CHAPTER XXIIIA SURPRISE FOR COUNT VON LUXBURG

CHAPTER XXIIIA SURPRISE FOR COUNT VON LUXBURG

"HERR DOCTOR BRECHT," SPEAKER AT HIS BANQUET IN BUENOS AIRES, WAS U. S. NAVAL AGENT—NAVAL INTELLIGENCE FRUSTRATED PLOTS OF GERMANS—FRENCH EXECUTED TWO WOMEN SPIES CAUGHT NEAR ST. NAZAIRE, GIVING GERMANS INFORMATION REGARDING AMERICAN TROOPS.

Everyone recalls the Count von Luxburg, German Minister to Argentina, and his famous "spurlos versenkt" dispatch advising his Government that Argentine steamers, if not spared by the U-boats, be sunk without leaving a trace. But there is one incident in connection with that worthy which may, even yet, be news to the Teutons.

One of the speakers at the last big banquet by the Germans in Buenos Aires, over which Luxburg presided—one of the orators they applauded vociferously and patted on the back as the cries of "Hoch der Kaiser!" rang round the festive board, was an agent of the United States Government. And thereby hangs a tale.

When this country broke relations with Germany, German activities in South America were redoubled. The large German population in Brazil not only planned to keep that country from joining the Allies, but talked boldly of "uprisings," and joining in action with the Germans in neighbor countries. We needed to find out more about Teuton activities in that region. An American of varied accomplishments, who spoke Portuguese and Spanish, as well as German, offered his services to the Navy. He had spent years in Germany, and though of a Colonial American family, was a doctor of philosophy of Leipzig University, and intimately acquainted with German conditions and German character. He had volunteered to act as a secret agent, in which capacity he had served the Navy in Spain itself during the Spanish War.

In February, 1917, he was accepted by Naval Intelligence, and on March 3, a month before we declared war, sailed for Brazil. He was no amateur in securing information, and he welcomed the chance of going to Brazil and Argentina, the danger to him rather adding zest to the task.

When he reached southern Brazil as a German emissary coming from Switzerland, he was taken into their clubs and councils, and told what they planned and plotted. He was with the optimistic Teuton singers as they roared out "Die Wacht am Rhein" and "Deutschland über Alles," and toasted "Der Tag"—the day when Germany would gather in its spoils in South America. He attended the secret meetings of German intriguers and learned their secrets. But, suspected at last, he was attacked by burly Teutons and emerged with a broken head and a badly hurt arm.

Departing for Argentina, he appeared there as "Dr. Ernst Brecht," bearing tidings from the Germans in Brazil, which had just declared war. He was taken into their inner circles, their plots and purposes were poured into his ears. Not once did they have the faintest suspicion that he was an American, much less a Government agent.

Members of the German legation staff conferred with him. Plotting and intriguing there, as they did in the United States, they were pretending the greatest friendship for Argentina, giving officials and people to understand that, while the U-boats might be sinking vessels of other nations without warning, Argentinian shipping was exempt. If any of its ships were sunk, it was only a regrettable mistake. And at the very time Luxburg was talking this dear friendliness, he was sending "spurlos versenkt" messages to the German Government.

"Doctor Brecht" had many adventures, but the most picturesque was the role he played in Buenos Aires. Joining at once the German "Bund," which had branches all over the Argentine, the "Doctor" formed one of the group of well-known Austrians and Germans which gathered at the famous round-table in the Bismarck restaurant.

At the annual banquet of the Deutscher Bund, the German event of the year, Count von Luxburg presided. "Herr Doctor Ernst Brecht" was called upon to speak on behalf of the Germans of Brazil. Giving a touching account of the situation of the Brazilian Teutons and their determination and devotion to the cause of the "Vaterland," he ended by quoting a bellicose poem written by a well-known German poetess who lived at Blumenau, the hotbed of Teutonism in Brazil.

He was cheered and applauded enthusiastically, and Count von Luxburg himself unbent far enough to thank the speaker for his inspiring words and express the hope that his sojourn in the hospitable Argentine would prove pleasant and profitable. It certainly did—but in a way that the Count never suspected.

There was general regret when "Doctor Brecht" announced that he felt compelled within a few weeks to return to Europe. He had found that the German officials were planning to send important dispatches they would not entrust to the mails, and they planned at first to make him their messenger. But before this was arranged, Luxburg's code messages regarding the U-boat warfare were published by the United States. The Count was amazed.

Sent in a complicated code known only to himself and the Berlin Foreign Office, five thousand miles away; cabled by the minister of another country among his own private dispatches, he could not understand how those messages could be captured and deciphered by the Americans. It was evident that they were not so stupid as he and Captain von Papen thought they were.

Luxburg's dispatches, when made public, led to uprisings against the Germans, making it impossible for him to remain in Argentina. The day the Count got his passports, September 12, 1917, "Doctor Brecht" had left the Bismarck restaurant and was on his way home with a German acquaintance when they saw a fire in the distance, and found the German Club was burning. It had been mobbed and set on fire by pro-Ally students and others. Seeing the club half destroyed, the Doctor and his companion returned to the Bismarck to inform their confreres. But they found that the restaurant had been completely gutted by a mob, the tables and dishes smashed, and every portrait of the Kaiser, Hindenburg, and other "heroes" slashed to pieces.

Germany had been astonished a few months before by the publication of Foreign Minister Zimmerman's note to the German Minister in Mexico, proposing an alliance of Germany and Mexico to make war against the United States. There was nothing the Germans guarded more closely than that.

Yet before Bernstorff reached Europe, that secret dispatch was published, and the first thing the German Ambassador to Sweden demanded to know when the Count reached Christiania, was how the Americans ever managed to get hold of it. The Foreign Office was stunned. Not only had its plot been exposed, but the exposure had shown that the Allies could decipher the most secret and puzzling code they could devise.

Captain von Papen, who once called us "those idiotic Yankees," might have told them that we were more alert than he had supposed, for the exposure of his dealings in every detail; of the activities of Wolf von Igel, his aide; of Doctor Albert, of Fritz von Rintelen; of the ship-bomb plots; the plan to blow up the Welland Canal locks, and various other German intrigues, must have by that time convinced him that the Americans had some secret service of their own. When, on December 4, 1915, our Government demanded the recall of Papen, who was military attaché of the German embassy, and Captain Boy-Ed, the naval attaché, it was merely stated that the cause was "improper activity in military matters." Both protested, declaring that they had done nothing illegal. But later we published a full account of Papen's activities, with photographs of his checks, the exact amounts paid to his tools who did the dirty work, to whom they were paid and for what purpose. It was shown that Boy-Ed had transactions amounting to millions with German steamship lines whose officials were, through false manifests, sending out ships laden with coal and other supplies for German raiders.

Boy-Ed, at that, did not seem to be so deeply involved as Papen was. He protested that he had no part in conspiring with Huerta, and had never seen the Mexican "ex-President." But it was known that Rintelen had had dealings with Huerta, and that Rintelen had received from Boy-Ed at least half a million dollars. The dealings of Captain von Papen with Huerta were too thoroughly disclosed to admit of denial.

Germany, beginning years before, had built up in this country an extensive spy system, which kept it informed not only ofmilitary developments, but of what was done in every branch of industry. When the European war began they used every possible means of preventing the manufacture of munitions or supplies for the Allies. Nearly every large factory or plant had in its employ workmen who were paid agents of the German Government. That they could secure information of what was going on was not so menacing as what they might do, for one or two men could damage machinery so as to retard work for months. There were explosions in munition plants, machinery was at times mysteriously wrecked, shells were damaged; and while the cause seldom could be definitely determined, it was the general belief that many of these "accidents" were the work of German agents.

The Office of Naval Intelligence, whose function in peace times is to gather naval information from all parts of the world, had a more difficult task to perform when war came. An Investigation Section was formed to seek out and take into custody persons who were, by sabotage, explosion, fomenting strikes or other means, seeking to prevent or retard the manufacture of munitions; to discover and thwart any attempt to damage vessels, shipyards, bases or factories; to counteract German propaganda and, in general, restrain the activities of Germans and German sympathizers.

In each naval district there was an Aide for Information, reporting to Rear Admiral Roger Welles, Director of Naval Intelligence, at Washington. Each district was further sub-divided into sections with representatives working under the district aid. The activity of these aides was tremendous, especially in our large ports of entry, New York, Boston, Philadelphia, Baltimore, and Norfolk. Arrests of suspects sent fear into the hearts of any who might be plotting sabotage. In one day I ordered the arrest of more than a score in one plant.

Ships from countries near Germany were examined from truck to keel for contraband, or papers or literature that might convey secret messages. Passengers and crews were carefully scrutinized. Close inspection and censorship of mails and cables prevented Germany from communicating with its agents in this country, and also prevented them from sending out military information.

Outgoing ships were carefully inspected to prevent them from taking supplies or materials to Germany. Some neutral vessels had been carrying from America quantities of spare machinery and electrical parts, especially those composed of copper, brass and zinc. There was reason to believe much of this was smuggled to Germany and used in the manufacture of parts for U-boats. Radio apparatus was purchased in quantities. Ships leaving for Holland or Sweden sometimes sailed with enough lubricating oil to take them around the world. Much of it must have "leaked" into Germany. This traffic was greatly reduced, and that in contraband practically ended.

Military guards were placed around piers, no enemy or suspected aliens were allowed to work around shipping, and all dock workers were required to carry identification cards. Vessels were under government supervision during their entire stay in port.

Not only navy yards and shipyards were kept under surveillance, but all plants engaged on naval work were constantly inspected. Thus all sources of production were protected from enemy activity. For this purpose a Plant Division was created, which also reported any undesirable working conditions or lack of fire protection. This led later to the creation of the Fire Prevention Section of the War Industries Board.

Admiral Welles kept in close touch with the Director of Military Intelligence, the State and Labor Departments, and the Department of Justice. Naval attachés abroad obtained a large amount of information regarding "trading with the enemy" as well as military activities, and this was transmitted to the War Industries Board, the State and War Departments. The Bureau of War Trade Intelligence coöperated with the Navy in holding up undesirable imports and exports.

Information regarding foreign navies and ships and war developments was compiled and disseminated, in confidential publications, to all our forces afloat. Fleet, Force and Division commanders were kept informed of the activities of all fleets, Allied and enemy, of ships sunk, and tonnage destruction; of the number and tracks of submarines in the Atlantic and Mediterranean; and of all efforts made by the Allied and associated powers.

The British had a remarkably complete system which constantly improved, so that, in the latter part of the war, it was said that they were informed of the sailing of every submarine sent out from Germany, and its probable destination. We had the advantage of this, as well as the information obtained by France and Italy. We had our own agents in most foreign countries, and maintained quite a force in France.

The most important of these activities was along the coast around Brest and St. Nazaire, the centers of troop and supply traffic. German agents, it was reported, were using Belle Ile as a signal station to advise their submarines.

Convoys reported suspicious lights, and it was believed that these were informers on shore signaling to U-boats. The submarines used various disguises. One, submerged with its periscope showing, lay hidden for hours in the midst of a fishing fleet. Yet the fishermen paid so little attention to it that the French semaphore station, only a few kilometers away, was not notified. A Greek merchantman hove in sight, the U-boat fired a torpedo and the steamship was sunk.

The French authorities welcomed our intelligence officers, and together they set about developing an efficient service all along the coast. A U. S. Naval Reserve officer who spoke French fluently was attached to the staff of the French commander-in-chief in Brittany. That coast is rugged and bold, with groups of small islands. The most important is Belle-Ile-en-Mer, twelve kilometers from shore, the first land sighted by convoys going to St. Nazaire, and the last seen on their way home. At the northern end is the famous "Passage de la Tenouse," leading to the bay of Quiberon. Once through this passage and in the bay, ships were considered safe from submarines. One group of our first troop convoys was attacked three miles west of the Point des Poulin, the entrance to this passage, and several shells fired by the transports ricocheted and exploded on the rocky bluffs of the island. West-bound convoys were assembled in Quiberon Bay. Every effort was made to conceal their departure, but the information that enemy submarines seemed to obtain at times was startling. When the merchant convoy system was inaugurated, ships were instructed to anchor off Le Palais, in the lee of Belle Ile. Two days latera submarine laid mines in the roadstead. The next night ships were anchored two miles to the north, but within twelve hours mines were laid there.

Lights and signals were not the only means of enemy communication. Some fisherman, seeing the transports in the bay, might go out at night and inform a submarine, which could radio the news to all the U-boats in the vicinity.

These were the conditions that had to be met. Every report of suspicious happenings had to be investigated, and the French were quite willing that the American Navy assume this task, as it was responsible for most of the convoy work through these waters.

With the greatest care and secrecy, forty-five of the most intelligent fishermen who had boats of their own were selected, and formed into a patrol service. Proceeding with their fishing, they were instructed to watch for any sign of submarines or mines and report it immediately. Furthermore, they were to report any mysterious behavior of fishermen or strangers in boats, and any lights or suspicious happenings along the coast. Experienced detectives were employed, with headquarters at Nantes, to investigate all reports. A flood of them came in from the population who, like the French officers, seemed anxious to aid the Americans.

Hundreds of investigations were made, fishermen and residents ashore were aroused to the necessity of reporting everything that seemed likely to aid the enemy, and an intelligence system was built up that was no small factor in making safe the coast of France.

Women spies were found, now and then; quite as dangerous as the men in enemy pay. The most remarkable and pathetic instance, perhaps, was the "Alvarez Case," handled by the French from its beginning to its tragic end.

In the spring of 1917, French agents in Barcelona, Spain, reported that two women known as the Alvarez sisters, were associating with a man strongly suspected of being in the German secret service. Soon afterward they disappeared, and for two months their whereabouts was unknown. The Paris authorities directed that all regions in France, particularly the American zone, be searched for them. They were at last discoveredin the seacoast town of Sables d'Olonne, thirty miles south of St. Nazaire, where our troop convoys landed. They were closely watched and when they boarded a train for Bordeaux, evidently attempting to get back to Spain, they were arrested. Upon trial it proved that they had come under the influence of German agents in Spain and had been induced by an offer of 50,000 francs to obtain information, among other things, concerning the American troops disembarking in Brittany.

By this trial the mystery of the blowing up of the French destroyerEnseigne Rouxwas cleared up. It turned out that the condemned sisters had been closely associated with a French sailor named Gaitton, and evidence pointed to him as having mixed dynamite with the bunker coal on the destroyer. This was not conclusively proved, but Gaitton had enough counts against him to be sentenced to twenty years in a naval prison.

The Alvarez sisters were convicted, and were sentenced to be shot. The execution took place at daybreak in the courtyard of the ancient Chateau of Anne de Bretagne, at Nantes. In the courtyard were assembled the officers in charge of the execution, government officials and witnesses.

The women were led to two posts near the wall of the chateau, and the last words were spoken to them by the priest. At their trial they had confessed all, so there was little left to say. One was in a fainting condition, but the elder of the two proved unusually courageous. She refused to be blindfolded, and stood her ground.

An army officer read the sentence. There was a volley of musketry, and the blindfolded woman dropped to the ground. But the sister who had shown such courage, though mortally wounded, remained erect, and had to be despatched by a shot from a revolver.

The Naval Intelligence officer who gave Admiral Welles the account of this pathetic case, from which are taken the particulars recited above, wrote:

"For years to come, when the American tourists visit the now historic ports of the American Expeditionary Forces, they will see, if they look carefully, a few scars on the thick wall of the Chateau courtyard at Nantes. These are the marks of bullets which ended the careers of two poor deluded women who attempted to betray the Allies. ***"


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