FOOTNOTES:

FOOTNOTES:[20]Kinglake, vii. 192.[21]Bazancourt, ii. 239-242.[22]Kinglake, vii. 121.[23]Kinglake, vii. 245, and De Bazancourt, ii. 266.[24]De Bazancourt, ii. 266-274.[25]Ibid.ii. 252.[26]See also Clode'sMilitary Forces of the Crown, ii. 237.[27]Kinglake, vii. 260-273.[28]Kinglake, vii. 287; also De Bazancourt, ii. 273-276.[29]Ibid.278.[30]Kinglake, viii. 25.[31]Lord Raglan's despatch, June 2, 1855.

[20]Kinglake, vii. 192.

[21]Bazancourt, ii. 239-242.

[22]Kinglake, vii. 121.

[23]Kinglake, vii. 245, and De Bazancourt, ii. 266.

[24]De Bazancourt, ii. 266-274.

[25]Ibid.ii. 252.

[26]See also Clode'sMilitary Forces of the Crown, ii. 237.

[27]Kinglake, vii. 260-273.

[28]Kinglake, vii. 287; also De Bazancourt, ii. 273-276.

[29]Ibid.278.

[30]Kinglake, viii. 25.

[31]Lord Raglan's despatch, June 2, 1855.

CAPTURE OF THE MAMELON AND QUARRIES—INTERVIEW WITH GENERAL PÉLISSIER

The next combined action of the allied forces took place against the Mamelon, theouvrages blancs, and the quarries in front of the Redan. As the capture of these important outworks involved not only a partial re-armament of the siege batteries and a renewal of their munitions, but also a careful consideration of engineer arrangements, some short delay necessarily followed before decisive action could be taken. Towards the end of May a meeting was arranged to take place at the French head quarters between the senior artillery and engineer officers of the two armies, with a view to discuss the various details. As General Dacres was temporarily absent, owing to illness, and had gone for a few days to Constantinople, Lord Raglan directed me to accompany General Harry Jones, the Commanding Engineer. The meeting took place in a hut, at 6A.M.To my surprise General Pélissier came in and presided; and, instead of the conference being limitedto officers of the special arms, the following were present: French Generals Martimprey, Niel, Bosquet, Trochu, Frossard, Beuret, and Thiry, and one or two more; General Jones and myself being the only English officers at the meeting. Major Claremont and Prince Polignac were also in the room, to act as interpreters if required.

General Pélissier, in opening the proceedings, said it was decided that in a few days the French were to attack the Mamelon and other adjacent positions, whilst the English would seize the quarries in front of the Redan; and he invited those present to offer any remarks on details. A plan of Sebastopol was lying on the table for reference. General Niel began the discussion, stating that on an important occasion like the present it was necessary to take a general survey of the allied position and of the trenches, and he would begin with the left attack. Pélissier stopped him at once, and declined to enter into any such general considerations, saying that all he wanted was assistance as to details. He then took a ruler, laid it across the left attack, and said: 'L'attaque gauche n'existe plus.' General Niel under these circumstances abstained from taking any further part in the discussion.

General Bosquet having made a few remarks as to the troops to be detailed for the assault of the Mamelon, in which the Zouaves were to occupy aconspicuous place, Pélissier objected to the arrangement, contending that the Zouaves were not the best troops—'Pourquoi toujours les Zouaves?' he added. He went on to say that these, however, were small questions of detail to be settled afterwards. He was evidently determined to assert his position as Commander-in-Chief, and told us that there were persons in France of the highest position (evidently alluding to the Emperor) who read history and studied campaigns, and then sent him out their ideas as to what should be done. He told us that he had written respectfully to the Minister for War that, so long as he commanded the French army in the field, he declined to carry out any plans except such as were arranged and concerted between Lord Raglan and himself. A few other officers offered some observations, and then Pélissier turned to General Harry Jones. Apparently he had some difficulty in pronouncing his name, and approximately addressed him as General Hairy-Joze.[32]The General—who, I found afterwards, was considerably ruffled by Pélissier's arbitrary language—speaking in somewhat moderate French, said that when the French were ready to take the Mamelon the British troops were prepared to storm and capture the quarries in front of the Redan, and then sat down. Pélissier at once expressed hispleasure at hearing the statement of General Hairy-Joze. The English, he added, were evidently waiting for their allies, and with that 'solidité' which so distinguished them would no doubt succeed in what they undertook. The day and hour of the attack were known only to Lord Raglan and himself, but they should not have long to wait. Pélissier ended by stating that the discussion had been very interesting (no one having practically spoken except himself), and then he wished us all good morning.

Lord Raglan was much interested and amused when he heard of the interview, saying that had he known General Pélissier would be present he would have gone himself to listen to his lecture. It was known at the time that considerable differences existed between Pélissier and Niel. Years afterwards, in Kinglake's 'History of the Crimea,'[33]he quotes extracts of letters written at this time by General Niel to the Emperor Napoleon, and which evidently refer to the conference I have just described. In one General Niel says: 'At a meeting which took place yesterday he, General Pélissier, ordered me to be silent with a harshness not to be characterised.... We were in the presence of English officers.' Again, he writes to the Minister for War: 'Knowing nothing of what is going on, I abstain from all reflections. Iasked leave to offer some observations on the state of the siege, and was told that it was not the time....'

It must be borne in mind that the active measures which had been carried out by the allied generals during the latter part of May were by no means approved of in Paris, so much so that on June 5 Napoleon telegraphed to Pélissier as follows:[34]'Je vous donne l'ordre positif, de ne point vous acharner au siège, avant d'avoir investi la place.' General Pélissier, however, entirely ignoring the veto, simply replied that he was in perfect accord with Lord Raglan, and was making final dispositions for the assault of the white redoubts, the Mamelon, and the quarries; and adds, that he should commence on the 7th and push on with the utmost vigour. And so he did.

A few days later, in writing to Paris, he speaks of himself as being at the paralysing extremity of an electric wire.[35]Lord Panmure, the Minister for War, however, about this time informed Lord Raglan that the English and French Governments had arranged that no orders should be sent out as to operations, without mutual consent,[36]and it seems curious that so obvious and common-sense a plan had not been in force throughout.

On the afternoon of June 6 the third great bombardment of Sebastopol commenced. My brother,Captain Mortimer Adye, R.A., was in command of an advanced battery in the trenches, and, the weather being hot, was fighting his guns in his shirt sleeves, when a shell from the enemy burst in the battery, exploding some loose gunpowder which was lying there, and burned him and two sergeants seriously; in fact, nearly blew them away. His face, neck, and arms were scorched, blackened, and blistered, and his flannel shirt smouldering. Some infantry soldiers, seeing his condition, threw some water over him, and he was then conveyed to camp; but some weeks elapsed before he was able to resume his duties.

The fire of the allied batteries soon obtained a mastery, and the Mamelon especially was in ruins. Todleben, speaking of the bombardment, said that more terrific than all else was the fire of the English.[37]It was arranged that the assault of the Russian advanced works should take place shortly before sunset, and during the afternoon of the 7th the French columns, in the highest spirits, marched under cover and unobserved down the ravines in readiness. The signal was given about half-past six, and the French first attacked and occupied theouvrages blancs, near the Careening Bay ravine, taking several hundred prisoners. They then assaulted the Mamelon, took it with great rapidity and comparative ease, and hoisted their flag on the work; but, led away by success, theyimpetuously, and contrary to the intention, followed the enemy even up to the glacis of the Malakoff. The Russians, however, came out in great force, and not only drove back the French columns, but followed them into the Mamelon and recaptured it, the French retreating down the slopes in disorder and with great loss. It was a critical moment, but Pélissier was equal to the occasion. Having large reserves in the adjoining ravine, he at once sent them forward and for a second time occupied the great outwork; and, darkness coming on, its entrenchments were turned during the night and the position firmly held. At the same time, whilst these serious battles were taking place, the English troops, consisting of part of the Light and Second Divisions, stormed the quarries in front of the Redan in the most brilliant manner; and although they were furiously attacked several times during the night by sorties from the Russian adjacent works, and suffered great loss, they resisted all efforts to dislodge them, and the next morning found them firmly established in comparatively close proximity to the Redan.

The great energy and activity of the allies during the fortnight since Pélissier had been in command of the French army and in full accord with Lord Raglan had thus been attended with important results, not only on the Chernaya and at Kertch, but also in depriving the enemy of the outworks in front of thecity which they had established during the previous winter. Within a day or two of the successful actions of June 7, another meeting took place of the senior artillery and engineer officers of the two armies, at which I was present with General Dacres. The subject considered had reference to the arrangements in the trenches necessary for the further prosecution of the siege. Opinions rather differed, some considering that in view of the recent success, and its moral effect on the Russians, a general assault should speedily follow. Colonel Frossard, a distinguished engineer of the French army, however, urged that as we were still at a distance of some hundred yards from the Malakoff and Redan we should continue to advance cautiously by means of sap and trench as heretofore. He pointed out that an assault from our present position would involve the carrying of scaling ladders and woolbags to fill the ditches, for a considerable distance in the open under heavy fire, and that under all the circumstances we might be liable to defeat in assaulting prematurely. General Dacres entirely concurred in the views of Colonel Frossard, and the event proved that their misgivings were justified.

Some days passed away, during which time the batteries in the trenches were augmented and again prepared for a fresh effort, and it was finally decided that a general assault should be made on the Malakoff and Redan on June 18, to be preceded by a vigorousbombardment at daylight for two or three hours, so as to smash and silence the enemy's batteries and open a road for the attacking columns. It is important, however, to bear in mind that General Pélissier declined to make a simultaneous movement against the Bastion du Mât. A heavy fire was opened at daylight on June 17 from the English and French trenches, and continued throughout the day. In the evening Lord Raglan sent for me, and directed orders to be issued at once to all the batteries, that the renewed bombardment at daylight the next morning was not to be carried out. I ventured to remark that every preparation had been made, and that it would not only be a great disappointment to the navy and artillery, but it seemed to me that a concentrated fire for two or three hours on the points to be assaulted would produce a great effect. Lord Raglan replied that he entirely agreed with me, but, he added, it was useless to argue the question, as he had just received a message from General Pélissier altering previous arrangements, and saying that the French columns would attack at daylight.[38]The necessary orders were, of course, given.

FOOTNOTES:[32]Soon afterwards, when he was knighted, he called him 'Sairey-Joze'! (Sir Harry Jones).[33]'Extracts from French Official Documents,' Kinglake, viii. 32 and 88.[34]Kinglake, viii. 89-90.[35]Ibid.viii. 129.[36]Ibid.236.[37]Kinglake, viii. 94.[38]See Lord Raglan's despatch, June 19, 1855. Also Kinglake, viii. 310.

[32]Soon afterwards, when he was knighted, he called him 'Sairey-Joze'! (Sir Harry Jones).

[33]'Extracts from French Official Documents,' Kinglake, viii. 32 and 88.

[34]Kinglake, viii. 89-90.

[35]Ibid.viii. 129.

[36]Ibid.236.

[37]Kinglake, viii. 94.

[38]See Lord Raglan's despatch, June 19, 1855. Also Kinglake, viii. 310.

BATTLE OF JUNE 18 AND DEATH OF LORD RAGLAN

The night of the 17th was passed in concentrating the allied forces destined for the great assault. Lord Raglan and his staff arrived in the English trenches shortly before daylight. Two important circumstances occurred at the very outset, both of bad omen for the allies. One, that the Russians by some means had become aware of, and were consequently prepared for, the attack; the other, that one of the French generals, under a mistaken idea that the signal had been given, led his troops to the assault prematurely, and before all was ready. It was, in fact, still dark, when the ground in front of the Malakoff became suddenly the scene of a terrific conflict, of which for some time it was not possible to form a judgment, or to forecast the result.

As the day dawned it soon became apparent that the French were in difficulties, and were not within the Malakoff. Lord Raglan had always reserved to himself freedom of action as to the proper moment for ordering the advance of theEnglish. As he wrote to Lord Panmure afterwards, he felt that there ought to be some hope of the French success before committing his troops.[39]However, when he observed the serious condition of affairs, and that his allies were in dire conflict and suffering great losses, but were still persisting in their attack on the dominating position of the Malakoff, he felt that it was impossible for the English troops to remain inactive, and therefore gave the requisite signal. Our troops, composed of parts of the Light, Second and Fourth Divisions, accompanied by a storming party of seamen carrying scaling ladders and of gunners with means for spiking guns, jumped from their cover and made straight for the Redan; but the whole ground was torn and swept with grape and musketry from the enemy's works, both in front and on the flanks, and our men, gallantly as they were led and bravely as they advanced, were quite unable to enter the work. Lord Raglan, when the advance commenced, desired his staff to sit down in the trench; but he and General Jones, R.E., stood up together, anxiously watching the event. In the midst of the carnage, General Jones was struck on the forehead with a glancing grape-shot, and for a moment as he fell back it was feared the wound was mortal. He wastaken away for medical aid, but in a minute or two suddenly returned with the blood streaming down his face, being anxious to speak to the Commander-in-Chief on some point which he deemed important; and it was with difficulty that he could be induced to have his wound attended to. It was about this time that Captain William Peel, R.N., who had led the seamen with the scaling ladders, passed us on his return, wounded, together with a great many other officers and men. The battle continued for some time, but at length ended in the failure of the allies at every point, and Lord Raglan then directed the batteries to re-open fire, in order to cover the retreat and to hold in check the Russian forces.

Soon after the termination of the various attacks, General Hugh Rose,[40]the British Commissioner at French head quarters, came to Lord Raglan with a message from General Pélissier, to ascertain his views on the situation. Lord Raglan said that in his opinion Pélissier had made two great mistakes—one, in attacking prematurely before a bombardment and the other that he had not simultaneously assaulted the Bastion du Mât. 'However,' he added, 'I will go myself and see him,' and he then left the trenches with General Harry Jones, who in the meantime had returned, having tied a handkerchief over his forehead, making light of his wound. Thelosses during the day were serious. Of the English—General Sir John Campbell was killed, with many other officers of rank, and our total casualties were 1,443. The French suffered far more, their losses amounting to no less than 3,500. In fact, during the month that General Pélissier had been in command of the French army it is estimated that their casualties in killed, wounded, and missing amounted to upwards of 12,000 officers and men.

The failure of the great assault on Sebastopol on June 18 was undoubtedly the severest blow which the allies had received since their landing in the Crimea; and indeed it became difficult to forecast the future, as the activity, courage, and great resources of the Russians in men and material apparently rendered the capture of the city a somewhat remote and uncertain speculation. The British army were, however, destined in a few days to suffer another great misfortune, by the death of their beloved Commander-in-Chief on June 28. There is no doubt that the failure of the attack on Sebastopol, and the great losses on that eventful morning, had a serious effect upon Lord Raglan, following, as they did, on the accumulated anxieties of the previous months; so that his strong constitution at length gave way. Within a few hours of his death he happened to send for me on some matter of business, and then complained of illness and of great thirst; but he madelight of it, and I had no idea that his condition was serious, or that it was destined to be my last interview with one with whom I had been so closely associated.

It will be well to consider briefly some of the great events which had occurred during the period of his command, as illustrative of his conduct and character during the campaign. In the first place, it must always be remembered that we entered into a war against a great Power after a peace in Europe of nearly forty years, when we had with difficulty collected about 30,000 men for the purpose; and when even these were inadequately provided with commissariat and transport, and there were no reserves existent to replace casualties as they arose. Again, the order to proceed to the Crimea came from home, without any specific knowledge of the resources and preparations of the Russians; it was given at a late season, and when the troops were physically weak; and as the Government did not anticipate a winter campaign, no provision had been made to meet it. In view of these circumstances Marshal Saint-Arnaud, as I have shown, hesitated at the last moment. It is true that he was then very ill—in fact, a dying man—but this must have added greatly to Lord Raglan's responsibilities at a critical time.

When the siege of Sebastopol commenced, thefailure of the first bombardment was due in a measure to the weakness of the French siege train, and to the unfortunate explosion of some of their magazines. In the three great battles of Alma, Balaclava, and Inkerman, the English lost about 5,000 men, and as the winter came on, and found the allies with open trenches, it was evident not only that great sickness and suffering must ensue, but that our numbers and means were quite inadequate. In short, the English and French Governments entered into the war apparently under the impression that with a force of 60,000 men they could crush an empire, and that Sebastopol would fall by acoup-de-main. As regards the events which followed, I have quoted official documents which prove that General Canrobert, brave and good soldier as he was, still allowed himself to be constantly controlled and over-influenced by secret orders from Paris, which practically set at naught the plans of the allied generals and at last brought matters to a dead lock; and it is important to bear in mind also that, steadfast as Lord Raglan was in his opinions, yet so loyal was he to his colleague, and so magnanimous, that no word in his public despatches gave a hint of the enormous difficulties caused by the circumstance I have described. He submitted to great personal injustice, rather than say or do anything to weaken theentente cordialebetween the two Powers, or to attach blame to others.Again, when the allies landed in the Crimea their numbers were approximately equal, but, as the English had no reserves to replenish their rapidly diminishing ranks, the equality soon disappeared, and early in 1855 the French forces were at least three times greater than ours; and this disparity, whilst it gave increased authority to their views, must have tended to complicate Lord Raglan's position in council.

There is another point to be noticed—namely, that all the commanders of the allied armies and fleets, French, Sardinian, and Turkish, entertained the highest opinion of the ability, high courage, and character of Lord Raglan. I had good means of knowing, and believe there was no difference of opinion on the subject. General Canrobert always expressed these views, and indeed was anxious that Lord Raglan should be appointed to command all the allied forces. Pélissier, from the day he assumed command of the French army, was in complete accord with him, and so stated over and over again. Lord Lyons, I remember well, after the war told me that it was the proudest boast of his life that he should have been closely associated with Lord Raglan, during all the exceptional difficulties and dangers of his position.

I have recapitulated these points because they were by no means known to the people of Englandat the time; in fact, it was not until years afterwards, on the fall of the Empire, and by the publication of the French despatches, that many of the circumstances were brought to light. Finally, Lord Raglan, during all these months of incessant and harassing anxiety, had to bear a trial even greater than those I have attempted to describe. The English Press at home, and their correspondents in the Crimea, day after day continued to criticise his conduct, and to misrepresent his character in violent and unmeasured terms; describing him as indifferent, incompetent, and unfit for command; and attributing to his supposed incapacity and want of foresight the sufferings of the troops and the delays of the campaign, whilst during the whole time the facts were all the other way. Having been closely associated with Lord Raglan, and knowing a good deal of the circumstances, I feel it a matter of common justice to defend the memory of a great and distinguished man, the close of whose life was embittered by the feeling that the Government at home would not defend him, and that the people, grossly misled as they were, had withdrawn from him their confidence. One day, not long before his death, in conversation with him I expressed a hope that he would soon return to England, and have the opportunity of defending himself against the unjust attacks of which he was the object, when he replied—smiling, perhaps, rather bitterly—'Return home? I shall never return home. Why, I should be stoned to death before I could get to Stanhope Street.'

But there is a still more important aspect of the case than the personal one. It is a great injury to the public service that a Commander-in-Chief in the field, surrounded, as he must be, by constant difficulties and anxieties, should be thus misjudged by violent and erroneous statements, and be attacked behind his back at a time when from absence, want of leisure, and from the nature of his position he is unable to reply. I must add that in almost every campaign in which I have borne a part, the same tendency to hasty criticism has been more or less observable, and always at moments when the people at home, being naturally anxious, are all the more susceptible and easily misled.

The death of Lord Raglan tended, no doubt, to diminish the influence of England in the councils of the war at a critical period of the campaign, and theentente cordialebetween the generals of the allied armies which his influence and high character had done so much to maintain, gradually weakened. It was in every sense a calamity. The appointment, however, of General Simpson as his successor at all events prevented any divergence of opinion as regarded the immediate operations against Sebastopol. General Pélissier and himself were in entire accordthat the Malakoff was the dominant feature of the situation; and although other parts of the enceinte, such as the Great and Little Redans and the Bastion du Mât, could not be left out of account, still in the final assault the attacks on these points would not necessarily lead to the fall of the place, and would, therefore, be subsidiary diversions, as it were, to the capture of the central position. In one of his first despatches General Simpson said that 'we were repairing and improving our works, to be in readiness to co-operate with the French, when their approaches towards the Malakoff shall be completed.' The opinion given at the beginning of the siege by Sir John Burgoyne, that 'the great tower was the key of the whole position,' had at length become the axiom of all.[41]

FOOTNOTES:[39]See Lord Raglan's despatch, June 19, 1855. Also Kinglake, viii. 161.[40]Afterwards Field Marshal Lord Strathnairn.[41]General Pélissier, in his despatch of September 11 on the fall of Sebastopol, specially says that the Malakoff was the key of the defences, and that the other attacks were subordinate.

[39]See Lord Raglan's despatch, June 19, 1855. Also Kinglake, viii. 161.

[40]Afterwards Field Marshal Lord Strathnairn.

[41]General Pélissier, in his despatch of September 11 on the fall of Sebastopol, specially says that the Malakoff was the key of the defences, and that the other attacks were subordinate.

BATTLE OF CHERNAYA AND THE FALL OF SEBASTOPOL.

During the month of July and the early part of August the allies were occupied in pushing on their trenches, in obtaining fresh armaments and munitions, and adding to their batteries. About this time I was present at several interesting councils connected with these preparations, and partly with the consideration of suggestions from home. In my journal is a record as follows:—

First Conference, August 3, 1855. Present: Generals Pélissier, Simpson, Niel, Thiry, Barnard, Airey, Sir H. Jones;[42]Colonels Dupuis, Steele, and Adye. Subject: 'Whether, in case the town should not fall before the winter, it may not be necessary to raise the siege?' General Pélissier refused to entertain the idea, and the meeting broke up unsatisfactorily. The conference took place at the English head quarters, and during the discussion one of the French generals having made some remarks as to the great losses daily in the trenches, GeneralPélissier turned to him and said, 'Did you ever hear of a war without losses? We are not here to make warà laMonsieur Cobden!' After the meeting, in passing through General Simpson's room, Pélissier took up a book, and asked me what was the inscription on its cover. It was a Bible, and I told him the words were 'Society for the Promotion of Christian Knowledge.' He laughed, and said it was a good society, but whether he was a subscriber I do not know.

Second Conference, August 5. Present: Artillery and engineer officers of both armies only. Subject considered: 'A telegraphic despatch from England, Can the town be destroyed? Can it be taken? What will you do next?'

Answer: No amount of fire, both vertical and horizontal, would destroy the town—that is to say, the forts, docks, basins, and all that give importance to Sebastopol.

Answer to second question: This question is one for the Commanders-in-Chief to decide. The meeting stated the general condition of the trenches for their information. The third question was also for the Generals-in-Chief.

Third Conference, August 7. 'Two hundred mortars being expected from France and England, can the town be destroyed by this means and an assault obviated?'

Answer: No.

Fourth Conference, August 14. The French state that their batteries on the Mamelon and Careening Bay are ready to open. Proposed, therefore, that we open on the 17th all round, and then push forward our approaches.

In the meantime, and before the final preparations for the assault of Sebastopol were quite complete, the Russians determined to make one more effort to raise the siege by an attack on the position of the allies on the Chernaya. It was a desperate movement on their part. In the first place, the Fedhukine heights were held by 18,000 French troops with 48 guns, and the Sardinians on the hills to their right near Tchergoum were 9,000 strong with 36 guns, and in rear were 10,000 Turks in reserve. The heights themselves, which were well adapted for defence, had been strengthened by entrenchments, and the river Chernaya, as well as a narrow canal, acted as wet ditches along the front, and rendered an assault very difficult. It so happened also that a few days before the battle the allied generals had received information through spies of the intentions of the enemy, and were therefore fully prepared.

On August 12 I was sent to Balaclava to call upon General La Marmora, who wished that some English guns should be placed at his disposal, and by his invitation rode with him to the heights occupied by the Sardinian army, and received his directions as to the position to be taken up by the battery in the event of an assault. At daylight on August 16 the Russians advanced with great courage to the attack. General Pélissier, in his General Order to the French army on the following day, estimated the forces of the Russians as being 60,000 strong, with a numerous artillery and considerable masses of cavalry. Notwithstanding all the obstacles, the enemy succeeded in temporarily capturing thetête-du-pont, and in advancing for a considerable distance up the heights; but, after five hours' fighting, were ultimately driven back and defeated all along the line, losing more than 6,000 men, some of whom were drowned, and leaving 2,200 wounded and prisoners behind. General Pélissier specially alluded to the good service rendered by the English heavy battery, which took part in the action in co-operation with the Sardinians. C troop Horse Artillery was also present towards the close of the battle.

On the following day the allies commenced another bombardment, and in three days alone threw 10,000 shells from mortars into the doomed city, independently of the fire from the heavy guns. The batteries of the Malakoff and Redan were reduced to ruins and were almost silent. The end was approaching. The English artillery at this time,having been largely reinforced, were about 7,000 strong, and, in addition to 200 pieces of ordnance in the trenches, they had 92 guns horsed and ready for the field. Under cover of this great bombardment, work in the trenches was actively carried on, and the French approached close to the counter scarps of the Malakoff. Their losses, however, were reckoned at 100 daily. In view of the crisis which was at hand, the Russians, towards the end of August, constructed a bridge of rafts across the harbour; an evident symptom of a possible withdrawal of the garrison and surrender of the city.

At the beginning of September a final meeting of the French and English officers of artillery and engineers took place, and a careful memorandum was then drawn up for the consideration of the Commanders-in-Chief. After recapitulating the general condition of the trenches, and pointing out that the French were within twenty-five yards of the place, they recommended that the whole of the batteries should re-open at once and maintain a vigorous fire for three days, and that the assault should then be given without delay; the Malakoff to be first attacked and captured, and then the Great and Little Redans, and the works near the Bastion du Mât, so as to divide the Russian forces as much as possible.[43]

The end had come at last. On September 5 the bombardment re-commenced, and the Russians were speedily driven to seek refuge in their numerous underground shelters, in the midst of crumbling ruins and dismantled batteries. On the morning of the 8th the troops of the allies marched quietly down to their allotted positions; and at noon, all being ready, General Mac Mahon led his division straight to the Malakoff, and in a few minutes entered it and hoisted the tricolor. This was the preconcerted signal, and then the other columns also rushed to the assault. On the extreme right, the French in great force attacked the Little Redan and works near the harbour, but, after a prolonged struggle and heavy losses, failed to maintain their ground. The English troops, composed of parts of the Light and Second Divisions and accompanied by a ladder and spiking party, advanced on the salient of the Great Redan, entered the work, and held it for some time. The interior of the work, however, was swept by the fire of artillery and infantry in rear, and they were ultimately forced back with great loss. At the same time, far away on the left, the Bastions Centrale and Du Mât were stormed by French columns, but also without success—in fact, the three subordinate assaults on the city all failed.

Mac Mahon, however, having once gained possession of the redoubt surrounding the old Malakofftower, held it in spite of the furious efforts of the Russians for hours to drive him out. As one cause of the failure of the subsidiary attacks, it is as well to point out that they were all open works, swept by batteries and interior entrenchments; whilst, on the other hand, the ground round the Malakoff had been converted by the Russians into a closed redoubt which, whilst it may, at the outset, have added to the difficulties of its capture, still, when once taken, gave the French under Mac Mahon the advantage of comparative shelter.

The losses on all sides were very severe, and were as follows:

Thus ended, after a siege of eleven months, the series of battles in front of Sebastopol. The Russians, aware that their position on the south side was no longer tenable, during the night set fire to the city, exploded their magazines, sunk their fleet, and, having withdrawn the garrison by means of the floating bridge across the harbour, then destroyed it, leaving their arsenal, docks, and large remaining supplies of guns and stores in the hands of the allies. As Pélissier said in his order of the day, 'Le boulevard de la Puissance Russe dans la Mer Noir n'existe plus.'In the afternoon of the 9th Fort Paul blew up with a great explosion, and then all was still. What a comfort it was, after months of incessant anxiety, that the uproar had for a time ceased, and that there was nothing to do!

During the next few days we buried the dead, wandered about the desolate city, took stock of the armaments and reserves, and were occasionally shelled by the enemy at long range from the north side of the harbour. One large hospital which I visited presented a dreadful spectacle. There were hundreds of dead bodies of Russians lying in the beds; of men who had been wounded before the retreat, and then left at the last to die unheeded and alone. In a few of the beds were found wounded men still living!

With the fall of Sebastopol the Crimean war had virtually reached its termination, although several months elapsed before this was recognised. The Emperor of the French still hankered after a campaign in the interior; but the season was late, and the corner occupied by the allied armies formed a bad base for operations in the field. Marshal Pélissier, obstinate and determined as ever, would have none of it, and wrote to Paris: 'Thank God! it is not difficulties which frighten me.... But here the situation is not the same. I see the obstacles, but I do not perceive the success, nor even the hope of it.I should be perplexed to form a plan of campaign, still more to carry it out.' In short, the fall of Sebastopol had destroyed the power of Russia in the Black Sea; and therefore the occupation of the Crimea, whilst it would entail great losses and considerable risk, would be of no special value.

The two allied Commanders-in-Chief, Simpson and Pélissier, were men of very different character and also of general appearance. The one was a tall, thin Scotchman; the other a short, stout, thick-set Norman. The first time they met after the capture of the city, Pélissier rushed up to the English general and embraced him with great fervour, having almost to climb up to reach his cheek. The English staff were amused at this demonstration, and said to Simpson, 'Why General, Pélissier kissed you!' And his reply, with a strong national dialect, was: 'Well, it was a great occasion, and I could na' resist him.'

As there was nothing specially to be done—at all events, until the English and French Governments had made up what they were pleased to call their minds as to future operations—I was fortunate enough in November to obtain a few weeks' leave, and went off to Malta for a holiday. On arriving at Constantinople I embarked in a small store steamer, in which there was only one passenger besides myself—a private soldier on his way to England. So, we talked of thewar, and on my asking who had ordered him home, he replied: 'The Minister for War, sir.' On my asking why, he said, 'I'm in charge of his brother, sir.' This seemed rather incomprehensible, so I added, 'Where is his brother?' 'Sure, he's in the hold, sir.' This bewildered me still more; but it appeared that the soldier had been present at the funeral of Colonel the Honourable Lauderdale Maule, who died of cholera at Varna just before we left in the autumn of 1854, and had been sent to exhume the body and bring it to England at the request of his brother, Lord Panmure.

When I returned to the Crimea at the end of the year, although active operations were necessarily suspended for the winter, we were busily occupied in blowing up the docks, forts, and barracks, and in carrying off the Russian guns out of the arsenal (about 2,000 in number) and thus completing the destruction of Sebastopol. Preparations were also being made for a renewal of hostilities in the spring in some other part of the Russian Empire. But in reality a change was coming over the scene, and, instead of action, reaction had set in. In the first place, France was tired of the war. Her finances were exhausted and her troops anxious to return home. On the other hand, Russia also was crippled, both as to men and means. England, so tardy at the outset and so unprepared, was indeed the only Powerwhich apparently had the will or vigour left to continue the contest. Our troops during the second winter were well clothed, housed, and fed, and as healthy as at home; and their numbers were daily increasing. At the beginning of 1856 we had upwards of 50,000 men and 96 field guns in the Crimea, with considerable reserves both at Malta and in England. The administrative departments, also, were becoming models of efficiency; and the transport branch, which hardly existed at the outset, had no less than 28,000 animals collected and ready for the field.

In the meantime the Turkish contingent had occupied Kertch and Enikale, at the entrance to the Sea of Azov; and in January 1856 I was sent by Sir William Codrington (who had succeeded Sir James Simpson as Commander-in-Chief) on a mission to General Vivian in command of the troops there. A French officer accompanied me, and we were conveyed in H.M.S. 'Stromboli,' our instructions being, in the first place, to make a rapid survey along the coast of the Crimea in order to ascertain if the Bay of Kaffa, or its neighbourhood, were fortified and held in strength by the Russians; and, if not, whether it offered facilities for landing. On arrival at Kertch, we were directed to confer with General Vivian as to the defences and to inquire whether he desired reinforcements or assistance of any kind, naval or military, and then to return forthwith to Sebastopol.The fact was, that information had been received that Kertch was shortly to be attacked by the Russians in force, and the Commander-in-Chief was desirous of ascertaining General Vivian's views on the position. I remember when handing him the letter from Sir William Codrington, he confirmed the rumour of the expected attack, and as to holding out said, 'I can tell you at once; I shall be able to hold out for about five-and-twenty minutes.' He did not, of course, intend his words to be taken literally, but explained that in his opinion the place was not tenable against a powerful assault. Extensive earthworks had been constructed and armed on some of the heights; but they were commanded by others, and there was an entire deficiency of water in the outlying forts. However, after remaining a few days at Kertch, information was received of the probabilities of peace, and in February the representatives of the allied powers having met at Paris, towards the end of March an armistice was proclaimed, and the war came to an end.

So ended the great Crimea campaign, of which my narrative necessarily gives but a short and imperfect sketch. To the present generation it is now a mere matter of history, and few remain of all those who took part in a contest which, at the time, so deeply affected the people of this country, and, indeed, of the whole of Europe. The long siege, with its battles,vicissitudes, and sufferings, forms, however, a remarkable page in the annals of war. Of my own corps, 13 officers were killed[44]and 29 wounded. Altogether, no less than 10,508 officers and men of the Royal Artillery served during the campaign, of whom 1,520 died, either killed in action or from wounds and sickness.

Many weeks elapsed before the allied armies had altogether quitted the Crimea; and in the meantime we wandered about and formed acquaintances with the Russians, who were always civil and good-natured. At the end of the harbour of Sebastopol were extensive marshes, filled with frogs, which kept up an incessant croaking. The French soldiers were in the habit of catching and eating them in large quantities, but the English despised such food. It was said that the frogs, after a time, learnt to distinguish between the two nations, and that when our men appeared in theirredcoats the frogs chirped away merrily, but when they saw soldiers inredtrousers approaching, down they went, and remained perfectly mute till the danger had passed away.Se non è vero, è ben trovato.

I did not leave the Crimea until June, and then embarked with a battery of Horse Artillery forhome. The weather was beautiful, and, after passing through the Bosphorus and Dardanelles, we were steaming along past the Greek Islands when my servant one morning came into the cabin and said I had better get up. As it was only just daylight I did not take the hint. Presently, however, he looked in again, repeating his suggestion. On my asking why he disturbed me at such an early hour, he replied: 'I beg your pardon, sir, but the ship is on fire!' This altered the situation; I lost no time in jumping into my clothes, went on deck, where I perceived smoke coming up through the hatch-ways. Going on to the bridge I inquired of the captain, who informed me that the fire was in the powder magazine! It seems that having all the ammunition boxes and stores of a battery of Horse Artillery on board, the ordinary magazine was insufficient, and a temporary arrangement had been made on the lower deck. It is supposed that by some accident a box of lucifer matches had ignited, and set fire to the whole concern. Captain Dyneley, R.H.A., with a few men at once went below, and passing down buckets of water the fire was gradually extinguished, the boxes hauled up and laid on deck, several of them considerably burnt. It was a critical half-hour, but nothing could be more quiet and steady than the conduct of all on board. In the midst of our trouble the 'Charlemagne,' a French line-of-battle ship, came up close to us, crammed with troops, and offered help. We, however, explained that we had plenty of men on board, and in a short time we were able to say that all danger was at an end, and separated with three cheers from both vessels. That was my last adventure connected with the Crimean war.

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