July31st.—After a quiet night I was up at 4·30 and sent out a reconnoitering party, which got well into Cantonments without resistance, and returned almost unopposed. While, however, they were so employed, a large body of Cavalry and Infantry appeared on our right front, in the direction of Mandi Hissar, and occupied 2 villages within 1,000 yards of the wall. General Primrose ordered me to take out some Cavalry and Infantry to clear them off, which I did, and had a smart little fight, effecting our object, and killing about 30 of the enemy, with a loss to ourselves of one man killed and 3 wounded. I sent in to ask General Primrose to send me some guns, as the enemy had fallen back into a strongvillage, against the loopholed walls of which I did not care to rush the men until I had got a practicable breach. No guns coming, and the object of the little expedition having been effected, I withdrew my party to the Fort, where I found that General Primrose had not wished to push the affair further, and had sent to tell me so, but the message had not reached me. Hard at work all day improving our defences. Everyone is on duty always, and despite the hot sun and incessant labor, all are in first-rate|Demolitions of cover outside city gates.|health. Now the General regrets that he did not take advantage of the opportunity offered by the firing on our guards and picquets, to have all the cover, which lies round the City Gates outside, down. It must all be done now, and as our working parties are always opposed, we lose men daily over the business. We all feel that we owe more than half our troubles and difficulties to the happy-go-lucky style adopted by General Stewart, who steadily objected to any military precautions whatever being taken at Kandahar. He is certainly the luckiest man in the world—having got safe away before his faults and oversights began to bear fruit.
August1st.—Sent out very heavy working parties to clear the front of the Kabul Gate, which is a mass of houses and bazaars. These parties are relieved every four hours, and have to be protected by strong covering parties who are in conflict with the enemy the whole day, but both sides takingadvantage of the cover afforded by the numerous walls, little serious loss results as a rule, though there is seldom a day that 4, 5, or more men are not killed and wounded. At 2 p.m. took direction of a small force to endeavour to find more of the Pathans, who are, I am confident, still lurking in the City intent on no good. It was a most unpleasant duty, but I hardened my heart, and made all I found go out. We got over 700 out on this occasion. I cannot say I am yet satisfied, and think we are being fooled and possibly betrayed by the Wāli and his servants.
August2nd.—Up at 5 a.m. to direct an attack on a garden opposite our S.W. Bastion, which is the salient of my line of defence. Gave the executive charge to Colonel Bannerman, who carried out the affair in accordance with my instruction in an excellent manner, and most successfully, and though the resistance was steady, our loss was only 1 man killed and 1 wounded, the enemy losing very considerably.
Walls divided into separate commands.
August3rd.—My birthday; 44 years old to-day; could not help thinking much of all the dear ones at home, knowing how anxious they would be, and feeling sure I would not be forgotten on this day especially. Still working hard at our defences. The walls were divided into 4 sections for commands, as follows:—
General Primrose—The North or Eedgah Front.General Burrows—W. or Herat Front.General Nuttall—E. or Kabul Front.General Brooke—S. or Shikarpore Front.
Though mine is shorter a good deal than either General Burrows' or General Nuttall's, it has the drawback of being farthest from the Citadel, and it is generally supposed it will be the one on which the heaviest attack will come. Each front is covered outside with a net-work of walls which must be destroyed.
August4th.—All at the works. The enemy was rather troublesome, but a few shot and shell, and a steady fire from our selected marksmen, kept them off. The Wāli's Cavalry—about 80 men—went out of the Shikarpore Gate and looted some forage, about a mile to the front, in very good style. Prepared an Abatis in front of my gate, and cut off the water supply of a village 1,000 yards due south. Slept on the ramparts, and visited all my line twice between 11 p.m. and 4 a.m. I have a camp bed up on the walls, but no one undresses, and sleep is taken in very small snatches. I may say now I live on my wall, as, except returning to the Citadel for breakfast and dinner and a wash, I never leave the ramparts. We have rather a snug little mess, managed by Colonel Beville, consisting of General Burrows and his Brigade Major, Captain Law; Colonel Beville, and Captain Leckie, my BrigadeMajor, and myself. So far we have fared very comfortably, as there is a good deal to be bought, and we had a good deal of stores, &c., when we came in. I have quite given up any sort of wine or spirits during the day, and drink nothing but water or cold tea until dinner, when I have one glass of sherry, and sometimes a little hock and water, but generally, when I can get it, lime juice and water. I never touch spirits at all, and am convinced that for hard work there is nothing like drinks that do not inebriate.
August5th.—Large covering and working parties in front of the Herat Gate to remove heavy cover between it and the General's old garden. Hardly any resistance offered by the enemy. I completed the Abatis and wire entanglements opposite my gate, and the S.E. and S.W. Bastions, both of which come within my charge. I consider the S.W. Bastion the weakest point of my line, and the one where the heaviest and worst attack will be. I have a 40-pounder gun in the S.E. Bastion, and 2 9-pounders in the S.W. Bastion. Urged thereto by General Burrows and myself, General Primrose had the Kotwal of the City arrested, and in the presence of General Burrows, Colonel St. John, the Nawab Hussun Ali, and myself, warned him of the precarious position in which he stood in case of any outbreak in the City, and told him of the reason of his arrest, &c. He was then conveyed to safequarters, where he is kept under a European guard, no one seeing him except in the presence of the officer. I feel sure he was a traitor to us, and had some bad scheme in contemplation, and his arrest will nip his machinations in the bud. Even Colonel St. John was glad he was arrested.
August6th.—At 3 a.m. every man was turned out and occupied the post he would hold in case of attack, to ascertain that all knew their places. Everything was very quietly done, and the arrangements worked well. The working parties in front of my gate were much annoyed by the enemy firing at long distances. One officer, Lieut. De Trafford, 7th Fusiliers, was wounded. We brought down a mortar and cleared out one of the most troublesome villages. Ayoob Khan's Camp was observed to be pitched behind Picquet Hill in the old Cantonments.
Enemy's camp successfully shelled.
August7th.—Threw some shells (40-pounders) with excellent effect into Ayoob's Camp. A regular stampede ensued, and many tents were seen to be on fire, and the Camp was quickly deserted. The distance from us being 3,500 yards (2 miles) they thought they were quite safe, and their horror and astonishment was all the greater. We heard afterwards that one shell had killed 10 and wounded 2 men, burning down the tent in which they were lying. Busy all day on my walls improving the fire capacity which, owing to the peculiar formationof the walls and towers, is very defective, and, do what we may, will never be really good. The heat is very great, inducing great lassitude, which is not wonderful, seeing one barely gets 4 hours sleep out of 24, and never has one's clothes off except for one's tub, the great luxury of the day, and which I always have now just before dinner.
August8th.—Heavy firing from the enemy on the working parties in front of the Durani and Kabul Gates, and it took a serious administration of mortar shells to quiet the enemy. For the first time the enemy opened their Artillery on us from a well constructed battery on Picquet Hill. Our 40-pounder at the N.W. angle, however, made excellent practice, and dismounted one of their guns. The enemy have moved their Camp to a position beyond Abasabad, 5,000 yards from our guns. They are busy throwing up batteries against the Herat face.
First proposal to attack Deh Kojah.
August9th.—Large working and covering parties (under Colonel Daubeny) in front of the S.W. Bastion to complete necessary demolitions. We lost several men, killed and wounded, but did good work. A large force of the enemy collected in the village opposite Shikarpore Gate, but were turned out by our mortar fire. It was proposed to attack the village of Deh Kojah, which is 900 yards from the Kabul Gate, in view to inflicting a lesson on the enemy. It was clear we could notthink of holding it, or any other place beyond the walls, and therefore we should have no real advantage to recompense us for the certain loss the enterprise would entail. For many good reasons I objected to the plan, as useless and involving a certain heavy loss and discouragement to the men, and eventually it was given up, a short bombardment being substituted for it, which was, I fear, not very useful either.
August10th.—Quiet night; but at 6·30 a.m. enemy opened, on the S.W. Bastion, with a gun which had been placed in position during the night in village opposite Shikarpore Gate. The shells fell short, doing no damage, and our artillery forced him to evacuate the position. Enemy appear to be busy throwing up entrenchments on Picquet Hill, also in a corner of the garden opposite S.W. Bastion. He threw some shells into the Citadel, one bursting in a room next to the Church. For the first time I had leisure, and went round and visited all the wounded officers and men, all doing well, though Major Iredell's wound is very serious. Threw some shells into enemy's work in front of S.W. Bastion. Effect not satisfactory, and the distance being only 400 yards, portions of the shells flew back over us, and one bit killed one of our mules. On going my rounds at 10 p.m. I heard decided indications of men at work in the village opposite the Shikarpore Gate, and also sounds of wheels (artillery), fromwhich I judged the enemy werethrowingup a battery there. Reinforced parties on walls, and remained expecting an attack all night, but none came.
August11th.—At daylight discovered that the village in front of my Gate has, as I anticipated, been much fortified since the previous evening, but were quite unable to discover where the battery, if there is one, is placed. Letters received for the first time from India, but only two in cypher, for General Primrose and Colonel St. John. By them we are informed that Sir F. Roberts left Kabul on the 7th, with a division to assist us—he cannot be here before the 1st of next month—and that General Phayre was doing all he could to gather a force to bring to our relief. He was at Quetta on the 6th, so it is unlikely that he either can arrive until the end of the month. Bombarded village in front of Shikarpore Gate with good effect.
August12th.—A quiet night. Being grouse-shooting day, we acted as grouse, and were heavily shot at as we had a large covering and working party out opposite the S.W. Bastion, in hopes of effecting some much wanted demolitions. The whole were under the command of Lieut.-Colonel Griffiths, 1st N.I., who, in my judgment, by no means made the most of his opportunities, and little or no work was done. The gardens which had to betaken were full of the enemy, who were, however, smartly driven out by the Fusiliers and 19th N.I., but owing to supports not being brought up, the enemy returned in force, and the position became untenable, unless we wished to precipitate a general action, which was undesirable. All sorts of wild reports were sent in of large gatherings of the enemy approaching, which I did not credit, but it was considered wiser to recall the parties, which was done, and all fell back under a fierce fire, during which many of our men fell. I was standing on the parapet, directing matters as far as I could, when I|Gallant act of two R.E. Officers.|witnessed, just 20 feet beneath me, a grand piece of gallantry on the part of two young R.E. Officers (Lieuts. Jones and Waller), who, under a galling fire, returned from safe cover and carried into safety a wounded sepoy, during which operation one of the men who was with them, a private of the 7th, was killed—shot through the head. I can personally testify to the hotness of the fire, and I have recommended both for the V. C., which I think they fully deserve. I am opposed altogether to these small fights which cost many lives and have but little results, but the next there is I shall, I think, take myself and try to make a better job of it than was done to-day.
August13th.—Quiet night and morning. Not a soul to be seen all round. After breakfast went on the Signal Tower to watch the effect of a few40-pounder shells, which we were going to throw into the enemy's new camp, at 5,000 yards' range. The shots were excellent, and evidently created much consternation, but the enemy had evidently seen our group on the Signal Tower, and at once sent a 12-pounder shell at us, which went beyond the Tower, his second trial was short and went into the City, but his third shot was so far successful that he hit the lower part of the Tower. At 6 p.m. we shelled a Battery in Deh Khoja. The enemy replied briskly for ½ an hour, and then finding it too hot, shut up. On this occasion we used 7-pounder shells in the 9-pounder guns, to which they had been adapted by an ingenious contrivance of Major Caldecott. They proved a great success, and are a grand addition to our firing powers, as we have 1,100 of them in the Arsenal. On coming back to the walls after dinner I found a telegram from the Herat Gate, to say that large bodies of men were advancing with music, &c. Knowing the anxious nature of my friend in command there the information did not much excite me, and I waited till I could get down to the S.W. Bastion before deciding if any special measures were necessary. Getting there I heard the music (most discordant), and concluded it was in the Engineer Garden in our old Cantonments, and was merely the enemy having a musical evening. The fact that there was music was rather a proof that the enemy did not contemplate an attack. There were, nodoubt, many people about, but on the whole I decided there was nothing at the moment worth turning out the Garrison for, so sent a re-assuring telegram to Head Quarters, which was justified by a quiet night.
Further attacks on the Shikapore Gate.
August14th.—At 6·30 the enemy opened a Battery on the Shikarpore Gate, to which we quickly replied, shutting him and his guns up in ½ an hour. A spy came in who reports our shells have created much damage among the enemy; also that they lost 60 men in the little affair of the 12th, among them Mahomed Azim Khan, Governor of Furrah, a very great man indeed. The spy says there is an Artillery Officer prisoner with Ayoub Khan, and that he is very well treated in every way; he also says that the enemy have 1,500 wounded now lying at Maiwand.
Here the Diary ends!
FromRt. Hon. Hugh Childers, M.P.,War Office.ToMrs. Brooke,Ashbrooke,Brookeboro'.I deeply regret to have to announce to you that GeneralBrookefell in a sortie from Kandahar on the Sixteenth of August. Pray accept my most sincere condolences on the terrible loss to yourself and to the country.
FromRt. Hon. Hugh Childers, M.P.,War Office.
ToMrs. Brooke,Ashbrooke,Brookeboro'.
I deeply regret to have to announce to you that GeneralBrookefell in a sortie from Kandahar on the Sixteenth of August. Pray accept my most sincere condolences on the terrible loss to yourself and to the country.
From Her Majesty the Queen.Balmoral Castle,August 27th, 1880.Lt.-General Sir Henry Ponsonby presents his compliments to Mrs. Brooke.He has been commanded to convey the Queen's sincere and earnest sympathy with her in her grief, and Her Majesty's sorrow at the loss sustained by Mrs. Brooke in the recent action near Kandahar, where the Queen has had to lament the death of so many brave officers and men.The accounts which Her Majesty has received of Brigadier-GeneralBrookeonly increase her deep regret that she should have been deprived of the services of so gallant and worthy a soldier.
From Her Majesty the Queen.
Balmoral Castle,
August 27th, 1880.
Lt.-General Sir Henry Ponsonby presents his compliments to Mrs. Brooke.
He has been commanded to convey the Queen's sincere and earnest sympathy with her in her grief, and Her Majesty's sorrow at the loss sustained by Mrs. Brooke in the recent action near Kandahar, where the Queen has had to lament the death of so many brave officers and men.
The accounts which Her Majesty has received of Brigadier-GeneralBrookeonly increase her deep regret that she should have been deprived of the services of so gallant and worthy a soldier.
FromH. E. The Governor,Bombay.ToMrs. Brooke,Ashbrooke,Brookeboro'.Viceroy desires me to convey to you his deep sympathy, in which I beg to join. It is reported your gallant Husband was killed while trying to carry off Captain Cruikshank when wounded.
FromH. E. The Governor,Bombay.
ToMrs. Brooke,Ashbrooke,Brookeboro'.
Viceroy desires me to convey to you his deep sympathy, in which I beg to join. It is reported your gallant Husband was killed while trying to carry off Captain Cruikshank when wounded.
From Major General Dillon.Horse Guards, Pall Mall,London, August 30th, 1880.My dear Mrs. Brooke,I have waited for some days before carrying out the wishes of the Duke of Cambridge, received from Kissengen, to convey to you by letter an expression of His Royal Highness' deep sympathy with you in your great affliction, and his sense of the loss which the service has sustained by the death of a gallant soldier and distinguished officer. In alluding to the sad event in the last letter received from Germany only to-day, His Royal Highness continues—"I am too sorry for GeneralBrooke'sdeath, a good officer lost to the service at a critical moment for the garrison of Kandahar. Lord Napier will feel it much."Believe me,Dear Mrs. Brooke,Yours very sincerely,M. A. DILLON.
From Major General Dillon.Horse Guards, Pall Mall,London, August 30th, 1880.My dear Mrs. Brooke,
I have waited for some days before carrying out the wishes of the Duke of Cambridge, received from Kissengen, to convey to you by letter an expression of His Royal Highness' deep sympathy with you in your great affliction, and his sense of the loss which the service has sustained by the death of a gallant soldier and distinguished officer. In alluding to the sad event in the last letter received from Germany only to-day, His Royal Highness continues—"I am too sorry for GeneralBrooke'sdeath, a good officer lost to the service at a critical moment for the garrison of Kandahar. Lord Napier will feel it much."
Believe me,Dear Mrs. Brooke,Yours very sincerely,M. A. DILLON.
From Lord Napier of Magdala.August 25th, 1880.Dear Lady Arabella,I cannot resist writing you a few lines to express my most sincere sympathy with you, and my sorrow at the loss ofyour gallant son at Kandahar, which the telegram has to-day announced to us. I have felt so much confidence in your son being with the Force, that I look upon his loss as a great public misfortune, as well as a domestic calamity, the bitterness of which you and his widow alone can tell. I much entreat you, dear friend, to try and remember that he fell nobly doing his duty, and I trust that God in his mercy will give you strength to bear this heavy bereavement, and will in His own time comfort you and the poor widow. Lady Napier joins me in the truest and deepest sympathy.Believe me,Dear Lady Arabella,Yours most sincerely,NAPIER OF MAGDALA.
From Lord Napier of Magdala.
August 25th, 1880.
Dear Lady Arabella,
I cannot resist writing you a few lines to express my most sincere sympathy with you, and my sorrow at the loss ofyour gallant son at Kandahar, which the telegram has to-day announced to us. I have felt so much confidence in your son being with the Force, that I look upon his loss as a great public misfortune, as well as a domestic calamity, the bitterness of which you and his widow alone can tell. I much entreat you, dear friend, to try and remember that he fell nobly doing his duty, and I trust that God in his mercy will give you strength to bear this heavy bereavement, and will in His own time comfort you and the poor widow. Lady Napier joins me in the truest and deepest sympathy.
Believe me,Dear Lady Arabella,Yours most sincerely,NAPIER OF MAGDALA.
Statement of Sergeant-Major Rickard, 2/7th Royal Fusiliers.Sergeant-Major T. Rickard, of the 2/7th Fusiliers, states:—On the 16th August, 1880, I was one of the Party ordered out for the storming of Deh Khoja, under GeneralBrooke. We attacked the village at the South end about 5.30 a.m. under a very heavy fire in all directions from the enemy. When we arrived in the centre of the village, Captain Cruikshank, R.E., got wounded. GeneralBrookeassisted in helping him along. We then advanced further on, to force our way through the village, when we halted and got under a wall, as we thought under cover, but the enemy's fire from all directions kept getting heavier, and the longer we stopped the heavier the fire got. GeneralBrookesaid to me, "Sergeant-Major, we shall never get out of this, I am afraid." He then ordered us to retire back out of the village. We did so. After we got out of the village about 300 yards, we halted again under cover about 10 minutes, and fired on the enemy as fast as we could. GeneralBrookeasked me to send him another man to help him along with Captain Cruikshank.I did so, and we retired again towards the Fort, and had only got about 200 yards when GeneralBrookewas shot in the head (dead), and the other man that was helping was shot. I was with GeneralBrookethe whole time, till he was shot.T. RICKARD,Sergeant-Major 2/7th Royal Fusiliers.
Statement of Sergeant-Major Rickard, 2/7th Royal Fusiliers.
Sergeant-Major T. Rickard, of the 2/7th Fusiliers, states:—On the 16th August, 1880, I was one of the Party ordered out for the storming of Deh Khoja, under GeneralBrooke. We attacked the village at the South end about 5.30 a.m. under a very heavy fire in all directions from the enemy. When we arrived in the centre of the village, Captain Cruikshank, R.E., got wounded. GeneralBrookeassisted in helping him along. We then advanced further on, to force our way through the village, when we halted and got under a wall, as we thought under cover, but the enemy's fire from all directions kept getting heavier, and the longer we stopped the heavier the fire got. GeneralBrookesaid to me, "Sergeant-Major, we shall never get out of this, I am afraid." He then ordered us to retire back out of the village. We did so. After we got out of the village about 300 yards, we halted again under cover about 10 minutes, and fired on the enemy as fast as we could. GeneralBrookeasked me to send him another man to help him along with Captain Cruikshank.I did so, and we retired again towards the Fort, and had only got about 200 yards when GeneralBrookewas shot in the head (dead), and the other man that was helping was shot. I was with GeneralBrookethe whole time, till he was shot.
T. RICKARD,Sergeant-Major 2/7th Royal Fusiliers.
From Colonel French, R.A., Commanding Artillery in Kandahar.Kandahar, 26th August.My Dear Annie,Most sincerely do I sympathize with you in the loss of your dear good Husband, poorHenry; he was so genial, cheery, kind, and courteous to all who came in contact with him, and much beloved and respected by everyone in this Force. No braver or truer soldier lost his life in that ill-fated attack on Deh Khoja. I miss him so very much, we were thrown so much together during the last four months. No man was more keen for a fight than poorHenry, and when the day of battle did come, right gallantly he led his men, sacrificing his life in the humane effort to rescue a wounded man from falling into the hands of the enemy. From Trumpeter McGlynn, C/2 R.A., who was his Orderly Trumpeter on the 16th August, I have heard the following account of how poorHenryfell:—After half an hour's skirmishing they reached the village, and on entering,Henryand the Trumpeter had just dismounted, when a volley from the enemy so startled their horses they broke away, and galloped back to within the City.Henryadvanced through the village on foot, cheering on his men amidst a galling fire of musketry, which the enemy poured on them from loop-holed walls. Arrived in the centre of the village, Captain Cruikshank, R.E., fell badly wounded. At this time our men were being driven back by superior numbers and the heavy fire from the houses.Henryhelped to carry Cruikshank; succeeded in getting him out of the village, ofwhich they had got clear about 30 yards,Henrystill supporting Cruikshank, when he was struck down by apparently a bullet in the head. Trumpeter McGlynn states that he fell forward on his face and never moved after; so poorHenry'sdeath must have been instantaneous. The Trumpeter and a few men of the 7th Fusiliers tried to carry off the body, but were compelled to desist owing to the enemy making a rush on them. Deh Khoja was evacuated on the night of the 24th, and on the following day search was made for the bodies of our fallen.Henry'swas found and buried near where he fell, under a Peepul tree, the Rev. Mr. Cane, our Chaplain, having read the Burial Service. This terrible loss of life at Maiwand and Deh Khoja has cast a gloom on all here, and no man is more generally sorrowed for and regretted than poorHenry—every inch a soldier. No man worked harder to put this City in a state of defence. I looked upon him as one of our rising Generals, who, later on, would have shone out with much distinction.
From Colonel French, R.A., Commanding Artillery in Kandahar.
Kandahar, 26th August.
My Dear Annie,
Most sincerely do I sympathize with you in the loss of your dear good Husband, poorHenry; he was so genial, cheery, kind, and courteous to all who came in contact with him, and much beloved and respected by everyone in this Force. No braver or truer soldier lost his life in that ill-fated attack on Deh Khoja. I miss him so very much, we were thrown so much together during the last four months. No man was more keen for a fight than poorHenry, and when the day of battle did come, right gallantly he led his men, sacrificing his life in the humane effort to rescue a wounded man from falling into the hands of the enemy. From Trumpeter McGlynn, C/2 R.A., who was his Orderly Trumpeter on the 16th August, I have heard the following account of how poorHenryfell:—After half an hour's skirmishing they reached the village, and on entering,Henryand the Trumpeter had just dismounted, when a volley from the enemy so startled their horses they broke away, and galloped back to within the City.Henryadvanced through the village on foot, cheering on his men amidst a galling fire of musketry, which the enemy poured on them from loop-holed walls. Arrived in the centre of the village, Captain Cruikshank, R.E., fell badly wounded. At this time our men were being driven back by superior numbers and the heavy fire from the houses.Henryhelped to carry Cruikshank; succeeded in getting him out of the village, ofwhich they had got clear about 30 yards,Henrystill supporting Cruikshank, when he was struck down by apparently a bullet in the head. Trumpeter McGlynn states that he fell forward on his face and never moved after; so poorHenry'sdeath must have been instantaneous. The Trumpeter and a few men of the 7th Fusiliers tried to carry off the body, but were compelled to desist owing to the enemy making a rush on them. Deh Khoja was evacuated on the night of the 24th, and on the following day search was made for the bodies of our fallen.Henry'swas found and buried near where he fell, under a Peepul tree, the Rev. Mr. Cane, our Chaplain, having read the Burial Service. This terrible loss of life at Maiwand and Deh Khoja has cast a gloom on all here, and no man is more generally sorrowed for and regretted than poorHenry—every inch a soldier. No man worked harder to put this City in a state of defence. I looked upon him as one of our rising Generals, who, later on, would have shone out with much distinction.
From Colonel B.Kandahar, 14th September, 1880.My dear Major H.,I am sorry I have been unable, through press of work, to fulfil my promise before now, and send you the particulars of the unfortunate affair of Deh Khoja, on the 16th August, as far as they are known by me, which cost us so many valuable lives, and more especially that of my dear friend GeneralBrooke, whose loss was deeply felt by everyone here, for he was not only much loved by all, but he had proved himself to be possessed of the greatest energy and cool good judgment, and had consequently gained the confidence of all ranks, both senior and junior. I have no hesitation in saying that we are indebted to him for much that was done to strengthen our position here, and in the arrangements for the defence. He never rested until he got the Pathansturned out of the City, and the place disarmed. How much he did do, and how much his wise influence effected will probably never be known fully by the Public; but from a perusal of his Diary which I gave you, it will be seen how continually active he was in carrying out the work assigned to him, and what his opinions were on many subjects. He was strongly opposed to the attack on Deh Khoja, for many reasons, which he gives in his Diary, and he was mainly instrumental in its being abandoned the week before, when it had been resolved on. The attack was finally decided on, the following week, on the advice, I believe, of the Commanding Engineer, in consequence of our working parties employed outside the Kabul Gate, in demolishing some buildings, having been prevented by the fire from Deh Khoja completing the work. His objections to it were stronger than before, as it was known that the enemy had been busily employed all the week in fortifying the village, and he feared that the loss would be greater than we could afford, or than the good to be gained. He could not, however, urge his objections, as he had done on the previous occasion, as he was nominated to command the attack. The force was composed of 300 Cavalry, 300 Royal Fusiliers, and 500 Native Infantry. The Cavalry left the Eedgar Gate at 4 o'clock in the morning, and making a wide detour of the village of Kairabad took up a position in the rear of Deh Khoja,i.e., on the west. Our guns on the walls then commenced a bombardment to prepare the Infantry attack, and at 5·30 a.m. the Infantry moved out of the Kabul Gate, covered by riflemen from the walls. Immediately they got out into the open they came under a very heavy fire from the village, which is from 700 to 800 yards from the City, but the troops advanced in splendid form and were never once checked. They entered the village at the south, as had been previously decided on, and we then lost sight of them, but we could hear them hard at work with their rifles. I need not describe the village, for you have seen it and know what a labyrinth of narrow streets and high walls it is, every enclosure being a regular little fortification, so that as soon as theenemy was driven out of one position they ran into another like a lot of rats, and our force was too weak to hold the positions as they were taken. GeneralBrooke, however, pushed on with his troops right through the village from south to north, and leaving a strong party of the Fusiliers at the latter part, he retraced his steps with a view of completing the capture, but by this time the enemy began to pour in from the south of the village; these were reinforcements sent by Ayoob Khan from the cantonments as soon as he had heard the firing going on. They advanced by the gardens and village on the south of the City, which afforded them shelter from our fire until they came opposite our S. E. Bastion where we had a 40-pounder and 9-pounder which gave them several rounds, but did not do them much damage, the practice being bad. It did not at any rate check them. Our cavalry, however, seeing them coming, moved down in that direction and stopped them for some little time, but being exposed to a heavy fire from the enclosures when they could not act, they had to be withdrawn. On finding that the enemy were crowding into the village from the south, GeneralBrookesent his Brigade-Major to General Primrose to report matters and to ask for orders, the reply to which was to retire his Force at once, but by the time this officer got back to the village the enemy held it in such force he could not get to GeneralBrooke, who was still in the centre of it. A Trumpeter of C/2, who was with GeneralBrookeall the time, informed me that when they returned from the north of the village and had reached about the centre, they found Captain Cruikshank, R.E., severely wounded, and unable to move, and finding that the enemy was closing in on them all round, GeneralBrookelooked out for some defensible place into which he could get the party which was with him, consisting of men of the Fusiliers and Native Sappers, and for this purpose he made for a court-yard in which there were buildings, but directly they entered it they were met by a heavy fire. It was here that Captain Cruikshank begged him to leave him to his fate, and save himself and party, but he nobly refusedto do this, and thinking there were still some of his party in the south of the village where he had left them, he determined to push on in that direction, so calling for volunteers of the Fusiliers to carry poor Cruikshank, they moved down to the south under a heavy fire and got out into the open. All the parties had been compelled to withdraw, and there was nothing left for them but to make the best of their way back to the City, taking advantage of what cover they could find. They were much hampered by having to carry poor Cruikshank, and they had frequently to change the men who were carrying him. It was during one of these changes, when they had got about 100 yards from the village, and poorBrookewas supporting Cruikshank with his left arm while the men were being relieved, that he was shot through the back, just between the shoulders, and fell dead; at the same time a number of Ghazis made a rush on them from the village, and the remainder of the party retreated hastily towards the City. On the 25th August the village was evacuated by the enemy, and we went out to bury the bodies. I found and recognised poorBrooke'sbody. He was lying among several others, and Cruikshank and a Sergeant Strong were close to him. It was a fearfully melancholy sight, but it was a great satisfaction to recover the bodies and to give them burial, which we did under a tree close to the spot where they fell. While deeply grieving and lamenting over his death and those who died with him, one cannot but feel proud of his noble and gallant conduct in sacrificing himself in endeavouring to save a brother officer. Among the papers which I gave you, you will find one containing his views on the situation in Afghanistan, which will repay perusal, and which will, no doubt, be valuable to his family. I have his sword, which I forgot to give you with the other things I had selected to send home. I will take care of it till I get an opportunity of sending it home.
From Colonel B.
Kandahar, 14th September, 1880.
My dear Major H.,
I am sorry I have been unable, through press of work, to fulfil my promise before now, and send you the particulars of the unfortunate affair of Deh Khoja, on the 16th August, as far as they are known by me, which cost us so many valuable lives, and more especially that of my dear friend GeneralBrooke, whose loss was deeply felt by everyone here, for he was not only much loved by all, but he had proved himself to be possessed of the greatest energy and cool good judgment, and had consequently gained the confidence of all ranks, both senior and junior. I have no hesitation in saying that we are indebted to him for much that was done to strengthen our position here, and in the arrangements for the defence. He never rested until he got the Pathansturned out of the City, and the place disarmed. How much he did do, and how much his wise influence effected will probably never be known fully by the Public; but from a perusal of his Diary which I gave you, it will be seen how continually active he was in carrying out the work assigned to him, and what his opinions were on many subjects. He was strongly opposed to the attack on Deh Khoja, for many reasons, which he gives in his Diary, and he was mainly instrumental in its being abandoned the week before, when it had been resolved on. The attack was finally decided on, the following week, on the advice, I believe, of the Commanding Engineer, in consequence of our working parties employed outside the Kabul Gate, in demolishing some buildings, having been prevented by the fire from Deh Khoja completing the work. His objections to it were stronger than before, as it was known that the enemy had been busily employed all the week in fortifying the village, and he feared that the loss would be greater than we could afford, or than the good to be gained. He could not, however, urge his objections, as he had done on the previous occasion, as he was nominated to command the attack. The force was composed of 300 Cavalry, 300 Royal Fusiliers, and 500 Native Infantry. The Cavalry left the Eedgar Gate at 4 o'clock in the morning, and making a wide detour of the village of Kairabad took up a position in the rear of Deh Khoja,i.e., on the west. Our guns on the walls then commenced a bombardment to prepare the Infantry attack, and at 5·30 a.m. the Infantry moved out of the Kabul Gate, covered by riflemen from the walls. Immediately they got out into the open they came under a very heavy fire from the village, which is from 700 to 800 yards from the City, but the troops advanced in splendid form and were never once checked. They entered the village at the south, as had been previously decided on, and we then lost sight of them, but we could hear them hard at work with their rifles. I need not describe the village, for you have seen it and know what a labyrinth of narrow streets and high walls it is, every enclosure being a regular little fortification, so that as soon as theenemy was driven out of one position they ran into another like a lot of rats, and our force was too weak to hold the positions as they were taken. GeneralBrooke, however, pushed on with his troops right through the village from south to north, and leaving a strong party of the Fusiliers at the latter part, he retraced his steps with a view of completing the capture, but by this time the enemy began to pour in from the south of the village; these were reinforcements sent by Ayoob Khan from the cantonments as soon as he had heard the firing going on. They advanced by the gardens and village on the south of the City, which afforded them shelter from our fire until they came opposite our S. E. Bastion where we had a 40-pounder and 9-pounder which gave them several rounds, but did not do them much damage, the practice being bad. It did not at any rate check them. Our cavalry, however, seeing them coming, moved down in that direction and stopped them for some little time, but being exposed to a heavy fire from the enclosures when they could not act, they had to be withdrawn. On finding that the enemy were crowding into the village from the south, GeneralBrookesent his Brigade-Major to General Primrose to report matters and to ask for orders, the reply to which was to retire his Force at once, but by the time this officer got back to the village the enemy held it in such force he could not get to GeneralBrooke, who was still in the centre of it. A Trumpeter of C/2, who was with GeneralBrookeall the time, informed me that when they returned from the north of the village and had reached about the centre, they found Captain Cruikshank, R.E., severely wounded, and unable to move, and finding that the enemy was closing in on them all round, GeneralBrookelooked out for some defensible place into which he could get the party which was with him, consisting of men of the Fusiliers and Native Sappers, and for this purpose he made for a court-yard in which there were buildings, but directly they entered it they were met by a heavy fire. It was here that Captain Cruikshank begged him to leave him to his fate, and save himself and party, but he nobly refusedto do this, and thinking there were still some of his party in the south of the village where he had left them, he determined to push on in that direction, so calling for volunteers of the Fusiliers to carry poor Cruikshank, they moved down to the south under a heavy fire and got out into the open. All the parties had been compelled to withdraw, and there was nothing left for them but to make the best of their way back to the City, taking advantage of what cover they could find. They were much hampered by having to carry poor Cruikshank, and they had frequently to change the men who were carrying him. It was during one of these changes, when they had got about 100 yards from the village, and poorBrookewas supporting Cruikshank with his left arm while the men were being relieved, that he was shot through the back, just between the shoulders, and fell dead; at the same time a number of Ghazis made a rush on them from the village, and the remainder of the party retreated hastily towards the City. On the 25th August the village was evacuated by the enemy, and we went out to bury the bodies. I found and recognised poorBrooke'sbody. He was lying among several others, and Cruikshank and a Sergeant Strong were close to him. It was a fearfully melancholy sight, but it was a great satisfaction to recover the bodies and to give them burial, which we did under a tree close to the spot where they fell. While deeply grieving and lamenting over his death and those who died with him, one cannot but feel proud of his noble and gallant conduct in sacrificing himself in endeavouring to save a brother officer. Among the papers which I gave you, you will find one containing his views on the situation in Afghanistan, which will repay perusal, and which will, no doubt, be valuable to his family. I have his sword, which I forgot to give you with the other things I had selected to send home. I will take care of it till I get an opportunity of sending it home.
From Mrs. L.11th October.My dear B.,I am enclosing one sheet of the letter which was written on the 16th August, the day of the sortie.Kandahar, August 16th.This is a very sad day for us. There was a great sortie this morning against a village outside the Kabul Gate. We sent out 800 Infantry and 300 Cavalry under GeneralBrooke. They got into the village, and there they suffered considerable loss. The Fusiliers lost 2 Officers, Marsh and Wood, both young boys, 25 killed, and 29 wounded; the 28th one Officer, Colonel Newport, killed, and 30 killed and 19 wounded; the 19th 2 Officers, Major Trench and Lieut. Stayner, killed. Their return of men have not yet come in. Major Vandeleur, 7th Fusiliers, is badly wounded; Colonel Nimmo, 28th, dangerously; Colonel Shewell, of the Commissariat, wounded; Lieut. Wood, of the Transport, badly wounded; Captain Cruikshank, of the Engineers, killed; the Rev. Gordon, dangerously wounded; and last and worst, GeneralBrookekilled. I feel so sad about it, I can hardly speak, for I had learnt almost to love him, indeed I may say quite. He was shot through the head as he was carrying poor Cruikshank away from the village; and the worst of it is, that, in the opinion of many of us, this sortie was a quite useless waste of life. I believe we inflicted considerable loss of life on the enemy; but it was mere madness attacking with such a small force, a labyrinth of lanes and houses like that.Brookeknew it, but could not protest, as he was ordered to command the Force. Burrows knew it, but he was not consulted. A man of the Fusiliers, whom I questioned aboutBrooke'sdeath, says, the party he was with would never have got out of the village but for him. He is a great loss, for he was the best head we had, and I think the whole Force deplores his loss, nearly—though not quite as much as I do. When you write to B., let her and herhusband know how he was loved, and how nobly he died. I cannot write any more. There is a great deal to be done; but no more sorties, I trust. We ought merely to have waited, but somebody got an idea we ought to do something."PoorBrookewas warned that he was going to certain death when he went back for Cruikshank, but he would go. Cruikshank was mortally wounded, and begged them to leave him and save themselves.Brookehad ordered the Cavalry to cover the retreat of the Infantry, which was construed into an order to retire, and the consequence was that the Cavalry was withdrawn, and crowds of men rushed into the village, which had been kept in check on the far side of the Cavalry—even before our men were out of the village. I cannot tell you how I missBrooke, he was always so cheery and jolly, and had such sound views; he was the best head we had in the Force." In another letter he says, "Brooke'sloss shows day by day more seriously; his cheery temper and sound views had the best influence."We miss his counsels greatly, in another way he is a great loss, as he knew every yard of the country round, and would have been the very man to lead a turning column. If it were not for the loss ofBrooke, I should feel quite jolly, but I can't get him out of my head."
From Mrs. L.
11th October.
My dear B.,
I am enclosing one sheet of the letter which was written on the 16th August, the day of the sortie.
Kandahar, August 16th.
This is a very sad day for us. There was a great sortie this morning against a village outside the Kabul Gate. We sent out 800 Infantry and 300 Cavalry under GeneralBrooke. They got into the village, and there they suffered considerable loss. The Fusiliers lost 2 Officers, Marsh and Wood, both young boys, 25 killed, and 29 wounded; the 28th one Officer, Colonel Newport, killed, and 30 killed and 19 wounded; the 19th 2 Officers, Major Trench and Lieut. Stayner, killed. Their return of men have not yet come in. Major Vandeleur, 7th Fusiliers, is badly wounded; Colonel Nimmo, 28th, dangerously; Colonel Shewell, of the Commissariat, wounded; Lieut. Wood, of the Transport, badly wounded; Captain Cruikshank, of the Engineers, killed; the Rev. Gordon, dangerously wounded; and last and worst, GeneralBrookekilled. I feel so sad about it, I can hardly speak, for I had learnt almost to love him, indeed I may say quite. He was shot through the head as he was carrying poor Cruikshank away from the village; and the worst of it is, that, in the opinion of many of us, this sortie was a quite useless waste of life. I believe we inflicted considerable loss of life on the enemy; but it was mere madness attacking with such a small force, a labyrinth of lanes and houses like that.Brookeknew it, but could not protest, as he was ordered to command the Force. Burrows knew it, but he was not consulted. A man of the Fusiliers, whom I questioned aboutBrooke'sdeath, says, the party he was with would never have got out of the village but for him. He is a great loss, for he was the best head we had, and I think the whole Force deplores his loss, nearly—though not quite as much as I do. When you write to B., let her and herhusband know how he was loved, and how nobly he died. I cannot write any more. There is a great deal to be done; but no more sorties, I trust. We ought merely to have waited, but somebody got an idea we ought to do something.
"PoorBrookewas warned that he was going to certain death when he went back for Cruikshank, but he would go. Cruikshank was mortally wounded, and begged them to leave him and save themselves.Brookehad ordered the Cavalry to cover the retreat of the Infantry, which was construed into an order to retire, and the consequence was that the Cavalry was withdrawn, and crowds of men rushed into the village, which had been kept in check on the far side of the Cavalry—even before our men were out of the village. I cannot tell you how I missBrooke, he was always so cheery and jolly, and had such sound views; he was the best head we had in the Force." In another letter he says, "Brooke'sloss shows day by day more seriously; his cheery temper and sound views had the best influence.
"We miss his counsels greatly, in another way he is a great loss, as he knew every yard of the country round, and would have been the very man to lead a turning column. If it were not for the loss ofBrooke, I should feel quite jolly, but I can't get him out of my head."
From Mrs. P.21st October, 1880.Dear Mr. Brooke,We had this morning letters from my brother Colonel H., at Kandahar, and we think you would like to hear what he says of your Brother. To my husband my brother writes:—PoorBrooke, as gallant a fellow as ever stepped, led the attack, and after doing gallant deeds was recalled by the orders of General Primrose (from the walls of the City), and in retiring and trying to save a brother officer's life lost his own. The three columns, as is invariably the case, lost all sight and touch ofeach other, and nobody knew where the others were; in spite of it all, the effect on the enemy was very great, and the siege to all intents and purposes ended.PoorBrookewas full of zeal and energy, and died a soldier's death in being the last to leave the village, and in attempting to carry poor Cruikshank, who had been fatally wounded, out of action. It may be a satisfaction to Mrs. Brooke to know that he behaved so gallantly and was spared all suffering while carrying his brother officer under a most murderous fire. 24 were killed round about him, and the heaviest loss occurred where he fell; he did not retire of his own accord, and was greatly surprised to get the order which was sent him by General Primrose; on receiving it he sent orders for the several parties to retire, and fell back himself last of all with a few men. Being ordered to retire, he had no opportunity to carry out his plan to the end; it might have been a grand success or a heavy loss, but his loss was very heavily felt by the Force.In the Battle of Pir Paimal we formed, with one of Roberts' Brigades, the Reserve, while two Brigades attacked. Our Reserve had a grand chance of distinguishing themselves, and hadBrookebeen alive, I believe it would have been done.
From Mrs. P.
21st October, 1880.
Dear Mr. Brooke,
We had this morning letters from my brother Colonel H., at Kandahar, and we think you would like to hear what he says of your Brother. To my husband my brother writes:—PoorBrooke, as gallant a fellow as ever stepped, led the attack, and after doing gallant deeds was recalled by the orders of General Primrose (from the walls of the City), and in retiring and trying to save a brother officer's life lost his own. The three columns, as is invariably the case, lost all sight and touch ofeach other, and nobody knew where the others were; in spite of it all, the effect on the enemy was very great, and the siege to all intents and purposes ended.
PoorBrookewas full of zeal and energy, and died a soldier's death in being the last to leave the village, and in attempting to carry poor Cruikshank, who had been fatally wounded, out of action. It may be a satisfaction to Mrs. Brooke to know that he behaved so gallantly and was spared all suffering while carrying his brother officer under a most murderous fire. 24 were killed round about him, and the heaviest loss occurred where he fell; he did not retire of his own accord, and was greatly surprised to get the order which was sent him by General Primrose; on receiving it he sent orders for the several parties to retire, and fell back himself last of all with a few men. Being ordered to retire, he had no opportunity to carry out his plan to the end; it might have been a grand success or a heavy loss, but his loss was very heavily felt by the Force.
In the Battle of Pir Paimal we formed, with one of Roberts' Brigades, the Reserve, while two Brigades attacked. Our Reserve had a grand chance of distinguishing themselves, and hadBrookebeen alive, I believe it would have been done.
Extract from another Brother's Letter.
August 27th, 1880.The day before yesterday we got the news of the sortie of the Garrison (Kandahar) on the 16th: it has had good results, and was successful; yet the heavy loss in Senior Officers does not read well. GeneralBrookeis amongst the killed, and I am very sorry at this, for, no doubt, he was one of the best men in the Garrison, and is sure to have been always plucky and cheery.
August 27th, 1880.
The day before yesterday we got the news of the sortie of the Garrison (Kandahar) on the 16th: it has had good results, and was successful; yet the heavy loss in Senior Officers does not read well. GeneralBrookeis amongst the killed, and I am very sorry at this, for, no doubt, he was one of the best men in the Garrison, and is sure to have been always plucky and cheery.
From Col.Kandahar, September, 1880....Brookewas constantly at General Primrose about our weakness in Troops and the defencelessness of the Citadel, but he would never sanction any money being spent on it. Everything he did, or rather did not do, was bad enough, but I shall never forgive him the Deh Khoja business on the 16th August, which lost us poorBrooke's life, and the lives of so many brave men, without any object. General Primrose had ordered the assault on Deh Khoja the week before, butBrookeand Burrows got him to countermand it for the following reasons, namely:—The village was built of thick mud walls and roofs, so that it could not possibly be burned; it was known to be very strongly held by the enemy, and would therefore require alargeForce to take it, and we should therefore lose a great many more men than we could spare, and if we captured it we could not hold it, as we had not enough men to man our own walls properly, and as it could not be burned, or destroyed, or held, the enemy would simply walk back into it the minute we left it; and the last and best reason was, that as there were two Forces coming to our relief, our duty was to hold Kandahar, and do nothing to endanger our position, and certainly not to go outside the walls to fight the enemy, giving up the advantage that we had. We all thought the insane idea had been given up for good, but the following week General Primrose sent forBrookeand Burrows, and told them that he had made up his mind to attack the village next morning, and toldBrookehe was to command the Force. This, of course, effectually preventedBrookesaying what he thought, as he told me he could not raise objections against it, under these circumstances, as it might be thought that he was afraid, but he said, "the objections against it are greater than they were before, as it is known that the enemy have been hard at work all the week fortifying the place." Burrows ought to have done his best to oppose it, but asBrookedid not oppose, for the above reason he,said nothing, and so the attack unfortunately took place the next morning. Being on the Head Quarter Staff, I was not, of course, allowed to go, but I watched it from the walls where our riflemen covered the advance of the attacking party and our big guns. The village of Deh Khoja was only 700 yards off, and the enemy fired at us tremendously. The troops advanced under a very heavy fire, very steadily and well, and entered the village and went right through it, but the place was like a rabbit warren right through it, with very large loop-holed walls, from which the enemy kept up an incessant fire without our men being able to see them, and as soon as they were turned out of one enclosure they ran into another, and back again into those they had been turned out of, for our Forces were not strong enough to hold the enclosures as they were taken, and all this time the enemy was pouring into the village from Ayoub Khan's main Force. At last General Primrose sent to order the Force to retreat, and no doubt poorBrookecould have got away unhurt, but he stopped to bring away a wounded officer, and so lost his life. We did not recover the bodies of the killed until the 25th, 10 days after, when the village was deserted by the enemy. I went to search for poorBrooke, whom I recognised, and I buried him myself. I cannot get over his loss. We have lived together since we came here, and I have become very fond of him; I am sure he liked me, and that I have lost a good friend in him. He was a fine fellow, brave as a lion, and a thorough soldier in every way; clear-headed and with excellent judgment. It is indeed grievously sad such a fine fellow should have been lost, for he is a loss to the whole army, in such a needless manner.
From Col.
Kandahar, September, 1880.
...Brookewas constantly at General Primrose about our weakness in Troops and the defencelessness of the Citadel, but he would never sanction any money being spent on it. Everything he did, or rather did not do, was bad enough, but I shall never forgive him the Deh Khoja business on the 16th August, which lost us poorBrooke's life, and the lives of so many brave men, without any object. General Primrose had ordered the assault on Deh Khoja the week before, butBrookeand Burrows got him to countermand it for the following reasons, namely:—The village was built of thick mud walls and roofs, so that it could not possibly be burned; it was known to be very strongly held by the enemy, and would therefore require alargeForce to take it, and we should therefore lose a great many more men than we could spare, and if we captured it we could not hold it, as we had not enough men to man our own walls properly, and as it could not be burned, or destroyed, or held, the enemy would simply walk back into it the minute we left it; and the last and best reason was, that as there were two Forces coming to our relief, our duty was to hold Kandahar, and do nothing to endanger our position, and certainly not to go outside the walls to fight the enemy, giving up the advantage that we had. We all thought the insane idea had been given up for good, but the following week General Primrose sent forBrookeand Burrows, and told them that he had made up his mind to attack the village next morning, and toldBrookehe was to command the Force. This, of course, effectually preventedBrookesaying what he thought, as he told me he could not raise objections against it, under these circumstances, as it might be thought that he was afraid, but he said, "the objections against it are greater than they were before, as it is known that the enemy have been hard at work all the week fortifying the place." Burrows ought to have done his best to oppose it, but asBrookedid not oppose, for the above reason he,said nothing, and so the attack unfortunately took place the next morning. Being on the Head Quarter Staff, I was not, of course, allowed to go, but I watched it from the walls where our riflemen covered the advance of the attacking party and our big guns. The village of Deh Khoja was only 700 yards off, and the enemy fired at us tremendously. The troops advanced under a very heavy fire, very steadily and well, and entered the village and went right through it, but the place was like a rabbit warren right through it, with very large loop-holed walls, from which the enemy kept up an incessant fire without our men being able to see them, and as soon as they were turned out of one enclosure they ran into another, and back again into those they had been turned out of, for our Forces were not strong enough to hold the enclosures as they were taken, and all this time the enemy was pouring into the village from Ayoub Khan's main Force. At last General Primrose sent to order the Force to retreat, and no doubt poorBrookecould have got away unhurt, but he stopped to bring away a wounded officer, and so lost his life. We did not recover the bodies of the killed until the 25th, 10 days after, when the village was deserted by the enemy. I went to search for poorBrooke, whom I recognised, and I buried him myself. I cannot get over his loss. We have lived together since we came here, and I have become very fond of him; I am sure he liked me, and that I have lost a good friend in him. He was a fine fellow, brave as a lion, and a thorough soldier in every way; clear-headed and with excellent judgment. It is indeed grievously sad such a fine fellow should have been lost, for he is a loss to the whole army, in such a needless manner.
From Lieut. F.26th February, 1881.My dear Mrs. Brooke,... He (GeneralBrooke) was quite against the sortie, but being put in command of it he was obliged to keep quiet. General Nuttall, who commanded the Cavalry, and who was senior to GeneralBrooke, was ordered to co-operate with him. After our Infantry, with whom GeneralBrookewas, had penetrated into the village, the General found that he could not hold it, and sent a note in pencil to General Nuttall, who was with the Cavalry, which was drawn up in line to the south of Deh Khoja, and thus between it and the villages to the south, asking him to cover the retreat from Deh Khoja. However, General Primrose, who was looking on from the walls just about this time, sent his orderlies, one to GeneralBrooke, the other to General Nuttall, ordering them both to retire. General Nuttall received the order immediately after getting GeneralBrooke's note, and instead of doing what the latter requested, retired his Cavalry at once to the City. The result was that the villagers of all the southern villages instantly swarmed round Deh Khoja, and cut off the retreat of the Infantry. These poor fellows had to run for their lives through a gauntlet of fire. GeneralBrookegot safely out of the village, but went back with a few men to aid others, and in trying to save Captain Cruikshank, of the Engineers, was shot through the head and killed instantly. This, I believe, is the full account of the disaster, which would not have occurred, if the Cavalry had remained to cover the retreat.
From Lieut. F.
26th February, 1881.
My dear Mrs. Brooke,
... He (GeneralBrooke) was quite against the sortie, but being put in command of it he was obliged to keep quiet. General Nuttall, who commanded the Cavalry, and who was senior to GeneralBrooke, was ordered to co-operate with him. After our Infantry, with whom GeneralBrookewas, had penetrated into the village, the General found that he could not hold it, and sent a note in pencil to General Nuttall, who was with the Cavalry, which was drawn up in line to the south of Deh Khoja, and thus between it and the villages to the south, asking him to cover the retreat from Deh Khoja. However, General Primrose, who was looking on from the walls just about this time, sent his orderlies, one to GeneralBrooke, the other to General Nuttall, ordering them both to retire. General Nuttall received the order immediately after getting GeneralBrooke's note, and instead of doing what the latter requested, retired his Cavalry at once to the City. The result was that the villagers of all the southern villages instantly swarmed round Deh Khoja, and cut off the retreat of the Infantry. These poor fellows had to run for their lives through a gauntlet of fire. GeneralBrookegot safely out of the village, but went back with a few men to aid others, and in trying to save Captain Cruikshank, of the Engineers, was shot through the head and killed instantly. This, I believe, is the full account of the disaster, which would not have occurred, if the Cavalry had remained to cover the retreat.
From Colonel B.Kandahar, 5th December, 1880.My dear Mrs. Brooke,... We had lived together up here, and I had learnt to love him as a brother, for he was all that was noble and kind and generous, and I felt his sad loss most truly and most deeply. I shall never forget that fearful morning as long as I live. I was distracted when the remnants of the Force returned and he was not with it. I fear I forgot everyone else in my grief at losing my dearest friend, andtheone head in whom we all placed full reliance and faith, and regarding whom we universally felt, as long ashewas with us, all would be well. I can assure you, dear Mrs. Brooke, he was beloved by every one here, and his loss was universally mourned for as the greatest one that could have happened to us, for every one appreciated his splendid soldier-like qualities and clear-headed abilities, and as to his courage and determination it was the admiration of everyone, so you must not think he was not loved and valued here, for I have no hesitation in saying that he possessed the love and confidence of everybody, for everybody went to him for advice, and he never refused it to anyone. Would that General Primrose had taken his advice, and stuck to it alone, and then that wretched sortie would never have taken place. I handed over his Letts' rough diary to Major H., and in that he records his opinion on the sortie when ordered the week before, and which he prevented. Unfortunately, as he told me himself, his mouth was closed on the second occasion, as he was ordered to command the attacking Force, and it would appear as if he was afraid, and besides he had given General Primrose his opinion very clearly about it, on the previous occasion, and the objections and arguments, he then made against it, had become stronger, for it was known that the enemy had been busily engaged all the week fortifying the place. I will not relate again the particulars of that sad day, as I feel sure you must have, before now, received the long account I sent through Major H., and it is very painful to me to refer to it; suffice it to say, that your dear Husband fell as a true and brave soldier, nobly endeavouring to save the life of poor Captain Cruikshank, after having remained to the very last in the village to collect all the remaining men and bring them out. He might, no doubt, have secured his own safety by retiring himself sooner, buthewas not the man to do so, as long as he thought there was anyone else left behind, and in fact he was coming out with Colonel Daubeny's party of the Fusiliers, by the north of the village, when he returned to satisfy himself that no one was left behind, and he went rightthrough the place again, and came out by the south, and it was then, I understand, he found Captain Cruikshank and endeavoured to bring him out. I am sure it will be a consolation to you to know that he fell perfectly dead, and never suffered any pain. I had this direct from his Trumpeter orderly, a European, who was with him all the time, and by his side when he fell. I examined him most minutely on this point, and he assured me he never spoke a word when he fell, and I found a wound through his body caused by a bullet, which must have caused instant death.
From Colonel B.
Kandahar, 5th December, 1880.
My dear Mrs. Brooke,
... We had lived together up here, and I had learnt to love him as a brother, for he was all that was noble and kind and generous, and I felt his sad loss most truly and most deeply. I shall never forget that fearful morning as long as I live. I was distracted when the remnants of the Force returned and he was not with it. I fear I forgot everyone else in my grief at losing my dearest friend, andtheone head in whom we all placed full reliance and faith, and regarding whom we universally felt, as long ashewas with us, all would be well. I can assure you, dear Mrs. Brooke, he was beloved by every one here, and his loss was universally mourned for as the greatest one that could have happened to us, for every one appreciated his splendid soldier-like qualities and clear-headed abilities, and as to his courage and determination it was the admiration of everyone, so you must not think he was not loved and valued here, for I have no hesitation in saying that he possessed the love and confidence of everybody, for everybody went to him for advice, and he never refused it to anyone. Would that General Primrose had taken his advice, and stuck to it alone, and then that wretched sortie would never have taken place. I handed over his Letts' rough diary to Major H., and in that he records his opinion on the sortie when ordered the week before, and which he prevented. Unfortunately, as he told me himself, his mouth was closed on the second occasion, as he was ordered to command the attacking Force, and it would appear as if he was afraid, and besides he had given General Primrose his opinion very clearly about it, on the previous occasion, and the objections and arguments, he then made against it, had become stronger, for it was known that the enemy had been busily engaged all the week fortifying the place. I will not relate again the particulars of that sad day, as I feel sure you must have, before now, received the long account I sent through Major H., and it is very painful to me to refer to it; suffice it to say, that your dear Husband fell as a true and brave soldier, nobly endeavouring to save the life of poor Captain Cruikshank, after having remained to the very last in the village to collect all the remaining men and bring them out. He might, no doubt, have secured his own safety by retiring himself sooner, buthewas not the man to do so, as long as he thought there was anyone else left behind, and in fact he was coming out with Colonel Daubeny's party of the Fusiliers, by the north of the village, when he returned to satisfy himself that no one was left behind, and he went rightthrough the place again, and came out by the south, and it was then, I understand, he found Captain Cruikshank and endeavoured to bring him out. I am sure it will be a consolation to you to know that he fell perfectly dead, and never suffered any pain. I had this direct from his Trumpeter orderly, a European, who was with him all the time, and by his side when he fell. I examined him most minutely on this point, and he assured me he never spoke a word when he fell, and I found a wound through his body caused by a bullet, which must have caused instant death.