Chapter 7

Goldsmith in his “Deserted Village” has well portrayed the “moody” teacher:—“A man severe he was, and stern to view;I knew him well, and every truant knew:Well had the boding tremblers learned to traceThe day’s disasters in his morning face;Full well they laughed, with counterfeited glee,At all his jokes, for many a joke had he;Full well the busy whisper, circling round,Conveyed the dismal tidings when he frowned.”

Goldsmith in his “Deserted Village” has well portrayed the “moody” teacher:—

“A man severe he was, and stern to view;I knew him well, and every truant knew:Well had the boding tremblers learned to traceThe day’s disasters in his morning face;Full well they laughed, with counterfeited glee,At all his jokes, for many a joke had he;Full well the busy whisper, circling round,Conveyed the dismal tidings when he frowned.”

“A man severe he was, and stern to view;

I knew him well, and every truant knew:

Well had the boding tremblers learned to trace

The day’s disasters in his morning face;

Full well they laughed, with counterfeited glee,

At all his jokes, for many a joke had he;

Full well the busy whisper, circling round,

Conveyed the dismal tidings when he frowned.”

167.Second. Training is to exert a determining influence; it is to induce the pupilto choose(147). Under this head falls the discrimination spoken of above between varieties of volitional impulse—the will to bear, to have, and to do; hence also experiential knowledge of the natural consequences of doing or of failure to do (157), for unless these are taken into consideration, the manifold of will cannot be reduced to harmony. Now the first point to be noticed in connection with this aspect of training is that the teacher does not choose for the pupil. The pupil himself must choose, for it is his own characterthat is to be determined. He must himself experience a part, although only the smallest part, of that which is desirable or harmful. That the flame burns that a pin pricks, that a fall or knock hurts, this lesson even the little child must learn; and similar experiences must be gained later, provided they do not carry the pupil to the verge of serious danger. Everything essential has been accomplished if, in consequence of actual experiences confirming the teacher’s words of warning, the pupil believes other warnings without waiting for confirmation.

Not second in importance to the act of choosing is the content of the choice. If conduct must have a social outcome, all the activities of the school will focus at this point. In order to have rational choice there must be first of all social intelligence. This it is the function of instruction to develop. According to a well-known doctrine of Herbart, it is the chief duty of instruction to make a progressive revelation to the pupil of the ethical world, in order that his puny will may gradually be reinforced by race experience. The instruments for this revelation are the studies on the one hand, and the conduct of the school according to social principles on the other. In the second place, that the ethical choice may truly express the pupil’s inward state, rather than his outward constraint, it must grow out of his insight as suffused by his social responsiveness to ethical ideas. In other words, his disposition should confirm his intellectual perception of the right line of conduct. This raises the whole matter of interest as related to will.[17]Hereagain natural, spontaneous, almost unconscious attitude is vastly superior to morbid introspection, no matter how ‘good’ the pupil’s disposition may prove to be. A boy should not have to ‘reflect’ as to whether he will rob a bird’s nest or not.

[17]See Dr. John Dewey, “Interest as Related to Will,” National Herbart Society, reprint for 1899.

168.Pleasure and pain arise so largely out of social relations that the pupil must grow up amidst a social environment in order to become somewhat acquainted with his natural place among men. This requirement gives rise accordingly to solicitous precautions against a bad example and rudeness. On the other hand, a boy’s companions should not be chosen with such anxious care as if the intention were to spare him the feeling of pressure which in all human society is generated by the efforts and counter-efforts of men. Too great complaisance on the part of playmates causes delusions as to the actual conditions of life.

Again, society and seclusion must alternate. The social current is not to carry everything else along with it, and to become more powerful than education. Even the boy, and much more the youth, must learn to be alone, and to fill up his time profitably.

Unbroken association of the child with his mates tends to bring him too exclusively under the influence of imitation and of acting impulsively upon those forms of unreasoning suggestion which sway the crowd, the gang, and the mob. To quote Professor Baldwin:[18]“The characteristics of the social suggestions upon which the crowd act show them to be strictly suggestions.They are not truths, nor arguments, nor insights, nor inventions.... The suggestible mind has very well known marks. Balzac hit off one of them in ‘Eugénie Grandet’ in the question, ‘Can it be that collectively man has no memory?’ We might go through the list of mental functions asking the same question of them one by one. Has man collectively no thought, no sense of values, no deliberation, no self-control, no responsibility, no conscience, no will, no motive, no purpose? And the answer to each question would be the same, No, he has none. The suggestible consciousness is the consciousness that has no past, no future, no height, no depth, no development, no reference to anything; it is only in and out. It takes in and it acts out—that is all there is to it.” It is here that we find the source of the youthful escapade so common to street, school, and college, as well as of the adult deeds of diabolism that have so often shocked the moral sense of the American people. The child needs frequent opportunities to be alone, when he can “come to himself” as a responsible person. Even where the association with his mates is perfectly innocent, there is a growing responsiveness to mere suggestion. This tendency is corrected by attention to individual tasks and responsibilities.

[18]“Social and Ethical Interpretations,” pp. 236–237.

169.By living alternately with his equals in age and with adults, the pupil grows familiar with diverse standards of honor. To unite these, and to subordinate one to the other in a proper manner, will prove an easy or a difficult part of training, according to the smaller or greater gap between the value set on brute force on the one hand, and the demand for good-breeding, as well as regard for talent and knowledge,on the other. The main thing is not to foster ambition artificially, though care must be taken at the same time to refrain from crushing out a natural and true self-esteem. Usually, however, those interested in the progress of a pupil stand in need themselves of guarding against the self-deception due to extravagant hopes. By giving themselves up to these, they involuntarily turn flatterers, and push the boy, and the young man still more, beyond the position he is able to maintain. Bitter experiences follow.

The tendency to an abnormal overestimation of the value of physical excellence is seen in the attitude of the modern college toward athletics. Doubtless the public as a whole still underestimates the importance of fine physical development. Our modern life with its nerve-racking occupation will shatter the efficiency of large portions of the race, unless the physical organism is so developed as to withstand the strain. This, if true of men, is still more true of women, who are now undertaking many new lines of exhausting labor, not the easiest of which is teaching. But the college student is prone to adore muscle. The successful athlete is, for a brief period, praised, petted, and advertised far more than is the ablest student or professor in the institution. Scarcely do the noblest achievements of science or philanthropy receive so much notice as a successful full-back on a foot-ball team. The athlete goes up indeed like a rocket, startling the ear and dazzling the eye for a moment—then oblivion, or deserved obscurity. The teacher must endeavor to displace this false estimate of values by one more true if less exciting.

170.The regard for the value of things in their relation to the ordinary necessities of life develops somewhat more slowly than the natural sense of honor. This is true especially of money, which at first boys rarely know how to use. Instead of saying, either this or that, which a fixed sum will buy, the boy falls a victim to the deception that lurks in saying, thisandthat. In this respect also the pupil needs to gain experience on a small scale; he must, moreover, come to know the value of objects last, not merely in terms of money, but also in terms of the inconvenience of doing without them. Warnings against petty closeness are seldom necessary; not infrequently, however, a boy follows common talk, and it may happen that he practises parsimony by imitation, and squanders in obedience to his own impulses. Where faults of this sort are not conquered by the pupil’s own sense of honor, they fall within the province of moral education.

A modern device for teaching children the value of money, and especially the usefulness of saving it, is the institution of school savings banks. Here the pupil develops his instincts for accumulation. At the same time he learns to inhibit his often inordinate fondness for spending. If indulgence to self, accompanied by penuriousness toward others, is permitted to grow into a habit in childhood and youth, it becomes a source of much unhappiness in later family life. Wife and children are often victims of this kind of selfishness. Now that women are in the main the teachers of children, they should have the interest of their sex sufficiently at heart toinculcate suitable ideals and habits respecting the gathering and spending of money. No form of selfishness is so obnoxious as self-indulgence at the expense of those who have a natural right to an equitable share of what is produced. The ‘meanness’ of such conduct if constantly unveiled will effect its own cure.

171.When experience has taught the pupil to what extent he must endure or need not endure the pressure of human society, and what honors, objects, enjoyments, he can have or must do without, the question arises: How does he connect all this with the pursuits which attract or repel him? The thoughtful pupil soon realizes, without being told, that one thing often makes another possible, that one thing involves or conditions another. But upon the thoughtless boy this truth does not impress itself with sufficient force; consequently, the teacher has to help him to deepen that impression, because a man without a settled mind regarding these matters remains devoid of character.

Yet a lack of fixedness is often desirable rather than otherwise—a statement applying to those pupils whose intellectual interests it is the business of instruction to awaken, or whose moral and religious culture are as yet in a backward state. The objective part of character (142) should not become fixed too soon; and very often a large part of the value of training consists in retarding this process. Such an end is subserved by the restraint under which the pupil iskept by the subordinate position assigned to him in conformity with his age, and particularly by the refusal of freedom to act without permission, and according to his own inclination (152). The theoretical judgment of will relations (149) is frequently late in maturing, or remains weak in comparison with the impression produced by the experiences mentioned. In that case moral ardor is also wanting, and if the pupil were given liberty to do as he chose, his character would be formed, to be sure, but in the wrong way. Rather would it be better to encourage juvenile amusements, and even boyish games, beyond the usual age limit.

172.Third. Regulative training begins its work with the first appearance of the subjective part of character (143). For an earlier period the rule not to argue with children holds good (164); that is, it holds good as long as we can get along with it. That stage, however, is passed when the pupil begins to reason for himself; in other words, when his thinking has acquired such consecutiveness that his thoughts no longer come and go as momentary fancies, but attain to permanency and coherence. Reasoning processes of this sort ought not to be left to themselves, nor can they be repressed by dictatorial decrees. The educator must now enter into his pupil’s trains of reflection, must argue with him and prevent further development in the wrong direction.

The tendency to set up rules reveals itself early; for example, in the games of children. Commands as to what to do are given every moment, only these imperatives are imperfectly obeyed and often changed. Neither is there lack of original, childish resolutions; but they can mean little so long as they do not remain the same. It is very different when they acquire stability, when means and ends combine into plans, when execution is attempted under difficulties, and finally when these resolves are thought in the forms of general concepts, thereby laying claim to validity in possible future instances, and becoming thus transformed into maxims.

173.The wise forethought essential to regulative training requires in the first place that the teacher shall rather tolerate an inconvenient discussion than check a frank expression of opinion, provided the objections of the pupil are indubitably sincere, and his vanity, we will say, is not flattered too much by the unexpected consideration accorded to his remarks. The same foresight is to be exercised in cases where it proves impossible to convince the pupil at once. Here the final judgment, instead of being insisted upon, should rather be postponed; it will always be easy to point out to the pupil his lack of adequate knowledge and to refer him to future studies. The positiveness that usually characterizes the assertions of boys and young men, generally has its roots in their great ignorance.They have not the least inkling of how many opinions have been held and disputed. Instruction will gradually cure them of their excessive self-confidence.

Only in a pure despotism would the enforcement of unquestioning obedience to authority be admissible. No country aspiring to political liberty could tolerate such a system. Even if all political considerations were dismissed, the development of subjective character alone would demand a condemnation of such a method. But in a country like ours, where men are both personally and politically self-governing, education to leadership is not second to education to obedience. There comes a time, therefore, when argument is in place, provided its purpose is to clarify the pupil’s insight into prudence or duty. It will not be too much to insist upon obedience without argument with all pupils so far as the ordinary school virtues—regularity, punctuality, silence, and industry—are concerned. Old and young can see their necessity. When it comes to the more intricate phases of conduct, the grounds for authority, if it is still exercised, may be revealed through dialogue. It is the constant effort of training to establish regulative principles in the minds of the older pupils, so that within the range of their capacity they may become self-governing. In other words, the moral plateaus of Kant are to be attained, not at a bound, but by a gradual progress in moral autonomy. Herein we see the superiority of Herbart’s conception of moral training. What Kant gave up as an unsolvable problem, can be seen to be only a natural process. Says Kant, “How a law can of itself directly determine the will is for human reason an insoluble problem, for it is identical with the problem how a free will is possible.”[19]The difficulty withKant’s theory was that he admitted no psychological means for attaining the free directive power of the mind. He could only say to the child: “You are free; be free. You are morally autonomous; exercise your power; be a free, self-governing citizen.” Kant regarded natural impulses, emotions, desires, pleasures, interests, as impure, hence to be rejected. They are indeed to be rejected as the final ends of character, but what Kant did not recognize is that they are the psychological means for attaining character. Primarily these feelings, far from being radically bad, as he thought, are radically good, since they help to furnish the necessary conditions of survival, both for the individual and for the race. Hunger, fear, courage, combativeness, prudence, sexual instinct, inquisitiveness, love of adornment, frugality, and a hundred other elemental passions have preserved the race from destruction in the past. A new set of social and intellectual impulses will in the future provide the instruments of survival, now that the field of evolution is transported from the jungle to the city. It is through intellectual insights that new ideals are formulated; it is through these elemental feelings that the active powers of the mind are stirred up to motor efficiency for their realization. From being biological means for physical survival, the feelings of man have now become psychological means for civic survival. Psychologically, therefore, men are not born free; they become free. To become free they must have opportunity to exercise freedom; at first within definite but widening limits while they are under the tuition of the school; later within the limits set by civil society; at last absolutely, when they have recognized that what is rational law in society is the law of their own being.

[19]“Selections,” p. 284.

174.But the matter of greatest importance from the point of view of training is consistency or inconsistencyof action. One who lightly sets up maxims must be made to feel the difficulty of living up to them. In this way a mirror is held up to the pupils, partly in order to put to rout untenable maxims, and partly to reinforce valid principles.

Among the untenable maxims we include also those which, although in accord with prudence, would offend against morality. If the pupil does not see already that they cannot be maintained, the application, by exhibiting their objectionable consequences, must bring to light their true character.

175.Regulative training often calls for rousing words from the teacher. He has to remind the pupil of happenings in the past and predict future consequences in case his faults should continue; he has to induce him to look within himself for the purpose of tracing the causal connection of his actions to its source. If, however, this was done earlier, with a view to moral education, no long speeches are now needed. Moreover, the teacher’s remarks become calmer and briefer the more effective they have been, the more he is justified in expecting independent judgment on the part of the pupil, and finally the more fully the latter has entered upon that period during which he looks about him to observe the words and actions of strangers. For, at the time when he has begun to compare the new with the old, his receptivity for the old is very weak, and soon vanishes completely;unless, indeed, the old had been deeply impressed beforehand.

The purpose of the “rousing word” is to stimulate the mind to exercise its dynamic force to moral ends. The pupil must not be permitted to assume the attitude of negation, or to be a mere passive observer, or an innocent, devoid alike of power and significance, but he must be roused into a responsible character, an efficient participant in life’s activities. Successful appeal may be made to insights already acquired, but theoretically held; to dispositions implanted, but not yet actively exercised; to the application of old habits to new uses. Even where appeal must be made against objectionable conduct, it is better to apply the “inhibition of substitution” to that of “negation.”[20]While protesting against the evil, point the way to the right road.

[20]James, “Talks on Psychology,” p. 192.

176.Fourth. The pupil is to be kept in a quiet frame of mind; his intellect in a state suitable for clear apprehension. To outbursts of passion this applies absolutely; not so generally to emotions. Above all, tranquillity is the condition for the formation of theoretical judgments and hence also, although not exclusively so, for laying the foundation of morality.

Every desire may develop into passion, if the soul is so often and so long in a desiring state that thoughts become focussed in the object longed for, whereby plans shape themselves, hopes arise, and ill-willtoward others strikes root. Accordingly, watchful attention must be given to all persistent and recurrent desires.

177.The most usual desires are those which arise from the physical need of food and of bodily activity. Now the first step to take is, while guarding against excess, to satisfy these natural impulses in order to subdue the unruliness springing from unsatisfied cravings. We ought not to permit hunger to tempt a boy to steal, nor encourage truancy by making him sit still too long. This warning is not superfluous. Such things happen even in families where less irrational practices might be expected. Over-indulgence, to be sure, is of far more frequent occurrence.

When the natural wants have lost their sting, a positive and irrevocable refusal must be opposed to further desires. With it should be combined some occupation capable of diverting the attention.

If the object which continues to excite desire can be removed, all the better. In one’s own home this is more often practicable, and more necessary as well, than in that of strangers. If the object cannot be removed, gratification may be put off until some future time. The foregoing statement may be illustrated by reference to the eating of fruit from the tree. An unconditional prohibition carries with it a dangerous temptation to disobedience, while unconditional permission would be equally inadmissible on account ofthe plucking of green fruit, let alone the possible injury to the orchards of others.

Analogy will suggest many similar applications of the rule given.

178.Again, children must be watched at their games. The more free play of the imagination we discover, and the more change there is, the less cause for concern. But when the same game is frequently repeated according to the same fixed rules, when a species of study is devoted to it in order to attain special proficiency, passions may be generated, such, for instance, as an excessive fondness for playing at cards, even where no stakes are involved. Gambling must be forbidden entirely, and in case compliance with this prohibition is doubtful, obedience must be secured by watchful supervision.

To what end shall a teacher watch the games of children? To prevent the bullying of the weak by the strong, to see that unfairness does not creep in, to ward off vulgarity and profanity—these and similar purposes will be in the mind of the teacher. One of the chief functions of play, however, is to cultivate social efficiency. This has two aspects, willingness to coöperate with a group and ability to lead a group. It is necessary that there should be alternation of leadership and coöperation. If one child is allowed to lead all the time, he becomes overbearing; if another is always compelled to follow, he becomes subservient. Each has a one-sided development. Without discouraging unduly natural capacity for leadership, it is well for the teacher quietly to see to it that each child has his chance, bothto lead and to follow. Just as the kindergarten utilizes play to simulate the occupations of men, arousing sympathy with them and respect for them, so the school may by proper modification make the numerous group games, in which children delight, a potent means for securing coöperative habits and a general aptitude for social activities. Not a little attention is now paid to the various forms of children’s play. This is especially true of such publications as thePedagogical Seminary, published at Clark University, Worcester, Massachusetts.

179.An excellent means to avert the dangers connected with passionate tendencies is to engage in the acquisition of one of the fine arts, say music or drawing, even though there should be no more than a modicum of talent. The student must be given to understand, however, that he is not to take up the study of several musical instruments at once, nor give himself up to distracting attempts in sundry branches of pictorial representation. On the contrary, he is to strive consistently for proficiency in one definite direction.

In the total absence of aptitude we may avail ourselves of preferences of one kind or other, such as fondness for collecting plants or shells, for work in papier-maché, for joinery, for gardening even, etc.

Poetical talent, highly desirable in itself, nevertheless demands a solid counterweight in the shape of serious scholarly effort; for the young poet sets up claims that are likely to prove dangerous if he becomes absorbed in them.

The importance of this suggestion can hardly be overestimated. It is a case of the permanent inhibition of a host of possible evil tendencies by substitution. The youth who can turn with pleasure to his violin at every spare moment, never seriously misses the companionship of his mates. He has, moreover, a never failing source of enjoyment when there is nothing to interfere with his happiness, and an equally inexhaustible source of consolation when the waves of life are rough.

180.Projects springing from passionate impulses, and betraying their existence by their interference with order, diligence, and the distribution of time, must be resolutely thwarted. This step is rendered all the more urgent when several share in the same plan, above all when ostentation, party spirit, and rivalry enter as impelling factors. Such things must not be allowed to gain ground; they very quickly vitiate the soil which education has been at such pains to prepare for tillage.

181.The passions being kept at a distance, the successful grounding of the pupil in morality depends in general on the manner in which instruction coöperates with his occupations. The branch of instruction primarily most important in this respect is religious instruction. The most immediate source, however, of the development of disposition is found in the pupil’s social environment, and it becomes the business of training to cultivate a right spirit or disposition.Let us, therefore, take up the practical ideas one by one.

England and Germany are a unit in insisting upon the necessity of religious instruction in the schools. Half the elementary schools of the former country are in charge of the Church of England, five per cent are controlled by Roman Catholics, three per cent by Wesleyans, and some forty-two per cent by public boards of education. All of these schools are subsidized by the state, yet all, with few exceptions, give religious instruction. In Germany there are but two strong religious organizations—the Roman Catholic Church, mostly at the south, and the Lutheran, mostly at the north. The state establishes all schools, furnishing most of the funds for sustaining them and controlling their administration in large measure; yet the morning hour of the day is devoted to instruction in religion. Not so in the United States. Here, religious teaching is, to all appearances, permanently excluded from the public schools. In this condition of affairs there is but one resource: we must the more diligently insist upon those things that reflect the content of religion. That is, we must teach children to live in close coöperative union with their fellows. The subjective side of this training is portrayed in the sections that follow, where the transformation of ethical insights into ethical habits is discussed.

182.To speak of strife first, which cannot easily be wholly prevented among children, and which is present to their minds, at least as a possibility, self-help against unexpected bodily assaults cannot be forbidden. A determined self-defence is rather to be recommended, but self-defence paired with a mercifultreatment of one’s assailant. On the other hand, it is necessary to prohibit absolutely any arbitrary appropriation of objects, even though these objects should consist of ownerless or discarded trifles. No one must imagine that his mere pleasure is a law unto others. On the contrary, children ought to get used to limitations on ownership. That which has been given them for a certain purpose is to be used for that purpose alone, and must be taken care of with that purpose in view. Promises among children should not lightly be declared void, however foolish and impossible of fulfilment. The boy who, by a hasty promise, puts himself in an embarrassing position must be made conscious of the fact. Let his perplexity serve as a warning for the future. But over-hasty promises are to be accepted as little as they are to be made; and here is where we have to begin in untying the knots in which children occasionally entangle themselves.

It is not undesirable that pupils by their own acts furnish themselves with a few keenly-felt instances of complicated questions of rights. But pleasure in wrangling must be discountenanced; the pupils should learn to prevent and to avoid contention. They may gain enough familiarity with it to realize that it gives displeasure.

183.At this point two paths open to our reflection. In the first place, contention pleases children becauseit implies strength; in seeking it they are, as a rule, merely giving vent to excess of animal spirits. The outlet in this direction we must block, but we must furnish another elsewhere. Gymnastic exercises, too, are exhibitions of strength; emulation, which is not contention, is a welcome feature of sport and play. Mental activity likewise affords suitable opportunities for excelling; it also provides proper occasions for making comparisons; but relative excellence, children must understand distinctly, is not to be advanced by them as a basis for claims. Where the question is one of degree of attainment,—therefore one ofperfice te,—the pupil is supplied with a practically useful standard by his own progress and retrogression. To hold up one pupil as a model for another to follow awakens envy; it will be much better, instead, to make allowances where a weak pupil cannot do more than he is actually doing.

In all the ages of the past men have been the teachers of boys. Being men, they have naturally taken the man’s attitude toward youthful conduct. When one boy is gratuitously assaulted by another, they have upheld a sturdy self-defence as belonging to self-respect. In their eyes an unsuccessful defence is better than a cowardly retreat. With the advent of women as the teachers of boys it is natural that the doctrine of passive non-resistance should be emphasized. When women were only the physical mothers of the race, there was no danger of the decay of virility, but now that they have become the intellectual mothers as well, there may be such a danger. It is generallyconceded that the English boys’ schools, like Eton, Harrow, and Rugby, have been the best English conservers of independent manhood, for there every boy stood on his own merits, having to fight his own battles, being responsible for his own conduct, and at the same time living under a high code of boyish honor. In our own public schools, where no suchesprit de corpsis possible, and where the doctrine of peace at any price is likely to be insisted upon, it is possible that there may be a distinct decline of virility in the boys. Such a result would be deplorable; it would work to the detriment of public education, and would decrease in public estimation the value of woman’s services in the schoolroom. While discouraging strife, a teacher may, by a word of approval or excuse, justify an exercise of primitive defence of the person against unwarranted assault. Manly social games, like foot-ball, basket-ball, base-ball, are our best resources in developing those phases of character that are closely associated with motor efficiency. Here under proper guidance, self-control, sense of power and efficiency, courage, and almost every characteristic of virility may be happily developed. That forethought and supervision are needed is most true, else unlovely traits of character may easily get the upper hand.

184.The second of the two ways alluded to takes us from the idea of rights to that of equity. Strife is displeasing, but revenge still more, notwithstanding the truth of the saying: what is fair for one is fair for another. Children may indeed exercise their ethical acumen by trying to determine how much one deserves to suffer or to receive at the hands of others for the liberties he has taken or the self-restraint he has practised,but they are not to arrogate to themselves the function of inflicting punishments or of bestowing rewards. Without surrendering their own insight, they must in this respect submit willingly to the authority of their superiors.

A similar course is to be pursued with reference to the distribution of presents, enjoyments, and marks of approval. To avoid giving the appearance of favoritism, the teacher should not, except for very good reasons, depart from the principle of equal division; but, on the other hand, he should refuse to accord to the pupils a right to these free gifts. While permitting them to have an opinion on the appropriateness of a greater or smaller share, he will properly deny them any right to demand by virtue of this opinion.

185.In cases deeply engaging the children’s own sense of justice and equity, complaisance and readiness to yield should not be exacted on the spot. Children must have time to get to the end of their thoughts, and to weary of what is often very fruitless brooding, before they realize that to yield is after all a necessity, and hence in no sense a matter of magnanimous choice. At some future time they may be reminded that their path would have been smoother if the sentiment of good-will had been in control from the beginning and had arbitrated the dispute, or rather had prevented it entirely.

Good-will is to be revered everywhere as higher thanright; still the latter must be represented as something that cannot be set aside with impunity, unless it be by common agreement; that is, in consequence of the consent of the holders of rights.

There are two distinct aspects to good-will,—the benevolent, and the coöperative or social. The well-known story of the Jericho Road illustrates the first. He is the good neighbor who rescues the life of the man who has been assaulted by the way. But social good-will is more than benevolence; it is coöperation for the accomplishment of common purposes. Among farmers it means mutual care to prevent aggression, because of unruly stock or bad fences; it involves combined efforts for good schools, good roads, public libraries, educational agencies for promoting successful farming, associations for promoting successful pleasures. In cities social good-will means coöperation for paving and lighting streets, for the suppression of crime, for furnishing good water and efficient sewerage, for defence against fire, for rapid transit, besides the myriad agencies for promoting the mental, moral, and spiritual welfare of the people. A man in a city needs to be a good neighbor to everybody, even though he may know personally but one in a million. In other words, the civic man must be a brother, not only to him who falls among thieves, but to him who lives among them; not only to his brother in adversity, but also to his brother in prosperity.

186.Finally, the degrees of difference among older boys, and especially among young men, with respect to the nearness with which they approach the still distant realization of the idea of inner freedom, are, as a rule, sufficiently marked to be patent to all.The superior excellence of those distinguished for steady and rational conduct is usually dwelt on by the teacher rather too much than too little; children are themselves too keen in observing each other’s shortcomings not to see how far behind the best some are. We ought, therefore, rather to avoid stimulating in children the tendency to belittle others, than to turn their attention to that which does not escape them anyway.

187.The bad conduct of adults near to the pupils will not, of course, be exposed by the teacher; and if publicly known, the example set will repel more than allure, so long as self-interest does not prompt imitation or a search for excuses. But we need not entertain much hope either that a worthy example will be followed; youth is too prone to regard rectitude as a matter of course. Hence it will not be superfluous to call special attention to right conduct, and to give expression to the esteem which is its due. This applies particularly to the time when a growing boy’s outlook over society widens, and he begins to compare many things whose false glitter might deceive him.

There are many aspects of inner freedom. It is possible for a narrow-minded man to live in perfect tranquillity, so far as his conscience is concerned. Even if one lived true to Kant’s categorical imperative, which says, “So act that the maxims, or rules, of your conduct might, through your own will, becomeuniversal laws,” it would still be possible for one to have a mind at peace with itself while doing things that a higher code of morality would forbid. For example, suppose I am an American Indian, and the question arises, Shall I torture my enemies? Of course: do not the traditions of my tribe prescribe it? This simply means that our ideals of conduct grow out of our environment; they are social in their genesis. This truth shows the infinite importance of making instruction reveal clearly the best ideals of religion and civilization, for there may be as much inward freedom, or good conscience, in the slums as in the wealthy districts of the city. Subjective peace of mind may mean much or little. A murderer may sleep as soundly as a missionary, but a man of high ideals is whipped as with scorpions, if his conduct be base. He feels that his higher self is outraged; he has no peace except through repentance, restitution, and reform.

188.Fifth. The pupil’s mind, we will suppose, has been properly directed, partly through the social relations obtaining among children, partly through examples and instruction, to the requirements of the various moral ideas, and he has learned accordingly to discriminate with some keenness between will relations. Now the time has arrived for moral education in the strict sense. For we cannot leave it to chance whether our young charges will, of their own initiative, synthesize for themselves noble actions on the one hand and base actions on the other, whether they will take time to reflect, and will, each for himself, apply the lessons taught. On the contrary, theyall have to be told, each one individually has to be told, truths that no one is wont to hear with pleasure. The more thoroughly the teacher knows his pupils, the better. By showing them that he divines their thoughts, he supplies them with the most effectual incentive to self-observation. Now the basis of what is commonly known as moralizing is furnished by a retrospective view of the pupil’s conduct for some time past, by references to influences formerly at work within him, and by an analysis of his good and bad qualities. Such teaching is by no means to be condemned, nor even to be regarded as superfluous. In its proper place it is absolutely essential. Many, it is true, grow up without ever having heard a serious word of deserved censure, but no one ought to grow up in that way.

189.Only praise and censure are thought of here, not harsh words, much less harsh treatment. Reprimands and punishments following upon single acts are something different; they, too, may lead to moral reflections, but must first have become things of the past. Moral improvement is not brought about by the constraint of government, nor is it the result of those pedagogical punishments which warn the pupil and sharpen his wits by means of the natural consequences of actions (157). But it is brought about through the imitation of the language of conscience and of genuine honor, as seen in impartial spectators.Moreover, this does not exclude consideration of the excuses which every one readily finds in his heart. But while due allowance is made for mitigating circumstances, the pupil is cautioned against relying on them in future.

190.Ordinarily youth deserves neither strong commendation nor severe criticism, and it is well to guard carefully against exaggeration in either direction, if for no other reason than merely this, that exaggeration either detracts from effectiveness, or else causes, if not timidity, at least an unfortunate embarrassment. There is one species of magnifying, however, which subserves a good purpose, because it enables pupils to see more clearly the importance of trifles and the great significance of their own actions, and in this way helps to counteract thoughtlessness. We refer to viewing the present in the light of the future. The pettiest faults are liable to grow through habit; the faintest desire, unless kept under control, may turn into passion. Then, too, the future circumstances of one’s life are uncertain; allurements and temptations may come into it, or unlooked-for misfortunes. This prevision of the possibilities of the future is, of course, not prophecy, and no such claim should be made for it; nevertheless, it does good service as a warning.

191.When the pupil has been brought to the point where he regards his moral education as a matter of serious import, instruction in conjunction with a growingknowledge of the world may bring it about that a glow of moral sentiment permeates his whole thought, and that the idea of a moral order unites on the one hand with his religious concepts, and with his self-observation on the other. Henceforth the direct, emphatic expression of praise or censure will have to be less frequent. It will no longer be as easy as formerly to give a clearer account to the pupil of what goes on within him than he has already rendered to himself. We may still, however, come to his assistance from another direction, namely, that of general concepts,—a field in which advancing youthful reflection is little by little finding its bearings.

192.Sixth. It is the business of training to remind at the right moment and to correct faults. We may safely assume that, even after a young man has reached the plane of moral decisions, he will still stand in need of frequent reminders, although in this respect individuals exhibit great differences, which observation alone is able to reveal. But that which he is reminded of consists of resolves which lay claim to something like universal validity, but which are not likely to make good that claim when incorrectly formulated or conceived in the wrong connection. General considerations become predominant with only a very few at best; but youth especially sees and experiences so much that is new that the old is easily slighted for the new, and, accordingly, the general for the particularstill more. Nevertheless, it is far easier for training to remind and to correct with success where a good, firm foundation has been laid, than it is to support (161–166) when in adolescence nothing is found by which the pupil might try to steady himself.

193.It is evident from the wide divergence among the principles which schools old and new have accepted as the basis of ethics and of systems of justice, that many conflicting, or at any rate, one-sided views may arise when the attempt is made to introduce order, definiteness, and consistency into existing ethical concepts. This whole conflict and one-sidedness of opinion, together with the innumerable fluctuations that may find a place here besides,—all this is likely to be reproduced in youthful minds, particularly where they make it a point of going their own way. Very frequently acquired principles adjust themselves to inclinations; the subjective side of character adapts itself to the objective. Now, while it is the business of instruction to correct error, training must avail itself of those opportunities that reveal a directing of thoughts by inclination.

194.When, however, the pupil has once established confidence in his disposition as well as in his principles, training must withdraw. Unnecessary judging and over-anxious observation would only impair naturalness, and give rise to extraneous motives. When once self-culture has been assumed, it should be left alone.

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