The sort of robbery I have alluded to is committed either at night or in the dusk of the evening or at the dinner-hour, when the inmates are all in one part of the house. There is also that very frequent and too often successful plan of stealing coats, &c. from a hall, when some stranger calls with a fictitious message that causes the servant to leave him alone for a moment, during which he hurries off with everything within reach that is worth stealing. To prevent such an occurrence plainly the best thing is never to allow a stranger to wait inside one’s door.
A professional burglar’s tools comprise skeleton-keys, silent matches, a dark lantern, a wax taper, a palette-knife used for opening windows by pushing the fastening back; a small crowbar, generally made in two pieces to screw together, and with one end forked; a centre-bit, and a carpet-bag. If the object of attack is a safe, then to these must be added chisels and steel wedges of different sizes, an ‘alderman,’ or large crowbar, a ‘Jack-in-the-box,’ some aqua fortis, and sometimes gunpowder for blowing open locks. Besides providing himself with tools, the burglar will often wear a ‘reversible,’ or a coat which can be worn inside out, each side being a different colour, so that if he happened to be noticed he will turn his coat in some quiet corner and become another man to all outward appearances.
The writer of an able article in theCornhill Magazineof January 1863 gives as a list of the various ways in which houses are regularly broken into, the following: ‘Jumping a crib,’ which is entrance by a window; ‘breaking a crib,’ forcing a back door; ‘grating a crib,’ through cellar gratings; ‘garreting a crib,’ through the roof. Entrance in this last way, the writer states, is sometimes cleverly effected (from the leads of an empty house adjacent) by means of an umbrella. First, a few slates are removed, then a small hole is made, and through this aperture a strong springless umbrella is thrust and shaken open. Again the thieves go to work upon the hole in the roof, which they widen rapidly and with perfect confidence, since thedébrisfalls noiselessly into the umbrella hanging beneath. When in the house the thieves’ only care is to move silently and to show little or no light. When the plunder is secured and the confederates signal that the way is clear, the burden is divided, and they at once separate, though perhaps going to the same place. Cabs are occasionally employed by the thieves; and though the driversare not exactly in league, yet they must know pretty well by whom they are being hired. The plunder is disposed of immediately to ‘receivers,’ who always drive a good bargain, and if there is any plate or gold at once put it into the melting-pot. These receivers are the curse of large towns, where alone they are to be found. It is entirely owing to them that the majority of robberies are committed, for if thieves had to run a second risk in disposing of the goods after stealing them, they would not continue a dishonest life with the chances of success they now have. The police are generally well aware of the men who thus assist the thieves, but the difficulty of getting evidence against them is extreme, although occasionally a rascal is caught and severely punished owing to information being received from some informer. There are no less than eighty-seven houses in Londonknownto be those of receivers of stolen goods.
In February 1858 there were in Manchester alone ninety-four returned transports, and out of the whole of that number there were not more than six in employment or who had any known means of livelihood. In view of this statement can it be wondered at that in the eleven years from 1857 to 1867 there were no less than seventeen successful robberies effected in that city alone, involving a loss of property amounting to £25,788, chiefly in cash and jewellery? This loss would have been largely augmented had it not been for the vigilance of the Manchester police, who could not, however, possibly frustrate every attempt made by dishonest men let loose upon society in large numbers by a system which is open to very serious objections. The Habitual Criminals Act proves that the country has at length recognised the fact that the ticket-of-leave system has been grossly abused by convicted persons, and that to protect life and property effectually it is necessary to give the police more power of supervisionover suspected characters. For the benefit of those not acquainted with this Act, I may state that its most important provision is to give a Judge power to include in the sentence of a person, who has been previously convicted, a certain term of police supervision, to take effect after release from prison; and during this term the person may be called upon at any time to prove that he or she is gaining an honest livelihood—the burden of the proof resting with the suspected person, instead of the police being required to prove dishonesty.
A man who commits a great robbery is not one who up to that moment was honest and industrious; it is most probable that he has been an associate of thieves, and has been apprenticed to it, so to speak, as to a trade; hence the advantage of the new system by which he can be watched and if necessary captured on suspicion. The London police have now on their register 117,000 names of habitual criminals, and the list is said to be increasing at the rate of 30,000 a year.
A few somewhat imperfect statistics may be given. In London, during the years 1862 to 1867 inclusive, there were eight successful burglaries, in which £14,845 worth of valuables was stolen; in other large towns of the kingdom, such as Glasgow, Sheffield, &c., there were thirteen burglaries, with a loss of £11,375; and if our Colonies were to be taken into account, at Hong Kong alone there was a robbery (referred to more fully on page 59), in 1865, of £50,000 from a bank.
Omitting this last, however, it will be seen that in eleven years no less than £52,000 of property was stolen by burglars in Great Britain. It is true a great deal of this was recovered—sometimes in remarkable ways, an instance of which was the finding of some gold watches in the Thames, stolen from Mr. Walker’s, Cornhill; one of the watches having attracted the attention of a river policeman. But, on the other hand, there were numbers of successful attempts where no booty was found; a large number of unsuccessful attempts; and many of both kinds which never appeared in the newspapers at all.
The total would indeed make a formidable list, and yet there is hardly a case in which proper care combined with the use of the best safeguards would not have prevented all loss.
In the year 1873 the total amount of property lostby robberies of all kindswithin the metropolitan district alone was £84,000, of which nearly £21,000 was subsequently recovered.
So large a proportion of this loss was occasioned by the use of insecure fastenings on doors or windows, that the Metropolitan Police have drawn the special attention of householders to the risks thus incurred. Colonel Henderson not long since issued a notice, of which the following is an extract:—
‘Caution to Householders and others.—The Commissioner considers it to be his duty to caution householders and others that larcenies are in most instances committed by thieves entering through windows left open or so insecurely fastened that they can be readily opened by thrusting back the catch from the outside with a knife, without any violence or force whatever. The plates of window-fastenings should overlap each other, and self-acting side-stops should be used in sashes. Attention is also directed to the following means by which thieves effect their purpose:—
‘In the absence of the family, especially on Saturday and Sunday evenings, entering with false or skeleton keys, passing through an empty house in the neighbourhood, going along the parapet, and entering any window found open—climbing up the portico and entering through upper windows—calling at houses under pretence ofhaving messages or parcels to deliver, and during the absence of the servant stealing articles from the hall or passage and decamping.
‘If ordinary and necessary precautions were taken, as above recommended, the efforts of the police in preventing crime would be materially aided, and property more effectually secured.’
A short time since there was a robbery at the warehouse of a person who immediately wrote to the newspapers blaming the police and making out a plausible case. Now, the real facts were, that this person gave up residing on his City premises without informing the police. The door had on it only a common latch, easily opened by a false key. There was a window up a side-passage through which it was easy to obtain entrance; and though all these circumstances conspired to facilitate the operations of thieves, yet this was thought a proper opportunity to blame the City Police!
Although seventeen years have elapsed since the conviction of the men who stole the bullion on the South-Eastern Railway, the case is still the most remarkable of its kind—remarkable for the deliberation, the professional spirit, and the pecuniary resources of the modern offender.
The following very condensed account I take from the ‘Times’ newspaper of the day, merely premising that the case shows the extreme importance of guarding one’s keys most jealously, for even up to the present time no lock, such as can be brought within the reach of everyone for practical use, has been invented that will permit of its keys being carelessly used.
On the night of May 15, 1855, gold to the value of £12,000 was taken from the van of a train on the South-Eastern Railway, between London and Folkestone. The boxes were weighed in London and again at Boulogne; at the second place the weight, as was subsequently discovered, differed from the weight in London. The weight in Paris corresponded with the weight at Boulogne. Consequently the boxes must have been tampered with between London and Boulogne, or, as it had been impossible to touch them while in the boat, between London and Folkestone. When the boxes were opened, bags of shot were found substituted for gold. Of course the surprise was great, and the search after the offender earnest. But whatever may be the skill of the detectives, we know from sad experience that the criminal world is more than equal to them in craft. For sixteen months the pursuit was in vain, and the robbery was well-nigh forgotten, when an unexpected revelation threw light on the matter. A man named Edward Agar was convicted in October 1855 of uttering a forged cheque, and sentenced to be transported for life. This man, after his conviction, stated to the authorities that he could give information respecting the great gold robbery of 1855. On being questioned he announced himself as one of the perpetrators, and named as his accomplices Pierce, formerly in the service of the South-Eastern Company; Burgess, a guard; and Tester, a clerk in the traffic department.
Agar was forty-one years of age, and had by his own confession lived by crime from fourteen to twenty years. His evidence was that Pierce first suggested the scheme, but that he himself thought it impracticable. Pierce said he believed he could obtain impressions of keys of the Chubb’s locks by which the iron safes were secured; and Agar then answered that if it could be done he thought the thing might be effected. Pierce and Agar went down to Folkestone as casual visitors for the benefit of sea-bathing. They took lodgings and employed themselves in observing the arrival of the tidal service trains to the boats. This was in May 1854, twelve monthsbefore the actual commission of the robbery—so long a time can modern depredators afford to spend upon their preparations. They went daily to the pier to enjoy the fresh air; but their constant observation of the trains and the station aroused suspicion, and they left, though not before they had discovered ‘what Chapman, who had the key of the iron safe, did when the trains arrived and the luggage was removed to the boats.’ By these means it was ascertained where the key was kept, the impression of which it was desirable to obtain.
But to know where the key was kept and to obtain possession of it were very different things, and Agar, according to his own story, was much disheartened. Not so Pierce. Pierce knew a man named Tester who was in the office of the Superintendent of Traffic, and Tester could get possession of the keys for them. However, time rolls on, and we are in August, when Pierce discovers that the locks are to be altered, and that the new keys will be in Tester’s hands. Tester was the clerk who corresponded with Mr. Chubb on the subject of the alterations, and by his means the impression of a key which opened one lock of each box was obtained.
But as each box had two locks it was necessary to obtain the impression of another key, and the following device was adopted: Agar was in possession of no less a sum than £3,000. It was arranged that a box of bullion of the value of two hundred pounds should be conveyed in the iron safe in the usual way, and that it should be delivered to him under the name of Archer.
Agar goes for the box, and it is delivered to him by Chapman, who opens the safe with a key which he takes from a cupboard. Thus Agar learns where the second key is kept. Now, how are they to obtain an impression of the key? Two months have elapsed since they got the impression of key No. 1. This is October,and they are still without No. 2. But they are not disheartened. Pierce and Agar go to Dover, and put up at the ‘Dover Castle;’ they walk over to Folkestone, and arrive just when the train is coming in. In the confusion of an arrival the attendants leave the office for a few minutes. Pierce goes boldly in, opens the cupboard which contains the key of the iron safe, hands it to Agar, who takes an impression, and then replaces it. Thus five months after their reconnoissance at Folkestone they have surmounted the first difficulty which suggested itself to the reflective mind of Agar. They have obtained wax impressions of the keys; everything else remains to be done.
The next thing, of course, was to make keys from the impressions. For that purpose lodgings are taken in Lambeth and Kennington. Pierce disguises himself in a black wig, and the next two months are spent in filing keys. When the keys were completed to a probable similarity with the rough wax impressions—no easy task, it would seem, for two inexpert operators with common files—it was necessary to try them. Agar went down several times in the van with Burgess, the guard. They did not fit at first, but they fitted more nearly every time he went. At last they fitted completely, and the deed was resolved on. Of course, after nearly a year’s labour, it was not worth their while to fly at any paltry game—they would wait till a large sum was to be sent. Two chests would hold about £12,000, and they heard that £12,000 was shortly to be sent.
They then buy shot to replace the gold. Agar and Pierce are admitted into the van by Burgess, and on May 15, 1855, twelve months after the deed was planned, the boxes of Messrs. Spielman, Bult, and Abell are securely rifled. Nineteen months after the crime was committed, and more than two years and a half after itwas planned, justice overtook the delinquents. No sentence was passed upon the informer Agar, who was remitted back to prison under the sentence he had incurred by an act of forgery; but Burgess and Tester were sentenced to transportation for fourteen years, while Pierce, through a technicality, got off with only two years’ imprisonment: and so ends this romantic case.
One of the convicts, I have heard, has been of some use to the police, for, like many other convicted thieves, he has been communicative, and at least one improvement in lock-making has resulted from this man’s suggestions.
Though a robbery so patiently planned, so quietly carried out, and with such a successful result, is rare; yet we still hear of instances wherein the same forethought and misguided talent are shown.
The dark autumn and winter evenings have latterly been chosen for the commission of what are earning a separate name, so numerous have they become—‘Jewel Robberies.’ At the West End of London and the fashionable suburbs there have been numerous cases in which the thieves wait till the inhabitants are assembled at dinner—having possibly left some of their jewellery lying about on dressing-tables—and by entering through a window the burglars are able to make a successful haul. Either in this manner or by an ordinary night burglary much of the plate and jewellery is stolen with comparatively slight risk of discovery. The residences of Sir F. Peel, the Dowager Marchioness of Cholmondeley, the Countess Waldegrave, the Countess of Donoughmore, and many other noticeable personages have recently suffered from these unwelcome visits.
The following notice, issued some time ago, I have Colonel Fraser’s permission to republish. It very clearly shows the responsibilities resting with both the police andthe public of large towns. If householders would but perform their part as well as the police do in this matter, robbery of the kind indicated would be of the rarest occurrence:—
POLICE NOTICE.Recent occurrences having shown that an impression somewhat extensively prevails in the City that the duty of protecting house property at night is one which belongs exclusively to the police, it is desirable to point out what the true functions of the police are with respect to the guardianship of house property, inasmuch as the proprietors of houses, when distinctly informed as to the nature and extent of the protection which they may reasonably expect to receive from the police force, will be in a better position to determine what those additional safeguards should be which ordinary prudence makes it incumbent on them to provide for themselves.Under the influence of the impression above referred to a practice has sprung up in the City, and is gradually increasing, of leaving shops and warehouses, stored with goods of great value, entirely untenanted at night, and throughout the whole of Sunday. Numerous buildings are let out in separate rooms to separate tenants, who require them only for purposes of business during the day; the street-door, during business hours, is left open, in order to give ready access to every part of the house; and thus, in the case of houses which are habitually deserted at night, not only have thieves great facilities for entering them, and secreting themselves there by day, but they may do this with the knowledge that they will, almost certainly, be left for many hours at night in the undisturbed possession of the abandoned premises.These risks are, moreover, greatly aggravated by want of due care in thoroughly searching the house before it is finally closed for the night, by the defective condition, in many instances, of the external fastenings, and by neglect in making even these fastenings secure.It has, indeed, been supposed by some persons that if, during their absence, they leave lights burning in their shops, and openings in the shutters through which the interior of the shop can be partially inspected, the property within may be safely left to the exclusive guardianship of the police. This practice has never been approved by the head of the force, and is itself open to serious objection, as tending to encourage reliance on a contrivance which is not only untrustworthy, but which may be used by dexterous thieves to further their own plans.Nor must it be imagined that a policeman who is in charge of a beat can, without manifest neglect of his duty to the householders generally, devote to the shops where the practice in question is followed, the special supervision which seems to be expected from him. If a constable on duty were bound, each time he passed, to make a careful inspection of the interior of shops through the several apertures which individual shopkeepers may please to make in their shutters, he would obviously be unable to complete the circuit of the buildings under his charge within the time appointed for that purpose, and the majority of houses on the beat, as well as passengers in the streets, would be left without that protection which the police should properly afford.Under these circumstances it is most important to bear in mind that the special watching over particular premises, which it is sought by the adoption of the custom referred to to exact from the police, is a duty which the police cannot undertake to perform.The chief functions of police in connection with the protection of house property at night are to prevent, as far as possible, a forcible entry being made into any building from without; to afford protection to all housesequally; to be vigilant in detecting the first indications of fire, and to exercise a general supervision throughout the night over the doors, shutters, and other external defences of the houses.These functions the police can discharge, but they cannot be responsible for what may be occurring out of their sight, within deserted buildings to which they have no access—theycannot keep stationary guard over the doors of unoccupied warehouses unprovided with any locks or outer fastenings but such as are of the most worthless description—they cannot prevent robberies being effected in premises to which thieves are admitted during the day and secured from all interruption when locked in for the night by the owners of the premises themselves—nor can they, in justice to the legitimate claims which the majority of the ratepayers have on the protection of the police, employ the greater portion of their time in watching over the property of a few individuals, who invite attacks from thieves by omitting to take the precautions which common prudence enjoins.James Fraser, Colonel,Commissioner of Police.City Police Office, 1865.
POLICE NOTICE.
Recent occurrences having shown that an impression somewhat extensively prevails in the City that the duty of protecting house property at night is one which belongs exclusively to the police, it is desirable to point out what the true functions of the police are with respect to the guardianship of house property, inasmuch as the proprietors of houses, when distinctly informed as to the nature and extent of the protection which they may reasonably expect to receive from the police force, will be in a better position to determine what those additional safeguards should be which ordinary prudence makes it incumbent on them to provide for themselves.
Under the influence of the impression above referred to a practice has sprung up in the City, and is gradually increasing, of leaving shops and warehouses, stored with goods of great value, entirely untenanted at night, and throughout the whole of Sunday. Numerous buildings are let out in separate rooms to separate tenants, who require them only for purposes of business during the day; the street-door, during business hours, is left open, in order to give ready access to every part of the house; and thus, in the case of houses which are habitually deserted at night, not only have thieves great facilities for entering them, and secreting themselves there by day, but they may do this with the knowledge that they will, almost certainly, be left for many hours at night in the undisturbed possession of the abandoned premises.
These risks are, moreover, greatly aggravated by want of due care in thoroughly searching the house before it is finally closed for the night, by the defective condition, in many instances, of the external fastenings, and by neglect in making even these fastenings secure.
It has, indeed, been supposed by some persons that if, during their absence, they leave lights burning in their shops, and openings in the shutters through which the interior of the shop can be partially inspected, the property within may be safely left to the exclusive guardianship of the police. This practice has never been approved by the head of the force, and is itself open to serious objection, as tending to encourage reliance on a contrivance which is not only untrustworthy, but which may be used by dexterous thieves to further their own plans.
Nor must it be imagined that a policeman who is in charge of a beat can, without manifest neglect of his duty to the householders generally, devote to the shops where the practice in question is followed, the special supervision which seems to be expected from him. If a constable on duty were bound, each time he passed, to make a careful inspection of the interior of shops through the several apertures which individual shopkeepers may please to make in their shutters, he would obviously be unable to complete the circuit of the buildings under his charge within the time appointed for that purpose, and the majority of houses on the beat, as well as passengers in the streets, would be left without that protection which the police should properly afford.
Under these circumstances it is most important to bear in mind that the special watching over particular premises, which it is sought by the adoption of the custom referred to to exact from the police, is a duty which the police cannot undertake to perform.
The chief functions of police in connection with the protection of house property at night are to prevent, as far as possible, a forcible entry being made into any building from without; to afford protection to all housesequally; to be vigilant in detecting the first indications of fire, and to exercise a general supervision throughout the night over the doors, shutters, and other external defences of the houses.
These functions the police can discharge, but they cannot be responsible for what may be occurring out of their sight, within deserted buildings to which they have no access—theycannot keep stationary guard over the doors of unoccupied warehouses unprovided with any locks or outer fastenings but such as are of the most worthless description—they cannot prevent robberies being effected in premises to which thieves are admitted during the day and secured from all interruption when locked in for the night by the owners of the premises themselves—nor can they, in justice to the legitimate claims which the majority of the ratepayers have on the protection of the police, employ the greater portion of their time in watching over the property of a few individuals, who invite attacks from thieves by omitting to take the precautions which common prudence enjoins.
James Fraser, Colonel,Commissioner of Police.
City Police Office, 1865.
OFlate years there has been an increasing demand for strong safes, and it is in response to this demand that such a multitude of patents have been taken out. Of these very few have been introduced to the public, for most of the inventions are by persons not practically acquainted with the trade, who consequently have not the opportunity of foreseeing the practical difficulties in the working of their patent, nor often the means of introducing it to public notice.
Perhaps one patent in six is ultimately used, but even of these many are but unwitting copies of former ones. As an instance, a special mode of making an angle-iron frame is claimed by three inventors. However, after the great robbery at a jeweller’s in Cornhill, in 1865, among the numerous patents introduced there were some of undoubted advantage, the object in all being to give greater strength to the door and its fastenings, and (in some patents) to close all joints in a safe against the operation of wedging.
The employment of wedges for forcing open safes was then quite novel, and therefore the many improvements suggested or patented were intended chiefly to baffle this new mode of attack. It is necessary to notice very briefly the salient points of the best of those inventions which by being now used have proved to some extent their utility. Perhaps the safes most generallyknown are Milner’s, Tann’s, Hobbs’s, Chatwood’s and Chubb’s. There are many other makers, most of whose names appear in the list of patentees, but whose productions have hardly obtained the notoriety belonging to the five names here mentioned. Respecting the first-named makers, so many different qualities are made that it is difficult to give any definite opinion of their work, but it may be safely said that the makers rely more upon the general construction of their safes than upon any special invention to overcome the ‘wedge’ or other instrument. They use to a large extent wedge-shaped pieces of iron fastened to the inner face of the door, which fit into, as the door shuts, corresponding holes in the frame or lining face. These cannot, however, be used well at the back of the door, in consequence of the clearance required when it is swinging open; otherwise, if fastened in a solid manner, they give some additional strength. One of the noticeable features of Messrs. Milners’ safe is the use of an outside band or frame round the body, the advisability of which position for it is sometimes questioned, although it adds somewhat to the appearance of strength. They also use hinges in place of the pivot or centre working in a socket, the more general mode of construction.
One of their stronger safes has been described as follows: ‘Its dimensions being 83¼ inches high; 58¼ inches wide, and 36½ inches deep, and secured by one single and two pairs of double doors. The first, which is of massive strength, and well provided with lock, bolts, and wedge-guards, secures a small chest or treasury designed for bullion, which is in fact the principal object for which the safe was intended. Over this door close a pair of equally strong double doors, each shooting eight massive bolts, and coated, like the inner door, with a layer of hardened steel. Over these second doors close a third pair, consisting, like the inner ones, of two ½-inch plates of iron separated by aplate of ½-inch cast steel. The composition is 3½ inches thick. The weight of the safe is thirteen tons (?), and the cost £300.’
The safes made by Messrs. Tann, of Newgate Street, make no pretension to any special novelty beyond having, in the strong qualities, a projecting rimall roundthe inside of the door, which fits into a corresponding recess, in order to foil the action of wedges. The finish of most of these safes is decidedly good, showing careful workmanship.
The following is a published description of one of Messrs. Tann’s safes: ‘No special provision as against fire was made, strength being the first object. The size of the safe is 5 feet 6 inches high, and 2 feet 4 inches deep, about four tons weight of iron being used in its manufacture. The case consists first of boiler plate of ½-inch, then of ⅜-inch plate of steel and iron welded together, a third outer case being of ⅜-inch iron plate. The frame is six inches by 1¼ inches, with solid corners; and the construction of the doors is novel. They are folding, and fit into each other at their meeting with dovetails seven inches high and one inch wide of solid ½-inch iron, which effectually prevents any attempt to force them apart by wedging. The back edge of each door is provided with what is technically called a hook rebate, with the same view.’
Messrs. Hobbs’s safes are also of various qualities, their strongest having bolts of a hooked or claw shape, and the outer edges of the body plates being protected in a peculiar way by a covering under which molten metal is run to cover or close the joints.
The safe made by Chatwood has a door with a curved edge,[2]and bolts of hooked shape which slide behind projections on the frame; sometimes he uses also projecting pieces on the inner edge of a door, somewhat in Milner’s way, and his stronger safes have hard metal run in while hot betweentwo iron plates to form the sides. Some of his safes are very ponderous, and more work is spent on them than seems necessary for any but the most extraordinary requirement. The finish is good, and the general plan of construction more elaborate than that used by some makers. The number of applications for patents made by Mr. Chatwood will be seen by reference to the list to be large, but only some of them or parts are in use.
ELEVATION SHEWING DIAGONAL ACTION OF BOLTSELEVATION SHEWING DIAGONAL ACTION OF BOLTS
Messrs. Chubb and Son’s safes are chiefly in two distinct qualities, the best being made as shown by the annexedengravings. The advantage of the diagonal bolts will be obvious; they fasten into a solid frame, which in its turn overlaps the body-plates, so that if it were possible to get a wedge past the rebate on the door, the moment the wedge was inserted the bolts would grip the sides and bind it tightly. The edges are joined by angle-iron, rivets and screws, and are rebated and dovetailed together.
SECTION OF FRONT CORNERSECTION OF FRONT CORNER
Messrs. Chubb and Son have lately (1874) patented a new mode of construction, with the object of providing astronger safe at a less cost than has hitherto been charged. The frame of the safe, on which the door hangs, is a solid T-iron, its outer edge overlapping the body-plates, and the flange receiving behind it the bolts. Though the inner lining has no screw or rivet, yet it is most securely fastened in the process of joining the other parts. In order to increase the fire-resisting properties of this new safe, besides the usual casing of fire-resisting material, a tube is introduced into the open space behind the T-iron, filled with a substance that will on the approach of fire cause steam to be projected into the interior of the safe. The engraving shows a section of one corner of this patent safe, and an elevation of it will be found facing page 36.
CHUBB’S PATENT.CHUBB’S PATENT.
Beyond the fact that its simplicity of construction enables it to be produced at a moderate cost, the chief advantages claimed for this particular safe are:—
1. The door being slightly recessed when shut, a wedge cannot be inserted with the same ease as if it were flush; and if it is inserted, the pressure is exerted against the point of greatest strength and away from the door.
2. The frame being a special T-iron section with a thickened corner, its strength is enormous, and the power necessary to bend it can hardly be applied but by machinery.
3. The bolts fasten behind this solid iron, in place of, as is usually the case, into the lining.
4. The edges of the outer plates are recessed into the frame, so that there is not an open joint.
5. The outer plates are fastened to the frame by a new screw rivet, which can neither be driven in nor taken out.
6. Even if one of the plates should be taken off, the lining cannot be got out, in consequence of the mode adopted for securing it at the front.
7. The adoption of the Patent Steam Tube adds greatly to the fireproof qualities of the safe at the part most subject to the entrance of heat.
Among safe manufacturers I may name Messrs. Mordan and Co., Mr. Whitfield, Mr. Elwell, Messrs. Perry and Co., Mr. Price, and others, whose productions I have not space to describe.
There are in Staffordshire certain firms who make safes of the lightest and most trumpery description, chiefly for export. A partner in one of these establishments once told me that as long as the safes were strong enough to stand the rough voyage round the Cape to India they were all that was needed! I need hardly say that a safe need be no stronger than a packing-case to standthattest. There are, however, already signs of a much better article being required in the East; and the export trade in good English safes to India, China, Australia, and other parts is rapidly becoming of much importance.
Wedging has already been mentioned as an ingenious and somewhat new mode adopted by burglars to force open safes. It is accomplished by means of a number of steel wedges, thin and small, and about two inches long by half an inch broad; these are driven in one by one at different parts round the edge of the door; gradually
CHUBB’S NEW PATENT SAFE, WITH T-IRON FRAME To face page 36CHUBB’S NEW PATENT SAFE, WITH T-IRON FRAMETo face page 36
thicker ones are put in until the side has been sprung away sufficiently to allow a crowbar to be inserted, and then if the bolts are not of the very best the door is likely to be wrenched open. The sound of hammering the wedges is deadened by a leather pad being put under the hammer, so that it becomes almost a silent operation.
A convicted burglar, who had enjoyed the advantage of some experience in wedging safes, stated that on first trying the door of a safe, if the wedge sprang out and would not remain in the joint without being held, it was generally hopeless to proceed with wedges; but if the first wedge took ‘a bite’ in the joint and stayed in, he was almost certain of success.
But besides this method there is that of using drills, a very favourite way formerly with thieves, and one that has lately again become popular, because of the increased facilities for procuring better drilling instruments. The object sought in drilling is to get at the lock or working parts, so that by destroying the works and bolt of the lock the handle of the safe merely has to be turned and the door comes open. It is quite easy to drill any number of holes into an ordinaryironsafe, but unless the holes are near the lock the contents of the safe cannot be reached without much labour and time. Therefore to counteract the drilling it is necessary to protect the lock by steel or some other hard substance. A plate of steel well fixed is usually employed, but in addition to this Mr. John Chubb invented a very simple but effective mode of protection. A number of small holes are made in the door-plate from the inside almost through the plate; the holes are tapped, and then filled up with hard steel screws; so that when a drill touches, however slightly, even one of the steel screws, its edge immediately breaks and the drill becomes useless.
The construction and operation of the powerful instrument which made large holes was unknown until one of them, with all its tools, was captured by the police, and a more powerful, well-made, and compact instrument has seldom been seen. By the courtesy of the Metropolitan Police Authorities Mr. Chubb was allowed to experiment with the instrument, and his attention was directed to provide some means to baffle and destroy its operation. This has been effectually done, and the improvement secured by letters patent.
Fig. 1.Fig. 1.
It would be obviously improper to publish any description or illustration of the machine itself, but fig. 1
Fig. 2.Fig. 2.
Fig. 3.Fig. 3.
shows a part of an iron door with a hole two inches in diameter cut through it. Fig 2 is the cutting tool used, and uninjured, as it was when taken from the machine after cutting the hole. Fig. 3 also shows a part of an irondoor, having the patent improvement, upon which a trial was next made by the instrumentwith the same cutter. No impression, farther than taking a mere skin off the surface, could be made, and the cutter was utterly destroyed, as shown in fig. 4.
Another and more powerful machine was taken by the Manchester police, with cutters capable of making much larger holes, but the improvement is equally effective in destroying the tools.
Fig. 4Fig. 4
A third and more desperate mode of opening safes is by introducing gunpowder into the locks, destroying them, and thus opening the door with ease. This, however, has not lately been tried to any extent; the noise made is likely to lead to detection. It is rather a dangerous thing to try, and the locks of good safes have generally received such improvements as enable them to resist the shock of an explosion without injury.
There have been other methods said to be used by burglars to obtain their object, such as softening steel with a blow-pipe, so as to get a drill through it, or using drills made of diamonds, which are said to be very powerful, or employing acids to act upon and destroy hard steel, but I have not known of any burglaries proving successful by these means.
There is no doubt a vast amount of low ingenuity and cunning always at work, quietly scheming or planning the best mode of getting at the treasure so often kept in safes, and the only safeguard against this is to get the best safe possible, and then not to rely upon its being utterly impregnable (for no safe can be that), but to use ordinary watchfulness and care, so that it may not be exposed to unusual risks.
A safe is protected as much by having careful and honest persons in the employ of a firm as by its own strength; and the common-sense view of the matter to take is to advise all who wish to obtain the best security to pay what is necessarily a good price for a good safe, and to take good care of it—and its keys.
The careless way in which the keys, not only of safes, but of warehouse doors, private boxes, and bags are left about, has been the cause of many robberies.
The great gold robbery on the South-Eastern Railway in 1855 was effected through the thieves obtaining, though only for a few moments, possession of the keys and taking an impression from them. A jewel robbery at the West End of London in 1872 was owing to the key of the jewel-case being left in the same room as the case. It is often found that important keys instead of being in personal custody are kept in some drawer or box having only a very common lock.
Even bankers, careful as they are, need a caution about this, for their keys are so numerous in most instances that great care should be exercised to prevent them from ever getting into improper hands; whatever kind of keys are used, they should never be out of the possession of their rightful owners.
A plan, to which I may call attention, because of its complete success and simplicity, has been extensively used for the recovery of lost keys. It consists of a chain witha label attached to it, engraved as shown in the accompanying illustration, the object being to ensure the return of the keys without the finder becoming aware to whom they belong, thus preventing their possible unlawful use. The bunch of keys being brought to the address on the label, by reference to a register kept of each label, the rightful owner is known and communicated with. Several thousands are now in use, and their value is proved by the constant, almost daily, recovery of keys.
Some of the instances in which this plan has been successfully used are somewhat remarkable, and among these may be mentioned the loss of a gentleman’s keys on one of the Swiss mountains. All hope of finding them was given up and a fresh set accordingly made; but the following year a bunch of keys was found where the snow had melted, and these, brought home by an English traveller, were found to be the missing ones.
Perhaps a more curious case, in which an unexpected use was made of the register, occurred at the time of the terrible Abergele accident to the Irish mail train. Mr. Lund, a passenger in the train, was killed, but nothing could at first be found upon him as a likely means of identification. He happened, however, to have a registered chain, and upon telegraphing to my firm the number on the label his name and address were at once discovered.
It may be of use to add a few particulars respecting the amount of coin that can be stowed in a certain space, in order that it may be easily calculated how much any safe will hold. The Bank of England reckoning for the room required to stow away gold coin in bags is 79 cubic inches to 1,000l.One cubic foot will contain no less than 21,875l.In order to allow a slight margin and to be on the right side, it may be considered that 80 cubic inches will contain 1,000l.in bags of sovereigns.
For silver coin the Bank reckoning is that 157 cubic inches will hold 100l., and that one cubic foot will hold 1,235l.in bags. To allow a margin as before, it may be said that 160 cubic inches contain 100l.in silver coin.
PERHAPSthere is a greater demand for fire-resisting than for thief-resisting safes, and certainly it is in the former character that they are most often put to the test. The consideration, therefore, of what is the best form of construction to cope with fire is most important; while it is also a much simpler matter than when strength against thieves is required.
In fire we have an element whose character is known, and which cannot attack us in some new way for which we are not fully prepared. All that it can do to a safe is to exercise upon it a certain heat, the intensity of which may be pretty nearly determined, and which cannot in actual practice last beyond a certain time. Probably heat that will melt iron in a large mass is seldom produced in the burning of an ordinary dwelling-house; but in a warehouse with inflammable contents such fierce heat often exists, so that a safe should be proof against it for two or three hours. Unless a safe were very bulky it could not well preserve its contents without any damage for a much longer time; and indeed it is not necessary, for no safe is very likely to be exposed to an intense all-round fire longer than three hours; by that time it will either have fallen into rubbish, or thedébrisfrom above will have covered it in, and protected it from immediate contact with the fire. It will be seen from this that it is advisable not to build a safe partially into a wall or recess; the chances being that it will be kept in its place long enough to have the full force of the fire expended upon its exposed portion, and then fall a greater distance and upon harder material than if it had fallen when the wooden floor first gave way.
The first quality that a fire-resisting safe should possess is strength in its construction sufficient to prevent its being damaged by a heavy fall, or sustaining injury through the plates warping from heat. This cannot be obtained unless the outer plates are at least a quarter of an inch thick (or upwards, in big safes), strongly joined at all the edges by stout angle-irons well rivetted to them. Other and more expensive methods are used to join the edges, and are doubtless better than the foregoing; but this is at once a cheap, effectual, and most generally used method.
Secondly, it is essential to make the safe as nearly airtight as possible, to do which it is only necessary that the door should fit very closely at its edges, and that its inside face touches at every possible point the interior of the safe.
The third thing to be considered is the fire-proofing—the most important feature of the safe. Almost everything that one can think of has been either proposed or used for proofing—water, wood, paper, plaster-of-Paris, chemicals of all sorts, and many other things besides. But of all these what may be termed a combination of water and wood, in the forms of alum and sawdust, has been most extensively used.
There are two walls of wrought iron in the safe, and the intervening space has to be filled with a fire-resisting material, which may be either of a refractory nature, such as fire-clay, sand, or any other practically infusible slow conductor of heat; or it may be an absorbent substancecontaining chemicals that will evolve moisture when heated. The former of these two methods is now seldom used except by makers of cheap common safes, who sometimes use clay, ashes, or mould. The evaporating system is generally adopted, and as a rule the absorbent material is common sawdust, with which is mixed ordinary alum, the water of crystallisation in the alum being gradually parted with under the continued heat generated by fire. Mahogany sawdust is preferred, as being less combustible than that of white woods.
At one time tubes of glass or fusible metal containing alkaline solutions were imbedded in the sawdust and were supposed to burst or fuse at a given temperature, but it was found that the glass accidentally broke or the fusible metal became corroded, and allowed the liquids to escape, thus damping the contents of the safe. But the mixture of alum with sawdust is open to two objections. Owing to the hygroscopic nature of sawdust the alum is liable to decomposition, thereby producing a certain moisture in the safe; and, secondly, there is of course a limit to the production of moisture from the alum when under the action of fire, after which the sawdust will become gradually dry, and although it may not actually ignite, it will become charred, and even red hot, under sufficiently continued heat. It is but fair, however, to say, as I have previously suggested, that such instances of continued heat are but rarely probable; yet, for the before-mentioned reasons, I prefer and use anincombustiblematerial, very light and absorbent, and which does not possess the bad qualities of sawdust, but which is more expensive. Supposing the alum to become exhausted, there still remains the protection of a substance which is both infusible and a bad conductor of heat.
Of course the actual amount of resistance to fire depends largely on the capacity of the proofing chambers.When advisable the thickness of these may be increased to any extent desired, or the safe may have several chambers, all containing proofing, or intermediate ones left as air-chambers only.
To sum up the qualities which are requisite to make a safe proof against an ordinary fire, it must, first, be made entirely of wrought iron; secondly, the outer plates must be at least a quarter of an inch thick; thirdly, there should be a space of three to four inches all round it of an evaporating non-conducting composition. With such a safe as this, properly put together, the general run of fires may be defied; but there are cases where extra precaution should be taken, and the safe kept in a brick, stone, or iron strong-room. No safe inside a strong-room has, to my knowledge, ever been destroyed; but many—always light ones—in warehouses or offices have had their contents burnt.
And here I would caution those not acquainted with the subject to put little faith in the tests, either public or private, that are sometimes made, unless they are conducted by persons quite disinterested. When it is done in this way of course the result is one that may, if certain conditions are fulfilled, be valuable; but so frequently are these ‘tests’ arranged, either by making a safe specially for a trial, by carefully packing its contents, or by constructing the fire in a particular mode, to turn out such wonderful successes, that it will be well not to rely upon anything but actual experience gained from the result of safes which have been known to be subject to an ordeal in the ordinary course of things. Plenty of such instances can be investigated, but it will obviously be unadvisable to give here the numerous results that have from time to time been chronicled by the daily papers and other publications.
It should be borne in mind that certain things are lessliable to injury from heat than others; and therefore it is that books will sometimes sustain no injury, whilst loose papers in the same safe may be more or less damaged. For this reason it is advisable that all parchments and papers be kept in a drawer or cupboard of a safe, as the second enclosure (though with no more fire-proofing round it) gives a slight extra security.
Another caution I would give is that, after being in one fire, a safe should not be relied on to resist fire again until it has been examined and re-proofed by the maker or a thoroughly competent person. The resisting properties are certain to be damaged, if not destroyed altogether; and although I know of safes still in use that have not been renovated since preserving their contents, I would not place any faith at all in their power to prove again successful.
The destruction of the Pantechnicon has presented an opportunity of fairly ascertaining the effect of great heat upon various safes, and, strange as it may seem, scarcely one of the many safes survived the conflagration without injury. One French safe had nothing but its four sides left intact, its front, back, and inside having disappeared as if driven out by a cannon-ball. The cast-iron safes, of which there were several, proved, as might be expected, utterly useless, being found when pulled out of the ruins twisted into all sorts of shapes, or cracked and broken like glass. Other safes, by makers whose reputation can hardly be affected by damage done in such an unprecedented fire, had their contents very seriously injured; and only a few safes came out of the trial in at all a satisfactory state.
Speaking of French safes, I may here say that, as a rule, they and most of the Continental safes cannot be trusted in English fires, nor against the more advanced skill prevailing among our English thieves. Withoutoffence their character may be summed up as being really ‘French’—pretty in outward appearance (which is more than can be said for our safes), with peculiar locks requiring no keys, and certain other un-English things about them; they are quite unsuitable for our market, andvice versâour British safes find little sale in France.
Safes and other receptacles to contain gunpowder and preserve it from explosion have recently been talked about; and there is no doubt that one result of such a calamity as the late Regent’s Canal explosion will be to expedite legislation on the subject of the transit and storage of gunpowder and other explosives. It may appear curious that gunpowder can be preserved from damage by fire with much greater ease than such a substance as parchment, but the former can only be destroyed by being in contact with actual fire, or becoming subject to a most intense heat (about 560 degrees); while a moderate heat or exposure to steam, such as is necessarily generated by the fire-proofing of a safe, often irretrievably damages parchment. A well-made safe, on the principle of evaporation already described, may be relied on to preserve gunpowder from considerable heat, but to avoid the possibility of flame or sparks entering the space round the door, a second safe of lighter make may be placed inside the ordinary one. Major Majendie, in a recent report to the Government on this subject, suggests that there should be public trials by the various makers, of safes, such as they severally think most suitable for this special purpose. It remains to be seen if this advice will be followed, and if so, upon what principle the trials will be conducted, and whether the safes or chests so tested will be precisely the same as the makers intend to retail, or are made specially for the occasion. It is extremely doubtful if the Government would be acting wisely in affording facilities at the public expense for private firmsto experiment with safes the merits of which are pretty well known; but should the trials take place, no doubt the results will, in some instances, be of a nature to astonish those not practically familiar with the action of fire in such cases.
INthe broadest sense of the term there cannot be such a thing as a burglar-proof or fire-proof safe, but in the usually restricted sense of these words it is easy to obtain a safe that combines both qualities, provided what is considered to be a good price is paid.
But it will be well to begin by warning those who hunt after so-called second-hand safes that a real second-hand one, by a good maker, is seldom to be obtained; also that the majority of safes advertised and sold as genuinely second-hand, and with which a warranty is often said to be given, are absolutely worthless, being made by small makers in London and Birmingham, chiefly on purpose to be sold as second-hand, and constructed of the lightest and poorest materials. The parts that are visible of these safes of course look strong; for instance, the edge of the door is sometimes about an inch thick, thus making it appear as if of that thickness throughout; while the fact is that the door is made of two thin sheets of iron with a thick narrow bar all round the edge, thus showing apparent strength where there is none in reality, for nothing is easier than to drill through this door and force back the bolts.
It is well for the reputation—such as it is—of these second-hand safes that they are covered with paint; the more the defects the nicer the safe frequently looks,outwardly; for it is easy enough to cover up cracks, bad joints, &c. with putty, and then paint it all as smooth as a carriage-panel. The angle-iron, by which the plates are fastened together, is very slight, the rivets are small and few and far between; the plates themselves are but sheet-iron, often of less thickness than the mere linings of good safes; and as for the fireproofing material, it is sometimes the ashes from the hearth, and sometimes garden-mould. It is a fact that, at an auction in Scotland, whilst a safe of this description was being ‘put up’ as one of the best ever made, it suddenly fell to the ground, broke open in the fall, and out came the fireproofing in the shape of fresh garden-turf, with live worms in it.
At a dealer’s at the West End of London, within the last few months, there was one of thesenewsecond-hand safes, its outer plates being less than an eighth of an inch thick. The safe, about five feet high, was so top-heavy and badly made that upon being touched it rocked like a jelly, and had to be supported by boards at the back. Such is a sample of many a wretched safe bought by unsuspecting and naturally ignorant customers.
As to the fastening of such safes, the bolts are two or three in number, thrown to the front of the door, while at the back of the door are what are called ‘dogs,’ that is, immovable bolts, of little or no use, and put in merely to make the fastenings look stronger. The hinges, too, which ought to be well-made and of the best wrought-iron, are of cast-iron, so that not only does the movement of the door quickly wear them away, but a sharp blow would at once smash them in pieces.
The lock, which is generally used as a bait to catch the purchaser, is frequently of good make, but of a kind never intended for a safe. Locks made for wooden drawers are constantly bought and used for this purpose, although totally unsuitable, and in spite of all proceedings that can betaken to prevent it. Neither my firm nor any of the large safe-manufacturers make safe-locks for any but safes of their own make. A lock for this purpose requires to be, first, very strong, and protected by hard steel, so as to be drill-proof; second, completely gunpowder-proof; third, simple in construction, so that it may never be liable to derangement. Locks on such safes as we are now describing are seldom anything but the last, and not always that. So weak and poor in its construction is this most important part of most of these safes, that workmen with the simplest tools have, with ease and without noise, forced open many of them in from five to fifteen minutes. The lock most suitable for safes is shown in annexed engraving.