Wherein Captain Galligasken views the illustrious Soldier in the Battle of Shiloh, and corrects some popular Errors in regard to that savage Fight.
Wherein Captain Galligasken views the illustrious Soldier in the Battle of Shiloh, and corrects some popular Errors in regard to that savage Fight.
In approaching the battle of Shiloh, or Pittsburg Landing, I find myself coming to a point which envy, jealousy, and misrepresentation have battered against with the utmost fury. No action of the war has been so little understood, none so grossly misstated, none so thoroughly and maliciously criticised. It was one of the severest, if not the severest conflict of the whole war; but more doubt and uncertainty seem to hang over it than over any other event connected with the history of the national arms during the rebellion. There is no good reason that its facts should be so grossly perverted, nor that any of its details should be concealed, or apologized for.
Viewing General Grant as the central figure in this tremendous conflict, every word he spoke was the right word, every movement he made was the right one. I find nothing in his conduct that needs to be excused, nothing to be explained, and nothing to be undone. As in every other battle of the war in which he was engaged, he was heroic, self-possessed, skilful, and, by his personal influence and exertions, saved thehard-fought field on the first day. I do not mean to say that no mistakes were made; only that Grant did not make them. It is one of his crowning triumphs that he counteracted the errors of others, that he saved the army from the full consequences of the blunders, disobedience, and tardiness of subordinates, and of the partial demoralization among the raw troops. I am only surprised that we were not overwhelmed and driven into the Tennessee, instead of holding the ground at the end of that awful fight, which began at daylight and continued until night.
The national troops were posted on a line three miles in length, extending from a creek on the right to another on the left, each of which had overflowed its banks and effectually protected the flanks of the army. The Union troops numbered at the beginning of the battle thirty-three thousand men. At Crump's Landing, four miles distant, was General Lew Wallace's division of five thousand more.
The rebel troops were reported by Beauregard to be over forty thousand; but there were some discrepancies in his statements which render it probable that he magnified the results of the first day by understating his force. The forward movement of the Union army into the first heart of the Confederacy had startled the rebel leaders, and they had decided to make a gigantic effort to overwhelm the daring invaders. For this purpose General A.S. Johnston, the most accomplished soldier in the enemy's ranks, was sent to the scene of operations, with the most reliable troops in their army. Beauregard, who, in spite of his sensational style, was a very able soldier, whose name carried a prestige noother rebel chief had won, was the leading spirit of the battle, while Hardee, Bragg, and Polk, all educated military men, were in command of divisions. On the other side, only Grant and Sherman were trained soldiers.
The Confederacy was smarting under its overwhelming defeat at Donelson. The boasted superiority of Southern soldiers had been disproved, and, in addition to the necessity of saving the rebel cause from the disaster of having its railway communications severed, lost honor and lost prestige were to be recovered. Never was an army more thoroughly stimulated to valor and desperation than that which was hurled upon the national lines at Pittsburg Landing. A stirring appeal had been issued by General Johnston, in which he inflamed the zeal of the soldiers to the highest pitch, pointing out to them the bitter results of defeat, all of which were fully realized in the ultimate issue. Everything which could rouse the men to desperation in the approaching fight was done with unsparing energy. Thus goaded to madness by the hopes and fears of the future, the confident army of the Mississippi marched out of Corinth, under Johnston, three days before the great battle.
The Union generals were on the alert, and during the three days that the armies confronted each other there was much heavy skirmishing. On the morning of Sunday, the first day of the battle, Prentiss, in the centre of the line, sent out a regiment at three o'clock to reconnoitre the position of the enemy. He had doubled his pickets on Saturday, thus carefully guarding himself against the possibility of a surprise. OnFriday, the day on which he was injured by the fall of his horse, Grant was at the front with Sherman, to make sure that every preparation had been made to receive a sudden attack, though none was yet expected.
At five o'clock in the morning the regiment Prentiss had sent out engaged the advance pickets of the rebels, which Beauregard declares was the commencement of the fight, when Johnston gave orders to begin the movement. My excellent friend Mr. Pollard, in "The Lost Cause," says, "The magnificent army was moving forward to the deadly conflict; but the enemy"—the national troops—"scarcely gave time to discuss the question of attack, for soon after dawn he commenced a rapid fire on the Confederate pickets."
Some envious, hypercritical Union men made the astonishing discovery that Sherman, the old soldier, who had been skirmishing for three days with the enemy, was surprised; but happily the rebels themselves have not found it out to this day. If ever an army was wide awake at an early hour in the morning, that army was Grant's at Shiloh. When the enemy came, they found the nationals in force at the camps, and in their advanced positions, and "in strong force along almost the entire line," according to their own acknowledgment.
The onslaught was as fierce and terrible as the zeal of Johnston's inflammatory appeal. The troops of Prentiss were raw and inexperienced; they gave way, but formed again within their camp. Sherman's troops were also new, and failed him in the critical moment, though it was hardly to be wondered at thatany troops should yield before that impetuous assault of superior numbers. But the weak places in the line were strengthened, and the ground was doggedly disputed, after the recoil of the first tremendous shock. The battle raged with horrid fury along the entire line.
Grant himself was at Savannah, in accordance with his engagement. He was taking an early breakfast with his staff in order to be in readiness to ride out and meet the commander of the army of the Ohio. The scene of hostilities was nine miles distant, and the sound of the booming guns reached his anxious ears. He wrote a hasty note to Buell, informing him that the battle had begun, and that, instead of meeting him, he must hasten up the river to join his forces.
Taking a steamer at the shore, he sped on his way to the scene of the strife, only stopping a moment at Crump's Landing, to leave his orders with General Lew Wallace, in anticipation of an emergency. Hurrying on, he arrived at Pittsburg Landing at eight o'clock, and instantly dashed to the front, as fast as horse could carry him. The condition of the battle was not hopeful, but Grant went to work with his accustomed zeal and energy. Messages were sent to Wallace and Nelson to hasten forward their troops; wagon loads of ammunition were ordered up to the front, stragglers and panic-stricken files of men were reorganized, and every effort made to save the day.
Some six or eight thousand men were demoralized by the savageness of the conflict; but in spite of this mortifying fact, the line remained unbroken: indeed, only once during the day was it penetrated. Thinnedas it was by the misconduct of a fourth part of the troops, it still permitted no opening for the enemy. The contest had become a hand-to-hand fight, in which personal prowess and valor were to win the day. It was only a question of pluck and endurance. Grant was everywhere, encouraging the faithful, and stimulating the recreant.
Anxiously did the hard-pressed line wait the coming of the expected reenforcements; but neither Nelson nor Wallace appeared in season to render any efficient service. Step by step, inch by inch, the national line was forced back, until darkness suspended the conflict. Johnston had fallen; Beauregard was in command; and again and again did he hurl his forces against the Union line: still it remained firm to the last, and still it held the battle-field in spite of the ground it had lost.
My friend Pollard almost curses Beauregard for not striking the final blow in this sharp battle; but doubtless that distinguished rebel knew what he was about better than any civilian could teach him. He was fond enough of display and sensation to finish up the battle if it had been possible. He had found, after fighting the national forces from early dawn, what it was made of, and, with the remotest hope of driving the army of Grant into the river, he would not have given the order to withdraw beyond the enemy's fire.
Though a portion of the army of the Tennessee misbehaved before the enemy, it was not routed, nor, as an army, demoralized. Technically, according to Sherman, it had gained the victory: it had certainly repulsed the attack. It had not been driven into theriver, and there was no thought of surrender. No transports were sent for; no attempt to bridge the river was made, in order to retreat and escape. The fiery zeal, the mad enthusiasm, of the Confederates had carried them through one of the severest fights of the war. The advantage, but not the victory, was with them. It was a drawn battle.
As the conflict was suspended, Grant gave orders for his army to attack on the following morning. Before Buell's main army was heard from, even before Nelson's division had crossed the river, he had decided to renew the fight at an early hour the next day, making the attack himself! It was wicked for my friend Pollard to reproach his friend Beauregard for not annihilating such a man; for not giving the finishing blow to an army which was at that moment making its calculations to attack with the next daylight.
After dark, in the midst of a pelting storm, almost worn out by the heavy burdens of that day, and still suffering from the injuries he had received by the fall of his horse, Grant went to the headquarters of each general of division, assigned to him his position, and gave him particular orders for the resumption of the battle at daylight. At midnight he had completed his rounds, and returned to the Landing, where he lay down upon the soaked ground, with his head on a stump for a pillow, and slept soundly till morning. He was completely drenched with the rain, but he was confident of the victory on the morrow, and no discomfort was too great for him to endure in the holy cause in which he had embarked.
While he slept, the two gunboats in the river keptup their fire over his head, throwing shells into the rebel lines. It is a popular idea that these gunboats saved the Union army from total destruction; that without them the heroes of that hard-fought battle would have been obliged to surrender, or be driven into the river. The men saved and protected themselves by their strong right hands, though doubtless the gunboats rendered considerable assistance. Even Pollard, who generally has a proper respect for these terrible engines of war, says their fire was terrific in sound, but did no damage.
A mile from the camp the wounded of the army lay in the agony of their suffering. Nothing could be done for them, for they were within the enemy's line. The exhausted troops slept on their arms, pelted by the fierce tempest of the elements at night, as they had been by the bullets of a savage foe through all the long day. They were safe, or they could not have slept. Most of them had performed miracles of valor, in strong contrast with the cowards who had fled.
Sherman had been wounded several times, and had three horses shot under him. He had fought his own division and that of an inexperienced general near him. His personal influence, backed up by his personal heroism, had kept the line firm and united under the fierce onslaughts of the enemy. Grant commended him on the battle-field for his noble exertions, and there can be no doubt that, in the morning, Sherman had saved the day.
At half past four in the afternoon, after the conflict had been raging almost incessantly for twelve hours,it reached the culminating point of its fierceness. Grant sat on his horse, calm, unmoved, and grand in his thoughtful silence. The cannon roared fearfully on the left, and seemed to be approaching nearer, as though the rebels were successful in their attempt to flank the entire position, so as to cut off the retreat of the nationals.
"Doesn't the prospect begin to look gloomy?" said an officer at his side, just as another was killed within a few feet of him.
"Not at all," replied Grant, quietly. "They can't force our lines around these batteries to-night—it is too late. Delay counts everything with us. Tomorrow we shall attack them with fresh troops, and drive them, of course."
During the night, Buell's divisions arrived, were ferried over the river, and placed in line for the battle of the next day. It is almost a pity that it can never be known what Grant would have done without these reënforcements, though, for my own part, I am entirely satisfied that the result would have been the same. I am quite sure that he had impressed himself upon his officers and men in such a manner as to win the victory by the plan he had laid down. His genius would have found a way to overcome all obstacles, for his will was as resolute at night as in the morning.
After the battle, General Buell, in a kindly way, indulged in some criticisms on Grant's policy of fighting with the Tennessee in his rear.
"Where could you have retreated if you had been beaten, general?" asked Buell.
"I didn't mean to be beaten," replied Grant.
"But suppose you had been beaten in spite of all your exertions."
"Well, there were all the transports to convey the remains of the command across the river."
"But, general, your whole number of transports would not accommodate more than ten thousand men, and you had thirty thousand engaged," persisted Buell.
"Well, if I had been beaten, transportation for ten thousand would have been abundant for all there would have been left of us."
Such was the spirit of the man in the midst of the gigantic difficulties which surrounded him. Demoralized troops, the tardiness of his reënforcements, and the incapacity of some of his officers, failed to overwhelm him. He rose above all obstacles, and looked confidently to victory, even in the darkest hour of that desperate fight.
It ought to be added, in justice to our army, that "straggling" was not confined to their ranks. The enemy suffered quite as much from this evil, in spite of Johnston's stirring appeal. Bragg, in his report, mentions the fact that the rebel ranks "were thinned by killed, wounded, and stragglers, amounting in the whole to nearly one half our force." The unparalleled length and severity of the contest may, to some extent, explain this defection on both sides. But the result of the day proved that, in pluck and endurance, the Northern army was the equal, if not the superior, of its rival.
Wherein Captain Galligasken finishes the Battle of Shiloh, and sympathizes with the illustrious Soldier in his unmerited Disgrace while he is waiting, waiting, before Corinth.
Wherein Captain Galligasken finishes the Battle of Shiloh, and sympathizes with the illustrious Soldier in his unmerited Disgrace while he is waiting, waiting, before Corinth.
The rebels had no intimation of the arrival of Buell's army, and though they had lost one half of their force in the battle of the first day, they stood their ground. If my innocent friend Mr. Pollard really believed that it only required a smart dash to finish the army of the Union, he must severely censure Beauregard for not following up his advantage, not knowing that Buell had effected a junction with the army of the Tennessee. If Beauregard himself believed the sensational report he wrote of the battle, he would have made haste to drive his beaten foe into the river. He was an early riser on emergencies like this, but he does not seem to have had any fears that Grant would attempt to escape in his alleged broken and helpless condition!
The rebel general knew better than he wrote, and his actions speak louder than his words. He had lost half his army, according to his own confession, which was a much greater loss in proportion to the force engaged than the national army sustained. He hadbeen repeatedly repulsed during the preceding day, and he was in no hurry to resume the conflict.
The battle of Monday commenced on the left and centre by the advance of Nelson's fresh troops. The rebels fought well, notwithstanding the fatigues of the previous day, and gallantly disputed every inch of ground. The scene of Sunday was repeated, with the results reversed. Slowly and steadily the Confederates were forced back, until all the lost ground had been recovered. General Buell was in the field, and exhibited the most conspicuous gallantry and skill.
At two o'clock in the afternoon the repulse of the rebels was complete, and they had been driven from the battle-field. Before dark they were five miles from Grant's front line on Sunday morning. Towards night a regiment of Union troops was hard pressed by the enemy, in their efforts to capture a certain position which it was desirable to possess. The rebels, intent upon holding the point, had brought a heavy force to bear upon their assailants, and the regiment had begun to give way. Grant saw the struggles of the overmatched Union men, and deemed it of the highest importance to capture the position.
An Ohio regiment, marching across the field, attracted his attention. He immediately halted it, and, leading the way himself, ordered the men to charge in support of the overpowered force. They recognized Grant, and shouting with enthusiasm, promptly obeyed the command. He led them into the battle himself, more exposed in person than any private in the ranks. The breaking line, seeing their general bringing assistance to them in this impressive manner,close up their files, and with thundering cheers the two regiments went into the fight, driving the enemy before them, and securing the last position on the field.
The battle was ended, and the day was won. Grant, desirous of fighting the battle "through," expressed his wishes to two of Buell's division commanders; but they protested that their men were exhausted by their long march, and were in no condition to pursue the fleeing host, and Grant was reluctantly compelled to content himself with the finale he had already achieved; though a portion of Sherman's command followed the rebels a short distance on the road to Corinth.
The entire loss of the national army in this bloody fight, in killed, wounded, and missing, was twelve thousand two hundred and seventeen. This number included the loss in the army of the Ohio. Beauregard reported his total loss at ten thousand seven hundred; but he made a mistake in his footings somewhere. Both he and Bragg declare that the rebels could put only twenty thousand of the force they reported on Sunday into the field for the second day's battle, which leaves a like number to be accounted for on the first day's engagement. His loss was heavy on the second day. He must have had at least fifteen thousand stragglers and deserters, according to his own statements, or his loss was much greater than he reported.
According to General Sherman, who ought to be regarded as the highest authority, the battle of Shiloh was fought forprestige. The rebels had marched out of Corinth, three days before, with the finest armythey could gather, with the ablest and most experienced officers in their service in command, to overwhelm the "Northern hordes." They had fought with a pluck and persistency, nay, with a savage ferocity, which certainly had not been equalled at that time, and has not since been surpassed. They were met with a correspondent obstinacy on the part of the national forces.
"It was a contest for manhood," says Sherman—"man to man, soldier to soldier. We fought and held our ground, and therefore counted ourselves victorious. From that time forward we had with us the prestige. The battle was worth millions and millions to us by reason of the fact of the courage displayed by the brave soldiers on that occasion; and from that time to this, I have not heard of the first want of courage on the part of our Northern soldiers."
Thus said Sherman; and what he said Grant felt, as he showed in every movement he made. To have lost that battle would have been to lose vastly more than the field on which it was fought, and the attendant military advantages which it secured. The grand lesson which all our commanders had to learn was taught in this tremendous battle—that, where the two armies were so equally matched in the material of which their soldiers were composed, and in the military skill which their officers brought into the field, great victories were to be achieved only by hard fighting.
I have often heard Grant called a "butcher." I have often heard it revilingly said of him that he won his battles by mere brute force. On my honor andconscience as a soldier and a student of the solemn lessons of history, I believe that Grant, in the matter of the expenditure of human life, was the most economical commander which the War of the Rebellion produced. When he fought a battle, he won a victory from the very first to the very last. He did not waste a single precious life in all his campaigns. The manes of no slaughtered hero can rise up against him, saying, "You sacrificed me in a vain and foolish battle, wherein nothing was gained, but much was lost. By your timidity and weakness, by your vacillation and penny-wise wisdom, you gave that to the enemy for which I fought and died." Not thus can the ghost of the murdered patriots reproach Grant.
If five thousand noble and brave men died to win Shiloh and the prestige which lighted up our banners from that glorious day, they also died to save twenty thousand who would have been sacrificed in a more protracted struggle, without that inspiration of victory which blazed along the path of the army to Vicksburg, to Atlanta and Chattanooga, and which was borne from the West to the East with the glorious hero who had kindled it in the souls of the soldiers.
In giving up the lives of thousands of willing heroes he saved the lives of tens of thousands. This was true economy, and this was Grant's policy, solemnly chosen, after a broad view of the situation and the fullest consideration of the awful responsibility which rests upon the commander of an army. I believe he covenanted with the nation, before God, wisely and prudently to expend the blessed lives placed in his keeping. He is a gentle and humane man, incapable ofrevelling in the flow of blood. I repeat emphatically that every life lost beneath his victorious banner was a life which purchased its share in the nation's redemption and peace.
As I have said before, no battle has been more thoroughly misrepresented than that of Shiloh. In spite of the heroic and masterly operations of Grant, in spite of the success which crowned his arms, he was systematically vilified and abused. My blood boils with indignation as I think of it, that he, the brilliant soldier, the most successful commander even then upon the arena of battle, should be foully and basely maligned by his inferiors and his superiors. It is mortifying to think that his stanch friend, but former political opponent, Mr. Washburne, found it necessary to defend the hero of Fort Donelson and Shiloh on the floor of Congress, though it is pleasant to know that he did it effectually and enthusiastically—in just such a spirit as I would have done it had I been there.
Grant was accused of bad generalship, of incompetency, of being a butcher, a drunkard, and a sheep-stealer, for aught I know. His generalship was certainly of a different order from that which had been exhibited to the waiting nation by the commanders of the Union, who marched, countermarched, felt of the enemy, and then retired to recruit for three or six months, rarely fighting a battle, unless compelled to do so by the pertinacity of the enemy. It was Grant's policy to attack, and not wait to be attacked—his policy from the beginning to the end; and with what success it was attended is known now if it was not then.
Cowards and poltroons who had deserted the ranks at Shiloh told exaggerated tales of the misfortunes of the battle. They were frightened and demoralized—Grant was not. Those who believed in carrying on war as a game of chess is played stood aghast at the real battle which the hero fought. But his mode of operations will appear so decidedly advantageous in contrast with that which immediately followed under the leadership of one who believed only in "brilliant strategy," in chess-board movements, that it is not necessary to dwell upon his defence.
Kid-glove critics, civilian correspondents of newspapers, and the advocates of the checker-board theory, howled because Grant established his camp on the left, instead of the right, bank of the Tennessee—on the same side as the enemy, instead of on the opposite side. Certainly the eastern shore was the safe side; but the invincible conqueror went down in Tennessee for the purpose of capturing Corinth, and breaking the line of the rebel railroad communication, and he had no idea of posting himself where he could not get at the enemy. He knew very well that he was able to defend himself; and when he fought the great battle, though the enemy brought it on, he fought it for the possession of Corinth; and if he had had his own way, he would have taken Corinth within a fortnight after Shiloh. The position was selected by General C.F. Smith, the veteran soldier; it was indorsed and retained by Grant; and the result fully justifies his course.
The personal habits of the hero were maliciously stated to be bad. It was affirmed that he was adrunkard—that he was intoxicated in the field. Mr. Washburne was able to say at that time, "There is no more temperate man in the army than General Grant. He never indulges in the use of intoxicating liquors at all. He is an example of courage, honor, fortitude, activity, temperance, and modesty; for he is as modest as he is brave and incorruptible."
I have before shown that Grant was not surprised—for if his army had been surprised, the fault would have been as justly chargeable to him as though he had been personally present on the ground. He had been to the front himself the night before and examined the situation; he had placed Sherman—the tried and the true as he knew him then—in the most advanced position. Grant himself says, "As to the talk of our being surprised, nothing could be more false. If the enemy had sent us word where and when they would attack, we could not have been better prepared."
It was undeniable that the brave general, the successful commander, was again under a cloud. All the false rumors were in time disproved; but if there had been no malignant, jealous enemies, dreading a total eclipse of their own farthing candles in his department, the country would have believed in Grant after Shiloh, as they did after Donelson. An effort was made to relieve him entirely from command, and to extinguish the star which was steadily rising.
General Halleck painfully went through the necessary form of thanking Generals Grant and Buell for their conduct at Shiloh, and immediately repaired to the scene of operations to take command of the unitedarmies of Grant and Buell in person, now called "The Grand Army of the Tennessee." It was largely reënforced, and numbered one hundred and twenty thousand men. It was divided into three corps, under Thomas, Pope, and Buell, with McClernand in the reserve. Grant was nominally in command of the Tennessee district; but his army was placed beyond his control, and orders were transmitted to his subordinates without any knowledge on his part of their purport.
Grant was second in command, without power or influence in the camp. Halleck consoled him with a sarcastic bit of philosophy, declaring that the second in command, in case the chief was killed, ought not to be embarrassed with the immediate control of a body of troops. Grant did not appreciate the situation, and evidently believed that there was no danger of his superior's falling in battle. The man who had won Donelson and Shiloh so heroically could not be winked entirely out of sight, or doubtless he would not have been permitted to retain even a complimentary position. Grant was practically in disgrace, and was so regarded in the army. His situation was intensely disagreeable, and nothing but his unselfish devotion to the cause prevented him from retiring in disgust from the field where he was insultingly ignored.
The grand army of the Tennessee, under Halleck, felt its way, behind a series of intrenchments, to a position in front of Corinth, using up six weeks in a progress of fifteen miles. Probably Beauregard at Corinth had seventy thousand men, though he stated his force as below fifty. The grand army was evidently superior in numbers, and both officers and men were anxious to strike a blow, confident of their ability to annihilate the rebel army. It made our blood boil to see these glorious opportunities slipping away from us. Halleck only waited and waited for the rebels to come out and attack him; but Beauregard had been educated up to the point of prudence by Grant, and he stuck to his works as closely as Halleck did. In a word, while Grant was shelved as a second in command, the farce of Manassas was repeated to the satisfaction of the admiring rebels, and to the disgust and mortification of the loyal people.
But Grant was not idle, cipher as he was in the army. He watched the enemy, and found, with unerring skill, the weak point in their line of intrenchments. He shared the general feeling of impatience which pervaded the army, and ventured to suggest to General Halleck that an assault at the point indicated, followed up by a general movement, would be successful. Halleck scouted the idea, and crustily told Grant that when his suggestions were wanted, they would be called for.
All this time Beauregard was studying up a plan to escape without the knowledge of the besiegers. On the 30th of May, after the grand army had been nearly two months rusting in inactivity, the cunning rebel made a deceptive movement, and the mighty general, hoodwinked and deceived, deeming an attack imminent, drew up in line of battle his vast army, the largest ever gathered in the West, and made elaborate preparations to defend himself. But not a gun opened upon him, not a rebel was to be seen.
Beauregard, with wonderful skill and prudence, had fled from the toils of the overwhelming force on his front, leaving his wooden guns on the ramparts where they had confounded General Halleck. Corinth was evacuated, and the wily rebel had saved his army! General Halleck marched in triumph into Corinth!
Wherein Captain Galligasken treats of the Corinth Campaign, and admiringly calls Attention to the splendid Abilities of the illustrious Soldier as a District Commander.
Wherein Captain Galligasken treats of the Corinth Campaign, and admiringly calls Attention to the splendid Abilities of the illustrious Soldier as a District Commander.
During the quiet repose of the grand army of the Tennessee before Corinth, events of vast importance had transpired in the West and South. Island No. 10 had been captured by the indomitable flag-officer Foote; New Orleans had been taken by the tremendous operations of Farragut. In the East, Fort Pulaski had been battered down, Fredericksburg captured; Fort Macon had fallen, following Burnside's success in North Carolina; and Huntsville, Alabama, was occupied by General Mitchell. McClellan had at last commenced a hopeful forward movement with the army of the Potomac. With vast armies in the East and in the West, with strong naval forces ascending and descending the Mississippi towards its obstructed points, the national cause looked exceedingly promising as the summer of 1862 opened. But the promise was not realized. The summer sun glared on many a lost battle in the East, though the conquest was uninterrupted in the West.
Halleck made no efficient pursuit of the enemy afterthey had abandoned Corinth. Beauregard had been successfully hiding his weakness from his prudent checker-board adversary, and, understanding his man, outwitted him completely and handsomely. Grant had fought and won Corinth, whether it was occupied in a week or in two months. He had taught the vaunting rebels a lesson by which Halleck was too willing to profit, as he peacefully pursued his siege operations till the 1st of June. Buell was a prudent man, and he was sent out to catch the retreating and demoralized foe. Pope had been despatched on the same errand; but their united forces accomplished nothing. During this time, Grant remained at Corinth. The grand army was then broken up, and Buell sent in the direction of Chattanooga. From Shiloh the vast army marched up the hill and then marched down again, in humble imitation of the King of France in the nursery rhyme. Nothing was done except what Grant had accomplished.
By the continued successes of the flotilla on the Mississippi, Memphis, after a brilliant naval engagement, fell into the hands of the Union force. Grant, as the commander of the Tennessee district, established his headquarters at this city. Pope was ordered to Virginia, to supersede Fremont, where he established his celebrated "headquarters in the saddle."
McClellan had gradually felt his way down to the vicinity of Richmond, when the rebels, out of patience with him, fell upon his forces, and drove him to the shelter of the gunboats on the James, after his glorious army had fought some of the most brilliant defensive battles of the war. The country cried out againsthim for this delay, derided his use of the pick and shovel, and unhorsed him because he neglected his opportunities. While he was still resting from his hard-fought but useless battles, the government removed him from his position of general-in-chief, and assigned General Halleck to his place, probably on account of his brilliant operations before Corinth, where he had played through the farce of "regular approaches," though with none of the tragic features which attended it before Richmond.
Halleck was now in power, and one of his first acts, even before he left for Washington, was to offer the command of the army of the Tennessee to Colonel Allen, a quartermaster. This gentleman, who was to be promoted to the required rank, to enable him to accept the command, had the good sense to decline it, and Grant was permitted to retain his position. He was deprived of nearly his entire force, and left to maintain a defensive position. He made his headquarters at Corinth, protecting the railroad communications, and holding what had before been gained. He spent the summer in this manner, though with enough to do to keep him busy, for he was continually harassed and threatened by the enemy under Van Dorn and Price.
Halleck, in his new capacity of general-in-chief, had his hands full in attending to McClellan and Pope. Grant seems to have been forgotten, and was thereby permitted to manage the affairs of his district without being hampered with instructions. The North was in danger of invasion in Maryland, rendered possible by the disastrous battles of Pope, and in Ohio bythe rebel army under General Bragg, who had out-generaled the prudent and deliberate Buell. In these emergencies, Grant's men were taken from him, till the smallness of his force afforded even him no little anxiety.
Van Dorn, in command of the rebels in this section, ordered Price to seize Iuka, which was done. Van Dorn himself was four days' march to the south-west, threatening Corinth. Grant wished to overwhelm Price at Iuka, without exposing Corinth to capture by Van Dorn. He sent out two columns, one under Rosecrans and the other under Ord, to accomplish this purpose. A sharp battle followed, but the intention to capture Price's army failed, on account of a delay of one of the columns in reaching the point of attack. The rebels escaped, and effected a junction with Van Dorn.
Placing Rosecrans in command of Corinth, Grant established his headquarters at Jackson, Tennessee, where he could better control the affairs of his district. On the 2d of October, the rebels united all their forces in this vicinity, and attacked Corinth, making a good fight, and gaining decided advantages; but in the end they were defeated, and the place saved. The force of the enemy was double that of Rosecrans, who behaved with distinguished gallantry. The defensive works which had been erected under Grant's direction proved to be of immense service, and showed that the general who had been severely criticised for neglecting them before knew when and where to use them—knew when they were necessary, and where they were a hinderance.
Grant had marked out this campaign himself; and though the battle of Corinth had been fought, and the rebels defeated, there was to be a sequel to the affair. Reading the intention of the foe to attack his strong place, he sent McPherson with a brigade to the assistance of Rosecrans; but he arrived only in season to witness the conclusion of the fight, being obliged to make a detour in order to effect his junction. Grant, with his usual confidence in the success of his combinations, had also sent Generals Ord and Hurlbut, each with a brigade, to punish still further the audacious foe in his retreat. He had notified Rosecrans of his plan, and directed him to follow up the retreating enemy vigorously, as well to insure his complete discomfiture, as to save either Ord or Hurlbut from being separately overwhelmed by a superior force. But these two commanders had joined their brigades, and Ord posted the whole so as to cover a bridge on the Hatchie River.
Van Dorn's column pushed on, and its advance crossed the bridge, when Ord's force attacked vigorously, and immediately routed it. A battery of artillery and several hundred men were captured, and the advance scattered, many of the rebels being drowned in their attempt to cross the river. Ord held the bridge, but had not strength enough to attack the entire rebel army, which he compelled to retrace its steps, and seek another bridge six miles distant. Unfortunately, Ord was wounded in the conflict, and Hurlbut, who succeeded to the command, did not deem it prudent even to harass the fleeing rebels in the rear or on the flanks.
Rosecrans permitted his men, weary after their two days' hard fight, to rest till the next morning, when he started to obey Grant's order. Then he mistook his road, marched eight miles in the wrong direction, but he corrected his error, and marched towards the Hatchie. He was behind time, having disregarded the order of Grant to march the day before, arriving at the bridge, where the rebels had crossed, just as the rear-guard was going over. Had he obeyed his orders, he would have fallen on Van Dorn's rear, while his front was engaged with Ord; and nothing could have saved the rebel army from total destruction. Grant decided that the favorable moment had passed, and he ordered Rosecrans back to his post.
These movements relieved West Tennessee from any further peril at the present time. The rebels had been whipped at Iuka, at Corinth, and at the Hatchie. All these movements and all these victories were achieved under the direction of Grant. The success of these operations was gratifying, though not all it would have been if the general had selected his own subordinates, as he did subsequently in a wider sphere. If Grant had any fault as a soldier in the field, it was the result of the amiability of his character, which prompted him to save the feelings of others, even at the expense of his own reputation. He was not always obeyed, because he was not a stormy and demonstrative man, because he did not bluster and put on airs. There was nothing personally imposing or grand in him, and the officers of the army estimated him too low—so low that some of them evaded his orders.
But Grant could be terribly severe, terribly just, when the emergencies of the service demanded, when his devotion to the glorious cause he had espoused required it. During his brief sojourn in Memphis, which was the very hotbed of treason and treachery, he breathed the spirit of loyalty to the government into the souls of the rebels, who did not scruple to carry on war by divers underhand methods within the still hostile city. No letters not examined by the provost marshal could be carried out of town without subjecting the offender to arrest. Arms and ammunition were prohibited from being taken out of the city, or carried within it, on severe penalty. As these orders failed to suppress the illicit traffic with foes outside of the lines, all passes were refused, except to such as took the oath of allegiance, or parole. As Confederate officers and soldiers found opportunities to communicate with their families in Memphis, thereby obtaining important military information, the families of all such were banished beyond the lines. This order included the connections of other specified persons in the Confederate government, and there was not much room left for rebel sympathizers to operate.
As a check upon guerrillas, who were doing much mischief, Grant authorized reprisals upon the personal property of those in the vicinity who were in sympathy with the rebellion, to an extent sufficient to remunerate the government for all losses by their depredations. A bitter partisan organ, the Memphis Avalanche, which published incendiary and treasonable articles, was promptly suppressed. He took possession of unoccupied premises belonging to personsabsent and in arms against the government, rented them, and paid the proceeds into the treasury of the United States. For the benefit of the fugitive negroes, who crowded into his lines, he issued humane and just orders, particularly defining the manner in which they should be employed and paid. Persons from the South who were willing to bluster, but not to fight, for the Confederacy, and hastened to Memphis to escape the remorseless rebel conscription, were made liable to draft.
In dealing with the troops under his own command, Grant was just and humane; but "bumming" and marauding on private account were prohibited. When the soldiers, in some instances, disobeyed the strict orders on this subject, the value of property taken or destroyed by them was charged to the account of their regiment, and deducted from their pay, if the offenders could not be discovered.
In dealing with civil affairs, in the multitudinous details which come within the scope of a department commander, he displayed a decided talent and ability to adjust the most difficult matters. He always knew where he was, and what to do. For every difficulty he had a remedy; for every infraction of law or discipline he had a check. In the management of the trying affairs of a military district, which has so frequently proved to be the severest demand upon the wisdom, skill, and patience of the soldier holding it under martial law, he displayed the highest order of ability. His judgment, tact, and discretion would have been more than creditable in one who had spent a lifetime in the study and practice of the principlesof political economy, or who had served a long apprenticeship as a magistrate. Without being a politician, he was a statesman.
But Grant had hardly made his mark yet, and, except as the hero of Donelson and Shiloh, he was scarcely known to the country, before which he was soon to stand as the foremost man of his time. I watched Grant at Memphis, I watched him at Corinth and at Jackson, as he controlled the difficult details of his department, kept the rebel civilians in subjection, and directed his forces to certain conquest, and I would rather have been Ulysses S. Grant than my illustrious ancestor Sir Bernard Galligasken, whose knightly prowess and whose glittering title had early tickled my imagination. Even then I loved the man, and almost adored him, as I realized that a brilliant destiny was in store for him.
As far back as May, 1862, when McClellan had only proved that he was great as the organizer of an army,—and it must be conceded that he has not since proved any more than this,—my excellent friend Mr. Washburne, in his noble speech in Congress, deemed it expedient to use these remarkable words: "Let no gentleman have any fears of General Grant.He is no candidate for the presidency." Surely with only the lustre of Donelson and Shiloh reflected upon him, he never thought of aspiring to that magnificent position. Why was it necessary, when the illustrious soldier had only taken a couple of steps towards fame, to make this astounding declaration? Was it seen even then that he was a probable or a possible candidate in the future? The noble-mindedand patriotic representative made this declaration to save Grant from the persecution of the wire-pullers, whose friends, the possible candidates, would be damaged by the appearance of a new aspirant, who, with a fitness for the office, added thereto the merit of availability. It was well for the politicians to take the bull by the horns, but they might as well attempt to nullify the laws of nature as to defeat the will of the people.
Grant had then no thought of being president. His modesty, if nothing else, would have forbidden the aspiration. He was a pure patriot then, as he is now; and the only consideration with him was to suppress the rebellion. He never "pulled the wires," even for a brigadier's commission, which was not above the ambition of thousands of fourth-rate politicians. He was ready to serve the country in any capacity, obeyed his orders, and quietly submitted to disgrace and insult for the good of the cause. The people are not blind. They see and know their man.
Wherein Captain Galligasken shows how six Months were spent around Vicksburg by the illustrious Soldier, and how the President rather liked the Man, and thought he would try him a little longer.
Wherein Captain Galligasken shows how six Months were spent around Vicksburg by the illustrious Soldier, and how the President rather liked the Man, and thought he would try him a little longer.
The second line of rebel defences had been broken. Memphis, Corinth, and the towns on the Tennessee River, in Northern Alabama, connecting links in the chain, were in possession of the national forces. But Buell had failed in his expedition to East Tennessee. He had made no impression upon Chattanooga; he had been beaten at Perrysville, and had been superseded by Rosecrans.
After the departure of General Halleck from the West to act as general-in-chief, Grant was left virtually in charge of the department of the Tennessee, and discharged all the duties of that important position. On the 16th of October, 1862, he was formally assigned to the command, and near the close of the month issued his order to that effect, and defined the limits of his jurisdiction. Very soon after, he proposed to Halleck to commence a movement upon Vicksburg; and this was the first mention which had beenmade by either of them of this important point. But Grant meekly and modestly added that he was ready to do with all his might whatever his superior, should order, andwithout criticism, which, I humbly submit, was a magnificent position for a man of his enlarged and comprehensive views to take, for most of our generals believed they were nothing unless they were critical. He was a grand exception, and we do not, in a single instance, outside of the line of his duty, find him analyzing and carping at the operations of others.
Vicksburg was now the objective point, for Halleck gave the commander of the department of the Tennessee full power and permission to carry out his own plans and purposes in his own way. From this time there was no clashing between the two generals. They heartily supported each other, as Grant had always been willing to do, and Halleck afforded him every assistance and encouragement in his power. It is possible that he had received a new revelation in regard to the abilities of the hero of Donelson and Shiloh; that Grant's exhibition of his skill in constructing earthworks at Corinth had won the heart of the general-in-chief, or that his handsome strategic movements in the operations which had included Iuka, Corinth, and the Hatchie had demonstrated the fact that he was not a mere bull-dog thirsting for blood, and without any perception of military tact and skill. It was rather late for Halleck to learn this; but to his honor and glory let it be said, that he no longer permitted himself to be a stumbling-block in the path of his subordinate; that he fairly and squarely sustained him in his grand enterprises.
From the beginning of the war the Confederacy had been fully alive to the vital importance of the Mississippi River. From Columbus to the Gulf it had been fortified and protected by every means which the skill and resources of the South could afford. Forts Jackson and St. Philip guarded its lower part, and covered New Orleans; though these were nullified by the daring of Farragut, and the city fell early in the war. But there were half a dozen other "Gibraltars" on its long line—Columbus, Island No. 10, Fort Pillow, Memphis, Vicksburg, and Port Hudson. Foote had used up Island No. 10, after the rebels were compelled to evacuate Columbus. Fort Pillow and Memphis had yielded before the persuasive force of the naval squadron, and only Vicksburg and Port Hudson were left to dispute the passage of the great river. Between these two points the enemy, depending almost wholly upon Texas for its supplies of cattle, ferried them over, and by the line of railroads from Vicksburg to Charleston, not yet approached by the national arms, were enabled still to send food to all their armies in the east and south.
Bold Farragut had passed the batteries at Port Hudson with his squadron, and sailed up to Vicksburg, more than five hundred miles from the Gulf. Here he had bombarded the strong works which protected the city; but as they were planted on high bluffs, all the advantage was in favor of the enemy, and the result was not a success. The troops which accompanied him under General Williams attempted to open the canal, which was to form a new bed for the river, and enable the fleet to pass the city. Butthis scheme also failed, and though a part of the squadron ran the gantlet of the batteries, and joined the naval force above the city, the expedition was obliged to return to New Orleans to escape the diseases incident to the climate.
About the 1st of November Grant initiated his movement in the direction of Vicksburg. Commencing on the line of defence which had just been wrested from the rebels, there was a railroad extending from Memphis to Grenada. Fifty miles east of Memphis, from near La Grange, on the railroad extending east and west, was another line to the south—the Mississippi Central—which also went to Grenada, where the two roads meeting extended to Jackson, forty miles east of Vicksburg, and thence to New Orleans. Both of these roads crossed the Tallahatchie River, a branch of the Yazoo, which flowed into the Mississippi a few miles above Vicksburg. Grant's plan was to move down upon these lines of railway, depending upon them in his rear for supplies.
Pemberton, who was in command of Vicksburg and the forces which were covering it in the State of Mississippi, was holding the railroad, and made the Tallahatchie River his line of defence. On the 4th of November, Grant took possession of La Grange, near the Central Railroad, driving the Confederate advance to Holly Springs, about twenty miles farther south.
While Grant moved in this direction, Sherman started from Memphis, and another force was moved out from Helena to coöperate with him. Grant proceeded on the railroad, captured Holly Springs, andmade it his depot of supplies, placing it in charge of Colonel Murphy. Continuing on his victorious path, the enemy abandoned Abbeville, and the line of the Tallahatchie, without a battle, and were finally driven into Grenada, with the Yallabusha River as their line of defence. Here the commander proposed to hold the rebels, and send an army from Memphis to make the direct attack upon Vicksburg. For this purpose Sherman was sent back, with directions to organize the expedition, and procure the coöperation of the squadron under Admiral Porter.
Sherman executed his orders with his usual decision. With one hundred and twenty-seven steamers, and a flotilla of gunboats for his protection, he went down the river, and debarked his force at Johnston's Landing, near the mouth of the Yazoo.
In the mean time, Van Dorn fell upon Holly Springs, surprised the garrison, and captured the place, with all the supplies which had been accumulated for the support of the advancing army. Colonel Murphy, in command, made no resistance whatever. By this sad and unexpected blow, inflicted by the imbecility or treachery of a single officer, the entire plan of the campaign was defeated. Grant, with his army, was in the heart of the enemy's country. His communications were cut in several places behind him; his base of supplies was lost, and his stores destroyed. The success of the experiment of subsisting upon the enemy had not been demonstrated then, and sorely chagrined and disappointed, the progressive general was obliged to retrace his steps. It was a bitter day to him. Murphy was promptly dismissedfrom the army, without even the formality of a court martial.
Sherman, having no knowledge of the disaster which had crippled Grant, attacked the enemy's positions, and gained some advantages; but the rebels were reënforced by the withdrawal of the army in the rear of Vicksburg, and he reëmbarked his forces, abandoning the attempt. At this point General McClernand appeared, and superseded Sherman, who then took command of one of the corps of the army of the Mississippi, as it was from that time designated. The great bugbear of Grant's military existence, "a political general," was thrown into his path, and though this act of the president sorely grieved him, he made the best of the circumstances.
His grand calculation had failed through the dastardly cowardice and imbecility of Murphy; but Grant was still serene in his disappointment, as he was in his triumphs, and immediately set himself at work to "fick it again". He was conscious of the magnitude of the enterprise he had undertaken, and of the difficulties which lay in his path. After all the minor "Gibraltars" had melted away before the victorious arms of the Union, Jeff. Davis declared that Vicksburg wastheGibraltar of the Mississippi. So thoroughly had it been fortified, with battery behind battery, with every conceivable approach guarded, with the heights for miles around the city bristling with guns, the president of the Southern Confederacy was perfectly confident that the place was invulnerable. Above and below the city the country was intersected with bayous, lakes, and rivers, and the land solow that it hardly afforded a foothold for an army. Every rood of high ground in the vicinity was occupied by the rebels, and covered with defensive works.
Grant knew all this, and he made up his mind to capture Vicksburg. Frowning heights studded with guns, fortifications overrunning with obstinate soldiers, swamps and morasses, could not deter him. "I cannot tell exactly when I shall take Vicksburg," he said, "but I mean to stay here till I do, if it takes thirty years." This was the spirit of the man. He had actually begun the job, and he was determined to carry it through. Towards the close of the year 1862 he issued orders for the reorganization of his army, having matured the system himself.
On the 1st of January, 1863, the president issued the Emancipation Proclamation, taking that greatest and most decisive step of the war. It was contrary to Grant's political antecedents, but he gave the measure his hearty support. Many generals did otherwise, and opposed in spirit, if not in fact, the policy of the government in using negro troops. Grant issued an order in relation to this subject, directing his subordinates to afford every facility for the organization of negro regiments, requesting them "especially to exert themselves in carrying out the policy of the administration, not only in organizing colored regiments and rendering them efficient, but also in removing prejudice against them."
Grant's force in the department of the Tennessee, in January, was one hundred and thirty thousand men. Fifty thousand of these he sent down the river into camp at Milliken's Bend and at Young's Point.Admiral Porter coöperated with him, having a fleet of sixty vessels of all classes. On the 29th of January he arrived at Young's Point himself, and assumed the control of operations against Vicksburg, in spite of a protest on the part of McClernand, who gave Grant a great deal of trouble in one way and another.
Grant was then face to face with the great problem of the day, the solution of which would cut the Confederacy in two, and separate the east from the cattle plains of Texas, from which its armies were fed. No point was accessible from which he could operate. There was not the remotest possibility of making a successful attack in front of the city. The point was to reach a position in the rear of the place, where there was standing room to conduct siege operations.
The country was flooded with water, and the troops were frequently inundated in their camps. The perils and difficulties of the gigantic enterprise were patent to all; but the troops were mostly veterans, and they worked with zeal and patience. The president had considerable confidence in the Vicksburg canal, and, though Grant had but little hope of its success, or little confidence in its value if completed,—as the lower end of it was covered by rebel batteries,—he labored patiently upon it for two months.
His next plan was to flank the water communications of Vicksburg by a navigable course by Lake Providence, through a series of bayous and rivers, to the Wachita, and thence to the Red River, by which a passage could be obtained for light steamers to the Mississippi, four hundred miles below. It was an immense undertaking, which nothing but Americanenterprise would have considered, but which American enterprise would have accomplished if it had been possible. It was not possible, and the plan was abandoned.
A similar attempt was made on the east side of the Mississippi, but rather as a means of entering the Yazoo to destroy the rebel steamers which had gathered there, and to break up gunboats in process of construction on its shores. There had formerly been a steamboat route through Moon Lake, Yazoo Pass, the Coldwater and Tallahatchie Rivers, to the Yazoo; but as the influx of water from the great river above inundated the whole region annually, a strong levee had been built by the state to protect the country, and the passage was thus closed. This levee was cut through, and after the most incredible exertions in removing obstructions placed in the stream by the rebels, and cutting an opening through the overhanging branches, a fleet of light gunboats and transports penetrated to the Yallabusha, where its farther progress was interrupted by a battery called Fort Pemberton, which could neither be battered down nor drowned out. With difficulty the expedition was extricated from its perilous position, and though Grant had entertained a hope from its first success that he should be able to transport his troops and supplies by this route to the rear of Vicksburg, he was compelled to abandon the idea.
Still another attempt was made to secure the position by entering the Yazoo, which our gunboats held near its mouth, passing through Steele's Bayou and several streams into the Big Sunflower, and thence intothe Yazoo again. This attempt was made in conjunction with the Yazoo Pass movement, and while General Ross, in command of the military expedition connected with it, was shut up in the swamp. General Grant gave his personal attention to these enterprises; but all of them were impracticable in their nature, and had to be abandoned. All the troops and vessels were brought off in safety; and if nothing was gained, nothing was lost, even in time, for the country was so flooded with water, that operations, except in boats, were difficult, if not impossible.
The nation had been watching these experiments with intense interest. When they failed the people began to be impatient. Demands were made for the removal of General Grant from his command. Again was he accused of incompetency, of drunkenness. Not a success of any importance had been obtained for the national cause since his own victories at Iuka and Corinth. Even the president appeared to be dissatisfied, and Grant knew that he was in imminent peril of being displaced. Some of his best friends deserted him, and one of them voluntarily demanded his removal; but the president replied, "I rather like the man. I think we'll try him a little longer." But Grant was still confident of ultimate success; he was approaching the mighty idea by which Vicksburg was to be brought down.