text from the Old Testament, and lays the whole stress of his argument on two letters.“He says not,‘And to seeds’σπέρμασιν, as of many, but as of one,‘And to thy seed’σπερματι.”According to Gaussen's argument, Paul must have believed in the inspiration of the letters. But Gaussen is careful not to adduce this instance, which seems at first so much in his favor. For, in fact, both in Hebrew and Greek, as in English,“seed”is a collective noun, and does meanmanyin the singular. The argument of Paul, therefore, falls through; and it is evident that he is no example to be imitated here, in laying stress[pg 455]on one or two letters. Most modern interpreters admit that he made a mistake; and so, among the ancients, did Jerome, who nevertheless, said the argument“was good enough for the foolish Galatians.”Having thus replied, very briefly, but we believe sufficiently, to the main arguments in support of this theory, we say, in conclusion, that it cannot be true, for the following reasons, which we simply state, and do not now attempt to unfold.1. The New Testament writers nowhere claim to be infallibly inspired to write. If they had been infallibly inspired to write the Gospels and Epistles, they certainly ought to have announced this important fact. Instead of which Luke gives as his reason for writing, not that God inspired him to write, but that“inasmuch as others have taken in hand”to write, it seemed good to him also to do the same, and that for the benefit of Theophilus. John and Paul assert the truth of what they say, but not on account of their being inspired to write, but because they are disciples and apostles.2. The differences in the accounts of the same transactions show that their inspiration was not verbal.These differences appear on every page of any Harmony of the New Testament. They are numerous but unimportant; they go to prove the truth of the narrative, and give probability to the main Gospel statements. But they utterly disprove the theory of plenary inspiration.3. Paul declares that some things which he says are“of the Lord,”other things“of himself;”that in regard to some things he was inspired, in regard to others, not.4. Every writer in the New Testament has a style of his own, and there is no appearance of his being merely an amanuensis.5. While the New Testament writers lay no claim to any such inspiration as this theory assumes, they do claim for themselves and for all other Christians another kind of inspiration, which is sufficient for all the facts, and which gives them ample authority over our faith and life, and makes them independent sources of Christian truth.This view we have already sufficiently considered in our chapter on inspiration.§ 3. Defence of the Doctrine that Sin is a Nature, by Professor Shedd.In the“Christian Review”for 1852 appeared an article of great power, written by a gentleman who has since become eminent as a thinker and writer—Professor W. G. T. Shedd. The title of[pg 456]the article was calculated to attract attention, as a bold attempt to defend an extreme position of Calvinism—“Sin a Nature, and that Nature Guilt.”The article was so rational and clear that we consider it as being even now the best statement extant of this thorough-going Calvinism, and therefore devote a few pages here to its examination.87After some introductory remarks, which it is not necessary to notice, the writer lays down his first position, that sin is a nature. His statement is, that we all sin necessarily and continually in consequence ofour nature, i.e., the character born with us, original and innate.The proofs of this position are, 1. The language of St. Paul (Eph. 2:3),“We were by nature the children of wrath, even as others.”2. That we are compelled by the laws of our mind to refer volitions to a nature, as qualities to a substance. We cannot stop in the outward act of sin, but by a mental instinct look inward to the particular volition from which the sin came. Nor can the mind stop with this particular volition. There is a steady and uniform state of character, which particular volitions cannot explain. The instinct of reason causes us to look back for one common principle and source, which shall give unity to the subject; and, having attained a view both central and simple, it is satisfied. As our mind compels us to refer all properties to a substance in which they inhere, so it compels us to refer all similar volitions to a simple nature. When we see exercises of the soul, we as instinctively refer them to a nature in that soul, as we refer the properties of a body to the substance of that body. 3. Christian experience proves that sin is a nature. The Christian, especially as his experience deepens, is troubled, not so much by his separate sinful actions and volitions, as by the sinful nature which they indicate, and out of which they spring. We are compelled to believe, as we look inward, that there is a principle of evil within us, below those separate transgressions of which we are conscious. There is a diseased condition of the soul, which these transgressions, indicate. There are secret faults from which we pray to be cleansed. 4. The history of Christian doctrine shows that the Church has in all ages believed in a sinful nature, as distinguished from conscious transgressions.These are the proofs of the first position, that sin is a nature.[pg 457]We have stated them concisely, but with sufficient distinctness and completeness. Let us now examine their validity.The first argument is the text in Ephesians,“We were by nature children of wrath,”ἦμεν τέκνα φύσει ὀργῆς. The word φύσις, the writer contends,“always denotes something original and innate, in contradistinction to something acquired by practice or habit.”This text, we know, is the proof-text of original sin, and is considered by many commentators as teaching that man's nature is wholly corrupt. But plainly this is going too far. Granting the full meaning claimed for the word φύσις, the text only asserts that there is something in man's nature which exposes him to the divine displeasure by being the source of sin. It does not assert the corruption of the whole nature, nor preclude the supposition that we are born with tendencies to good, no less than to evil. That we are so, the writer is bound by his own statement to admit; for if this Greek word“always denotes something original and innate,”it denotes this in Rom. 2:14,88which declares that the Gentiles“do by nature the things contained in the law.”According to this passage in Romans, if there be such a thing as natural depravity, it is not total; and if there be such a thing as total depravity, it is not natural. Those who wish to maintain both doctrines can only do it by admitting two different kinds of sinfulness in man, one of which is natural, but not total; the other total, but not natural—a distinction which we esteem a sound one. According to this passage in Rom 2:14, we must understand φύσις as referring to the good side of man's nature, and the same word in Eph. 2:3 as referring to the corrupt side of man's moral nature. The first refers to the“law of the mind;”the second, to the other“law in the members”(Rom. 7:23). But there is another passage (Gal. 2:15), which asserts that the Jews by nature are not sinners, like the heathen. Now, as we can hardly suppose that the original instincts and innate tendencies of the Jewish child were radically good from birth, and essentially different from those of the heathen, and as such a supposition would contradict the whole argument of Paul in Rom. ch. 2, it is[pg 458]evident that φύσις in Gal. 2:15 does not denote something original and innate. The meaning of this verse probably is, that the Jew from birth up, and by the mere fact of being born a Jew, came under the influences of a religious education, which preserved him from many forms of heathen depravity. The word, therefore, means in that passage, not a Jew by nature, but a Jew by birth; and, if so, we are at liberty, if we choose, to ascribe the same meaning to the word in Ephesians, and to understand the text to teach that we were by birth placed under circumstances which tended necessarily to deprave the character.This passage, therefore, quoted by the writer, does not teach entire depravity by nature, but a partial depravity, either found in the hereditary tendencies and instincts, or acquired by means of the evil circumstances surrounding the child from his birth.The second argument of the writer is, that the laws of mind compel us to refer sinful volitions to a sinful nature, as they compel us to refer qualities to a substance.We admit that, where we see uniform and constant habits of action, we are compelled to refer these to a permanent character or state of being. If a man once in his life becomes intoxicated, we do not infer any habit of intemperance, or any vicious tendency; but if he is habitually intemperate, we are compelled, as the writer justly asserts, to look beneath the separate single actions for one common principle and source. But in assuming that this source is a nature brought with us into the world, the writer seems to us to jump to a conclusion. It may be an acquired character, not an original nature. It may be an induced state of disease either of body or mind, a depravity which has commenced this side of childhood. We know that there are acquired habits both of mind and of body; otherwise, not only would it be impossible for a man to grow worse, but it would also be impossible for him to grow better, and there would be an end to all improvement and progress. Such an acquired character introduces unity into the subject of investigation, as completely as does an original nature, and therefore satisfies all the wants of the mind.A precisely similar answer may be made to the writer's third argument, drawn from Christian experience. He is perfectly right, we think, in saying that the Christian is troubled, not merely, nor chiefly, by the recollection of single acts and volitions of evil, but in the evidence which they seem to give of a sinful state of mind and heart. He is right in considering any theory of[pg 459]moral evil shallow and inadequate which only takes into account sinful actions and sinful volitions. What earnest man, who has seriously set about correcting a fault, or improving his character, but has been obliged to say,“To will is present with me; but how to perform that which I will, I find not”? Every earnest effort shows us more plainly how deep the roots of evil run below the surface. We find alawin the members warring against the law of the mind, and bringing us into captivity to the law of sin. This is the description which Paul gives of it. It is alaw; that is, something regular, constant, permanent—a steady stress, a bias towards evil. The apostle, however, differs from the writer in placing this law, not in the will, but in the members; and also in stating that there is another law,—that of the mind,—which has a tendency towards good. In the unregenerate we understand him to teach that the law of evil is the stronger, and holds the man, the personal will, captive. In the regenerate, the reverse is the case. Nor does Paul teach that this sinful tendency is guilt. It is not“Oguiltyman that I am!”but“Owretchedman that I am!”Now, while we agree with the writer in rejecting as superficial and inadequate any theory of evil, whether emanating from our own denomination or from any other, which does not recognize this evil state or tendency lying below the volitions, we differ from him in that we think it not always a nature, but a character. He has not proved, nor begun to prove, that this dark ground of evil in man is always innate or original. It may or may not be; but the argument from Christian experience shows nothing of the sort.The writer's fourth and remaining argument is, that the Church has, in all ages, believed in a sinful nature, as distinguished from conscious transgressions. If this were so, we admit that it should have weight in the inquiry; but we deny the fact so far, at least, as the sinful nature is concerned.89[pg 460]The writer proceeds thus:“Assuming, then, that the fact of a sinful nature has been established, we pass to the second statement of St. Paul, that man is by nature a child of wrath. We pass from his statement that sin, in its ultimate form, is a nature, to his statement that this nature is guilt.”If we have done justice to the writer's arguments,—and it has been our object to state them fairly, though briefly,—we submit that the fact of a sinful nature has not been established by them. He has shown that in man there is a tendency to evil running below the conscious, distinct volitions—that there is a permanent character, good or evil, which manifests itself, and becomes first apparent to ourselves, or to others, in these separate, spiritual exercises or actions. But that this stress either to good or evil, this law either of the mind or members, is original and inborn, is yet to be proved. Let us then consider the second point, namely, whether this character or nature, whichever it may be, is also guilt.As the writer's first argument to prove a sinful nature was drawn from the Greek word φύσις, so his first argument to prove that nature guilt is derived from the Greek word ὀργή in the same passage.“The apostle teaches,”he says,“that sinful man is a child of wrath. Now, none but a guilty being can be the object of the righteous and holy displeasure of God.”But this word, translatedwrath, is confessedly used in other senses besides that of the divine anger or displeasure. It may mean the sufferings or punishments which come as the result of sin, in which sense it is used in Matt. 3:7,“Who hath warned you to flee from the wrath to come?”and other places. This word is used in the passage just quoted for some future evil; in John 3:36, for a present evil—“The wrath of God abides on him;”and in 1 Thess. 2:16, for a past evil—“For the wrath is come [lit.hascome] on them to the uttermost.”It may mean the subjective feeling of guilt; the sense that we deserve the divine displeasure, which is removed by the assurance of forgiveness. It may mean the state of alienation from God, which results by a law of the conscience from this sense of guilt—an alienation removed by the divine act by which God reconciles the sinner to himself. And the radical meaning, from which these secondary meanings flow, may be the essential antagonism existing between the holy nature of God and all evil. But whatever it means, it cannot intend anything like human anger. In the divine wrath there is neither selfishness nor passion; and it must consist with an infinite love towards its object. The word, therefore, as used in Eph. 2:3, does not convey the[pg 461]idea of guilt,a vi terminis. It may mean as well, that this sinful tendency in man, manifesting itself in sinful actions, produces a state of estrangement or alienation between man and God. How far this is a guilty alienation, and how far it is evil and sorrowful, is not to be learned from the term itself.But the main proof of the writer in support of his second position is found in the assertion, that this sinful tendency in man, out of which evil acts continually flow, is not a tendency of the physical nature, but of the will itself. He distinguishes the will proper from the mere faculty of single choices, and considers it to be a deeper power lying at the very centre of the soul, which determines the whole man with reference to some great and unlimited end of living. It is, in fact, the man himself—the person. For man, he asserts, is not essentially intellect or feeling; but is essentially and at bottom a will, a self-determining creature.“His other faculties of knowing and feeling are grafted into this stock and root; and hence he is responsible from centre to circumference.”He then affirms the will, thus defined, to be the responsible and guilty author of the sinful nature; being nothing more nor less than its constant and total determination to self as the ultimate end of living. This voluntary power, which is the man himself, has turned away from God and directed itself to self as an ultimate end; and this state of the will is the sinful nature of man.We have no disposition to quarrel with the psychology of this statement. We admit man to be essentially will, in the sense here described. He is essentially activity; an activity limited externally, by special organization and circumstances,—limited internally, by quantity of force, and knowledge.Nor, again, do we deny that in the unregenerate state the will of man is directed to self rather than to God as its ultimate end; and that this is guilt, and in a certain sense total guilt. No man can serve two masters. If he is obedient to one, he is necessarily disobedient to the other. This disobedience may, or may not, appear in act; but it is there in state. He whose ultimate end is self-gratification is always ready to sacrifice the will of God to his own. He whose ultimate end is God is always ready to sacrifice his own will. In this sense, the unregenerate man may be said to be wholly sinful; and he who is born of God, not to commit sin.Thus much we grant; and the admission is a large one. But we must now object to the writer, that this is but one side of the question; and that he has omitted to see the other side. The[pg 462]sources of evil are not so simple as he seems to suppose; for man is a very complex being, and the world in which he lives is a very complex world. We therefore would inquire,—What proof have we that this guilty direction of the will is anature, in the sense claimed, i.e., something innate or original? Why may not the will have been turned gradually in this direction as we grow up, by enticements of pleasure; and why might not the will, in like manner, by means of wise culture, have been gradually directed to God?Again: what proof have we that we are so whollyunconsciousof this direction of the will, as our author contends? That a great many of the acts of the will are unconscious acts, like the separate movements of the finger in a skilful pianist, or lifting of the feet in walking, we admit; and we are not responsible for these separate acts, but for thepreceding choice, by means of which we determine to play the tune, or walk the mile. In like manner, the direction of the soul to self rather than to God may be moral evil; but is not moral guilt, until we become conscious of it, in a greater or less degree. Then, when partially or wholly awakened to the evil direction of the soul, if we allow ourselves to neglect this discovery, to turn away from the fact and forget it, on that conscious act presses the whole burden of guilt, and not on the unconscious volitions which may result from it. We say, therefore, in opposition to the writer, that though there may be depravity without consciousness of the depraved state, there cannot be guilt without consciousness of the evil choice, or, as the apostle says,“Sin is not imputed where there is no law.”Again: we totally dissent from the statement that this deep-lying will in man is unable to obey the commands,“Turn ye, turn ye from your evil way, for why will ye die?”—“Repent and be converted, that your sins may be blotted out,”—“Make you a new heart and a new spirit,”—“Choose you this day whom you will serve,”—“Believe in the Lord Jesus Christ and be saved.”The writer says, that“such a power as this, including so much, and running so deep, which is a determination of the whole soul, cannot, from the very nature of the case, be such a facile and easily managed power as that by which we resolve to do some particular thing in every-day life.”True: notsoeasily managed; but can it not be managed at all? It may requiremoreself-examination to understand what the direction of the will is, and more concentration of thought and will, and more leaning on God's help; but[pg 463]withall these are we able or not able to turn to God? He says, the great main tendency of the will to self and sin as an ultimate end, though having a free and criminal origin,“is not to be reversed so easily.”True, again; but why notlesseasily? The writer speaks of the sinful will as a“total determination of itself to self;”and asks“how the power that is to reverse all this process can possibly come out of the will thus shut up, and entirely swallowed in the process. How is the process to destroy itself?”But what! Has man becomea process? He is essentially will, but is this will blind mechanism? Has it not, according to our author's own theory, intelligence, conscience, affection, rooted into it? The moment that the writer begins to speak of the will, as unable to change its direction, he is compelled to conceive of it materially and mechanically, and not as the moral, responsible soul. He says,“The human will becomes a current that becomes unmanageable simply because of its own momentum.”And therefore, again, he is obliged to conceive of the whole voluntary power as lost, and lost before man was born; and he reduces all our real freedom to the original act of the will previous to birth, which took place when we were present in Adam's soul, and committed the first transgression with him.This is plainly the denial of all human freedom since the fall of Adam. We bring into the world, according to the writer, a will wholly and inevitably bent to evil. We have no consciousness of this tendency, and if we were conscious of it we have no power to change it; but we yet are responsible for it, and guilty because of it, inasmuch as we began this state ourselves when all our souls were mystically present in the soul of Adam. Of this theory, we merely say now, that, if it be true, man is notnowguilty of any sin which he commits in his mortal life; for he is not now a free being. He is only responsible for the sin which he freely committed in Adam. He is no more responsible when we suppose his sin to proceed from his will, than when we suppose it to proceed from a depraved sensuous nature, or from involuntary ignorance, for he is no more free in the one case than in the other. He may be an infinitely depraved and infinitely miserable being, but he can in no true sense be called aguiltybeing. Again we say, if this theory be true, it is an awful theory, and one which we cannot possibly reconcile with the justice or goodness, and still less with the fatherly character, of God. That God should so have constituted human nature that all the millions of the human[pg 464]race should have had this fatal opportunity of destroying themselves utterly, by one simultaneous act, in Adam, is, to say the least, anawfultheory to propound concerning our heavenly Father. We might put Christ's argument to any man not hardened by theological study, as it seems to us, with irresistible force.“What man is there amongyou,being a father,”who could do anything of this sort? But we know too well that all such appeals fall harmless from the sevenfold shield of a systematized theology.Therefore we will only say further, concerning this theory, that, as beingapparentlyin direct conflict with the divine attributes as taught in the New Testament; as making man a mere process deprived of real freedom; as proving man not guilty for any sin committed in this life; and as thereby deadening the sense of responsibility, and showing that we cannot possibly obey the command,“Repent and turn to God,”—this theory of a sin committed in Adamought to have the amplest proofbefore we believe it. We admit that it may be true, though opposed to all our ideas of God, man, and duty. But being thus opposed, it ought to be sustained by the most unanswerable arguments. If Jesus and his apostles have told us so plainly, we will believe it if we can. How is it, then? Not a word on the subject in the four Gospels. Not a text from the lips of Jesus which can be pretended to lay down any such theory. He does not even mention the name of Adam once in the Gospels, nor allude to him, except when speaking of marriage. This theory rests, not on anything contained in the Gospels, book of Acts, or Epistles of Peter, James, or John, but on two texts in two Epistles of Paul (Rom. 5:14; 1 Cor. 15:22). In the latter passage Paul says not a word of Adam's sin, but only of his death,—the whole chapter treating, not of sin, but of death and the resurrection. This passage, therefore, can hardly be considered a plain statement of the theory. The other, in Romans, is confessedly so far from plain, that it is difficult to make it agree with any theory; but the most evident meaning, to one who has no theory to support, is, that sin began with Adam, and the consequences of sin, which are moral and physical evil, began also with him; and as he thus set in motion a series of evil tendencies which we find in our organization, and which Paul elsewhere calls the law of the members, and a series of evil circumstances which we find around us in the world, both of which are the occasion of sin, we may trace back[pg 465]to him the commencement of human disobedience. If the passage teaches anything more than this, it certainly does not teach it plainly or explicitly.

Appendix. Critical Notices.In this Appendix we shall add a brief critical examination of certain recent works on points connected with our previous subjects. These criticisms will complete the discussion in these various directions, so far as space will allow here. The largest part of what follows has been printed already, either in the“Christian Examiner,”or in the“Monthly Journal of the American Unitarian Association.”§ 1. On the Defence of Nescience in Theology, by Herbert Spencer and Henry L. Mansel.Mr. Herbert Spencer, in his book called“First Principles,”lays down the doctrine of theological nescience, as the final result of religious inquiry. In his chapter on“Ultimate Religious Ideas”he argues thus: The religious problem is, Whence comes the universe? In answer to this question only three statements are possible. It is self-existent. It was self-created. It was created by external agency. Now, none of these, says Spencer, is tenable. For, (1.) Self-existence means simply an existence without a beginning, and it is not possible to conceive of this. The conception of infinite past time is an impossibility. (2.) Self-creation is Pantheism. We can conceive, somewhat, of self-evolution, but not of a potential universe passing into an actual one. (3.) The theistic hypothesis is equally inconceivable. For this is to suppose the world made as a workman makes a piece of furniture. We can conceive of this last, because[pg 442]the workman has the material given; he only adds form to the substance. To produce matter out of nothing is the real difficulty. No simile enables us to conceive of this production of matter out of nothing. Again, says Spencer, space is something, the non-existence of which is inconceivable; hence the creation of space is inconceivable. And lastly, says Spencer, if God created the universe, the question returns, Whence came God? The same three answers recur. God was self-existent, or he was self-created, or he was createdab extra. The last theory is useless. For it leads to an endless series of potential existences. So the theist returns to self-existence; which, however, says Spencer, is as inconceivable as a self-existent universe, involving the inconceivable idea of unlimited duration.Nevertheless, continues Spencer, we are compelled to regard phenomena as effects of some cause. We must believe in a cause of that cause, till we reach afirst cause. The First Cause must be infinite and absolute. He then follows Mansel in showing the contradiction between the two ideas.But total negation is not the result,—only nescience. Atheism, Pantheism, and Theism agree in one belief, namely, that of a problem to be solved. An unknown God is the highest result of theology and of philosophy.“If religion and science are to be reconciled, the basis of the reconciliation must be their deepest, widest, and most certain of all facts—that the power which the universe manifests is utterly inscrutable.”Thus Mr. Spencer proposes to take back human thought eighteen centuries, and ignoring the conquests of Christian faith in civilization, theology, and morals, carries us to Athens, in the time of Paul, to worship at the altar of an unknown God. He makes a solitude in the soul, and calls it peace. He makes peace between religion and science, by commanding the first to surrender at discretion to the other. Science knows nothing of God; therefore theology must know nothing of God. But not so. Let each impart to the other that which it possesses, and which the other lacks. Let science enlarge theology with the idea of law, and theology inform science with the idea of a living God.It is not difficult to detect the fallacies in this argument of Spencer for religious nescience. His notion of conception is that of a purely sensible image. He assumes that we have no knowledge but sensible knowledge, and then easily infers that we do not know[pg 443]God. We can conceive, he says, of a rock on which we are standing, but not of the whole earth. No great magnitudes, he declares, can be conceived. The conception of infinite time is, therefore, an impossibility.But it is clear to any one, not bound hand and foot by the assumptions of sensationalism, that it is just as easy to conceive of the whole globe of earth, as of the piece of it which we see. We cannot havea visual imageof the whole earth, indeed, but the mental conception of the globe is as distinct as that of the stone we throw from our hand. And so far from the conception of infinite duration being an impossibility, not to conceive of time and space as infinite is the impossibility. It is impossible to imagine or conceive of the beginning of time, or the commencement of space.Looking at his trilemma concerning the universe, namely, that it was either, (1.) Self-existent, (2.) Self-created, or, (3.) Created by an external power, we say,—1. The real objection to a self-existent universe, is not that we cannot conceive of existence without beginning. Nothing is easier than to conceive of an everlasting, unchanging universe, without beginning or end. It is not existence, but change, that suggests cause. Phenomena, events, require us to believe in some power which produces them. Now, the events which take place in the universe suggest an intelligent, absolute, and central cause, that is, a cause combining supreme wisdom, power, and goodness. A self-existent universe is not inconceivable, but it is incredible.2. Self-creation, he objects, is Pantheism. But this is no reason for denying it, since Pantheism may, for all we see at this stage of the argument, be the true explanation of the universe. The real objection to the hypothesis of a self-created universe (or of a self-created God), is that it involves the contradiction of something which exists and which does not exist at the same moment; at the moment of self-creation, the universe must exist in order to create, but must be non-existent in order to be created. A self-created universe, then, is not incredible because it involves Pantheism, but because it involves a contradiction.3. He objects to the Theistic hypothesis, that we cannot conceive of the production of matter (more strictly, of substance) out of nothing. He adds that no simile can enable us to imagine it.But I can produce, out of nothing, something visible, tangible, and audible. There is no motion and no sound. I move my arm[pg 444]by the power of will, and I produce both sound and motion. The motion of a body in space is a material phenomenon; for whatever is perceived by the senses is material. We do then constantly perceive material phenomena created out of nothing, by human will.His argument against the Theist, that space could not have been created by God, since its non-existence is inconceivable, is much more plausible. But suppose we grant that space, supposed to be a real existence, was not created in time. Does it follow from that, that it does not proceed from God? Not being an event in time, it does not require a cause; but being conceived of as a reality, it may have eternally proceeded from the divine will, and so not be independent of the Creator.And as regards his trilemma concerning Deity, that also fails in the failure of his thesis that eternal duration is inconceivable. His argument against the self-existent Deity, only rests on that assumption which we have shown to be untenable.But Mr. Spencer, who is not a theologian, is at this point reënforced by Mr. Mansel, on whose former work,“The Limits of Religious Thought,”we proceed to offer some criticism. This also is an argument for nescience in theology, in the presumed interests of revelation. Mr. Martineau has ably shown the weakness and the dangerous tendency of this whole argument of Mansel, in an article to which we earnestly refer our readers.The work of Mr. Mansel is a desperate attempt to save Orthodox doctrines from the objections of reason, not by replying to those objections and pointing out their fallacy, but by showing that similar objections can be brought against all religious belief. For example, when reason objects to the Trinity, that it is a contradiction, Mr. Mansel does not attempt to show that it isnota contradiction, but argues that our belief in God is another contradiction of the same kind. His inference therefore is, that as we believe in God, notwithstanding the contradiction, we ought to believe in the Trinity also, notwithstanding the contradiction. If we believe one, we may believe both.But this is a dangerous argument; since it is evident that one might reply, that there remains another alternative; which is, to believeneither. If Mr. Mansel succeeds in convincing his readers, the result may be a belief in the Trinity, or it may be a disbelief in God altogether; one of two things—either a return to Orthodoxy, or a departure from all religion. Either they will renounce[pg 445]reason in order to retain religion, or they will renounce religion in order to retain reason.At the very best, also, the help which this argument offers us is to be paid for somewhat dearly. It proposes to save Orthodoxy by giving up the use of reason in religion. Mr. Mansel would say,“by giving up the unlimited use of reason;”but, as we shall presently see, this comes very much to the same thing at last.What, then, is the nature of Mr. Mansel's argument? It is an argument founded upon Sir William Hamilton's philosophy of the Unconditioned. Now, this has been generally considered the weak side of Hamilton's system. According to him, the unconditioned is inconceivable: in other words, of the Absolute and Infinite we have no conception at all. But this denies to man the power of conceiving of God, and so leads directly to Atheism. This charge has already been brought against Hamilton's philosophy, in various quarters; for example, in the“North British Review ”for May, 1835. But we will not here attempt any examination of Hamilton's theory, but confine ourselves to Mr. Mansel.The argument of Mansel is this (p. 75):“To conceive the Deity as he is, we must conceive him as First Cause, as Absolute, and as Infinite. By the First Cause is meant that which produces all things, and is itself produced of none; by the Absolute is meant that which exists in and by itself, having no necessary relation to any other being; by the Infinite is meant that which is free from all possible limitation.”Having thus defined the Deity as the First Cause, the Absolute, and the Infinite, Mansel goes on to show that these ideas are mutually contradictory and destructive. A First Cause necessarily supposes effects, and therefore cannot be absolute: nor can the Infinite be a person; for personality is a limitation. By a course of such arguments as these, Mansel endeavors to show that the reason is as incapable of conceiving God as it is of conceiving the Trinity, the Atonement, or any other Orthodox doctrine; and since we do not renounce our belief in God because of these contradictions, neither ought we, because of similar contradictions, to renounce our belief in the Trinity.Such is the substance of Mansel's statement, though the arguments by which it is proved are varied with great ingenuity and to great extent. This course of thought is by no means original, either with Mr. Mansel or Sir William Hamilton. A far greater thinker than either of them (Immanuel Kant) had long before[pg 446]shown the logical contradictions of the understanding in what he called the Antinomies of the pure reason. But the important question is, If the reason contradicts itself thus in its conception of Deity, how are we to obtain a ground for our belief in God? Mansel answers,“Through revelation; that is, through the direct declarations of Scripture.”This he calls faith. We are to believe in a personal God on the ground of a Bible confirmed by miracles.This result is so strange, that it may well seem incredible. Yet we cannot think that we have misrepresented the tendency of the argument; though, of course, we have given no ideas of the acuteness and flexibility of the reasoning, the extent of the knowledge, and mastery of logic, in this work. That such a position should be taken by a religious man, in the supposed interest of Christianity, is sufficiently strange; for it seems to us equally untenable in its grounds, unfounded in its statements, empty of insight, destructive in its results. We will add, very briefly, a few of the criticisms which occur to us.The first thing which strikes us in the argument is, that everywhere it deals with words rather than with things. The whole object of the discussion concerns the meaning of terms, and it deals throughout with the relation of words to other words. It is an acute philological argument. We feel ourselves to be arguing about forms, and not about substances. Now, such arguments may confuse, but they cannot convince. We do not know, perhaps, what to say in reply; but we remain unsatisfied. One not used to logic may listen to an argument which shall conclusively prove that white is black; that nothing is greater than something; that a man who jumps from the top of the house can never reach the ground; but, though the thing is proved, he is not convinced. So, when Mr. Mansel proves to us that we cannot conceive of a Being who is at the same time Infinite and Personal, we are unable, perhaps, to reply to the argument; but we know it to be false, since we actually have the two conceptions in our mind.Wedoconceive of the Deity as an infinite personality. Of what use to tell us that wecannothave an idea, when we know that wedohave it?Mansel tells us that we cannot think the idea of the Infinite and Absolute. He says (p. 110),“The Absolute and the Infinite are thus, like the Inconceivable and Imperceptible, names indicating, not an object of thought or of consciousness at all, but the mere absence of the conditions under which consciousness is possible.”[pg 447]But, then, they are only words, with no meaning attached; and, if so, how can we argue about them at all? All argument must cease when we come to an unmeaning phrase; therefore the existence of Mr. Mansel's argument proves the falsehood of his assertion. Since he argues about the Infinite, it is evident that he has the idea of the Infinite in his mind.Mr. Mansel agrees in principle wholly with the Atheists; for the Atheists do not say that God does not exist, or that God cannot exist, but that we cannot know that he exists. So says Mr. Holyoake, a leading modern Atheist. This is what Mansel also asserts, only he goes farther than they, contending that the very idea of God is impossible to the human reason. It is true that he believes in God on grounds of revelation, which the Atheists do not; but he agrees with them in setting aside all natural and reasonable knowledge of Deity.But how is it possible to obtain an idea of God from revelation, if we are before destitute of such an idea? When Paul preached to the Athenians, he addressed them as having already a true, though an imperfect, idea of God.“Whom, therefore, ye ignorantly worship, him declare I unto you.”But, if they had not already an idea of God, how could he have given them such an idea? Suppose that he works a miracle, and says,“This miracle proves that God has sent me to teach you.”But, by the supposition, they know nothing about God; consequently, they have nothing by which to test the truth of a revelation professing to come from him. Neither miracles, nor the nature of the truth taught, nor the character of the teacher, avail anything as evidence of a revelation from a Being of whom we know nothing. Without a previous knowledge of God, only immediate revelation is possible.Mr. Mansel, therefore, is one who, without a foundation, builds a house on the sand. He attempts to erect faith in God after taking away the foundation of reason. The apostles built revealed religion upon natural religion, revealed theology upon natural theology, according to the rule,“That is not first which is spiritual, but that which is natural; afterward that which is spiritual.”Christ said,“Ye believe in God: believe also in me.”Mr. Mansel reverses all this, and makes Christ say,“Ye believe in me: believe also in God.”But, even if it were possible to ascend to belief in God through belief in Christ, we must ask, Is not belief thought? If the mind cannotthinkthe Infinite, how can it believe the Infinite? Must we not apprehend a proposition before we can believe it? Does[pg 448]not the conception of a thing logically precede the belief of it? If it is impossible to apprehend the Absolute, if this is only an empty name, how is it possible to believe in the Absolute on grounds of revelation, or on any other grounds? A miracle cannot communicate to the mind an idea which is beyond its power of conception.Mr. Mansel declares that our religious knowledge isregulative, but notspeculative.He lays great stress on this distinction: by which he means that we have ideas of the Deity sufficient to guide our practice, but not to satisfy our intellect; which tell us, not what God is in himself, but how hewillsthat we should think of him. According to this view, all revelation is overturned, just as all natural religion has been previously overturned. Revelation does not reveal God on this theory. We have no knowledge of God in the gospel, any more than we had in nature. Instead of knowledge, we have only law. But this seems to despoil Christianity of its vital force. Christ says,“This is life eternal, toknowthee, the only true God.”But Mr. Mansel tells us that such knowledge of God is impossible. Therefore, instead of the gospel, he gives us the law; for it is certain that hisregulativetruths are simply moral precepts, addressed to the will, not to the intellect; capable of being obeyed, but not of being understood.The radical error of Mansel seems to be this,—that his mind works only in the logical region belonging to the understanding, and is ignorant of those higher truths which are beheld by the reason. He has tried to find God by logical processes, and, of course, has failed. He therefore concludes that God cannot be known by the intellect. He has fully demonstrated that God cannot be comprehended by the logical understanding; and in this he has done a good work. But he has not shown that God cannot be known by the intuitive reason. The understanding comprehends: the reason apprehends. The understanding perceives the form: reason takes holds of the substance. The understanding sees how things are related to each other: the reason sees how things are in themselves. The understanding cannot, therefore, see the infinite and absolute; cannot apprehend substance or cause; knows nothing of the eternal. But the reason is as certain of cause as of effect; knows eternity as really as it knows time; it is as sure of the existence of spirit as it is of matter; and sees the infinite to be as real as the finite. Therefore,[pg 449]though we cannot comprehend God by logic, we can apprehend him by reason. We can be as sure of his being as we are of our own, and we are not obliged to explain away all those profound scriptures which teach us that the object and end of our being is to know God.Since, therefore, Mr. Mansel's argument, with all its acuteness, learning, and honesty, tends directly to Atheism; since, by overturning the foundation of Christianity, it overturns Christianity itself; since it substitutes mere moral laws in place of the vital forces of the gospel,—it is no wonder that its positions have been rejected with much unanimity by the most eminent Orthodox scholars. Its defence of Orthodoxy costs too much. Leading thinkers of very different schools—for example, Mr. Brownson, the Roman Catholic, in his“Quarterly Review;”Professor Hickok, the Presbyterian, in the“Bibliotheca Sacra;”and Mr. Maurice, of the Church of England, in an able pamphlet—have opposed with great force the arguments and conclusions of this volume. It is true that some Orthodox divines consider that Mr. Mansel hasdemonstratedthat the human consciousness is unequal to the speculative conception of a Being at once absolute, infinite, and personal, and seem gladly to have the aid of this book in defending the Trinity. But the more distinguished and experienced thinkers mentioned above are cautious of accepting the help of so dangerous an ally.§ 2. On the Defence of Verbal Inspiration by Gaussen.Following the declaration of the apostle Paul, that“the letter killeth,”we have, in the text of this volume, set aside all the theories of the Bible which assume its absolute and literal infallibility. But within a few years, a work in defence of this doctrine has been published abroad, by an excellent man, M. Gaussen, of Geneva, and translated and republished in America by Rev. Dr. Kirk, of Boston. Such a work, coming from such sources, deserves some examination. We shall, therefore, show the course of argument followed in this book, and the reasons which lead us to consider its conclusions unsound, and its reasoning inadequate.Inspiration, as defined by Gaussen, is“that inexplicable power which the divine Spirit formerly exercised over the authors of the Holy Scriptures, to guide them even in the employment of the words they were to use, and to preserve them from all error, as well as from every omission.“We aim,”says he,“to establish, by the word of God, that the[pg 450]Scriptures are from God—that all the Scriptures are from God—and that every part of the Scripture is from God.”Let us consider the arguments in support of this kind of inspiration, and the objections to them.Argument I. Plenary Inspiration is necessary, that we may know with certainty what we ought to believe.Great stress is laid upon this supposednecessity, both by Gaussen and Kirk.“The book so written,”say they,“is the Word of God, and binds the conscience of the world; and nothing else does so bind it, even though it were the writings of Paul and Peter.“With the Infidel, whether he be Christian in name or otherwise, the sharp sword of a perfect inspiration will be found, at last, indispensable. If the ground is conceded to him that there is a single passage in the Bible that is not divine, then we are disarmed; for he will be sure to apply this privilege to the very passages which most fully oppose his pride, passion, and error. How is the conscience of a wicked race to be bound down by a chain, one link of which is weak?”Reply to Argument I.—It is no way to prove a theorytrueto assume itsnecessity. The only legitimate proof of a theory is by an induction of facts. This method of beginning by a supposed necessity, this looking first at consequences, has always been fruitful of false and empty theories. The great advance in modern science has come from substituting the inductive for the ideological method. Find what the facts say, and the consequences will take care of themselves. An argument from consequences is usually only an appeal to prejudices.Again: This argument is fatal to the arguments drawn from the Scriptures themselves. In arguing from the Scripture to prove that every passage is divine, we have, of course, no right to assume that every passage is divine, for that is the very thing to be proved. Then the texts which we quote to prove our position may themselves not be divine, and if we grant that,“we are disarmed.”For, according to this argument, nothing can be proved conclusively from Scripture except we believe in plenary inspiration—then plenary inspiration itself cannot be proved from Scripture. But Gaussen admits that this doctrine can be proved“only by the Scriptures;”therefore (according to this argument) it cannot be proved at all.If, therefore, the doctrine of plenary inspiration is necessary“to[pg 451]bind the conscience of the world,”it is a doctrine incapable of proof. If, on the other hand, it can be proved, it is then clearly not necessary“to bind the conscience of the world.”But again. This theory of plenary inspiration doesnotbind the consciences of men. If men are naturally disposed (as Messrs. Gaussen and Kirk maintain) to deny and disbelieve the doctrines and statements of the Bible, they have ample opportunity of doing so, notwithstanding their belief in this theory. For, after admitting that the words of Scripture, just as they stand, are perfectly true and given by God, the question comes, What do they mean? For instance, I wish, we will suppose, to deny the doctrine of the Deity of Christ. Now, you quote to me the text Rom. 9:5.“Of whom, as concerning the flesh, Christ came, who is over all, God, blessed forever,”—which is the strongest text in the Bible in support of that doctrine. Now, though I believe in the doctrine of plenary inspiration, I am not obliged to accept this passage as proof of the Deity of Christ. For I can, 1. Assert that the verse is an interpolation; 2. Assert that it is wrongly pointed; 3. Assert that it is mistranslated; 4. Assert that Christ is called God in an inferior sense, as God over the Church. And, as a matter of fact, these are the arguments always used, even by those who deny the doctrine of a plenary inspiration. They seldom or never accuse the writer of a mistake, but always rely on a supposed mistranslation, or misinterpretation, in order to avoid the force of a passage. Hence, also, we find believers in this doctrine of plenary inspiration, differing in opinion on a thousand matters, and with no probability of ever coming to an agreement.Argument II. Several Passages of the New Testament plainly teach the Doctrine of the Plenary Inspiration of the Bible.The passages quoted by Gaussen, and mainly relied upon, are 2 Tim. 3:16.“All Scripture is given by inspiration,”&c.; 2 Peter 1:27,“Holy men of God spake as they were moved,”&c. Besides these, he refers to many passages in the Old and New Testaments, but his chief stress is laid on these.Reply to Argument II.—It is well known that both these passages refer only to the Old Testament Scriptures. It is well known that the first may be translated so as to read,“All Scripture, given by inspiration, is profitable,”&c. But it is reply enough to both these passages, to say, that neither of them indicates what kind of inspiration is intended. They assert an inspiration,[pg 452]which we also maintain. But they donotassert a verbal inspiration, nor one which makes the Scripturesinfallible, but simply one which makes themprofitable.The stress laid on the passage 2 Tim. 3:16,“All Scripture,”&c., is itself an argument against the theory of plenary inspiration. The most which can be made of this text, byanypunctuation or translation, is, that all the Scripture is written by inspired men. What was the degree or kind of their inspiration, is not in the least indicated. It might have been verbal, it might have been the inspiration of suggestion, or of superintendence, or the general inspiration of all Christians.Gaussen's only argument on this point is,“that it is thewritingwhich is said to be inspired, and writing must be in words; hence the inspiration must be verbal.”To this we must reply, that inspired writing can only mean what is written by inspired men. The writing itself cannot be inspired. This argument is too flimsy to be dwelt upon.But further still. There is another argument which lies against every attempt to prove plenary inspiration out of the Scripture.Every such attempt is necessarily reasoning in a circle.Gaussen and Kirk have labored earnestly to reply to this argument, but in vain. The answer they make is,“We are not reasoning with Infidels, but with Christians. We address men who respect the Scriptures, and who admit their truth. The Scriptures are inspired, we affirm, because, being authentic and true, they declare themselves inspired; and the Scriptures are plenarily inspired, because, being inspired, they say that they are so totally, and without any exception.”But we answer Messrs. Gaussen and Kirk thus:“You are indeed reasoning with Christians, not with Deists; but you are reasoning with Christians who do not believe thatevery passageof Scripture is infallibly inspired. To prove your doctrine from any particular passages or verbal expressions, you must prove that those particular passages and expressions are not themselves errors. You yourselves assert that this cannot be done, except we believe these passages to be infallibly inspired. Therefore you must assume infallible inspiration in order to prove infallible inspiration. In other words, you beg the question instead of arguing it.”In this vicious circle the advocates of a verbal inspiration of infallibility are necessarily imprisoned whenever they attempt to[pg 453]argue from the words of Scripture. They contend that one must believe their theory in order to be sure that any passage is absolutely true, and then they quote passages to prove their theory, as if they were absolutely true.Argument III. The theory of plenary inspiration is simple, precise, intelligible, and easy to be applied.We admit this to be true. It has this merit in common with the opposite theory of no inspiration. Both are simple, precise, and very easy of application. But simplicity is not always a sign of truth. The facts of nature and life are more apt to be complex than simple. Theories distinguished by their simplicity most commonly ignore or omit a part of the facts. Simplistic theories are generally one-sided and partial. Materialism, Atheism, Idealism, Fatalism, are all very simple theories, and explain all difficulties with a marvellous rapidity. This makes them, at first, attractive to the intellect, which always loves clear and distinct views; but afterwards, when it is seen that they obtain clearness by means of shallowness they are found unsatisfactory.Argument IV. The quotations from the Old Testament, by Jesus and his apostles, show that they regarded its language as infallibly inspired.This argument, upon which great stress is laid, both by Prof. Gaussen and Dr. Kirk, though plausible at first sight, becomes wholly untenable on examination.Thus, in the temptation of Jesus, in his reply to the tempter, he says,“Thou shalt not live by bread alone;”the whole force of the argument depending on the single wordalone.Replying to the Sadducees, who denied the resurrection, he says,“Have ye not read that God says, Iamthe God of Abraham, and of Isaac, and of Jacob? God is not the God of the dead, but of the living.”Then the whole stress of the argument rests on the use of the verb in the present tense,“I am.”Arguing with the Pharisees,“How did David, by the Spirit, call himLord, saying, The Lord said to my Lord,”&c.? Here the argument depends on the use of the single wordLord.Many more instances could be produced of the same kind; and Gaussen contends, that when Jesus and his apostles thus rest their argument on the force of a single word of the Old Testament, they must have believed that the very words were given by inspiration. For otherwise the writers might not have chosen the right word to express their thought in each particular case. And unless the[pg 454]Jews had also believed in the verbal inspiration of their Scriptures, they would have replied that these particular words might have been errors.Reply to this Argument.—Plausible as this argument may seem, it turns out to be wholly empty and worthless. Whenever any writer is admitted to be an authority, then his words become authoritative, and arguments are necessarily based on single words and expressions. In all such cases, we assume that he chose the best words by which to convey his thought, and yet we do not ascribe to him any inspiration or infallibility.Thus, go into our courts of law, and you will hear the language of the United States constitution, of the acts of legislature, of previous decisions of the courts, argued from, word by word. Counsel argue by the hour upon the force and weight of single words in the authorities. Judges in their charges instruct the jury to determine the life and death of the criminal according to the letter of the law. And this they do necessarily, according to the rule,“Cum recedit a litera, judex transit in legislatorem.”But will any one maintain that the counsel and court believe that the legislature was infallibly inspired to choose the very language which would convey their meaning?In this very argument for plenary inspiration, Gaussen and his associates rest their argument on the single word“all,”in the text,“All Scripture is given by inspiration,”&c. Yet, say they, we are not assuming that this text is plenarily inspired, for that, we admit, would be begging the question. If, then, Mr. Gaussen can argue from the force of the single wordall, without assuming the doctrine of plenary inspiration, why could not Jesus and his apostles argue from single words, without assuming the doctrine of plenary inspiration?There is, however, a passage in Paul (Gal. 3:16), in which the apostle quotes a text from the Old Testament, and lays the whole stress of his argument on two letters.“He says not,‘And to seeds’σπέρμασιν, as of many, but as of one,‘And to thy seed’σπερματι.”According to Gaussen's argument, Paul must have believed in the inspiration of the letters. But Gaussen is careful not to adduce this instance, which seems at first so much in his favor. For, in fact, both in Hebrew and Greek, as in English,“seed”is a collective noun, and does meanmanyin the singular. The argument of Paul, therefore, falls through; and it is evident that he is no example to be imitated here, in laying stress[pg 455]on one or two letters. Most modern interpreters admit that he made a mistake; and so, among the ancients, did Jerome, who nevertheless, said the argument“was good enough for the foolish Galatians.”Having thus replied, very briefly, but we believe sufficiently, to the main arguments in support of this theory, we say, in conclusion, that it cannot be true, for the following reasons, which we simply state, and do not now attempt to unfold.1. The New Testament writers nowhere claim to be infallibly inspired to write. If they had been infallibly inspired to write the Gospels and Epistles, they certainly ought to have announced this important fact. Instead of which Luke gives as his reason for writing, not that God inspired him to write, but that“inasmuch as others have taken in hand”to write, it seemed good to him also to do the same, and that for the benefit of Theophilus. John and Paul assert the truth of what they say, but not on account of their being inspired to write, but because they are disciples and apostles.2. The differences in the accounts of the same transactions show that their inspiration was not verbal.These differences appear on every page of any Harmony of the New Testament. They are numerous but unimportant; they go to prove the truth of the narrative, and give probability to the main Gospel statements. But they utterly disprove the theory of plenary inspiration.3. Paul declares that some things which he says are“of the Lord,”other things“of himself;”that in regard to some things he was inspired, in regard to others, not.4. Every writer in the New Testament has a style of his own, and there is no appearance of his being merely an amanuensis.5. While the New Testament writers lay no claim to any such inspiration as this theory assumes, they do claim for themselves and for all other Christians another kind of inspiration, which is sufficient for all the facts, and which gives them ample authority over our faith and life, and makes them independent sources of Christian truth.This view we have already sufficiently considered in our chapter on inspiration.§ 3. Defence of the Doctrine that Sin is a Nature, by Professor Shedd.In the“Christian Review”for 1852 appeared an article of great power, written by a gentleman who has since become eminent as a thinker and writer—Professor W. G. T. Shedd. The title of[pg 456]the article was calculated to attract attention, as a bold attempt to defend an extreme position of Calvinism—“Sin a Nature, and that Nature Guilt.”The article was so rational and clear that we consider it as being even now the best statement extant of this thorough-going Calvinism, and therefore devote a few pages here to its examination.87After some introductory remarks, which it is not necessary to notice, the writer lays down his first position, that sin is a nature. His statement is, that we all sin necessarily and continually in consequence ofour nature, i.e., the character born with us, original and innate.The proofs of this position are, 1. The language of St. Paul (Eph. 2:3),“We were by nature the children of wrath, even as others.”2. That we are compelled by the laws of our mind to refer volitions to a nature, as qualities to a substance. We cannot stop in the outward act of sin, but by a mental instinct look inward to the particular volition from which the sin came. Nor can the mind stop with this particular volition. There is a steady and uniform state of character, which particular volitions cannot explain. The instinct of reason causes us to look back for one common principle and source, which shall give unity to the subject; and, having attained a view both central and simple, it is satisfied. As our mind compels us to refer all properties to a substance in which they inhere, so it compels us to refer all similar volitions to a simple nature. When we see exercises of the soul, we as instinctively refer them to a nature in that soul, as we refer the properties of a body to the substance of that body. 3. Christian experience proves that sin is a nature. The Christian, especially as his experience deepens, is troubled, not so much by his separate sinful actions and volitions, as by the sinful nature which they indicate, and out of which they spring. We are compelled to believe, as we look inward, that there is a principle of evil within us, below those separate transgressions of which we are conscious. There is a diseased condition of the soul, which these transgressions, indicate. There are secret faults from which we pray to be cleansed. 4. The history of Christian doctrine shows that the Church has in all ages believed in a sinful nature, as distinguished from conscious transgressions.These are the proofs of the first position, that sin is a nature.[pg 457]We have stated them concisely, but with sufficient distinctness and completeness. Let us now examine their validity.The first argument is the text in Ephesians,“We were by nature children of wrath,”ἦμεν τέκνα φύσει ὀργῆς. The word φύσις, the writer contends,“always denotes something original and innate, in contradistinction to something acquired by practice or habit.”This text, we know, is the proof-text of original sin, and is considered by many commentators as teaching that man's nature is wholly corrupt. But plainly this is going too far. Granting the full meaning claimed for the word φύσις, the text only asserts that there is something in man's nature which exposes him to the divine displeasure by being the source of sin. It does not assert the corruption of the whole nature, nor preclude the supposition that we are born with tendencies to good, no less than to evil. That we are so, the writer is bound by his own statement to admit; for if this Greek word“always denotes something original and innate,”it denotes this in Rom. 2:14,88which declares that the Gentiles“do by nature the things contained in the law.”According to this passage in Romans, if there be such a thing as natural depravity, it is not total; and if there be such a thing as total depravity, it is not natural. Those who wish to maintain both doctrines can only do it by admitting two different kinds of sinfulness in man, one of which is natural, but not total; the other total, but not natural—a distinction which we esteem a sound one. According to this passage in Rom 2:14, we must understand φύσις as referring to the good side of man's nature, and the same word in Eph. 2:3 as referring to the corrupt side of man's moral nature. The first refers to the“law of the mind;”the second, to the other“law in the members”(Rom. 7:23). But there is another passage (Gal. 2:15), which asserts that the Jews by nature are not sinners, like the heathen. Now, as we can hardly suppose that the original instincts and innate tendencies of the Jewish child were radically good from birth, and essentially different from those of the heathen, and as such a supposition would contradict the whole argument of Paul in Rom. ch. 2, it is[pg 458]evident that φύσις in Gal. 2:15 does not denote something original and innate. The meaning of this verse probably is, that the Jew from birth up, and by the mere fact of being born a Jew, came under the influences of a religious education, which preserved him from many forms of heathen depravity. The word, therefore, means in that passage, not a Jew by nature, but a Jew by birth; and, if so, we are at liberty, if we choose, to ascribe the same meaning to the word in Ephesians, and to understand the text to teach that we were by birth placed under circumstances which tended necessarily to deprave the character.This passage, therefore, quoted by the writer, does not teach entire depravity by nature, but a partial depravity, either found in the hereditary tendencies and instincts, or acquired by means of the evil circumstances surrounding the child from his birth.The second argument of the writer is, that the laws of mind compel us to refer sinful volitions to a sinful nature, as they compel us to refer qualities to a substance.We admit that, where we see uniform and constant habits of action, we are compelled to refer these to a permanent character or state of being. If a man once in his life becomes intoxicated, we do not infer any habit of intemperance, or any vicious tendency; but if he is habitually intemperate, we are compelled, as the writer justly asserts, to look beneath the separate single actions for one common principle and source. But in assuming that this source is a nature brought with us into the world, the writer seems to us to jump to a conclusion. It may be an acquired character, not an original nature. It may be an induced state of disease either of body or mind, a depravity which has commenced this side of childhood. We know that there are acquired habits both of mind and of body; otherwise, not only would it be impossible for a man to grow worse, but it would also be impossible for him to grow better, and there would be an end to all improvement and progress. Such an acquired character introduces unity into the subject of investigation, as completely as does an original nature, and therefore satisfies all the wants of the mind.A precisely similar answer may be made to the writer's third argument, drawn from Christian experience. He is perfectly right, we think, in saying that the Christian is troubled, not merely, nor chiefly, by the recollection of single acts and volitions of evil, but in the evidence which they seem to give of a sinful state of mind and heart. He is right in considering any theory of[pg 459]moral evil shallow and inadequate which only takes into account sinful actions and sinful volitions. What earnest man, who has seriously set about correcting a fault, or improving his character, but has been obliged to say,“To will is present with me; but how to perform that which I will, I find not”? Every earnest effort shows us more plainly how deep the roots of evil run below the surface. We find alawin the members warring against the law of the mind, and bringing us into captivity to the law of sin. This is the description which Paul gives of it. It is alaw; that is, something regular, constant, permanent—a steady stress, a bias towards evil. The apostle, however, differs from the writer in placing this law, not in the will, but in the members; and also in stating that there is another law,—that of the mind,—which has a tendency towards good. In the unregenerate we understand him to teach that the law of evil is the stronger, and holds the man, the personal will, captive. In the regenerate, the reverse is the case. Nor does Paul teach that this sinful tendency is guilt. It is not“Oguiltyman that I am!”but“Owretchedman that I am!”Now, while we agree with the writer in rejecting as superficial and inadequate any theory of evil, whether emanating from our own denomination or from any other, which does not recognize this evil state or tendency lying below the volitions, we differ from him in that we think it not always a nature, but a character. He has not proved, nor begun to prove, that this dark ground of evil in man is always innate or original. It may or may not be; but the argument from Christian experience shows nothing of the sort.The writer's fourth and remaining argument is, that the Church has, in all ages, believed in a sinful nature, as distinguished from conscious transgressions. If this were so, we admit that it should have weight in the inquiry; but we deny the fact so far, at least, as the sinful nature is concerned.89[pg 460]The writer proceeds thus:“Assuming, then, that the fact of a sinful nature has been established, we pass to the second statement of St. Paul, that man is by nature a child of wrath. We pass from his statement that sin, in its ultimate form, is a nature, to his statement that this nature is guilt.”If we have done justice to the writer's arguments,—and it has been our object to state them fairly, though briefly,—we submit that the fact of a sinful nature has not been established by them. He has shown that in man there is a tendency to evil running below the conscious, distinct volitions—that there is a permanent character, good or evil, which manifests itself, and becomes first apparent to ourselves, or to others, in these separate, spiritual exercises or actions. But that this stress either to good or evil, this law either of the mind or members, is original and inborn, is yet to be proved. Let us then consider the second point, namely, whether this character or nature, whichever it may be, is also guilt.As the writer's first argument to prove a sinful nature was drawn from the Greek word φύσις, so his first argument to prove that nature guilt is derived from the Greek word ὀργή in the same passage.“The apostle teaches,”he says,“that sinful man is a child of wrath. Now, none but a guilty being can be the object of the righteous and holy displeasure of God.”But this word, translatedwrath, is confessedly used in other senses besides that of the divine anger or displeasure. It may mean the sufferings or punishments which come as the result of sin, in which sense it is used in Matt. 3:7,“Who hath warned you to flee from the wrath to come?”and other places. This word is used in the passage just quoted for some future evil; in John 3:36, for a present evil—“The wrath of God abides on him;”and in 1 Thess. 2:16, for a past evil—“For the wrath is come [lit.hascome] on them to the uttermost.”It may mean the subjective feeling of guilt; the sense that we deserve the divine displeasure, which is removed by the assurance of forgiveness. It may mean the state of alienation from God, which results by a law of the conscience from this sense of guilt—an alienation removed by the divine act by which God reconciles the sinner to himself. And the radical meaning, from which these secondary meanings flow, may be the essential antagonism existing between the holy nature of God and all evil. But whatever it means, it cannot intend anything like human anger. In the divine wrath there is neither selfishness nor passion; and it must consist with an infinite love towards its object. The word, therefore, as used in Eph. 2:3, does not convey the[pg 461]idea of guilt,a vi terminis. It may mean as well, that this sinful tendency in man, manifesting itself in sinful actions, produces a state of estrangement or alienation between man and God. How far this is a guilty alienation, and how far it is evil and sorrowful, is not to be learned from the term itself.But the main proof of the writer in support of his second position is found in the assertion, that this sinful tendency in man, out of which evil acts continually flow, is not a tendency of the physical nature, but of the will itself. He distinguishes the will proper from the mere faculty of single choices, and considers it to be a deeper power lying at the very centre of the soul, which determines the whole man with reference to some great and unlimited end of living. It is, in fact, the man himself—the person. For man, he asserts, is not essentially intellect or feeling; but is essentially and at bottom a will, a self-determining creature.“His other faculties of knowing and feeling are grafted into this stock and root; and hence he is responsible from centre to circumference.”He then affirms the will, thus defined, to be the responsible and guilty author of the sinful nature; being nothing more nor less than its constant and total determination to self as the ultimate end of living. This voluntary power, which is the man himself, has turned away from God and directed itself to self as an ultimate end; and this state of the will is the sinful nature of man.We have no disposition to quarrel with the psychology of this statement. We admit man to be essentially will, in the sense here described. He is essentially activity; an activity limited externally, by special organization and circumstances,—limited internally, by quantity of force, and knowledge.Nor, again, do we deny that in the unregenerate state the will of man is directed to self rather than to God as its ultimate end; and that this is guilt, and in a certain sense total guilt. No man can serve two masters. If he is obedient to one, he is necessarily disobedient to the other. This disobedience may, or may not, appear in act; but it is there in state. He whose ultimate end is self-gratification is always ready to sacrifice the will of God to his own. He whose ultimate end is God is always ready to sacrifice his own will. In this sense, the unregenerate man may be said to be wholly sinful; and he who is born of God, not to commit sin.Thus much we grant; and the admission is a large one. But we must now object to the writer, that this is but one side of the question; and that he has omitted to see the other side. The[pg 462]sources of evil are not so simple as he seems to suppose; for man is a very complex being, and the world in which he lives is a very complex world. We therefore would inquire,—What proof have we that this guilty direction of the will is anature, in the sense claimed, i.e., something innate or original? Why may not the will have been turned gradually in this direction as we grow up, by enticements of pleasure; and why might not the will, in like manner, by means of wise culture, have been gradually directed to God?Again: what proof have we that we are so whollyunconsciousof this direction of the will, as our author contends? That a great many of the acts of the will are unconscious acts, like the separate movements of the finger in a skilful pianist, or lifting of the feet in walking, we admit; and we are not responsible for these separate acts, but for thepreceding choice, by means of which we determine to play the tune, or walk the mile. In like manner, the direction of the soul to self rather than to God may be moral evil; but is not moral guilt, until we become conscious of it, in a greater or less degree. Then, when partially or wholly awakened to the evil direction of the soul, if we allow ourselves to neglect this discovery, to turn away from the fact and forget it, on that conscious act presses the whole burden of guilt, and not on the unconscious volitions which may result from it. We say, therefore, in opposition to the writer, that though there may be depravity without consciousness of the depraved state, there cannot be guilt without consciousness of the evil choice, or, as the apostle says,“Sin is not imputed where there is no law.”Again: we totally dissent from the statement that this deep-lying will in man is unable to obey the commands,“Turn ye, turn ye from your evil way, for why will ye die?”—“Repent and be converted, that your sins may be blotted out,”—“Make you a new heart and a new spirit,”—“Choose you this day whom you will serve,”—“Believe in the Lord Jesus Christ and be saved.”The writer says, that“such a power as this, including so much, and running so deep, which is a determination of the whole soul, cannot, from the very nature of the case, be such a facile and easily managed power as that by which we resolve to do some particular thing in every-day life.”True: notsoeasily managed; but can it not be managed at all? It may requiremoreself-examination to understand what the direction of the will is, and more concentration of thought and will, and more leaning on God's help; but[pg 463]withall these are we able or not able to turn to God? He says, the great main tendency of the will to self and sin as an ultimate end, though having a free and criminal origin,“is not to be reversed so easily.”True, again; but why notlesseasily? The writer speaks of the sinful will as a“total determination of itself to self;”and asks“how the power that is to reverse all this process can possibly come out of the will thus shut up, and entirely swallowed in the process. How is the process to destroy itself?”But what! Has man becomea process? He is essentially will, but is this will blind mechanism? Has it not, according to our author's own theory, intelligence, conscience, affection, rooted into it? The moment that the writer begins to speak of the will, as unable to change its direction, he is compelled to conceive of it materially and mechanically, and not as the moral, responsible soul. He says,“The human will becomes a current that becomes unmanageable simply because of its own momentum.”And therefore, again, he is obliged to conceive of the whole voluntary power as lost, and lost before man was born; and he reduces all our real freedom to the original act of the will previous to birth, which took place when we were present in Adam's soul, and committed the first transgression with him.This is plainly the denial of all human freedom since the fall of Adam. We bring into the world, according to the writer, a will wholly and inevitably bent to evil. We have no consciousness of this tendency, and if we were conscious of it we have no power to change it; but we yet are responsible for it, and guilty because of it, inasmuch as we began this state ourselves when all our souls were mystically present in the soul of Adam. Of this theory, we merely say now, that, if it be true, man is notnowguilty of any sin which he commits in his mortal life; for he is not now a free being. He is only responsible for the sin which he freely committed in Adam. He is no more responsible when we suppose his sin to proceed from his will, than when we suppose it to proceed from a depraved sensuous nature, or from involuntary ignorance, for he is no more free in the one case than in the other. He may be an infinitely depraved and infinitely miserable being, but he can in no true sense be called aguiltybeing. Again we say, if this theory be true, it is an awful theory, and one which we cannot possibly reconcile with the justice or goodness, and still less with the fatherly character, of God. That God should so have constituted human nature that all the millions of the human[pg 464]race should have had this fatal opportunity of destroying themselves utterly, by one simultaneous act, in Adam, is, to say the least, anawfultheory to propound concerning our heavenly Father. We might put Christ's argument to any man not hardened by theological study, as it seems to us, with irresistible force.“What man is there amongyou,being a father,”who could do anything of this sort? But we know too well that all such appeals fall harmless from the sevenfold shield of a systematized theology.Therefore we will only say further, concerning this theory, that, as beingapparentlyin direct conflict with the divine attributes as taught in the New Testament; as making man a mere process deprived of real freedom; as proving man not guilty for any sin committed in this life; and as thereby deadening the sense of responsibility, and showing that we cannot possibly obey the command,“Repent and turn to God,”—this theory of a sin committed in Adamought to have the amplest proofbefore we believe it. We admit that it may be true, though opposed to all our ideas of God, man, and duty. But being thus opposed, it ought to be sustained by the most unanswerable arguments. If Jesus and his apostles have told us so plainly, we will believe it if we can. How is it, then? Not a word on the subject in the four Gospels. Not a text from the lips of Jesus which can be pretended to lay down any such theory. He does not even mention the name of Adam once in the Gospels, nor allude to him, except when speaking of marriage. This theory rests, not on anything contained in the Gospels, book of Acts, or Epistles of Peter, James, or John, but on two texts in two Epistles of Paul (Rom. 5:14; 1 Cor. 15:22). In the latter passage Paul says not a word of Adam's sin, but only of his death,—the whole chapter treating, not of sin, but of death and the resurrection. This passage, therefore, can hardly be considered a plain statement of the theory. The other, in Romans, is confessedly so far from plain, that it is difficult to make it agree with any theory; but the most evident meaning, to one who has no theory to support, is, that sin began with Adam, and the consequences of sin, which are moral and physical evil, began also with him; and as he thus set in motion a series of evil tendencies which we find in our organization, and which Paul elsewhere calls the law of the members, and a series of evil circumstances which we find around us in the world, both of which are the occasion of sin, we may trace back[pg 465]to him the commencement of human disobedience. If the passage teaches anything more than this, it certainly does not teach it plainly or explicitly.

In this Appendix we shall add a brief critical examination of certain recent works on points connected with our previous subjects. These criticisms will complete the discussion in these various directions, so far as space will allow here. The largest part of what follows has been printed already, either in the“Christian Examiner,”or in the“Monthly Journal of the American Unitarian Association.”

§ 1. On the Defence of Nescience in Theology, by Herbert Spencer and Henry L. Mansel.Mr. Herbert Spencer, in his book called“First Principles,”lays down the doctrine of theological nescience, as the final result of religious inquiry. In his chapter on“Ultimate Religious Ideas”he argues thus: The religious problem is, Whence comes the universe? In answer to this question only three statements are possible. It is self-existent. It was self-created. It was created by external agency. Now, none of these, says Spencer, is tenable. For, (1.) Self-existence means simply an existence without a beginning, and it is not possible to conceive of this. The conception of infinite past time is an impossibility. (2.) Self-creation is Pantheism. We can conceive, somewhat, of self-evolution, but not of a potential universe passing into an actual one. (3.) The theistic hypothesis is equally inconceivable. For this is to suppose the world made as a workman makes a piece of furniture. We can conceive of this last, because[pg 442]the workman has the material given; he only adds form to the substance. To produce matter out of nothing is the real difficulty. No simile enables us to conceive of this production of matter out of nothing. Again, says Spencer, space is something, the non-existence of which is inconceivable; hence the creation of space is inconceivable. And lastly, says Spencer, if God created the universe, the question returns, Whence came God? The same three answers recur. God was self-existent, or he was self-created, or he was createdab extra. The last theory is useless. For it leads to an endless series of potential existences. So the theist returns to self-existence; which, however, says Spencer, is as inconceivable as a self-existent universe, involving the inconceivable idea of unlimited duration.Nevertheless, continues Spencer, we are compelled to regard phenomena as effects of some cause. We must believe in a cause of that cause, till we reach afirst cause. The First Cause must be infinite and absolute. He then follows Mansel in showing the contradiction between the two ideas.But total negation is not the result,—only nescience. Atheism, Pantheism, and Theism agree in one belief, namely, that of a problem to be solved. An unknown God is the highest result of theology and of philosophy.“If religion and science are to be reconciled, the basis of the reconciliation must be their deepest, widest, and most certain of all facts—that the power which the universe manifests is utterly inscrutable.”Thus Mr. Spencer proposes to take back human thought eighteen centuries, and ignoring the conquests of Christian faith in civilization, theology, and morals, carries us to Athens, in the time of Paul, to worship at the altar of an unknown God. He makes a solitude in the soul, and calls it peace. He makes peace between religion and science, by commanding the first to surrender at discretion to the other. Science knows nothing of God; therefore theology must know nothing of God. But not so. Let each impart to the other that which it possesses, and which the other lacks. Let science enlarge theology with the idea of law, and theology inform science with the idea of a living God.It is not difficult to detect the fallacies in this argument of Spencer for religious nescience. His notion of conception is that of a purely sensible image. He assumes that we have no knowledge but sensible knowledge, and then easily infers that we do not know[pg 443]God. We can conceive, he says, of a rock on which we are standing, but not of the whole earth. No great magnitudes, he declares, can be conceived. The conception of infinite time is, therefore, an impossibility.But it is clear to any one, not bound hand and foot by the assumptions of sensationalism, that it is just as easy to conceive of the whole globe of earth, as of the piece of it which we see. We cannot havea visual imageof the whole earth, indeed, but the mental conception of the globe is as distinct as that of the stone we throw from our hand. And so far from the conception of infinite duration being an impossibility, not to conceive of time and space as infinite is the impossibility. It is impossible to imagine or conceive of the beginning of time, or the commencement of space.Looking at his trilemma concerning the universe, namely, that it was either, (1.) Self-existent, (2.) Self-created, or, (3.) Created by an external power, we say,—1. The real objection to a self-existent universe, is not that we cannot conceive of existence without beginning. Nothing is easier than to conceive of an everlasting, unchanging universe, without beginning or end. It is not existence, but change, that suggests cause. Phenomena, events, require us to believe in some power which produces them. Now, the events which take place in the universe suggest an intelligent, absolute, and central cause, that is, a cause combining supreme wisdom, power, and goodness. A self-existent universe is not inconceivable, but it is incredible.2. Self-creation, he objects, is Pantheism. But this is no reason for denying it, since Pantheism may, for all we see at this stage of the argument, be the true explanation of the universe. The real objection to the hypothesis of a self-created universe (or of a self-created God), is that it involves the contradiction of something which exists and which does not exist at the same moment; at the moment of self-creation, the universe must exist in order to create, but must be non-existent in order to be created. A self-created universe, then, is not incredible because it involves Pantheism, but because it involves a contradiction.3. He objects to the Theistic hypothesis, that we cannot conceive of the production of matter (more strictly, of substance) out of nothing. He adds that no simile can enable us to imagine it.But I can produce, out of nothing, something visible, tangible, and audible. There is no motion and no sound. I move my arm[pg 444]by the power of will, and I produce both sound and motion. The motion of a body in space is a material phenomenon; for whatever is perceived by the senses is material. We do then constantly perceive material phenomena created out of nothing, by human will.His argument against the Theist, that space could not have been created by God, since its non-existence is inconceivable, is much more plausible. But suppose we grant that space, supposed to be a real existence, was not created in time. Does it follow from that, that it does not proceed from God? Not being an event in time, it does not require a cause; but being conceived of as a reality, it may have eternally proceeded from the divine will, and so not be independent of the Creator.And as regards his trilemma concerning Deity, that also fails in the failure of his thesis that eternal duration is inconceivable. His argument against the self-existent Deity, only rests on that assumption which we have shown to be untenable.But Mr. Spencer, who is not a theologian, is at this point reënforced by Mr. Mansel, on whose former work,“The Limits of Religious Thought,”we proceed to offer some criticism. This also is an argument for nescience in theology, in the presumed interests of revelation. Mr. Martineau has ably shown the weakness and the dangerous tendency of this whole argument of Mansel, in an article to which we earnestly refer our readers.The work of Mr. Mansel is a desperate attempt to save Orthodox doctrines from the objections of reason, not by replying to those objections and pointing out their fallacy, but by showing that similar objections can be brought against all religious belief. For example, when reason objects to the Trinity, that it is a contradiction, Mr. Mansel does not attempt to show that it isnota contradiction, but argues that our belief in God is another contradiction of the same kind. His inference therefore is, that as we believe in God, notwithstanding the contradiction, we ought to believe in the Trinity also, notwithstanding the contradiction. If we believe one, we may believe both.But this is a dangerous argument; since it is evident that one might reply, that there remains another alternative; which is, to believeneither. If Mr. Mansel succeeds in convincing his readers, the result may be a belief in the Trinity, or it may be a disbelief in God altogether; one of two things—either a return to Orthodoxy, or a departure from all religion. Either they will renounce[pg 445]reason in order to retain religion, or they will renounce religion in order to retain reason.At the very best, also, the help which this argument offers us is to be paid for somewhat dearly. It proposes to save Orthodoxy by giving up the use of reason in religion. Mr. Mansel would say,“by giving up the unlimited use of reason;”but, as we shall presently see, this comes very much to the same thing at last.What, then, is the nature of Mr. Mansel's argument? It is an argument founded upon Sir William Hamilton's philosophy of the Unconditioned. Now, this has been generally considered the weak side of Hamilton's system. According to him, the unconditioned is inconceivable: in other words, of the Absolute and Infinite we have no conception at all. But this denies to man the power of conceiving of God, and so leads directly to Atheism. This charge has already been brought against Hamilton's philosophy, in various quarters; for example, in the“North British Review ”for May, 1835. But we will not here attempt any examination of Hamilton's theory, but confine ourselves to Mr. Mansel.The argument of Mansel is this (p. 75):“To conceive the Deity as he is, we must conceive him as First Cause, as Absolute, and as Infinite. By the First Cause is meant that which produces all things, and is itself produced of none; by the Absolute is meant that which exists in and by itself, having no necessary relation to any other being; by the Infinite is meant that which is free from all possible limitation.”Having thus defined the Deity as the First Cause, the Absolute, and the Infinite, Mansel goes on to show that these ideas are mutually contradictory and destructive. A First Cause necessarily supposes effects, and therefore cannot be absolute: nor can the Infinite be a person; for personality is a limitation. By a course of such arguments as these, Mansel endeavors to show that the reason is as incapable of conceiving God as it is of conceiving the Trinity, the Atonement, or any other Orthodox doctrine; and since we do not renounce our belief in God because of these contradictions, neither ought we, because of similar contradictions, to renounce our belief in the Trinity.Such is the substance of Mansel's statement, though the arguments by which it is proved are varied with great ingenuity and to great extent. This course of thought is by no means original, either with Mr. Mansel or Sir William Hamilton. A far greater thinker than either of them (Immanuel Kant) had long before[pg 446]shown the logical contradictions of the understanding in what he called the Antinomies of the pure reason. But the important question is, If the reason contradicts itself thus in its conception of Deity, how are we to obtain a ground for our belief in God? Mansel answers,“Through revelation; that is, through the direct declarations of Scripture.”This he calls faith. We are to believe in a personal God on the ground of a Bible confirmed by miracles.This result is so strange, that it may well seem incredible. Yet we cannot think that we have misrepresented the tendency of the argument; though, of course, we have given no ideas of the acuteness and flexibility of the reasoning, the extent of the knowledge, and mastery of logic, in this work. That such a position should be taken by a religious man, in the supposed interest of Christianity, is sufficiently strange; for it seems to us equally untenable in its grounds, unfounded in its statements, empty of insight, destructive in its results. We will add, very briefly, a few of the criticisms which occur to us.The first thing which strikes us in the argument is, that everywhere it deals with words rather than with things. The whole object of the discussion concerns the meaning of terms, and it deals throughout with the relation of words to other words. It is an acute philological argument. We feel ourselves to be arguing about forms, and not about substances. Now, such arguments may confuse, but they cannot convince. We do not know, perhaps, what to say in reply; but we remain unsatisfied. One not used to logic may listen to an argument which shall conclusively prove that white is black; that nothing is greater than something; that a man who jumps from the top of the house can never reach the ground; but, though the thing is proved, he is not convinced. So, when Mr. Mansel proves to us that we cannot conceive of a Being who is at the same time Infinite and Personal, we are unable, perhaps, to reply to the argument; but we know it to be false, since we actually have the two conceptions in our mind.Wedoconceive of the Deity as an infinite personality. Of what use to tell us that wecannothave an idea, when we know that wedohave it?Mansel tells us that we cannot think the idea of the Infinite and Absolute. He says (p. 110),“The Absolute and the Infinite are thus, like the Inconceivable and Imperceptible, names indicating, not an object of thought or of consciousness at all, but the mere absence of the conditions under which consciousness is possible.”[pg 447]But, then, they are only words, with no meaning attached; and, if so, how can we argue about them at all? All argument must cease when we come to an unmeaning phrase; therefore the existence of Mr. Mansel's argument proves the falsehood of his assertion. Since he argues about the Infinite, it is evident that he has the idea of the Infinite in his mind.Mr. Mansel agrees in principle wholly with the Atheists; for the Atheists do not say that God does not exist, or that God cannot exist, but that we cannot know that he exists. So says Mr. Holyoake, a leading modern Atheist. This is what Mansel also asserts, only he goes farther than they, contending that the very idea of God is impossible to the human reason. It is true that he believes in God on grounds of revelation, which the Atheists do not; but he agrees with them in setting aside all natural and reasonable knowledge of Deity.But how is it possible to obtain an idea of God from revelation, if we are before destitute of such an idea? When Paul preached to the Athenians, he addressed them as having already a true, though an imperfect, idea of God.“Whom, therefore, ye ignorantly worship, him declare I unto you.”But, if they had not already an idea of God, how could he have given them such an idea? Suppose that he works a miracle, and says,“This miracle proves that God has sent me to teach you.”But, by the supposition, they know nothing about God; consequently, they have nothing by which to test the truth of a revelation professing to come from him. Neither miracles, nor the nature of the truth taught, nor the character of the teacher, avail anything as evidence of a revelation from a Being of whom we know nothing. Without a previous knowledge of God, only immediate revelation is possible.Mr. Mansel, therefore, is one who, without a foundation, builds a house on the sand. He attempts to erect faith in God after taking away the foundation of reason. The apostles built revealed religion upon natural religion, revealed theology upon natural theology, according to the rule,“That is not first which is spiritual, but that which is natural; afterward that which is spiritual.”Christ said,“Ye believe in God: believe also in me.”Mr. Mansel reverses all this, and makes Christ say,“Ye believe in me: believe also in God.”But, even if it were possible to ascend to belief in God through belief in Christ, we must ask, Is not belief thought? If the mind cannotthinkthe Infinite, how can it believe the Infinite? Must we not apprehend a proposition before we can believe it? Does[pg 448]not the conception of a thing logically precede the belief of it? If it is impossible to apprehend the Absolute, if this is only an empty name, how is it possible to believe in the Absolute on grounds of revelation, or on any other grounds? A miracle cannot communicate to the mind an idea which is beyond its power of conception.Mr. Mansel declares that our religious knowledge isregulative, but notspeculative.He lays great stress on this distinction: by which he means that we have ideas of the Deity sufficient to guide our practice, but not to satisfy our intellect; which tell us, not what God is in himself, but how hewillsthat we should think of him. According to this view, all revelation is overturned, just as all natural religion has been previously overturned. Revelation does not reveal God on this theory. We have no knowledge of God in the gospel, any more than we had in nature. Instead of knowledge, we have only law. But this seems to despoil Christianity of its vital force. Christ says,“This is life eternal, toknowthee, the only true God.”But Mr. Mansel tells us that such knowledge of God is impossible. Therefore, instead of the gospel, he gives us the law; for it is certain that hisregulativetruths are simply moral precepts, addressed to the will, not to the intellect; capable of being obeyed, but not of being understood.The radical error of Mansel seems to be this,—that his mind works only in the logical region belonging to the understanding, and is ignorant of those higher truths which are beheld by the reason. He has tried to find God by logical processes, and, of course, has failed. He therefore concludes that God cannot be known by the intellect. He has fully demonstrated that God cannot be comprehended by the logical understanding; and in this he has done a good work. But he has not shown that God cannot be known by the intuitive reason. The understanding comprehends: the reason apprehends. The understanding perceives the form: reason takes holds of the substance. The understanding sees how things are related to each other: the reason sees how things are in themselves. The understanding cannot, therefore, see the infinite and absolute; cannot apprehend substance or cause; knows nothing of the eternal. But the reason is as certain of cause as of effect; knows eternity as really as it knows time; it is as sure of the existence of spirit as it is of matter; and sees the infinite to be as real as the finite. Therefore,[pg 449]though we cannot comprehend God by logic, we can apprehend him by reason. We can be as sure of his being as we are of our own, and we are not obliged to explain away all those profound scriptures which teach us that the object and end of our being is to know God.Since, therefore, Mr. Mansel's argument, with all its acuteness, learning, and honesty, tends directly to Atheism; since, by overturning the foundation of Christianity, it overturns Christianity itself; since it substitutes mere moral laws in place of the vital forces of the gospel,—it is no wonder that its positions have been rejected with much unanimity by the most eminent Orthodox scholars. Its defence of Orthodoxy costs too much. Leading thinkers of very different schools—for example, Mr. Brownson, the Roman Catholic, in his“Quarterly Review;”Professor Hickok, the Presbyterian, in the“Bibliotheca Sacra;”and Mr. Maurice, of the Church of England, in an able pamphlet—have opposed with great force the arguments and conclusions of this volume. It is true that some Orthodox divines consider that Mr. Mansel hasdemonstratedthat the human consciousness is unequal to the speculative conception of a Being at once absolute, infinite, and personal, and seem gladly to have the aid of this book in defending the Trinity. But the more distinguished and experienced thinkers mentioned above are cautious of accepting the help of so dangerous an ally.

Mr. Herbert Spencer, in his book called“First Principles,”lays down the doctrine of theological nescience, as the final result of religious inquiry. In his chapter on“Ultimate Religious Ideas”he argues thus: The religious problem is, Whence comes the universe? In answer to this question only three statements are possible. It is self-existent. It was self-created. It was created by external agency. Now, none of these, says Spencer, is tenable. For, (1.) Self-existence means simply an existence without a beginning, and it is not possible to conceive of this. The conception of infinite past time is an impossibility. (2.) Self-creation is Pantheism. We can conceive, somewhat, of self-evolution, but not of a potential universe passing into an actual one. (3.) The theistic hypothesis is equally inconceivable. For this is to suppose the world made as a workman makes a piece of furniture. We can conceive of this last, because[pg 442]the workman has the material given; he only adds form to the substance. To produce matter out of nothing is the real difficulty. No simile enables us to conceive of this production of matter out of nothing. Again, says Spencer, space is something, the non-existence of which is inconceivable; hence the creation of space is inconceivable. And lastly, says Spencer, if God created the universe, the question returns, Whence came God? The same three answers recur. God was self-existent, or he was self-created, or he was createdab extra. The last theory is useless. For it leads to an endless series of potential existences. So the theist returns to self-existence; which, however, says Spencer, is as inconceivable as a self-existent universe, involving the inconceivable idea of unlimited duration.

Nevertheless, continues Spencer, we are compelled to regard phenomena as effects of some cause. We must believe in a cause of that cause, till we reach afirst cause. The First Cause must be infinite and absolute. He then follows Mansel in showing the contradiction between the two ideas.

But total negation is not the result,—only nescience. Atheism, Pantheism, and Theism agree in one belief, namely, that of a problem to be solved. An unknown God is the highest result of theology and of philosophy.“If religion and science are to be reconciled, the basis of the reconciliation must be their deepest, widest, and most certain of all facts—that the power which the universe manifests is utterly inscrutable.”

Thus Mr. Spencer proposes to take back human thought eighteen centuries, and ignoring the conquests of Christian faith in civilization, theology, and morals, carries us to Athens, in the time of Paul, to worship at the altar of an unknown God. He makes a solitude in the soul, and calls it peace. He makes peace between religion and science, by commanding the first to surrender at discretion to the other. Science knows nothing of God; therefore theology must know nothing of God. But not so. Let each impart to the other that which it possesses, and which the other lacks. Let science enlarge theology with the idea of law, and theology inform science with the idea of a living God.

It is not difficult to detect the fallacies in this argument of Spencer for religious nescience. His notion of conception is that of a purely sensible image. He assumes that we have no knowledge but sensible knowledge, and then easily infers that we do not know[pg 443]God. We can conceive, he says, of a rock on which we are standing, but not of the whole earth. No great magnitudes, he declares, can be conceived. The conception of infinite time is, therefore, an impossibility.

But it is clear to any one, not bound hand and foot by the assumptions of sensationalism, that it is just as easy to conceive of the whole globe of earth, as of the piece of it which we see. We cannot havea visual imageof the whole earth, indeed, but the mental conception of the globe is as distinct as that of the stone we throw from our hand. And so far from the conception of infinite duration being an impossibility, not to conceive of time and space as infinite is the impossibility. It is impossible to imagine or conceive of the beginning of time, or the commencement of space.

Looking at his trilemma concerning the universe, namely, that it was either, (1.) Self-existent, (2.) Self-created, or, (3.) Created by an external power, we say,—

1. The real objection to a self-existent universe, is not that we cannot conceive of existence without beginning. Nothing is easier than to conceive of an everlasting, unchanging universe, without beginning or end. It is not existence, but change, that suggests cause. Phenomena, events, require us to believe in some power which produces them. Now, the events which take place in the universe suggest an intelligent, absolute, and central cause, that is, a cause combining supreme wisdom, power, and goodness. A self-existent universe is not inconceivable, but it is incredible.

2. Self-creation, he objects, is Pantheism. But this is no reason for denying it, since Pantheism may, for all we see at this stage of the argument, be the true explanation of the universe. The real objection to the hypothesis of a self-created universe (or of a self-created God), is that it involves the contradiction of something which exists and which does not exist at the same moment; at the moment of self-creation, the universe must exist in order to create, but must be non-existent in order to be created. A self-created universe, then, is not incredible because it involves Pantheism, but because it involves a contradiction.

3. He objects to the Theistic hypothesis, that we cannot conceive of the production of matter (more strictly, of substance) out of nothing. He adds that no simile can enable us to imagine it.

But I can produce, out of nothing, something visible, tangible, and audible. There is no motion and no sound. I move my arm[pg 444]by the power of will, and I produce both sound and motion. The motion of a body in space is a material phenomenon; for whatever is perceived by the senses is material. We do then constantly perceive material phenomena created out of nothing, by human will.

His argument against the Theist, that space could not have been created by God, since its non-existence is inconceivable, is much more plausible. But suppose we grant that space, supposed to be a real existence, was not created in time. Does it follow from that, that it does not proceed from God? Not being an event in time, it does not require a cause; but being conceived of as a reality, it may have eternally proceeded from the divine will, and so not be independent of the Creator.

And as regards his trilemma concerning Deity, that also fails in the failure of his thesis that eternal duration is inconceivable. His argument against the self-existent Deity, only rests on that assumption which we have shown to be untenable.

But Mr. Spencer, who is not a theologian, is at this point reënforced by Mr. Mansel, on whose former work,“The Limits of Religious Thought,”we proceed to offer some criticism. This also is an argument for nescience in theology, in the presumed interests of revelation. Mr. Martineau has ably shown the weakness and the dangerous tendency of this whole argument of Mansel, in an article to which we earnestly refer our readers.

The work of Mr. Mansel is a desperate attempt to save Orthodox doctrines from the objections of reason, not by replying to those objections and pointing out their fallacy, but by showing that similar objections can be brought against all religious belief. For example, when reason objects to the Trinity, that it is a contradiction, Mr. Mansel does not attempt to show that it isnota contradiction, but argues that our belief in God is another contradiction of the same kind. His inference therefore is, that as we believe in God, notwithstanding the contradiction, we ought to believe in the Trinity also, notwithstanding the contradiction. If we believe one, we may believe both.

But this is a dangerous argument; since it is evident that one might reply, that there remains another alternative; which is, to believeneither. If Mr. Mansel succeeds in convincing his readers, the result may be a belief in the Trinity, or it may be a disbelief in God altogether; one of two things—either a return to Orthodoxy, or a departure from all religion. Either they will renounce[pg 445]reason in order to retain religion, or they will renounce religion in order to retain reason.

At the very best, also, the help which this argument offers us is to be paid for somewhat dearly. It proposes to save Orthodoxy by giving up the use of reason in religion. Mr. Mansel would say,“by giving up the unlimited use of reason;”but, as we shall presently see, this comes very much to the same thing at last.

What, then, is the nature of Mr. Mansel's argument? It is an argument founded upon Sir William Hamilton's philosophy of the Unconditioned. Now, this has been generally considered the weak side of Hamilton's system. According to him, the unconditioned is inconceivable: in other words, of the Absolute and Infinite we have no conception at all. But this denies to man the power of conceiving of God, and so leads directly to Atheism. This charge has already been brought against Hamilton's philosophy, in various quarters; for example, in the“North British Review ”for May, 1835. But we will not here attempt any examination of Hamilton's theory, but confine ourselves to Mr. Mansel.

The argument of Mansel is this (p. 75):“To conceive the Deity as he is, we must conceive him as First Cause, as Absolute, and as Infinite. By the First Cause is meant that which produces all things, and is itself produced of none; by the Absolute is meant that which exists in and by itself, having no necessary relation to any other being; by the Infinite is meant that which is free from all possible limitation.”

Having thus defined the Deity as the First Cause, the Absolute, and the Infinite, Mansel goes on to show that these ideas are mutually contradictory and destructive. A First Cause necessarily supposes effects, and therefore cannot be absolute: nor can the Infinite be a person; for personality is a limitation. By a course of such arguments as these, Mansel endeavors to show that the reason is as incapable of conceiving God as it is of conceiving the Trinity, the Atonement, or any other Orthodox doctrine; and since we do not renounce our belief in God because of these contradictions, neither ought we, because of similar contradictions, to renounce our belief in the Trinity.

Such is the substance of Mansel's statement, though the arguments by which it is proved are varied with great ingenuity and to great extent. This course of thought is by no means original, either with Mr. Mansel or Sir William Hamilton. A far greater thinker than either of them (Immanuel Kant) had long before[pg 446]shown the logical contradictions of the understanding in what he called the Antinomies of the pure reason. But the important question is, If the reason contradicts itself thus in its conception of Deity, how are we to obtain a ground for our belief in God? Mansel answers,“Through revelation; that is, through the direct declarations of Scripture.”This he calls faith. We are to believe in a personal God on the ground of a Bible confirmed by miracles.

This result is so strange, that it may well seem incredible. Yet we cannot think that we have misrepresented the tendency of the argument; though, of course, we have given no ideas of the acuteness and flexibility of the reasoning, the extent of the knowledge, and mastery of logic, in this work. That such a position should be taken by a religious man, in the supposed interest of Christianity, is sufficiently strange; for it seems to us equally untenable in its grounds, unfounded in its statements, empty of insight, destructive in its results. We will add, very briefly, a few of the criticisms which occur to us.

The first thing which strikes us in the argument is, that everywhere it deals with words rather than with things. The whole object of the discussion concerns the meaning of terms, and it deals throughout with the relation of words to other words. It is an acute philological argument. We feel ourselves to be arguing about forms, and not about substances. Now, such arguments may confuse, but they cannot convince. We do not know, perhaps, what to say in reply; but we remain unsatisfied. One not used to logic may listen to an argument which shall conclusively prove that white is black; that nothing is greater than something; that a man who jumps from the top of the house can never reach the ground; but, though the thing is proved, he is not convinced. So, when Mr. Mansel proves to us that we cannot conceive of a Being who is at the same time Infinite and Personal, we are unable, perhaps, to reply to the argument; but we know it to be false, since we actually have the two conceptions in our mind.

Wedoconceive of the Deity as an infinite personality. Of what use to tell us that wecannothave an idea, when we know that wedohave it?

Mansel tells us that we cannot think the idea of the Infinite and Absolute. He says (p. 110),“The Absolute and the Infinite are thus, like the Inconceivable and Imperceptible, names indicating, not an object of thought or of consciousness at all, but the mere absence of the conditions under which consciousness is possible.”

But, then, they are only words, with no meaning attached; and, if so, how can we argue about them at all? All argument must cease when we come to an unmeaning phrase; therefore the existence of Mr. Mansel's argument proves the falsehood of his assertion. Since he argues about the Infinite, it is evident that he has the idea of the Infinite in his mind.

Mr. Mansel agrees in principle wholly with the Atheists; for the Atheists do not say that God does not exist, or that God cannot exist, but that we cannot know that he exists. So says Mr. Holyoake, a leading modern Atheist. This is what Mansel also asserts, only he goes farther than they, contending that the very idea of God is impossible to the human reason. It is true that he believes in God on grounds of revelation, which the Atheists do not; but he agrees with them in setting aside all natural and reasonable knowledge of Deity.

But how is it possible to obtain an idea of God from revelation, if we are before destitute of such an idea? When Paul preached to the Athenians, he addressed them as having already a true, though an imperfect, idea of God.“Whom, therefore, ye ignorantly worship, him declare I unto you.”But, if they had not already an idea of God, how could he have given them such an idea? Suppose that he works a miracle, and says,“This miracle proves that God has sent me to teach you.”But, by the supposition, they know nothing about God; consequently, they have nothing by which to test the truth of a revelation professing to come from him. Neither miracles, nor the nature of the truth taught, nor the character of the teacher, avail anything as evidence of a revelation from a Being of whom we know nothing. Without a previous knowledge of God, only immediate revelation is possible.

Mr. Mansel, therefore, is one who, without a foundation, builds a house on the sand. He attempts to erect faith in God after taking away the foundation of reason. The apostles built revealed religion upon natural religion, revealed theology upon natural theology, according to the rule,“That is not first which is spiritual, but that which is natural; afterward that which is spiritual.”Christ said,“Ye believe in God: believe also in me.”Mr. Mansel reverses all this, and makes Christ say,“Ye believe in me: believe also in God.”

But, even if it were possible to ascend to belief in God through belief in Christ, we must ask, Is not belief thought? If the mind cannotthinkthe Infinite, how can it believe the Infinite? Must we not apprehend a proposition before we can believe it? Does[pg 448]not the conception of a thing logically precede the belief of it? If it is impossible to apprehend the Absolute, if this is only an empty name, how is it possible to believe in the Absolute on grounds of revelation, or on any other grounds? A miracle cannot communicate to the mind an idea which is beyond its power of conception.

Mr. Mansel declares that our religious knowledge isregulative, but notspeculative.

He lays great stress on this distinction: by which he means that we have ideas of the Deity sufficient to guide our practice, but not to satisfy our intellect; which tell us, not what God is in himself, but how hewillsthat we should think of him. According to this view, all revelation is overturned, just as all natural religion has been previously overturned. Revelation does not reveal God on this theory. We have no knowledge of God in the gospel, any more than we had in nature. Instead of knowledge, we have only law. But this seems to despoil Christianity of its vital force. Christ says,“This is life eternal, toknowthee, the only true God.”But Mr. Mansel tells us that such knowledge of God is impossible. Therefore, instead of the gospel, he gives us the law; for it is certain that hisregulativetruths are simply moral precepts, addressed to the will, not to the intellect; capable of being obeyed, but not of being understood.

The radical error of Mansel seems to be this,—that his mind works only in the logical region belonging to the understanding, and is ignorant of those higher truths which are beheld by the reason. He has tried to find God by logical processes, and, of course, has failed. He therefore concludes that God cannot be known by the intellect. He has fully demonstrated that God cannot be comprehended by the logical understanding; and in this he has done a good work. But he has not shown that God cannot be known by the intuitive reason. The understanding comprehends: the reason apprehends. The understanding perceives the form: reason takes holds of the substance. The understanding sees how things are related to each other: the reason sees how things are in themselves. The understanding cannot, therefore, see the infinite and absolute; cannot apprehend substance or cause; knows nothing of the eternal. But the reason is as certain of cause as of effect; knows eternity as really as it knows time; it is as sure of the existence of spirit as it is of matter; and sees the infinite to be as real as the finite. Therefore,[pg 449]though we cannot comprehend God by logic, we can apprehend him by reason. We can be as sure of his being as we are of our own, and we are not obliged to explain away all those profound scriptures which teach us that the object and end of our being is to know God.

Since, therefore, Mr. Mansel's argument, with all its acuteness, learning, and honesty, tends directly to Atheism; since, by overturning the foundation of Christianity, it overturns Christianity itself; since it substitutes mere moral laws in place of the vital forces of the gospel,—it is no wonder that its positions have been rejected with much unanimity by the most eminent Orthodox scholars. Its defence of Orthodoxy costs too much. Leading thinkers of very different schools—for example, Mr. Brownson, the Roman Catholic, in his“Quarterly Review;”Professor Hickok, the Presbyterian, in the“Bibliotheca Sacra;”and Mr. Maurice, of the Church of England, in an able pamphlet—have opposed with great force the arguments and conclusions of this volume. It is true that some Orthodox divines consider that Mr. Mansel hasdemonstratedthat the human consciousness is unequal to the speculative conception of a Being at once absolute, infinite, and personal, and seem gladly to have the aid of this book in defending the Trinity. But the more distinguished and experienced thinkers mentioned above are cautious of accepting the help of so dangerous an ally.

§ 2. On the Defence of Verbal Inspiration by Gaussen.Following the declaration of the apostle Paul, that“the letter killeth,”we have, in the text of this volume, set aside all the theories of the Bible which assume its absolute and literal infallibility. But within a few years, a work in defence of this doctrine has been published abroad, by an excellent man, M. Gaussen, of Geneva, and translated and republished in America by Rev. Dr. Kirk, of Boston. Such a work, coming from such sources, deserves some examination. We shall, therefore, show the course of argument followed in this book, and the reasons which lead us to consider its conclusions unsound, and its reasoning inadequate.Inspiration, as defined by Gaussen, is“that inexplicable power which the divine Spirit formerly exercised over the authors of the Holy Scriptures, to guide them even in the employment of the words they were to use, and to preserve them from all error, as well as from every omission.“We aim,”says he,“to establish, by the word of God, that the[pg 450]Scriptures are from God—that all the Scriptures are from God—and that every part of the Scripture is from God.”Let us consider the arguments in support of this kind of inspiration, and the objections to them.Argument I. Plenary Inspiration is necessary, that we may know with certainty what we ought to believe.Great stress is laid upon this supposednecessity, both by Gaussen and Kirk.“The book so written,”say they,“is the Word of God, and binds the conscience of the world; and nothing else does so bind it, even though it were the writings of Paul and Peter.“With the Infidel, whether he be Christian in name or otherwise, the sharp sword of a perfect inspiration will be found, at last, indispensable. If the ground is conceded to him that there is a single passage in the Bible that is not divine, then we are disarmed; for he will be sure to apply this privilege to the very passages which most fully oppose his pride, passion, and error. How is the conscience of a wicked race to be bound down by a chain, one link of which is weak?”Reply to Argument I.—It is no way to prove a theorytrueto assume itsnecessity. The only legitimate proof of a theory is by an induction of facts. This method of beginning by a supposed necessity, this looking first at consequences, has always been fruitful of false and empty theories. The great advance in modern science has come from substituting the inductive for the ideological method. Find what the facts say, and the consequences will take care of themselves. An argument from consequences is usually only an appeal to prejudices.Again: This argument is fatal to the arguments drawn from the Scriptures themselves. In arguing from the Scripture to prove that every passage is divine, we have, of course, no right to assume that every passage is divine, for that is the very thing to be proved. Then the texts which we quote to prove our position may themselves not be divine, and if we grant that,“we are disarmed.”For, according to this argument, nothing can be proved conclusively from Scripture except we believe in plenary inspiration—then plenary inspiration itself cannot be proved from Scripture. But Gaussen admits that this doctrine can be proved“only by the Scriptures;”therefore (according to this argument) it cannot be proved at all.If, therefore, the doctrine of plenary inspiration is necessary“to[pg 451]bind the conscience of the world,”it is a doctrine incapable of proof. If, on the other hand, it can be proved, it is then clearly not necessary“to bind the conscience of the world.”But again. This theory of plenary inspiration doesnotbind the consciences of men. If men are naturally disposed (as Messrs. Gaussen and Kirk maintain) to deny and disbelieve the doctrines and statements of the Bible, they have ample opportunity of doing so, notwithstanding their belief in this theory. For, after admitting that the words of Scripture, just as they stand, are perfectly true and given by God, the question comes, What do they mean? For instance, I wish, we will suppose, to deny the doctrine of the Deity of Christ. Now, you quote to me the text Rom. 9:5.“Of whom, as concerning the flesh, Christ came, who is over all, God, blessed forever,”—which is the strongest text in the Bible in support of that doctrine. Now, though I believe in the doctrine of plenary inspiration, I am not obliged to accept this passage as proof of the Deity of Christ. For I can, 1. Assert that the verse is an interpolation; 2. Assert that it is wrongly pointed; 3. Assert that it is mistranslated; 4. Assert that Christ is called God in an inferior sense, as God over the Church. And, as a matter of fact, these are the arguments always used, even by those who deny the doctrine of a plenary inspiration. They seldom or never accuse the writer of a mistake, but always rely on a supposed mistranslation, or misinterpretation, in order to avoid the force of a passage. Hence, also, we find believers in this doctrine of plenary inspiration, differing in opinion on a thousand matters, and with no probability of ever coming to an agreement.Argument II. Several Passages of the New Testament plainly teach the Doctrine of the Plenary Inspiration of the Bible.The passages quoted by Gaussen, and mainly relied upon, are 2 Tim. 3:16.“All Scripture is given by inspiration,”&c.; 2 Peter 1:27,“Holy men of God spake as they were moved,”&c. Besides these, he refers to many passages in the Old and New Testaments, but his chief stress is laid on these.Reply to Argument II.—It is well known that both these passages refer only to the Old Testament Scriptures. It is well known that the first may be translated so as to read,“All Scripture, given by inspiration, is profitable,”&c. But it is reply enough to both these passages, to say, that neither of them indicates what kind of inspiration is intended. They assert an inspiration,[pg 452]which we also maintain. But they donotassert a verbal inspiration, nor one which makes the Scripturesinfallible, but simply one which makes themprofitable.The stress laid on the passage 2 Tim. 3:16,“All Scripture,”&c., is itself an argument against the theory of plenary inspiration. The most which can be made of this text, byanypunctuation or translation, is, that all the Scripture is written by inspired men. What was the degree or kind of their inspiration, is not in the least indicated. It might have been verbal, it might have been the inspiration of suggestion, or of superintendence, or the general inspiration of all Christians.Gaussen's only argument on this point is,“that it is thewritingwhich is said to be inspired, and writing must be in words; hence the inspiration must be verbal.”To this we must reply, that inspired writing can only mean what is written by inspired men. The writing itself cannot be inspired. This argument is too flimsy to be dwelt upon.But further still. There is another argument which lies against every attempt to prove plenary inspiration out of the Scripture.Every such attempt is necessarily reasoning in a circle.Gaussen and Kirk have labored earnestly to reply to this argument, but in vain. The answer they make is,“We are not reasoning with Infidels, but with Christians. We address men who respect the Scriptures, and who admit their truth. The Scriptures are inspired, we affirm, because, being authentic and true, they declare themselves inspired; and the Scriptures are plenarily inspired, because, being inspired, they say that they are so totally, and without any exception.”But we answer Messrs. Gaussen and Kirk thus:“You are indeed reasoning with Christians, not with Deists; but you are reasoning with Christians who do not believe thatevery passageof Scripture is infallibly inspired. To prove your doctrine from any particular passages or verbal expressions, you must prove that those particular passages and expressions are not themselves errors. You yourselves assert that this cannot be done, except we believe these passages to be infallibly inspired. Therefore you must assume infallible inspiration in order to prove infallible inspiration. In other words, you beg the question instead of arguing it.”In this vicious circle the advocates of a verbal inspiration of infallibility are necessarily imprisoned whenever they attempt to[pg 453]argue from the words of Scripture. They contend that one must believe their theory in order to be sure that any passage is absolutely true, and then they quote passages to prove their theory, as if they were absolutely true.Argument III. The theory of plenary inspiration is simple, precise, intelligible, and easy to be applied.We admit this to be true. It has this merit in common with the opposite theory of no inspiration. Both are simple, precise, and very easy of application. But simplicity is not always a sign of truth. The facts of nature and life are more apt to be complex than simple. Theories distinguished by their simplicity most commonly ignore or omit a part of the facts. Simplistic theories are generally one-sided and partial. Materialism, Atheism, Idealism, Fatalism, are all very simple theories, and explain all difficulties with a marvellous rapidity. This makes them, at first, attractive to the intellect, which always loves clear and distinct views; but afterwards, when it is seen that they obtain clearness by means of shallowness they are found unsatisfactory.Argument IV. The quotations from the Old Testament, by Jesus and his apostles, show that they regarded its language as infallibly inspired.This argument, upon which great stress is laid, both by Prof. Gaussen and Dr. Kirk, though plausible at first sight, becomes wholly untenable on examination.Thus, in the temptation of Jesus, in his reply to the tempter, he says,“Thou shalt not live by bread alone;”the whole force of the argument depending on the single wordalone.Replying to the Sadducees, who denied the resurrection, he says,“Have ye not read that God says, Iamthe God of Abraham, and of Isaac, and of Jacob? God is not the God of the dead, but of the living.”Then the whole stress of the argument rests on the use of the verb in the present tense,“I am.”Arguing with the Pharisees,“How did David, by the Spirit, call himLord, saying, The Lord said to my Lord,”&c.? Here the argument depends on the use of the single wordLord.Many more instances could be produced of the same kind; and Gaussen contends, that when Jesus and his apostles thus rest their argument on the force of a single word of the Old Testament, they must have believed that the very words were given by inspiration. For otherwise the writers might not have chosen the right word to express their thought in each particular case. And unless the[pg 454]Jews had also believed in the verbal inspiration of their Scriptures, they would have replied that these particular words might have been errors.Reply to this Argument.—Plausible as this argument may seem, it turns out to be wholly empty and worthless. Whenever any writer is admitted to be an authority, then his words become authoritative, and arguments are necessarily based on single words and expressions. In all such cases, we assume that he chose the best words by which to convey his thought, and yet we do not ascribe to him any inspiration or infallibility.Thus, go into our courts of law, and you will hear the language of the United States constitution, of the acts of legislature, of previous decisions of the courts, argued from, word by word. Counsel argue by the hour upon the force and weight of single words in the authorities. Judges in their charges instruct the jury to determine the life and death of the criminal according to the letter of the law. And this they do necessarily, according to the rule,“Cum recedit a litera, judex transit in legislatorem.”But will any one maintain that the counsel and court believe that the legislature was infallibly inspired to choose the very language which would convey their meaning?In this very argument for plenary inspiration, Gaussen and his associates rest their argument on the single word“all,”in the text,“All Scripture is given by inspiration,”&c. Yet, say they, we are not assuming that this text is plenarily inspired, for that, we admit, would be begging the question. If, then, Mr. Gaussen can argue from the force of the single wordall, without assuming the doctrine of plenary inspiration, why could not Jesus and his apostles argue from single words, without assuming the doctrine of plenary inspiration?There is, however, a passage in Paul (Gal. 3:16), in which the apostle quotes a text from the Old Testament, and lays the whole stress of his argument on two letters.“He says not,‘And to seeds’σπέρμασιν, as of many, but as of one,‘And to thy seed’σπερματι.”According to Gaussen's argument, Paul must have believed in the inspiration of the letters. But Gaussen is careful not to adduce this instance, which seems at first so much in his favor. For, in fact, both in Hebrew and Greek, as in English,“seed”is a collective noun, and does meanmanyin the singular. The argument of Paul, therefore, falls through; and it is evident that he is no example to be imitated here, in laying stress[pg 455]on one or two letters. Most modern interpreters admit that he made a mistake; and so, among the ancients, did Jerome, who nevertheless, said the argument“was good enough for the foolish Galatians.”Having thus replied, very briefly, but we believe sufficiently, to the main arguments in support of this theory, we say, in conclusion, that it cannot be true, for the following reasons, which we simply state, and do not now attempt to unfold.1. The New Testament writers nowhere claim to be infallibly inspired to write. If they had been infallibly inspired to write the Gospels and Epistles, they certainly ought to have announced this important fact. Instead of which Luke gives as his reason for writing, not that God inspired him to write, but that“inasmuch as others have taken in hand”to write, it seemed good to him also to do the same, and that for the benefit of Theophilus. John and Paul assert the truth of what they say, but not on account of their being inspired to write, but because they are disciples and apostles.2. The differences in the accounts of the same transactions show that their inspiration was not verbal.These differences appear on every page of any Harmony of the New Testament. They are numerous but unimportant; they go to prove the truth of the narrative, and give probability to the main Gospel statements. But they utterly disprove the theory of plenary inspiration.3. Paul declares that some things which he says are“of the Lord,”other things“of himself;”that in regard to some things he was inspired, in regard to others, not.4. Every writer in the New Testament has a style of his own, and there is no appearance of his being merely an amanuensis.5. While the New Testament writers lay no claim to any such inspiration as this theory assumes, they do claim for themselves and for all other Christians another kind of inspiration, which is sufficient for all the facts, and which gives them ample authority over our faith and life, and makes them independent sources of Christian truth.This view we have already sufficiently considered in our chapter on inspiration.

Following the declaration of the apostle Paul, that“the letter killeth,”we have, in the text of this volume, set aside all the theories of the Bible which assume its absolute and literal infallibility. But within a few years, a work in defence of this doctrine has been published abroad, by an excellent man, M. Gaussen, of Geneva, and translated and republished in America by Rev. Dr. Kirk, of Boston. Such a work, coming from such sources, deserves some examination. We shall, therefore, show the course of argument followed in this book, and the reasons which lead us to consider its conclusions unsound, and its reasoning inadequate.

Inspiration, as defined by Gaussen, is“that inexplicable power which the divine Spirit formerly exercised over the authors of the Holy Scriptures, to guide them even in the employment of the words they were to use, and to preserve them from all error, as well as from every omission.

“We aim,”says he,“to establish, by the word of God, that the[pg 450]Scriptures are from God—that all the Scriptures are from God—and that every part of the Scripture is from God.”

Let us consider the arguments in support of this kind of inspiration, and the objections to them.

Argument I. Plenary Inspiration is necessary, that we may know with certainty what we ought to believe.

Great stress is laid upon this supposednecessity, both by Gaussen and Kirk.

“The book so written,”say they,“is the Word of God, and binds the conscience of the world; and nothing else does so bind it, even though it were the writings of Paul and Peter.

“With the Infidel, whether he be Christian in name or otherwise, the sharp sword of a perfect inspiration will be found, at last, indispensable. If the ground is conceded to him that there is a single passage in the Bible that is not divine, then we are disarmed; for he will be sure to apply this privilege to the very passages which most fully oppose his pride, passion, and error. How is the conscience of a wicked race to be bound down by a chain, one link of which is weak?”

Reply to Argument I.—It is no way to prove a theorytrueto assume itsnecessity. The only legitimate proof of a theory is by an induction of facts. This method of beginning by a supposed necessity, this looking first at consequences, has always been fruitful of false and empty theories. The great advance in modern science has come from substituting the inductive for the ideological method. Find what the facts say, and the consequences will take care of themselves. An argument from consequences is usually only an appeal to prejudices.

Again: This argument is fatal to the arguments drawn from the Scriptures themselves. In arguing from the Scripture to prove that every passage is divine, we have, of course, no right to assume that every passage is divine, for that is the very thing to be proved. Then the texts which we quote to prove our position may themselves not be divine, and if we grant that,“we are disarmed.”For, according to this argument, nothing can be proved conclusively from Scripture except we believe in plenary inspiration—then plenary inspiration itself cannot be proved from Scripture. But Gaussen admits that this doctrine can be proved“only by the Scriptures;”therefore (according to this argument) it cannot be proved at all.

If, therefore, the doctrine of plenary inspiration is necessary“to[pg 451]bind the conscience of the world,”it is a doctrine incapable of proof. If, on the other hand, it can be proved, it is then clearly not necessary“to bind the conscience of the world.”

But again. This theory of plenary inspiration doesnotbind the consciences of men. If men are naturally disposed (as Messrs. Gaussen and Kirk maintain) to deny and disbelieve the doctrines and statements of the Bible, they have ample opportunity of doing so, notwithstanding their belief in this theory. For, after admitting that the words of Scripture, just as they stand, are perfectly true and given by God, the question comes, What do they mean? For instance, I wish, we will suppose, to deny the doctrine of the Deity of Christ. Now, you quote to me the text Rom. 9:5.“Of whom, as concerning the flesh, Christ came, who is over all, God, blessed forever,”—which is the strongest text in the Bible in support of that doctrine. Now, though I believe in the doctrine of plenary inspiration, I am not obliged to accept this passage as proof of the Deity of Christ. For I can, 1. Assert that the verse is an interpolation; 2. Assert that it is wrongly pointed; 3. Assert that it is mistranslated; 4. Assert that Christ is called God in an inferior sense, as God over the Church. And, as a matter of fact, these are the arguments always used, even by those who deny the doctrine of a plenary inspiration. They seldom or never accuse the writer of a mistake, but always rely on a supposed mistranslation, or misinterpretation, in order to avoid the force of a passage. Hence, also, we find believers in this doctrine of plenary inspiration, differing in opinion on a thousand matters, and with no probability of ever coming to an agreement.

Argument II. Several Passages of the New Testament plainly teach the Doctrine of the Plenary Inspiration of the Bible.

The passages quoted by Gaussen, and mainly relied upon, are 2 Tim. 3:16.“All Scripture is given by inspiration,”&c.; 2 Peter 1:27,“Holy men of God spake as they were moved,”&c. Besides these, he refers to many passages in the Old and New Testaments, but his chief stress is laid on these.

Reply to Argument II.—It is well known that both these passages refer only to the Old Testament Scriptures. It is well known that the first may be translated so as to read,“All Scripture, given by inspiration, is profitable,”&c. But it is reply enough to both these passages, to say, that neither of them indicates what kind of inspiration is intended. They assert an inspiration,[pg 452]which we also maintain. But they donotassert a verbal inspiration, nor one which makes the Scripturesinfallible, but simply one which makes themprofitable.

The stress laid on the passage 2 Tim. 3:16,“All Scripture,”&c., is itself an argument against the theory of plenary inspiration. The most which can be made of this text, byanypunctuation or translation, is, that all the Scripture is written by inspired men. What was the degree or kind of their inspiration, is not in the least indicated. It might have been verbal, it might have been the inspiration of suggestion, or of superintendence, or the general inspiration of all Christians.

Gaussen's only argument on this point is,“that it is thewritingwhich is said to be inspired, and writing must be in words; hence the inspiration must be verbal.”To this we must reply, that inspired writing can only mean what is written by inspired men. The writing itself cannot be inspired. This argument is too flimsy to be dwelt upon.

But further still. There is another argument which lies against every attempt to prove plenary inspiration out of the Scripture.Every such attempt is necessarily reasoning in a circle.Gaussen and Kirk have labored earnestly to reply to this argument, but in vain. The answer they make is,“We are not reasoning with Infidels, but with Christians. We address men who respect the Scriptures, and who admit their truth. The Scriptures are inspired, we affirm, because, being authentic and true, they declare themselves inspired; and the Scriptures are plenarily inspired, because, being inspired, they say that they are so totally, and without any exception.”

But we answer Messrs. Gaussen and Kirk thus:“You are indeed reasoning with Christians, not with Deists; but you are reasoning with Christians who do not believe thatevery passageof Scripture is infallibly inspired. To prove your doctrine from any particular passages or verbal expressions, you must prove that those particular passages and expressions are not themselves errors. You yourselves assert that this cannot be done, except we believe these passages to be infallibly inspired. Therefore you must assume infallible inspiration in order to prove infallible inspiration. In other words, you beg the question instead of arguing it.”

In this vicious circle the advocates of a verbal inspiration of infallibility are necessarily imprisoned whenever they attempt to[pg 453]argue from the words of Scripture. They contend that one must believe their theory in order to be sure that any passage is absolutely true, and then they quote passages to prove their theory, as if they were absolutely true.

Argument III. The theory of plenary inspiration is simple, precise, intelligible, and easy to be applied.

We admit this to be true. It has this merit in common with the opposite theory of no inspiration. Both are simple, precise, and very easy of application. But simplicity is not always a sign of truth. The facts of nature and life are more apt to be complex than simple. Theories distinguished by their simplicity most commonly ignore or omit a part of the facts. Simplistic theories are generally one-sided and partial. Materialism, Atheism, Idealism, Fatalism, are all very simple theories, and explain all difficulties with a marvellous rapidity. This makes them, at first, attractive to the intellect, which always loves clear and distinct views; but afterwards, when it is seen that they obtain clearness by means of shallowness they are found unsatisfactory.

Argument IV. The quotations from the Old Testament, by Jesus and his apostles, show that they regarded its language as infallibly inspired.

This argument, upon which great stress is laid, both by Prof. Gaussen and Dr. Kirk, though plausible at first sight, becomes wholly untenable on examination.

Thus, in the temptation of Jesus, in his reply to the tempter, he says,“Thou shalt not live by bread alone;”the whole force of the argument depending on the single wordalone.

Replying to the Sadducees, who denied the resurrection, he says,“Have ye not read that God says, Iamthe God of Abraham, and of Isaac, and of Jacob? God is not the God of the dead, but of the living.”Then the whole stress of the argument rests on the use of the verb in the present tense,“I am.”

Arguing with the Pharisees,“How did David, by the Spirit, call himLord, saying, The Lord said to my Lord,”&c.? Here the argument depends on the use of the single wordLord.

Many more instances could be produced of the same kind; and Gaussen contends, that when Jesus and his apostles thus rest their argument on the force of a single word of the Old Testament, they must have believed that the very words were given by inspiration. For otherwise the writers might not have chosen the right word to express their thought in each particular case. And unless the[pg 454]Jews had also believed in the verbal inspiration of their Scriptures, they would have replied that these particular words might have been errors.

Reply to this Argument.—Plausible as this argument may seem, it turns out to be wholly empty and worthless. Whenever any writer is admitted to be an authority, then his words become authoritative, and arguments are necessarily based on single words and expressions. In all such cases, we assume that he chose the best words by which to convey his thought, and yet we do not ascribe to him any inspiration or infallibility.

Thus, go into our courts of law, and you will hear the language of the United States constitution, of the acts of legislature, of previous decisions of the courts, argued from, word by word. Counsel argue by the hour upon the force and weight of single words in the authorities. Judges in their charges instruct the jury to determine the life and death of the criminal according to the letter of the law. And this they do necessarily, according to the rule,“Cum recedit a litera, judex transit in legislatorem.”But will any one maintain that the counsel and court believe that the legislature was infallibly inspired to choose the very language which would convey their meaning?

In this very argument for plenary inspiration, Gaussen and his associates rest their argument on the single word“all,”in the text,“All Scripture is given by inspiration,”&c. Yet, say they, we are not assuming that this text is plenarily inspired, for that, we admit, would be begging the question. If, then, Mr. Gaussen can argue from the force of the single wordall, without assuming the doctrine of plenary inspiration, why could not Jesus and his apostles argue from single words, without assuming the doctrine of plenary inspiration?

There is, however, a passage in Paul (Gal. 3:16), in which the apostle quotes a text from the Old Testament, and lays the whole stress of his argument on two letters.“He says not,‘And to seeds’σπέρμασιν, as of many, but as of one,‘And to thy seed’σπερματι.”According to Gaussen's argument, Paul must have believed in the inspiration of the letters. But Gaussen is careful not to adduce this instance, which seems at first so much in his favor. For, in fact, both in Hebrew and Greek, as in English,“seed”is a collective noun, and does meanmanyin the singular. The argument of Paul, therefore, falls through; and it is evident that he is no example to be imitated here, in laying stress[pg 455]on one or two letters. Most modern interpreters admit that he made a mistake; and so, among the ancients, did Jerome, who nevertheless, said the argument“was good enough for the foolish Galatians.”

Having thus replied, very briefly, but we believe sufficiently, to the main arguments in support of this theory, we say, in conclusion, that it cannot be true, for the following reasons, which we simply state, and do not now attempt to unfold.

1. The New Testament writers nowhere claim to be infallibly inspired to write. If they had been infallibly inspired to write the Gospels and Epistles, they certainly ought to have announced this important fact. Instead of which Luke gives as his reason for writing, not that God inspired him to write, but that“inasmuch as others have taken in hand”to write, it seemed good to him also to do the same, and that for the benefit of Theophilus. John and Paul assert the truth of what they say, but not on account of their being inspired to write, but because they are disciples and apostles.

2. The differences in the accounts of the same transactions show that their inspiration was not verbal.

These differences appear on every page of any Harmony of the New Testament. They are numerous but unimportant; they go to prove the truth of the narrative, and give probability to the main Gospel statements. But they utterly disprove the theory of plenary inspiration.

3. Paul declares that some things which he says are“of the Lord,”other things“of himself;”that in regard to some things he was inspired, in regard to others, not.

4. Every writer in the New Testament has a style of his own, and there is no appearance of his being merely an amanuensis.

5. While the New Testament writers lay no claim to any such inspiration as this theory assumes, they do claim for themselves and for all other Christians another kind of inspiration, which is sufficient for all the facts, and which gives them ample authority over our faith and life, and makes them independent sources of Christian truth.

This view we have already sufficiently considered in our chapter on inspiration.

§ 3. Defence of the Doctrine that Sin is a Nature, by Professor Shedd.In the“Christian Review”for 1852 appeared an article of great power, written by a gentleman who has since become eminent as a thinker and writer—Professor W. G. T. Shedd. The title of[pg 456]the article was calculated to attract attention, as a bold attempt to defend an extreme position of Calvinism—“Sin a Nature, and that Nature Guilt.”The article was so rational and clear that we consider it as being even now the best statement extant of this thorough-going Calvinism, and therefore devote a few pages here to its examination.87After some introductory remarks, which it is not necessary to notice, the writer lays down his first position, that sin is a nature. His statement is, that we all sin necessarily and continually in consequence ofour nature, i.e., the character born with us, original and innate.The proofs of this position are, 1. The language of St. Paul (Eph. 2:3),“We were by nature the children of wrath, even as others.”2. That we are compelled by the laws of our mind to refer volitions to a nature, as qualities to a substance. We cannot stop in the outward act of sin, but by a mental instinct look inward to the particular volition from which the sin came. Nor can the mind stop with this particular volition. There is a steady and uniform state of character, which particular volitions cannot explain. The instinct of reason causes us to look back for one common principle and source, which shall give unity to the subject; and, having attained a view both central and simple, it is satisfied. As our mind compels us to refer all properties to a substance in which they inhere, so it compels us to refer all similar volitions to a simple nature. When we see exercises of the soul, we as instinctively refer them to a nature in that soul, as we refer the properties of a body to the substance of that body. 3. Christian experience proves that sin is a nature. The Christian, especially as his experience deepens, is troubled, not so much by his separate sinful actions and volitions, as by the sinful nature which they indicate, and out of which they spring. We are compelled to believe, as we look inward, that there is a principle of evil within us, below those separate transgressions of which we are conscious. There is a diseased condition of the soul, which these transgressions, indicate. There are secret faults from which we pray to be cleansed. 4. The history of Christian doctrine shows that the Church has in all ages believed in a sinful nature, as distinguished from conscious transgressions.These are the proofs of the first position, that sin is a nature.[pg 457]We have stated them concisely, but with sufficient distinctness and completeness. Let us now examine their validity.The first argument is the text in Ephesians,“We were by nature children of wrath,”ἦμεν τέκνα φύσει ὀργῆς. The word φύσις, the writer contends,“always denotes something original and innate, in contradistinction to something acquired by practice or habit.”This text, we know, is the proof-text of original sin, and is considered by many commentators as teaching that man's nature is wholly corrupt. But plainly this is going too far. Granting the full meaning claimed for the word φύσις, the text only asserts that there is something in man's nature which exposes him to the divine displeasure by being the source of sin. It does not assert the corruption of the whole nature, nor preclude the supposition that we are born with tendencies to good, no less than to evil. That we are so, the writer is bound by his own statement to admit; for if this Greek word“always denotes something original and innate,”it denotes this in Rom. 2:14,88which declares that the Gentiles“do by nature the things contained in the law.”According to this passage in Romans, if there be such a thing as natural depravity, it is not total; and if there be such a thing as total depravity, it is not natural. Those who wish to maintain both doctrines can only do it by admitting two different kinds of sinfulness in man, one of which is natural, but not total; the other total, but not natural—a distinction which we esteem a sound one. According to this passage in Rom 2:14, we must understand φύσις as referring to the good side of man's nature, and the same word in Eph. 2:3 as referring to the corrupt side of man's moral nature. The first refers to the“law of the mind;”the second, to the other“law in the members”(Rom. 7:23). But there is another passage (Gal. 2:15), which asserts that the Jews by nature are not sinners, like the heathen. Now, as we can hardly suppose that the original instincts and innate tendencies of the Jewish child were radically good from birth, and essentially different from those of the heathen, and as such a supposition would contradict the whole argument of Paul in Rom. ch. 2, it is[pg 458]evident that φύσις in Gal. 2:15 does not denote something original and innate. The meaning of this verse probably is, that the Jew from birth up, and by the mere fact of being born a Jew, came under the influences of a religious education, which preserved him from many forms of heathen depravity. The word, therefore, means in that passage, not a Jew by nature, but a Jew by birth; and, if so, we are at liberty, if we choose, to ascribe the same meaning to the word in Ephesians, and to understand the text to teach that we were by birth placed under circumstances which tended necessarily to deprave the character.This passage, therefore, quoted by the writer, does not teach entire depravity by nature, but a partial depravity, either found in the hereditary tendencies and instincts, or acquired by means of the evil circumstances surrounding the child from his birth.The second argument of the writer is, that the laws of mind compel us to refer sinful volitions to a sinful nature, as they compel us to refer qualities to a substance.We admit that, where we see uniform and constant habits of action, we are compelled to refer these to a permanent character or state of being. If a man once in his life becomes intoxicated, we do not infer any habit of intemperance, or any vicious tendency; but if he is habitually intemperate, we are compelled, as the writer justly asserts, to look beneath the separate single actions for one common principle and source. But in assuming that this source is a nature brought with us into the world, the writer seems to us to jump to a conclusion. It may be an acquired character, not an original nature. It may be an induced state of disease either of body or mind, a depravity which has commenced this side of childhood. We know that there are acquired habits both of mind and of body; otherwise, not only would it be impossible for a man to grow worse, but it would also be impossible for him to grow better, and there would be an end to all improvement and progress. Such an acquired character introduces unity into the subject of investigation, as completely as does an original nature, and therefore satisfies all the wants of the mind.A precisely similar answer may be made to the writer's third argument, drawn from Christian experience. He is perfectly right, we think, in saying that the Christian is troubled, not merely, nor chiefly, by the recollection of single acts and volitions of evil, but in the evidence which they seem to give of a sinful state of mind and heart. He is right in considering any theory of[pg 459]moral evil shallow and inadequate which only takes into account sinful actions and sinful volitions. What earnest man, who has seriously set about correcting a fault, or improving his character, but has been obliged to say,“To will is present with me; but how to perform that which I will, I find not”? Every earnest effort shows us more plainly how deep the roots of evil run below the surface. We find alawin the members warring against the law of the mind, and bringing us into captivity to the law of sin. This is the description which Paul gives of it. It is alaw; that is, something regular, constant, permanent—a steady stress, a bias towards evil. The apostle, however, differs from the writer in placing this law, not in the will, but in the members; and also in stating that there is another law,—that of the mind,—which has a tendency towards good. In the unregenerate we understand him to teach that the law of evil is the stronger, and holds the man, the personal will, captive. In the regenerate, the reverse is the case. Nor does Paul teach that this sinful tendency is guilt. It is not“Oguiltyman that I am!”but“Owretchedman that I am!”Now, while we agree with the writer in rejecting as superficial and inadequate any theory of evil, whether emanating from our own denomination or from any other, which does not recognize this evil state or tendency lying below the volitions, we differ from him in that we think it not always a nature, but a character. He has not proved, nor begun to prove, that this dark ground of evil in man is always innate or original. It may or may not be; but the argument from Christian experience shows nothing of the sort.The writer's fourth and remaining argument is, that the Church has, in all ages, believed in a sinful nature, as distinguished from conscious transgressions. If this were so, we admit that it should have weight in the inquiry; but we deny the fact so far, at least, as the sinful nature is concerned.89[pg 460]The writer proceeds thus:“Assuming, then, that the fact of a sinful nature has been established, we pass to the second statement of St. Paul, that man is by nature a child of wrath. We pass from his statement that sin, in its ultimate form, is a nature, to his statement that this nature is guilt.”If we have done justice to the writer's arguments,—and it has been our object to state them fairly, though briefly,—we submit that the fact of a sinful nature has not been established by them. He has shown that in man there is a tendency to evil running below the conscious, distinct volitions—that there is a permanent character, good or evil, which manifests itself, and becomes first apparent to ourselves, or to others, in these separate, spiritual exercises or actions. But that this stress either to good or evil, this law either of the mind or members, is original and inborn, is yet to be proved. Let us then consider the second point, namely, whether this character or nature, whichever it may be, is also guilt.As the writer's first argument to prove a sinful nature was drawn from the Greek word φύσις, so his first argument to prove that nature guilt is derived from the Greek word ὀργή in the same passage.“The apostle teaches,”he says,“that sinful man is a child of wrath. Now, none but a guilty being can be the object of the righteous and holy displeasure of God.”But this word, translatedwrath, is confessedly used in other senses besides that of the divine anger or displeasure. It may mean the sufferings or punishments which come as the result of sin, in which sense it is used in Matt. 3:7,“Who hath warned you to flee from the wrath to come?”and other places. This word is used in the passage just quoted for some future evil; in John 3:36, for a present evil—“The wrath of God abides on him;”and in 1 Thess. 2:16, for a past evil—“For the wrath is come [lit.hascome] on them to the uttermost.”It may mean the subjective feeling of guilt; the sense that we deserve the divine displeasure, which is removed by the assurance of forgiveness. It may mean the state of alienation from God, which results by a law of the conscience from this sense of guilt—an alienation removed by the divine act by which God reconciles the sinner to himself. And the radical meaning, from which these secondary meanings flow, may be the essential antagonism existing between the holy nature of God and all evil. But whatever it means, it cannot intend anything like human anger. In the divine wrath there is neither selfishness nor passion; and it must consist with an infinite love towards its object. The word, therefore, as used in Eph. 2:3, does not convey the[pg 461]idea of guilt,a vi terminis. It may mean as well, that this sinful tendency in man, manifesting itself in sinful actions, produces a state of estrangement or alienation between man and God. How far this is a guilty alienation, and how far it is evil and sorrowful, is not to be learned from the term itself.But the main proof of the writer in support of his second position is found in the assertion, that this sinful tendency in man, out of which evil acts continually flow, is not a tendency of the physical nature, but of the will itself. He distinguishes the will proper from the mere faculty of single choices, and considers it to be a deeper power lying at the very centre of the soul, which determines the whole man with reference to some great and unlimited end of living. It is, in fact, the man himself—the person. For man, he asserts, is not essentially intellect or feeling; but is essentially and at bottom a will, a self-determining creature.“His other faculties of knowing and feeling are grafted into this stock and root; and hence he is responsible from centre to circumference.”He then affirms the will, thus defined, to be the responsible and guilty author of the sinful nature; being nothing more nor less than its constant and total determination to self as the ultimate end of living. This voluntary power, which is the man himself, has turned away from God and directed itself to self as an ultimate end; and this state of the will is the sinful nature of man.We have no disposition to quarrel with the psychology of this statement. We admit man to be essentially will, in the sense here described. He is essentially activity; an activity limited externally, by special organization and circumstances,—limited internally, by quantity of force, and knowledge.Nor, again, do we deny that in the unregenerate state the will of man is directed to self rather than to God as its ultimate end; and that this is guilt, and in a certain sense total guilt. No man can serve two masters. If he is obedient to one, he is necessarily disobedient to the other. This disobedience may, or may not, appear in act; but it is there in state. He whose ultimate end is self-gratification is always ready to sacrifice the will of God to his own. He whose ultimate end is God is always ready to sacrifice his own will. In this sense, the unregenerate man may be said to be wholly sinful; and he who is born of God, not to commit sin.Thus much we grant; and the admission is a large one. But we must now object to the writer, that this is but one side of the question; and that he has omitted to see the other side. The[pg 462]sources of evil are not so simple as he seems to suppose; for man is a very complex being, and the world in which he lives is a very complex world. We therefore would inquire,—What proof have we that this guilty direction of the will is anature, in the sense claimed, i.e., something innate or original? Why may not the will have been turned gradually in this direction as we grow up, by enticements of pleasure; and why might not the will, in like manner, by means of wise culture, have been gradually directed to God?Again: what proof have we that we are so whollyunconsciousof this direction of the will, as our author contends? That a great many of the acts of the will are unconscious acts, like the separate movements of the finger in a skilful pianist, or lifting of the feet in walking, we admit; and we are not responsible for these separate acts, but for thepreceding choice, by means of which we determine to play the tune, or walk the mile. In like manner, the direction of the soul to self rather than to God may be moral evil; but is not moral guilt, until we become conscious of it, in a greater or less degree. Then, when partially or wholly awakened to the evil direction of the soul, if we allow ourselves to neglect this discovery, to turn away from the fact and forget it, on that conscious act presses the whole burden of guilt, and not on the unconscious volitions which may result from it. We say, therefore, in opposition to the writer, that though there may be depravity without consciousness of the depraved state, there cannot be guilt without consciousness of the evil choice, or, as the apostle says,“Sin is not imputed where there is no law.”Again: we totally dissent from the statement that this deep-lying will in man is unable to obey the commands,“Turn ye, turn ye from your evil way, for why will ye die?”—“Repent and be converted, that your sins may be blotted out,”—“Make you a new heart and a new spirit,”—“Choose you this day whom you will serve,”—“Believe in the Lord Jesus Christ and be saved.”The writer says, that“such a power as this, including so much, and running so deep, which is a determination of the whole soul, cannot, from the very nature of the case, be such a facile and easily managed power as that by which we resolve to do some particular thing in every-day life.”True: notsoeasily managed; but can it not be managed at all? It may requiremoreself-examination to understand what the direction of the will is, and more concentration of thought and will, and more leaning on God's help; but[pg 463]withall these are we able or not able to turn to God? He says, the great main tendency of the will to self and sin as an ultimate end, though having a free and criminal origin,“is not to be reversed so easily.”True, again; but why notlesseasily? The writer speaks of the sinful will as a“total determination of itself to self;”and asks“how the power that is to reverse all this process can possibly come out of the will thus shut up, and entirely swallowed in the process. How is the process to destroy itself?”But what! Has man becomea process? He is essentially will, but is this will blind mechanism? Has it not, according to our author's own theory, intelligence, conscience, affection, rooted into it? The moment that the writer begins to speak of the will, as unable to change its direction, he is compelled to conceive of it materially and mechanically, and not as the moral, responsible soul. He says,“The human will becomes a current that becomes unmanageable simply because of its own momentum.”And therefore, again, he is obliged to conceive of the whole voluntary power as lost, and lost before man was born; and he reduces all our real freedom to the original act of the will previous to birth, which took place when we were present in Adam's soul, and committed the first transgression with him.This is plainly the denial of all human freedom since the fall of Adam. We bring into the world, according to the writer, a will wholly and inevitably bent to evil. We have no consciousness of this tendency, and if we were conscious of it we have no power to change it; but we yet are responsible for it, and guilty because of it, inasmuch as we began this state ourselves when all our souls were mystically present in the soul of Adam. Of this theory, we merely say now, that, if it be true, man is notnowguilty of any sin which he commits in his mortal life; for he is not now a free being. He is only responsible for the sin which he freely committed in Adam. He is no more responsible when we suppose his sin to proceed from his will, than when we suppose it to proceed from a depraved sensuous nature, or from involuntary ignorance, for he is no more free in the one case than in the other. He may be an infinitely depraved and infinitely miserable being, but he can in no true sense be called aguiltybeing. Again we say, if this theory be true, it is an awful theory, and one which we cannot possibly reconcile with the justice or goodness, and still less with the fatherly character, of God. That God should so have constituted human nature that all the millions of the human[pg 464]race should have had this fatal opportunity of destroying themselves utterly, by one simultaneous act, in Adam, is, to say the least, anawfultheory to propound concerning our heavenly Father. We might put Christ's argument to any man not hardened by theological study, as it seems to us, with irresistible force.“What man is there amongyou,being a father,”who could do anything of this sort? But we know too well that all such appeals fall harmless from the sevenfold shield of a systematized theology.Therefore we will only say further, concerning this theory, that, as beingapparentlyin direct conflict with the divine attributes as taught in the New Testament; as making man a mere process deprived of real freedom; as proving man not guilty for any sin committed in this life; and as thereby deadening the sense of responsibility, and showing that we cannot possibly obey the command,“Repent and turn to God,”—this theory of a sin committed in Adamought to have the amplest proofbefore we believe it. We admit that it may be true, though opposed to all our ideas of God, man, and duty. But being thus opposed, it ought to be sustained by the most unanswerable arguments. If Jesus and his apostles have told us so plainly, we will believe it if we can. How is it, then? Not a word on the subject in the four Gospels. Not a text from the lips of Jesus which can be pretended to lay down any such theory. He does not even mention the name of Adam once in the Gospels, nor allude to him, except when speaking of marriage. This theory rests, not on anything contained in the Gospels, book of Acts, or Epistles of Peter, James, or John, but on two texts in two Epistles of Paul (Rom. 5:14; 1 Cor. 15:22). In the latter passage Paul says not a word of Adam's sin, but only of his death,—the whole chapter treating, not of sin, but of death and the resurrection. This passage, therefore, can hardly be considered a plain statement of the theory. The other, in Romans, is confessedly so far from plain, that it is difficult to make it agree with any theory; but the most evident meaning, to one who has no theory to support, is, that sin began with Adam, and the consequences of sin, which are moral and physical evil, began also with him; and as he thus set in motion a series of evil tendencies which we find in our organization, and which Paul elsewhere calls the law of the members, and a series of evil circumstances which we find around us in the world, both of which are the occasion of sin, we may trace back[pg 465]to him the commencement of human disobedience. If the passage teaches anything more than this, it certainly does not teach it plainly or explicitly.

In the“Christian Review”for 1852 appeared an article of great power, written by a gentleman who has since become eminent as a thinker and writer—Professor W. G. T. Shedd. The title of[pg 456]the article was calculated to attract attention, as a bold attempt to defend an extreme position of Calvinism—“Sin a Nature, and that Nature Guilt.”The article was so rational and clear that we consider it as being even now the best statement extant of this thorough-going Calvinism, and therefore devote a few pages here to its examination.87

After some introductory remarks, which it is not necessary to notice, the writer lays down his first position, that sin is a nature. His statement is, that we all sin necessarily and continually in consequence ofour nature, i.e., the character born with us, original and innate.

The proofs of this position are, 1. The language of St. Paul (Eph. 2:3),“We were by nature the children of wrath, even as others.”2. That we are compelled by the laws of our mind to refer volitions to a nature, as qualities to a substance. We cannot stop in the outward act of sin, but by a mental instinct look inward to the particular volition from which the sin came. Nor can the mind stop with this particular volition. There is a steady and uniform state of character, which particular volitions cannot explain. The instinct of reason causes us to look back for one common principle and source, which shall give unity to the subject; and, having attained a view both central and simple, it is satisfied. As our mind compels us to refer all properties to a substance in which they inhere, so it compels us to refer all similar volitions to a simple nature. When we see exercises of the soul, we as instinctively refer them to a nature in that soul, as we refer the properties of a body to the substance of that body. 3. Christian experience proves that sin is a nature. The Christian, especially as his experience deepens, is troubled, not so much by his separate sinful actions and volitions, as by the sinful nature which they indicate, and out of which they spring. We are compelled to believe, as we look inward, that there is a principle of evil within us, below those separate transgressions of which we are conscious. There is a diseased condition of the soul, which these transgressions, indicate. There are secret faults from which we pray to be cleansed. 4. The history of Christian doctrine shows that the Church has in all ages believed in a sinful nature, as distinguished from conscious transgressions.

These are the proofs of the first position, that sin is a nature.[pg 457]We have stated them concisely, but with sufficient distinctness and completeness. Let us now examine their validity.

The first argument is the text in Ephesians,“We were by nature children of wrath,”ἦμεν τέκνα φύσει ὀργῆς. The word φύσις, the writer contends,“always denotes something original and innate, in contradistinction to something acquired by practice or habit.”This text, we know, is the proof-text of original sin, and is considered by many commentators as teaching that man's nature is wholly corrupt. But plainly this is going too far. Granting the full meaning claimed for the word φύσις, the text only asserts that there is something in man's nature which exposes him to the divine displeasure by being the source of sin. It does not assert the corruption of the whole nature, nor preclude the supposition that we are born with tendencies to good, no less than to evil. That we are so, the writer is bound by his own statement to admit; for if this Greek word“always denotes something original and innate,”it denotes this in Rom. 2:14,88which declares that the Gentiles“do by nature the things contained in the law.”According to this passage in Romans, if there be such a thing as natural depravity, it is not total; and if there be such a thing as total depravity, it is not natural. Those who wish to maintain both doctrines can only do it by admitting two different kinds of sinfulness in man, one of which is natural, but not total; the other total, but not natural—a distinction which we esteem a sound one. According to this passage in Rom 2:14, we must understand φύσις as referring to the good side of man's nature, and the same word in Eph. 2:3 as referring to the corrupt side of man's moral nature. The first refers to the“law of the mind;”the second, to the other“law in the members”(Rom. 7:23). But there is another passage (Gal. 2:15), which asserts that the Jews by nature are not sinners, like the heathen. Now, as we can hardly suppose that the original instincts and innate tendencies of the Jewish child were radically good from birth, and essentially different from those of the heathen, and as such a supposition would contradict the whole argument of Paul in Rom. ch. 2, it is[pg 458]evident that φύσις in Gal. 2:15 does not denote something original and innate. The meaning of this verse probably is, that the Jew from birth up, and by the mere fact of being born a Jew, came under the influences of a religious education, which preserved him from many forms of heathen depravity. The word, therefore, means in that passage, not a Jew by nature, but a Jew by birth; and, if so, we are at liberty, if we choose, to ascribe the same meaning to the word in Ephesians, and to understand the text to teach that we were by birth placed under circumstances which tended necessarily to deprave the character.

This passage, therefore, quoted by the writer, does not teach entire depravity by nature, but a partial depravity, either found in the hereditary tendencies and instincts, or acquired by means of the evil circumstances surrounding the child from his birth.

The second argument of the writer is, that the laws of mind compel us to refer sinful volitions to a sinful nature, as they compel us to refer qualities to a substance.

We admit that, where we see uniform and constant habits of action, we are compelled to refer these to a permanent character or state of being. If a man once in his life becomes intoxicated, we do not infer any habit of intemperance, or any vicious tendency; but if he is habitually intemperate, we are compelled, as the writer justly asserts, to look beneath the separate single actions for one common principle and source. But in assuming that this source is a nature brought with us into the world, the writer seems to us to jump to a conclusion. It may be an acquired character, not an original nature. It may be an induced state of disease either of body or mind, a depravity which has commenced this side of childhood. We know that there are acquired habits both of mind and of body; otherwise, not only would it be impossible for a man to grow worse, but it would also be impossible for him to grow better, and there would be an end to all improvement and progress. Such an acquired character introduces unity into the subject of investigation, as completely as does an original nature, and therefore satisfies all the wants of the mind.

A precisely similar answer may be made to the writer's third argument, drawn from Christian experience. He is perfectly right, we think, in saying that the Christian is troubled, not merely, nor chiefly, by the recollection of single acts and volitions of evil, but in the evidence which they seem to give of a sinful state of mind and heart. He is right in considering any theory of[pg 459]moral evil shallow and inadequate which only takes into account sinful actions and sinful volitions. What earnest man, who has seriously set about correcting a fault, or improving his character, but has been obliged to say,“To will is present with me; but how to perform that which I will, I find not”? Every earnest effort shows us more plainly how deep the roots of evil run below the surface. We find alawin the members warring against the law of the mind, and bringing us into captivity to the law of sin. This is the description which Paul gives of it. It is alaw; that is, something regular, constant, permanent—a steady stress, a bias towards evil. The apostle, however, differs from the writer in placing this law, not in the will, but in the members; and also in stating that there is another law,—that of the mind,—which has a tendency towards good. In the unregenerate we understand him to teach that the law of evil is the stronger, and holds the man, the personal will, captive. In the regenerate, the reverse is the case. Nor does Paul teach that this sinful tendency is guilt. It is not“Oguiltyman that I am!”but“Owretchedman that I am!”

Now, while we agree with the writer in rejecting as superficial and inadequate any theory of evil, whether emanating from our own denomination or from any other, which does not recognize this evil state or tendency lying below the volitions, we differ from him in that we think it not always a nature, but a character. He has not proved, nor begun to prove, that this dark ground of evil in man is always innate or original. It may or may not be; but the argument from Christian experience shows nothing of the sort.

The writer's fourth and remaining argument is, that the Church has, in all ages, believed in a sinful nature, as distinguished from conscious transgressions. If this were so, we admit that it should have weight in the inquiry; but we deny the fact so far, at least, as the sinful nature is concerned.89

The writer proceeds thus:“Assuming, then, that the fact of a sinful nature has been established, we pass to the second statement of St. Paul, that man is by nature a child of wrath. We pass from his statement that sin, in its ultimate form, is a nature, to his statement that this nature is guilt.”If we have done justice to the writer's arguments,—and it has been our object to state them fairly, though briefly,—we submit that the fact of a sinful nature has not been established by them. He has shown that in man there is a tendency to evil running below the conscious, distinct volitions—that there is a permanent character, good or evil, which manifests itself, and becomes first apparent to ourselves, or to others, in these separate, spiritual exercises or actions. But that this stress either to good or evil, this law either of the mind or members, is original and inborn, is yet to be proved. Let us then consider the second point, namely, whether this character or nature, whichever it may be, is also guilt.

As the writer's first argument to prove a sinful nature was drawn from the Greek word φύσις, so his first argument to prove that nature guilt is derived from the Greek word ὀργή in the same passage.“The apostle teaches,”he says,“that sinful man is a child of wrath. Now, none but a guilty being can be the object of the righteous and holy displeasure of God.”But this word, translatedwrath, is confessedly used in other senses besides that of the divine anger or displeasure. It may mean the sufferings or punishments which come as the result of sin, in which sense it is used in Matt. 3:7,“Who hath warned you to flee from the wrath to come?”and other places. This word is used in the passage just quoted for some future evil; in John 3:36, for a present evil—“The wrath of God abides on him;”and in 1 Thess. 2:16, for a past evil—“For the wrath is come [lit.hascome] on them to the uttermost.”It may mean the subjective feeling of guilt; the sense that we deserve the divine displeasure, which is removed by the assurance of forgiveness. It may mean the state of alienation from God, which results by a law of the conscience from this sense of guilt—an alienation removed by the divine act by which God reconciles the sinner to himself. And the radical meaning, from which these secondary meanings flow, may be the essential antagonism existing between the holy nature of God and all evil. But whatever it means, it cannot intend anything like human anger. In the divine wrath there is neither selfishness nor passion; and it must consist with an infinite love towards its object. The word, therefore, as used in Eph. 2:3, does not convey the[pg 461]idea of guilt,a vi terminis. It may mean as well, that this sinful tendency in man, manifesting itself in sinful actions, produces a state of estrangement or alienation between man and God. How far this is a guilty alienation, and how far it is evil and sorrowful, is not to be learned from the term itself.

But the main proof of the writer in support of his second position is found in the assertion, that this sinful tendency in man, out of which evil acts continually flow, is not a tendency of the physical nature, but of the will itself. He distinguishes the will proper from the mere faculty of single choices, and considers it to be a deeper power lying at the very centre of the soul, which determines the whole man with reference to some great and unlimited end of living. It is, in fact, the man himself—the person. For man, he asserts, is not essentially intellect or feeling; but is essentially and at bottom a will, a self-determining creature.“His other faculties of knowing and feeling are grafted into this stock and root; and hence he is responsible from centre to circumference.”He then affirms the will, thus defined, to be the responsible and guilty author of the sinful nature; being nothing more nor less than its constant and total determination to self as the ultimate end of living. This voluntary power, which is the man himself, has turned away from God and directed itself to self as an ultimate end; and this state of the will is the sinful nature of man.

We have no disposition to quarrel with the psychology of this statement. We admit man to be essentially will, in the sense here described. He is essentially activity; an activity limited externally, by special organization and circumstances,—limited internally, by quantity of force, and knowledge.

Nor, again, do we deny that in the unregenerate state the will of man is directed to self rather than to God as its ultimate end; and that this is guilt, and in a certain sense total guilt. No man can serve two masters. If he is obedient to one, he is necessarily disobedient to the other. This disobedience may, or may not, appear in act; but it is there in state. He whose ultimate end is self-gratification is always ready to sacrifice the will of God to his own. He whose ultimate end is God is always ready to sacrifice his own will. In this sense, the unregenerate man may be said to be wholly sinful; and he who is born of God, not to commit sin.

Thus much we grant; and the admission is a large one. But we must now object to the writer, that this is but one side of the question; and that he has omitted to see the other side. The[pg 462]sources of evil are not so simple as he seems to suppose; for man is a very complex being, and the world in which he lives is a very complex world. We therefore would inquire,—

What proof have we that this guilty direction of the will is anature, in the sense claimed, i.e., something innate or original? Why may not the will have been turned gradually in this direction as we grow up, by enticements of pleasure; and why might not the will, in like manner, by means of wise culture, have been gradually directed to God?

Again: what proof have we that we are so whollyunconsciousof this direction of the will, as our author contends? That a great many of the acts of the will are unconscious acts, like the separate movements of the finger in a skilful pianist, or lifting of the feet in walking, we admit; and we are not responsible for these separate acts, but for thepreceding choice, by means of which we determine to play the tune, or walk the mile. In like manner, the direction of the soul to self rather than to God may be moral evil; but is not moral guilt, until we become conscious of it, in a greater or less degree. Then, when partially or wholly awakened to the evil direction of the soul, if we allow ourselves to neglect this discovery, to turn away from the fact and forget it, on that conscious act presses the whole burden of guilt, and not on the unconscious volitions which may result from it. We say, therefore, in opposition to the writer, that though there may be depravity without consciousness of the depraved state, there cannot be guilt without consciousness of the evil choice, or, as the apostle says,“Sin is not imputed where there is no law.”

Again: we totally dissent from the statement that this deep-lying will in man is unable to obey the commands,“Turn ye, turn ye from your evil way, for why will ye die?”—“Repent and be converted, that your sins may be blotted out,”—“Make you a new heart and a new spirit,”—“Choose you this day whom you will serve,”—“Believe in the Lord Jesus Christ and be saved.”The writer says, that“such a power as this, including so much, and running so deep, which is a determination of the whole soul, cannot, from the very nature of the case, be such a facile and easily managed power as that by which we resolve to do some particular thing in every-day life.”True: notsoeasily managed; but can it not be managed at all? It may requiremoreself-examination to understand what the direction of the will is, and more concentration of thought and will, and more leaning on God's help; but[pg 463]withall these are we able or not able to turn to God? He says, the great main tendency of the will to self and sin as an ultimate end, though having a free and criminal origin,“is not to be reversed so easily.”True, again; but why notlesseasily? The writer speaks of the sinful will as a“total determination of itself to self;”and asks“how the power that is to reverse all this process can possibly come out of the will thus shut up, and entirely swallowed in the process. How is the process to destroy itself?”But what! Has man becomea process? He is essentially will, but is this will blind mechanism? Has it not, according to our author's own theory, intelligence, conscience, affection, rooted into it? The moment that the writer begins to speak of the will, as unable to change its direction, he is compelled to conceive of it materially and mechanically, and not as the moral, responsible soul. He says,“The human will becomes a current that becomes unmanageable simply because of its own momentum.”And therefore, again, he is obliged to conceive of the whole voluntary power as lost, and lost before man was born; and he reduces all our real freedom to the original act of the will previous to birth, which took place when we were present in Adam's soul, and committed the first transgression with him.

This is plainly the denial of all human freedom since the fall of Adam. We bring into the world, according to the writer, a will wholly and inevitably bent to evil. We have no consciousness of this tendency, and if we were conscious of it we have no power to change it; but we yet are responsible for it, and guilty because of it, inasmuch as we began this state ourselves when all our souls were mystically present in the soul of Adam. Of this theory, we merely say now, that, if it be true, man is notnowguilty of any sin which he commits in his mortal life; for he is not now a free being. He is only responsible for the sin which he freely committed in Adam. He is no more responsible when we suppose his sin to proceed from his will, than when we suppose it to proceed from a depraved sensuous nature, or from involuntary ignorance, for he is no more free in the one case than in the other. He may be an infinitely depraved and infinitely miserable being, but he can in no true sense be called aguiltybeing. Again we say, if this theory be true, it is an awful theory, and one which we cannot possibly reconcile with the justice or goodness, and still less with the fatherly character, of God. That God should so have constituted human nature that all the millions of the human[pg 464]race should have had this fatal opportunity of destroying themselves utterly, by one simultaneous act, in Adam, is, to say the least, anawfultheory to propound concerning our heavenly Father. We might put Christ's argument to any man not hardened by theological study, as it seems to us, with irresistible force.“What man is there amongyou,being a father,”who could do anything of this sort? But we know too well that all such appeals fall harmless from the sevenfold shield of a systematized theology.

Therefore we will only say further, concerning this theory, that, as beingapparentlyin direct conflict with the divine attributes as taught in the New Testament; as making man a mere process deprived of real freedom; as proving man not guilty for any sin committed in this life; and as thereby deadening the sense of responsibility, and showing that we cannot possibly obey the command,“Repent and turn to God,”—this theory of a sin committed in Adamought to have the amplest proofbefore we believe it. We admit that it may be true, though opposed to all our ideas of God, man, and duty. But being thus opposed, it ought to be sustained by the most unanswerable arguments. If Jesus and his apostles have told us so plainly, we will believe it if we can. How is it, then? Not a word on the subject in the four Gospels. Not a text from the lips of Jesus which can be pretended to lay down any such theory. He does not even mention the name of Adam once in the Gospels, nor allude to him, except when speaking of marriage. This theory rests, not on anything contained in the Gospels, book of Acts, or Epistles of Peter, James, or John, but on two texts in two Epistles of Paul (Rom. 5:14; 1 Cor. 15:22). In the latter passage Paul says not a word of Adam's sin, but only of his death,—the whole chapter treating, not of sin, but of death and the resurrection. This passage, therefore, can hardly be considered a plain statement of the theory. The other, in Romans, is confessedly so far from plain, that it is difficult to make it agree with any theory; but the most evident meaning, to one who has no theory to support, is, that sin began with Adam, and the consequences of sin, which are moral and physical evil, began also with him; and as he thus set in motion a series of evil tendencies which we find in our organization, and which Paul elsewhere calls the law of the members, and a series of evil circumstances which we find around us in the world, both of which are the occasion of sin, we may trace back[pg 465]to him the commencement of human disobedience. If the passage teaches anything more than this, it certainly does not teach it plainly or explicitly.

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