Slavery in Cuba—Horrible Tortures Inflicted—The Conspiracy ofLopez—The United States Interferes—Lopez Captured and Executed—Seizure of American Ships—Our Government Demands and SecuresIndemnity From Spain—Enormous Salaries of Cuban Officials—Oppressive Taxation.
Slavery was a demoralizing influence to Cuba as it has been, to every other country in which the system has existed, and to its presence was traced one of the most sensational episodes in all the sensational history of the unhappy island. It is impossible to know to what extent the suspected insurrection of slaves on the sugar plantations about Matanzas was an actual threat. So horrible were the charges made by the accusers that it is almost impossible to believe them. At any rate, such an insurrection was anticipated, and the authorities took measures to crush it out, more severe than any such governmental movement has been since the days of the Spanish Inquisition itself. It was impossible to obtain witnesses by ordinary methods, so the most shocking forms of torture were employed. Those who refused to confess whatever charges happened to be brought against them were tortured till they did confess, and then probably executed for the crimes which they admitted under such circumstances. By such "judicial" processes, 1,346 persons were convicted, of whom seventy-eight were shot and the others punished less severely in various ways. Hundreds of others died from the tortures to which they were subjected, or in the foul prisons in which they were confined, and of these we have no record. Of those convicted and punished under the alleged forms of law, fourteen were white, 1,242 were free negroes, and fifty-nine were slaves. The negroes of Cuba have never forgotten the barbarities to which their parents were subjected in that trying year.
The most notable outbreak of Cuban insurrectionary forces prior to that of the Ten Years' war, which began in 1868, was that known as the conspiracy of Lopez.
As early as May, 1847, Narcisso Lopez and a number of his associates who had planned an insurrection in the central part of the island, were pursued to the United States by Spanish agents, who had kept track of their conspiracy. The Lone Star Society was in close sympathy with these refugees, and to a certain extent the two were co-existent. Lopez, in 1849, organized a military expedition to invade Cuba. By the exertions of the officers of the United States government the sailing of the expedition was prevented. Notwithstanding the activity of the government, however, Lopez, in the following year, got together a force of 600 men outside of the United States, shipped arms and ammunition to them from this country, and on May 19, 1850, made a landing at Cardenas.
The United States authorities had put the Spanish government in Cuba on the alert for this expedition. President Taylor had issued a proclamation warning all citizens of the United States not to take part in such an expedition or to assist it in any way. The expedition was driven out to sea from Cardenas a few days after it landed, sailed for Key West, and there disbanded. Meantime there were a number of uprisings in the island between groups of unhappy natives who had not the wisdom to co-operate in the effort to resist the oppressive hand of the Spaniards.
In August of 1851, Lopez eluded the United States authorities at the port of New Orleans, and sailed out into the Gulf of Mexico with an expedition 450 strong. His lieutenant on this expedition was a Colonel Crittenden, a native of the State of Kentucky. They landed near Bahia Honda, about thirty miles west of Havana, and found the government forces waiting for them. Colonel Crittenden, with a subdivision of 150 men, was compelled to surrender, and the rest were scattered. Lopez, with fifty others, was captured, taken to Havana, and there executed.
The circumstances attending the Lopez failure, and several Spanish outrages against American citizens and vessels, aroused deep feeling in the United States, and the sentiment was growing rapidly that it was a national duty to our own peace, to do something that would make the troublesome neighbor a pleasant one. It was fifty years before action was taken, but, once begun, it was well done.
It was in 1848, prior to the Lopez invasion, that President Polk made the first approaches to the Spanish government with a suggestion to purchase the island for $100,000,000, but was refused with scant consideration. A few years later came the succession of attacks on American merchant vessels by Spanish ships of war, on the pretext that the intercepted craft were in filibuster service. Some of these were fired on, and the American mail bags opened, the steamships Falcon and Crescent City being in this list. The most flagrant case was that of the Black Warrior, a large steamer in coasting trade between New York and Mobile. In February, 1850, while in the harbor of Havana, she was stopped, her cargo confiscated, and a fine of twice its value declared. Her captain hauled down the colors, and taking them with him, left the vessel as a Spanish capture. After five years of "diplomacy," Spain paid an indemnity of $300,000 for the outrage.
It was in 1852 that the governments of Great Britain and France tried to draw the United States into an agreement on the question of Cuba, which was happily refused on genuinely American grounds. It was suggested that all the parties should be bound not to acquire Cuba themselves, nor to permit any other power to do so. Our government gave the proposal respectful consideration, but declined to enter into any such arrangement, on the ground that we prefer to avoid entangling foreign alliances, that it would be unwise, if not unconstitutional, to tie our hands for the future regardless of what might happen, and that on geographical grounds, while England and France were making very slight concessions, we were asked to make a very important one.
The United States came as near to the purchase of Cuba in 1854 as it ever was, but Spain gave the plan little encouragement. Three American ministers to European countries, Messrs. Buchanan, Mason and Soule, met at Ostend and formulated a plan for the purchase, signing and issuing what came to be known as the Ostend manifesto. They recommended the purchase of the island for $120,000,000, and that in no event should it be allowed to come under the power of any other European government than the one by which it was held. At this time, and afterward, while filibustering expeditions were frequent and disorder constantly threatening in Cuba, the subject of the acquisition of Cuba was discussed in Congress, but no headway was made in the matter. At last, conditions in the island became intolerable to the patriots there, and the Ten Years' war began.
It is necessary at this point to relate some of the causes of the frequent disorders and uprisings in the island of Cuba. Some of the features of Spanish misgovernment in the colony have been named, but the catalogue is far from complete.
The most judicial writers, however bitterly they condemn Spain, admit that that peninsular kingdom has itself suffered and that the people have suffered almost beyond endurance themselves. Cuba is not the only land with which we may share a little of our sympathy. But sympathy for Spain must come from other things than oppression from without. Her oppression is within her own borders, and her authorities have tried to shift the burden of it to the colonists across the sea. The debt of Spain has reached enormous proportions, and having fallen from her high estate as a commercial nation, it has become impossible for the great interest charges on her floating debt to be paid by ordinary and correct methods. Says one writer: "To pay the interest necessitates the most grinding oppression. The moving impulse is not malice, but the greed of the famishing; and oppressor and oppressed alike are the objects for sympathy."
The annual revenue raised in the island of Cuba had reached nearly $26,000,000 by the time of the outbreak of the Ten Years' war, and preparations were in progress for largely increasing the exactions. The large revenue raised was expended in ways to irritate the Cubans or any one else who had to help pay it. The annual salary of the captain general was $50,000, when the president of the United States was getting only $25,000 a year. Each provincial governor in Cuba got a salary of $12,000, while the prime minister of Spain received only half that.
The bishop of Havana and the archbishop of Santiago de Cuba each received a salary of $18,000. All offices, civil, military and ecclesiastical, were productive of rich perquisites, except in those cases where stealing was simpler. Wholesale corruption in the custom houses was generally known and admitted by all. The thefts in the custom houses in Havana was estimated at forty per cent, and in Santiago at seventy per cent of the entire revenue. All offices except the very lowest, in church and state alike, were filled by men sent from Spain, with the frank understanding that as soon as he could, each new appointee could garner a fortune by fair means and foul combined, he should retire and let another be sent over to have a turn at the plunder. The result of this was that strangers were always in authority, men with no sympathy for local need, and no local reputation to sustain. It is perfectly obvious what sort of a public service such conditions would create.
As might have been expected, the result was the growth of two parties, one the native-born Cubans, and called the insulares, the other of those from Spain, and their adherents, known as the peninsulares. The line between them has been sharply drawn for many years, and they are on opposite sides of everything. It is from the ranks of the continentals that the volunteer corps of Cuba has been drawn, one of the most aggravating and threatening of all influences against peace in Cuba.
Spain imposed differential duties in such a way as to virtually monopolize the trade of the island. At the same time the prices of all imports to Cuba were forced, to an unnatural figure, to the great distress of the people. Petty oppression in postage and in baptismal fees multiplied, so that instead of petty it became great. The increase in taxation of Cuba for use in Spain in two years prior to the outbreak of the Ten Years' war was more than $14,000,000, and the next year it was proposed to increase it still more. The cities were hopelessly in debt and unable to make the most ordinary and most necessary public improvements. What few schools there had been were nearly all closed. Lacking insane asylums, the unfortunate of that class were kept in the jails. The people saw a country separated from them but by a narrow stretch of water, where freedom reigned. They saw that they were being heavily oppressed with taxation for the benefit of the people of Spain, and that, in addition, they were being robbed mercilessly for the benefit of the authorities who were placed over them temporarily. If the money collected from them had been expended for their benefit in the island, or had been expended honestly, the case might have been different. As it was, however, an intolerable condition had been endured too long, and they rose against it for the struggle known to history as the Ten Years' war.
Cuba Again Stirred to Turmoil—The Taxes of the Island Increased—A Declaration of Independence—Civil Government Organized—Meeting of the Legislature, and Election of Officers—The Edict ofa Tyrant.
Before the outbreak of the Ten Years' War, the reform party in Cuba, which included all the most enlightened, wealthy and influential citizens of the island, had exhausted all the resources at their command to induce Spain to establish a more just and equitable administration of affairs, but all to no avail.
It was proposed that Cuba receive an autonomist constitution. The abolition of the supreme power of the Captain General, the freedom of the press, the right of petition, the regulation of the chief frauds by which elections were so arranged that no Cuban could hold government office, the right of assembly, representation in the Cortes, and complete local self-government were among the reforms asked for. The plans were considered in Spain and were reconsidered, and considered again, and that was about all that ever came of them, except that in June, 1868, Captain General Lersundi was permitted to raise the direct taxes on the island ten per cent.
Finally, driven to a point where they could endure it no longer, they made the start for freedom, and began to fight for it, as brave men should do and have done through the history of the world.
Several months before the revolution in Spain and the abdication of Isabella, measures had been taken to prepare for the effort to achieve independence. At last matters progressed so rapidly in the mother country that the Cubans dared not wait for the completion of their plans, but on October 10, 1868, began the hostilities. On that day, Carlos M. de Cespedes, a lawyer of Bayamo, took the initiative with 128 poorly armed men, and issued a declaration of independence at Yara. This declaration justified itself by referring in the following terms to the grievances that have been outlined:
"In arming ourselves against the tyrannical government of Spain, we must, according to precedent in all civilized countries, proclaim before the world the cause that impels us to take this step, which, though likely to entail considerable disturbances upon the present, will ensure the happiness of the future. … And as Spain has many a time promised us Cubans to respect our rights, without having fulfilled her promises; and she continues to tax us heavily, and by so doing is likely to destroy our wealth; as we are in danger of losing our property, our lives and our honor under Spanish dominion," etc.
Within a few weeks Cespedes was at the head of 15,000 men, ill-prepared for war, so far as arms and equipment were concerned, but well provided with resolution, bravery and a just cause. A civil government was organized, and a constitution drawn up, providing for an elective president and vice-president, a cabinet, and a single legislative chamber. It also declared the immediate abolition of slavery. This constitution was promulgated at Guaimaro in Central Cuba, on the 10th of April, 1869. The legislature met soon after, and elected Cespedes president, and Francisco M. Aguilero vice-president.
This insurrection soon assumed formidable dimensions, and the following edict was issued by General Balmaceda:
Inhabitants of the country! The reinforcement of troops that I have been waiting for have arrived. With them I shall give protection to the good, and punish promptly those that still remain in rebellion against the government of the metropolis.
You know that I have pardoned those who have fought us with arms; that your wives, mothers and sisters have found in me the unexpected protection that you have refused them. You know, also, that many of those we have pardoned have turned against us again. Before such ingratitude, such villainy, it is not possible for me to be the man I have been; there is no longer a place for a falsified neutrality; he that is not for me is against me; and that my soldiers may know how to distinguish, you hear the order they carry.
1st. Every man, from the age of fifteen years upward, found away from his habitation (finca), and who does not prove a justified motive therefor, will be shot.
2nd. Every habitation unoccupied will be burned by the troops.
3rd. Every habitation from which does not float a white flag, as a signal that its occupants desire peace, will be reduced to ashes.
Women that are not living in their own homes, or at the houses of their relatives, will collect in the town of Jiguani, or Bayamo, where maintenance will be provided. Those who do not present themselves will be conducted forcibly.
The foregoing determinations will commence to take effect on the 14th of the present month.
Bayamo, April 4, 1869.
Even Weyler, the "Butcher," has never succeeded in concocting a manifesto that surpassed this in malicious excuses for the ancient Spanish amusements of pillage, incendiarism and murder.
It is now conceded by high Spanish authorities that the insurgents had just grounds for this revolt, and Senor Dupuy de Lome, formerly the Spanish minister to the United States, admits in a letter to the New York Herald that a very large majority of the leading citizens of the island were in sympathy with the struggle for liberty.
The new government received the moral support of nearly all of the South American republics, but as many of them were troubled with internal dissensions, and uncertain of their own security, they were not in a condition to furnish assistance of a more practical nature, and the revolutionists were left to work out their own salvation.
In an exhaustive review of the trouble between Spain and her Cuban possessions, published in 1873, the Edinburg Review said:
"It is well known that Spain governs the island of Cuba with an iron and bloodstained hand. The former holds the latter deprived of civil, political and religious liberty. Hence the unfortunate Cubans being illegally prosecuted and sent into exile, or executed by military commissions in time of peace; hence their being kept from public meeting, and forbidden to speak or write on affairs of state; hence their remonstrances against the evils that afflict them being looked upon as the proceedings of rebels, from the fact that they are bound to keep silence and obey; hence the never-ending plague of hungry officials from Spain to devour the product of their industry and labor; hence their exclusion from public stations, and want of opportunity to fit themselves for the art of government; hence the restrictions to which public instruction with them is subjected, in order to keep them so ignorant as not to be able to know and enforce their rights in any shape or form whatever; hence the navy and the standing army, which are kept in their country at an enormous expenditure from their own wealth, to make them bend their knees and submit their necks to the iron yoke that disgraces them; hence the grinding taxation under which they labor, and which would make them all perish in misery but for the marvelous fertility of their soil."
Excitement in the United States over a Spanish Outrage of Twenty-fiveYears Ago—The Virginius a Blockade Runner—Severity of the SpanishCourt Martial—Insolence to the American Consul—Indignation in theUnited States—Negotiations Between Washington and Madrid—Settlement anUnsatisfactory One to Most People—No Just Retribution Ever Made.
It was less than twenty-five years before the destruction of the Maine, that another vessel whose crew met its fate in a Spanish port in Cuba was the subject of as intense public interest in the United States as that created by the catastrophe of 1898. The hopeful progress of the Cuban revolution of 1868-78 had stimulated their friends in the United States to aid the insurgents in every way possible, by money, men and the munitions of war. Filibustering was constant and scarcely discouraged by the people of the United States, in spite of the protest of Spain. It was as a result of this condition that the terrible affair of the Virginius occurred.
The case of the Virginius had in it elements of tragedy that made it more spectacular and dramatic than that of the Maine, and American spirit was worked to an even higher tension than it is now, before diplomacy and caution averted a war between the United States and Spain. In the case of the Virginius the facts of Spanish aggression were in no way denied, but, on the contrary, avowed for a time with pride, until the authorities at Madrid subdued their people, who were making a settlement more difficult by their talk. The only controversy was as to whether or not Spain's action in the matter was within its rights. But the settlement, however it might have left the rights of the vessel still unsolved, was a rebuke to Spain, and for its execution of American citizens with scarcely a formality of law Spain has never been forgiven by those who remember it, whatever diplomacy decided as to being satisfied.
The Virginius was originally an English-built sidewheel steamer called the Virgin, and during the war between the States was one of the most famous of blockade runners until captured by a vessel of the United States. In 1870 she was sold in Washington to an agent of the Cuban Junta at New York, her name was changed to Virginius, and she cleared for Curacoa in the West Indies. From that time till her unhappy fate she was never in United States waters. At Aspinwall and in the ports of Venezuela and the West Indies she was known for three years as the most daring and the most successful of filibusters, making repeated landings on the Cuban coast with supplies of arms, ammunition, food and clothes for the insurgents who were then fighting the Ten-Years' war. In all her filibustering it was claimed, however, that the Virginius never lost her character as an American ship, though the Cuban flag was kept at the masthead whenever that practice served any good purpose.
The vessel sailed on the fatal voyage from Kingston, Jamaica, October 23, 1873, having cleared at the United States consulate as a United States vessel bound for Port Simon, Costa Rica. The commander was Captain Joseph Fry, a citizen of the United States. The cargo was made up of munitions of war for the Cuban insurgents, and the crew was part of Cuban and part of American citizens. There were also on board a number of enlisted men on their way to join the insurgent army.
It was not until October 31 that the Virginius approached the coast of Cuba to make her landing, and was intercepted by the Spanish gunboat Tornado. The Tornado had been built by the same English firm that constructed the Virginius, also for blockade running, but in the race that followed the Virginius was unable to equal the speed of her Spanish pursuer. The chase lasted eight hours. Finally, at 10 o'clock at night, the Virginius was stopped and surrendered in response to the cannon shots of the Tornado, which had come in range. The captain protested that his papers were regular and that the Virginius was "an American ship, carrying American colors and papers, with an American captain and an American crew." In response he was told that he was a pirate, his flag was lowered and trampled upon, and the Spanish flag was hoisted in its place.
During the chase after the Virginius, the passengers and crew of the fated vessel were in a state of panic. The cargo, which was made up of war material, was thrown overboard, and all persons on the vessel emptied their trunks of whatever might be considered suspicious. Almost from the instant of the capture the fate of the unfortunate men was assured, and they soon realized the extent of the danger that threatened them.
When the Tornado and the Virginius reached Santiago de Cuba the next day the 155 men captured were placed in close confinement and a court-martial was convened at once. The various courts-martial condemned most if not all of the prisoners to death, this summary proceeding being, as was alleged, in accordance with Spanish laws, so far at least as the character of the court and the nature of the judicial forms were concerned. The first executions were on the morning of November 4, when four men were shot, one of them being Brigadier Washington Ryan, who claimed British citizenship, as a Canadian, although he had served in the Union army during the late war. The victims were shot in the back, and their bodies were afterward beheaded, the heads displayed on spikes and the trunks trampled by horses. George W. Sherman, the correspondent of the New York Herald, tried to sketch the scene and was imprisoned for four days for his attempt. A guard kept the American consul in his house, so he could not appear to protest.
As the Virginius had displayed the American colors and was chartered and cleared as an American vessel, she had a prima facie claim to protection as such, until her right should be disproved. Hence Mr. E. G. Schmitt, the American vice-consul at Santiago, was prompt and urgent in demanding access to the prisoners, with a view to protecting the rights of the vessel and any on board who might be American citizens. He was treated with great discourtesy by the provincial governor, who told him in effect that it was none of his business, and persisted in declaring that they were all pirates and would be dealt with as such. Mr. Schmitt was even refused the use of the submarine cable to consult with the consul at Kingston, Jamaica. He would thus have been left entirely helpless but for the friendly aid of the British and French consuls.
On the 8th of November twelve more men were executed, and on the 13th thirty-seven were executed, this last batch including the officers and crew of the Virginius and most of the American citizens. At 4 o'clock in the afternoon the condemned men were marched to the place of execution, passing and saluting the American consulate, where the flag was not flying from its staff.
Captain Fry was shot first, and was the only man, though the soldiers stood but ten feet away, who fell dead at the first volley. The majority of the poor fellows, as the firing continued, were wounded, and killed as they lay on the ground by the usual Spanish fashion of firing rifles in the mouths of those who were disabled. The second engineer of the Virginius was among those executed. He had made a declaration to the Spanish that he had tampered with the engines and cut down the speed of the vessel so that she could be captured, and was marched with the rest to prevent his comrades from knowing that he was to be spared. He was shot by mistake while making frantic protests and explanations, but, as he was a traitor in one way or the other, his death was the only one of all that was never regretted.
During all this time the consuls at Santiago were not idle, but they were helpless. E. G. Schmitt, the American vice-consul, and Theodore Brooks, the British vice-consul, made all sorts of protests that were unavailing. Schmitt was not permitted to see the prisoners before or after the court-martial, until the very end, when he reached Captain Fry and signed his protest with him. He was not permitted the use of the telegraph in order to communicate with the government at Washington by way of Kingston, Jamaica.
He wrote repeated notes to Gen. Burriel, the Spanish commander at Santiago, getting no answer to them, until at last an answer came that was more irritating than silence. Burriel told him that he should have known that the previous day was a day of religious festival, during which he and all his officers were engaged in "meditation of the divine mysteries," and could not consider temporal affairs. He also informed the consul that he might be expelled from the island for trying to embroil the United States and Spain in difficulties if he were not careful.
Then came the only bright spot in the whole affair. News of what was going on reached Jamaica, and the British gunboat Niobe, Captain Sir Lambton Lorraine, left for the scene of massacre, sailing in such a hurry that he left some of the crew ashore. The Captain landed at Santiago before his ship was anchored, and demanded that the slaughter be stopped instantly. He declared that he represented the United States as well as England, and that he would bombard the city if there was another American citizen executed. Ninety-three men were under sentence of death, many of whom were Americans, but the sentences were immediately suspended and the lives were saved. The Spanish afterward asserted that the executions were stopped because of orders received from Madrid.
The next time Sir Lambton Lorraine was in New York he was offered a reception, which he declined. He was presented, however, with a silver brick, on which were engraved the words: "Blood is thicker than water." A resolution of thanks to him was laid on the table in the House of Representatives and never passed.
When the news of all this reached the United States, public indignation rose rapidly. Mass-meetings were held demanding vengeance on Spain. President Grant sent special messages to Congress, and the state department began diplomatic negotiations. Hamilton Fish, secretary of state, declared that the Virginius, having been registered as an American vessel carrying official documents regular upon their face and bearing the United States flag, was entirely beyond the jurisdiction of any other power on the high seas in the time of peace; that if she had secured fraudulent entry or committed any other fraud against the laws of the United States it was for her to be turned over to the United States courts for punishment, and not for her to be captured and punished by some other power.
The Spanish minister of foreign affairs at that time was Admiral Polo de Bernabe, father of the new Spanish minister who succeeded Dupuy de Lome. He wanted to submit the matter to arbitration, and Secretary Fish replied to him that the "United States was ready to refer to arbitration all questions properly subjects for reference, but that the question of an indignity to the flag of the nation and the capture in time of peace on the high seas of a vessel bearing that flag and having also the register and papers of an American ship, is not deemed to be one referable to other powers to determine. A nation must be the judge and custodian of its own honor."
Most of the men were executed after protests to Madrid began to be made. Madrid mobs made a demonstration against the American minister, General Sickles. November 4, Secretary Fish cabled Sickles: "In case of refusal of satisfactory reparation within twelve days from this date close your legation and leave Madrid." Ten days later, when the executions were over, he telegraphed: "If Spain cannot redress these outrages, the United States will." Ten days after that he wired: "If no settlement is reached by the close of to-morrow, leave." Next day Spain became tractable and war was averted.
By his conduct in Madrid at that time General Sickles made many friends of those Americans who wanted to see energetic action, and many enemies among those who wanted peace at any price. It was alleged afterward that the latter influence became dominant, and that his recall from that post was the result of their work to punish him for his energy that was not always diplomatic in its forms.
The terms of settlement of the trouble were that the Virginius should be surrendered to an American warship, with the survivors of those who had been captured with her, and that on December 25 the United States flag should be saluted by the Tornado. The surrender was made in the obscure harbor of Bahia Honda, December 16, the Spanish having taken the Virginius there to avoid the humiliation of a surrender in Santiago or Havana, where it should have been made. Captain W. D. Whiting, the chief of staff of the North Atlantic Squadron, was appointed to receive the surrender of the Virginius, and the gunboat Dispatch was sent to Bahia Honda with him for that purpose. Lieut. Adolph Marix was the flag lieutenant of the Dispatch, the same who was afterwards the judge-advocate of the court of inquiry on the Maine disaster. The Virginius was delivered with the flag flying, but she was unseaworthy, and, struck by a storm off Cape Hatteras, was sunk on her way to New York. The salute to the flag that had been arranged was waived by the United States because the attorney-general gave an opinion that the Virginius had no right to fly the American flag when she was captured.
Major Moses P. Handy, afterwards famous as a journalist, was present at the surrender of the Virginius to the American men of war in the harbor of Bahia Honda, and gives a graphic account of the circumstances attending that ceremony. In concluding the tale he says: "The surrender of the surviving prisoners of the massacre took place in the course of time at Santiago, owing more to British insistence than to our feeble representation. As to the fifty-three who were killed, Spain never gave us any real satisfaction. For a long time the Madrid government unblushingly denied that there had been any killing, and when forced to acknowledge the fact they put us off with preposterous excuses. 'Butcher Borriel,' by whose orders the outrage was perpetrated, was considered at Madrid to have been justified by circumstances. It was pretended that orders to suspend the execution of Ryan and his associates were 'unfortunately' received too late, owing to interruption of telegraph lines by the insurgents, to whose broad and bleeding shoulders an attempt was thus made to shift the responsibility.
"There was a nominal repudiation of Borriel's act and a promise was made to inflict punishment upon 'those who have offended,' but no punishment was inflicted upon anybody. The Spanish government, with characteristic double dealing, resorted to procrastination, prevarication and trickery, and thus gained time, until new issues effaced in the American mind the memory of old wrongs unavenged. Instead of being degraded, Borriel was promoted. Never to this day has there been any adequate atonement by Spain, much less an apology or expression of regret for the Virginius massacre."
The amount of money paid to the United States government for distribution among the families of American sufferers by this affair was $80,000. And that is the extent of the reparation made for the shocking crime.
The Virginius, although the most conspicuous, was not the only American victim of Spanish misgovernment in Cuba during the Ten Years' war. In 1877 the three whaling vessels, Rising Sun, Ellen Rizpah, and Edward Lee, while pursuing their legitimate business under the American flag, outside of Cuban waters, were fired upon and detained for days, with circumstances of peculiar hardship and brutality. The United States government investigated the outrage with care, and demanded of Spain an indemnity of $19,500. The demand, however, was not enforced, and the sum of $10,000 was accepted as a compromise settlement.
The Two Wars Compared—The Havana Volunteers—The Slaughter at the Villaneuva Theater—The Court Martial of the Students—A Holiday in Havana—The Close of the War—The Treaty of Zanjon.
The reader who has watched closely the struggle in Cuba for the past three years need not be told that Spain has had every advantage in men, money, arms and ammunition. The same state of affairs existed during the Ten Years' War. In fact, the inequality was even greater, for the Spanish army was then composed of experienced soldiers who were well fed, well clothed and paid regularly. In the present conflict many of them are boys who have been sent from home to make targets for insurgent bullets. They know comparatively nothing of military tactics, they have not been paid for months, and they lack food and clothing. The equipment of the insurgent forces in the former rebellion was even more limited than it has been in this one. While they did not experience serious difficulty in obtaining food, the implements of war in any quantities were beyond their reach. But the same spirit that gave courage to our American heroes in revolutionary times was in them, and for ten years they struggled bravely against overwhelming odds.
It is not possible to tell in detail of the monstrous cruelties practiced by the Spanish army during those years of carnage. Here is the testimony of one officer:
"We captured seventeen, thirteen of whom were shot outright; on dying they shouted, 'Hurrah for Free Cuba, hurrah for independence.' A mulatto said, 'Hurrah for Cespedes.' On the following day we killed a Cuban officer and another man. Among the thirteen that we shot the first day we found three sons and their father. The father witnessed the execution of his sons without even changing color, and when his turn came he said he died for the independence of his country. On coming back we brought along with us three carts filled with women and children, the families of those we had shot, and they asked us to shoot them, because they would rather die than live among Spaniards."
Another wrote:
"Not a single Cuban will remain in this island, because we shoot all that we find in the fields, on the farms and in every hovel. We do not leave a creature alive where we pass, be it man or animal. If we find cows we kill them, if horses, ditto, if hogs, ditto, men, women or children, ditto. As to the houses, we burn them. So every one receives his due, the men in balls, the animals in bayonet thrusts. The island will remain a desert."
In the cities, outrages equally barbarous were committed.
The Havana volunteers, made up of the Spanish-born residents, in whose favor the government of the island has always been arranged, took possession of Havana, and put it under mob rule. In May, 1870, they marched out in front of the Villaneuva theater and fired volleys into the crowds that were entering. They had reason to believe, some of them said, that the performance to be given there was to raise funds for the insurgent cause.
So powerful was this organization that shortly after this outrage they placed the Captain-General of the island under arrest, and finally shipped him to Spain, sending word to the home government that he was not severe enough in his rule to suit their views, and suggesting that in case there were no Peninsulars who had the necessary stamina to govern Cuba according to their ideas, they might feel it advisable to assume command themselves.
On another occasion the dead body of one of these volunteers was placed in a public tomb in Havana, and the repository was found to have been defaced by scurrilous writing on the glass of the door. For no known reason, except a blood-thirsty desire for vengeance on someone, no matter whether guilty or innocent, it was claimed that the outrage was committed by some of the students of the university, and on complaint of the volunteer corps, forty-three of these young men were arrested.
They were arraigned before the military tribunal, and so manifestly unjust was the accusation that an officer of the regular army of Spain volunteered to defend them. There was absolutely no proof against them, and they were acquitted. But the volunteers were determined that their victims should not escape, and taking advantage of the fear in which they were held, even by the Havana officials, they forced the Governor-General to issue an order for a second courtmartial. At this examination they manipulated matters so that two thirds of the members of the trial board were connected with their organization, and a verdict of guilty was quickly rendered against all of the prisoners. Eight of them were sentenced to be shot, and the others to long terms of imprisonment at hard labor.
The day of the execution was a holiday in Havana. Bands of music paraded the streets, followed by the volunteers, 15,000 strong, while behind them, bound in chains, and under military guard, came the eight boys who had been condemned to die. Conscious of their innocence of any crime, they did not falter, but marched bravely to the place of execution, where they faced their murderers and fell, riddled by bullets from the rifles of the volunteers. The report of this affair sent a thrill of horror throughout the whole of the civilized world, and the perpetrators of the outrage were severely censured by the Spanish Cortes, but there was no attempt at punishment, nor were the ones who had been imprisoned released.
Meantime the war was being carried on in the provinces with varying success, but dissensions finally arose between the civil and military authorities of the republic of Cuba, and as "a house divided against itself cannot stand," the effectiveness of the campaign was destroyed, and, in 1878, concessions were offered by the Spanish government, which were accepted by the revolutionists, and the struggle was abandoned.
What the outcome of the contest might have been, could it have been continued with the leaders united for its success, is an open question. As the years went by the rank and file of the Cuban army seemed to be more determined than ever to throw off the yoke, and the government in Spain became less prompt in sending supplies of men and money to carry on the war. They eagerly seized the opportunity to bring it to a close, and the treaty of Zanjon, which was signed by General Martinez Campos, the Spanish Governor-General of the island, and General Maximo Gomez, Commander-in-Chief of the Cuban army, promised many reforms, and gave amnesty to all who had taken part in the rebellion.
Spanish Hypocrisy and Deceit—Cubans Denied Representation—Increase of Taxation—The Royal Edicts—A Plausible Argument,Which Is Not Borne Out by Facts—Spain's Promises Always Broken.
If Spain had been sincere in the promises of reform she made her Cuban colony when the treaty of Zanjon was signed, it is probable that the present war would have never occurred. For while a few of the leaders—notably General Maceo—refused to become pacified, the great majority of the better classes were glad to accept a peaceful settlement on terms that gave them, in fact, if not in name, nearly every concession for which they had fought.
But it did not take them long to learn that they had been duped. Spain granted to Cuba the liberties of Puerto Rico, which had none. On this deceitful ground was laid the new situation, through which ran a current of falsehood and hypocrisy. Spain, whose mind did not change, hastened to change the name of things. The captain-general was called the governor-general. The royal decrees took the name of authorizations. The commercial monopoly of Spain was named coasting trade. The right of banishment was transformed into the law of vagrancy. The brutal attacks of defenseless citizens were called "componte." The law of constitutional guarantees became the law of public order. Taxation without the consent or knowledge of the Cuban people was changed into the law of estimates (budget) voted by the representatives of Spain.
The painful lesson of the Ten Years' War was entirely lost on Spain. Instead of inaugurating a redeeming policy that would heal the recent wounds, allay public anxiety, and quench the thirst for justice felt by the people, who were desirous to enjoy their natural rights, the Peninsula, while lavish in promises of reform, persisted in carrying on, unchanged, its old and crafty system, namely: to exclude every native Cuban from every office that could give him any effective influence and intervention in public affairs; the ungovernable exploitation of the colonists' labor for the benefit of Spanish commerce and Spanish bureaucracy, both civil and military. To carry out the latter purpose it was necessary to maintain the former at any cost.
Mr. Clarence King, a recognized authority on political subjects connected with Cuban affairs, says:
"The main concession for which the insurgents accepted peace was the promise of constitutional reform. As a matter of fact, there promptly followed four royal edicts as follows: June 9, entitling Cuba to elect deputies to the Cortes, one for each 40,000 people; June 9, dividing the island into the present six provinces; June 21, instituting a system of provincial and municipal government, followed on August 16 by the necessary electoral regulations. But the system was immediately seen to be the shadow without the substance of self-government. The Provincial Assembly could nominate only three candidates for presiding officer. It was the inevitable governor-general who had the power to appoint, not necessarily one of the three nominees, but any member of the Assembly he chose. But all this provincial machinery is in reality an empty form, since expressly by law the governor-general was given the power to prorogue the assemblies at will. The deputies have never been able to accomplish anything in the Cortes. Moreover the crux of the whole financial oppression—tariff, taxes, and absolute control and expenditure of the revenue—remained with Spain."
The loyal Spaniard insists that every agreement entered into by his government was faithfully carried out; that the Cubans were given from time to time even greater liberties than the treaty promised them; and that in several matters of importance, immunities have been granted them that the people of the mother country did not share.
The Assistant Colonial Secretary of Spain concludes a voluminous defense of the policy of his government in Cuba as follows:
There is thus no reason in Cuba to complain of the illiberality of the laws. If there has been any shortcoming in respect to morals, the nation is not to blame; none but the colonial provinces are to blame for this; if we proposed to seek comfort in comparisons, it would not be necessary to look for them in South America, in the countries that have emancipated themselves from the Spanish mother-country, because examples (some of them very recent) of acts of violence, anarchy and scandalous outbreaks could be found in the States of the Union itself.
In respect to another matter, a great deal of foolish talk is indulged in. From the statements of some people it would appear that Cuba does nothing but contribute, by the taxes which it pays, to alleviate the burdens of the peninsular treasury, whereas, in reality, just the contrary is the truth. The nation has, of late, guaranteed the conversion of Spanish debts in Cuba, which took place in 1886 and 1890. Owing to these operations, and to the fact that all taxes which did not have to be met directly by its government have been rigorously eliminated from the budget of Cuba, it was possible to reduce the Cuban budget from forty-six and one-half million dollars, which was its amount at the close of the former war (for the fiscal year of 1878-79) to a little more than twenty-three millions of dollars, as appears from the budget of 1893.
The financial laws have been assimilated, and if the system of taxation has not been entirely assimilated, this is because of the fact that direct taxes are very repugnant to the popular feeling in Cuba, especially the tax on land, which is the basis of the Peninsular budget. It appears, however, that our Cuban brethren have no reason to complain in this respect. The direct tax on rural property is two per cent, in Cuba, whereas in Spain it is seventeen, and even twenty per cent. It is evident that every budget must be based on something; in Cuba, as in all other countries in which the natural conditions are similar, that something must necessarily be the income from customs duties. Notwithstanding this, it may be remarked that in the years when the greatest financial distress prevailed, the Spanish Government never hesitated to sacrifice that income when it was necessary to do so in order to meet the especial need of the principal agricultural product of Cuba. Consequently the Spanish commercial treaty with the United States was concluded, which certainly had not been concluded before, owing to any fault of the Spanish Government. Under that treaty, the principal object of which was to encourage the exportation of Cuban sugar, which found its chief market in the States of the Union, many Spanish industries were sacrificed which have formerly supplied the wants of the people of Cuba. That sacrifice was unhesitatingly made, and now that the treaty is no longer in force, is due to the fact that the new American tariff has stricken sugar from the free list.
Attention may also be called to the fact that the colonial provinces alone enjoy exemption from the blood tax, Cuba never having been obliged to furnish military recruits.
The disqualifications of the Cubans to hold public office is purely a myth. Such disqualifications is found on the text of no law or regulation, and in point of fact there is no such exclusion. In order to verify this assertion it would be sufficient to examine the lists of Cuban officers, especially of those employed in the administration of justice and in all branches of instruction. Even if it were desired to make a comparison of political offices, even of those connected with the functions which are discharged in the Peninsula, the proportion would still be shown in which Spaniards in Cuba aspire to both. The fact is that a common fallacy is appealed to in the language habitually used by the enemies of Spain, who call persons "Peninsulars" who were not born in Cuba, but have resided there many years and have all their ties and interests there, and do not call those "Cubans" who were born there and have left the island in order to meet necessities connected, perhaps, with their occupation. This was done in the Senate, when the advocates of the separation of Cuba only were called "Cubans," while those only who refused allegiance to the Spanish mother-country were called patriots.
In conclusion, I will relate a fact which may appear to be a joke, but which, in a certain way, furnished proof of what I have just said. When Rafael Gasset returned from Habana, he came and asked me for some data showing the proportion of Cubans holding office under our Government. I asked him, as a preliminary question, for a definition of what we were to understand by "Cuban" and what by "Peninsular." He immediately admitted that the decision of the whole question was based upon that definition, and I called his attention to the fact that here, in the Ministry of the Colonies, at the present time, there are three high governmental functionaries. One is a representative from Habana, being at the same time a professor in its University, and another, viz., your humble servant, is a Spaniard because he was born in Habana itself. Is the other man a Peninsular, and am I not a Cuban?
GUILLERMO. Assistant Colonial Secretary of Spain.
This is the argument from the Peninsular standpoint, and it is probably made in good faith. But while the Spanish rule in Cuba may seem to be just and equitable in theory, it is oppressive and tyrannical in fact. While the government may have partly carried out the letter of its promises, there has been no effort to fulfill the spirit of the compact in the slighest degree, and the violated pledges of the treaty of Zanjon only add new chapters to the long record of Spanish treachery and deceit.