The greatest statesmen of Europe and America have sought for many years to unify the coinage of nations, and to adopt common standards of weights and measures, so that commerce may be freed from the restrictions now imposed upon it, but Great Britain has steadily opposed all these enlightened measures, and thus far has been able to defeat them.
My report from the committee on finance, made to the Senate June 7, 1868, contains a full statement of the acts of the monetary conference at Paris, and of the approval of its action by many of the countries there represented, and of the support given to the plan in Great Britain by many of her ablest statesmen and the great body of her commercial classes, but the party then in power in parliament refused its sanction, and thus, as already stated, the measure failed.
It has been quite common, during recent discussion about silver, to attribute the alleged demonetization of that metal to the action of the Paris monetary conference. In 1867, when this conference was in session, as already stated, sixteen ounces of silver were worth more than one ounce of gold. Fifteen and one-half ounces of silver were the legal equivalent of one ounce of gold in all European countries. No suggestion was made or entertained to disturb the circulation of silver. The only object sought was to secure some common coin by which other coins could be easily measured. As gold was the most valuable metal in smallest space, and the five-franc gold piece of France was the bestunitby which other coins could be measured, other gold coins were to be multiples of the unit, so that five francs would be a dollar and five dollars would be a pound. The coins of other nations would be made to conform to multiples of this unit.
It was perfectly understood that, while silver was the chief coin in domestic exchanges in every country, it was not convenient for foreign commerce, owing to its bulk. The ratio between gold and silver was purely a domestic matter, to be determined by each country for itself. It is apparent that the chief cause of the fall of the market value of silver is its increased production. This affects the price of every commodity, cotton, corn, or wheat as well as silver. The law of supply and demand regulates value. It is the "higher law" more potent than acts of Congress. If the supply is in excess of demand the price will fall, in spite of legislation. The most striking evidence of this was furnished by our recent legislation by which we purchased over 400,000,000 ounces of silver at its market value and hoarded it, and yet the price of it steadily declined. We can coin it into silver dollars, but we can keep these dollars at par with gold only be receiving them as the equal of gold when offered.
During the spring and summer of 1867 the question of impeaching Andrew Johnson, President of the United States, was frequently discussed in the House of Representatives. The resolutions relating to his impeachment were introduced by James M. Ashley, of Ohio, on the 7th of March, 1867, and they were adopted on the same day. These resolutions instructed the judiciary committee, when appointed, to continue the inquiry, previously ordered, into certain charges preferred against the President of the United States, with authority to sit during the sessions of the House, and during any recess the Congress might take.
On the 25th of November, 1867, a majority of the committee on the judiciary reported a resolution of impeachment, as follows:
"Resolved, That Andrew Johnson, President of the United States, be impeached of high crimes and misdemeanors."
This resolution was accompanied by a long report and the testimony, all of which was ordered to be printed, and made the special order for Wednesday, December 4, 1867. James F. Wilson, of Iowa, made a minority report against the resolution of impeachment, signed by himself and Frederick E. Woodbridge, of Vermont. Samuel S. Marshall, of Illinois, also made a minority report in behalf of himself and Charles A. Eldridge, of Wisconsin.
On the 7th of December, the resolution of impeachment reported by the committee on the judiciary at the previous session was disagreed to by a vote of 57 yeas and 108 nays. This decision of the House of Representatives against an impeachment on the charges then made was entirely justified. This imposing process was not authorized for misconduct, immorality, intoxication or neglect of duties, such as were alleged in the report of the committee, but only for high crimes or misdemeanors. The House properly made this distinction, and here the accusations against the President would have ended, but for his attempt, in violation of the constitution and law, to place General Lorenzo Thomas in an important office without the advice and consent of the Senate, then in session.
In the latter part of 1867, and the early part of 1868, I became involved in a controversy, between President Johnson, General Grant and General Sherman, which caused the last-named serious embarrassment. As much of the correspondence between these parties has been published in the "Sherman Letters," I at first thought it best not to make any reference to the matter, but upon reflection, and to explain subsequent events, I insert the letters in their order.
General Sherman was summoned to Washington, by the President, and upon his arrival there wrote me the following letter:
"Washington, October 11, 1867. "Dear Brother:—I have no doubt that you have been duly concerned about my being summoned to Washington.
"It was imprudently done by the President without going through Grant. But I think I have smoothed it over so that Grant does not feel hurt. I cannot place myself in a situation even partially antagonistic with Grant. We must work together. Mr. Johnson has not offered me anything, only has talked over every subject, and because I listen to him patiently, and make short and decisive answers, he says he would like to have me here. Still he does not oppose my going back home. . . .
"On Monday I will start for St. Louis by the Atlantic and G. W. road, and pass Mansfield Tuesday. Can't you meet me and ride some miles? I have been away from home so much, and must go right along to Fort Laramie, that I cannot well stop at Cleveland or Mansfield, and would like to see you for an hour or so to hear your views of the coming events. . . .
"Yours affectionately,"W. T. Sherman."
And on his return to St. Louis he continues:
. . . "I have always talked kindly to the President, and have advised Grant to do so. I do think that it is best for all hands that his administration be allowed to run out its course without threatened or attempted violence. Whoever begins violent proceedings will lose in the long run. Johnson is not a man of action but of theory, and so long as your party is in doubt as to the true mode of procedure, it would be at great risk that an attempt be made to displease the President by a simple law of Congress. This is as much as I have ever said to anybody. I have never, by word or inference, given anybody the right to class me in opposition to, or in support of, Congress. On the contrary, I told Mr. Johnson that from the nature of things he could not dispense with a Congress to make laws and appropriate money, and suggested to him to receive and make overtures to such men as Fessenden, Trumbull, Sherman, Morgan, and Morton, who, though differing with him in abstract views of constitutional law and practice, were not destructive. That if the congressional plan of reconstruction succeeded, he could do nothing, and if it failed or led to confusion, the future developed results in his favor, etc.; and that is pretty much all I have ever said or done. At the meeting of the society of the army of the Tennessee on the 13th inst., I will be forced to speak, if here, and though I can confine myself purely to the military events of the past, I can make the opportunity of stating that in no event will I be drawn into the complications of the civil politics of this country.
"If Congress could meet and confine itself to current and committee business, I feel certain that everything will work along quietly till the nominations are made, and a new presidential election will likely settle the principle if negroes are to be voters in the states without the consent of the whites. This is more a question of prejudice than principle, but a voter has as much right to his prejudices as to his vote. . . ."
I answered:
"Mansfield, Ohio, November 1, 1867. "Dear Brother:— . . . I see no real occasion for trouble with Johnson. The great error of his life was in not acquiescing in and supporting the 14th amendment of the constitution in the 39th Congress. This he could easily have carried. It referred the suffrage question to each state, and if adopted long ago the whole controversy would have culminated; or, if further opposed by the extreme radicals, they would have been easily beaten. Now I see nothing short of universal suffrage and universal amnesty as the basis. When you come on, I suggest that you give out that you go on to make your annual report and settle Indian affairs. Give us notice when you will be on, and come directly to my house, where we will make you one of the family.
"Grant, I think, is inevitably the candidate. He allows himself to drift into a position where he can't decline if he would, and I feel sure he don't want to decline. My judgment is that Chase is better for the country and for Grant himself, but I will not quarrel with what I cannot control.
"John Sherman."
And later I wrote:—
"If you can keep free from committals to Johnson, you will surely as you live be called upon to act as President. The danger now is that the mistakes of the Republicans may drift the Democratic party into power. If so, the Rebellion is triumphant, and no man active in suppressing it will be treated or honored. Grant is not injured by his correspondence with Johnson, but no doubt feels annoyed. . . ."
At this time President Johnson had come to open disagreement with Mr. Stanton, his Secretary of War, and wished to force him from the cabinet. Mr. Stanton had refused to resign and had been upheld by Congress. The President then turned for help in his difficulties to General Grant, commanding the army; but the latter found that any interference on his part would be illegal and impossible.
Mr. Johnson then planned to create a new office for General Sherman, that of brevet general of the army, in order to bring him to Washington.
The following letters and telegrams refer to this difficulty:
"(Confidential.)"Library Room, War Department, }"Washington, D. C., January 31, 1868.}"To the President:—Since our interview of yesterday I have giventhe subject of our conversation all my thoughts, and I beg you willpardon my reducing the result to writing.
"My personal preferences, if expressed, were to be allowed to return to St. Louis to resume my present command, because my command was important, large, suited to my rank and inclination, and because my family was well provided for there, in house facilities, schools, living, and agreeable society.
"Whilst, on the other hand, Washington was for many (to me) good reasons highly objectionable. Especially because it is the political capital of the country and focus of intrigue, gossip, and slander. Your personal preferences were, as expressed, to make a new department east adequate to my rank, with headquarters at Washington, and to assign me to its command—to remove my family here, and to avail myself of its schools, etc.; to remove Mr. Stanton from his office as Secretary of War, and have me to discharge the duties.
"To effect this removal two modes were indicated: To simply cause him to quit the war office building and notify the treasury department and the army staff departments no longer to respect him as Secretary or War; or to remove him, and submit my name to the Senate for confirmation. Permit me to discuss these points a little, and I will premise by saying that I have spoken to no one on the subject, and have not even seen Mr. Ewing, Mr. Stanbery, or General Grant since I was with you.
"It has been the rule and custom of our army, since the organization of the government, that the officer of the army second in rank should be in command at the second place in importance, and remote from general headquarters. To bring me to Washington would put three heads to an army,—yourself, General Grant, and myself,—and we would be more than human if we were not to differ. In my judgment it would ruin the army, and would be fatal to one or two of us.
"Generals Scott and Taylor proved themselves soldiers and patriots in the field, but Washington was fatal to them both. This city and the influences that centered here defeated every army that had its head here from 1861 to 1865, and would have overwhelmed General Grant at Spottsylvania and Petersburg, had he not been fortified by a strong reputation already hard earned, and because no one then living coveted the place. Whereas in the west we made progress from the start, because there was no political capital near enough to poison our minds and kindle into light that craving itching for fame which has killed more good men than battles. I have been with General Grant in the midst of death and slaughter—when the howls of people reached him after Shiloh; when messengers were speeding to and fro, between his army and Washington, bearing slanders to induce his removal before he took Vicksburg; in Chattanooga, when the soldiers were stealing the corn of the starving mules to satisfy their own hunger; at Nashville, when he was ordered to the 'forlorn hope' to command the army of the Potomac, so often defeated—and yet I never saw him more troubled than since he has been in Washington, and has been compelled to read himself a 'sneak and deceiver,' based on reports of four of the cabinet, and apparently with your knowledge. If this political atmosphere can disturb the equanimity of one so guarded and so prudent as he is, what will be the result with one so careless, so outspoken, as I am? Therefore, with my consent, Washington never.
"As to the Secretary of War, his office is twofold. As cabinet officer he should not be there without your hearty, cheerful consent, and I believe that is the judgment and opinion of every fair-minded man. As the holder of a civil office, having the supervision of money appropriated by Congress, and of contracts for army supplies, I do think Congress, or the Senate by delegation from Congress, has a lawful right to be consulted. At all events, I would not risk a suit or contest on that phase of the question. The law of Congress of March 2, 1867, prescribing the manner in which orders and instructions relating to 'military movements' shall reach the army, gives you, as constitutional commander in chief, the very power you want to exercise, and enables you to prevent the secretary from making any such orders and instructions, and consequently he cannot control the army, but is limited and restricted to a duty that an auditor of the treasury could perform. You certainly can afford to await the result. The executive power is not weakened, but, rather, strengthened. Surely he is not such an obstruction as would warrant violence or even a show of force which could produce the very reaction and clamor that he hopes for, to save him from the absurdity of holding an empty office 'for the safety of the country.'
"With great respect, yours truly,"W. T. Sherman."
"Headquarters Military Division of the Missouri,}"St. Louis, Mo., February 14, 1868. }"To the President:
"Dear Sir:—It is hard for me to conceive you would purposely do me an unkindness, unless under the pressure of a sense of public duty, or because you do not believe me sincere.
"I was in hopes, since my letter to you of the 31st of January, that you had concluded to pass over that purpose of yours, expressed more than once in conversation, to organize a new command for me in the east, with headquarters in Washington; but a telegram, from General Grant, of yesterday, says that 'the order was issued ordering you' (me) 'to Atlantic division;' and the newspapers of this morning contain the same information, with the addition that I have been nominated as 'brevet general.' I have telegraphed to my own brother in the Senate to oppose my nomination, on the ground that the two higher grades in the army ought not to be complicated with brevets, and I trust you will conceive my motives aright. If I could see my way clear to maintain my family, I should not hesitate a moment to resign my present commission and seek some business wherein I would be free from those unhappy complications that seem to be closing about me, in spite of my earnest efforts to avoid them; but necessity ties my hands, and I submit with the best grace I can, till I make other arrangements.
"In Washington are already the headquarters of a department, and of the army itself, and it is hard for me to see wherein I can render military service there. Any staff officer with the rank of major could surely fill any gap left between those two military offices; and by being placed at Washington I shall be universally construed as a rival to the general in chief, a position damaging to me in the highest degree. Our relations have always been most confidential and friendly, and if, unhappily, any cloud of difficulty should arise between us, my sense of personal dignity and duty would leave me no alternative but resignation. For this I am not yet prepared, but I shall proceed to arrange for it as rapidly as possible, that when the time does come (as it surely will if this plan is carried into effect), I may act promptly.
"Inasmuch as the order is now issued, I cannot expect a full revocation of it, but I beg the privilege of taking post at New York, or at any point you may name, within the new military division, other than Washington.
"This privilege is generally granted to all military commanders, and I can see no good reasons why I, too, may not ask for it; and this simple concession, involving no public interest, will much soften the blow which, right or wrong, I construe as one of the hardest I have sustained in a life somewhat checkered with adversity.
"With great respect, yours truly,(Signed) "W. T. Sherman, Lieutenant General."
"Headquarters Military Division of Missouri,} "St. Louis, February 14, 1868. } "Dear Brother:— . . . I am again in the midst of trouble, occasioned by a telegram from Grant saying that the order is out for me to come to the command of the military division of the Atlantic, headquarters at Washington. The President repeatedly asked me to accept of some such position, but I thought I had fought it off successfully, though he again and again reverted to it.
"Now, it seems, he has ordered it, and it is full of trouble for me. I wrote him one or two letters in Washington, which I though positive enough, but have now written another, and if it fails in its object I might as well cast about for new employment. The result would be certain conflict, resulting in Grant's violent deposition, mine, or the President's.
"There is not room on board of one ship for more than one captain.
"If Grant intends to run for President I should be willing to come on, because my duties would then be so clearly defined that I think I could steer clear of the breakers—but now it would be impossible. The President would make use of me to beget violence, a condition of things that ought not to exist now.
"He has no right to use us for such purposes, though he is commander in chief. I did suppose his passage with Grant would end there, but now it seems he will fight him as he has been doing Congress. I don't object if he does so himself and don't rope me in. . . .
"If the President forces me into a false position out of seeming favor, I must defend myself. It is mortifying, but none the less inevitable.
"Affectionately,"W. T. Sherman."
(Telegram.)"Washington, February 14, 1868."From St. Louis, February 14, 1868."To General U. S. Grant, Commander U. S. Army:
"Your dispatch informing me that the order for the Atlantic division was issued, and that I was assigned to its command, is received.
"I was in hopes I had escaped the danger, and now, were I prepared, should resign on the spot, as it requires no foresight to predict such must be the inevitable result in the end.
"I will make one more desperate effort by mail, which please await.
(Signed) "W. T. Sherman, Lieutenant General."
(Telegram.)"Dated St. Louis, February 14, 1868."Received at House of Representatives, February 14."To Hon. John Sherman:
"Oppose confirmation of myself as brevet general on ground that it is unprecedented, and that it is better not to extend the system of brevets above major general. If I can't avoid coming to Washington I may have to resign.
"W. T. Sherman, Lieutenant-General."
This correspondence, some of which was published, excited a great deal of attention, and I received many letters in regard to it, one of which I insert:
"Washington, D. C., February 17, 1868. "Dear Sherman:—How nobly and magnanimously your gallant brother has acted. If A. J. was not callous to all that would affect gentlemen generally, he would feel this rebuke stingingly. But since he has betrayed the men who elected him he is proof against such things.
"Yours very truly,"Schuyler Colfax."
Upon the receipt of General Sherman's telegram I requested the committee on military affairs to take no action upon his nomination, as he did not desire, and would not accept, the proposed compliment. This correspondence then followed:
"Headquarters Military Division of the Missouri.} "St. Louis, Mo., February 17, 1868. } "Dear Brother:— . . . I have not yet got the order for the Atlantic division, but it is coming by mail, and when received I must act. I have asked the President to let me make my headquarters at New York, instead of Washington, making my application of the ground that my simply being in Washington will be universally construed as rivalry to General Grant, a position which would be damaging to me in the extreme.
"If I must come to Washington, it will be with a degree of reluctance never before experienced. I would leave my family here on the supposition that the change was temporary. I do not question the President's right to make the new division, and I think Congress would make a mistake to qualify his right. It would suffice for them to nonconfirm the brevet of general. I will notify you by telegraph when the matter is concluded.
"Affectionately,"W. T. Sherman."
(Telegram.)"Received Washington, February 20, 1868."From St. Louis, Mo., February 20, 1868."To General U. S. Grant:
"The President telegraphs that I may remain in my present command.I write him a letter of thanks through you to-day. Congress shouldnot have for publication my letters to the President, unless thePresident himself chooses to give them.
(Signed) "W. T. Sherman, Lieut. General."
"Headquarters Army of the United States.} "Washington, February 21, 1868. } "Dear Sir:—By General Grant's direction I inclose a copy of a dispatch from General Sherman, seeming to indicate his preference that the correspondence in question should not now be made public.
"Respectfully yours,"C. B. Comstock, B. B. S."Hon. John Sherman, United States Senate."
A few days after this, General Sherman went to Washington in response to the President's order, and while there had several interviews with the President relating to the change of his command. He objected very strongly, as has been seen, to any such change, because he felt that he could not hold a command in Washington without interfering with Grant's interests, and because he had a rooted objection to living in Washington in the midst of the turmoil of politics. These objections were embodied in three letters which General Sherman wrote and showed to Grant before he sent them to the President. One of them found its way into the public press, and created a disturbance which called forth the following letters:
"Headquarters Army of the United States,}"Washington, D. C., February 22, 1868. }"Hon. J. Sherman, United States Senate.
"Dear Sir:—The 'National Intelligencer' of this morning contains a private note which General Sherman sent to the President whilst he was in Washington, dictated by the purest kindness and a disposition to preserve harmony, and not intended for publication. It seems to me that the publication of that letter is calculated to place the general in a wrong light before the public, taken in connection with what correspondents have said before, evidently getting their inspiration from the White House.
"As General Sherman afterwards wrote a semi-official note to the President, furnishing me a copy, and still later a purely official one sent through me, which placed him in his true position, and which have not been published, though called for by the 'House,' I take the liberty of sending you these letters to give you the opportunity of consulting General Sherman as to what action to take upon them. In all matters where I am not personally interested, I would not hesitate to advise General Sherman how I would act in his place. But in this instance, after the correspondence I have had with Mr. Johnson, I may not see General Sherman's interest in the same light that others see it, or that I would see it in if no such correspondence had occurred. I am clear in this, however, the correspondence here inclosed to you should not be made public except by the President, or with the full sanction of General Sherman. Probably the letter of the 31st of January, marked 'confidential,' should not be given out at all.
"Yours truly,"U. S. Grant."
The following letter was addressed to the "National Intelligencer," a Washington newspaper:
"United States Senate Chamber, } "Washington, February 22, 1868.} "Gentlemen:—The publication in your paper yesterday of General Sherman's note to the President, and its simultaneous transmission by telegraph, unaccompanied by subsequent letters withheld by the President because they were 'private,' is so unfair as to justify severe censure upon the person who furnished you this letter, whoever he may be. Upon its face it is an informal private note dictated by the purest motives—a desire to preserve harmony—and not intended for publication. How any gentleman receiving such a note could first allow vague but false suggestions of its contents to be given out, and then print it, and withhold other letters because they were 'private,' with a view to create the impression that General Sherman, in referring to ulterior measures, suggested the violent expulsion of a high officer from his office, passes my comprehension. Still I know that General Sherman is so sensitive upon questions of official propriety in publishing papers, that he would rather suffer from this false inference than correct it by publishing another private note, and as I know that this letter was not the only one written by General Sherman to the President about Mr. Stanton, I applied to the President for his consent to publish subsequent letters. This consent was freely given by the President, and I therefore send copies to you and ask their publication.
"These copies are furnished me from official sources; for while I know General Sherman's opinions, yet he did not show me either of the letters to the President, during his stay here, nervously anxious to promote harmony, to avoid strife, and certainly never suggested or countenanced resistance to law—or violence in any form. He no doubt left Washington with his old repugnance to politics, politicians, and newspapers very much increased by his visit here.
"John Sherman."
"United States Senate Chamber, February 23, 1868. "Dear Brother:—I received your letters and telegrams, and did not answer because events were moving so rapidly that I could say nothing but might be upset before you got the letter.
"Now you can congratulate yourself upon being clear of the worst complications we have ever had. Impeachment seems to be a forgone conclusion so far as the House of Representatives is concerned, based upon the allegedforcibleexpulsion of Stanton. No one disputes the right of the President to raise a question of law upon his right to remove Stanton, but the forcible removal of a man in office, claiming to be in lawfully, is like the forcible ejectment of a tenant when his right of possession is in dispute. It is a trespass, an assault, a riot, or a crime, according to the result of the force. It is strange the President can contemplate such a thing, when Stanton is already stripped of power, and the courts are open to the President to try his right of removal. The President is acting very badly with respect to you. He creates the impression that you acted disingenuously with him. He has published your short private note before you went to Annapolis, and yet refuses to publish your formal one subsequently sent to him, because it was 'private.' The truth is, he is a slave to his passions and resentments. No man can confide in him, and you ought to feel happy at your extrication from all near connection with him. . . . Grant is anxious to have your letters published, since the note referred to was published. I will see Grant and the President this evening, and if the latter freely consents, I will do it informally; but if he doubts or hesitates, I will not without your expressed directions. In these times of loose confidence, it is better to submit for a time to a wrong construction, than to betray confidential communications. Grant will, unquestionably, be nominated. Chase acquiesces, and I see no reason to doubt his election. . . .
"Affectionately,"John Sherman."
"Headquarters Military Division of the Missouri.} "St. Louis, Mo., February 25, 1868. } "Dear Brother:— . . . I am in possession of all the news up to date—the passage of the impeachment resolution, etc.—but I yet don't know if the nomination of T. Ewing, Senior, was a real thing or meant to compromise a difficulty.
"The publication of my short note of January 18, is nothing to me. I have the original draft which I sent through Grant's hands, with his indorsement back to me. At the time this note must have been given to the reporter, the President had an elaborate letter from me, in which I discussed the whole case, and advised against the very course he has pursued, but I don't want that letter or any other to be drawn out to complicate a case already bad enough.
"You may always safely represent me by saying that I will not make up a final opinion until called on to act, and I want nothing to do with these controversies until the time comes for the actual fight, which I hope to God may be avoided. If the Democratic party intend to fight on this impeachment, which I believe they do not, you may count 200,000 men against you in the south. The negroes are no match for them. On this question, the whites there will be more united than on the old issue of union and secession. I do not think the President should be suspended during trial, and, if possible, the Republican party should not vote on all side questions as a unit. They should act as judges, and not as partisans. The vote in the House, being a strictly party vote, looks bad, for it augurs a prejudiced jury. Those who adhere closest to the law in this crisis are the best patriots. Whilst the floating politicians here share the excitement at Washington, the people generally manifest little interest in the game going on at Washington. . . .
"Affectionately yours,"W. T. Sherman."
"United States Senate Chamber.} "Washington, March 1, 1868. } "Dear Brother:—Your letter of the 25th is received. I need not say to you that the new events transpiring here are narrowly watched by me. So far as I am concerned, I mean to give Johnson a fair and impartial trial, and to decide nothing until required to do so, and after full argument. I regard him as a foolish and stubborn man, doing even right things in a wrong way, and in a position where the evil that he does is immensely increased by his manner of doing it. He clearly designed to have first Grant, and then you, involved in Lorenzo Thomas' position, and in this he is actuated by his recent revolt against Stanton. How easy it would have been, if he had followed your advice, to have made Stanton anxious to resign, or what is worse, to have made his position ridiculous. By his infernal folly we are drifting into turbulent waters. The only way is to keep cool and act conscientiously. I congratulate you on your lucky extrication. I do not anticipate civil war, for our proceeding is unquestionably lawful, and if the judgment is against the President, his term is just as clearlyoutas if the 4th of March, 1869, was come. The result, if he is convicted, would cast the undivided responsibility of reconstruction upon the Republican party, and would unquestionably secure the full admission of all the states by July next, and avoid the dangerous questions that may otherwise arise out of the southern vote in the Presidential election. It is now clear that Grant will be a candidate, and his election seems quite as clear. The action of North Carolina removed the last doubt of his nomination.
"Affectionately yours,"John Sherman."
"Headquarters Military Division of the Missouri,} "St. Louis, March 14, 1868. } "Dear Brother:—I don't know what Grant means by his silence in the midst of the very great indications of his receiving the nomination in May. Doubtless he intends to hold aloof from the expression of any opinion, till the actual nomination is made, when, if he accepts with a strong radical platform, I shall be surprised. My notion is that he thinks that the Democrats ought not to succeed to power, and that he would be willing to stand a sacrifice rather than see that result. . . . I notice that you Republicans have divided on some of the side questions on impeachment, and am glad that you concede to the President the largest limits in his defense that are offered. I don't see what the Republicans can gain by shoving matters to an extent that looks like a foregone conclusion.
"No matter what men may think of Mr. Johnson, his office is one that ought to have a pretty wide latitude of opinion. Nevertheless, the trial is one that will be closely and sternly criticised by all the civilized world. . . .
"Your brother,"W. T. Sherman."
At this time I wrote from Washington:
"You notice the impeachment proceedings have commenced. As a matter of course, I have nothing to say about them. It is strange that they have so little effect on prices and business. The struggle has been so long that the effect has been discounted. . . .
"The President was very anxious to send you to Louisiana, and only gave it up by reason of your Indian command. He might think that your visit to Europe now was not consistent with the reason given for your remaining at St. Louis. Still, on this point you could readily ask his opinion, and if that agrees with Grant's you need feel no delicacy in going. No more favorable opportunity or time to visit Europe will likely occur. . . ."
General Sherman replied:
"I hardly know what to think of the impeachment. Was in hopes Mr. Johnson would be allowed to live out his term, and doubt if any good will result by a change for the few months still remaining of his term. A new cabinet, and the changes foreshadowed by Wade's friends, though natural enough, would have insufficient time to do any good. I have a private letter from Grant as late as March 18, but he says not a word of his political intentions. So far as I know, he would yet be glad of a change that would enable him to remain as now. . . ."
On the 27th of February, 1868, Mr. Stevens made the following report:
"The committee on reconstruction, to whom was referred, on the 27th of January last, the following resolution:
'Resolved, That the committee on reconstruction be authorized to inquire what combinations have been made or attempted to be made to obstruct the due execution of the laws; and to that end the committee have powers to send for persons and papers, and to examine witnesses on oath, and report to this House what action, if any, they may deem necessary; and that said committee have leave to report at any time.'
"And to whom was also referred, on the 21st day of February, instant, a communication from Hon. Edwin M. Stanton, Secretary of War, dated on said 21st day of February, together with a copy of a letter from Andrew Johnson, President of the United States, to the said Edwin M. Stanton, as follows:
'Executive Mansion, } 'Washington, D. C., February 21, 1868.} 'Sir:—By virtue of the power and authority vested in me, as President, by the constitution and laws of the United States, you are hereby removed from office as secretary for the department of war, and your functions as such will terminate upon the receipt of this communication.
'You will transfer to Brevet Major General Lorenzo Thomas, Adjutant General of the Army, who has this day been authorized and empowered to act as Secretary of Warad interim, all records, books, papers, and other public property now in your custody and charge.
'Respectfully yours,'Andrew Johnson.'Hon. Edwin M. Stanton, Washington, D. C.'
"And to whom was also referred by the House of Representatives the following resolution, namely:
'Resolved, That Andrew Johnson, President of the United States, be impeached of high crimes and misdemeanors.'
"Have considered the several subjects referred to them, and submit the following report:
"That in addition to the papers referred to the committee, the committee find that the President, on the 21st day of February, 1868, signed and issued a commission or letter of authority to one Lorenzo Thomas, directing and authorizing said Thomas to act as Secretary of Warad interim, and to take possession of the books, records, and papers, and other public property in the war department, of which the following is a copy:
'Executive Mansion, } 'Washington, February 21, 1868.} 'Sir:—Hon. Edwin M. Stanton having been this day removed from office as secretary for the department of war, you are hereby authorized and empowered to act as Secretary of Warad interim, and will immediately enter upon the discharge of the duties pertaining to that office. Mr. Stanton has been instructed to transfer to you all the records, books, papers, and other public property now in his custody and charge.
'Respectfully yours,'Andrew Johnson.'To Brevet Major General Lorenzo Thomas, Adjutant General of theUnited States Army, Washington, District of Columbia.
'Official copy respectfully furnished to Hon. Edwin M. Stanton.
'L. Thomas'Secretary of Warad interim.'
"Upon the evidence collected by the committee, which is herewith presented, and in virtue of the powers with which they have been invested by the House, they are of the opinion that Andrew Johnson, President of the United States, be impeached of high crimes and misdemeanors. They therefore recommend to the House the adoption of the accompanying resolution:
"Thaddeus Stevens,"George S. Boutwell,"John A. Bingham,"C. T. Hulburd,"John F. Farnsworth,"F. C. Beaman,"H. E. Paine.
"Resolution providing for the impeachment of Andrew Johnson,President of the United States:
'Resolved, That Andrew Johnson, President of the United States, be impeached of high crimes and misdemeanors in office.'"
On the 24th of February the resolution providing for impeachment was adopted by a vote of 126 yeas and 47 nays.
On the same day Mr. Stevens introduced the following resolution, which was agreed to:
"Resolved, That a committee of two be appointed to go to the Senate and, at the bar thereof, in the name of the House of Representatives and of all the people of the United States, to impeach Andrew Johnson, President of the United States, of high crimes and misdemeanors in office, and acquaint the Senate that the House of Representatives will, in due time, exhibit particular articles of impeachment against him and make good the same; and that the committee do demand that the Senate take order for the appearance of said Andrew Johnson to answer to said impeachment.
"2.Resolved, That a committee of seven be appointed to prepare and report articles of impeachment against Andrew Johnson, President of the United States, with power to send for persons, papers, and records, and to take testimony under oath."
The speaker then announced the following committees under these resolutions:
"Committee to communicate to the Senate the action of the House ordering an impeachment of the President of the United States:— Thaddeus Stevens, of Pennsylvania, and John A. Bingham, of Ohio.
"Committee to declare articles of impeachment against the President of the United States:—George S. Boutwell, of Massachusetts; Thaddeus Stevens, of Pennsylvania; John A. Bingham, of Ohio; James F. Wilson, of Iowa; John A. Logan, of Illinois; George W. Julian, of Indiana; and Hamilton Ward, of New York."
The trial of this impeachment by the Senate was an imposing spectacle, which excited profound interest during its continuance. It was soon developed that the gravamen of the charges was not the removal of Stanton, but was the attempt of the President to force General Lorenzo Thomas into a high office without the advice and consent of the Senate.
In the trial of this impeachment I wished to be, and I think I was, absolutely impartial. I liked the President personally and harbored against him none of the prejudice and animosity of some others. I knew he was bold and rash, better fitted for the storms of political life than the grave responsibilities of the chief magistrate of a great country. His education, such as it was, was acquired late in life, when his character was formed and his habits fixed. Still, his mind was vigorous and his body strong, and when thoroughly aroused he was an able speaker; his language was forcible and apt and his influence over a popular audience was effective. I disliked above all things to be a judge in his case. I knew some of my associates were already against the President, and others were decided in his favor. I resolutely made up my mind, so far as human nature would admit, to fairly hear and impartially consider all the evidence produced and all the arguments made.
The counsel for the President were Henry Stanbery, B. R. Curtis, Jeremiah S. Black, William M. Evarts, William S. Groesbeck, and Thomas A. R. Nelson. The managers on the part of the House of Representatives were John A. Bingham, George S. Boutwell, James F. Wilson, John A. Logan, Thomas Williams, Benjamin F. Butler and Thaddeus Stevens. The trial lasted nearly two months, was ably conducted on both sides, and ended by the acquittal of the President, on the eleventh article of impeachment, by a vote of 35 guilty and 19 not guilty. Two-thirds of those voting not having pronounced "guilty," as required by the constitution, the President was acquitted upon this article. Two other articles were voted on with the same result. Thereupon, on the 26th day of May, 1868, the Senate sitting as a court of impeachment adjourned without day. Mr. Stanton resigned and General Schofield became Secretary of War.
I voted for conviction for the reasons stated in the opinion given by me. I have carefully reviewed this opinion and am entirely content with it. I stated in the beginning my desire to consider the case without bias or feeling. I quote in full the opening paragraphs:
"This cause must be decided upon the reasons and presumptions which by law apply to all other criminal accusations. Justice is blind to the official station of the respondent, and to the attitude of the accusers speaking in the name of all the people of the United States. It only demands of the Senate the application to this cause of the principles and safeguards provided for every human being accused of crime. For the proper application of these principles we ourselves are on trial before the bar of public opinion. The novelty of this proceeding, the historical character of the trial, and the grave interests involved, only deepen the obligation of the special oath we have taken to do impartial justice according to the constitution and laws.
"And this case must be tried upon the charges now made by the House of Representatives. We cannot consider other offenses. An appeal is made to the conscience of each Senator of guilty or not guilty by the President of eleven specific offenses. In answering this appeal a Senator cannot justify himself by public opinion, or by political, personal, or partisan demands, or even grave considerations of public policy. His conscientious conviction of the truth of these charges is the only test that will justify a verdict of guilty. God forbid that any other shall prevail here. In forming this conviction we are not limited merely to the rules of evidence, which, by the experience of ages, have been found best adapted to the trial of offenses in the double tribunal of court and jury, but we may seek light from history, from personal knowledge, and from all sources that will tend to form a conscientious conviction of the truth. And we are not bound to technical definitions of crimes and misdemeanors.
"A willful violation of the law, a gross and palpable breach of moral obligations tending to unfit an officer for the proper discharge of his office, or to bring the office into public contempt and derision, is, when charged and proven, an impeachable offense. And the nature and criminality of the offense may depend on the official character of the accused. A judge would be held to higher official purity, and an executive officer to a stricter observance of the letter of the law. The President, bound as a citizen to obey the law, and specially sworn to execute the law, may properly, in his high office as chief magistrate, be held to a stricter responsibility than if his example was less dangerous to the public safety. Still, to justify the conviction of the President there must be specific allegations of some crime or misdemeanor involving moral turpitude, gross misconduct, or a willful violation of law, and the proof must be such as to satisfy the conscience of the truth of the charge.
"The principal charges against the President are that he willfully and purposely violated the constitution and the laws, in the order for the removal of Mr. Stanton, and in the order for the appointment of General Thomas as Secretary of Warad interim. These two orders were contemporaneous—part of the same transaction—but are distinct acts, and are made the basis of separate articles of impeachment."
I stated the grounds of my conviction that the action of the President, in placing Lorenzo Thomas in charge of the office of Secretary of War, without the advice and consent of the Senate, was a clearly illegal act, committed for the purpose of obtaining control of that office. I held that the President had the power to remove Secretary Stanton, but that he had not the power to put anyone in his place unless the person appointed was confirmed by the Senate.
Did the act of March 2, 1867, commonly known as the "tenure of office act," confer this authority? On the contrary, it plainly prohibits all temporary appointments except as specially provided for. The third section repeats the constitutional authority of the President to fill all vacancies happening during the recess of the Senate by death or resignation, and provides that if no appointment is made during the following session to fill such vacancy, the office shall remain in abeyance until an appointment is duly made and confirmed, and provision is made for the discharge of the duties of the office in the meantime. The second session provides for the suspension of an officer during the recess, and for a temporary appointmentduring the recess. This power was exercised and fully exhausted by the suspension of Mr. Stanton until restored by the Senate, in compliance with the law. No authority whatever is conferred by this act for any temporary appointment during the session of the Senate, but, on the contrary, such an appointment is plainly inconsistent with the act, and could not be inferred or implied for it. The sixth section further provides:
"That every removal, appointment, or employment, made, had, or exercised, contrary to the provisions of this act, and the making, signing, sending, countersigning, or issuing of any commission or letter of authority for, or in respect to, any such appointment or employment, shall be deemed, and are hereby declared to be, high misdemeanors, and, upon trial and conviction thereof, every person guilty thereof shall be punished by a fine not exceeding $10,000, or by imprisonment not exceeding five years, or both said punishments, in the discretion of the court."
This language is plain, explicit, and was inserted not only to prohibit all temporary appointments except during the recess, and in the mode provided for in the second section, but the unusual course was taken of affixing a penalty to a law defining the official duty of the President. The original bill did not contain penal clauses; but it was objected in the Senate that the President had already disregarded mandatory provisions of law, and would this; and therefore, after debate, these penal sections were added to secure obedience to the law, and to give to it the highest sanction.
I quote my view of the action of the President:
"Was not this act willfully violated by the President during the session of the Senate?
"It appears, from the letter of the President to General Grant, from his conversation with General Sherman, and from his answer, that he had formed a fixed resolve to get rid of Mr. Stanton, and fill the vacancy without the advice of the Senate. He might have secured a new Secretary of War by sending a proper nomination to the Senate. This he neglected and refused to do. He cannot allege that the Senate refused to relieve him from an obnoxious minister. He could not say that the Senate refused to confirm a proper appointee, for he would make no appointment to them. The Senate had declared that the reasons assigned for suspending Mr. Stanton did not make the case required by the tenure of office act, but I affirm as my conviction that the Senate would have confirmed any one of a great number of patriotic citizens if nominated to the Senate. I cannot resist the conclusion, from the evidence before us, that he was resolved to obtain a vacancy in the department of war in such a way that he might fill the vacancy by an appointment without the consent of the Senate, and in violation of the constitution and the law. This was the purpose of the offer to General Sherman. This was the purpose of the appointment of General Thomas. If he had succeeded as he hoped, he could have changed his temporary appointment at pleasure, and thus have defied the authority of the Senate and the mandatory provisions of the constitution and the law. I cannot in any other way account for his refusal to send a nomination to the Senate until after the appointment of General Thomas. The removal of Mr. Stanton by a new appointment, confirmed by the Senate, would have complied with the constitution. The absolute removal of Mr. Stanton would have created a temporary vacancy, but the Senate was in session to share in the appointment of another. Anad interimappointment, without authority of law, during the session of the Senate, would place the department of war at his control in defiance fo the Senate and the law, and would have set an evil example, dangerous to the public safety—one which, if allowed to pass unchallenged, would place the President above and beyond the law.
"The claim now made, that it was the sole desire of the President to test the constitutionality of the tenure of office act, is not supported by reason or by proof. He might, in August last, or at any time since, without anad interimappointment, have tested this law by a writ ofquo warranto. He might have done so by an order of removal, and a refusal of Mr. Stanton's requisitions. He might have done so by assigning a head of department to the place made vacant by the order of removal. Such was not his purpose or expectation. He expected by the appointment of General Sherman at once to get possession of the war department, so when General Thomas was appointed there was no suggestion of a suit at law, until the unexpected resistance of Mr. Stanton, supported by the action of the Senate, indicated that as the only way left."
It is difficult to convey, by extracts, a correct idea of a carefully prepared opinion, but this statement shows my view of the case, and, entertaining it, I felt bound, with much regret, to vote "guilty" in response to my name, but I was entirely satisfied with the result of the vote, brought about by the action of several Republican Senators. There was some disposition to arraign these Senators and to attribute their action to corrupt motives, but there was not the slightest ground for the imputations. Johnson was allowed to serve out his term, but there was a sense of relief when General Grant was sworn into office as President of the United States.
During the 40th Congress, extending from the 4th of March, 1867, to the 4th of March, 1869, the chief subjects of debate were the contraction of the currency, the refunding of the public debt, the payment of United States notes in coin, and a revision of the laws imposing internal taxation and duties on imported goods.
Early in the first session of this Congress, the opposition of the people to the policy of contraction, constantly pressed by Secretary McCulloch, became so imperative that both Houses determined to take from him all power to diminish the volume of currency then in circulation. On the 5th of December, 1867, Robert C. Schenck, chairman of the committee of ways and means, reported a bill in the following words:
"Be it enacted, etc., That so much of an act entitled 'An act to amend an act to provide ways and means to support the government,' approved April 12, 1866, as authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury to retire United States notes to an amount not exceeding $4,000,000 in any one month, is hereby repealed.
"Sec. 2.And be it further enacted, That from and after the passage of this act the further reduction of the currency by retiring or canceling United States notes shall be, and hereby is, prohibited."
This bill was taken up for consideration on the 7th of December, and, after a brief debate, with little opposition, passed the House by the vote of 127 yeas and 32 nays. It was sent to the Senate, referred to the committee on finance, and was carefully considered. That committee, with but two dissenting voices, directed me to report the bill to the Senate with a single amendment. On the 9th of January, 1868, I called up the bill for consideration, and made a brief explanation, in which I said the committee, after full reflection, had thought proper to recommend the passage of the bill of the House of Representatives, in substance as it was sent to us, only changing the phraseology. I said that the bill contemplated further legislation during that session. It was understood by all that some more comprehensive measures must be adopted during that session, but until further legislation there should be no more contraction of the currency. I thus stated the reasons which, in my opinion, justified the passage of the bill:
"First. It will satisfy the public mind that no further contraction will be made when industry is in a measure paralyzed. We hear the complaint from all parts of the country, from all branches of industry, from every state in the Union, that industry for some reason is paralyzed, and that trade and enterprise are not so well rewarded as they were. Many, perhaps erroneous, attribute all this to the contraction of the currency—a contraction that I believe is unexampled in the history of any nation. $140,000,000 has been withdrawn out of $737,000,000 in less than two years. There is no example, that I know of, of such rapid contraction. It may be wise, it may be beneficial, but still it has been so rapid as to excite a stringency that is causing complaint, and I think the people have a right to be relieved from that.
"Second. This bill will restore to the legislature their power over the currency, a power too important to be delegated to any single officer of the government. I do not wish to renew the discussion that occurred here two years ago on the passage of the law of April 12, 1866; but it is still my opinion, as it has been always, that the question of the amount of currency ought to be fixed by Congress. We have the power to coin money, and to regulate the value thereof. We have coined money in the form of paper money, and certainly the power of Congress in this respect ought not to be delegated to any single officer. If contraction ought to be established as a policy it should be by Congress, not by the Secretary of the Treasury, and it is not wise to confer upon any officer of the government a power of this kind, which can be and may be properly controlled and limited by Congress.
"Third. This will strongly impress upon Congress the imperative duty of acting wisely upon financial measures, for the responsibility will then rest entirely upon Congress, and will not be shared with them by the Secretary of the Treasury.
"Fourth. It will encourage business men to continue old, and embark in new, enterprises, when they are assured that no change will be made in the measure of value without the open and deliberate consent of their representatives.
"These considerations are amply sufficient to justify this measure, but it is only preliminary to others of far greater importance that must command our attention. These involve—
"1. The existence of the banking system of the United States.
"2. The time and manner of resuming specie payments.
"3. The mode of redeeming the debt of the United States and the kind of money in which it may be redeemed; and, in this connection, the taxes, if any, that may be levied upon the public creditors.
"4. Such a reduction of our expenditures and taxes as will relieve our constituents, as far as practicable, from the burdens resulting from the recent war."
This led to a long debate, which continued until the 15th of January, when the bill, as amended, passed by a vote of 33 years and 4 nays.
These decisive votes against contraction definitely settled the policy of the government to retain in circulation the then existing volume of United States notes. The disagreement between the two Houses was referred to a committee of conference, and the conferees reported the bill in the following form:
"Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
"That, from and after the passage of this act, the authority of the Secretary of the Treasury to make any reduction of the currency, by retiring or canceling United States notes, shall be, and is hereby, suspended; but nothing herein contained shall prevent the cancellation and destruction of mutilated United States notes, and the replacing of the same with notes of the same character and amount."
This bill was sent to the President, and, not having been returned by him within ten days, it became a law without his approval, under the constitution of the United States.
On the 17th of December, 1867, I reported from the committee on finance a bill for refunding the national debt and for a conversion of the notes of the United States. This bill was accompanied by an elaborate report. This report was carefully prepared by me, and met, I believe, the general approval of the committee on finance. In that Congress there were but five Democratic Senators, and it so happened that all the members of the committee on finance were Republicans, but these represented widely different opinions on financial subjects. I undertook, in this report, to deal in a general way with these topics. Upon a careful reading of it now I find but little that I do not approve. The general policy set out in this report was subsequently embodied into laws, but the measures relating to refunding the debt and the resumption of specie payments were not adopted until several years after the date of the report.
The ascertained debt on the first day of December, 1867, as stated by the Secretary of the Treasury, was $2,639,382,572.68, divided as follows:
Debt bearing coin interest. 5 per cent. bonds, 10-40's, and old fives $205,532,580.00 6 per cent. bonds of 1867 and 1868 . . . . 14,690,941.80 6 per cent. bonds, 1881 . . . . . . . . . 282,731,550.00 6 per cent. 5-20 bonds . . . . . . . . . . 1,324,412,550.00 Navy pension fund . . . . . . . . . . . . 13,000,000.00 ———————— $1,840,367,891.80 Debt bearing currency interest. 6 per cent. bonds . . . . . . . . . . . . $18,601,000.00 3-year compound interest notes . . . . . . 62,249,360.00 3-year 7-30 notes . . . . . . . . . . . . 285,587,100.00 3 per cent. certificates . . . . . . . . . 12,855,000.00 ———————— $379,292,460.00 Matured debt not presented for payment. 3 year 7-30 notes, due August 15, 1867 . . $2,855,400.00 Compound interest notes, matured June 10, July 15, August 15, and October 15, 1867 7,065,750.00 Bonds, Texas indemnity . . . . . . . . . . 260,000.00 Treasury notes, acts July 17, 1861 and prior thereto . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163,011.64 Bonds, April 15, 1842 . . . . . . . . . . 54,061.64 Treasury notes, March 3, 1863 . . . . . . 868,240.00 Temporary loan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2,880,900.55 Certificates of indebtedness . . . . . . . 31,000.00 ———————— $14,178,363.83 Debt bearing no interest. United States notes . . . . . . . . . . . $356,212,473.00 Fractional currency . . . . . . . . . . . 30,929,984.05 Gold certificates of deposit . . . . . . . 18,401,400.00 ———————— $405,543,857.05 Total debt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $2,639,382,572.68 Amount in treasury, coin . . . . . . . . . $100,690,645.69 Amount in treasury, currency . . . . . . . 37,486,175.24 Amount of debt less cash in treasury . . . . . . . . . . . $2,501,205,751.75
Besides the amounts thus stated there were large balances due to loyal states, upon accounts not then rendered or ascertained, and to individuals for losses sustained during the war.
The ascertained debt consisted of twenty different forms of liability, some payable in coin and some in lawful money. Much of this debt was due on demand, but the great body of it was payable in from one to twenty years, while the unascertained debt was being stated from time to time and had to be met from accruing revenues. Nearly $300,000,000 of debt had been paid out of current revenue since the close of the war. The first recommendation of the committee was that the debt should be refunded as rapidly as practicable into bonds bearing as low a rate of interest as possible, payable in twenty or thirty years, but redeemable at the pleasure of the United States in five or ten years. This recommendation was based on the fixed policy of the government to limit the duration of a bond within its lifetime, and thus leave it to the option of the government to pay its indebtedness and to reduce the rate of interest after a brief period, if the condition of the public revenues and of the money market should enable it to do so.
Here the question arose whether the bonds known as the 5-20 bonds could be paid in lawful money after the period of five years, when, by their terms, they were redeemable. These bonds promised to pay so many dollars. Other bonds were specifically payable in coin, and still other bonds were payable in lawful money; that is, in United States notes. These notes were then at a discount, being worth in the market about 88 cents in coin. But the notes were obligations of the United States, and it was the duty, and then within the power of the United States, to advance these notes to par in coin.
The majority of the committee, I among them, believed that the United States should not take advantage of its own wrong, in not redeeming its notes in coin, but should either advance these notes to par in coin, or pay its bonds in coin. The committee, therefore, recommended that both the notes and bonds should be received in exchange for the funding bonds, and that the notes should be reissued and maintained at par with coin, and be supported by a reserve of coin ample to maintain the notes at par with coin. In other words, the United States would resume specie payments. The committee expressed the opinion that, with the system of taxation then in existence, this policy of refunding and resumption could be maintained, and that the rate of interest then paid could be reduced to four or five per cent., and the money then in circulation would be kept at par with coin at the cost only of the interest on the bullion and coin held to meet any notes presented for redemption. The committee also recommended that the internal and tariff taxes be revised to correct irregularities or defects, and to repeal such as were oppressive.
While the committee opposed any contraction of the currency it also opposed any increase of it. The general theory of the report was to advance both bonds and notes to par in coin, and to issue bonds in such form and terms that the government could redeem them, or renew them at lower rates of interest.
The report states:
"Your committee are therefore of opinion that no legal tender notes, beyond the amount now limited by law, should be issued under any pressure of financial or political necessity until they are convertible into gold and silver. Our duty is to elevate the 'greenback,' the standard of national credit, to the standard of gold, the money of the world. Until then we are not on a substantial foundation. Let us make the dollar of our promise in the pocket of a laboring man equal to the dollar of our mint. The rapidity of the process is a question of public policy. It may be by gradually diminishing the volume of currency, or be left at its present amount until increased business or improved credit bring it up to the specie standard."
The refunding bill was taken up by the Senate on the 27th of February, 1868, and was fully discussed by me. After stating its general objects I said:
"It is with this view, and actuated by this principle, that the committee on finance have endeavored to make this a bill of relief, reducing, if possible, consistent with the public faith, the interest of the public debt, and giving increased value to United States notes. We have endeavored in this bill to accomplish three results: First, to reduce the rate of interest with the voluntary consent of the holders of our securities; second, to make a distinct provision for the payment of the public debt; and third, to give increased value to United States notes, and to provide for a gradual resumption of specie payments. All these are objects admitted to be of the highest importance. The only question is, whether the measure proposed tends to accomplish them."
I then quoted the example of the United States and Great Britain in reducing the rate of interest on public securities. I do not approve all I said in that speech. It has been frequently quoted as being inconsistent with my opinions and action at a later period. It is more important to be right than to be consistent. I then proposed to use the doubt expressed by many people as to the right of the government to redeem the 5-20 bonds in the legal tender money in circulation when the bonds were sold, as an inducement to the holders of bonds to convert them into securities bearing a less rate of interest but specifically payable in coin. Upon this policy I changed my opinion. I became convinced that it was neither right nor expedient to pay these bonds in money less valuable than coin, that the government ought not to take advantage of its neglect to resume specie payments after the war was over, by refusing the payment of the bonds with coin. I acted on this conviction when years afterwards the resumption act was adopted, and the beneficial results from this action fully justified my change of opinion.
The debate on this bill was participated in by nearly every Senator, and was conceded to be the most comprehensive and instructive debate on financial questions for many years.