Chapter 35

364Plato, Legg. x. pp. 894 D, 895 B.

365Plato, Legg. x. pp. 896 A, 897 A. The κινήσεις of soul are πρωτουργοί — those of body are δευτερουργοί.

366Plato, Legg. x. p. 896 E. ψυχὴν δὴ διοικοῦσαν καὶ ἐνοικοῦσαν ἐν ἅπασι τοῖς πάντῃ κινουμένοις.As an illustration or comment on this portion of Plato De Legibus, Lord Monboddo’sAncient Metaphysicsare instructive. See vol. i. pp. 2-7-9-25. He adopts the distinction between Mind and Body made both in the tenth Book De Legg., and in the Epinomis. He considers that Body and Mind are mixed together in each part of nature; and in the material world never separated: that motion is perpetual; and “Where there ismotion, there must be there something thatmoves. What ismoved, I callbody; whatmoves, I callmind.“Undermind, in this definition, I include:— 1. The rational and intellectual; 2. The animal life; 3. That principle in the vegetable, by which it is nourished, grows, and produces its like, and which therefore is commonly called thevegetable life; and 4. Thatmotive principlewhich I understand to be in all bodies, even such as are thought to be inanimate. This is the distinction betweenbodyandmindmade by Plato in his tenth Book of Laws” (pp. 8-9).“The Greek word ψυχή denotes the three first kinds I have mentioned, which are not expressed by any one word that I know in English; for the wordmind, that I have used to express them, denotes in common use only therational mindorsoul, as it is otherwise called. The fourth kind that I have mentioned,viz., themotive principlein all bodies, is not commonly in Greek called ψυχή. But Aristotle, in a passage which I shall afterwards quote, says that it is ὥσπερ ψυχή (p. 8, note).“As to theprinciple of motionormoving principle, which Aristotle supposes to be in all bodies, it is what he callsnature(p. 9). … He makes Nature also to be the principle ofrestin bodies; by which I suppose he means, that those bodies which he callsheavy, that is, which move towards the centre of the earth, wouldrestif they were there” (p. 9, note).“From the account here given of motion, it is evident that by it the whole business of nature, above, below, and round about us, is carried on. … To those who hold thatmindis the first of things, and principal in the universe, it will not appear surprising that I have mademoving, orproducing motion, an essential attribute ofmind” (p. 25).In the same Treatise — which exhibits very careful study both of Plato and of Aristotle — Lord Monboddo analyses the ten varieties of motion here recognised by Plato, and shows that Plato’s account is confused and unsatisfactory. Ancient Metaphysics, vol. i. pp. 23-230-252.

366Plato, Legg. x. p. 896 E. ψυχὴν δὴ διοικοῦσαν καὶ ἐνοικοῦσαν ἐν ἅπασι τοῖς πάντῃ κινουμένοις.

As an illustration or comment on this portion of Plato De Legibus, Lord Monboddo’sAncient Metaphysicsare instructive. See vol. i. pp. 2-7-9-25. He adopts the distinction between Mind and Body made both in the tenth Book De Legg., and in the Epinomis. He considers that Body and Mind are mixed together in each part of nature; and in the material world never separated: that motion is perpetual; and “Where there ismotion, there must be there something thatmoves. What ismoved, I callbody; whatmoves, I callmind.

“Undermind, in this definition, I include:— 1. The rational and intellectual; 2. The animal life; 3. That principle in the vegetable, by which it is nourished, grows, and produces its like, and which therefore is commonly called thevegetable life; and 4. Thatmotive principlewhich I understand to be in all bodies, even such as are thought to be inanimate. This is the distinction betweenbodyandmindmade by Plato in his tenth Book of Laws” (pp. 8-9).

“The Greek word ψυχή denotes the three first kinds I have mentioned, which are not expressed by any one word that I know in English; for the wordmind, that I have used to express them, denotes in common use only therational mindorsoul, as it is otherwise called. The fourth kind that I have mentioned,viz., themotive principlein all bodies, is not commonly in Greek called ψυχή. But Aristotle, in a passage which I shall afterwards quote, says that it is ὥσπερ ψυχή (p. 8, note).

“As to theprinciple of motionormoving principle, which Aristotle supposes to be in all bodies, it is what he callsnature(p. 9). … He makes Nature also to be the principle ofrestin bodies; by which I suppose he means, that those bodies which he callsheavy, that is, which move towards the centre of the earth, wouldrestif they were there” (p. 9, note).

“From the account here given of motion, it is evident that by it the whole business of nature, above, below, and round about us, is carried on. … To those who hold thatmindis the first of things, and principal in the universe, it will not appear surprising that I have mademoving, orproducing motion, an essential attribute ofmind” (p. 25).

In the same Treatise — which exhibits very careful study both of Plato and of Aristotle — Lord Monboddo analyses the ten varieties of motion here recognised by Plato, and shows that Plato’s account is confused and unsatisfactory. Ancient Metaphysics, vol. i. pp. 23-230-252.

367Plato, Legg. x. p. 897 B.

368Plato, Legg. x. pp. 897 E-898 A. ᾗ προσέοικε κινήσει νοῦς τῶν δέκα ἐκείνων κινήσεων τὴν εἰκόνα λάβωμεν … τούτοιν δὴ τοῖν κινήσεοιν τὴν ἐν ἑνὶ φερομένην ἀεὶ περί γέ τι μέσον ἀνάγκη κινεῖσθαι, τῶν ἐντόρνων οὐσῶν [al. οὖσαν] μίμημά τι κύκλων, εἶναί τε αὐτὴν τῇ τοῦ νοῦ περιόδῳ πάντως ὡς δυνατὸν οἰκειοτάτην τε καὶ ὁμοίαν.

369Plato, Legg. x. p. 898 B-C.

370Plato, Legg. x. p. 898 D.

371Plato, Legg. x. p. 899 B. εἴθ’ ὅστις ὁμολογεῖ ταῦτα, ὑπομένει μὴ θεῶν εἶναι πλήρη πάντα;

Plato’s argument is unsatisfactory and inconsistent.

In this argument — which Plato tells us that no man will be insane enough to dispute,372and which he proclaims to be a triumphant refutation of the unbelievers — we find, instead of the extra-kosmical Demiurgus and pre-kosmical Chaos or necessity (the doctrine of the Platonic Timæus373), two opposing primordial forces both intra-kosmical: the good soul and the bad soul, there being a multiplicity of each. Though Plato here proclaims his conclusion with an unqualified confidence which contrasts greatly with the modest reserve often expressed in his Timæus — yet the conclusion is rather disproved than proved by his own premisses. It cannot be true that all things are full of Gods, since there are two varieties of soul existing and acting, the bad as well as the good: and Plato calls the celestial bodies Gods, as endowed with and moved by good and rational souls. Aristotle in his theory draws a marked distinction between the regularity and perfection of the celestial region, and the irregularity and imperfection of the terrestrial and sublunary: Plato’s premisses as here laid out would have called upon him to do the same, and to designate theKosmos as the theatre of counteracting agencies, partly divine, partly not divine. So he terms it indeed in the Timæus.374

372Plato, Legg. x. p. 899 C. οὐκ ἔστιν οὕτως παραφρονῶν οὐδείς.

373Plato, Timæus, pp. 48 A, 69 A-B.

374Plato, Timæus, p. 48 A.The remarks of Zeller, in the second edition of his work, Die Philosophie der Griechen (vol. ii. p. 634 seq.), upon this portion of the Treatise De Legibus, are very acute and instructive. He exposes the fallacy of the attempt made by various critics to explain away the Manichæan doctrine declared in this treatise, and to reconcile the Leges with the Timæus. The subject is handled in a manner superior to the Platonische Studien of the same author (wherein the Leges are pronounced to be spurious, while in the History of Philosophy Zeller retracts this opinion), though in that work also there is much instruction. — Stallbaum’s copious notes on these passages (pp. 188-189-195-207-213 of his edition of Leges), while admitting the discrepancy between Leges and Timæus, furnish what he thinks a satisfactory explanation. One portion of his explanation is, that Plato here accommodates himself “ad captum hominum vulgarem (p. 189) … ad captum civium communem accommodaté et populari ratione explicari” (p. 207). I dissent from this as a matter of fact. I think that the heretics of the second and third class coincide rather with the “captus vulgaris”. So Plato himself intimates.

374Plato, Timæus, p. 48 A.

The remarks of Zeller, in the second edition of his work, Die Philosophie der Griechen (vol. ii. p. 634 seq.), upon this portion of the Treatise De Legibus, are very acute and instructive. He exposes the fallacy of the attempt made by various critics to explain away the Manichæan doctrine declared in this treatise, and to reconcile the Leges with the Timæus. The subject is handled in a manner superior to the Platonische Studien of the same author (wherein the Leges are pronounced to be spurious, while in the History of Philosophy Zeller retracts this opinion), though in that work also there is much instruction. — Stallbaum’s copious notes on these passages (pp. 188-189-195-207-213 of his edition of Leges), while admitting the discrepancy between Leges and Timæus, furnish what he thinks a satisfactory explanation. One portion of his explanation is, that Plato here accommodates himself “ad captum hominum vulgarem (p. 189) … ad captum civium communem accommodaté et populari ratione explicari” (p. 207). I dissent from this as a matter of fact. I think that the heretics of the second and third class coincide rather with the “captus vulgaris”. So Plato himself intimates.

Reverence of Plato for uniform circular rotation.

There is another feature, common both to the Timæus and the Leges, which deserves attention as illustrating Plato’s point of view. It is the reverential sentiment with which he regards uniform rotatory movement in the same place. This he pronounces to be the perfect, regular, movement appertaining and congenial to Reason and the good variety of soul. Because the celestial bodies move thus and only thus, he declares them to be Gods. It is this circular rotation which continues with perfect and unchangeable regularity in the celestial sphere of the Kosmos, and also, though imperfect and perturbed, in the spherical cranium of man.375Aristotle in his theory maintains unabated the reverence for this mode of motion, as the perfection of reason and regularity. The feeling here noted exercised a powerful and long-continued influence over the course of astronomical speculations.

375Plato, Timæus, pp. 44 B, 47 C.

Argument of Plato to confute the second class of heretics.

Having demonstrated to his own full satisfaction, from the regularity of the celestial rotations, that the heavenly bodies are wise and good Gods, and that all things are full of Gods — Plato applies this conclusion to refute the second class of heretics — those who did not believe that the Gods directed all human affairs, the small things as well as the great;376that is, the lot of each individual personas well as that of the species or of its component aggregates. He himself affirms that they direct all things. It is inconsistent with their attributes of perfect intelligence, power, and goodness (he maintains) that they should leave anything, either small or great, without regulation. All good human administrators, generals, physicians, pilots, &c., regulate all things, small and great, in their respective provinces: the Gods cannot be inferior to them, and must be held to do the same. They regulate every thing with a view to the happiness of the whole, in which each man has his share and interest; and each man has his special controuling Deity watching over his minutest proceedings, whether the individual sees it or not.377Soul, both in its good variety and its bad variety, is essentially in change from one state to another, and passes from time to time out of one body into another. In the perpetual conflict between the good and the bad variety of soul, according as each man’s soul inclines to the better or to the worse, the Gods or Fate exalt it to a higher region or degrade it to a lower. By this means the Gods do the best they can to ensure triumph to virtue, and defeat to vice, in the entire Kosmos. This reference to the entire Kosmos is overlooked by the heretics who deny the all-pervading management of the Gods.378

376The language of Plato sometimes implies, that the opponents whom he is controverting disbelieve altogether the intervention of the Gods in human affairs, pp. 899 E, 900 A, 885 B. But the main stress of his argument is directed against those who, admitting the intervention of the Gods in great things, deny it in small, pp. 900 D, 901 A-B-C-D, 902 A-B.

377Plato, Legg. x. pp. 902-903 B-C.

378This argument is set forth from p. 903 B to 905 B. It is obscure and difficult to follow.

Contrary doctrine of Plato in Republic.

Plato gives here an outburst of religious eloquence which might prove impressive when addressed to fellow-believers — but which, if employed for the avowed purpose of convincing dissentients, would fail of its purpose, as involving assumptions to which they would not subscribe. As to the actual realities of human life, past as well as present, Plato himself always gives a very melancholy picture of them. “The heaven is full of good things, and also full of things opposite to good: but mostly of things not good.”379Moreover,when we turn back to the Republic, we find Plato therein expressly blaming a doctrine very similar to what he declares true here in the Leges — as a dangerous heresy, although extensively believed, from the time of Homer downward. “Since God is good” (Plato had there affirmed380) “he cannot be the cause of all things, as most men pronounce him to be. He is the cause of a few things, but of most things he is not the cause: for the good things in our lot are much fewer than the evil. We must ascribe all the good things to him, but for the evil things we must seek some other cause, and not God.” The confessed imperfection of the actual result381was one of the main circumstances urged by those heretics, who denied that all-pervading administration of the Gods which Plato in the Leges affirms.382If he undertook to convince them at all, he would have done well to state and answer more fully their arguments, and to clear up the apparent inconsistencies in his own creed.

379Plato, Legg. x. p. 906 A. ἐπειδὴ γὰρ συγκεχωρήκαμεν ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς εἶναι μὲν τὸν οὐρανὸν πολλῶν μεστὸν ἀγαθῶν, εἶναι δὲ καὶ τῶν ἐναντίων, πλειόνων δὲ τῶν μή, μάχη δή, φαμέν, ἀθάνατός ἐστιν ἡ τοιαύτη καὶ φυλακῆς θαυμαστῆς δεομένη. Ast in his note affirms that after μὴ is understood ἀγαθῶν. Stallbaum thinks, though with some hesitation, that ἐναντίων is understood after μή. I agree with Ast.Compare iii. pp. 676-677, where Plato states that in the earlier history of the human race, a countless number of different societies (μυρίαι ἐπὶ μυρίαις) have all successively grown up and successively perished, with extinction of all their comforts and civilization.

Compare iii. pp. 676-677, where Plato states that in the earlier history of the human race, a countless number of different societies (μυρίαι ἐπὶ μυρίαις) have all successively grown up and successively perished, with extinction of all their comforts and civilization.

380Plato, Republic, ii. p. 379 C. Οὐδ’ ἄρα ὁ θεὸς, ἐπειδὴ ἀγαθὸς, πάντων ἂν εἴη αἴτιος, ὡς οἱ πολλοὶ λέγουσιν· ἀλλ’ ὀλίγων μὲν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις αἴτιος, πολλῶν δὲ ἀναίτιος· πολὺ γὰρ ἐλάττω τἀγαθὰ τῶν κακῶν ἡμῖν· καὶ τῶν μὲν ἀγαθῶν οὐδένα ἄλλον αἰτιατέον, τῶν δὲ κακῶν ἄλλ’ ἅττα ζητεῖν δεῖ τὰ αἴτια, ἀλλ’ οὐ τὸν θεόν. See a striking passage in Arnobius, adv. Gentes, ii. 46.

381Plato, Legg. x. p. 903 A-B. Πείθωμεν τὸν νεανίαν τοῖς λόγοις … ὧν ἓν καὶ τὸ σόν, ὦ σχέτλιε, μόριον εἰς τὸ πᾶν ξυντείνει βλέπον ἀεί.

382Lucretius, v. 197:—Nequaquam nobis divinitus esse paratamNaturam mundi: tantâ stat prædita culpâ.

382Lucretius, v. 197:—

Nequaquam nobis divinitus esse paratamNaturam mundi: tantâ stat prædita culpâ.

Argument of Plato to refute the third class of heretics.

A similar criticism may be made still more forcibly, upon the demonstration whereby he professes to refute the third and most culpable class of heretics — “Those who believe that the Gods exercise an universal agency, but that they can be persuaded by prayer and conciliated by sacrifice”. Here he was treading on dangerous ground: for he was himself a heretic, by his own confession, if compared with Grecian belief generally. Not merely the ordinary public, but the most esteemed and religious persons among the public383— poets, rhetors, prophets, and priests — believed the doctrine which he here so vehemently condemns. Moreover it was the received doctrine of the city384— that is, it was assumed as the basis of the official and authorised religious manifestations:and the law of the city was recognised by the Delphian oracle385as the proper standard of reference for individual enquirers who came there to ask for information on matters of doubtful religious propriety. In the received Grecian conception of religious worship, prayer and sacrifice were correlative and inseparable: sacrifice was the gift of man to the Gods, accompanying the prayer for gifts from the Gods to man, and accounted necessary to render the prayer efficacious.386The priest was the professional person competent and necessary to give advice as to the details: but as a general principle, it was considered disrespectful to ask favours from the Gods without tendering to them some present, suitable to the means of the petitioner.

383Plato, Legg. x. p. 885 D; Republic, ii. pp. 364-365-366.

384Plato, Republic, ii. p. 366 A-B. ἀλλ’ ὠφελήσουσιν ἁγνιζομένους αἱ τελεταὶ καὶ οἱ λύσιοι θεοί, ὡς αἱ μέγισται πόλεις λέγουσι καὶ οἱ θεῶν παῖδες, ποιηταὶ καὶ προφῆται τῶν θεῶν γενόμενοι, οἳ ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχειν μηνύουσιν.

385Xenophon, Memor. i. 3, 1, iv. 3, 16; Cicero, Legg. ii. 16.

386See Nägelsbach, Nach-Homerische Theologie, Part 5, 1, p. 194 seq., where this doctrine is set forth and largely illustrated.In approaching a king a satrap or any other person of exalted position above the level of ordinary men, it was the custom to come with a present. Thucyd. ii. 97; Xenoph. Anab. vii. 3, 26; Xenoph. Hellen. iii. 1, 10-12.The great person, to whom the presents were made, usually requited them magnificently.

386See Nägelsbach, Nach-Homerische Theologie, Part 5, 1, p. 194 seq., where this doctrine is set forth and largely illustrated.

In approaching a king a satrap or any other person of exalted position above the level of ordinary men, it was the custom to come with a present. Thucyd. ii. 97; Xenoph. Anab. vii. 3, 26; Xenoph. Hellen. iii. 1, 10-12.

The great person, to whom the presents were made, usually requited them magnificently.

General belief in Greece about the efficacy of prayer and sacrifice to appease the Gods.

Plato himself states this view explicitly in his Politikus.387Moreover, when a man desired information from the Gods on any contemplated project or on any grave matter of doubt, he sought it by means of sacrifice.388Such sacrifice was a debt to the God: and if it remained unpaid, his displeasure was incurred.389The motive for sacrificing to the Gods was thus, not simply to ensure the granting of prayers, but to pay a debt: and thus either to prevent or to appease the wrath of the Gods. The religious practice of Greece rested upon the received belief that the Gods were not merely pleased with presents, but exacted them as a mark of respect, and were angry if they were not offered: yet that being angry, their wrath might be appeased by acceptable presents and supplications.390To learn what proceedings of this kindweresuitable, a man went to consult the oracle, the priests, or the Exêgêtæ: in cases wherein he believedthat he had incurred the displeasure of the Gods by any wrong or omission.391

387Plato, Politikus, p. 290 D. καὶ μὴν καὶ τὸ τῶν ἱερέων αὖ γένος, ὡς τὸ νόμιμόν φησι, παρὰ μὲν ἡμῶν δωρεὰς θεοῖς διὰ θυσιῶν ἐπιστῆμόν ἐστι κατὰ νοῦν ἐκείνοις δωρεῖσθαι, παρὰ δὲ ἐκείνων ἡμῖν εὐχαῖς κτῆσιν ἀγαθῶν αἰτήσασθαι. Compare Euthyphron, p. 14.

388Xenophon, Anab. vii. 6, 44; Euripid. Ion. 234.

389Plato, Republic, i. p. 331 B. Compare also Phædon, p. 118, the last words spoken by Sokrates before his decease — ὀφείλομεν Ἀσκληπιῷ ἀλεκτρύονα· ἀλλ’ ἀπόδοτε καὶ μὴ ἀμελήσητε.

390See Nägelsbach, Nach-Homerische Theologie, pp. 211-213.

391See, as one example among a thousand, the proceeding of the Spartan government, Thucyd. i. 134; also ii. 48-54.

Incongruities of Plato’s own doctrine.

Now it is against this latter sentiment — that which recognised the Gods as placable or forgiving392— that Plato declares war as the worst of all heresies. He admits indeed, implicitly, that the Gods are influenced by prayer and sacrifice; since he directs both the one and the other to be constantly offered up, by the citizens of his Magnêtic city, in this very Treatise. He even implies that the Gods are too facile and compliant: for in his second Alkibiadês, Sokrates is made to remark that it was dangerous for an ignorant man to pray for specific advantages, because he might very probably bring ruin upon himself by having his prayers granted —

“Evertêre domos totas, optantibus ipsis,Di faciles.”

Farthermore Plato does not scruple to notice393it as a real proceeding of the Gods, that they executed the prayer or curse of Theseus, by bringing a cruel death upon the blameless youth Hippolytus; which Theseus himself is the first to deplore when he becomes acquainted with the true facts. That the Gods should inflict punishment on a person who did not deserve it, Plato accounts not unworthy of their dignity: but that they should remit punishment in any case where he conceives it to have been deserved, he repudiates with indignation. Though accessible and easily influenced by prayer and sacrifice from other persons, they are deaf and inexorable to those who have incurred their displeasure by wrong-doing.394The prayer so offered is called by Plato a treacherous cajolery, the sacrifice a guilty bribe, to purchase their indulgence.395Since, in human affairs, no good magistrate, general, physician, pilot, &c., will allow himself to be persuaded by prayers or presents to betrayhis trust: much less can we suppose (he argues) the Gods to be capable of such betrayal.396

392The common sentiment is expressed in a verse of Euripides — Τίνα δεῖ μακάρων ἐκθυσαμένους Εὑρεῖν μόχθων ἀνάπαυλαν — (Fragm. Ino 155); compare Eurip. Hippol. 1323.

393Plato, Legg. xi. p. 931 C. ἀραῖος γὰρ γονεὺς ἐκγόνοις ὡς οὐδεὶς ἕτερος ἄλλοις,δικαιότατα. Also iii. p. 687 D.

394Plato, Legg. iv. pp. 716-717.

395Plato, Legg. x. p. 906 B. θωπείαις λόγων.

396Plato, Legg. x. pp. 906-907.

Both Herodotus and Sokrates dissented from Plato’s doctrine.

The general doctrine, upon which Plato here lays so much stress, and the dissent from which he pronounces to be a capital offence — that the Gods, though persuadeable by every one else, were thoroughly unforgiving, deaf to any prayer or sacrifice from one who had done wrong — is a doctrine from which Sokrates397himself dissented; and to which few of Plato’s contemporaries, perhaps hardly even himself, consistently adhered. The argument, upon which Plato rests for convincing all these numerous dissentients, is derived from his conception of the character and functions of the Gods. But this, though satisfactory to himself, would not have been granted by his opponents. The Gods were conceived by Herodotus as jealous, meddlesome, intolerant of human happiness beyond a narrow limit, and keeping all human calculations in a state of uncertainty:398in this latter attribute Sokrates also agreed. He affirmed that the Gods kept all the important results essentially unpredictable by human study, reserving them for special revelations by way of prophecy to those whom they preferred. These were privileged and exclusive communications to favoured individuals, among whom Sokrates was one:399and Plato, though not made a recipient of the same favour as Sokrates, declares his own full belief in the reality of such special revelations from the Gods, to particular persons and at particular places.400Aristotle,on the other hand, pronounces action and construction, especially action in details, to be petty and unworthy of the Gods; whom he regards as employed in perpetual contemplation and theorising, as the only occupation worthy to characterise their blessed immortality.401Epikurus and his numerous followers, though not agreeing with Aristotle in regarding the Gods as occupied in intellectual contemplation, agreed with him fully in considering the existence of the Gods as too dignified and enviable to be disturbed by the vexation of meddling with human affairs, or to take on the anxieties of regard for one man, displeasure towards another.

397Xenophon, Memorab. ii. 2, 14. Σὺ οὖν, ὦ παῖ, ἂν σωφρονῇς, τοὺς μὲν θεοὺς παραιτήσῃ συγγνώμονάς σοι εἶναι, εἴ τι παρημέληκας τῆς μητρός, μή σε καὶ οὗτοι νομίσαντες ἀχάριστον εἶναι οὐκ ἐθέλωσιν εὖ ποιεῖν.At the same time, Sokrates maintains that the Gods accepted sacrifices from good men with greater favour than sacrifices from bad men. Xenoph. Mem. i. 3, 3.

At the same time, Sokrates maintains that the Gods accepted sacrifices from good men with greater favour than sacrifices from bad men. Xenoph. Mem. i. 3, 3.

398Herodotus, i. 32, iii. 40.

399Xenoph. Mem. i. 1, 8-9. τοὺς θεοὺς γάρ, οἷς ἂν ὦσιν ἵλεῳ, σημαίνειν. Also i. 3, 4, iv. 3, 12; Cyropæd. i. 6, 5-23-46. θεοὶ ἀεὶ ὄντες πάντα ἴσασι … καὶ τῶν συμβουλευομένων ἀνθρώπων οἷς ἂν ἵλεῳ ὦσι, προσημαίνουσιν ἅ τε χρὴ ποιεῖν καὶ ἃ οὐ χρή. Εἰ δὲ μὴ πᾶσιν ἐθέλουσι συμβουλεύειν, οὐδὲν θαυμαστόν· οὐ γὰρ ἀνάγκη αὐτοῖς ἐστιν, ὧν ἂν μὴ θέλωσιν, ἐπιμελεῖσθαι (Cyrop. i. 6, 46).Solon. Frag. v. 53, ed. Gaisf.:—Ἄλλον μάντεν ἔθηκιν ἄναξ ἑκάεργος Ἀπόλλων·Ἔγνω δ’ ἀνδρὶ κακὸν τήλοθεν ἐρχόμενον.See the curious narrative in Herodotus ix. 94 seq. about the prophetic gifts bestowed on Euenius. The same narrative attests the full belief prevalent respecting both the displeasure of the Gods and their placability on the proper expiation being made. It conflicts signally in every respect with the canon of orthodoxy set up by Plato.

Solon. Frag. v. 53, ed. Gaisf.:—

Ἄλλον μάντεν ἔθηκιν ἄναξ ἑκάεργος Ἀπόλλων·Ἔγνω δ’ ἀνδρὶ κακὸν τήλοθεν ἐρχόμενον.

See the curious narrative in Herodotus ix. 94 seq. about the prophetic gifts bestowed on Euenius. The same narrative attests the full belief prevalent respecting both the displeasure of the Gods and their placability on the proper expiation being made. It conflicts signally in every respect with the canon of orthodoxy set up by Plato.

400Plato, Legg. v. pp. 738 C, 747 E, vii. p. 811 D; Republic, vi. pp. 496 C, 499 C.

401Aristotle, Ethic. Nikom. x. 8, p. 1178 b. 21. ὥστε ἡ τοῦ θεοῦ ἐνέργεια, μακαριότητι διαφέρουσα, θεωρητικὴ ἂν εἴη.

Great opposition which Plato’s doctrine would have encountered in Greece.

The orthodox religious belief, which Plato imposes upon his 5040 Magnêtic citizens under the severest penalties, would thus be found inconsistent with the general belief, not merely of ordinary Greeks, but also of the various lettered and philosophical individuals who thought for themselves. Most of these latter would have passed, under one of the three heads of Platonic heresy, into the Platonic prison for five years, and from thence either to recantation or death. The arguments which Plato considered so irresistible, that none but silly youths could be deaf to them — did not appear conclusive to Aristotle and other intelligent contemporaries. Plato makes up his own mind, what proceedings he thinks worthy and unworthy of the Gods, and then proclaims with confidence as a matter of indisputable fact, that they act conformably. But neither Herodotus, nor Aristotle, would have granted his premisses: they conceived the attributes and character of the Gods differently from him, and differently from each other. And if we turn to the Kratylus of Plato, we find Sokrates there declaring, that men knew nothing about the Gods: that speculations about the Gods were in reality speculations about the opinions of men respecting the Gods.402

402Plato, Kratylus, pp. 400-401. Περὶ θεῶν οὐδὲν ἴσμεν, οὔτε περὶ αὐτῶν, οὔτε περὶ τῶν ὀνομάτων, ἅττα ποτὲ αὐτοὶ ἑαυτοὺς καλοῦσι (400 D) … σκοπῶμεν ὥσπερ προειπόντες τοῖς θεοῖς ὅτι περὶ αὐτῶν οὐδὲν ἡμεῖς σκεψόμεθα, οὐ γὰρ ἀξιοῦμεν οἷοί τ’ ἂν εἶναι σκοπεῖν, ἀλλὰ περὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων, ἥντινά ποτε δόξαν ἔχοντες ἐτίθεντο αὐτοῖς τὰ ὀνόματα· τοῦτο γὰρ ἀνεμέσητον (401 A). Compare also Kratyl. p. 425 B.

Local infallibility was claimed as a rule in each community, though rarely enforced with severity: Plato both claims it more emphatically, and enforces it more rigorously.

Such opinions were local, traditional, and dissentient, among the numerous distinct cities and tribes which divided the inhabited earth between them in Plato’s time.403Each of these claimed a local infallibility, principally as to religious rites and customs, indirectly also as to dogmas and creed: and Plato’s Magnêtic community, if it had come into existence, would have added one to the number of distinct varieties. To this general sentiment, deeply rooted in the emotions and unused to the scrutiny of reason, the philosophers were always more or less odious, as dissenters, enquirers, and critics, each on his own ground.404At Athens the sentiment manifested itself occasionally in severe decrees and judicial sentences against obnoxious freethinkers, especially in the case of Sokrates. If the Athenians had carried out consistently and systematically the principle involved in their sentence against Sokrates, philosophy must have been banished from Athens.405The school of Plato could never have been maintained. But the principle of intolerance was usually left dormant at Athens: philosophical debate continued active and unshackled, so that the school of Plato subsisted in the city without interruption for nearly forty years until his death. We might have expected that the philosophers, to whose security toleration of free dissent and debate was essential, would have upheld it as a general principle against the public. But here we find the most eminent among them, at the close of a long life, not only disallowing all liberty of philosophising to others, and assuming to himself the exclusive right of dictating the belief, as well as the conduct, of his imaginary citizens — but also enforcing this exclusive principle with an amount of systematic rigour, which I do not believe to have been equalled in any actual Grecian city. This is a memorable fact in the history of Grecian philosophy. TheStoic Kleanthes, in the century after Plato’s death, declared that the Samian astronomer Aristarchus ought to be indicted for impiety, because he had publicly advocated the doctrine of the Earth’s rotation round the Sun. Kleanthês and Plato thus stand out as known examples, among Grecian philosophers before the Christian era, of that intolerance which would apply legal penalties against individual dissenters and competitors.406

403Plato, Politikus, p. 262 D. γένεσιν ἀπείροις οὖσι καὶ ἀμίκτοις καὶ ἀσυμφώνοις πρὸς ἄλληλα. Herodot. iii. 39.

404Plato, Euthyphron, p. 3.

405See the Apologies both of Plato and Xenophon. In one of the rhetorical discourses cited by Aristotle, on the subject of the trial of Sokrates (seemingly that by the Rhetor Theodektês), the point is put thus:— Μέλλετε δὲ κρίνειν, οὐ περὶ Σωκράτους, ἀλλὰ περὶ ἐπιτηδεύματος, εἰ χρὴ φιλοσοφεῖν (Aristot. Rhetor. ii. 1399, a. 8, b. 10).

406The Platonist and astronomer Derkyllides afterwards (about 100-120A.D.) declares those who affirm the doctrine, that the earth moves and that the stars are stationary, to be accursed and impious — τοὺς δὲ τὰ κινητὰ στήσαντας, τὰ δὲ ἀκίνητα φύσει καὶ ἕδρᾳ κινήσαντας, ὡς παρὰ τὰς τῆς μαντικῆς ὑποθέσεις, ἀποδιοπομπεῖται. (Theon Smyrnæus, De Astronomiâ, ch. 41, p. 328, fol. 26, ed. Martin.)

Farther civil and political regulations for the Magnêtic community. No evidence that Plato had studied the working of different institutions in practice.

The eleventh Book of the Treatise De Legibus, and the larger portion of the twelfth, are devoted to a string of civil and political regulations for the Magnêtic community. Each regulation is ushered in with an expository prologue, often with severe reproof towards persons committing the various forbidden acts. There is little of systematic order in the enumeration of subjects. In general we may remark that neither here nor elsewhere in the Treatise is there any proof, that Plato — though doubtless he had visited Italy, Sicily, and Egypt, perhaps other countries — had taken much pains to acquaint himself with the practice of human life, or that he had studied and compared the working of different institutions in different communities. His experience seems all derived from Athenian law and practice: the criticisms and modifications which he applies to it flow from his own sentiment and theory: from his religious or ethical likings or dislikings. He sets up a type of character which he desires to enforce among his citizens, and which he guards against adulteration by very stringent interference. The displeasure of the Gods is constantly appealed to, as a justification for the penalties which he proposed: sometimes even the current mythes are invoked as authority, though in other places Plato so greatly disparages them.407

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