V.

[1]Part.1.ch.1.

Madam,

Your Authours opinion is,[1]thatwhen a thing lies still, unless somewhat else stir it, it will lie still for ever; but when a thing is in motion, it will eternally be in motion, unless somewhat else stay it; the reason is,saith he,because nothing can change it self; To tell you truly,Madam, I am not of his opinion, for if Matter moveth it self, as certainly it doth, then the least part of Matter, were it so small as to seem Individable, will move it self; 'Tis true, it could not desist from motion, as being its nature to move, and no thing can change its Nature; for God himself, who hath more power then self-moving Matter, cannot change himself from being God; but that Motion should proceed from another exterior Body, joyning with, or touching that body which it moves, is in my opinion not probable; for though Nature is all Corporeal, and her actions are Corporeal Motions, yet that doth not prove, that the Motion of particular Creatures or Parts is caused by the joining, touching or pressing of parts upon parts; for it is not the several parts that make motion, but motion makes them; and yet Motion is not the cause of Matter, but Matter is the cause of Motion, for Matter might subsist without Motion, but not Motion without Matter, onely there could be no perception without Motion, nor no Variety, if Matter were not self-moving; but Matter, if it were all Inanimate and void of Motion, would lie as a dull, dead and senseless heap; But that all Motion comes by joining or pressing of other parts, I deny, for if sensitive and rational perceptions, which are sensitive and rational motions, in the body, and in the mind, were made by the pressure of outward objects, pressing the sensitive organs, and so the brain or interior parts of the Body, they would cause such dents and holes therein, as to make them sore and patched in a short time; Besides, what was represented in this manner, would always remain, or at least not so soon be dissolved, and then those pressures would make a strange and horrid confusion of Figures, for not any figure would be distinct; Wherefore my opinion is, that the sensitive and rational Matter doth make or pattern out the figures of several Objects, and doth dissolve them in a moment of time; as for example, when the eye seeth the object first of a Man, then of a Horse, then of another Creature, the sensitive motions in the eye move first into the figure of the Man, then straight into the figure of the Horse, so that the Mans figure is dissolved and altered into the figure of the Horse, and so forth; but if the eye sees many figures at once, then so many several figures are made by the sensitive Corporeal Motions, and as many by the Rational Motions, which are Sight and Memory, at once: But in sleep both the sensitive and rational Motions make the figures without patterns, that is, exterior objects, which is the cause that they are often erroneous, whereas, if it were the former Impression of the Objects, there could not possibly be imperfect Dreams or Remembrances, for fading of Figures requires as much motion, as impression, and impression and fading are very different and opposite motions; nay, if Perception was made by Impression, there could not possibly be a fading or decay of the figures printed either in the Mind or Body, whereas yet, as there is alteration of Motions in self-moving Matter, so there is also an alteration of figures made by these motions. But you will say, it doth not follow, if Perception be made by Impression, that it must needs continue and not decay; for if you touch and move a string, the motion doth not continue for ever, but ceaseth by degrees; I answer, There is great difference between Prime self-motion, and forced or Artificial Motions; for Artificial Motions are onely an Imitation of Natural Motions, and not the same, but caused by Natural Motions; for although there is no Art that is not made by Nature, yet Nature is not made by Art; Wherefore we cannot rationally judg of Perception by comparing it to the motion of a string, and its alteration to the ceasing of that motion, for Nature moveth not by force, but freely. 'Tis true, 'tis the freedom in Nature for one man to give another a box on the Ear, or to trip up his heels, or for one or more men to fight with each other; yet these actions are not like the actions of loving Imbraces and Kissing each other; neither are the actions one and the same, when a man strikes himself, and when he strikes another; and so is likewise the action of impression, and the action of self-figuring not one and the same, but different; for the action of impression is forced, and the action of self-figuring is free; Wherefore the comparison of the forced motions of a string, rope, watch, or the like, can have no place here; for though the rope, made of flax or hemp, may have the perception of a Vegetable, yet not of the hand, or the like, that touched or struck it; and although the hand doth occasion the rope to move in such a manner, yet it is not the motion of the hand, by which it moveth, and when it ceases, its natural and inherent power to move is not lessened; like as a man, that hath left off carving or painting, hath no less skill then he had before, neither is that skill lost when he plays upon the Lute or Virginals, or plows, plants, and the like, but he hath onely altered his action, as from carving to painting, or from painting to playing, and so to plowing and planting, which is not through disability but choice. But you will say, it is nevertheless a cessation of such a motion. I grant it: but the ceasing of such a motion is not the ceasing of self-moving matter from all motions, neither is cessation as much as annihilation, for the motion lies in the power of the matter to repeat it, as oft it will, if it be not overpowred, for more parts, or more strength, or more motions may over-power the less; Wherefore forced, or artificial and free Natural motions are different in their effects, although they have but one Cause, which is the self-moving matter, and though Matter is but active and passive, yet there is great Variety, and so great difference in force and liberty, objects and perceptions, sense and reason, and the like. But to conclude, perception is not made by the pressure of objects, no more then hemp is made by the Rope-maker, or metal by the Bell-founder or Ringer, and yet neither the rope nor the metal is without sense and reason, but the natural motions of the metal, and the artificial motions of the Ringer are different; wherefore a natural effect in truth cannot be produced from an artificial cause, neither can the ceasing of particular forced or artificial motions be a proof for the ceasing of general, natural, free motions, as that matter it self should cease to move; for there is no such thing as rest in Nature, but there is an alteration of motions and figures in self-moving matter, which alteration causeth variety as well in opinions, as in every thing else; Wherefore in my opinion, though sense alters, yet it doth not decay, for the rational and sensitive part of matter is as lasting as matter it self, but that which is named decay of sense, is onely the alteration of motions, and not an obscurity of motions, like, as the motions of memory and forgetfulness, and the repetition of the same motions is called remembrance. And thus much of this subject for the present, to which I add no more but rest

Madam,

your faithful Friend,

and Servant.

[1]Leviathan, Part.1.c.2.

MADAM,

Your Authour discoursing of Imagination, saith,[1]That as soon as any object is removed from our Eyes, though the Impression that is made in us remain, yet other objects more present succeeding and working on us, the Imagination of the past is obscured and made weak. To which I answer, first, that he conceives Sense and Imagination to be all one, for he says,Imagination is nothing else, but a fading or decaying sense; whereas in my opinion they are different, not onely their matter, but their motions also being distinct and different; for Imagination is a rational perception, and Sense a sensitive perception; wherefore as much as the rational matter differs from the sensitive, as much doth Imagination differ from Sense. Next I say, that Impressions do not remain in the body of sensitive matter, but it is in its power to make or repeat the like figures; Neither is Imagination less, when the object is absent, then when present, but the figure patterned out in the sensitive organs, being altered, and remaining onely in the Rational part of matter, is not so perspicuous and clear, as when it was both in the Sense and in the Mind: And to prove that Imagination of things past doth not grow weaker by distance of time, as your Authour says, many a man in his old age, will have as perfect an Imagination of what is past in his younger years, as if he saw it present. And as for your Authours opinion, thatImagination and Memory are one and the same, I grant, that they are made of one kind of Matter; but although the Matter is one and the same, yet several motions in the several parts make Imagination and Memory several things: As for Example, a Man may Imagine that which never came into his Senses, wherefore Imagination is not one and the same thing with Memory. But your Authour seems to make all Sense, as it were, one Motion, but not all Motion Sense, whereas surely there is no Motion, but is either Sensitive or Rational; for Reason is but a pure and refined Sense, and Sense a grosser Reason. Yet all sensitive and rational Motions are not one and the same; for forced or Artificial Motions, though they proceed from sensitive matter, yet are they so different from the free and Prime Natural Motions, that they seem, as it were, quite of another nature: And this distinction neglected is the Cause, that many make Appetites and Passions, Perceptions and Objects, and the like, as one, without any or but little difference. But having discoursed of the difference of these Motions in my former Letter, I will not be tedious to you with repeating it again, but remain,

Madam,

Your faithful Friend

and Servant.

[1]Leviathan, part.1.c.2.

MADAM,

Your Authours opinion, concerning Dreams,[1]seemeth to me in some part very rational and probable, in some part not; For when he sayes, thatDreams are onely Imaginations of them that sleep, which imaginations have been before either totally or by parcels in the Sense; and that the organs of Sense, as the Brain and the Nerves, being benumb'd in sleep, as not easily to be moved by external objects, those Imaginations proceed onely from the agitation of the inward parts of mans body, which for the connexion they have with the Brain, and other organs, when they be distemper'd, do keep the same in motion, whereby the Imaginations there formerly made, appear as if a man were waking; This seems to my Reason not very probable: For, first, Dreams are not absolutely Imaginations, except we do call all Motions and Actions of the Sensitive and Rational Matter, Imaginations. Neither is it necessary, that all Imaginations must have been before either totally or by parcels in the Sense; neither is there any benumbing of the organs of Sense in sleep. But Dreams, according to my opinion, are made by the Sensitive and Rational Corporeal Motions, by figuring several objects, as awake; onely the difference is, that the Sensitive motions in Dreams work by rote and on the inside of the Sensitive organs, when as awake they work according to the patterns of outward objects, and exteriously or on the outside of the sensitive Organs, so that sleep or dreams are nothing else but an alteration of motions, from moving exteriously to move interiously, and from working after a Pattern to work by rote: I do not say that the body is without all exterior motions, when asleep, as breathing and beating of the Pulse (although these motions are rather interior then exterior,) but that onely the sensitive organs are outwardly shut, so as not to receive the patterns of outward Objects, nevertheless the sensitive Motions do not cease from moving inwardly; or on the inside of the sensitive Organs; But the rational matter doth often, as awake, so asleep or in dreams, make such figures, as the sensitive did never make either from outward objects, or of its own accord; for the sensitive hath sometimes liberty to work without Objects, but the Rational much more, which is not bound either to the patterns of Exterior objects, or of the sensitive voluntary Figures. Wherefore it is not divers distempers, as your Authour sayes, that cause different Dreams, or Gold, or Heat; neither are Dreams the reverse of our waking Imaginations, nor all the Figures in Dreams are not made with their heels up, and their heads downwards, though some are; but this error or irregularity proceeds from want of exterior Objects or Patterns, and by reason the sensitive Motions work by rote; neither are the Motions reverse, because they work inwardly asleep, and outwardly awake, for Mad-men awake see several Figures without Objects. In short, sleeping and waking, is somewhat after that manner, when men are called either out of their doors, or stay within their houses; or like a Ship, where the Mariners work all under hatches, whereof you will find more in my Philosophical Opinions; and so taking my leave, I rest,

Madam,

Your faithful Friend

and Servant.

[1]Leviathan, Part.1.c.2.

MADAM,

Your Authour going on in his discourse of Imagination, says,[1]That, as we have no Imagination, whereof we have not formerly had sense, in whole or in parts; so we have not Transition from one Imagination to another, whereof we never had the like before in our senses. To which my answer is in short, that the Rational part of Matter in One composed figure, as in Man, or the like Creature, may make such figures, as the senses did never make in that composed Figure or Creature; And though your Authour reproves those that say,[2]Imaginations rise of themselves; yet, if the self-moving part of Matter, which I call Rational, makes Imaginations, they must needs rise of themselves; for the Rational part of matter being free and self-moving, depends upon nothing, neither Sense nor Object, I mean, so, as not to be able to work without them. Next, when your Author, definingUnderstanding, says that it is nothing else, but[3]an Imagination raised by words or other voluntary signs, My Answer is, that Understanding, and so Words and Signs are made by self-moving Matter, that is, Sense and Reason, and not Sense and Reason by Words and Signs; wherefore Thoughts are not like[4]Water upon a plain Table, which is drawn and guided by the finger this or that way, for every Part of self-moving matter is not alwayes forced, perswaded or directed, for if all the Parts of Sense and Reason were ruled by force or perswasion, not any wounded Creature would fail to be healed, or any disease to be cured by outward Applications, for outward Applications to Wounds and Diseases might have more force, then any Object to the Eye: But though there is great affinity and sympathy between parts, yet there is also great difference and antipathy betwixt them, which is the cause that many objects cannot with all their endeavours work such effects upon the Interiour parts, although they are closely press'd, for Impressions of objects do not always affect those parts they press. Wherefore, I am not of your Author's opinion, that all Parts of Matter press one another; It is true,Madam, there cannot be any part single, but yet this doth not prove, that parts must needs press each other: And as for hisTrain of Thoughts, I must confess, that Thoughts for the most part are made orderly, but yet they do not follow each other like Geese, for surely, man has sometimes very different thoughts; as for Example, a man sometime is very sad for the death of his Friend, and thinks of his own death, and immediately thinks of a wanton Mistress, which later thought, surely, the thought of Death did not draw in; wherefore, though some thought may be the Ring-leader of others, yet many are made without leaders. Again, your Author in his description of the Mind sayes, thatthe discourse of the mind, when it is govern'd by design, is nothing but seeking, or the Faculty of Invention; a hunting out of the Causes of some Effects, present or past; or of the Effects of some present or past Cause. Sometimes a man seeks what he has lost, and from that Place and Time wherein he misses it, his mind runs back from place to place, and time to time, to find where and when he had it, that is to say, to find some certain and limited Time and Place, in which to begin a method of Seeking. And from thence his thoughts run over the same places and times to find what action or other occasion might make him lose it. This we call Remembrance or calling to mind. Sometimes a man knows a place determinate, within the compass whereof he is to seek, and then his thoughts run over all the Parts thereof in the same manner as one would sweep a room to find a Jewel, or as a Spaniel ranges the field till he find a sent; or as a Man should run over the Alphabet to start a Rime.Thus far your Author: In which discourse I do not perceive that he defineth what the Mind is, but I say, that if, according to his opinion, nothing moves it self, but one thing moves another, then the Mind must do nothing, but move backward and forward, nay, onely forward, and if all actions were thrusting or pressing of parts, it would be like a crowd of People, and there would be but little or no motion, for the crowd would make a stoppage, like water in a glass, the mouth of the Glass being turned downwards, no water can pass out, by reason the numerous drops are so closely press'd, as they cannot move exteriously. Next, I cannot conceive how the Mind can run back either to Time or Place, for as for Place, the mind is inclosed in the body, and the running about in the parts of the body or brain will not inform it of an Exterior place or object; besides, objects being the cause of the minds motion, it must return to its Cause, and so move until it come to the object, that moved it first, so that the mind must run out of the body to that object, which moved it to such a Thought, although that object were removed out of the World (as the phrase is:) But for the mind to move backward, to Time past, is more then it can do; Wherefore in my opinion, Remembrance, or the like, is onely a repetition of such Figures as were like to the Objects; and for Thoughts in Particular, they are several figures, made by the mind, which is the Rational Part of matter, in its own substance, either voluntarily, or by imitation, whereof you may see more in my Book of Philosophical Opinions. Hence I conclude, that Prudence is nothing else, but a comparing of Figures to Figures, and of the several actions of those Figures; as repeating former Figures, and comparing them to others of the like nature, qualities, proprieties, as also chances, fortunes, &c. Which figuring and repeating is done actually, in and by the Rational Matter, so that all the observation of the mind on outward Objects is onely an actual repetition of the mind, as moving in such or such figures and actions; and when the mind makes voluntary Figures with those repeated Figures, and compares them together, this comparing is Examination; and when several Figures agree and joyn, it is Conclusion or Judgment: likewise doth Experience proceed from repeating and comparing of several Figures in the Mind, and the more several Figures are repeated and compared, the greater the experience is. One thing more there is in the same Chapter, which I cannot let pass without examination; Your Authour says, Thatthings Present onely have a being in Nature, things Past onely a being in the Memory, but things to come have no being at all; Which how it possibly can be, I am not able to conceive; for certainly, if nothing in nature is lost or annihilated, what is past, and what is to come, hath as well a being, as what is present; and, if that which is now, had its being before, why may it not also have its being hereafter? It might as well be said, that what is once forgot, cannot be remembred; for whatsoever is in Nature, has as much a being as the Mind, and there is not any action, or motion, or figure, in Nature, but may be repeated, that is, may return to its former Figure, When it is altered and dissolved; But by reason Nature delights in variety, repetitions are not so frequently made, especially of those things or creatures, which are composed by the sensitive corporeal motions in the inanimate part of Matter, because they are not so easily wrought, as the Rational matter can work upon its own parts, being more pliant in its self, then the Inanimate matter is; And this is the reason, that there are so many repetitions of one and the same Figure in the Rational matter, which is the Mind, but seldom any in the Gross and inanimate part of Matter, for Nature loves ease and freedom: But to conclude,Madam, I perceive your Author confines Sense onely to Animal-kind, and Reason onely to Man-kind: Truly, it is out of self-love, when one Creature prefers his own Excellency before another, for nature being endued with self-love, all Creatures have self-love too, because they are all Parts of Nature; and when Parts agree or disagree, it is out of Interest and Self-love; but Man herein exceeds all the rest, as having a supernatural Soul, whose actions also are supernatural; To which I leave him, and rest,

Madam,

Your faithful Friend,

and Servant.

[1]Leviathan, part.1.c.3.

[2]part.1.c.2.

[3]ibid. c.3.

[4]ibid.

MADAM,

When your Author discourseth of the use ofSpeech or Words and Names, he is pleas'd to say,[1]That their use is to serve for marks and notes of Remembrance; Whereof to give you my opinion, I say, That Speech is natural to the shape of Man; and though sometimes it serves for marks or notes of remembrance, yet it doth not always, for all other Animals have Memory without the help of Speech, and so have deaf and dumb men, nay more then those that hear and speak: Wherefore, though Words are useful to the mind, and so to the memory, yet both can be without them, whereas Words cannot be without Memory; for take a Bird, and teach him to speak, if he had not Memory, before he heard the words, he could never learn them. You will ask me,Madam, What then, is Memory the Cause of Speech? I answer, Life and Knowledg, which is Sense and Reason, as it creates and makes all sorts of Creatures, so also amongst the rest it makes Words: And as I said before, that Memory may be without the help of Speech or Words, so I say also, that there is a possibility of reckoning of numbers, as also of magnitudes, of swiftness, of force, and other things without words, although your Author denies it: But some men are so much for Art, as they endeavour to make Art, which is onely a Drudgery-maid of Nature, the chief Mistress, and Nature her Servant, which is as much as to prefer Effects before the Cause, Nature before God, Discord before Unity and Concord.

Again, yourAuthor, in his Chapter of Reason,[2]definesReasonto be nothing else butReckoning: I answer, That in my opinion Reckoning is not Reason it self, but onely an effect or action of Reason; for Reason, as it is the chiefest and purest degree of animate matter, works variously and in divers motions, by which it produces various and divers effects, which are several Perceptions, as Conception, Imagination, Fancy, Memory, Remembrance, Understanding, Judgment, Knowledg, and all the Passions, with many more: Wherefore this Reason is not in one undivided part, nor bound to one motion, for it is in every Creature more or less, and moves in its own parts variously; and in some Creatures, as for example, in some men, it moves more variously then in others, which is the cause that some men are more dull and stupid, then others; neither doth Reason always move in one Creature regularly, which is the cause, that some men are mad or foolish: And though all men are made by the direction of Reason, and endued with Reason, from the first time of their birth, yet all have not the like Capacities, Understandings, Imaginations, Wits, Fancies, Passions, &c. but some more, some less, and some regular, some irregular, according to the motions of Reason or Rational part of animate matter; and though some rational parts may make use of other rational Parts, as one man of another mans Conceptions, yet all these parts cannot associate together; as for example, all the Material parts of several objects, no not their species, cannot enter or touch the eye without danger of hurting or loosing it, nevertheless the eye makes use of the objects by patterning them out, and so doth the rational matter, by taking patterns from the sensitive; And thus knowledg or perception of objects, both sensitive and rational, is taken without the pressure of any other parts; for though parts joyn to parts, (for no part can be single) yet this joining doth not necessarily infer the pressure of objects upon the sensitive organs; Whereof I have already discoursed sufficiently heretofore, to which I refer you, and rest

Madam,

Your faithful Friend

and Servant.

[1]Leviathan, part.1.c.4.

[2]Ch.5.

MADAM,

Understandingsays your Author,[1]is nothing else but Conception caused by speech, and therefore, if speech be peculiar to man, (as, for ought I know, it is) then is understanding peculiar to him also.Where he confineth Understanding onely to speech and to Mankind; But, by his leave,Madam, I surely believe, that there is more understanding in Nature, then that, which is in speech, for if there were not, I cannot conceive, how all the exact forms in Generations could be produced, or how there could be such distinct degrees of several sorts and kinds of Creatures, or distinctions of times and seasons, and so many exact motions and figures in Nature: Considering all this, my reason perswadeth me, that all Understanding, which is a part of Knowledg, is not caused by speech, for all the motions of the Celestial Orbs are not made by speech, neither is the knowledg or understanding which a man hath, when sick, as to know or understand he is sick, made by speech, nor by outward objects, especially in a disease he never heard, nor saw, nor smelt, nor tasted, nor touched; Wherefore all Perception, Sensation, Memory, Imagination, Appetite, Understanding, and the like, are not made nor caused by outward objects, nor by speech. And as for names of things, they are but different postures of the figures in our mind or thoughts, made by the Rational matter; But Reasoning is a comparing of the several figures with their several postures and actions in the Mind, which joyned with the several words, made by the sensitive motions, inform another distinct and separate part, as an other man, of their minds conceptions, understanding, opinions, and the like.

Concerning Addition and Subtraction, wherein yourAuthorsayes Reasoning consists, I grant, that it is an act of Reasoning, yet it doth not make Sense or Reason, which is Life and Knowledge, but Sense and Reason which is self-motion, makes addition and subtraction of several Parts of matter; for had matter not self-motion, it could not divide nor compose, nor make such varieties, without great and lingring retardments, if not confusion. Wherefore all, what is made in Nature, is made by self-moving matter, which self-moving matter doth not at all times move regularly, but often irregularly, which causes false Logick, false Arithmetick, and the like; and if there be not a certainty in these self-motions or actions of Nature, much less in Art, which is but a secundary action; and therefore, neither speech, words, nor exterior objects cause Understanding or Reason. And although many parts of the Rational and Sensitive Matter joyned into one, may be stronger by their association, and over-power other parts that are not so well knit and united, yet these are not the less pure; onely these Parts and Motions being not equal in several Creatures, make their Knowledge and Reason more or less: For, when a man hath more Rational Matter well regulated, and so more Wisdom then an other, that same man may chance to over-power the other, whose Rational Matter is more irregular, but yet not so much by strength of the united Parts, as by their subtilty; for the Rational Matter moving regularly, is more strong with subtilty, then the sensitive with force; so that Wisdom is stronger then Life, being more pure, and so more active; for in my opinion, there is a degree of difference between Life and Knowledge, as my Book ofPhilosophical Opinionswill inform you.

Again, yourAuthorsayes,That Man doth excel all other Animals in this faculty, that when he conceives any thing whatsoever, he is apt to enquire the Consequences of it, and what effects he can do with it: Besides this(sayes he)Man hath an other degree of Excellence, that he can by Words reduce the Consequences he finds to General Rules called Theoremes or Aphorisms, that is, he can reason or reckon not onely in Number, but in all other things, whereof one may be added unto, or substracted from an other.To which I answer, That according to my Reason I cannot perceive, but that all Creatures may do as much; but by reason they do it not after the same manner or way as Man, Man denies, they can do it at all; which is very hard; for what man knows, whether Fish do not Know more of the nature of Water, and ebbing and flowing, and the saltness of the Sea? or whether Birds do not know more of the nature and degrees of Air, or the cause of Tempests? or whether Worms do not know more of the nature of Earth, and how Plants are produced? or Bees of the several sorts of juices of Flowers, then Men? And whether they do not make there Aphorismes and Theoremes by their manner of Intelligence? For, though they have not the speech of Man, yet thence doth not follow, that they have no Intelligence at all. But the Ignorance of Men concerning other Creatures is the cause of despising other Creatures, imagining themselves as petty Gods in Nature, when asNatureis not capable to make one God, much less so many as Mankind; and were it not for Mans supernatural Soul, Man would not be more Supreme, then other Creatures in Nature,But(says yourAuthor)this Priviledge in Man is allay'd by another, which is, No living Creature is subject to absurdity, but onely Man.Certainly,Madam, I believe the contrary, to wit, that all other Creatures do as often commit mistakes and absurdities as Man, and if it were not to avoid tediousness, I could present sufficient proofs to you: Wherefore I think, not onely Man but also other Creatures may be Philosophers and subject to absurdities as aptly as Men; for Man doth, nor cannot truly know the Faculties, and Abilities or Actions of all other Creatures, no not of his own Kind as Man-Kind, for if he do measure all men by himself he will be very much mistaken, for what he conceives to be true or wise, an other may conceive to be false and foolish. But Man may have one way of Knowledge in Philosophy and other Arts, and other Creatures another way, and yet other Creatures manner or way may be as Intelligible and Instructive to each other as Man's, I mean, in those things which are Natural. Wherefore I cannot consent to what yourAuthorsays,That Children are not endued with Reason at all, till they have attained to the use of Speech; for Reason is in those Creatures which have not Speech, witness Horses, especially those which are taught in the manage, and many other Animals. And as for the weak understanding in Children, I have discoursed thereof in my Book of Philosophy; The rest of this discourse, lest I tire you too much at once, I shall reserve for the next, resting in the mean time,

Madam,

Your faithful Friend,

and Servant.

[1]Leviathan, part.1.c.4.

Madam,

I sent you word in my last, that yourAuthor'sopinion is,That Children are not endued with Reason at all, until they have attained to the use of Speech,in the same Chapter[1]he speaks to the same purpose thus:Reason is not as Sense and Memory born with us, nor gotten by experience onely, as Prudence is, but attained by industry.To which I reply onely this, That it might as well be said, a Child when new born hath not flesh and blood, because by taking in nourishment or food, the Child grows to have more flesh and blood; or, that a Child is not born with two legs, because he cannot go, or with two arms and hands, because he cannot help himself; or that he is not born with a tongue, because he cannot speak: For although Reason doth not move in a Child as in a Man, in Infancy as in Youth, in Youth as in Age, yet that doth not prove that Children are without Reason, because they cannot run and prate: I grant, some other Creatures appear to have more Knowledg when new born then others; as for example, a young Foal has more knowledg than a young Child, because a Child cannot run and play; besides a Foal knows his own Dam, and can tell where to take his food, as to run and suck his Dam, when as an Infant cannot do so, nor all beasts, though most of them can, but yet this doth not prove, that a Child hath no reason at all; Neither can I perceive that man is a Monopoler of all Reason, or Animals of all Sense, but that Sense and Reason are in other Creatures as well as in Man and Animals; for example, Drugs, as Vegetables and Minerals, although they cannot slice, pound or infuse, as man can, yet they can work upon man more subtilly, wisely, and as sensibly either by purging, vomiting, spitting, or any other way, as man by mincing, pounding and infusing them, and Vegetables will as wisely nourish Men, as Men can nourish Vegetables; Also some Vegetables are as malicious and mischievous to Man, as Man is to one another, witness Hemlock, Nightshade, and many more; and a little Poppy will as soon, nay sooner cause a Man to sleep, though silently, then a Nurse a Child with singing and rocking; But because they do not act in such manner or way as Man, Man judgeth them to be without sense and reason; and because they do not prate and talk as Man, Man believes they have not so much wit as he hath; and because they cannot run and go, Man thinks they are not industrious; the like for Infants concerning Reason. But certainly, it is not local motion or speech that makes sense and reason, but sense and reason makes them; neither is sense and reason bound onely to the actions of Man, but it is free to the actions, forms, figures and proprieties of all Creatures; for if none but Man had reason, and none but Animals sense, the World could not be so exact, and so well in order as it is: but Nature is wiser then Man with all his Arts, for these are onely produced through the variety of Natures actions, and disputes through the superfluous varieties of Mans follies or ignorances, not knowing Natures powerful life and knowledg: But I wonder,Madam, yourAuthorsays in this place,That Reason is not born with Man, when as in another place,[2]he says,That every man brought Philosophy, that is Natural reason with him into the World; Which how it agree, I will leave to others to judg, and to him to reconcile it, remaining in the meantime,

Madam,

Your Constant Friend

and Faithful Servant.

[1]Ch.4.

[2]In hisElements of Philosophy, part.1.c.1.art.1.

Madam,

Two sorts of motions, I find yourAuthor[1]doth attribute to Animals,viz. Vital and Animal, the Vital motions, says he,are begun in Generation, and continued without Interruption through their whole life, and those are the Course of the Blood, the Pulse, the Breathing, Conviction, Nutrition, Excretion, &c. to which motions there needs no help of Imaginations; But the animal Motions, otherwise called voluntary Motions, are to go, to speak, to move any of our limbs, in such manner as is first fancied in our minds: And because going, speaking, and the like voluntary motions, depend always upon a precedent thought of whither, which way, and what, it is evident, that the Imagination is the first Internal beginning of all voluntary Motion. Thus far yourAuthor. Whereof in short I give you my opinion, first concerning Vital Motions, that it appears improbable if not impossible to me, that Generation should be the cause and beginning of Life, because Life must of necessity be the cause of Generation, life being the Generator of all things, for without life motion could not be, and without motion not any thing could be begun, increased, perfected, or dissolved. Next, that Imagination is not necessary to Vital Motions, it is probable it may not, but yet there is required Knowledg, which I name Reason; for if there were not Knowledg in all Generations or Productions, there could not any distinct Creature be made or produced, for then all Generations would be confusedly mixt, neither would there be any distinct kinds or sorts of Creatures, nor no different Faculties, Proprieties, and the like. Thirdly, concerningAnimal Motions, which yourAuthornamesVoluntary Motions, as to go, to speak, to move any of our limbs, in such manner as is first fancied in our minds, and that they depend upon a precedent thought of whither, which way, and what, and that Imagination is the first Internal beginning of them; I think, by yourAuthorsleave, it doth imply a contradiction, to call them Voluntary Motions, and yet to say they are caused and depend upon our Imagination; for if the Imagination draws them this way, or that way, how can they be voluntary motions, being in a manner forced and necessitated to move according to Fancy or Imagination? But when he goes on in the same place and treats of Endeavour, Appetite, Desire, Hunger, Thirst, Aversion, Love, Hate, and the like, he derives one from the other, and treats well as a Moral Philosopher; but whether it be according to the truth or probability of Natural Philosophy, I will leave to others to judge, for in my opinion Passions and Appetites are very different, Appetites being made by the motions of the sensitive Life, and Passions, as also Imagination, Memory, &c. by the motions of the rational Life, which is the cause that Appetites belong more to the actions of the Body then the Mind: 'Tis true, the Sensitive and Rational self-moving matter doth so much resemble each other in their actions, as it is difficult to distinguish them. But having treated hereof at large in my other Philosophical Work, to cut off repetitions, I will refer you to that, and desire you to compare our opinions together: But certainly there is so much variety in one and the same sort of Passions, and so of Appetites, as it cannot be easily express'd. To conclude, I do not perceive that yourAuthortells or expresses what the cause is of such or such actions, onely he mentions their dependance, which is, as if a man should converse with a Nobleman's Friend or Servant, and not know the Lord himself. But leaving him for this time, it is sufficient to me, that I know your Ladyship, and your Ladyship knows me, that I am,

Madam,

Your faithful Friend, and humble Servant.

[1]Leviathan, part.1.c.6.

Madam,

Having obey'd your Commands in giving you my opinion of the First Part of the Book of that famous and learnedAuthoryou sent me, I would go on; but seeing he treats in his following Parts of the Politicks, I was forced to stay my Pen, because of these following Reasons. First, That a Woman is not imployed in State Affairs, unless an absolute Queen. Next, That to study the Politicks, is but loss of Time, unless a man were sure to be a Favourite to an absolute Prince. Thirdly, That it is but a deceiving Profession, and requires more Craft then Wisdom. All which considered, I did not read that part of yourAuthor: But as for hisNatural Philosophy, I will send you my opinion so far as I understand it: For what belongs to Art, as to Geometry, being no Scholar, I shall not trouble my self withal. And so I'l take my leave of you, when I have in two or three words answered the Question you sent me last, which was, Whether Nature be the Art of God, Man the Art of Nature, and a Politick Government the Art of Man? To which I answer, 'Tis probable it may be so; onely I add this, That Nature doth not rule God, nor Man Nature, nor Politick Government Man; for the Effect cannot rule the Cause, but the Cause doth rule the Effect: Wherefore if men do not naturally agree, Art cannot make unity amongst them, or associate them into one Politick Body and so rule them; But man thinks he governs, when as it is Nature that doth it, for as nature doth unite or divide parts regularly or irregularly, and moves the several minds of men and the several parts of mens bodies, so war is made or peace kept: Thus it is not the artificial form that governs men in a Politick Government, but a natural power, for though natural motion can make artificial things, yet artificial things cannot make natural power; and we might as well say, nature is governed by the art of nature, as to say man is ruled by the art and invention of men. The truth is, Man rules an artificial Government, and not the Government Man, just like as a Watch-maker rules his Watch, and not the Watch the Watch-maker. And thus I conclude and rest,

Madam,

Your faithful Friend

and Servant.

MADAM,

Concerning the other Book of that learned AuthorHobbsyou sent me, calledElements of Philosophy, I shall likewise according to your desire, give you my judgment and opinion of it as I have done of the former, not that I intend to prejudice him any ways thereby, but onely to mark those places wherein I seem to dissent from his opinions, which liberty, I hope, he will not deny me; And in order to this, I have read over the first Chapter of the mentioned Book, treating of Philosophy in General, wherein amongst the rest, discoursing of the Utility of Natural Philosophy, and relating the commodities and benefits which proceed from so many arts and sciences, he is pleased to say,[1]that they areinjoyed almost by all people ofEurope, Asia,and some ofAfrica,onely the Americans, and those that live neer the Poles do want them: But why, says he,have they sharper wits then these? Have not all men one kind of soul, and the same faculties of mind?To which, give me leave,Madam, to add, That my opinion is, that there is a difference between the Divine and the Natural soul of man, and though the natural mind or soul is of one kind, yet being made of rational matter, it is divideable and composeable, by which division and composition, men may have more or less wit, or quicker and slower wit; the like for Judgments, Imaginations, Fancies, Opinions, &c. For were the natural rational mind individeable, all men would have the like degree of wit or understanding, all men would be Philosophers or fools, which by reason they are not, it proves the natural rational mind is divideable and composeable, making variations of its own several parts by self-motion; for it is not the several outward objects, or forreign instructions, that make the variety of the mind; neither is wit or ingenuity alike in all men; for some are natural Poets, Philosophers, and the like, without learning, and some are far more ingenious then others, although their breeding is obscure and mean, Neither will learning make all men Scholars, for some will continue Dunces all their life time; Neither doth much experience make all men wise, for some are not any ways advanced in their wisdom by much and long experiences; And as for Poetry, it is according to the common Proverb; aPoet is born, not made; Indeed learning doth rather hurt Fancy, for great Scholars are not always good Poets, nor all States-men Natural Philosophers, nor all Experienced Men Wise Men, nor all Judges Just, nor all Divines Pious, nor all Pleaders or Preachers Eloquent, nor all Moral Philosophers Vertuous; But all this is occasioned by the various Motions of the rational self-moving matter, which is the Natural Mind. And thus much for the present of the difference of wits and faculties of the mind; I add no more, but rest,

Madam,

Your faithful Friend,

and Servant.

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