Double purpose of the Platonic Republic — ethical and political.
In my last Chapter, I discussed the manner in which Plato had endeavoured to solve the ethical problem urged upon him by Glaukon and Adeimantus. But this is not the entire purpose of the Republic. Plato, drawing the closest parallel between the Commonwealth and the individual, seeks solution of the problem first in the former; because it is there (he says) written in larger and clearer letters. He sketches the picture of a perfect Commonwealth — shows wherein its justice consists — and proves, to his own satisfaction, that it will be happy in and through its justice —per se. This picture of a Commonwealth is unquestionablyoneof the main purposes of the dialogue; serving as commencement — or more properly as intermediate stage — to the Timæus and Kritias. Most critics have treated it as if it were the dominant and almost exclusive purpose. Aristotle, the earliest of all critics, adverts to it in this spirit; numbering Plato or the Platonic Sokrates among those who, not being practical politicians, framed schemes for ideal commonwealths, like Phaleas or Hippodamus. I shall now make some remarks on the political provisions of the Platonic Commonwealth: but first I shall notice the very peculiar manner in which Plato discovers therein the notions of Justice and Injustice.
Plato recognises the generating principle of human society — reciprocity of need and service. Particular direction which he gives to this principle.
The Platonic Sokrates (as I remarked above) lays down as the fundamental, generating, principle of human society, the reciprocity of need and service, essentially belonging to human beings: exchange of services is indispensable, because each man has many wants morethan he can himself supply, and thus needs the services of others: while each also can contribute something to supply the wants of others. To this general principle Plato gives a peculiar direction. He apportions the services among the various citizens; and he provides that each man shall be specialised for the service to which he is peculiarly adapted, and confined to that alone. No double man1is tolerated. How such specialisation is to be applied in detail among the multitude of cultivators and other producers, Plato does not tell us. Each is to have his own employment: we know no more. But in regard to the two highest functions, he gives more information: first, the small cabinet of philosophical Elders,2Chiefs, or Rulers — artists in the craft of governing, who supply professionally that necessity of the Commonwealth, and from whom all orders emanate: next, the body of Guardians, Soldiers, Policemen, who execute the orders of this cabinet, and defend the territory against all enemies. Respecting both of these, Plato carefully prescribes both the education which they are to receive, and the circumstances under which they are to live. They are to be of both sexes intermingled, but to know neither family nor property: they live together in barrack, and with common mess, receiving subsistence and the means of decent comfort, but no more, from the producers: respecting sexual relations and births, I shall say more presently.
1Plato, Rep. iii. p. 397 E.
1Plato, Rep. iii. p. 397 E.
2The principle laid down in the Protagoras will be remembered — εἷς ἔχων τέχνην πολλοῖς ἱκανὸς ἰδιώταις (Protag. p. 322 D).
2The principle laid down in the Protagoras will be remembered — εἷς ἔχων τέχνην πολλοῖς ἱκανὸς ἰδιώταις (Protag. p. 322 D).
The four cardinal virtues are assumed as constituting the whole of Good or Virtue, where each of these virtues resides.
When Plato has provided thus much, he treats his city as already planted and brought to consummation. He thinks himself farther entitled to proclaim it as perfectly good, and therefore as including the four constituent elements of Good: that is, as being wise, brave, temperate, just.3He then looks to find wherein each of these four elements resides: wisdom resides specially in the cabinet of Rulers — courage specially in the Guardians — temperance and justice,in these two, but in the producing multitude also. The two last virtues are universal in the Commonwealth. Temperance consists in the harmony of opinion between the multitude and the two higher classes as to obedience: the Guardians are as ready to obey as the Chiefs to command: the multitude are also for the most part ready to obey — but should they ever fail in obedience, the Guardians are prepared to lend their constraining force to the authority of the Chiefs. Having thus settled three out of the four elements of Good, which enumeration he assumes to be exhaustive — Plato assumes that what remains must be Justice. This remainder he declares to be — That each of the three portions of the Commonwealth performs its own work and nothing else: and this is Justice. Justice and Temperance are thus common to all the three portions of the Commonwealth: while Wisdom and Prudence belong entirely to the Chiefs, and Courage entirely to the Guardians.
3Plato, Repub. iv. pp. 427 D-428 A. ᾠκισμένη μὲν τοίνυν, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, ἤδη ἄν σοι εἴη, ὦ παῖ Ἀρίστωνος, ἡ πόλις … Οἶμαι ἡμῖν τὴν πόλιν, εἴπερ ὀρθῶς γε ᾤκισται,τέλεως ἀγαθὴν εἶναι. Ἀνάγκη, ἔφη. Δῆλον δή, ὅτι σοφή τ’ ἐστὶ καὶ ἀνδρεία καὶ σώφρων καὶ δικαία. Δῆλον. Οὐκοῦν, ὅ, τι ἂν αὐτῶν εὕρωμεν ἐν αὐτῇ, τὸ ὑπόλοιπον ἔσται τὸ οὐχ εὑρημένον; &c.
3Plato, Repub. iv. pp. 427 D-428 A. ᾠκισμένη μὲν τοίνυν, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, ἤδη ἄν σοι εἴη, ὦ παῖ Ἀρίστωνος, ἡ πόλις … Οἶμαι ἡμῖν τὴν πόλιν, εἴπερ ὀρθῶς γε ᾤκισται,τέλεως ἀγαθὴν εἶναι. Ἀνάγκη, ἔφη. Δῆλον δή, ὅτι σοφή τ’ ἐστὶ καὶ ἀνδρεία καὶ σώφρων καὶ δικαία. Δῆλον. Οὐκοῦν, ὅ, τι ἂν αὐτῶν εὕρωμεν ἐν αὐτῇ, τὸ ὑπόλοιπον ἔσται τὸ οὐχ εὑρημένον; &c.
First mention of these, as an exhaustive classification, in ethical theory. Plato effaces the distinction between Temperance and Justice.
Here, for the first time in Ethical Theory, Prudence, Courage, Temperance, Justice, are assumed as an exhaustive enumeration of virtues: each distinct from the other three, but all together including the whole of Virtue.4Through Cicero and others, these four have come down as the cardinal virtues. From whom Plato derived it, I do not know: not certainly from the historical Sokrates, who resolved the last three into the first.5Nor is it indeed in harmony with Plato’s own view: for temperance and justice are substantially coincident, in his explanation of them (since he does not recognise the characteristic feature of Justice, as directly tending to the good of a person other than the agent): and the line, by which he endeavours to part them, is obscure as well as unimportant. Schleiermacher — who admits that the distinction drawn here between Temperance and Justice is altogether forced— supposes that Plato took up this quadruple classification, because he found it already established in the common, non-theorising, consciousness.6If this be true, the real distinction between Justice (as directly bearing on the rights of another person) and Temperance (as directly concerning only the future happiness of the agent himself), which is one of the most important distinctions in Ethics — must have been already felt, without being formulated, in the common mind: and Plato, by retaining the two words, but effacing the distinction between the two, and giving a new meaning to Justice — took a step in the wrong direction. He himself however tells us, that the definition, here given of Justice, is not his own; but that he had heard it enunciated by many others before him.7What makes this more remarkable is, That the same definition (to do your own business and not to meddle with other people’s business) is what we read in the Charmidês as delivered respecting Temperance, by Charmides and Kritias:8delivered by them, and afterwards pulled to pieces in cross-examination by Sokrates. Herein we see farther proof how little distinction Plato drew between Justice and Temperance.
4Plat. Rep. iv. p. 432 B. τὸδὲ δὴ λοιπὸν εἶδος, δι’ ὃ ἂν ἔτι ἀρετῆς μετέχοι πόλις, τί ποτ’ ἂν εἴη; δῆλον γὰρ ὅτιτοῦτόἐστιν ἡδικαιοσύνη.Compare p. 444 D, where he defines Ἀρετή — Ἀρετὴ μὲν ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὑγίεια τέ τις ἂν εἴη καὶ κάλλος καὶ εὐεξία ψυχῆς· κακία δὲ, νόσος τε καὶ αἶσχος καὶ ἀσθένεια.
4Plat. Rep. iv. p. 432 B. τὸδὲ δὴ λοιπὸν εἶδος, δι’ ὃ ἂν ἔτι ἀρετῆς μετέχοι πόλις, τί ποτ’ ἂν εἴη; δῆλον γὰρ ὅτιτοῦτόἐστιν ἡδικαιοσύνη.
Compare p. 444 D, where he defines Ἀρετή — Ἀρετὴ μὲν ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὑγίεια τέ τις ἂν εἴη καὶ κάλλος καὶ εὐεξία ψυχῆς· κακία δὲ, νόσος τε καὶ αἶσχος καὶ ἀσθένεια.
5Xenoph. Mem. iii. 9, 4-5. σοφίαν δὲ καὶ σωφροσύνην οὐ διώριζεν, &c.Compare the discussion of σωφροσύνη, iv. 5, 9-11, where Sokrates enforces the practice of it on the ground that it ensured to a man both more pleasures and greater pleasures, of which he would deprive himself if he were foolish enough to be intemperate.
5Xenoph. Mem. iii. 9, 4-5. σοφίαν δὲ καὶ σωφροσύνην οὐ διώριζεν, &c.
Compare the discussion of σωφροσύνη, iv. 5, 9-11, where Sokrates enforces the practice of it on the ground that it ensured to a man both more pleasures and greater pleasures, of which he would deprive himself if he were foolish enough to be intemperate.
6Schleiermacher, Einl. zum Staat, pp. 25-26. “Dieser Tadel trifft höchstens die Aufstellung jener vier zusammengehörigen Tugenden; welche Platon offenbar genug nur mit richtigem praktischen Sinne aus Ehrfurcht für das Bestehende aufgenommen hat: wie sie denn schon auf dieselbe Weise aus dem gemeinen Gebrauch in die Lehrweise des Sokrates übergegangen sind.”
6Schleiermacher, Einl. zum Staat, pp. 25-26. “Dieser Tadel trifft höchstens die Aufstellung jener vier zusammengehörigen Tugenden; welche Platon offenbar genug nur mit richtigem praktischen Sinne aus Ehrfurcht für das Bestehende aufgenommen hat: wie sie denn schon auf dieselbe Weise aus dem gemeinen Gebrauch in die Lehrweise des Sokrates übergegangen sind.”
7Plato, Repub. iv. p. 433 A. καὶ μὴν ὅτι γε τὸ τὰ αὑτοῦ πράττειν καὶ μὴ πολυπραγμονεῖν δικαιοσύνη ἐστί, καὶ τοῦτοἄλλων τε πολλῶν ἀκηκόαμεν, καὶ αὐτοὶ πολλάκις εἰρήκαμεν. Compare iii. p. 406 E.
7Plato, Repub. iv. p. 433 A. καὶ μὴν ὅτι γε τὸ τὰ αὑτοῦ πράττειν καὶ μὴ πολυπραγμονεῖν δικαιοσύνη ἐστί, καὶ τοῦτοἄλλων τε πολλῶν ἀκηκόαμεν, καὶ αὐτοὶ πολλάκις εἰρήκαμεν. Compare iii. p. 406 E.
8See Charmidês, pp. 161-162. Heindorf observes in his note on this passage:— “Asophistisergo vulgata hæc σωφροσύνης definitio: adjustitiamquoque ab iisdem ut videtur, translata. Republ. iv. p. 433 (the passage cited in note preceding). Quo pertinent illa Ciceronis, De Officiis, i. 9, 2. Item adprudentiam, Aristot. Eth. Nicom. vi. 8, Philosopho vero hoc tribuit Sokrates, Gorgias, p. 526).”The definition given in the Charmidês appears plainly ascribed to Kritias as its author (p. 162 D). The affirmation that it was “a sophistis vulgata,” and afterwards transferred by these same to Justice, is made without any authority produced; and is expressed in the language usual with the Platonic commentators, who treat the Sophists as a philosophical sect or school.
8See Charmidês, pp. 161-162. Heindorf observes in his note on this passage:— “Asophistisergo vulgata hæc σωφροσύνης definitio: adjustitiamquoque ab iisdem ut videtur, translata. Republ. iv. p. 433 (the passage cited in note preceding). Quo pertinent illa Ciceronis, De Officiis, i. 9, 2. Item adprudentiam, Aristot. Eth. Nicom. vi. 8, Philosopho vero hoc tribuit Sokrates, Gorgias, p. 526).”
The definition given in the Charmidês appears plainly ascribed to Kritias as its author (p. 162 D). The affirmation that it was “a sophistis vulgata,” and afterwards transferred by these same to Justice, is made without any authority produced; and is expressed in the language usual with the Platonic commentators, who treat the Sophists as a philosophical sect or school.
From whomsoever Plato may have derived this ethical classification — Virtue as a whole, distributed into four varieties — 1. Prudence or Knowledge — 2. Courage or Energy — 3. Temperance — 4. Justice — we find it here placed in the foreground of his doctrine, respecting both the collective Commonwealth and theindividual man.9He professes to understand and explain what they are — to reason upon them all with confidence — and to apply them to very important conclusions.
9In some of the Platonic Dialogues these four varieties are not understood as exhausting the sum total of Virtue: ἡ ὁσιότης is included also; see Lachês, p. 199 D, Protagoras, p. 329 D, Euthyphron, pp. 5-6. Plato does not advert to τὸ ὅσιον in the Republic as a separate constituent, seemingly because on matters of piety he enjoins direct reference to Apollo and the Delphian oracle (Rep. iv. p. 427 B).
9In some of the Platonic Dialogues these four varieties are not understood as exhausting the sum total of Virtue: ἡ ὁσιότης is included also; see Lachês, p. 199 D, Protagoras, p. 329 D, Euthyphron, pp. 5-6. Plato does not advert to τὸ ὅσιον in the Republic as a separate constituent, seemingly because on matters of piety he enjoins direct reference to Apollo and the Delphian oracle (Rep. iv. p. 427 B).
All the four are here assumed as certain and determinate, though in former dialogues they appear indeterminate and full of unsolved difficulties.
But let us pause for a moment to ask, how these professions harmonise with the dialogues reviewed in my preceding volumes. No reader will have forgotten the doubts and difficulties, exposed by the Sokratic Elenchus throughout the Dialogues of Search: the confessed inability of Sokrates himself to elucidate them, while at the same time his contempt for the false persuasion of knowledge — for those who talk confidently about matters which they can neither explain nor defend — is expressed without reserve. Now, when we turn to the Hippias Major, we find Sokrates declaring, that no man can affirm, and that a man ought to be ashamed to pretend to affirm, what particular matters are beautiful (fine, honourable) or ugly (mean, base), unless he knows and can explain what Beauty is.10A similar declaration appears in the Menon, where Sokrates treats it as absurd to affirm or deny any predicate respecting a Subject, until you have satisfied yourself that you know what the Subject itself is: and where he farther proclaims, that as to Virtue, he does not know what it is, and that he has never yet found any one whodidknow.11Such ignorance is stated at the end of the dialogue not less emphatically than at the beginning. Again, respecting the four varieties or parts of Virtue. The first of the four, Prudence — (Wisdom — Knowledge) — has been investigated in the Theætêtus — one of the most elaborate of all the Platonic dialogues: several different explanations of it are proposed by Theætêtus, and each is shown by Sokrates to be untenable; the problem remains unsolved at last. As to Courage and Temperance, we have not been more fortunate. The Lachês and Charmidês exhibit nothing but a fruitless search both for one and for the other. And here the case is more remarkable; because in the Lachês, one of theseveral definitions of Courage, tendered to Sokrates and refuted by him, is, the very definition of Courage delivered by him in the Republic as complete and satisfactory: while in the Charmidês, one of the definitions of Temperance, refuted, and even treated as scarcely intelligible, by Sokrates (τὸ πράττειν τὰ ἑαυτοῦ) is the same as that which Sokrates in the Republic relies on as a valid definition of Justice.12Lastly, every one who has read the Parmenidês, will remember the acute objections there urged against the Platonic hypothesis of substantive Ideas, participated in by particulars: of which objections no notice is taken in the Republic, though so much is said therein about these Ideas, in regard to the training of the philosophical Chiefs.
10Plat. Hipp. Maj. pp. 286 D, 304 C.
10Plat. Hipp. Maj. pp. 286 D, 304 C.
11Plato, Menon, pp. 71 B-C, 86 B, 100 B.
11Plato, Menon, pp. 71 B-C, 86 B, 100 B.
12See Lachês p. 195 A. τὴν τῶν δεινῶν καὶ θαῤῥαλέων ἐπιστήμην, pp. 196 C-199 A-E — in the cross-examination of Nikias by Sokrates: and the question in the cross-examination of Lachês (who has defined Courage to be ἡ φρόνιμος καρτερία) put by Sokrates — ἡεἰς τίφρόνιμος; compared with Republic, iv. pp. 429 C, 430 B, 433 C. See also Charmidês, pp. 161 B, 162 B-C, compared with Republic, iv. p. 433 B-D.
12See Lachês p. 195 A. τὴν τῶν δεινῶν καὶ θαῤῥαλέων ἐπιστήμην, pp. 196 C-199 A-E — in the cross-examination of Nikias by Sokrates: and the question in the cross-examination of Lachês (who has defined Courage to be ἡ φρόνιμος καρτερία) put by Sokrates — ἡεἰς τίφρόνιμος; compared with Republic, iv. pp. 429 C, 430 B, 433 C. See also Charmidês, pp. 161 B, 162 B-C, compared with Republic, iv. p. 433 B-D.
Difficulties left unsolved, but overleaped by Plato.
If we revert to these passages (and many others which might be produced) of past dialogues, we shall find no means provided of harmonising them with the Republic. The logical and ethical difficulties still exist: they have never been elucidated: the Republic does not pretend to elucidate them, but overlooks or overleaps them. In composing it, Plato has his mind full of a different point of view, to which he seeks to give full effect. While his spokesman Sokrates was leader of opposition, Plato delighted to arm him with the maximum of negative cross-examining acuteness: but here Sokrates has passed over to the ministerial benches, and has undertaken the difficult task of making out a case in reply to the challenge of Glaukon and Adeimantus. No new leader of opposition is allowed to replace him. The splendid constructive effort of the Republic would have been spoiled, if exposed to such an analytical cross-examination as that which we read in Menon, Lachês, or Charmidês.
Ethical and political theory combined by Plato, treated apart by Aristotle.
In remarking upon the Platonic Republic as a political scheme only, we pass from the Platonic point of view to the Aristotelian: that is, to the discussion of Ethics and Politics as separate subjects, though adjoining and partially overlapping each other. Plato conceivesthe two in intimate union, and even employs violent metaphors to exaggerate the intimacy. Xenophon also conceives them in close conjunction. Aristotle goes farther in separating the two: a great improvement in regard to the speculative dealing with both of them.13
13The concluding chapter of the Nikomachean Ethics contains some striking remarks upon this separation.
13The concluding chapter of the Nikomachean Ethics contains some striking remarks upon this separation.
Platonic Commonwealth — only an outline — partially filled up.
If, following the example of Aristotle, we criticise the Platonic Republic as a scheme of political constitution, we find that on most points which other theorists handle at considerable length, Plato is intentionally silent. His project is an outline and nothing more. He delineates fully the brain and heart of the great Leviathan, but leaves the rest in very faint outline. He announces explicitly the purpose of all his arrangements, to obtain happiness for the whole city: by which he means, not happiness for the greatest number of individuals, but for the abstract unity called the City, supposed to be capable of happiness or misery, apart from any individuals, many or few, composing it.14Each individual is to do the work for which he is best fitted, contributory to the happiness of the whole — and to do nothing else. Each must be content with such happiness as consists with his own exclusive employment.15
14Plato, Republic, iv. pp. 420-421. The objection that the Guardians will have no happiness, is put by Plato into the mouth of Adeimantus, but is denied by Sokrates; who, however, says that even if it were true he could not admit it as applicable, since what he wishes is that the entire commonwealth shall be happy. Aristotle (Politic. ii. 5, 1264, 6-15) repeats the objection of Adeimantus, and declares that collective happiness (not enjoyed by some individuals) is impossible.See the valuable chapter on Ideal Models in Politics (vol. ii. ch. xxii. p. 236 seq.) in Sir George Cornewall Lewis’s Treatise on the methods of Observation and Reasoning in Politics. The different ideal models framed by theorists ancient and modern, Plato among the number, are there collected, with judicious remarks in comparing and appreciating them.
14Plato, Republic, iv. pp. 420-421. The objection that the Guardians will have no happiness, is put by Plato into the mouth of Adeimantus, but is denied by Sokrates; who, however, says that even if it were true he could not admit it as applicable, since what he wishes is that the entire commonwealth shall be happy. Aristotle (Politic. ii. 5, 1264, 6-15) repeats the objection of Adeimantus, and declares that collective happiness (not enjoyed by some individuals) is impossible.
See the valuable chapter on Ideal Models in Politics (vol. ii. ch. xxii. p. 236 seq.) in Sir George Cornewall Lewis’s Treatise on the methods of Observation and Reasoning in Politics. The different ideal models framed by theorists ancient and modern, Plato among the number, are there collected, with judicious remarks in comparing and appreciating them.
15Plato, Republic, iv. p. 421 C.He lays down this minute sub-division and speciality of aptitude in individuals as a fundamental property of human nature. Repub. iii. p. 395 B, καὶ ἔτι γε τούτων φαίνεταί μοι εἰς σμικρότερα κατακεκερματίσθαι ἡ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου φύσις, &c.Compare Xenophon, Cyropæd. ii. 1, 21, where the same principle is laid down. Another passage in the same treatise (Cyropæd. viii. 2, 5) is also interesting. Xenophon there contrasts the smaller towns, where many trades were combined in the same hand and none of the works well performed, with the larger towns, where there was a minuter subdivision of labour, each man doing one work only, and doing it well.
15Plato, Republic, iv. p. 421 C.
He lays down this minute sub-division and speciality of aptitude in individuals as a fundamental property of human nature. Repub. iii. p. 395 B, καὶ ἔτι γε τούτων φαίνεταί μοι εἰς σμικρότερα κατακεκερματίσθαι ἡ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου φύσις, &c.
Compare Xenophon, Cyropæd. ii. 1, 21, where the same principle is laid down. Another passage in the same treatise (Cyropæd. viii. 2, 5) is also interesting. Xenophon there contrasts the smaller towns, where many trades were combined in the same hand and none of the works well performed, with the larger towns, where there was a minuter subdivision of labour, each man doing one work only, and doing it well.
Absolute rule of a few philosophers — Careful and peculiar training of the Guardians.
The Chiefs or Rulers are assumed to be both specially qualified and specially trained for the business of governing. Their authority is unlimited: they represent thatOne Infallible Wise Man, whom Plato frequently appeals to (in the Politikus, Kriton, Gorgias, and other dialogues), but never names. They are a very small number, perhaps only one: the persons naturally qualified being very few, and even they requiring the severest preparatory training. The Guardians, all of them educated up to a considerable point, both obey themselves the orders of these few Chiefs, and enforce obedience upon the productive multitude. Of this last-mentioned multitude, constituting numerically almost the whole city, we hear little or nothing: except that the division of labour is strictly kept up among them, and that neither wealth nor poverty is allowed to grow up.16How this is to be accomplished, Plato does not point out: nor does he indicate how the mischievous working (i.e., mischievous, in his point of view, and as he declares it) of the proprietary and the family relations is to be obviated. His scheme tacitly assumes that separate property and family are to subsist among the great mass of the community, but not among the Guardians: he proclaims explicitly, that if the proprietary relations or the family relations were permitted among the Guardians, entire corruption of their character would ensue.17Among the Demos or multitude, he postulates nothing except unlimited submission to the orders of the Rulers enforced through the Guardians. The regulative powers of the Rulers are assumed to be of omnipotent efficacy against every cause of mischief, subject only to one condition — That the purity of the golden breed, together with the Platonic training and discipline, are to be maintained among them unimpaired.
16Plato, Republic, iv. p. 421.
16Plato, Republic, iv. p. 421.
17Plato, Republic, iii. p. 417.
17Plato, Republic, iii. p. 417.
Everything in the Platonic Republic turns upon this elaborate training of the superior class: most of all, the Chiefs or Rulers — next, the Soldiers or Guardians. Besides this training, they are required to be placed in circumstances which will prevent them from feeling any private or separate interest of their own, apart from or adverse to that of the multitude. “Every man” (says Plato) “will best love those whose advantage he believes to coincide with his own, and when he is most convinced thatif they do well, he himself will do well also: if not,not.”18“The Rulers must be wise, powerful, and affectionately solicitous for the city.”
18Plato, Republic, iii. p. 412 D.Καὶ μὲν τοῦτό γ’ ἂν μάλιστα φιλοῖ, ᾧ ξυμφέρειν ἡγοῖτο τὰ αὐτὰ καὶ ἑαυτῷ, καὶ ὅταν μάλιστα ἐκείνου μὲν εὖ πράττοντος οἴηται ξυμβαίνειν καὶ ἑαυτῷ εὖ πράττειν, μὴ δέ, τοὐναντίον.Compare v. pp. 463-464.
18Plato, Republic, iii. p. 412 D.
Καὶ μὲν τοῦτό γ’ ἂν μάλιστα φιλοῖ, ᾧ ξυμφέρειν ἡγοῖτο τὰ αὐτὰ καὶ ἑαυτῷ, καὶ ὅταν μάλιστα ἐκείνου μὲν εὖ πράττοντος οἴηται ξυμβαίνειν καὶ ἑαυτῷ εὖ πράττειν, μὴ δέ, τοὐναντίον.
Compare v. pp. 463-464.
These then are the two circumstances which Plato works out: The Education of the Rulers and Guardians: Their position and circumstances in regard to each other and to the remaining multitude. He does not himself prescribe, or at least he prescribes but rarely, what is to be enacted or ordered. He creates the generals and the soldiers; he relies upon the former for ordering, upon the latter for enforcing, aright.
Comparison of Plato with Xenophon — Cyropædia — Œconomicus.
On this point we may usefully compare him with his contemporary Xenophon. He, like Plato, presents himself to mankind as a preceptor or schoolmaster, rather than as a lawgiver. Most Grecian cities (he remarks) left the education of youth in the hands of parents, and permitted adults to choose their own mode of life, subject only to the necessity of obeying the laws: that is, of abstaining from certain defined offences, and of performing certain defined obligations — under penalties if such obedience were not rendered. From this mode of proceeding Xenophon dissents, and commends the Spartan Lawgiver Lykurgus for departing from it.19To regulate public matters, without regulating the private life of the citizens, appeared to him impossible.20At Sparta, the citizen was subject to authoritative regulation, from childhood to old age. In the public education, or in the public drill, he was constantly under supervision, going through prescribed exercises. This produced, according to Xenophon, “a city of pre-eminent happiness”. He proclaims and follows out the same peculiar principle, in his ideal scheme of society called the Persian laws. He embodies in the Cyropædia the biography of a model chief, trained up from his youth in (what Xenophon calls) the Persian system, and applying the virtues acquired therein to military exploits and to the government of mankind. The Persian polity, in which the hero Cyrus receives his training, is described. Instead of leaving individualsto their own free will, except as to certain acts or abstinences specifically enjoined, this polity placed every one under a regimental training: which both shaped his character beforehand, so as to make sure that he should have no disposition to commit offences21— and subjected him to perpetual supervision afterwards, commencing with boyhood and continued to old age, through the four successive stages of boys, youths, mature men, and elders.
19Xenophon, Rep. Lacedæm. i. 2. Λυκοῦργος, οὐ μιμησάμενος τὰς ἄλλας πόλεις, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐναντία γνοὺς ταῖς πλείσταις, προέχουσαν εὐδαιμονίᾳ τὴν πατρίδα ἀπέδειξεν.
19Xenophon, Rep. Lacedæm. i. 2. Λυκοῦργος, οὐ μιμησάμενος τὰς ἄλλας πόλεις, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐναντία γνοὺς ταῖς πλείσταις, προέχουσαν εὐδαιμονίᾳ τὴν πατρίδα ἀπέδειξεν.
20Compare Plato, Legg. vi. p. 780 A.
20Compare Plato, Legg. vi. p. 780 A.
21Xenophon, Cyrop. i. 2, 2-6. Οὗτοι δὲ δοκοῦσιν οἱ νόμοι ἄρχεσθαι τοῦ κοινοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἐπιμελούμενοι οὐκ ἔνθεν ὅθενπερ ἐν ταῖς πλείσταις πόλεσιν ἄρχονται. Αἱ μὲν γὰρ πλεῖσται πόλεις, ἀφεῖσαι παιδεύειν ὅπως τις ἐθέλει τοὺς ἑαυτοῦ παῖδας καὶ αὐτοὺς τοὺς πρεσβυτέρους ὅπως ἐθέλουσι διάγειν, ἔπειτα προστάττουσιν αὐτοὺς μὴ κλέπτειν.… Οἱ δὲ Περσικοὶ νόμοι προλαβόντες ἐπιμέλονται ὅπως τὴν ἀρχὴν μὴ τοιοῦτοι ἔσονται οἱ πολῖται, οἷοι πονηροῦ τινος ἢ αἰσχροῦ ἔργου ἐφίεσθαι. Ἐπιμέλονται δὲ δὴ ὧδε.
21Xenophon, Cyrop. i. 2, 2-6. Οὗτοι δὲ δοκοῦσιν οἱ νόμοι ἄρχεσθαι τοῦ κοινοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἐπιμελούμενοι οὐκ ἔνθεν ὅθενπερ ἐν ταῖς πλείσταις πόλεσιν ἄρχονται. Αἱ μὲν γὰρ πλεῖσται πόλεις, ἀφεῖσαι παιδεύειν ὅπως τις ἐθέλει τοὺς ἑαυτοῦ παῖδας καὶ αὐτοὺς τοὺς πρεσβυτέρους ὅπως ἐθέλουσι διάγειν, ἔπειτα προστάττουσιν αὐτοὺς μὴ κλέπτειν.… Οἱ δὲ Περσικοὶ νόμοι προλαβόντες ἐπιμέλονται ὅπως τὴν ἀρχὴν μὴ τοιοῦτοι ἔσονται οἱ πολῖται, οἷοι πονηροῦ τινος ἢ αἰσχροῦ ἔργου ἐφίεσθαι. Ἐπιμέλονται δὲ δὴ ὧδε.
Both of them combine polity with education — temporal with spiritual.
This general principle of combining polity with education, is fundamental both with Plato and Xenophon: to a great degree, it is retained also by Aristotle. The lawgiver exercises a spiritual as well as a temporal function. He does not content himself with prohibitions and punishments, but provides for fashioning every man’s character to a predetermined model, through systematic discipline begun in childhood and never discontinued. This was the general scheme, realised at Sparta in a certain manner and degree, and idealised both by Plato and Xenophon. The full application of the scheme, however, is restricted, in all the three, to a select body of qualified citizens; who are assumed to exercise dominion or headship over the remaining community.22
22In Xenophon all Persians are supposed to be legally admissible to the public training; but in practice, none can frequent it constantly except those whose families can maintain them without labour; nor can any be received into the advanced stages, except those who have passed through the lower. Hence none go really through the training except the Homotimoi.
22In Xenophon all Persians are supposed to be legally admissible to the public training; but in practice, none can frequent it constantly except those whose families can maintain them without labour; nor can any be received into the advanced stages, except those who have passed through the lower. Hence none go really through the training except the Homotimoi.
Differences between them — Character of Cyrus.
Thus far the general conception of Xenophon and Plato is similar: yet there are material differences between them. In Xenophon, the ultimate purpose is, to set forth the personal qualities of Cyrus: to which purpose the description of the general training of the citizens is preparatory, occupying only a small portion of the Cyropædia, and serving to explain the system out of which Cyrus sprang. And the character of Cyrus is looked at in reference to the government of mankind. Xenophon had seengovernments, of all sorts, resisted and overthrown — despotisms, oligarchies, democracies. His first inference from these facts is, that man is a very difficult animal to govern:— much more difficult than sheep or oxen. But on farther reflection he recognises that the problem is noway insoluble: that a ruler may make sure of ruling mankind with their own consent, and of obtaining hearty obedience — provided that he goes to work in an intelligent manner.23Such a ruler is described in Cyrus; who both conquered many distant and unconnected nations, — and governed them, when conquered, skilfully, so as to ensure complete obedience without any active discontent. The abilities and exploits of Cyrus thus step far beyond the range of the systematic Persian discipline, though that discipline is represented as having first formed both his character and that of his immediate companions. He is a despot responsible to no one, but acting with so much sagacity, justice, and benevolence, that his subjects obey him willingly. His military orders are arranged with the utmost prudence and calculation of consequences. He promotes the friends who have gone through the same discipline with himself, to be satraps of the conquered provinces, exacting from them submission, and tribute-collection for himself, together with just dealing towards the subjects. Each satrap is required to maintain his ministers, officers, and soldiers around him under constant personal inspection, with habits of temperance and constant exercise in hunting.24These men and the Persians generally, constitute the privileged class and the military force of the empire:25the other mass of subjects are not only kept disarmed, but governed as “gens tailleables et corvéables”. Moreover, besides combining justice and personal activity with generosity and winning manners, Cyrus does not neglect such ceremonial artifices and pomp as may impose on the imagination of spectators.26He keeps up designedly not merely competitionbut mutual jealousy and ill-will among those around him. And he is careful that the most faithful among them shall be placed on his left hand at the banquet, because that side is the most exposed to treachery.27
23Xenoph. Cyrop. i. 1, 3. ἤν τις ἐπισταμένως τοῦτο πράττῃ.Compare Xenoph. Economic. c. xxi. where τὸ ἐθελόντων ἄρχειν is declared to be a superhuman good, while τὸ ἀκόντων τυραννεῖν is reckoned as a curse equivalent to that of Tantalus.
23Xenoph. Cyrop. i. 1, 3. ἤν τις ἐπισταμένως τοῦτο πράττῃ.
Compare Xenoph. Economic. c. xxi. where τὸ ἐθελόντων ἄρχειν is declared to be a superhuman good, while τὸ ἀκόντων τυραννεῖν is reckoned as a curse equivalent to that of Tantalus.
24Xenophon, Cyropæd. viii. 6, 1-10.
24Xenophon, Cyropæd. viii. 6, 1-10.
25Xenoph. Cyrop. viii. 1, 43-45, viii. 6, 13, vii. 5, 79. viii. 5, 24: εἰ δὲ σύ, ὦ Κῦρε, ἐπαρθεὶς ταῖς παρούσαις τύχαις, ἐπιχειρήσεις καὶ Περσῶνἄρχειν ἐπὶ πλεονεξίᾳ, ὥσπερ τῶν ἄλλων, &c.
25Xenoph. Cyrop. viii. 1, 43-45, viii. 6, 13, vii. 5, 79. viii. 5, 24: εἰ δὲ σύ, ὦ Κῦρε, ἐπαρθεὶς ταῖς παρούσαις τύχαις, ἐπιχειρήσεις καὶ Περσῶνἄρχειν ἐπὶ πλεονεξίᾳ, ὥσπερ τῶν ἄλλων, &c.
26Xenoph. Cyrop. viii.1,40. ἀλλὰ καὶ καταγοητεύειν ᾤετο χρῆναι αὐτούς. Also viii. 3, 1.
26Xenoph. Cyrop. viii.1,40. ἀλλὰ καὶ καταγοητεύειν ᾤετο χρῆναι αὐτούς. Also viii. 3, 1.
27Xenoph. Cyrop. viii. 2, viii. 4, 3.
27Xenoph. Cyrop. viii. 2, viii. 4, 3.
Xenophontic genius for command — Practical training — Sokratic principles applied in Persian training.
What is chiefly present to the mind of Xenophon is, a select fraction of citizens passing their whole lives in a regimental training like that of Lacedæmon: uniformity of habits, exact obedience, the strongest bodily exercise combined with the simplest nutritive diet, perfect command of the physical appetites and necessities, so that no such thing as spitting or blowing the nose is seen.28The grand purpose of the system, as at Sparta,29is warlike efficiency: war being regarded as the natural state of man. The younger citizens learn the use of the bow and javelin, the older that of the sword and shield. As war requires not merely perfectly trained soldiers, but also the initiative of a superior individual chief, so Xenophon assumes in the chief of these men (like Agesilaus at Sparta) an unrivalled genius for command. The Xenophontic Cyrus is altogether a practical man. We are not told that he learnt anything except in common with the rest. Neither he nor they receive any musical or literary training. The course which they go through is altogether ethical, gymnastical, and military. Their boyhood is passed in learning justice and temperance,30which are made express subjects of teaching by Xenophon and under express masters: Xenophon thus supplies the deficiency so often lamented by the Platonic Sokrates, who remarks that neither at Athens nor elsewhere can he find either teaching or teacher of justice. Cyrus learns justice and temperance along with the rest,31but he does not learn more than the rest: nor does Xenophon performhis promise of explaining by what education such extraordinary genius for command is brought about.32The superior character of Cyrus is assumed and described, but noway accounted for: indeed his rank and position at the court of Astyages (in which he stands distinguished from the other Persians) present nothing but temptations to indulgence, partially countervailed by wise counsel from his father Kambyses. We must therefore consider Cyrus to be a king by nature, like the chief bee in each hive33— an untaught or self-taught genius, in his excellence as general and emperor. He obtains only one adventitious aid peculiar to himself. Being of divine progeny, he receives the special favour and revelations of the Gods, who, in doubtful emergencies, communicate to him by signs, omens, dreams, and sacrifices, what he ought to do and what he ought to leave undone.34Such privileged communications are represented as indispensable to the success of a leader: for though it was his duty to learn all that could be learnt, yet even after he had done this, so much uncertainty remained behind, that his decisions were little better than a lottery.35The Gods arranged the sequences of events partly in a regular and decypherable manner, so that a man by diligent study might come to understand them: but they reserved many important events for their own free-will, so as not to be intelligible by any amount of human study. Here the wisest man was at fault no less than the most ignorant: nor could he obtain the knowledge of them except by special revelation solicited or obtained. The Gods communicated such peculiar knowledge to their favourites, but not to every one indiscriminately: for they were under no necessity to take care of men towards whom they felt no inclination.36Cyrus was one of the men thus specially privileged: but he was diligent in cultivatingthe favour of the Gods by constant worship, not merely at times when he stood in need of their revelations, but at other times also: just as in regard to human friends or patrons, assiduous attentions were requisite to keep up their goodwill.37