CHAPTER XLIII.

Enthusiastic Answer to the Call—Requirements of the WarDepartment—Who May Enlist—How the Army was Formed—In theTraining Camps—The American Makes the Best Soldier—The "RoughRiders"—Cowboys and Society Men—Their Uniforms and TheirWeapons—Their Fighting Leaders.

If all the men who showed a desire to answer the call to arms had been accepted, no nation in the world could have boasted of a larger army. The demand was so limited and the supply so great that many more had to be refused than were accepted, and many of the National Guard, who were given the preference in all the States, were rejected at the final examination, because they lacked some of the qualifications necessary in a soldier of the United States.

According to the requirements of the war department applicants for enlistment must be between the ages of 18 and 35 years, of good character and habits, able-bodied, free from disease and must be able to speak the English language. If one is addicted to the bad habit of smoking cigarettes it is quite likely that he will not pass the physical examination. A man who has been a heavy drinker is apt to be rejected without ceremony.

Married men will only be enlisted upon the approval of the regimental commander.

Minors must not be enlisted without the written consent of father, only surviving parent, or legally appointed guardian. Original enlistment will be confined to persons who are citizens of the United States or who have made legal declaration of their intention to become citizens thereof.

These requirements fulfilled a man is permitted to take the physical examination. Few understand just how rigid this examination is. Many have been rejected who thought that they were in perfect physical condition. A number of applicants who were confident that they would be allowed to enlist were rejected by the physicians on account of varicose veins. Varicose veins are enlarged veins which are apt to burst under the stress of long continued exertion. Closely allied to this is varicocele, which threw out a surprisingly large proportion of the National Guard and the recruits.

After a man is weighed and his height taken, he is turned over to the doctor, who places the applicant's hands above his head and proceeds to feel his flesh. If it is soft and of flabby fiber the physician is not well pleased and if he finds that the bones are too delicate for the amount of flesh he turns the applicant down. Fat men, however, get through if their bones are solid and there is no organic weakness of any description. To discover the condition of the heart the applicant is made to hop about five yards on one foot and back again on the other. The doctor then listens to the beating of the heart. He lifts his head and says to some apparently fine-looking specimen of manhood the simple word:

"Rejected."

This man has heart trouble, and, strange to say, he does not know it. If a man be of a pale complexion or rather sallow, the doctors will question him with regard to his stomach. Of course the lungs are thoroughly tested. It is not often, however, that any one presents himself who is suffering from lung trouble. One man in particular was rejected because of the formation of his chest. He was what is commonly known as "pigeon-breasted." The doctors said that there was not enough room for air in the lungs, and yet the rejected applicant was a well-known athlete.

But after all organic centers have been found in excellent condition several things yet remain to be tested. A man's feet must not blister easily. His teeth must be good, because bad teeth interfere with digestion and are apt to develop stomach troubles. Of course other things taken into consideration a particular defect may be overlooked according to the discretion of the doctor. A man with his index finger gone stands no show.

A bow-legged man will be accepted, but a knocked-kneed man rarely.

The final test is of the eyes. At a, distance of twenty feet one must be able to read letters a half inch in size. Many tricks were played to read the letters when the eager candidate could see only a blur before him. The favorite method was to memorize the letters from those who had taken the examination and knew in just what order the letters were situated.

The making of an army—that is what it means to turn men of peace to men of war, to fit the mechanic or the business man, the farmer or the miner, for a passage at arms with a foreign foe—has been for the present generation a matter of conjecture and of lessons drawn from previous passages in the nation's chronicles. In our war with Spain it became a fact, and the progress made in the various stages forms a chapter in the public history which is as interesting as any of those conquests of either peace or war which brighten for every American the pages of the achievements of the Union of the States.

It is impossible to tell just how an army is made. During the long debates which preceded the declaration of war, eloquent men on both sides of the chambers of Congress pictured the strength of American arms, the shrillness of the scream of the eagle, and the sharpness of his talons, and applauding galleries saw in the coming combat little but the calling out of the vast body of the reserve strength of the American people, its marching upon the enemy, and return, bearing captured standards and leading prisoners in chains, to the music of the applauding nations, and the thanksgiving of a people made free by their struggles. The other side was never touched. The nights of toil by staff officers, the multiplied forces of mills and factories, the shriek of the trains crossing the continent, bearing men and munitions, and the hours of waiting for the completion of those warlike implements which the peaceful American has never before contemplated in the expansion of his industrial institutions, were entirely overlooked.

Not by all, however, for, from the moment the conflict seemed inevitable, stern-eyed men who had fought before began to count, not the cost, but the hours between the giving of an order and its fulfillment, between the calling and the coming, and finally when the results of their labors were completed the story of what they did may be partly told.

All the processes of making a soldier are as distinct as are those which mark the seed time and the harvest, the milling and the making of the loaf. It can be readily seen that in a country where the standing army is but 25,000, and the militia forces of the various States bears such a slight proportion to the population, that manufactures of materials of use only in time of war could not flourish. Thus it was that at the time of the commencement of hostilities there was available in the United States equipment for an army of less than one-fifth the size of that which afterwards took the field, and patriotism and fidelity were shown as much in the outfitting of that force, as can be shown in actual battle by any volunteer or regular officer, whether he be posted in fort or field, and win glory by brilliant dash, or simply doing his duty by holding his post.

The ready response to the President's call for volunteers was sufficient to prove that the people were eager to take up arms and ready to go to the front. But enthusiasm, patriotism and readiness never make an army. An army is a great machine, of which each individual is a part, and there even the militia men of the various States, who had spent so much time in preparing themselves for just such a struggle, lacked the one great element without which no army can hope for success: the capacity to move in unison. Few of the States had given their men the training which makes of the simple company or regiment a wheel in the brigade or division.

In the great camps at Chickamauga, at Camp Alger, at Tampa, and at San Francisco the task of making an army from men who a month before had been working in the store, the mill or the field, went on. This meant long, thorough drilling under competent instructors. Careful study of the tactics and intelligent comprehension of the meaning of an order makes the soldier. It is not possible to imagine anything more difficult than the thorough training of the arms bearer, and for this task the American seems better fitted than the men of any other country. In an analysis of the soldiers of the world an authority would place the American, combining as he does the blood of nations, at the head of the list, for the reason that with his finer sensibility, his greater capacity to think while acting and to act while thinking, all tend to produce in him that character capable of high and perfect development in the soldier.

At Chickamauga, under General Wade; at Washington, under General Graham; at Tampa, under General Shafter; at San Francisco, under General Merriam, and on the New York and New England coasts under brigadiers who had served East and West, the raw material was formed, until at length the perfect soldier was produced, the soldier of whom it could be said:

"Theirs not to reason why,Theirs but to do and die."

Those who are acquainted with the nature of the service usually required of cavalry in time of war will not question the usefulness of the cowboy regiment—rough riders as they are called—that were raised in the West to take part in the invasion of Cuba.

The cowboy is a rapidly passing type. Barbed wire, the fencing in of the range, together with the irrigation and cultivation of those regions which were once marked as deserts on the maps—have been responsible for his undoing and he has made what may prove to be his last stand, as a soldier.

The cowboy regiment was the idea of the assistant secretary of the navy, Theodore Roosevelt, who had had some experience himself as a cowboy on his Wyoming ranch and who was an expert in such matters as branding, rope-throwing, broncho breaking and those other practices which are peculiar to the "cow-puncher."

Lieutenant-Colonel Roosevelt's regiment, which figures on the army records as the "1st regiment of rifle rangers," but which the general public from the first preferred to call "Roosevelt's rough riders," or more simply still, "Teddy's terrors," was made up almost entirely of cowboys, with a small sprinkling of society men, who had both a fondness and an aptitude for horsemanship, which had found no other outlet than that offered by the hunting field and the polo ground.

In organization the regiment was not widely different from the famous Texas Rangers, but the uniform was the same as that of the cavalrymen of the regular army, slightly modified. Its personnel, with the exception of the millionaire members—was about the same, however, as that of the Rangers. It included men from almost every State in the Union, and they could one and all ride well, and shoot well, and many of them smelled powder in more than one Indian war.

While Lieutenant-Colonel Roosevelt took the most active part in its formation, he did not command the regiment. That responsibility was delegated to Colonel Wood, who was almost as well known in the West as Roosevelt was in the East. He entered the army as a surgeon, but he probably had much more to do with the making of wounds than their healing.

It is said of him that when he was first assigned for duty to an Arizona post he arrived at the post one night at 7 o'clock, and the next morning at 4 was in the field and at work. This was during the Apache campaign in 1885, and Surgeon Wood soon won for himself the name of the fighting doctor. He was conspicuous in the famous Geronimo outbreak, having command at various times of the infantry and scouts engaged in the chase after that wily savage.

The regiment was armed with the Krag-Jorgensen carbine and revolvers, without which no cowboy would be complete even in time of peace. And instead of the regular cavalry sword, which is a rather unwieldy instrument except in the hands of men trained to its use, the rough riders adopted the Cuban machete, which even the inexperienced can use successfully; but it was not intended that they should be swordsmen; their reliance was on the rifle and revolver. The machete was carried merely as a possible dependence should ammunition fail, or a hand-to-hand encounter with the cavalry of the enemy occur. In the development of this plan of action it can be seen that Colonel Wood and Lieutenent-Colonel Roosevelt in the tactics they employed followed closely those used by the mounted riflemen of the revolution. It was a band of this sort that after a ride of sixty miles the last day met and utterly routed the English under Colonel Ferguson.

Contraband of War—Confiscation of Cargoes—Establishment of aBlockade—Notice to Other Nations—Prizes, Lawful and Unlawful—Privateering Abolished—Distribution of Prize Money—The Use theGovernment Makes of Its Share.

While the great blockade was in progress the air was full of talk about "prizes," "contraband," "search," and "seizure," and some of the terms proved rather puzzling to the average citizen who had never had occasion to study the rules of war.

First about "contraband." It is one of the strictest rules of war that neutral nations must not interfere nor in any way give help to either party. To furnish ships or arms or ammunition might greatly prolong the conflict or even change its result, especially where this assistance is extended to a nation—like Spain to-day— ill supplied and of small resources. This would be manifestly unfair, and for a neutral to offer or abet such aid is a grave offense. For remissness in an aggravated case of this sort (that of the Alabama) England was forced to pay us heavy damages. Neither national sympathy nor national interests afford any excuse.

That is why we restrained and punished those who organized expeditions to help the Cubans while we were still at peace with Spain. But nations engaged in war must not ask too much. They may insist that a neutral shall allow no hostile operations to be carried on within its territory, but they have no right to demand that it shall punish its private citizens for engaging in trade in articles that may be helpful to the enemy, for that would be imposing too much trouble and expense upon a nation which has no concern in the quarrel. Such trade is punishable, but it is the business of the nation injured by it to catch the ships engaged in it and enforce the penalty—which is usually confiscation of the goods as "contraband of war." To do this it may stop and search any ships—except warships—which it finds at sea; and so long as no outrages are committed the neutral must submit and has no ground for complaint. Trade in contraband goods is tolerated, but it is carried on at the trader's own risk. His government will not undertake to protect him from the legitimate consequences of his venture.

As has been stated, the contraband goods are confiscated by the captor. The vessel, however, must be captured while the guilty goods are still on board; to seize the proceeds after the cargo has been sold and landed is not allowable, though it has sometimes been done. If the ship belongs to the same owner as the forfeited goods, it, too, is confiscated; otherwise it goes free after the goods are taken off.

It is very important to know just what articles are contraband and what are not; but this is often hard to decide. There is no question about weapons, military equipments and ammunition. These are plainly contraband, and the materials from which they are made are classed with them whenever they seem intended for military uses. Thus sulphur and saltpeter are always contraband. The detached parts of cannon and naval engines do escape by the trick of separation.

Cloth is not contraband in itself, but if of a quality evidently designed for the manufacture of uniform it would probably be seized. Horses are so useful in war that most nations treat them as contraband—though, oddly enough, Russia has never done so. Still more objectionable, nowadays, is coal, which will never be allowed to reach the bunkers of hostile warships if it can be prevented. This shows plainly how uncertain and changeful is the list, for fifty years ago coal was as free as provisions, though even food must not be run through the lines of a blockade.

Articles, such as coal, which are of great value in war, but are also largely used for peaceful purposes, are called "occasional contraband" and their seizure has given rise to endless disputes. There is no justice in treating them as contraband except when they are obviously destined for hostile use. Sometimes, in doubtful cases, such goods, instead of being confiscated, are seized and paid for to prevent their reaching the enemy. This is called "pre-emption;" but, fair as it seems, there is much danger that it will be made a pretext for appropriating goods which ought to go quite free, and the practice is generally condemned.

Search at sea is extremely annoying, and ships entirely innocent of contraband are often subjected to great inconvenience. That must be endured; to attempt to resist or escape would make them liable to confiscation, whatever their cargo might prove to be. Only properly commissioned vessels, however, are entitled to hold up merchantmen for this purpose. Another kind of meddling in war for which a neutral citizen may be punished by confiscation, but for which his government is not held responsible, is blockade running.

A blockade, such as we maintained around Cuba, is established by stationing war vessels at the entrances of harbors and at intervals along the blockaded coast. Its purpose is to cut off supplies and stop all communication with the enemy by sea. The merchant ships of all nations are therefore forbidden to pass or even to approach the line, and the penalty for disobedience is the confiscation of both ship and cargo—whether the latter is contraband or not here makes no difference. If the ship does not stop when hailed she may be fired upon, and if she is sunk while endeavoring to escape it is her own fault. And unlike vessels merely guilty of carrying contraband, she is no less liable to seizure on her return voyage, after her cargo has been disposed of. Altogether, blockade running is perilous business. It is usually attempted under cover of night or stormy weather, and it is as full of excitement and adventure as war itself. The motive is usually either to take advantage of famine prices, or to aid the enemy by bringing supplies or carrying dispatches.

Neutral ships, however, are entitled to some sort of warning that a blockade exists. Notice is therefore sent to all neutral governments, announcing the fact and stating exactly the extent of coast covered. Besides this, until the blockade has lasted for some time and thus has become generally known it is customary for the officers of the blockading fleet to visit and warn every ship that approaches, the warning, with the date, being entered upon her register. If, after that, she approaches the forbidden coast, she is liable to confiscation—though possibly great stress of weather might excuse her provided she landed no cargo. Instructions of this sort were issued by President McKinley to our squadron blockading Cuba. A reasonable time, also, was granted to ships that were lying in the blockaded ports at the time when the blockade was declared, to make their escape. President McKinley allowed thirty days for this purpose, which was unusually liberal.

Nations engaged in war have sometimes assumed that they could establish a blockade by simply issuing a proclamation forbidding neutrals to approach the enemy's coast, without stationing ships to enforce it. For example, during the Napoleonic wars, France declared the whole coast of England to be blockaded at a time when she scarcely dared send out a ship from her ports, having been soundly thrashed at Trafalgar. But these "paper blockades" are a mere waste of time and ink. They are not valid, and except in the way of angry and contemptuous protest, no nation would consider them worthy of the slightest attention. If Spain, for instance, should attempt a desperate game of bluff by declaring New Orleans, New York and Boston under blockade, all neutral ships would come and go just the same, and she would meddle with them at her peril. This question—if it ever was a question—was finally decided by the epoch-making convention of the powers at the close of the Crimean war (treaty of Paris, 1856), which, along with other rules that have revolutionized naval warfare, declared that "blockades in order to be binding must be effective." This means that they must be maintained by a force actually stationed on the blockaded coast, strong enough to make it decidedly dangerous to attempt to run through. The temporary absence of some of the ships, however, either in pursuit of an enemy or on account of a violent storm, would not invalidate the blockade, and ships seeking to take advantage of such an opening would be liable to the full penalty if caught.

And now a few words about "prizes"—a particularly interesting and timely theme, for during the very first week of the war our fleet captured no fewer than fifteen of them.

In time of war properly commissioned ships are entitled to capture not only the armed vessels but also the helpless merchantmen of the enemy. It does seem a good deal like piracy, but it has been the universal practice from time immemorial. These captured vessels are taken to some convenient port of the captor's own country that the courts may pass judgment on them, and if there has been no mistake made in the seizure they are forthwith condemned as "lawful prize." Then they are sold, and "prize money" is awarded the captors in proportion to the value of the prize. The cargo is treated in the same way, unless it happens to belong to a neutral, in which case it is free; though the owner must put up with the inconvenience and delay resulting from the seizure, since he deliberately took that risk when he placed his goods in a hostile craft. Formerly his property was sometimes confiscated under these circumstances, but the treaty of Paris, already mentioned, put a stop to that. Formerly, too, the goods of enemies could be taken from neutral ships and confiscated in the same manner as contraband of war, but the treaty of Paris made an end of that also.

Another excellent rule adopted on that notable occasion abolished privateering. Privateers were armed ships belonging to private citizens who had obtained from their own government a commission (letter of marque) which authorized them to make prize of the enemy's merchant vessels and appropriate the proceeds. The abolition of privateering was a long step in the right direction, for the privateer's motive was mainly plunder, and the whole business was really close kin to piracy. Neither the United States nor Spain signed the original agreement, but both have acceded to it now—Spain, evidently, very much against her will, for her citizens thirsted for the rich booty of our commerce, a fact which makes supremely ridiculous her crazy ravings against our legitimate captures as "American piracy."

The prize money adjudged to captors is distributed in the following proportions:

1. The commander of a fleet or squadron, one-twentieth part of all prize money awarded to any vessel or vessels under his immediate command.

2. To the commander of a division of a fleet or squadron, a sum equal to one-fiftieth of any prize money awarded to a vessel of the division under his command, to be paid from the moiety due the United States, if there be such moiety; if not, from the amount awarded the captors.

3. To the fleet captain, one-hundredth part of all prize money awarded to any vessel of the fleet in which he is serving, in which case he shall share in proportion to his pay, with the other officers and men on board such vessel.

4. To the commander of a single vessel, one-tenth of all the prize money awarded to the vessel.

5. After the foregoing deductions, the residue is distributed among the others doing duty on board, and borne upon the books of the ship, in proportion to their respective rates of pay.

All vessels of the navy within signal distance of the vessel making the capture, and in such condition as to be able to render effective aid if required, will share in the prize. Any person temporarily absent from his vessel may share in the captures made during his absence. The prize court determines what vessels shall share in a prize, and also whether a prize was superior or inferior to the vessel or vessels making the capture.

The share of prize money awarded to the United States is set apart forever as a fund for the payment of pensions to naval officers, seamen and marines entitled to pensions.

Spain Threatened with Interior Difficulties—Danger that theCrown Might Be Lost to the Baby King of Spain—Don Carlos and theCarlists Are Active—Castelar Is Asked to Establish a Republic—General Weyler as a Possible Dictator—History of the CarlistMovement and Sketch of "the Pretender."

While these events were in progress in the international relations of the United States and Spain, with a threat of a hopeless war hanging over the latter, the embarrassments of the government of the peninsular kingdom as to the conflict of its own affairs at home multiplied daily. Altogether aside from the prospective operations of the war itself the Queen Regent and her Ministry had more than one local difficulty to face.

It was frankly recognized in their inner councils that a succession of Spanish defeats, in all probability, would lose the throne to the dynasty and that the boy king would never wear the crown of his father. A second threat of danger was that in the midst of difficulties abroad there would be an uprising of the adherents of Don Carlos "The Pretender," who would take advantage of the situation to start a civil war and seize the authority. In addition to all this, the republicans of Spain, growing more restless under the misgovernment they saw, united in an address to Castelar, who was formerly the president of the Spanish republic, urging that he declare the republic again established and promising to support him in such a movement. The names of 20,000 of the best citizens of Spain were signed to this request, and it was an element of danger to the monarchy that was well recognized. Finally, the partisans of General Weyler, who comprised a large element of the proudest and most influential people of Spain, showed distinct signs of a desire to establish a dictatorship with that ferocious general as the supreme authority. He had been recalled from Cuba as a rebuke and in order to alter the policies which he had established there. His friends were ready to resent the rebuke and offer him higher place than he had had before.

Spain has been the scene of many revolutions, a fact easily understood when the character of the government is known. Dishonesty and oppression in an administration always breed the spirit of rebellion. Don Carlos, who regards Alfonso as a usurper, and believes himself the true King of Spain, issued, April 13, from his retreat in Switzerland, a manifesto to his supporters. In this he arraigned the government, sought to inflame the excited Spanish populace against the Queen Regent, her son and her ministers, and declared that they had permitted the Spanish standard to be dragged in the mud. He said in part:

Twenty years of patriotic retirement have proved that I am neither ambitious nor a conspirator. The greater and better part of my life as a man has been spent in the difficult task of restraining my natural impulses and those of my enthusiastic Carlists, whose eagerness I was the first to appreciate, but which nevertheless I curbed, although it rent my heart to do so. To-day national honor speaks louder than anything, and the same patriotic duty which formerly bade me say "Wait yet a while," may lead me to cry, commanding the Carlists, "Forward," and not only the Carlists, but all Spaniards, especially to the two national forces which still bravely withstand the enervating femininities of the regency, the people and the army.

If the glove which Washington has flung in the face of Spain is picked up by Madrid I will continue the same example of abnegation as before, wretched in that I cannot partake in the struggle other than by prayers and by the influence of my name. I will applaud from my soul those who have the good fortune to face the fire, and I shall consider those Carlists as serving my cause who embark in war against the United States.

But if everything leads me to fear that the policy of humiliation will again prevail, we will snatch the reins of government from those who are unworthy to hold them and we will occupy their places.

While their leader was talking in this strain, his supporters were preparing to act. They believed that the conditions for a revolution were more favorable than they had been for years, that the present dynasty was doomed, and that Spain would be forced to choose between republicanism and Don Carlos. The only chance, they said for the retention of the present dynasty, would be for Spain to defeat the United States, and they were not so blind as to believe that such would be the outcome of a war between the two powers.

Don Carlos himself believed that the time had come to act. He journeyed to Ostend, where he consulted with Lord Ashburnham and other Catholic Englishmen who were his supporters, and mapped out a plan of campaign. He stood ready at any convenient moment to cross the frontier and place himself at the head of his supporters.

Never since there was a pretender to the throne of Spain, and Don Carlos is the third of the name, had the outlook been so favorable for the fall of the constitutional monarchy.

Discontent has been widespread in Spain and it has been fomented by the Carlists, with a splendid organization, with more than 2,000 clubs scattered in various parts of the kingdom.

Causes for discontent have not been lacking, and the Cuban and Philippine revolts, together with the threatened trouble with the United States, were not the only reasons for popular dissatisfaction. Spain was bankrupt and found it difficult to borrow money from the money lenders of London and Paris. With the increased expenses due to the revolution there had been a decrease in receipts for the same cause—the usual revenues from Havana being lacking. The people were poor and thousands of them starving. Additional taxation was out of the question, for the people were taxed to the limit.

These were the causes to which the strength of the Carlist agitation was due. And that it was strong there can be no doubt. The birthday of Don Carlos, March 30, was celebrated this year with an enthusiasm and unprecedented degree of unanimity throughout the kingdom, and the government did not feel itself strong enough to interfere with them.

There were hundreds of fetes in cities, towns and villages, and many of them were held in the open air, where the pretender was toasted as "El Key" or "the king," and Alfonso was ignored.

This inaction could be due only to the fact that the government was powerless. To say that they did not fear Don Carlos would be ridiculous, as the latest manifesto of Don Carlos was suppressed, and the government was really in fear and trembling. A more plausible reason would be that the ministry wished to be in the good graces of Don Carlos should he win, and they were not ready to trust themselves to absolute loyalty to the present dynasty.

Meanwhile, as this chapter is written, reports from Spain tell of unprecedented Carlist activity. They are arming themselves. Arms are pouring across the frontier in such quantities as to show that the Carlists are preparing for an early rising, and all of the actions and utterances of the leader show that they are only waiting for a favorable opportunity to begin the revolution. Strong proof of this is to be found in the fact that since Don Carlos secured his second wife's vast fortune he has been penurious, and it is not believed that he would spend money in arms unless he believed the expenditure would bring about some practical advantage to his cause.

His agents have been working among the army officers, and it is said that they have secured many recruits for their cause. The throne of Spain, like the throne of Russia, during the last century, or that of Borne in the days of the empire, rests largely upon the army, and if the army, discontented and dissatisfied as it certainly is, were to revolt, Don Carlos' success would be almost certain.

Ever since his marriage in 1894 with the Princess de Rohan, who brought him a large fortune, Don Carlos has been watching a favorable opportunity for a coup. There cannot be a better one than that which will be offered when Spain is defeated by the United States, and it would not be surprising to see Don Carlos unfurl his banner to the breeze and call for troops to rally to his standard.

Those who are supporters of the pretensions of Don Carlos believe they have right on their side. His supporters love him with the loyalty of the legitimists to the house of Stuart during the period before the restoration in England. His personality is attractive. He has all the elements of personal popularity with the masses. He is brave and dashing. He does not sit and weep over the fallen glories of his race, but he is always ready for action. He is ready at any moment to lead an army in a forlorn cause and will fight, for what he believes to be his rights.

The position occupied in Spanish affairs by Don Carlos is similar to that occupied by Prince Charles Edward toward the throne of Great Britain during the last century. His family has been dispossessed for about the same length of time and he has made a fight just as romantic, but with more brilliant prospects, and at the head of the heroic highlanders, dwellers in the Basque mountains. His followers are the flower of Spain, the most aristocratic families in the kingdom, willing to risk all in his support, setting property and life itself as worth naught compared with their honor.

There have been three Carlist pretenders to the throne of Spain. The first was Carlos V., born in 1788. He laid claim to the throne on the death of his brother, Ferdinand VII., in 1833.

Ferdinand had had a stormy reign, torn by dissensions between the court and the popular party. Napoleon compelled him to resign in favor of Joseph Bonaparte, but he returned to the throne of his ancestors upon the fall of Bonaparte. During twenty-eight years he married five wives in succession. By four of these he had no children, but a daughter was born to the last, who had been Princess of Naples. She secured an absolute mastery of the king, who was an imbecile unfitted to reign. The heir apparent to the throne was the grandfather of the present Don Carlos, Carlos V., the brother of Ferdinand. Between Carlos and his brother there had been a long enmity.

Christina used her influence with her husband to persuade him to disinherit his brother. By the Salic law females were excluded from inheriting the throne of France. But through the influence of Ferdinand and his spouse the cortes was persuaded to repeal the law, the more willingly since Carlos was in favor of absolutism, while with a woman as ruler the chances would be better for the perpetuation of constitutionalism. The Carlists claim that during the last days Ferdinand repented his act and issued documents which would have established Carlos' right to the succession, but that these were suppressed. However that may be, upon the death of Ferdinand his baby daughter was declared Queen of Spain, with her mother as regent.

For five years there was civil war. The youth and weakness of the baby queen proved her strength. The liberals believed that with her as the nominal ruler the continuance of the constitutional monarchy would be assured. For the same reasons France and England supported Isabella. These were odds against which Carlos could not effectually fight, and in 1869 he retreated from Spain, and the historians treat the succession as settled in favor of the young girl, who even at that time was not in her teens.

Isabella II., or rather her mother, for the latter was the real ruler, did not rule with prudence. Scandals disgraced the reign, and led to the regent's removal from the regency. Queen Isabella's ill-fated marriage and other intrigues led to domestic disturbances which kept alive the pretensions of the Carlists.

Upon the death of the first pretender, in 1853, a second arose in the person of his son, Don Carlos, Count de Montemolim. He attempted to cause a revolution in 1860, but was arrested with his brother, and they were not liberated until they had signed a renunciation of their claims to the throne.

The second pretender died in 1861, and then the present Don Carlos arose. He was the son of Don Juan, and a brother of the two who had renounced their claims to the Spanish throne, and he claimed that their renunciation could not be binding on him. This was the Don Carlos who is now the leader of the legitimists, and he has never renounced his claim to the throne of his ancestors.

His name in full is Don Carlos de los Dolores Juan Isidore Josef Francisco Quirino Antonio Miguel Gabriel Rafael. He was born in the little village of Laibach in the Austrian Alps, while his parents were on a journey through the country, and from his infancy his career has been surrounded with a romance which has endeared him to the hearts of his followers. His father, Don Juan, was an exile from Spain and a royal wanderer seeking a place where he could end his life in peace.

He and his wife were befriended by the Emperor Ferdinand of Austria, who placed the young Don Carlos under the care of a Spanish priest, who educated him for the priesthood. Even in his infancy he cared nothing to become a priest in spite of his devout devotion to the Roman Catholic faith, but dreamed of the day when he would rule as King of Spain.

Don Carlos was only seventeen years of age when he met and fell in love with Margaret, the daughter of the Duke of Parma. She was only fourteen, and the mother of the young prince persuaded them to postpone the marriage for three years. With his wife the pretender received a large fortune and he has been able to maintain a court in the semblance of royalty for several years.

Thirty years ago Carlos might have been king. The crown was then offered him by Prim and Sagasta, who journeyed to London for the purpose. They said it should be his if he would support the liberal constitution proposed for the country and would favor the separation of church and state. It was the latter idea that led to his rejection of the proffered honor. His strict Roman Catholic training made him refuse, for religion was more to him than anything else.

"When I come to my throne," he declared, "I shall rule my land asI see fit."

These were the words with which he scornfully spurned their offer.

The republicans never forgave him, and later when, after the dethronement of Isabella, his name was again proposed in the cortes by his supporters, Prim and Sagasta were his most bitter enemies.

On Don Carlos' behalf, insurrections—speedily repressed—took place in 1869 and 1872. But the insurrection headed by him in person in 1873 proved much more formidable and kept the Basque provinces in a great confusion till the beginning of 1876, when it was crushed.

Before the commencement of the war of 1872-76, Don Carlos defined clearly his position and views in various manifestos addressed to the people of Spain. He declared that with him the revolutionary doctrine should have no place. What Spain wanted, said Don Carlos, was that no outrage should be offered to the faith of her fathers, for in Catholicity reposed the truth, as she understood it, the symbol of all her glories, the spirit of all her laws and the bond of concord between all good Spaniards. What Spain wanted was a real king and a government worthy and energetic, strong and respected.

The opportunity for Don Carlos was found in the troublous times that led to and followed the abdication of Amadeo I., Duke of Aosta, who had been elected by the cortes. The four years' war commenced in spring, 1872, and a year later Amadeo abdicated in a message saying that he saw Spain in a continual struggle, and the era, of peace more distant; he sought remedies within the law, but did not find them; his efforts were sterile.

Thereupon the two chambers combined as the sovereign power of Spain and voted for a republic. The two years of the republic were the stormiest in Spanish history, and it was then that the Carlists made the greatest progress. They numbered probably one-third of the people of Spain. A republic was not suited to the disposition of the Spaniards, and Castelar, who had the helm of the ship of state, gave up his task in disgust. Then Alfonso XII., son of the exiled Isabella, was proclaimed heir to the throne. Alfonso XIII., is his son.

Alfonso XII.'s first task was to suppress the Carlists, and in this he succeeded. The people were tired of the continual strife. Royalists and republicans alike welcomed the new monarch.

The number of his followers gradually dwindling and finding that continued resistance would be unavailable, Don Carlos was finally convinced that it would be useless to continue the struggle. So early in 1876 his army disbanded. Accompanied by his bodyguard he crossed the Pyrenees. As he stepped his foot on French soil he turned as if to bid farewell to Spain, but his last words, energetically pronounced, were: "Volvere, volvere! I will return, I will return!" And it is the belief of his followers that his time is near at hand.

No man has more devoted followers. The army that fought for him during the Carlist revolution was one of the most heroic that has ever been gathered together. To his standard came young men of good family from every nation. He was regarded as the representative of the old regime of monarchists, and in his ranks were those who hoped for the re-establishment of the now obsolete divine right of kings. He was the head of the house of Bourbon in all Europe. Except for the existence of Maria Theresa, daughter of Ferdinand of Modena, married the Prince Louis of Bavaria, Don Carlos would be the legitimate representative of the royal house of Stuart, and, barring the English act of settlement, King of Great Britain and Ireland.

This fact may have had something to do with the cold shoulder that was turned to him by all of the powers of Europe. Don Carlos was regarded as the representative of the half-dozen pretenders to the throne who live in exile amid little courts of their own and build air castles peopled with things they will do when they mount the thrones of which they believe themselves to have been defrauded.

The Carlists believe that with the support of one of the great governments they would have won. But they could obtain no recognition even of their belligerency, and that was in spite of the fact that, as early as 1873, the president of the Spanish Republic has declared in the cortes: "We have a real civil war. … It has a real administrative organization and collects taxes. You have presented to you one state in front of another. It is in fact a great war."

Yet in spite of this declaration and in spite of the fact that the five successive heads of the Madrid government recognized the belligerency of the Carlists by conventions; that treaties were made for the running of railroads and for other purposes, and that the Carlists, had a mint, postoffice and all of the equipments of a regular government, recognition was withheld by the powers. Everything depended upon England, and General Kirkpatrick, a brigadier general in the civil war, who represented the Carlists as charge d'affaires at London, was unable to secure that boon from Gladstone, and none of the continental powers would act until England had led the way.

After his retirement from Spain, when the war had exhausted his resources, Don Carlos lived humbly and quietly at Paris. He had ceased to love his wife and they led a miserable domestic life. He would sell his war horse and fling the money to her on the bare table, telling her to buy bread with it. Then his friends would buy the horse back again. Once he disposed of the badge of the Order of Golden Fleece that had decorated the son of his illustrious ancestor, Charles V. The discreditable part of this action was not so much in the actual act of pawning as that he put the blame for it on an old general who had served him with fidelity for twenty years. He claimed that the general had stolen it, imagining that the old soldier's devotion to his interests would induce him to remain silent. But the general at once told all of the facts in the case, and also told how Don Carlos had used the money to satisfy the demands of a notorious demi-mondaine.

His financial difficulties came to an end with the death of the Comte and Comtesse de Chambord, who bequeathed the larger part of their immense wealth to their favorite niece, wife of Don Carlos. The duchess kept the money in her own hands, but gave him all he needed. At her death she was quite as provident, leaving the money in trust for her children and giving only a small allowance to her husband, from whom she had lived apart for fifteen years.

This threw the pretender again into financial straits, for he has expensive tastes which require a large fortune to support. So he looked around for a bride. His followers were startled to hear of his marriage to the wealthy Princess Marie Berthe de Rohan. The marriage took place April 29, 1894, and, although she was handsome and exceedingly rich and a member of the illustrious Rohan family, which alone of all the noble families of France and Austria has the privilege of calling the monarch cousin—it was regarded as a mesalliance by all of the Carlists in Spain and legitimists everywhere. They believed that Don Carlos should have not married any but the scion of a royal house.

By his first marriage Don Carlos had five children, among them Don Jaime, now in his twenty-eighth year, who is regarded as heir to the throne by the Carlists. Don Jaime is said to possess to a high degree the strength of will and the determined character of his father. He was educated in England and Austria, and is now serving in the Russian army. Military science is his hobby, and he will be able to fight for his throne, as his father has done, if it becomes necessary.

Don Carlos is now in Switzerland, that home of the exiled from other lands, and where he spends his summers. His winter residence is at the Palais de Loredane in Venice.

At the present date the Carlist party is one of the strongest political parties in Spain. This does not appear in the representation in the Spanish cortes, for under the present system the right to exercise the franchise freely is a farce.

There is no doubt that Don Carlos' popularity is greater than that of the little king. The queen is regarded as a foreigner and the king is too young to awaken any admiration in spite of the fact that every opportunity is taken to make him do so. To popularize the little king the queen regent promenades the poor child through the provinces. He makes childish speeches to the populace, touches the flags of the volunteers and in every way seeks to revive the enthusiasm for the house of Austria. But without avail. The wretched peasants, ground down by taxes, find little to stir them in the sight.

On the contrary, Don Carlos is a great military hero, whose actions have stirred the people to admiration in spite of his many bad qualities.

That the present dynasty will endure when all of the evils from which Spain suffers are considered, seems hard to believe. Unless a miracle happens or the powers bolster up the throne of the little king, the people are likely to turn to Don Carlos for relief. There are those who believe that republicanism is also rampant and that the Carlist agitation masks republican doctrines, and that Weyler will be dictator. This may be. But Don Carlos seems nearer the throne than he has been at any time during his career.


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