III.OF GALL.THE ORGANS.
Of all Gall’s writings, his anatomy is that which has been most talked of, and yet it is the part least known.
In the year 1808, Gall read to the first class of the Institute a memoir on the anatomy of the brain;[86]and M. Cuvier made a report upon that memoir. But neither in that memoir norin the report do we find one word ofspecial anatomy, ofsecret anatomy, of what might be calledanatomy of the Doctrine; or, in other terms, and as it would be expressed at the present day, ofphrenological anatomy.
The anatomy of Gall’s memoir is nothing but a very ordinary anatomy. He insists that the cerebral nerves, all of them without exception, rise upwards from the medulla oblongata towards the encephalon; that the cineritious matter produces the white matter: he divides the fibres of the brain intodivergentandconvergent; he supposes that each convolution of this organ, instead of being a full and solid mass, as is generally thought, is merely a fold[87]of nervous or medullary fibres, &c. &c.
Such are the questions discussed by Gall; and it is sufficiently clear that, whatever sidewe take upon these questions, his doctrine assuredly would neither gain nor lose any thing.
Whether such or such a nerve ascends or descends; whether the white matter is produced by the gray; or whether, which is, to say the least, quite as probable, this be nonsense; whether this or that fibre goes out or comes in, diverges or converges, &c. &c. the doctrine of the plurality of brains, the doctrine of individual intelligences, will be neither more nor less true, more nor less doubtful.[88]
M. Cuvier, in his report, observed: “It is essential to repeat, were it merely for the information of the public, that the anatomicalquestions we have been considering, have no immediate and necessary connexion with the physiological doctrines taught by M. Gall, as to the functions and relative volume of different parts of the brain; and that all that we have inquired into as to the structure of the brain, might be either true or false, without affording the least conclusion in favour of or against the doctrine.”[89]
It is necessary not to make any mistake as to the real point of the question. Gall’s doctrine goes to establish one and only one thing, to wit,the plurality of intelligencesandthe plurality of brains.[90]That is what constitutes the special and peculiar doctrine;that is to say, different from the common doctrine, which admits but one understanding and a single brain. Whatever goes to prove the plurality of understandings and brains belongs to Gall’s doctrine; and whatever does not tend to prove the plurality of understandings and brains is in opposition to that doctrine.
Gall’s works then really contain two very distinct anatomies: one is ageneral anatomy, which has nothing in particular to do with his doctrine; the other is aspecial anatomy, which, supposing it to be true, would constitute the basis of his doctrine.
Now, a great deal has been said about Gall’s general anatomy; but as to his special anatomy, I know of no one who has spoken of it. Gall himself says as little as possible about it. In other matters he tells his opinions both very clearly and very positively: in this particular we are obliged to guess at them.
When Gall, in hispsycology, substitutes thefacultiesfor the understanding, he defines thosefaculties. He defines them, as we have already seen, to beindividual intelligences. How happens it, then, that in his anatomy, when he substitutes the organs of the brain for the brain itself, he does not define these organs? How strange! Gall’s whole doctrine, allphrenology, rests upon theorgans of the brain; for, without distinct cerebral organs, there can be no independent faculties; and without independent faculties there can be no phrenology: and Gall does not say, nor has any phrenologist said for him, what is the thing called acerebral organ.
The truth is: Gall never had any settled opinion upon what he called the organs of the brain; he never saw thoseorgans, and he imagined them for the use of hisfaculties. He did what so many others have done. He commenced with imagining a hypothesis, andthen he imagined an anatomy to suit his hypothesis.
When the doctrine of animal spirits was believed, the brain was composed of pipes and tubes to convey these spirits.
“The cortical substance which is found in the hemispheres of the brain,” says Pourfour du Petit, “furnishes the whole of the medullary portion, which is a mere collection of an infinite number of pipes.”[91]
“The small arteries of the cortical part of the brain,” says Haller, “transmit a spirituous liquor into the medullary and nervous tubes.”[92]
It is evident that theorgansof Gall have no more real existence than thepipesof Pourfour du Petit, or thetubesof Haller. They are two structures that have been imagined, as suitable for two hypotheses.
In searching for the primary idea, the secretnotion that led Gall to his doctrine of theplurality of the intelligences, I detect it in the analogy that he supposed to exist between the functions of the senses and the faculties of the soul.
He sees the functions of the senses constituting distinct functions, and insists that the faculties of the soul must constitute equally distinct faculties; he sees each particular sense possessing an organ proper to itself, and thinks that each faculty of the soul must have its proper organ;[93]in one word, he looks upon the outer man, and constructs the inner man after the image of the outer man.
According to Gall, every thing between an organ of a sense and an organ of a faculty, between a faculty and sense, is similar. Afaculty is a sense. His words are: thememory or the sense of things, thememory or the sense of persons, thememory or the sense of numbers. He talks of thesense of language, thesense of mechanics, thesense of the relations of colours, &c. &c.
“As we must admit,” says he, “five different external senses, since their functions are essentially different, ... so we must agree, after all, to acknowledge the different faculties and the different inclinations as being essentially different moral and intellectual forces, and likewise connected with organic apparatuses, which are special to each and independent of each other.”[94]
“Who,” says he, “can dare to say that sight, hearing, taste, smell, and touch, are simple modifications of faculties? Who could dare to derive them from a single and samesource, from a single and same organ? In the same way, the twenty-seven qualities and faculties which I recognise as fundamental or primary forces, ... cannot be regarded as the simple modifications of any one faculty.”[95]
On the one hand, Gall gives to thefacultiesall the independence of thesenses; and on the other, he gives thesensesall the attributes of thefaculties.
“Here,” says he, “are new reasons why I have always maintained in my public discourses, though these assertions are in opposition to the ideas that prevail among philosophers, that each organ of a sense possesses absolutely its own functions; that each of these organs has its peculiar faculty of receiving and even of perceiving impressions, its own conscience, its own faculty of reminiscence,”[96]&c.
Gall did not foresee that a physiological experiment (and a very sure one it is) would one day demonstrate that the sense receives the impression but does not perceive it, and that, consequently, it is endowed neither withconsciencenorreminiscence, &c.
When the cerebral lobes or hemispheres[97]are removed from an animal, the animal immediately loses its sight.
And yet nothing, as regards the eyes themselves, has been changed; objects continue to be depicted upon the retina, the iris retains its contractility, and the optic nerve its excitability. The retina continues to be sensible of light, for the iris contracts or dilates according as the light admitted to it is more or less intense.
No change has taken place as to the structure of the eye, and yet the animal does notsee! Therefore it is not the eye that perceives, nor is it the eye that sees.[98]
The eye does not see; it is the understanding that sees by means of the eyes.[99]
When Gall concludes from the independence of the external senses to the independence of the faculties of the soul, he confounds, as to the sense itself, two things that are essentially distinct, impression and perception. Impression is multiple; perception is single.
When the hemispheres are removed, the animal instantly loses its perception; it no longer sees nor hears,[100]&c. notwithstanding all the organs of the senses, the eye, the ear, &c. subsist, and the impressions take place.
Therefore the principle that perceives isone. Lost for one sense, it is lost for all the senses.And if it beonefor the external senses, how can it be other thanonefor the faculties of the soul?
Gall therefore cannot suppose the existence of several distinct principles for the faculties of the soul, otherwise than because he supposes several distinct principles for the perceptions; and he only supposes several principles for the perceptions because he confounds impression with perception. The whole of his psycology arises from a mistake; and the whole of his anatomy is constructed for the sake of his psycology.
In psycology he endeavours to prove that the faculties of the soul are merelyinternal senses; in anatomy, he endeavours to prove that the organs of the faculties of the soul only repeat and reproduce the organs of theexternal senses.
Now anorgan, that is to say, under the present point of view, thenerveof anexternalsense, is nothing more than afascicleofnervous fibres. Therefore the brain, under the theory, can be nothing but a collection offasciclesoffibres.[101]
According to Gall, the origin, the development, the structure and mode of termination, as to the organs of the faculties of the soul and the organs of the external senses, every thing is similar, every thing is in common. And yet the primitive difficulty remains unsolved.
When I say anorgan of the senses, I speak of a very determinate nervous apparatus. But is the same thing true when I say an organ of the brain? What is an organ of the brain? Is it afascicleoffibres? Is it each particular fibre? But if it be afascicleoffibres, there are too few of them, for there are not twenty-seven of them; and twenty-seven are necessary,for there are twenty-seven faculties. If it be each particular fibre, then there are too many of them, and far too many, because there are only twenty-seven faculties. What are we to do in this difficulty? We must do as Gall does: sometimes say it is a fascicle of fibres; at other times, that it is each fibre in particular.
In one place he says: “The brain consisting of several divisions whose functions are totally different, there are several primary bundles, which contribute by their development to produce it. Among these bundles we place the anterior and posterior pyramids, the bundles that come off direct from the corpora olivaria, and some others that are concealed in the interior of the medulla oblongata.”[102]
And there are yet some others; be it so; but they never can amount to twenty-seven.
Again he says: “A more extensive development of the same conjecture, might perhaps dispose the reader to consider each nervous fibrilla, whether in the nerves or in the brain itself, as a little special organ.”[103]
Even this is not all. For the sake of Gall’s doctrine, the anatomy of the brain must have a connexion with cranioscopy. And Gall takes great care to place all his organs upon the surface of the brain.
“The possibility of a solution of the problem under consideration,” says he, “supposes the organs of the soul to be situated at the surface of the brain.”[104]Indeed, were they not situated at the surface of the brain, howcould the cranium bear the impression of them? and what would become of cranioscopy?
Cranioscopy has nothing to fear. Gall has made provision for it; all the organs of the brain are placed at the surface of the brain; and Gall most judiciously adds, “This explains the relation or the correspondence that exists between craniology and the doctrine of the cerebral functions (cerebral physiology), the sole aim and end of my researches.”[105]
But as to the pretendedorgans of the brain, are they really situated at the surface of the brain, as Gall asserts? In plain terms, is the surface of the brain the only active part of the organ? Here is a physiological experiment that shows how very much mistaken Gall is.
You can slice off a considerable portion ofan animal’s brain, either in front, behind, on one side, or on the top, without his losing anyone of his faculties.[106]
The animal may, therefore, lose all that Gall calls surface of the brain, without losing any of his faculties. Therefore it cannot be that the organs of the faculties reside at thesurface of the brain.
And comparative anatomy is not less opposite to Gall’s opinions than is direct experiment itself. I shall not follow him here in the detail of his localizations. How could these localizations have any meaning? He does not even know whether an organ is afascicle of fibres, or afibre.[107]
For example; he places what he calls theinstinct of propagation in the cerebellum, and what he calls theinstinct of the love of offspring, in the posterior cerebral lobes; and he looks upon these two localizations as the very surest in his book.
“I should wish,” says he, “that all young naturalists might begin their researches with the study of these two organs. They are both easily to be recognised,”[108]&c.
What! The cerebellum, so different in its structure from the great brain, is the cerebellum, like the brain,[109]to be considered an organ of instinct? And what is more, is it to be regarded as the organ of a single instinctonly, while the brain shall have twenty-six of them?
I have already said that the cerebellum is the seat of the principle that presides over the locomotion[110]of the animal, and that it is not the seat of any instinct.
Gall places the love of offspring in the posterior lobes of the brain.[111]Now, the love of offspring, and especially maternal love, is every where to be found among the superior animals; it is found in all the mammifera, in all the birds.[112]The posterior lobes of the brain, therefore, ought to be found in all these beings. Not at all: the posterior lobes are wanting in most of the mammifera; they are wanting in all the birds.
Gall locates the faculties that are common toboth man and animals, in the posterior part of the brain; in the anterior part he places those[113]that are peculiar to man alone. According to this plan, the mostpersistentportion of the brain will be the posterior portion, and the least persistent the anterior portion. But the inverse of the proposition holds. The parts that are most frequently wanting are theposterior parts, and those that are most invariably present are theanterior parts.[114]
If, from the brain, I pass on to consider the cranium, all the foregoing is found to be ofstill greater force. How can the localizations that are destitute of meaning as to the brain—how can they, I say, have any meaning as relative to the cranium itself?
The cranium, especially the external surface of it, represents the superficial configuration of the brain but very imperfectly. Gall knows it. “I was the first,” says he, “to maintain that it is impossible for us to determine with exactitude the development of certain circumvolutions, by the inspection of the external surface of the cranium. In certain cases, the exterior lamina of the cranium is not parallel with the internal lamina.”[115]“There are certain species in which there is no frontal sinus; in others, the cells betwixt the two bony laminæ are found throughout the whole skull,”[116]&c. &c.
The cranium represents the convolutions ofthe brain only upon its inner surface; it does not represent them upon its external superficies. And as to thefibres, as to thebundles of fibres, it does not even represent them on its inner surface; for the fibres are covered with a layer of gray matter, and the bundles of fibres are situated in the interior of the nervous mass.
Gall is aware of all this, and nevertheless he inscribes his twenty-seven faculties upon the skulls.[117]Such confidence surprises one. Nothing is known of the intimate structure ofthe brain,[118]and yet people are bold enough to trace upon it their circumscriptions, their circles, their boundaries. The external surface of the skull does not represent the brain’ssurface, it is admitted; and yet they inscribe upon this surface twenty-seven names, each of which names is written within a small circle, each little circle corresponding to one precise faculty! And what is stranger yet, people are to be found who, under each of these names inscribed by Gall, imagine that there is concealed something more than a name!
Those who, seeing the success of Gall’s doctrine, imagine that the doctrine therefore rests upon some solid foundation, know very little of mankind. Gall knew mankind better. He studied them in his own way, but he studied them very closely. Let us hear his own words:
“In society, I employ many expedients to find out the talents and inclinations of people. I start the conversation upon a variety of topics. In general, we let fall in conversation whatsoever has little or no concern with our faculties and penchants; but when the interlocutor touches upon one of our favouritesubjects, we at once become interested in it.... Do you wish to spy out the character of a person, without the fear of being misled as to your conclusions, even though he might be on his guard? Set him to talking about his childhood and boyhood; make him relate his schoolboy exploits; his conduct towards his parents, his brothers and sisters, and his playfellows, and his emulators.... Ask him about his games, &c. Few persons think it necessary to dissemble upon these points; they do not suspect they are dealing with one who knows perfectly well that the basis of character remains ever the same; and that the objects only that interest us change with the progress of years.... Besides, when I discover what it is that a person admires or despises; when I see him act; when he is an author, and I merely read his book, &c. &c. the whole man stands unveiled before me.”[119]
Descartesshut himself up in a stove,[120]in order that he might meditate. According to Gall, there is no necessity for one’s shutting himself up in a stove.
Descartes says: “Now I shall shut my eyes, I shall stop my ears, I shall turn my senses aside; I shall even efface from my memory every image of corporeal objects, or at least, as that can hardly be done, I will repute them as vain and false; and thus, shut up within myself, and contemplating what is within me, I shall endeavour gradually to become more and more familiarly acquainted with my own real nature.”[121]
According to Gall, there is no occasion for this absolute gathering one’s self together within. All that is needful is to look at and touch the skulls of people. Gall’s doctrine succeeded just as Lavater’s did. Menwill always be looking out for external signs by which to discover secret thoughts and concealed inclinations: it is vain to confound their curiosity upon this point: after Lavater came Gall; after Gall some one else will appear.
We soon become wearied of a true philosophy, because it is true; because the search after truth, of whatsoever kind, requires strenuous and continual efforts. It is impossible, moreover, always to have the very same philosophy: even the same philosopher cannot be always approved of. Approbation must change its object, especially in France.
It was for the French that Fontenelle wrote these words: “The approbation of mankind is a sort of forced state, which seeks nothing so much as to come to an end.”[122]
Descartes goes off to die in Sweden, and Gall comes to reign in France.