ENDNOTES.

[1]According to Vasumitra’sTreatise on the Points of Contention by the Different Schools of Buddhism, of which there are three Chinese translations, the earliest being one by Kumârajîva (who came to China in A.D. 401), the first great schism seems to have broken out about one hundred years after the Buddha. The leader of the dissenters was Mahâdeva, and his school was known as the Mahâsangîka (Great Council), while the orthodox was called the school of Sthaviras (Elders). Since then the two schools subdivided themselves into a number of minor sections, twenty of which are mentioned by Vasumitra. The book is highly interesting as throwing light on the early pages of the history of Buddhism in India. (return)

[2]The Anagârika Dharmapala of Ceylon objects to this geographical distinction. He does not see any reason why the Buddhism of Ceylon should be regarded as Hînayânism, when it teaches a realisation of the Highest Perfect Knowledge (Anuttara-samyak-sambodhi) and also of the six Virtues of Perfection (Pâramitâ),—these two features, among some others, being considered to be characteristic of Mahâyânism. It is possible that when the so-called Mahâyânism gained great power all over Central India in the times of Nâgârjuna and Âryadeva, it also found its advocates in the Isle of Lion, or at least the followers of Buddha there might have been influenced to such an extent as to modify their conservative views. At the present stage of the study of Buddhism, however, it is not yet perfectly clear to see how this took place. When a thorough comparative review of Pâli, Singhalese, Tibetan, Sanskrit, and Chinese Buddhist documents is effected, we shall be able to understand the history and development of Buddhism to its full extent. (return)

[3]Translated into English by the author, 1900. The Open Court Pub. Co. Chicago. (return)

[4]These terms are explained elsewhere. (return)

[5]Followers of any religious sects other than Buddhism. The term is sometimes used in a contemptuous sense, like heathen by Christians. (return)

[6]The conception of Dharmakâya constitutes the central point in the system of Mahâyânism, and the right comprehension of it is of vital importance. The Body of the Law, as it is commonly rendered in English, is not exact and leads frequently to a misconception of the entire system. The point is fully discussed below. (return)

[7]They are: (1) form or materiality (rûpa), (2) sensation (vedanâ), (3) conception (samjnâ), (4) action or deeds (samkâra), and (5) consciousness (vijnâna). These terms are explained elsewhere. (return)

[8]The Dhammapada, v. 165. Tr. by A. J. Edmunds. (return)

[9]The Dhammapada, v. 127. (return)

[10]This last passage should not be understood in the sense of a total abnegation of existence. It means simply the transcendentality of the highest principle. (return)

[11]The Kathopaniṣad, IV. 10. (return)

[12]Guyau, a French sociologist, refers to the Buddhist conception of Nirvâna in hisNon-Religion of the Future. I take his interpretation as typical of those non-Buddhist critics who are very little acquainted with the subject but pretend to know much. (English translation, pp. 472-474.)

“Granted the wretchedness of life, the remedy that pessimists propose is the new religious salvation that modern Buddhists are to make fashionable... The conception is that of Nirvâna. To sever all the ties which attach you to the external world; to prune away all the young offshoots of desire, and recognise that to be rid of them is a deliverance; to practise a sort of complete psychial circumcision; to recoil upon yourself and to believe that by so doing you enter into the society of the great totality of things (the mystic would say, of God); to create an inner vacuum, and to feel dizzy in the void and, nevertheless, to believe that the void is plenitude supreme, pleroma, these have always constituted temptations to mankind. Mankind has been tempted to meddle with them, as it has been tempted to creep up to the verge of dizzy precipices and look over... Nirvâna leads, in fact, to the annihilation of the individual and of the race, and to the logical absurdity that the vanquished are the victors over the trials and miseries of life.”

Then, the author recites the case of one of his acquaintances, who made a practical experiment of Nirvâna, rejecting variety in his diet, giving up meat, wine, every kind of ragout, every form of condiment, and reducing to its lowest possible terms the desire that is most fundamental in every living being—the desire of food, and substituting a certain number of cups of pure milk. “Having thus blunted his sense of taste and the grosser of his appetites, having abandoned all physical activity, he thought to find a recompense in the pleasure of abstract meditation and of esthetic contemplation. He entered to a state which was not that of dreamland, but neither was it that of real life, with its definite details.” (return)

[13]For detailed explanation of this term seeChapter XI. (return)

[14]The Udâna, Ch. VIII, p. 118. Translation by General Strong. (return)

[15]This is a peculiarly Indian religious practice, which consists in counting one’s exhaling and inhaling breaths. When a man is intensely bent on the practise, he gradually passes to a state of trance, forgetting everything that is going on around and within himself. The practise may have the merit of alleviating nervousness and giving to the mind the bliss of relaxation, but it oftentimes leads the mind to a self-hypnotic state. (return)

[16]Here Nirvâna is evidently understood to mean self-abnegation or world-flight or quietism, which is not in accord with the true Buddhist interpretation of the term. (return)

[17]The sentiment of the Golden Rule is not the monopoly of Christianity; it has been expressed by most of the leaders of thought, thus, for instance: “Requite hatred with virtue” (Lao-tze). “Hate is only appeased by love” (Buddha). “Do not do to others what ye would not have done to you by others” (Confucius). “One must neither return evil, nor do any evil to any one among men, not even if one has to suffer from them” (Plato,Crito, 49). (return)

[18]The Buddhacarita, Book IX, 63-64. (return)

[19]According to one Northern Buddhist tradition, Buddha is recorded to have exclaimed at the time of his supreme spiritual beatitude: “Wonderful! All sentient beings are universally endowed with the intelligence and virtue of the Tathâgata!” (return)

[20]His date is not known, but judging from the contents of his works, of which we have at present two or three among the Chinese Tripitaka, it seems that he lived later than Açvaghoṣa, but prior to, or simultaneously with, Nâgârjuna. This little book occupies a very important position in the development of Mahâyânism in India. Next to Açvaghoṣa’sAwakening of Faith, the work must be carefully studied by scholars who want to grasp every phase of the history of Mahâyâna school as far as it can be learned through the Chinese documents. (return)

[21]Be it remarked here that a Bodhisattva is not a particularly favored man in the sense of chosen people or elect. We are all in a way Bodhisattvas, that is, when we recognise the truth that we are equally in possession of the Samyak-sambodhi, Highest True Intelligence, and through which everybody without exception can attain final enlightenment. (return)

[22]Mahâyâna-abhidharma-sangîti-çâstra, by Asanga. Nanjo, No. 1199. (return)

[23]Yogâcârya-bhûmi-çâstra, Nanjo, No. 1170. The work is supposed to have been dictated to Asanga by a mythical Bodhisattva. (return)

[24]By Asanga. Nanjo, 1177. (return)

[25]Mahâyâna-samparigraha-çâstra, by Asanga. Nanjo, 1183. (return)

[26]Perceiving an incarnation of the Dharmakâya in every spiritual leader regardless of his nationality and professed creed, Mahâyânists recognise a Buddha in Socrates, Mohammed, Jesus, Francis of Assisi, Confucius, Laotze, and many others. (return)

[27]Ancient Hindu Buddhists, with their fellow-philosophers, believed in the existence of spiritually transfigured beings, who, not hampered by the limitations of space and time, can manifest themselves everywhere for the benefit of all sentient beings. We notice some mysterious figures in almost all Mahâyâna sûtras, who are very often described as shedding innumerable rays of light from the forehead and illuminating all the three thousand worlds simultaneously. This may merely be a poetic exaggeration. But this Sambhogakâya or Body of Bliss (see Açvaghoṣa’sAwakening of Faith, p. 101) is very difficult for us to comprehend as it is literally described. For a fuller treatment see thechapteron “Trikâya.” (return)

[28]Though I am very much tempted to digress and to enter into a specific treatment concerning these two Hindu Mahâyâna doctrines, I reluctantly refrain from so doing, as it requires a somewhat lengthy treatment and does not entirely fall within the scope of the present work. (return)

[29]That Açvaghoṣa’s conception of the Âlaya varies with the view here presented may be familiar to readers of hisAwakening of Faith. This is one of the most abstruse problems in the philosophy of Mahâyâna Buddhism, and there are several divergent theories concerning its nature, attributes, activities, etc. In a work like this, it is impossible to give even a general statement of those controversies, however interesting they may be to students of the history of intellectual development in India.

The Âlayavijñâna, to use the phraseology of Samkhya philosophy, is a composition, so to speak, of the Soul (puruṣa) and Primordial Matter (prakṛti). It is the Soul, so far as it is neutral and indifferent to all those phenomenal manifestations, that are going on within as well as without us. It is Primordial Matter, inasmuch as it is the reservoir of everything, whose lid being lifted by the hands of Ignorance, there instantly springs up this universe of limitation and relativity. Enlightenment or Nirvâna, therefore, consists in recognising the error of Ignorance and not in clinging to the products of imagination. (return)

[30]For a more detailed explanation of the ideal philosophy of the Yogâcâra, see my article on the subject inLe Muséon, 1905. (return)

[31]“One mind” or “one heart” meaning the mental attitude which is in harmony with the monistic view of nature in its broadest sense. (return)

[32]These ten stages of spiritual development are somewhat minutely explained below. SeeChapter XII. (return)

[33]The ten moral precepts of the Buddha are: (1) Kill no living being; (2) Take nothing that is not given; (3) Keep matrimonial sanctity; (4) Do not lie; (5) Do not slander; (6) Do not insult; (7) Do not chatter; (8) Be not greedy; (9) Bear no malice; (10) Harbor no scepticism. (return)

[34]Mahâyânism recognises two “entrances” through which a comprehensive knowledge of the universe is obtained. One is called the “entrance of sameness” (samatâ) and the other the “entrance of diversity” (nânâtva). The first entrance introduces us to the universality of things and suggests a pantheistic interpretation of existence. The second leads us to the particularity of things culminating in monotheism or polytheism, as it is viewed from different standpoints. The Buddhists declare that neither entrance alone can lead us to the sanctum sanctorum of existence; and in order to obtain a sound, well-balanced knowledge of things in general, we must go through both the entrances of universality and particularity. (return)

[35]The doctrine of Trikâya will be given further elucidation in the chapter bearing the same title. (return)

[36]No efforts have yet been made systematically to trace the history of the development of the Mahâyâna thoughts in India as well as in China and Japan. We have enough material at least to follow the general course it has taken, as far as the Chinese and Tibetan collections of Tripitaka are concerned. When a thorough comparison by impartial, unprejudiced scholars of these documents has been made with the Pali and Sanskrit literature, then we shall be able to write a comprehensive history of the human thoughts that have governed the Oriental people during the last two thousand years. When this is done, the result can further be compared with the history of other religious systems, thus throwing much light on the general evolution of humanity. (return)

[37]Prajñâ,bodhi,buddhi,vidyâandjñâorjñânaare all synonymous and in many cases interchangeable. But they allow a finer discrimination. Speaking in a general way,prajñâis reason,bodhiwisdom or intelligence,buddhienlightenment,vidyâideality or knowledge, andjñâorjñânaintellect. Of these five terms,prajñâandbodhiare essentially Buddhistic and have acquired technical meaning, In this work bothprajñâandbodhiare mostly translated by intelligence, for their extent of meaning closely overlaps each other. But this is rather vague, and wherever I thought the term intelligence alone to be misleading, I either left the originals untranslated, or inserted them in parentheses. To be more exact,prajñâin many cases can safely be rendered by faith, not a belief in revealed truths, but a sort of immediate knowledge gained by intuitive intelligence.Prajñâcorresponds in some respects to wisdom, meaning the foundation of all reasonings and experiences. It may also be considered an equivalent for Greeksophia. Bodhi, on the other hand, has a decidedly religious and moral significance. Besides beingprajñâitself, it is also love (karunâ): for, according to Buddhism, these two,prajñâandkarunâ, constitute the essence of Bodhi. May Bodhi be considered in some respects synonymous with the divine wisdom as understood by Christian dogmatists? But there is something in the Buddhist notion of Bodhi that cannot properly be expressed by wisdom or intelligence. This seems to be due to the difference of philosophical interpretation by Buddhists and Christians of the conception of God. It will become clearer as we proceed farther. (return)

[38]For detailed exposition of the three forms of knowledge, the reader is requested to peruse Asanga’sComprehensive Treatise on Mahâyânism(Nanjo’s Catalogue, No. 1183), Vasubandhu’s work on Mahâyâna idealism (Vijnânamâtra Çâstra, Nanjo, No. 1215), theSûtra on the Mystery of Deliverance(Sandhinirmocana-sûtra, Nanjo. Nos. 246 and 247), etc. (return)

[39]When the eminent representatives of both parties, such as Dharmapala and Bhavaviveka, were at the height of their literary activity in India about the fifth or sixth century after Christ, their partisan spirit incited them bitterly to denounce each other, forgetting the common ground on which their principles were laid down. Their disagreement in fact on which they put an undue emphasis was of a very trifling nature. It was merely a quarrel over phraseology, for one insisted on using certain words just in the sense which the other negated. (return)

[40]

“Dve satye samupâçritya buddhânâm dhardeçanâLokasamvṛttisatyañ ca satyañ ca paramârthataḥ.Ye ca anayor na jânanti vibhâgam satyayor dvayoḥ,Te tatvam na vijânanti gambhîrabuddhaçâsane.”

(return)

[41]

Vyavahâram anâçritya paramârtho na deçyate,Paramârtham anâgamya nirvâṇam na adhigamyata.The Mâdhyamika, p. 181.

(return)

[42]Cf.The Udâna, chapter VI. (return)

[43]

Svabhâvam parabhâvanca, bhâvancâbhâvameva ca,Ye paçyanti, na paçyante tatvam hi buddhaçâsane.

(return)

[44]

Astîti çâçvatagrâho, nâstîtyucchedadarçanam:Tasmâdastitvanâstitve nâçriyeta vicaksanah

(return)

[45]

Astîti nâstîti ubhe ‘pi antâÇuddhî açuddhîti ime ‘pi antâ;Tasmâdubhe anta vivarjayitvâMadhye ‘pi syânam na karoti paṇditah.

(return)

[46]This is the famous phrase in theBrhadaranyaka Upanisadoccurring in several places (II, 3, 6; III, 9, 26; IV, 2, 4; IV, 4, 22; IV, 5, 5). The Atman or Brahman, it says, “is to be described by No, No! He is incomprehensible, for he cannot be comprehended; he is imperishable, for he cannot perish; he is unattached, for he does not attach himself; unfettered, he does not suffer, he does not fail. Him (who knows), these two do not overcome, whether he says that for some reason he has done evil, or for some reason he has done good—he overcomes both, and neither what he has done, nor what he has omitted to do, affects him.” (return)

[47]The Awakening of Faith, p. 59. Cf. this with the utterances of Dionysius the Areopagite, as quoted by Prof. W. James in hisVarieties of Religious Experience, pp. 416-417: “The cause of all things is neither soul nor intellect; nor has it imagination, opinion, or reason, or intelligence; nor is it spoken or thought. It is neither number, nor order, nor magnitude, nor littleness, nor equality, nor inequality, nor similarity, nor dissimilarity. It neither stands, nor moves, nor rests.... It is neither essence, nor eternity, nor time. Even intellectual contact does not belong to it. It is neither science nor truth. It is not even royalty nor wisdom; not one; not unity; not divinity or goodness; nor even spirit as we know it.”....ad libitum. (return)

[48]

Anirodham anutpâdam anucchedam açâçvatam,Anekârtham anânârtham anâgamam anirgamam.(Mâdhyamika Çâstra, first stanza.)

(return)

[49]

Param nirodhâdbhagavân bhavatîtyeva nohyate,Na bhavatyubhayam ceti nobhayam ceti nohyate:Atiṣṭhamâno ‘pi bhagavân bhavatîtyeva nohyate,Na bhavatyubhayam ceti nobhayam ceti nohyate.(Mâdhyamika, p. 199).

(return)

[50]He was the third son of king of Kâçi (?) in southern India. He came to China A.D. 527 and after a vain attempt to convert Emperor Wu to his own view, he retired to a monastery, where, it is reported, he spent all day in gazing at the wall without making any further venture to propagate his mysticism. But finally he found a most devoted disciple in the person of Shen Kuang, who was once a Confucian, and through whom the Dhyâna school became one of the most powerful Mahâyâna sect in China as well as in Japan. Dharma died in the year 535. Besides the one here mentioned, he had another audience with the Emperor. At that time, the Emperor said to Dharma: “I have dedicated so many monasteries, copied so many sacred books, and converted so many bhiksus and bhiksunis: what do you think my merits are or ought to be?” To this, however, Dharma replied curtly, “No merit whatever.” (return)

[51]Another interesting utterance by a Chinese Buddhist, who, earnestly pondering over the absoluteness of Suchness for several years, understood it one day all of a sudden, is: “The very instant you say it is something (or a nothing), you miss the mark.” (return)

[52]The Vimalakîrti Sûtra, Kumârajîva’s translation, Part II, Chapter 5. (return)

[53]Deussen relates, in his address delivered before the Bombay Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, 1893, a similar attitude of a Vedantist mystic in regard to the highest Brahma. “The Bhava, therefore, when asked by the king Vaksalin, to explain the Brahman, kept silence. And when the king repeated his request again and again, the rishi broke out into the answer: ‘I tell it you, but you don’t understand it;çânto ’yam âtmâ, this âtmâ is silence!’ ” (return)

[54]It is a well-known fact that the Vedanta philosophy, too, makes a similar distinction between Brahman as sagunam (qualified) and Brahman as nirgunam (unqualified). The former is relative, phenomenal, and has characteristics of its own; but the latter is absolute, having no qualification whatever to speak of, it is absolute Suchness. (See Max Mueller’sThe Six Systems of Indian Philosophy, p. 220 et seq.)

Here, a very interesting question suggests itself: Which is the original and which is the copy, Mahâyânism or Vedantism? Most of European Sanskrit scholars would fain wish to dispose of it at once by declaring that Buddhism must be the borrower. But I am strongly inclined to the opposite view, for there is reliable evidence in favor of it. In a writing of Açvaghoṣa, who dates much earlier than Çankara or Badarayana we notice this distinction of absolute Suchness and relative Suchness. He writes in hisAwakening of Faith(p. 55 et seq.) that though Suchness is free from all modes of limitation and conditionality, and therefore it cannot be thought of by our finite consciousness, yet on account of Avidyâ inherent in the human mind absolute Suchness manifests itself in the phenomenal world, thereby subjecting itself to the law of causality and relativity and proceeds to say that there is a twofold aspect in Suchness from the point of view of its explicability. The first aspect is trueness as negation (çûnyatâ) in the sense that it is completely set apart from the attributes of all things unreal, that it is a veritable reality. The second aspect is trueness as affirmation (açûnyatâ), in the sense that it contains infinite merits, that it is self-existent. Considering the fact that Açvaghoṣa comes earlier than any Vedanta philosophers, it stands to reason to say that the latter might have borrowed the idea of distinguishing the two aspects of Brahma from their Buddhist predecessors.

Çankara also makes a distinction betweensagunaandnirguna vidya, whose parallel we find in the Mahâyânistsamvṛttiandparamârtha satya. (return)

[55]While passing, I cannot help digressing and entering on a polemic in this footnote. The fact is, Western Buddhist critics stubbornly refuse to understand correctly what is insisted by Buddhists themselves. Even scholars who are supposed to be well informed about the subject, go astray and make false charges against Buddhism. Max Mueller, for example, declares in hisSix Systems of Indian Philosophy(p. 242) that “An important distinction between Buddhists and Vedantists is that the former holds the world to have arisen from what is not, the latter from what is, the Sat or Brahman.” The reader who has carefully followed my exposition above will at once detect in this Max Mueller’s conclusion an incorrect statement of Buddhist doctrine. As I have repeatedly said, Suchness, though described in negative terms, is not a state of nothingness, but the highest possible synthesis that the human intellect can reach. The world did not come from the void of Suchness, but from its fulness of reality. If it were not so, to where does Buddhism want us to go after deliverance from the evanescence and nothingness of the phenomenal world?

Max Mueller in another place (op. cit. p. 210) speaks of the Vedantists’ assertion of the reality of the objective world for practical purposes (vyavahârârtham) and of their antagonistic attitude toward “the nihilism of the Buddhists.” “The Buddhists” this seems to refer to the followers of the Mâdhyamika school, but a careful perusal of their texts will reveal that what they denied was not the realness of the world as a manifestation of conditional Suchness, but its independent realness and our attachment to it as such. The Mâdhyamika school was not in any sense a nihilistic system. True, its advocates used many negative terms, but what they meant by them was obvious enough to any careful reader. (return)

[56]Dharmadhâtu is the world as seen by an enlightened mind, where all forms of particularity do not contradict one another, but make one harmonious whole. (return)

[57]The word literally means recollection or memory. Açvaghoṣa uses it as a synonym of ignorance, and so do many other Buddhist philosophers. (return)

[58]Smṛtiorcittaorvijñâna. They are all used by Açvaghoṣa and other Buddhist authors as synonymous.Smṛtiliterally means memory;citta, thought or mentation; andvijñânais generally rendered by consciousness, though not very accurately. (return)

[59]Cf. theBhagavadgîtâ(S. B. E.Vol. VIII, chap. XIV, p. 107): “The Brahman is a womb for me, in which I cast the seed. From that, O descendant of Bharata! is the birth of all things. Of the bodies, O son of Kunti! which are born from all wombs, the main womb is the great Brahman, and I am the father, the giver of the seed.” (return)

[60]This is translated from the Chinese of Çikṣananda; the Sanskrit reads as follows:

“Tarangâ hi udadher yadvat pavanapratyaya îritâ,Nṛtyamânâh pravartante vyucchedaç ca na vidhyate:Âlayodhyas tathâ nityam viṣayapavana îritaḥ,Cittâis tarangavijñânâir nṛtyamânâḥ pravartate.”

(return)

[61]From the Chinese. The Sanskrit reads as follows:

“Nîle rakte ‘tha lavaṇe çankhe kṣîre ca çârkare,Kaṣayâiḥ phalapuṣpâdyâih kiraṇâ yatha bhâskare:No ‘nyena ca nânanyena tarangâ hi udadher matâ;Vijñânâni tathâ sapta, cittena saha samyuktâ.Udadheḥ pariṇâmo ‘sâu tarangânâm vicitratâ,Âlayam hi tathâ cittam vijñânâkhyam pravartate;Cittam manaç ca vijñânam lakṣaṇârtham prakalpyate;Âbhinna lakṣanâ hi aṣtâu na lakṣyâ na ca lakṣaṇâ.Udadheç ca tarangânâm yathâ nâsti viçeṣanâ.Vijñânânam tathâ citte pariṇâmo na labhyate.Cittena cîyate karmaḥ, manasâ ca vicîyate,Vijñânena vijânâti, dṛçyam kalpeti pañcabhiḥ.”

(return)

[62]A little digression here. It has frequently been affirmed of the ethics of Mahâyânism that as it has a nihilistic tendency its morality turns towards asceticism ignoring the significance of the sentiment and instinct. It is true that Mahâyânism perfectly agrees with Vedantism when the latter declares: “If the killer thinks that he kills, if the killed thinks that he is killed, they do not understand; for this one does not kill, nor is that one killed.” (The Katopanishad, II 19.) This belief in non-action (LaotzeanWu Wei) apparently denies the existence of a world of relativity, but he will be a superficial critic who will stop short at this absolute aspect of Mahâyâna philosophy and refuses to consider its practical side. As we have seen above, Buddhists do not conceive the evolution of the Manovijñâna as a fault on the part of the cosmic mind, nor do they think the assertion of Ignorance altogether wrong and morally evil. Therefore, Mahâyânism does not deny the claim of reality to the world of the senses, though of course relatively, and not absolutely.

Again, “Tat tvam asi” (thou art it) or “I am the Buddha”—this assertion, though arrogant it may seem to some, is perfectly justifiable in the realm of absolute identity, where the serene light of Suchness alone pervades. But when we descend on earth and commingle in the hurly-burly of our practical, dualistic life, we cannot help suffering from its mundane limitations. We hunger, we thirst, we grieve at the loss of the dearest, we feel remorse over errors committed. Mahâyânism does not teach the annihilation of those human passions and feelings.

There was once a recluse-philosopher, who was considered by the villagers to have completely vanquished all natural desires and human ambitions. They almost worshipped him and thought him to be superhuman. One day early in Winter, a devotee approached him and reverentially inquired after his health. The sage at once responded in verse:

“A hermit truly I am, world-renounced;Yet when the ground is white with snow,A chill goes through me and I shiver.”

A false conception of religious saintliness as cherished by so many pious-hearted, but withal ignorant, minds, has led them into some of the grossest superstitions, whose curse is still lingering even among us. Our earthly life has so many limitations and tribulations. The ills that the flesh is heir to must be relieved by some material, scientific methods. (return)

[63]That the Buddhist Ignorance corresponds to the Sâmkhya Prakṛti can be seen also from the fact that some Samkhya commentators give to Prakṛti as its synonyms such terms asçâkti(energy) which reminds of karma or sankâra,tamas(darkness),mâyâ, and even the very wordavidyâ(ignorance) (return)

[64]This view of the oneness of the Âlaya or Citta (mind) may not be acceptable to some Mahâyânists, particularly to those who advocate the Yogâcâra philosophy; but the present author is here trying to expound a more orthodox and more typical and therefore more widely-recognised doctrine of Mahâyânism, i.e., that of Açvaghoṣa. (return)

[65]Pudgalaorpudgalasamjñais sometimes used by Mahâyânists as a synonym of âtman. The Buddhist âtman in the sense of ego-substratum may be considered to correspond to the Vedantist Jîvâtman, which is used in contradistinction to Paramâtman, the supreme being or Brahma. (return)

[66]Mahâyâna Buddhists generally understand the essential characteristic of âtman to consist in freedom, and by freedom they mean eternality, absolute unity, and supreme authority. A being that is transitory is not free, as it is conditioned by other beings, and therefore it has no âtman. A being that is an aggregate of elemental matter or forms of energy is not absolute, for it is a state of mutual relationship, and therefore it has no âtman. Again, a being that has no authoritative command over itself and other beings, is not free, for it will be subjected to a power other than itself, and therefore it has no âtman. Now, take anything that we come across in this world of particulars; and does it not possess one or all of these three qualities: transitoriness, compositeness, and helplessness or dependence? Therefore, all concrete individual existences not excepting human beings have no âtman, have no ego, that is eternal, absolute, and supreme. (return)

[67]Tent-designer is a figurative term for the ego-soul. Following the prevalent error, the Buddha at first made an earnest search after the ego that was supposed to be snugly sitting behind our mental experiences, and the result was this utterance. (return)

[68]The Dharmapada, vs. 153-154. Tr. by A. J. Edmunds. (return)

[69]Prakṛtivikṛtayas.This is a technical term of Sâmkhya philosophy and means the modes of Prakrti, as evolved from it and as further evolving on. See Satis Chandra Banarji,Samkhya-Philosophy, p. XXXIII et seq. (return)

[70]The passages quoted here as well as one in the next paragraph are taken from Açvaghoṣa’sBuddhacarita. (return)

[71]The Questions of King Milinda, Sacred Books of the East, Vol. XXXV. (return)

[72]This reminds us of the passage quoted elsewhere from theKatha-Upanishad; cf. the footnote to it. (return)

[73]As cited elsewhere, Bodhi-Dharma of the Dhyâna sect, when questioned in a similar way, replied, “I do not know.” Walt Whitman echoes the same sentiment in the following lines:

“A child said, what is the grass? fetching it to me with full hands;How could I answer the child? I do not know what it is, any more than he.”

(return)

[74]There seem to be two Chinese translations of this Sûtra, one by Kumârajîva and the other by Paramârtha, but apparently they are different texts bearing the same title. Besides these two, there is another text entirely in Chinese transliteration. Owing to insufficiency of material at my disposal here, I cannot say anything definite about the identity or diversity of these documents. The following discussion that is reported to have taken place between the Buddha and Ananda is an abstract prepared from the first and the second fasciculi of Paramârtha’s (?) translation. Beal gives in hisCatena of Buddhist Scriptures from the Chinese(pp. 286-369) an English translation of the first four fasc. of theSurangama. Though this translation is not quite satisfactory in many points the reader may find there a detailed account of the discussion which is here only partially and roughly recapitulated. (return)

[75]Cf. the following which is extracted from theQuestions of King Milinda(Sacred Books of the East, vol. XXXV, 133): “If there be a soul [distinct from the body] which does all this, then if the door of the eye were thrown down [if the eye were plucked out] could it stretch out its head, as it were, through the larger aperture and [with greater range] see forms much more clearly than before? Could one hear sounds better if the ears were cut off, or taste better if the tongue were pulled out, or feel touch better if the body were destroyed?” (return)

[76]

Nirvikalpo ‘smi ciddipo nirahankaravasanaḥTvaya ahankarabijena na sambaddho ‘smi asanmaya (31)

(return)

[77]

Yathâ bhûtatayâ na ahammano na tvam na vâsanâAtmâ çuddhacidabhasaḥ kevalo yam vijṛbhate. (44)

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[78]The following is a somewhat free translation of the original Chinese of Kumârajîva, which pretty closely agrees with the Sanskrit text published by the Buddhist Text Society of India. (return)

[79]The Sanskrit text does not give this passage. (return)

[80]

Lakṣyâl lakṣaṇam anyac cet syât tal lakṣyam alakṣanam.

(return)

[81]

Rûpâdi vyatirekena yathâ kumbho na vidyate,Vâhyâdi vyatireṇa tathâ rûpam na vidyate.

(return)

[82]Abstracted from Pingalaka’sCommentary on the Mâdhyamika Çâstra, Chapter VII. The Chinese translation is by Kumârajîva. (return)

[83]The passage in parentheses is taken from Chandrakîrti’sCommentary on Nâgârjuna, pp. 180-181. (return)

[84]The Twelve Nidânas are: (1) Ignorance (avidyâ), (2) action (sanskâra), (3) Consciousness (vijñâna), (4) Name-and-form (nâmarûpa), (5) Six Sense-organs (âyatana), (6) Contact (sparça), (7) Sensation (vedanâ), (8) Desire (trṣnâ), (9) Attachment (upâdâna), (10) Procreation (bhâva), (11) birth (jati), (12) Old Age, Death, etc. (jarâ,marana,çoka, etc.). (return)

[85]From a Chinese Mahâyâna sutra. (return)

[86]The Pâli Jâtaka, no. 222. Translation by W. H. Rouse. (return)

[87]Warren’sBuddhism in Translations, p. 214. (return)

[88]On the Completion of Karma, by Vasubandhu. Nanjo, No. 1222. (return)

[89]The Distinguishing of the Mean, by Vasubandhu. Nanjo, 1248. (return)

[90]“Manhattan’s Streets I Saunter’d, Pondering.” I might have quoted the whole poem, if not for limitation of space. (return)

[91]If we understand the following words of Tolstoi in the light which we gain from the Buddhist doctrine of karmaic immortality, we shall perhaps find more meaning in them than the author himself wished to impart: “My brother who is dead acts upon me now more strongly than he did in life; he even penetrates my being and lifts me up towards him.” (return)

[92]TheAvatamsaka Sûtra, Chinese translation by Buddhabhadra, fas. XXXIV. (return)

[93]That is the Dharmakâya personified. (return)

[94]In Hindu philosophy space is always conceived as an objective entity in which all things exist. (return)

[95]This should be understood in the sense that “God maketh his sun to rise on the evil and on the good, and sendeth rain on the just and on the unjust.” The Dharmakâya is universal in its love, as space is in its comprehensiveness. Because it is absolutely free from human desires and passions that are the product of egoism and therefore tend always to be discriminative and exclusive. (return)

[96]The four views are: That the physical body is productive of impurities; that sensuality causes pain; that the individual soul is not permanent; and that all things are devoid of the Atman. (return)

[97]That is to say: The Dharmakâya, that assumes all forms of existence according to what class of being it is manifesting itself, is sometimes conceived by the believers to be a short-lived god, sometimes an immortal spirit, sometimes a celestial being of one hundred kalpas, and sometimes an existence of only a moment. As there are so many different dispositions, characters, karmas, intellectual attainments, moral environments, etc., so there are as many Dharmakâyas as subjectively represented in the minds of sentient beings, though the Dharmakâya, objectively considered, is absolutely one. (return)

[98]Asanga’sGeneral Treatise on Mahâyânism. (Mahâyâna samparigraha). (return)

[99]TheAvatamsaka Sûtra, chap. 13, “On Merit.” (return)

[100]This is by no means the case, for some of the Mahâyâna sûtras are undoubtedly productions of much later writers than the immediate followers of the Buddha, though of course it is very likely that some of the most important Mahâyâna canonical books were compiled within a few hundred years after the Nirvana of the Master. (return)

[101]“Purvapranidhânabala” is frequently translated “the power of original (or primitive) prayer.” Literally, pûrva means “former” or “original” or “primitive”; and pranidhâna, “desire” or “vow” or “prayer”; and bala, “power.” So far as literary rendering is concerned, “power of original prayer” seems to be the sense of the original Sanskrit. But when we speak of primitive prayers of the Dharmakâya or Tathâgata, how shall we understand it? Has prayer any sense in this connection? The Dharmakâya can by its own free will manifest in any form of existence and finish its work in whatever way it deems best. There is no need for it to utter any prayer in the agony of struggle to accomplish. There is in the universe no force whatever which is working against it so powerfully as to make it cry for help; and there cannot be any struggle or agony in the activity of the Dharmakâya. The term prayer therefore is altogether misleading and inaccurate and implicates us in a grave error which tends to contradict the general Buddhist conception of Dharmakâya. We must dispense with the term entirely in order to be in perfect harmony with the fundamental doctrine of Buddhism. This point will receive further consideration later. (return)

[102]“I am the father of all beings, and they are my children.” (TheAvatamsaka, thePundarîka, etc.) (return)

[103]To get more fully acquainted with the significance of the Sukhâvatî doctrine, the reader is advised to look up the Sukhâvatî sûtras in theSacred Books of the East, Vol. XLIX. (return)

[104]What follows is selected from a short sûtra calledThe Mahâvaipulya-Tathâgatagarbha Sûtra, translated into Chinese by Buddhabhadra of the Eastern Tsin dynasty (A.D. 371-420). Nanjo, No. 384. (return)

[105]Niyutais an exceedingly large number, but generally considered to be equal to one billion. (return)

[106]All these are unhuman forms of existence, including demons, dragon-kings, winged beasts, etc. (return)

[107]Âçrava literally means “oozing,” or “flowing out,” and the Chinese translators rendered it bylou, dripping, or leaking. Roughly speaking, it is a general name for evils, principally material and sensuous. According to an Indian Buddhist scholar, Âçrava has threefold sense: (1) “keeping,” for it retains all sentient beings in the whirlpool of birth and death; (2) “flowing,” for it makes all sentient beings run in the stream of birth and death; (3) “leaking,” or “oozing,” for it lets such evils as avarice, anger, lust, etc., ooze out from the six sense-organs after the fashion of an ulcer, which lets out blood and filthy substance. The cause of Âçrava is a blind will, and its result is birth and death. Specifically, Bhâvâçrava is one of the three Âçravas, which are (1) kâmâçrava, (2) vidyâçrava, and (3) bhâvâçrava. The first is egotistic desires, the second is ignorance, and the third is the material existence which we have to suffer on account of our previous karma. (return)

[108]Our thoughtful readers must have noticed here that the conceptions of the Buddha as entertained by the Mahâsangika School (Great Council) closely resemble those of the Mahâyâna Buddhism. Though we are still unable to trace step by step the development of Mahâyânism in India, the hypothesis assumed by most of Japanese Buddhist scholars is that the Mahâsangika was Mahâyânistic in tendency. (return)

[109]TheMahâparinibbâna sutta. (return)

[110]There are three Chinese translations of this sûtra: the first, by Dharmarakṣa during the first two decades of the fifth century A.D.; the second, by Paramârtha of the Liang dynasty, who came to China A.D. 546 and died A.D. 569; and the third, by I-tsing of the Tang dynasty who came back from his Indian pilgrimage in the year 695 and translated this sûtra A.D. 703. The last is the only complete Chinese translation of theSuvarnâ Prabhâ. A part of the original Sanskrit text recovered in Nepal was published by the Buddhist Text Society of India in 1898. Nanjo, Nos. 126, 127, 130. (return)

[111]The notion that great men never die seems to be universal. Spiritually they would never perish, because the ideas that moved them and made them prominent in the history of humanity are born of truth. And in this sense every person who is possessed of worthy thoughts is immortal, while souls that are made of trumpery are certainly doomed to annihilation. But the masses are not satisfied with this kind of immortality. They must have something more tangible, more sensual, and more individual. The notion of bodily resurrection of Christ is a fine illustration of this truth. When the followers of Christ opened the master’s grave, they did not find his body, so says legend, and they at once conceived the idea of resurrection, for they reasoned that such a great man as Jesus could not suffer the same fate that befalls common mortals only. The story of his corporeal resurrection now took wing and went wild; some heard him speak to them, some saw him break bread, and others even touched his wounds. What a grossly materialistic conception early Christians (and alas, even some of the twentieth century) cherished about resurrection and immortality! It is no wonder, therefore, that primitive Buddhists raised a serious question about the personality of Buddha which culminated in the conception of the Sambhogakâya, Body of Bliss, by Mahâyânists. (return)

[112]Compare this to the transfigured Christ. (return)

[113]Cf. I Cor. XIII, II. “When I was a child, I spake as a child, I understood as a child, I thought as a child, but when I became a man, I put away childish things.” This point of our ever-ascending spiritual progress is well illustrated in theSaddharma-pundarîka Sûtra. See Chapters II, III, IV, V, and XI. The following passage quoted from chap. II, p. 49 (Kern’s translation) will give a tolerably adequate view concerning diversity of means and unity of purpose as here expounded: “Those highest of men have, all of them, revealed most holy laws by means of illustrations, reasons and arguments, with many hundred proofs of skillfulness (upâyakauçalya). And all of them have manifested but one vehicle and introduced but one on earth; by one vehicle have they led to full ripeness inconceivably many thousands of kotis of beings.” As was elsewhere noted, this doctrine is sometimes known as the theory of Upâya. Upâya is very difficult term to translate into English; it literally means “way,” “method,” or “strategy.” For fuller interpretation seep. 298,footnote. (return)

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