But I think most psychologists are now agreed that this argument is quite worthless. There seem to me to be two possible alternatives to the conclusion drawn. It may, I think, possibly be the case that we did directly apprehend the ticks all the time, but that we cannot afterwards remember that we did, because the degree of attention (if any) with which we heard them was so small, that in ordinary life we should say that we did not attend to them at all. But, what, I think, is much more likely is that, though the same stimulus was acting on our ears, it failed to produce any mental effect whatever, because our attention was otherwise engaged.
(b) It is said that sometimes when we suddenly become aware, say, of the eighth stroke of a striking clock, we canrememberearlier strokes, although we seem to ourselvesnotto have directly apprehended them. I cannot say that I have ever noticed this experience in myself, but I have no doubt that it is possible. And people seem inclined to argue that, since we can remember the earlier strokes, we must have experienced them, though we did not directly apprehend them.
But here again, the argument does not seem to me at all conclusive. I should say, again, that it is possible that we did directly apprehend them, butonly with a very slight degree of attention (if any). And, as an alternative, I should urge that there is no reason why we should not be able to remember a thing, which we never experienced at all.
I do not know what other arguments can be used to show that we sometimesexperiencesensibles in a sense quite other than that of directly apprehending them. But I do not know how to show that we do not; and since people whose judgment I respect, seem to hold that we do, I think it is worth while to say something as to what this sense of "experience" can be, in case it does occur.
I have said that sometimes when people say that a given entity is "experienced" they seem to mean that it belongs to some individual, in the sense in which my acts of belief belong to me. To say that sensibles were experienced by me in this sense would, therefore, be to say that they sometimes have to my acts of belief and acts of direct apprehension the same relation which these have to one another—the relation which constitutes themmine.But that sensibles ever have this kind of relation to my mental acts, is a thing which I cannot believe. Those who hold that they are ever experienced at all, in some sense other than that of being directly apprehended, always hold, I think, that, whenever they are directly apprehended by us, they also, at the same time, have to us this other relation as well. And it seems to me pretty clear that when I do directly apprehend a sensible, it doesnothave to me the same relation which my direct apprehension of it has.
If, therefore, sensibles are ever experienced by us at all, in any sense other than that of being directly apprehended by us, we must, I think, hold that they are so in an entirely new sense, quite different both from that in which to be experienced means to be directly apprehended, and from that in which to beexperienced means to occur in some individual's mind. And I can only say that I see no reason to think that they ever are experienced in any such sense. If they are, the fact that they are so is presumably open to the inspection of us all; but I cannot distinguish any such fact as occurring in myself, as I can distinguish the fact that they are directly apprehended. On the other hand, I see no way of showing that they arenotexperienced in some such sense; and perhaps somebody will be able to point it out to me. I do not wish to assume, therefore, that thereisno such sense; and hence, though I am inclined to think that theonlysense in which they are experienced is that of being directly apprehended, I shall, in what follows, use the phrase "experienced" to meaneitherdirectly apprehendedorhaving to something this supposed different relation, if such a relation there be.
(3) We may now, therefore, raise the question: Do sensibles ever exist at times when they are not being experienced at all?
To this question it is usual to give a negative answer, and two differenta priorireasons may be urged in favour of that answer.
The first is what should be meant by Berkeley's dictum that theesseof sensibles ispercipi.This should mean, whatever else it may mean, at least this: that to suppose a sensible to exist and yetnotto be experienced in self-contradictory. And this at least seems to me to be clearly false. Anything which was a patch of colour would be a sensible; and to suppose that there are patches of colour which are not being experienced is clearly not self-contradictory, however false it may be.
It may, however, be urged (and this is the second argument) that, though to suppose a thing to be a sensible andyetnot experienced is not self-contradictory, yet we can clearly see that nothingcan have the one property without having the other. And I do not see my way to deny that we may be able to know,a priorithat such a connection holds between two such properties. In the present case, however, I cannot see that it does hold, and therefore, so far asa priorireasons go, I conclude that there is no reason why sensibles should not exist at times when they are not experienced.
It may, however, be asked: Is there any reason to suppose that they ever do? And the reason, which weighs with me most, is one which applies, I think, to a certain class of sensiblesonly; a class which I will try to define by saying that it consists of those whichwould(under certain conditions which actually exist) be experienced in asensation proper, if onlya living body, having a certain constitution, existed under those conditions in a position in which no such body does actually exist. I think it is very probable that this definition does not define at all accurately the kind of sensibles I mean; but I think that what the definition aims at will become clearer when I proceed to give my reasons for supposing that sensibles, of a kind to be defined insomesuch way, do exist unexperienced. The reason is simply that, in Hume's phrase, I have "a strong propensity to believe" that,e.g.,the visual sensibles which I directly apprehend in looking at this paper, still exist unchanged when I merely alter the position of my body by turning away my head or closing my eyes,providedthat the physical conditions outside my body remain unchanged. In such a case it is certainly true in some sense that Ishouldsee sensibles like what I saw the moment before,if onlymy head were still in the position it was at that moment or my eyes unclosed. But if, in such a case, there is reason to think that sensibles which I should see, if the position of my body were altered, exist in spite ofthe fact that I do not experience them, there is, I think, an equal reason to suppose it in other cases. We must, for instance, suppose that the sensibles which I should see now, if I were at the other end of the room, or if I were looking under the table, exist at this moment, though they are not being experienced. And similarly we must suppose that the sensibles whichyouwould see, if you were in the position in which I am now, exist at this moment, in spite of the fact that they may be more or less different from those which I see, owing to the different constitution of our bodies. All this implies of course, that a vast number of sensibles exist at any moment, which are not being experienced at all. But still it implies this only with regard to sensibles of a strictly limited class, namely sensibles which would be experiencedin a sensation proper,if a body, having a certain constitution, were in a position in which it is not, under the given physical conditions. It does not, for instance, imply that anyimages,of which it may be true that Ishouldhave them, under present physical conditions, if the position of my body were altered, exist now; nor does it imply that sensibles whichwouldbe experienced by me now in a sensation proper, if the physical conditions external to my body were different from what they are, exist now.
I feel, of course, that I have only succeeded in defining miserably vaguely the kind of sensibles I mean; and I do not know whether the fact that I have a strong propensity to believe that sensibles of a kind to be defined in some such way, do exist unexperienced, is any good reason for supposing that they actually do. The belief may, of course, be a mere prejudice. But I do not know of any certain test by which prejudices can be distinguished from reasonable beliefs. And I cannot help thinking that there may be a class of sensibles, capable ofdefinition insomesuch way, which there really is reason to think exist unexperienced.
But, if I am not mistaken, there is an empirical argument which, though, even if it were sound, it would have no tendency whatever to show thatnosensibles exist unexperienced, would, if it were sound, show that this very class of sensibles, to which alone my argument for unexperienced existence applies, certainly do not so exist. This, it seems to me, is the most weighty argument which can be used upon the subject; and I want, therefore, to give my reasons for thinking that it is fallacious.
The argument is one which asserts that there is abundant empirical evidence in favour of the view that the existence of the sensibles which we experience at any time, always depends upon the condition of our nervous system: so that, even where it also depends upon external physical conditions, we can safely say that sensibles, which we should have experienced, if only our nervous system had been in a different condition, certainly do not exist, when it is not in that condition. And the fallacy of this argument seems to me to lie in the fact that it does not distinguish between the existence of the sensibleswhichwe experience andthe fact that we experience them.What thereisevidence for is thatour experienceof sensibles always depends upon the condition of our nervous system; that, according as the condition of the nervous system changes, different sensibles areexperienced, even where other conditions are the same. But obviously the fact that our experience of a given sensible depends upon the condition of our nervous system does not directly show that the existence ofthe sensible experiencedalways also so depends. The fact that I am now experiencing this black mark is certainly a different fact from the fact that this black mark now exists. And hence the evidence which does tend to show thatthe former fact would not have existed if my nervous system had been in a different condition, has no tendency to show that the latter would not have done so either. I am sure that this distinction ought to be made; and hence, though I think there may be other reasons for thinking that the very existence of the sensibles, which we experience, and not merely the fact that we experience themdoesalways depend upon the condition of our nervous systems, it seems to me certain that this particular argument constitutes no such reason.
And I think that those who suppose that it does are apt to be influenced by an assumption, for which also, so far as I can see, there is no reason. I have admitted that the only reason I can see for supposing that sensibles which we experience ever exist unexperienced, seems to lead to the conclusion that the sensibles which would be seen by a colour-blind man, if he occupied exactly the position which I, who am not colour-blind, now occupy, exist now, just as much as those which I now see. And it may be thought that this implies that the sensibles, which he would see, and which would certainly be very different from those which I see, are nevertheless at this moment in exactly the same place as those which I see. Now, for my part, I am not prepared to admit that it is impossible they should be in the same place. But the assumption against which I wish to protest, is the assumption that, if they exist at all, theymustbe in the same place. I can see no reason whatever for this assumption. And hence any difficulties there may be in the way of supposing that they could be in the same place at the same time as the sensibles which I see, do not at all apply to my hypothesis, which is only that they existnow, notthat they existin the same placein which mine do.
On this question, therefore, as to whether sensibles ever exist at times when they are notexperienced, I have only to say (1) that I think there is certainly no good reason whatever for asserting thatnosensibles do; and (2) that I think perhaps a certain amount of weight ought to be attached to our instinctive belief that certain kinds of sensibles do; and that here again any special arguments which may be brought forward to show that, whether some sensibles exist unexperienced or not,thiskind certainly do not, are, so far as I can see, wholly inconclusive.
(II)
I now pass to the question how sensibles are related to physical objects. And here I want to say, to begin with, that I feel extremely puzzled about the whole subject. I find it extremely difficult to distinguish clearly from one another the different considerations which ought to be distinguished; and all I can do is to raise, more or less vaguely, certain questions as to how certainparticularsensibles are related to certainparticularphysical objects, and to give the reasons which seem to me to have most weight for answering these questions in one way rather than another. I feel that all that I can say is very tentative.
To begin with, I do not know how "physical object" is to be defined, and I shall not try to define it. I shall, instead, consider certain propositions, which everybody will admit to be propositionsaboutphysical objects, and which I shall assume that I know to be true. And the question I shall raise is as to how these propositions are to be interpreted—in what sensethey are true; in considering which, we shall at the same time consider how they are related to certain sensibles.
I am looking at two coins, one of which is a half-crown, the other a florin. Both are lying on the ground; and they are situated obliquely tomy line of sight, so that the visual sensibles which I directly apprehend in looking at them are visibly elliptical, and not even approximately circular. Moreover, the half-crown is so much farther from me than the florin thatitsvisual sensible is visibly smaller than that of the florin.
In these circumstances I am going to assume that I know the following propositions to be true; and no one, I think, will deny that we can know such propositions to be true, though, as we shall see, extremely different views may be taken as to what they mean. I know (a) that, in the ordinary sense of the word "see" I amreally seeing two coins;an assertion which includes, if it is not identical with, the assertion that the visual experiences, which consist in my direct apprehension of those two elliptical patches of colour,aresensations proper, and are not either hallucinations nor mere experiences of "images"; (b) that the upper sides of the coins arereallyapproximately circular, and not merely elliptical like the visual sensibles; (c) that the coinshaveanother side, and an inside, though I don't see it; (d) that the upper side of the half-crown is reallylargerthan that of the florin, though its visual sensible issmallerthan the visual sensible of the upper side of the florin: (e) that both coins continue to exist, even when I turn away my head or shut my eyes; but in saying this, I do not, of course, mean to say that there is absolutelynochange in them; I daresay there must besomechange, and I do not know how to define exactly what I do mean. But we can, I think, say at least this: viz., that propositions (h), (c), and (d) will still be true, although proposition (a) has ceased to be true.
Now all these propositions are, I think, typical propositions of the sort which we call propositions about physical objects; and the two coins themselvesarephysical objects, if anything is. My question is:In what senseare these propositions true?
And in considering this question, there are, I think, two principles which we can lay down as certain to begin with; though they do not carry us very far.
The one is (a) that the upper side of the coin, which I am said tosee,is not simply identical with the visual sensible which Idirectly apprehendin seeing it. That this is so might be thought to follow absolutely from each of the two facts which I have called (b) and (d); but I am not quite sure that it does follow from either of these or from both together: for it seems to me just possible that the two sensibles in question, thoughnotcircularin my private space,may yet be circular inphysicalspace; and similarly that though the sensible of the half-crown is smaller than that of the florinin my private space,it may be largerin physical space.But what I think it does follow from is the fact that another person may be seeing the upper side of the coin in exactly the same sense in which I am seeing it, and yet his sensible be certainly different from mine. From this it follows absolutely that the upper side of the coin cannot be identical withbothsensibles, since they arenotidentical with one another. And though it does not follow absolutely that it may not be identical withoneof the two, yet it does follow that wecanget a case in which it is not identical withmineand I need only assume that the case I am taking is such a case.
From this it follows that we must distinguish that sense of the word "see" in which we can be said to "see" a physical object, from that sense of the word in which "see" means merely to directly apprehend a visual sensible. In a proposition of the form "I see A," where A is a name or description of some physical object, though, if this propositionis to be true, there must be some visual sensible, B, which I am directly apprehending, yet the proposition "I see A" is certainly not always, and probably never, identical in meaning with the proposition "I directly apprehend B." In asserting "I see A" we are asserting not only that we directly apprehend some sensible but also something else about this sensible—it may be only some proposition of the form, "and this sensible has certain other properties," or it may be some proposition of the form "andI knowthis sensible to have certain other properties." Indeed we have not only to distinguish that sense of the word "perceive" in which it is equivalent to "directly apprehend," fromonesense in which we can be said to perceive a physical object; we have also to distinguish at least two different senses in which we can be said to perceive physical objects, different both from one another and from "directly apprehend." For it is obvious that though I should be said to be now seeingthe half-crown, there is a narrower, and more proper, sense, in which I can only be said toseeone side of it—notits lower side or its inside, and not therefore the whole half-crown.
The other principle, which we can lay down to start with is (β) that my knowledge of all the five propositions (a) to (e), is based, in the last resort, on experiences of mine consisting in the direct apprehension of sensibles and in the perception of relations between directly apprehended sensibles. It isbasedon these, in at least this sense, that I should never have known any of these propositions if I had never directly apprehended any sensibles nor perceived any relations between them.
What, in view of these two principles, can be the sense in which my five propositions are true?
(1) It seems to me possible that the onlytrueinterpretation which can be given to any of them is an interpretation of a kind which I can only indicate rather vaguely as follows: Namely, that all of them express only a kind of fact which we should naturally express by saying that,ifcertain conditions were fulfilled, I or some other person,shoulddirectly apprehend certain other sensibles. For instance the onlytruething that can be meant by saying that I really seecoinsmay be some such thing as that,ifI were to move my body in certain ways, I should directly apprehendothersensibles,e.g.tactual ones, which I should not directly apprehend as a consequence of these movements, if these present visual experiences of mine were mere hallucinations or experiences of "images." Again, the only true thing that can be meant by saying that the upper sides of the coins arereallyapproximately circular may be some such thing as that,ifI were looking straight at them, I should directly apprehend circular sensibles. And similarly, the only true interpretation of (c) may be some such fact as that,ifI were to turn the coins over, or break them up, Ishouldhave certain sensations, of a sort I can imagine very well; of (d) thatifI were at an equal distance from the half-crown and the florin, the sensible, I should then see corresponding to the half-crown would be bigger than that corresponding to the florin, whereas it is now smaller; of (e) that,if,when my eyes were closed, they had been open instead, I should have seen certain sensibles.
It is obvious, indeed, that if any interpretation on these linesisthe only true interpretation of our five propositions, none of those which I have vaguely suggested comes anywhere near to expressing it in its ultimate form. They cannot do so for the simple reason that, in them, the conditions under which Ishouldexperience certain other sensibles are themselves expressed in terms ofphysical objects,and notin terms of sensibles and our experience of them. The conditions are expressed in such terms as "if I were to move my body," "if I were to look straight at the coins," "if I were to turn the coins over," etc.; and all these are obviously propositions, which must themselves again be interpreted in terms of sensibles, if our original five propositions need to be so. It is obvious, therefore, that anyultimateinterpretation of our five propositions, on these lines, would be immensely complicated; and I cannot come anywhere near to stating exactly what it would be. But it seems to me possible thatsomesuch interpretation could be found, and that it is theonlytrue one.
The great recommendation of this view seems to me to be that it enables us to see, more clearly than any other view can, how our knowledge of physical propositions can be based on our experience of sensibles, in the way in which principle (β) asserts it to be. If, when I know that the coins are round, all that I know is some such thing as that if, after experiencing the sensibles I do now experience, I were to experience still others, I should finally experience a third set, we can understand, as clearly as we can understand how any knowledge can be obtained by induction at all, how such a knowledge could be based on our previous experience of sensibles, and how it could be verified by our subsequent experience.
On the other hand, apart from the difficulty of actually giving any interpretation on these lines, which will meet the requirements, the great objection to it seems to me to be this. It is obvious that, on this view, though we shall still be allowed to say that the coinsexistedbefore I saw them, arecircularetc., all these expressions, if they are to be true, will have to be understood in a Pickwickian sense. When I know that the coins existed beforeI saw them, what I know will not be that anything whatever existed at that time, in the sense in which those elliptical patches of colour exist now.Allthat I know will be simply that, since the elliptical patches exist now, it is true, that,ifcertain unrealised conditions had been realised, I should have had certain sensations that I have not had; or,ifcertain conditions, which may or may not be realised in the future, were to be so, Ishouldhave certain experiences. Something like this will actually be theonly truething that can be meant by saying that the coins existed before I saw them. In other words, to say of aphysical objectthat itexistedat a given time will always consist merely in saying of some sensible,notthatitexisted at the time in question, but something quite different and immensely complicated. And thus, though, when I know that the coins exist, what I know will be merely some proposition about these sensibles which I am directly apprehending, yet this view will not contradict principle (a) byidentifyingthe coins with the sensibles. For it will say that to assert a given thing of thecoinsis not equivalent to asserting thesame thingof the sensibles, but only to asserting of them something quite different.
The fact that these assertions that the coins exist, are round, etc., will, on this view, only be true in this outrageously Pickwickian sense, seems to me to constitute the great objection to it. But it seems to me to be an objection only, so far as I can see, because I have a "strong propensity to believe" that, when I know that the coins existed before I saw them,whatI know is that something existed at that time, in the very same sense in which those elliptical patches now exist. And, of course, this beliefmaybe a mere prejudice. Itmaybe that when I believe that Inowhave, in my body, blood and nerves and brain,whatI believe is only true, ifit doesnotassert, in the proper sense of the word "existence," thepresentexistence of anything whatever, other than sensibles which I directly apprehend, but only makes assertions as to the kind of experiences a doctorwouldhave, if he dissected me. But I cannot feel at all sure that my belief, that, when I know of the present Existence of these things (as I think I do), I am knowing of the present existence (in the proper sense) of things other than any sensibles which I or any one else am now directly apprehending, is a mere prejudice. And therefore I think it is worth while to consider what, if it is not, these things, of whose existence I know, can be.
(2) It is certain that if, when I know that that half-crown existed before I saw it, I am knowing that something existed at that time in other than a Pickwickian sense, I only know this somethingby description; and it seems pretty clear that the description by which I know it is asthething which has a certain connection with this sensible which I am now directly apprehending. Butwhatconnection? We cannot simply say, as many people have said, that by "that half-crown" I meanthething whichcausedmy experience of this sensible; because events which happen between the half-crown and my eyes, and events in my eyes, and optic nerves, and brains are just as muchcausesof my experiences as the half-crown itself. But it may perhaps be the case that the half-crown has some particularkindof causal relation to my experience, which these other events have not got—a kind which may be expressed, perhaps, by saying that it is its "source." And hence, when I know that that half-crown is circular, I may perhaps be knowing that thesourceof this experience is circular.
But what sort of a thing can this "source" be?
One kind of view, which I think is very commonly held, is that it is something "spiritual" in its nature, or something whose nature is utterly unknown to us. And those who hold this view are apt to add, that it is not really "circular," in any sense at all; nor is the "source" of my half-crown experience, in any sense at all, "bigger" than that of my florin experience. But if this addition were seriously meant, it would, of course, amount to saying that propositions (b) and (d) are not true, in any sense at all; and I do not think that those who make it, really mean to say this. I think that what they mean is only that the only sense in which those "sources" are circular, and one bigger than the other, is one in which to say this merely amounts to saying that the sensibles, which theywouldcause us to experience, under certain conditions,wouldbe circular, and one bigger than the other. In other words, in order to give a true interpretation to the propositions that the coins are circular and one bigger than the other, they say that we must interpret them in the same kind of way in which view (1) interpreted them; and the only difference between their view and view (1), is that, whereasthatsaid that you must give a Pickwickian interpretationbothto the assertion that the coinsexist, andto the assertion that they arecircular, they say that you mustnotgive it to the former assertion, and must to the latter.
To this view my objection is only that any reason there may be for saying that the "sources" exist in other than a Pickwickian sense, seems to me to be also a reason for saying that they are "circular" in a sense that is not Pickwickian. I have just as strong a propensity to believe that they are really circular, in a simple and natural sense, as that they exist in such a sense: and I know of no better reason for believing either.
(3) It may be suggested, next, that these "sources," instead of being something spiritual in their nature or something of a nature utterly unknown, consist simply of sensibles, of a kind which I have previously tried to define; namely of all those sensibles, which anybodywould,under the actual physical conditions, experience insensations properof which the half-crown and the florin were the source,iftheir bodies were in any of the positions relatively to those coins, in which they would get sensations from them at all. We saw before that it seemspossiblethat all these sensibles do really exist at times when they are not experienced, and that some people, at all events, seem to have a strong propensity to believe that they do. And in favour of the view that some such huge collection of sensiblesisthe upper side of the half-crown, is the fact that we do seem to have a strong propensity to believe that any particular sensible, which we directly apprehend in looking at the upper side of the half-crown, and of our direct apprehension of which the upper side is the source, isin the placein which the upper side is. And thatsomesense might be given to the expression "in the same place as," in which it could be true that sensibles of all sorts of different shapes and sizes, and of all sorts of different colours, were in the same place at the same time, seems to me to be possible. But the objection to this view seems to me to be the same as to the last; namely that if the upper side of the half-crown were identical with such a collection of sensibles, then the only sense in which it could be said to be "circular," or bigger than that of the florin, would certainly be very Pickwickian, though not the same as on that view.
(4) If, for the reasons given, we reject both (1), (2), and (3) as interpretations of our fivepropositions, the only alternative I can think of that remains, is one which is roughly identical, so far as I can see, with Locke's view. It is a view which asserts that the half-crown and the florin really did exist (in the natural sense) before I saw them; that they really are approximately circular (again in the natural sense); that, therefore, they are not composed of sensibles which I or others should directly apprehend under other conditions; and that therefore also neither these sensibles (even if such do now exist) nor those which I am now directly apprehending are in the place in which the coins are. It holds, therefore, that the coins do reallyresemblesome sensibles, in respect of the "primary" qualities which these have; that they really are round, and one larger than the other, in much the same sense in which some sensibles are round and some larger than others. But it holds also that no sensibles which we ever do directly apprehend, or should directly apprehend, if at a given time we were in other positions, arepartsof those coins; and that, therefore, there is no reason to suppose that any parts of the coins have any of the "secondary qualities"—colour, etc.—which any of these sensibles have.
On this view, it is plain, there is nothing to prevent us from holding that, as suggested in I (3), all sorts of unexperienced sensibles do exist. We are only prevented from holding that, if they do, those which have the same source all exist in thesame placeas their source. And the natural view to take as to the status of sensibles generally, relatively to physical objects, would be that none of them, whether experienced or not, were ever in the same place as any physical object. That none, therefore, exist "anywhere" in physical space; while, at the same time, we can also say, as argued in I (2), that none exist "in the mind," except inthe sense that some are directly apprehended by some minds. And the only thing that would need to be added, is that some, and some only,resemblethe physical objects which are their source, in respect of their shape.
To this view I can see no objection except the serious one that it is difficult to answer the questions: How can I ever come to know that these sensibles have a "source" at all? And how do I know that these "sources" are circular? It would seem that, if I do know these things at all, I must knowimmediately, in the case ofsomesensibles, both that they have a source and what the shape of this source is. And to this it may be objected that this is a kind of thing which I certainly cannot know immediately. The argument in favour of an interpretation of type (i) seems to me to rest wholly on the assumption that there are only certain kinds of facts which I can know immediately; and hence that if I believe I know a fact, which is not of this kind, and which also I cannot have learnt immediately, my belief must be a mere prejudice. But I do not know how it can be shown that an assertion of the form: Facts of certain kinds are the only ones you can know immediately; is itself not a prejudice. I do not think, therefore, that the fact that, if this last view were true, we should have to admit that we know immediately facts of a kind which many people think we cannot know immediately, is a conclusive objection to it.
The fourth chapter of Mr. Bradley'sAppearance and Realityis a chapter headed "Space and Time," and he begins the chapter as follows:—
"The object of this chapter is far from being an attempt to discuss fully the nature of space or of time. It will content itself with stating our main justification for regarding them as appearances. It will explain why we deny that,in the character which they exhibit, they eitherhaveorbelongto reality."[1]
Here, it will be seen, Mr. Bradley states that, in his opinion, Time,in a certain character, neither has nor belongs to reality; this is the conclusion he wishes to maintain. And to say that Timehas notreality would seem to be plainly equivalent to saying that Timeis notreal. However, if anybody should doubt whether the two phrases are meant to be equivalent, the doubt may be easily set at rest by a reference to the concluding words of the same chapter, where Mr. Bradley uses the following very emphatic expression: "Time," he says, "like space, has most evidently provednot to be real,but to be a contradictory appearance" (p. 43). Mr. Bradley does, then, say here, in so many words, that Timeis notreal. But there is one other difference between this statement at the end of the chapter, and the statement at the beginning of it,which we must not forget to notice. In the statement at the beginning he carefully qualifies the assertion "Time neither has nor belongs to reality" by saying "Time,in the character which it exhibits,neither has nor belongs to reality," whereas in the final statement this qualification is not inserted; here he says simply "Time is not real." This qualification, which is inserted in the one place and omitted in the other, might, of course, be meant to imply that, in someothercharacter—some character which it doesnotexhibit—Timehasreality and does belong to it. And I shall presently have something to say about this distinction between Time in one character and Time in another, because it might be thought that this distinction is the explanation of the difficulty as to Mr. Bradley's meaning, which I am going to point out.
However, so far it is clear that Mr. Bradley holds thatin some sense,at all events, the whole proposition "Time is not real" can be truly asserted. And, now, I want to quote a passage in which he says things which, at first sight, seem difficult to reconcile with this view. This new passage is a passage in which he is not talking of Time in particular, but of "appearances" in general. But, as we have seen, he does regard Time as one among appearances, and I think there is no doubt that what he here declares to be true of all appearances is meant to be true of Time, among the rest. This new passage is as follows:—
"For the present," he says,[2]"we may keep a fast hold upon this, that appearancesexist.That is absolutely certain, and to deny it is nonsense. And whatever exists mustbelong to reality.This is also quite certain, and its denial once more is self-contradictory. Our appearances, no doubt, may be a beggarly show, and their nature to an unknownextent may be something which,as it is,isnottrue of reality. That is one thing, and it is quite another thing to speak as if these facts had no actual existence, or as if there could be anything but reality to which they might belong. And I must venture to repeat that such an idea would be sheer nonsense. What appears, for that sole reason, most indubitablyis;and there is no possibility of conjuring its being away from it."
That is the passage which seems to me to raise a difficulty as to his meaning when contrasted with the former passage. And the reason why it seems to me to raise one is this. In the former passage Mr. Bradley declared most emphatically that Time is not real; he said: "Time hasmost evidentlyproved not to be real." Whereas in this one he seems to declare equally emphatically that Timedoesexist, andis.And his language here again is as strong as possible. He says it is sheer nonsense to suppose that Time doesnotexist, isnota fact, doesnotbelong to reality. It looks, therefore, as if he meant to make a distinction between "being real" on the one hand, and "existing," "being a fact," and "being" on the other hand—as if he meant to say that a thing may exist, and be, and be a fact, and yetnotbe real. And I think there is, at all events, some superficial difficulty in understanding this distinction. We might naturally think that to say "Time exists, is a fact, and is," is equivalent to saying that it is real. What more, we might ask, can a man who says that Timeisreal mean to maintain about it than that it exists, is a fact, and is? All that most people would mean by saying that time is real could, it would seem, be expressed by saying "There is such a thing as Time." And it might, therefore, appear from this new passage as if Mr. Bradley fully agreed with the view that most people would express by saying"Time is real"—as if he did not at all mean to contradict anything that most people believe about Time. But, if so, then what are we to make of his former assertion that, nevertheless, Time isnotreal? He evidently thinks that, in asserting this, he is asserting something which isnotmere nonsense; and he certainly would not have chosen this way of expressing what he means, unless he had supposed that what he is here asserting about Time is incompatible with what peopleoftenmean when they say "Time is real." Yet, we have seen that he thinks that what he is asserting isnotincompatible with the assertions that Time is, and is a fact, and exists. He must, therefore, think that when people say "Time is real" they often, at least, mean somethingmorethan merely that thereissuch a thing as Time, something therefore, which may be denied, without denying this. All the same, there is, I think, a real difficulty in seeing that they everdomean anything more, and,ifthey do, what more it is that they can mean.
The two expressions "Thereissuch a thing as so and so" and "So and so is real" are certainly sometimes and quite naturally used as equivalents, even if they are not always so used. And Mr. Bradley's own language implies that this is so. For, as we have seen, in the first passage, he seems to identify belonging to reality with being real. The conclusion which he expresses in one place by saying that Time does not belong to reality he expresses in another by saying that it is not real; whereas in the second passage he seems to identify the meaning of the same phrase "belonging to reality" withexisting;he says that whatever exists must belong to reality, and that it is self-contradictory to deny this. But if both being real and existing are identical with belonging to reality, it would seem they must be identical with one another.And, indeed, in another passage in the Appendix to the 2nd Edition (p. 555) we find Mr. Bradley actually using the following words: "Anything," he says, "that in any senseis,qualifies the absolute reality and so is real." Moreover, as we have seen, he declares it to be nonsense to deny that Timeis; he must, therefore, allow that,in a sense,at all events, it is nonsense to deny that Time is real. And yet this denial is the very one he has made. Mr. Bradley, therefore, does seem himself to allow that the word "real" may,sometimesat all events, be properly used as equivalent to the words "exists," "is a fact," "is." And yet his two assertions cannot both be true, unless there issomesense in which the whole proposition "Time is real" isnotequivalent to and cannot be inferred from "Time is," or "Time exists," or "Time is a fact."
It seems, then, pretty clear that Mr. Bradley must be holding that the statement "Time is real" is inonesense,notequivalent to "Time exists"; though he admits that, inanothersense, it is. And I will only quote one other passage which seems to make this plain.
"If," he says later on (p. 206) "Time is not unreal, I admit that our Absolute is a delusion; but, on the other side, it will be urged that time cannot be mere appearance. The change in the finite subject, we are told, is a matter of direct experience; it is a fact, and hence it cannot be explained away. And so much of course is indubitable. Change is a fact and, further,this fact, as such,isnotreconcilable with the Absolute. And, if we could not in any way perceive howthe factcan beunreal,we should be placed, I admit, in a hopeless dilemma.... But our real position is very different from this. For time has been shown to contradict itself, and so to be appearance. With this, its discord, we see at once, may pass as anelement into a wider harmony. And with this, theappeal to factat once becomes worthless."
"It is mere superstition to suppose that an appeal to experience can provereality.That I find something in existence in the world or in my self, shows that this somethingexists, and it cannot showmore.Any deliverance of consciousness—whether original or acquired—is but a deliverance of consciousness. It is in no case an oracle and a revelation which we have to accept as it is a fact, like other facts, to be dealt with; and there is no presumption anywhere that anyfactis better than appearance."
Here Mr. Bradley seems plainly to imply that to be "real" is somethingmoreand other than to be a fact or to exist. This is the distinction which I think he means to make, and which, I think, is the real explanation of his puzzling language, and this is the distinction which I am going presently to discuss. But I want first to say something as to that other distinction, which I said might be supposed to be the explanation of the whole difficulty—the distinction implied by the qualification "Time,in the character which it exhibits"; the suggestion that, when we talk of "Time," we may sometimes mean Time in one character, sometimes in another, and that what is true of it in the one character may not be true of it in the other. It might, I think, be suggested that this is the explanation of the whole difficulty. And I want briefly to point out why I think it cannot be the only explanation.
Stated very badly and crudely, the difficulty which requires explanation is this: Mr. Bradley says, "It is sheer nonsense to say Time is not real." But this thing which he says it is sheer nonsense to say is the very thing which he himself had formerly said. He had said, "Time has most evidently proved not to be real." Now, Mr. Bradley certainly does not mean to say that this proposition of hisown is sheer nonsense; and yet he says, in words, that itissheer nonsense. This is the difficulty. What is the explanation? Quite obviously, the explanation can only take one possible form. Mr. Bradley must be holding that the words "Time is real" may have two differentsenses.In one sense, the denial of them is sheer nonsense; in the other sense, so far from being sheer nonsense, denial of them is, according to him, evidently true. Now, what are these two different senses, between which the difference is so enormous? It is here that the two different explanations come in.
The first and, as I think, the wrong explanation (though I think Mr. Bradley's words do give some colour to it) is this. It might be said: "The whole business is perfectly easy to explain. When Mr. Bradley says that Time isnotreal, what he means is that Time,in the character which it exhibits,is not real. Whereas, when he says, Time does exist, is a fact, and is, and that it is nonsense to deny this, what he means is that Time does exist,in some other character—some characterotherthan that which it exhibits. He doesnotmean to make any distinction, such as you suppose, between two meanings of the word I real '—the one of them merely equivalent to 'exists,' 'is,' 'is a fact,' and the other meaning something very different from this. The only distinction he means to make is a distinction betweentwomeanings of 'Time' or of the whole sentence 'Time is real.' He distinguishes between the meaning of this sentence, when it means, 'Time in the character which it exhibits, is real,' which meaning, he says, is evidently false; and its meaning when it means, 'Time insome othercharacter, is real,' and this meaning, he says, is evidently true. This is the complete explanation of your supposed puzzle, which is, in fact, therefore, very easy to solve."
This, I think, might be offered as an explanation of Mr. Bradley's meaning. And it must be admitted that itwouldfurnish a complete explanation of the particular puzzle I have just stated, it would completely absolve Mr. Bradley from the charge of inconsistency; and would show that where he appears to contradict himself about the reality of Time, the contradiction is verbal only and not real. We might, indeed, object to this distinction between Time in one character and Time in another; on the ground that anything which has not got the character which Time exhibits, but only someothercharacter, ought not to be called Time at all. We are, indeed, perfectly familiar with the conception that one and the same thing mayat one timepossess a character which it doesnotpossess at another, so that what is true of it at one time may not be true of it at another. We are, that is, familiar with the idea of a thingchangingits character. But Time itself as a whole obviously cannot change its character in this sense. Mr. Bradley cannot mean to say that it possesses the character "which it exhibits" and in which it is unrealat one time,and possesses some other character, in which it is real, atsome other time.And hence we might say it is certainly wrong to speak as if Time itself could have two incompatible characters; since nothing can have two incompatible characters, unless it has themat different times.And this is an objection which does seem to apply to Mr. Bradley's doctrine in any case, since he does in any case seem to imply this distinction between Time in one character and Time in another, whether this distinction is the complete explanation of our particular puzzle or not. Yet this objection would not necessarily be more than an objection to Mr. Bradley's words; it would not necessarily be an objection to his meaning. Where he seems toimply that Time, in some character other than that which it exhibits, may be fully real, he may only mean that something completely different from Time, but which does in some sense correspond to it, is fully real; and if he does mean this, our objection would only amount to an objection to his giving the name of "Time" to this supposed counterpart of Time; we might say, and I think justly, that it is misleading to speak of this counterpart of Time as if it were Time itself in some other character; but this would go no way at all to show that there may not really be such a counterpart of Time, whichisreal, while Time itself is unreal. We might ask, too, what this supposed counterpart of Time is like, or (to put it in Mr. Bradley's way) what the precise character is, in which Time Areal? And I think Mr. Bradley would admit that he cannot tell us. But this, you see, would also be no objection to his actual doctrine. He might quite well know, and be right in saying, that there is and must be a realcounterpartof Time, completely different in character from Time, as we know it, even though he has not the least idea what this counterpart is like.
We must, therefore, admit that this proposed explanation of our puzzle would be a complete explanation of it. It would completely vindicate Mr. Bradley from the charge of inconsistency, and would give us, as his doctrine, a doctrine to which we have hitherto found no objection except verbal ones.
But, nevertheless, I think it is a wrong explanation, and I want to explain why. If we were to suppose that this distinction between Time in one character and Time in another were the only one on which Mr. Bradley meant to rely, we should have as his doctrine this: We should have to suppose him to affirm most emphatically that Time, inthe character which it exhibits, neither is real,norexists,noris a fact,noris. We should have to suppose him to be using all these four expressions always as strict equivalents, and to mean that it isonlyin its other character that Time either exists, or is a fact, or is. And if he did mean this, there would, of course, be no doubt whatever that he does mean to contradict the common view with regard to Time; since, of course, what most people mean by "Time" is what he chooses to call "Time in the character which it exhibits." Yet, his language, even in the passages that I quoted, seems to me to indicate that he does not mean this. I think, on the contrary, he means to affirm emphatically that Timeevenin the character which it exhibits, does exist,isa fact, and indubitablyis,though it isnotreal in that character. In the second passage, for instance, where he insists so emphatically that appearances do exist, are facts, and indubitablyare,he is, I think, plainly talking of appearances, in the character which they exhibit—or, as he there puts it, their nature,as it is—he does, I think, mean that appearances, even in this character, are facts, exist, and are, though, in this character, they are not "true of reality." And, so again in the third passage, where he says, Changeisa fact, and this fact,as such,is not reconcilable with the Absolute; this language is surely quite inexcusable, unless he means that Change, as such—change, in thecharacter which it exhibits—change,as it is, isa fact: though, of course, he holds thatinthis character it certainly is not real. I think, therefore, we have to assume that Mr. Bradley means to make a distinction not merely between Time, in one character, and Time in another, but also between "real," in one sense, and "real" in another. His meaning is not so simple as it would be, if he were merely making a distinction between Time in one characterand Time in another, and it is not, after all, at all plain whether he means to contradict what ordinary people hold about Time or not. He does not mean to assert that Time,as such, neitheris real,norexists,noris a fact,noris; but, on the contrary, that Time, evenas such,does exist,isa fact, andis;but,nevertheless, is not real. This, at least, is what I am going to assume him to mean. And on this assumption, we are brought face to face with the question as to the meaning of the word "real," and also as to the meaning of these other words "exists," "is a fact," and "is." Mr. Bradley seems to admit, we have seen, that "real" maysometimesbe properly used asmerelyequivalent to these other phrases. We are, however, now supposing that he also holds that in another sense they are not equivalent, but that "real" means something more than the others, so that it is quite consistent to maintain that Time isnot"real," and yetdoesexist, is a fact, and is. In holding this I think he is mistaken; and what I want to do is to explain, as clearly as I can, what sort of a mistake I take him to be making, and what seems to me to be the source of this mistake. I may, perhaps, be quite wrong in thinking that Mr Bradley has made this mistake, and that it is in any degree the source of the distinction he seems to draw between "reality" and "existence." To maintain that it is so is no part of my main object. My main object is simply to make clear the nature of this particular mistake, whether committed by Mr. Bradley or not, and that it is a mistake; because it seems to me that it is a mistake which it is very easy to make, and very important to avoid. I am, of course, not concerned at all to discuss the question whether Timeisreal or not, but only to discuss the question what sort of things would have to be true, if it were unreal, and whetherif those things were true it could still be true that Time either exists, or is, or is a fact.
Now, to begin with, I think I know pretty well, in part at least, what Mr. Bradley means when he says that it is unreal. I think that part at least of what he means is just what heoughtto mean—just what anyone else would mean if he said that Time was unreal, and what any ordinary person would understand to be meant, if he heard those words. But I can conceive that, when I have explained as well as I can what this is that heoughtto mean, some people may be inclined to dispute whether he means any such thing at all. They may say that he is using the word "real" exclusively in some highly unusual and special sense, so that in asserting that "Time is unreal" he is by no means denying any part of what ordinary people would mean by saying that "Time is real." And that some special sense maycome into his meaning I am prepared to admit. I do think it is possible thatpartof what Mr. Bradley is asserting may be something which no unsophisticated person would think of expressing in the same way, and I will admit, therefore, that he does not, very likely, mean by "Time is unreal"merelywhat other people would mean by this phrase, but something elseas well.What, however, I cannot help thinking is that, even if he means something more, hedoesmean what ordinary people would meanas well: that what they would mean is at least apartof his meaning. And if even this is disputed, if it is maintained that he is using the wordsexclusivelyin some special sense, I own I do not know how to argue the question. If anybody really does take the view that, when he says "Time is unreal," absolutely all that he means is something which is in no way incompatible with what most people would mean by saying "Time is real," I do not know how to show that this view iswrong. I can only say that if thishadbeen all that he meant, I cannot believe that he would have expressed his view in the form "Time is unreal." The only further argument I shall bring in favour of my view that he does mean what he ought to mean will take the form of an answer to one possible argument which might be brought against it. When I nave explained what heoughtto mean by saying that "Time is unreal," it will be quite clear that this is something which is in fact incompatible with the truth of the propositions that Timeis,orexists,oris a fact.And it might be urged that the fact that it is thus incompatible is a strong argument against the view that Mr. Bradley does mean what heoughtto mean, since, if he had meant it, he could hardly have failed to perceive that what he meantwasinconsistent with these propositions, whereas, as we have seen, he certainly does not perceive this. I have an answer to that argument, which consists in giving an explanation, which I think a plausible one, as to how he could come to think that the propositions arenotinconsistent, when in fact they are.
What, then,oughtMr. Bradley to mean by "Time is unreal"? What would most people mean by this proposition? I do not think there is much difficulty in discovering what sort of thing they would mean by it. Of course, Time, with a big T, seems to be a highly abstract kind of entity, and to defineexactlywhat can be meant by saying of an entity of that sort that it is unreal does seem to offer difficulties. But if you try to translate the proposition into the concrete, and to ask what itimplies,there is, I think, very little doubt as to the sort of thing it implies. The moment you try to do this, and think what it really comes to, you at once begin thinking of a number of differentkindsof propositions, all of which plainly must be untrue, ifTime is unreal. If Time is unreal, then plainly nothing ever happens before or after anything else; nothing is ever simultaneous with anything else; it is never true that anything is past; never true that anything will happen in the future; never true that anything is happening now; and so on. You can at once think of a considerable number of kinds of propositions (and you could easily add to the list), the falsehood of all of which is plainly implied by saying that Time is unreal. And it is clear, also, that to say that the falsehood of all propositions of these kinds is implied is equivalent to saying that there are no facts of certain corresponding kinds—no facts which consist in one event happening before another; none which consist in an event being past or future, and so on. That is to say, what "Time is unreal" implies is that, in the case of a large number of differentpropertieswhich are such that, if theydidbelong to anything, what they belonged to would be facts having some common characteristic, which we might express by calling them "temporal facts," the properties in question do, in fact, belong to nothing. It implies that the property of being a fact which consists in one event following another belongs to nothing; that that of being a past event belongs to nothing, and so on. And why it implies that all those different special properties belong to nothing is, I think we may say, because what itmeansis that the general property which I have called that of being a "temporal fact" belongs to nothing. To say that the property of being a temporal fact belongs to nothingdoes implythat such special properties as that of being a fact which consists in one event following another, or that of being a fact which consists in something being past, also belong to nothing; in exactly the same way as to say that the property of being "coloured" belongs to nothingimplieswith regardto the special properties "being red," "being blue," etc., that they also belong to nothing. We may, then, I think, say that what "Time is unreal"meansis simply "The property of being a temporal fact belongs to nothing," or, to express this in the way in which it would be expressed in ordinary life, "Thereareno temporal facts." And this being so, we have explained the usage of "unreal," where it is predicated of Time with a capital T, by reference to a much more common and perfectly familiar usage of the term. The use of "is unreal" in the phrase "Time is unreal" has been defined by reference to its use in the phrase "Temporal facts are unreal." And its use in this phrase is, so far as I can see, exactly the same as in hosts of phrases with which we are perfectly familiar; it is, I think,thecommonest and by far the most important use of the term "unreal." The use is that in which we use it when we say, "Unicorns are unreal," "Griffins are unreal," "Chimæras are unreal," and so on. It is the usage in which unreal is equivalent to "imaginary"; and in which to say "Unicorns are unreal" means the same as "There are no unicorns" or "Unicorns do not exist." In just the same way the proposition "Temporal facts are unreal," into which we have translated "Time is unreal," means the same as "There are no temporal facts," or "Temporal facts do not exist," or "Temporal facts are imaginary."
I think, then, that what Mr. Bradleyoughtto mean by "Time is unreal" can be defined by reference to one particular usage of the word "real" —or, if you like to put it that way, to one particular one among the conceptions for which the term "reality" may stand. And this particular conception seems to me to be by far the commonest and most important of those for which the term does stand. I want, therefore, before going on, todwell a little upon its nature; although I daresay that all that I have to say is perfectly familiar and perfectly well understood by every one here. Of course, it has often been said before, but I think it is still very far from being generally understood.
I think, perhaps, the point I want to insist on can be brought out in this way. I have just said that we have pointed out one particular one, and that the most important, among the conceptions for which the term "reality" may stand; and that is an excusable way of saying what we have done. But it would, I think, be more correct to say that we have pointed out one particular, and that the most important, usage of the terms "real" and "unreal," and that one of the peculiarities of this usage is that it is such that the terms "real" and "unreal" cannot, when used in this way, be properly said to stand for any conception whatever. I will try to explain what I mean. We have said that what "Lions are real"meansis that some particular property or other—I will say, for the sake of brevity,theproperty of being a lion, though that is not strictly accurate, does In factbelong tosome-thing—that there are things which have it, or, to put it in another way, that the conception of being a lion is a conception which does apply to some things—that there are things whichfall underit. And similarly what "Unicorns areunreal"means is that the property of being a unicorn belongs tonothing. Now, if this is so, then it seems to me, in a very important sense, "real" and "unreal" donotin this usage stand for any conceptions at all. The onlyconceptionswhich occur in the proposition "Lions are real" are, on this interpretation, plainly, (1) the conception of being a lion, and (2) the conception of belonging to something, and perfectly obviously "real" does not stand for either of these. In the case of the first that is obvious; but it isworth while pointing out that it is also true of the second.
For if "is real" did stand for "belongs to something," then the proposition "Lions are real" would stand, not for the assertion that the property of "being a lion" belongs to something, but for the assertion that lions themselvesare properties which belong to something; and it is quite obvious that what we mean to assert is not any such nonsense as this. "Real," therefore, does not, in this proposition, stand for the conception of "belonging to something" nor yet, quite plainly, does it stand for the conception of "being a lion." And hence, since these are the only two conceptions which do occur in the proposition, we may, I think, say that "real," in this usage, does not stand for any conception at all. To say that it did would be to imply that it stood for some property of which we are asserting that everything which has the property of "being a lion"alsohas this other property. But we are not, in fact, asserting any such thing. We are not asserting of any property called "reality" that it belongs to lions, as in the proposition "Lions are mammalian" weareasserting of the property of "being a mammal" thatitbelongs to lions. The two propositions "Lions are real" and "Lions are mammalian," though grammatically similar, are in reality of wholly different forms; and one difference between them may be expressed by saying that whereas "mammalian" does stand for a property or conception, the very point of this usage of "real" is that it does not.
To return to Mr. Bradley. "Time is unreal"oughtto mean, according to me, "Temporal facts are unreal," in the sense I have tried to explain. And I cannot help thinking that this which heoughtto mean is, in part at least, what Mr. Bradleydoesmean when he says "Time is unreal," thoughpossibly be also means something else as well. But if so, it is quite clear, I think, that what he means is inconsistent with its being true that Time exists or that there is such a thing as Time. To say that Time exists or that there is such a thing, is to assert at least, that there are some temporal facts: it may assert more than this, but it does assert this, at least. And this, we have seen, is exactly what is denied when it is said that Time is unreal. "Time is unreal" just means "Temporal facts are unreal,"or"there are no temporal facts,"or"Temporal facts do not exist." And just this is also what is meant by "Time does not exist" or "There is no such thing as Time." There is, in fact, nothing, else for these expressions to mean. What, therefore, Mr. Bradleyoughtto mean and (according to me) does mean by "Time is unreal" is, in fact, inconsistent with what he ought to mean by "Time exists" or by "Time is." And yet plainly he does not think that it is so. Is it possible to explain why he should have failed to perceive the inconsistency?
I think his failure can be explained as follows. It may have been noticed that, in the passages I quoted from him, he insists in one place, that to deny that appearances exist is not merely false butself-contradictory,and in another appeals to the principle that "any deliverance of consciousness is but a deliverance of consciousness" in support of his contention that whatisa fact need, nevertheless,notbe real. And the fact that he does these two things does, I think, give colour to the suggestion that the reason why he thinks that what is unreal may yet exist, and be a fact, and be, is the following. It is undoubtedly the case that, even if temporal facts are unreal,i.e.,thereareno such things, we can and dothink of them,just as it is undoubtedly the case that, though unicorns are unreal, we canand do imagine them. In other words, "temporal facts" and "unicorns" are both quite certainly "deliverances of consciousness," at least in the sense that they are "objects of thought"; being "objects of thought" they are, in a wide sense, "appearances" also, and I cannot help thinking that Mr. Bradley supposes that, merely because they are so, theymustat least BE. "How" (I imagine he would ask) "can a thing 'appear' or even 'be thought of' unless it is there to appear and to be thought of? To say that it appears or is thought of, and that yet there is no such thing, is plainly self-contradictory. A thing cannot have a property, unless it is there to have it, and, since unicorns and temporal factsdohave the property of being thought of, there certainly must be such things. When I think of a unicorn, what I am thinking of is certainly not nothing; if it were nothing, then, when I think of a griffin, I should also be thinking of nothing, and there would be no difference between thinking of a griffin and thinking of a unicorn. But there certainly is a difference; and what can the difference be except that in the one case what I am thinking of is a unicorn, and in the other a griffin? And if the unicorn is what I am thinking of, then there certainly mustbea unicorn, in spite of the fact that unicorns are unreal. In other words, though in one sense of the words there certainlyareno unicorns—that sense, namely, in which to assert that there are would be equivalent to asserting that unicorns are real—yet theremustbesomeother sense in which therearesuch things; since,ifthere were not, we could not think of them."
Perhaps, it may be thought that the fallacy involved in this argument is too gross for it to be possible that Mr. Bradley should have been guilty of it. But there are other passages inAppearanceand Reality—particularly what he says about Error —which look to me as if he certainly was guilty of it. I suppose it will be quite obvious to everyone here that it is a fallacy; that the fact that we can think of unicorns is not sufficient to prove that, in any sense at all, thereareany unicorns. Yet, I am not sure that I know myself what isthemistake involved in thinking that itissufficient, and I am going, therefore, to try to put as clearly as I can, what I think it is, in the hope that somebody may be able, if I am wrong, to correct me.
The main mistake, I suppose, is the mistake of thinking that the proposition "Unicorns are thought of" is a proposition of the same form as "Lions are hunted"; or the proposition "I am thinking of a unicorn" of the same form as "I am hunting a lion"; or the proposition "Unicorns are objects of thought" of the same form as "Lions are objects of the chase." Of the second proposition in each of these three pairs, it is in fact the case that it could not be true unless there were lions—at least one. Each of them does, in fact, assert both with regard to a certain property—which we will call that of "being a lion"—that therearethings which possess it, and also with regard to another—that of being hunted—that some of the things which possess the former possess this property too. But it is obvious enough to common sense that the same is by no means true of thefirstproposition in each pair, in spite of the fact that their grammatical expression shows no trace of the difference. It is perfectly obvious that if I say "I am thinking of a unicorn,"
I am not saying both that there is a unicorn and that I am thinking of it, although, if I say "I am hunting a lion," I am saying both that there is a lion, and that I am hunting it. In the former case,
I amnotasserting that the two properties of being a unicorn and of being thought of by me bothbelong to one and the same thing; whereas, in the latter case, I am asserting that the two properties of being a lion and of being hunted by medobelong to one and the same thing. It is quite clear that there isin fact, this difference between the two propositions; although no trace of it appears in their verbal expression. And why we should use the same form of verbal expression to convey such different meanings is more than I can say. It seems to me very curious that language, in this, as in the other instance which we have just considered of "Lions are real" and "Lions are mammalian," should have grown up just as if it were expressly designed to mislead philosophers; and I do not know why it should have. Yet, it seems to me there is no doubt that in ever so many instances it has. Moreover,exactlywhatismeant by saying "I am thinking of a unicorn" is not by any means clear to me. I think we can assert at least this: In order that this proposition should be true, it is necessary (1) that I should be conceiving, with regard to a certain property, the hypothesis that there Is something which possesses it, and (2) that the property in question should be such that, if anything did possess it there would be a unicorn. Although this is plainly true, it does not give us completely what ismeantby the statement, "I am thinking of a unicorn"; and I do not know what the complete meaning is. It is certainlynotthat I am conceiving with regard to the property of "being a unicorn," that there is something which possesses it; since I may be thinking of a unicorn, without ever having conceived the property of "being a unicorn" at all. Whatever it does mean, the point which concerns us is that it is certainlynotnecessary for its truth, that the property of being a unicorn should, in fact, belong to anything whatever, or, therefore, that there should in any sensewhateverbea unicorn. And the fallacy I am attributing to Mr. Bradley is that of supposing that,in some sense,it must imply this latter.