Chapter 12

189ii. 4.13.190i. 8.15.191As thought Plato in his Banquet, p. 211; Cary, 35.192As said Plato, Republic, vii. p. 534; Cary, 14.193As Plato says in his Phaedrus, p. 246; Cary, 54, 56.194As wrote Plato in his Banquet, p. 203; Cary, 28, 29, and see iii. 7.14 and iii. 5.9 as well as iii. 6.14.195According to the interpretation of Ficinus.196See ii. 4. This is an added confirmation of the chronological order; in the Enneadic order this book is later, not earlier.197Again a term discussed by Numenius, fr. ii. 8, 13; and iii; see i. 1.9; iv. 3.3, 30, 31; i. 4.10.198We notice how these latter studies of Plotinos do not take up any new problems, chiefly reviewing subjects touched on before. This accounts for Porphyry's attempt to group the Plotinic writings, systematically. This reminds us of the suggestion in the Biography, that except for the objections of Porphyry, Plotinos would have nothing to write. Notice also the system of the last Porphyrian treatises, contrasted with the more literary treatment of the later. All this supports Porphyry's table of chronological arrangement of the studies of Plotinos. This book is closely connected with the preceding studies of Fate and Providence, iii. 1–3; for he is here really opposing not the Gnostics he antagonized when dismissing Amelius, but the Stoic theories on Providence and Fate.199See iii. 1.5, 6; iii. 6; iv. 4.30–44.200Macrobins. In Somn. Scipionis.201Cicero, de Divinatione, i. 39.202Julius Firmicus Maternus, Astrol. ii. 23.203With Ptolemy's Tetrabiblion, i. p. 17.204See iv. 4.31.205Discussed in par. 4.206This incomprehensibility was no doubt due to Plotinos's advancing blindness and renal affection.207Numenius, fr. 32.208Cicero, de Nat. Deorum, ii. 46.209See iv. 4.32.210According to the Stoics: Alex. Aphrod. de Mixtione, p. 141; Cicero, de Nat. Deorum, ii. 32.211See iii. 1.4, 7–10.212See iii. 1.6.213See iv. 4.33.214See iv. 4.35; according to the Stoics, see Diogenes Laertes. vii. 140.215See iv. 4.32.216Seneca, Quest. Nat. i. 1.217See iii. 4.2, 4.218See ii. 3.13.219See iii. 4.3.220See iii. 1.8–10.221The law of Adrastea; see iii. 4.2; iv. 4.4, 5.222Plato, Phaedrus, p. 244–251; Cary, 47–66.223See i. 8; ii. 11; iii. 1; vi. 8.224Plato, Rep. x. p. 617; Cary, 14.225p. 41–42; Cary, 16, 17.226See i. 1.7–10.227See ii. 1.5.228Stoic terms.229See ii. 1.8–10.230See i. 2.1; vi. 8.231See i. 1.7–12; iv. 3.19–23.232This is the exact doctrine of Numenius, fr. 53; it logically agrees with the doubleness of matter, Num. 14; of the Creator, Num. 36; and the world-Soul, fr. 16. See note 71.233See par. 18.234Plato, Banquet, p. 202; Cary, 28; Timaeus, p. 90; Cary, 71.235See iii. 1.2.236That is, to share the passions of the bodies: see iii. 1.2.237See iv. 4.38–40.238Seneca, Nat. Quest. ii. 32.239According to Aristotle, Met. xii. 3.240See iii. 1.6.241See Cicero, de Nat. Deor. ii. 34.242See iv. 4.39, 40.243Plato, Phaedrus, p. 248; Cary, 59.60.244See iii. 1.8–10.245See iv. 4.39.246See iii. 4.3.247See iii. 1.10.248See iii. 1.5.249Rep. x. p. 616; Cary, 14; Enn. iii. 4.250See iv. 4.30, 40, 43, 44.251See i. 4.252See i. 2.5.253In i. 1; proof of the chronological order.254See ii. 9.12; iv. 3.9, 10; negatively.255See iii. 3.1, 2; see Seneca, de Provid. 5.256See ii. 3.17; iii. 8.257See iv. 4.9–12.258See ii. 4; Seneca, de Provid. 5.259See ii. 9.2; iii. 2, 3. Seneca, de Provid. 5.260Or generative reasons, a Stoic term, Seneca, Quest. Nat. iii. 29; see iii. 3.1, 2, 7.261Plotinos is here harking back to his very earliest writing, 1.6, where, before his monistic adventure with Porphyry, he had, under the Numenian influence of Amelius, constructed his system out of a combination of the doctrines of Plato (about the ideas), Aristotle (the distinctions of form and matter and of potentiality and actualization), and the Stoic (the "reasons," "seminal reasons," action and passions, and "hexis," or "habit," the inorganic informing principle). Of these, Numenius seems to have lacked the Aristotelian doctrines, although he left Plato's single triple-functioned soul for Aristotle's combination of souls of various degrees (fr. 53). Plotinos, therefore, seems to have distinguished in every object two elements, matter and form (ii. 4.1; ii. 5.2). Matter inheres potentially in all beings (ii. 5.3, 4) and therefore is non-being, ugliness, and evil (i. 6.6). Form is the actualization (K. Steinhart's Melemata Plotiniana, p. 31; ii. 5.2); that is, the essence and power (vi. 4.9), which are inseparable. Form alone possesses real existence, beauty and goodness. Form has four degrees: idea, reason, nature and habit; which degrees are the same as those of thought and life (Porphyry, Principles 12, 13, 14). The idea is distinguished into "idea" or intelligible Form, or "eidos," principle of human intellectual life. Reason is 1, divine (theios logos, i. 6, 2; the reason that comes from the universal Soul, iv. 3.10), 2, human (principle of the rational life, see Ficinus on ii. 6.2); 3, the seminal or generative reason (principle of the life of sensation, which imparts to the body the sense-form, "morphé," 3.12-end; Bouillet, i. 365). Now reasons reside in the soul (ii. 4.12), and are simultaneously essences and powers (vi. 4.9), and as powers produce the nature, and as essences, the habits. Now nature ("physis") is the principle of the vegetative life, and habit, "hexis," Numenius, fr. 55, see ii. 4.16, is the principle of unity of inorganic things.262As thought Aristotle, Met. xii, 3.263See ii. 9.13.264See iv. 4.9–13.265See iii. 4.1.266This is Numenius' doctrine, fr. 16.267See iii. 3.5, 11.268Plotinos here makes in the world-Soul a distinction analogous to that obtaining in the human one (where there is a reasonable soul, and its image, the vegetative soul, see i. 1.8–12; iv. 4. 13, 14). Here he asserts that there are two souls; the superior soul (the principal power of the soul, which receives the forms from Intelligence (see iv. 4.9–12, 35), and the inferior soul (nature, or the generative power), which transmits them to matter, so as to fashion it by seminal reasons (see iii. 4.13, 14, 22, 27). Bouillet, no doubt remembering Plotinos's own earlier invectives against those who divided the world-soul (ii. 9.6), evidently directed against Amelius and the Numenian influence, which till then he had followed—tries to minimize it, claiming that this does not mean two different hypostases, but only two functions of one and the same hypostasis. But he acknowledges that this gave the foundation for Plotinos's successors' distinction between the supermundane and the mundane souls (hyperkosmios, and egkosmios). Plotinos was therefore returning to Numenius's two world-souls (fr. 16), which was a necessary logical consequence of his belief in two human souls (fr. 53), as he himself had taught in iii. 8.5. Plotinos objectifies this doubleness of the soul in the myth of the two Hercules, in the next book, i. 1.12.269See ii. 9.2.270The subject announced in the preceding book, ii. 3.16; another proof of the chronological order. This is a very obscure book, depending on iv. 3 and 4: and vi. 7; on the theory of the three divine hypostases, on his psychology, the soul's relation to, and separation from the body, and metempsychosis. His doctrines of "self" and of the emotions are strikingly modern.271See sect. 2.272See sect. 3.273See sect. 4.274See sect. 7, 11.275This most direct translation of "pathos," is defective in that it means rather an experience, a passive state, or modification of the soul. It is a Stoic term.276"Dianoia" is derived from "dia nou," and indicates that the discursive thought is exercised "by means of the intelligence," receiving its notions, and developing them by ratiocination, see v. 3.3. It is the actualization of discursive reason "to dianoêtikon," or of the reasonable soul ("psychê logikê"), which conceives, judges, and reasons (dianoei, krínei, logizetai).277"Noêsis" means intuitive thought, the actualization of intelligence.278See sect. 7.279See Porphyry, Faculties of the Soul, and Ficinus, commentary on this book.280In Greek, "to zoon," "to syntheton," "to synamphoteron," "to koinon," "to eidôlon."281See i. 2.5.282According to the Stoics.283According to Alexander of Aphrodisia.284As thought Aristotle, de Anima 2.1; see 4.3.21, and Numenius, 32.285A famous comparison, found in Aristotle, de Anima, ii. 1; Plato, Laws, x. p. 906; Cary, 14; and especially Numenius, 32.286As Plotinos thinks.287iv. 4.20.288iv. 3.20.289Arist., de Anim. 2.1.290According to Aristotle.291Phaedo, p. 87; Cary, 82.292Similar to the modern James-Lange theory of bodily emotions.293See iv. 4.20, 28.294See sect. 7, 9, 10.295See iv. 3.22, 23.296Porphyry and Ammonius in Bouillet, i. Intr. p. 60, 63, 64, 75, 79, 93, 96, 98, and note on p. 362 to 377.297Namely, intelligence and the reasonable soul.298See Bouillet, i. p. 325, 332.299Bouillet, Intr. p. lxxviii.300See Bouillet, i., note, p. 327, 341.301One of the three hypostases.302See Bouillet, i. p. lxxiii. 344–352.303Plato, Timaeus, p. 35; Cary, 12.304These images of the universal Soul are the faculties of the soul, sense-power, vegetative power, generative power or nature; see iv. 4.13, 14.305"Turning" means here to incline.306See St. Paul, Rom. for phantasy, or imagination; vii. 7–25.307See iv. 3.29–31, also i. 1.9; Numenius, fr. ii. 8, 19; iii. See section 10.308See i. 2.5.309iv. 3.19, 23.310See ii. 9.3, 4, 11, 12.311Fancy or representation, i. 4.10; iv. 3.3, 30, 31.312See 4.3.19, 23; 6.7.6.7.313Plato, Rep. x. p. 611; Cary, 11.314For this see 4.3.12, 18; 4.8.315Odyss. xi. 602, 5; see 4.3.27.316We find here a reassertion of Numenius's doctrine of two souls in man, fr. 53.317Bouillet observes that this book is only a feeble outline of some of the ideas developed in vi. 7, 8, and 9. The biographical significance of this might be as follows. As in the immediately preceding books Plotinos was harking back to Numenius's doctrines, he may have wished to reconcile the two divergent periods, the Porphyrian monism of vi. 7 and 8, with the earlier Amelian dualism of vi. 9. This was nothing derogatory to him; for it is well known that there was a difference between the eclectic monism of the young Plato of the Republic, and the more logical dualism of the older Plato of the Laws. This latter was represented by Numenius and Amelius; the former—combined with Aristotelian and Stoic elements—by Porphyry. Where Plato could not decide, why should we expect Plotinos to do so? And, as a matter of fact, the world also has never been able to decide, so long as it remained sincere, and did not deceive itself with sophistries, as did Hegel. Kant also had his "thing-in-itself"—indeed, he did little more than to develop the work of Plotinos.318As the Stoics would say.319Which is one of the three hypostases, ii. 9.1 and v. 1.320We see here Plotinos feeling the approach of this impending dissolution.321Arranged by Bouillet in the order of the Enneads they summarize.322Passages in quotation marks are from the text of Plotinos.323See i. 2.3.324See i. 2.4.325See i. 2.4.326See i. 2.6.327See i. 2.7.328See i. 2.7.329See i. 2.5.330See i. 8.1.331See 36.38.332These are the three divine hypostases, i. 8.2; ii. 9.1.333See ii. 2.2.334See v. 3.6.335See iii. 7.2.336See iii. 7.2.337A pun on "noein" and "nous."338See v. 3.10–12.339See v. 6.11, 12, 13.340See v. 4.3, 2, 12.341See v. 4.4, 9.342See vi. 4.9.343See vi. 4.16.344See iii. 5.7–9. from Plato.345See vi. 2; vi. 5.346See vi. 5.1.347See vi. 4.4.348See vi. 5.2.349See vi. 5.3, 6.350See vi. 5.4.351See vi. 8.4.352See vi. 5.12.353See iv. 8.1.354See iv. 8.1.355See 23.356Stobaeus, Ecl. Phys., i. 52, ed. Heeren.357See iv. 3.23.358In his book "On the Soul."359See i. 1.12.360See ii. 6.1.361See Ennead, i. 1.362Stobaeus, Ecl. Physicae, i. 52, p. 878.363Of Human Nature, xv.364de Anima, ii. 3.365Stobaeus, Eclogae Physicae, i. 52. p. 894.366On Human Nature, 2.367See Plotinos, ii. 7.1; Porphyry, Principles, 17, 18, 21, 22, 36, 38.368See iv. 3.20.

189ii. 4.13.

190i. 8.15.

191As thought Plato in his Banquet, p. 211; Cary, 35.

192As said Plato, Republic, vii. p. 534; Cary, 14.

193As Plato says in his Phaedrus, p. 246; Cary, 54, 56.

194As wrote Plato in his Banquet, p. 203; Cary, 28, 29, and see iii. 7.14 and iii. 5.9 as well as iii. 6.14.

195According to the interpretation of Ficinus.

196See ii. 4. This is an added confirmation of the chronological order; in the Enneadic order this book is later, not earlier.

197Again a term discussed by Numenius, fr. ii. 8, 13; and iii; see i. 1.9; iv. 3.3, 30, 31; i. 4.10.

198We notice how these latter studies of Plotinos do not take up any new problems, chiefly reviewing subjects touched on before. This accounts for Porphyry's attempt to group the Plotinic writings, systematically. This reminds us of the suggestion in the Biography, that except for the objections of Porphyry, Plotinos would have nothing to write. Notice also the system of the last Porphyrian treatises, contrasted with the more literary treatment of the later. All this supports Porphyry's table of chronological arrangement of the studies of Plotinos. This book is closely connected with the preceding studies of Fate and Providence, iii. 1–3; for he is here really opposing not the Gnostics he antagonized when dismissing Amelius, but the Stoic theories on Providence and Fate.

199See iii. 1.5, 6; iii. 6; iv. 4.30–44.

200Macrobins. In Somn. Scipionis.

201Cicero, de Divinatione, i. 39.

202Julius Firmicus Maternus, Astrol. ii. 23.

203With Ptolemy's Tetrabiblion, i. p. 17.

204See iv. 4.31.

205Discussed in par. 4.

206This incomprehensibility was no doubt due to Plotinos's advancing blindness and renal affection.

207Numenius, fr. 32.

208Cicero, de Nat. Deorum, ii. 46.

209See iv. 4.32.

210According to the Stoics: Alex. Aphrod. de Mixtione, p. 141; Cicero, de Nat. Deorum, ii. 32.

211See iii. 1.4, 7–10.

212See iii. 1.6.

213See iv. 4.33.

214See iv. 4.35; according to the Stoics, see Diogenes Laertes. vii. 140.

215See iv. 4.32.

216Seneca, Quest. Nat. i. 1.

217See iii. 4.2, 4.

218See ii. 3.13.

219See iii. 4.3.

220See iii. 1.8–10.

221The law of Adrastea; see iii. 4.2; iv. 4.4, 5.

222Plato, Phaedrus, p. 244–251; Cary, 47–66.

223See i. 8; ii. 11; iii. 1; vi. 8.

224Plato, Rep. x. p. 617; Cary, 14.

225p. 41–42; Cary, 16, 17.

226See i. 1.7–10.

227See ii. 1.5.

228Stoic terms.

229See ii. 1.8–10.

230See i. 2.1; vi. 8.

231See i. 1.7–12; iv. 3.19–23.

232This is the exact doctrine of Numenius, fr. 53; it logically agrees with the doubleness of matter, Num. 14; of the Creator, Num. 36; and the world-Soul, fr. 16. See note 71.

233See par. 18.

234Plato, Banquet, p. 202; Cary, 28; Timaeus, p. 90; Cary, 71.

235See iii. 1.2.

236That is, to share the passions of the bodies: see iii. 1.2.

237See iv. 4.38–40.

238Seneca, Nat. Quest. ii. 32.

239According to Aristotle, Met. xii. 3.

240See iii. 1.6.

241See Cicero, de Nat. Deor. ii. 34.

242See iv. 4.39, 40.

243Plato, Phaedrus, p. 248; Cary, 59.60.

244See iii. 1.8–10.

245See iv. 4.39.

246See iii. 4.3.

247See iii. 1.10.

248See iii. 1.5.

249Rep. x. p. 616; Cary, 14; Enn. iii. 4.

250See iv. 4.30, 40, 43, 44.

251See i. 4.

252See i. 2.5.

253In i. 1; proof of the chronological order.

254See ii. 9.12; iv. 3.9, 10; negatively.

255See iii. 3.1, 2; see Seneca, de Provid. 5.

256See ii. 3.17; iii. 8.

257See iv. 4.9–12.

258See ii. 4; Seneca, de Provid. 5.

259See ii. 9.2; iii. 2, 3. Seneca, de Provid. 5.

260Or generative reasons, a Stoic term, Seneca, Quest. Nat. iii. 29; see iii. 3.1, 2, 7.

261Plotinos is here harking back to his very earliest writing, 1.6, where, before his monistic adventure with Porphyry, he had, under the Numenian influence of Amelius, constructed his system out of a combination of the doctrines of Plato (about the ideas), Aristotle (the distinctions of form and matter and of potentiality and actualization), and the Stoic (the "reasons," "seminal reasons," action and passions, and "hexis," or "habit," the inorganic informing principle). Of these, Numenius seems to have lacked the Aristotelian doctrines, although he left Plato's single triple-functioned soul for Aristotle's combination of souls of various degrees (fr. 53). Plotinos, therefore, seems to have distinguished in every object two elements, matter and form (ii. 4.1; ii. 5.2). Matter inheres potentially in all beings (ii. 5.3, 4) and therefore is non-being, ugliness, and evil (i. 6.6). Form is the actualization (K. Steinhart's Melemata Plotiniana, p. 31; ii. 5.2); that is, the essence and power (vi. 4.9), which are inseparable. Form alone possesses real existence, beauty and goodness. Form has four degrees: idea, reason, nature and habit; which degrees are the same as those of thought and life (Porphyry, Principles 12, 13, 14). The idea is distinguished into "idea" or intelligible Form, or "eidos," principle of human intellectual life. Reason is 1, divine (theios logos, i. 6, 2; the reason that comes from the universal Soul, iv. 3.10), 2, human (principle of the rational life, see Ficinus on ii. 6.2); 3, the seminal or generative reason (principle of the life of sensation, which imparts to the body the sense-form, "morphé," 3.12-end; Bouillet, i. 365). Now reasons reside in the soul (ii. 4.12), and are simultaneously essences and powers (vi. 4.9), and as powers produce the nature, and as essences, the habits. Now nature ("physis") is the principle of the vegetative life, and habit, "hexis," Numenius, fr. 55, see ii. 4.16, is the principle of unity of inorganic things.

262As thought Aristotle, Met. xii, 3.

263See ii. 9.13.

264See iv. 4.9–13.

265See iii. 4.1.

266This is Numenius' doctrine, fr. 16.

267See iii. 3.5, 11.

268Plotinos here makes in the world-Soul a distinction analogous to that obtaining in the human one (where there is a reasonable soul, and its image, the vegetative soul, see i. 1.8–12; iv. 4. 13, 14). Here he asserts that there are two souls; the superior soul (the principal power of the soul, which receives the forms from Intelligence (see iv. 4.9–12, 35), and the inferior soul (nature, or the generative power), which transmits them to matter, so as to fashion it by seminal reasons (see iii. 4.13, 14, 22, 27). Bouillet, no doubt remembering Plotinos's own earlier invectives against those who divided the world-soul (ii. 9.6), evidently directed against Amelius and the Numenian influence, which till then he had followed—tries to minimize it, claiming that this does not mean two different hypostases, but only two functions of one and the same hypostasis. But he acknowledges that this gave the foundation for Plotinos's successors' distinction between the supermundane and the mundane souls (hyperkosmios, and egkosmios). Plotinos was therefore returning to Numenius's two world-souls (fr. 16), which was a necessary logical consequence of his belief in two human souls (fr. 53), as he himself had taught in iii. 8.5. Plotinos objectifies this doubleness of the soul in the myth of the two Hercules, in the next book, i. 1.12.

269See ii. 9.2.

270The subject announced in the preceding book, ii. 3.16; another proof of the chronological order. This is a very obscure book, depending on iv. 3 and 4: and vi. 7; on the theory of the three divine hypostases, on his psychology, the soul's relation to, and separation from the body, and metempsychosis. His doctrines of "self" and of the emotions are strikingly modern.

271See sect. 2.

272See sect. 3.

273See sect. 4.

274See sect. 7, 11.

275This most direct translation of "pathos," is defective in that it means rather an experience, a passive state, or modification of the soul. It is a Stoic term.

276"Dianoia" is derived from "dia nou," and indicates that the discursive thought is exercised "by means of the intelligence," receiving its notions, and developing them by ratiocination, see v. 3.3. It is the actualization of discursive reason "to dianoêtikon," or of the reasonable soul ("psychê logikê"), which conceives, judges, and reasons (dianoei, krínei, logizetai).

277"Noêsis" means intuitive thought, the actualization of intelligence.

278See sect. 7.

279See Porphyry, Faculties of the Soul, and Ficinus, commentary on this book.

280In Greek, "to zoon," "to syntheton," "to synamphoteron," "to koinon," "to eidôlon."

281See i. 2.5.

282According to the Stoics.

283According to Alexander of Aphrodisia.

284As thought Aristotle, de Anima 2.1; see 4.3.21, and Numenius, 32.

285A famous comparison, found in Aristotle, de Anima, ii. 1; Plato, Laws, x. p. 906; Cary, 14; and especially Numenius, 32.

286As Plotinos thinks.

287iv. 4.20.

288iv. 3.20.

289Arist., de Anim. 2.1.

290According to Aristotle.

291Phaedo, p. 87; Cary, 82.

292Similar to the modern James-Lange theory of bodily emotions.

293See iv. 4.20, 28.

294See sect. 7, 9, 10.

295See iv. 3.22, 23.

296Porphyry and Ammonius in Bouillet, i. Intr. p. 60, 63, 64, 75, 79, 93, 96, 98, and note on p. 362 to 377.

297Namely, intelligence and the reasonable soul.

298See Bouillet, i. p. 325, 332.

299Bouillet, Intr. p. lxxviii.

300See Bouillet, i., note, p. 327, 341.

301One of the three hypostases.

302See Bouillet, i. p. lxxiii. 344–352.

303Plato, Timaeus, p. 35; Cary, 12.

304These images of the universal Soul are the faculties of the soul, sense-power, vegetative power, generative power or nature; see iv. 4.13, 14.

305"Turning" means here to incline.

306See St. Paul, Rom. for phantasy, or imagination; vii. 7–25.

307See iv. 3.29–31, also i. 1.9; Numenius, fr. ii. 8, 19; iii. See section 10.

308See i. 2.5.

309iv. 3.19, 23.

310See ii. 9.3, 4, 11, 12.

311Fancy or representation, i. 4.10; iv. 3.3, 30, 31.

312See 4.3.19, 23; 6.7.6.7.

313Plato, Rep. x. p. 611; Cary, 11.

314For this see 4.3.12, 18; 4.8.

315Odyss. xi. 602, 5; see 4.3.27.

316We find here a reassertion of Numenius's doctrine of two souls in man, fr. 53.

317Bouillet observes that this book is only a feeble outline of some of the ideas developed in vi. 7, 8, and 9. The biographical significance of this might be as follows. As in the immediately preceding books Plotinos was harking back to Numenius's doctrines, he may have wished to reconcile the two divergent periods, the Porphyrian monism of vi. 7 and 8, with the earlier Amelian dualism of vi. 9. This was nothing derogatory to him; for it is well known that there was a difference between the eclectic monism of the young Plato of the Republic, and the more logical dualism of the older Plato of the Laws. This latter was represented by Numenius and Amelius; the former—combined with Aristotelian and Stoic elements—by Porphyry. Where Plato could not decide, why should we expect Plotinos to do so? And, as a matter of fact, the world also has never been able to decide, so long as it remained sincere, and did not deceive itself with sophistries, as did Hegel. Kant also had his "thing-in-itself"—indeed, he did little more than to develop the work of Plotinos.

318As the Stoics would say.

319Which is one of the three hypostases, ii. 9.1 and v. 1.

320We see here Plotinos feeling the approach of this impending dissolution.

321Arranged by Bouillet in the order of the Enneads they summarize.

322Passages in quotation marks are from the text of Plotinos.

323See i. 2.3.

324See i. 2.4.

325See i. 2.4.

326See i. 2.6.

327See i. 2.7.

328See i. 2.7.

329See i. 2.5.

330See i. 8.1.

331See 36.38.

332These are the three divine hypostases, i. 8.2; ii. 9.1.

333See ii. 2.2.

334See v. 3.6.

335See iii. 7.2.

336See iii. 7.2.

337A pun on "noein" and "nous."

338See v. 3.10–12.

339See v. 6.11, 12, 13.

340See v. 4.3, 2, 12.

341See v. 4.4, 9.

342See vi. 4.9.

343See vi. 4.16.

344See iii. 5.7–9. from Plato.

345See vi. 2; vi. 5.

346See vi. 5.1.

347See vi. 4.4.

348See vi. 5.2.

349See vi. 5.3, 6.

350See vi. 5.4.

351See vi. 8.4.

352See vi. 5.12.

353See iv. 8.1.

354See iv. 8.1.

355See 23.

356Stobaeus, Ecl. Phys., i. 52, ed. Heeren.

357See iv. 3.23.

358In his book "On the Soul."

359See i. 1.12.

360See ii. 6.1.

361See Ennead, i. 1.

362Stobaeus, Ecl. Physicae, i. 52, p. 878.

363Of Human Nature, xv.

364de Anima, ii. 3.

365Stobaeus, Eclogae Physicae, i. 52. p. 894.

366On Human Nature, 2.

367See Plotinos, ii. 7.1; Porphyry, Principles, 17, 18, 21, 22, 36, 38.

368See iv. 3.20.

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