Lieut. Call reconnoiters and reports the enemy's position—Col. Scott desires to attack him with the Third Iowa, the Home Guards, and the Artillery—General Hurlbut declines his consent—Dangers of such a movement—Disappointment of the men—The General reviews the troops—And issues a proclamation—He sends it by flag of truce to Green's camp—Green don't see the point, but takes the hint and gets ready to leave—The General issues an order against plundering—Further details of our condition—A detachment goes to Lancaster after supplies—Escape and pursuit of Green—Details of the march—Suffering, straggling and plundering—Night at Wilsonsville—Night at Bear Creek—Scouts from Moore—Junction with Moore at Bethel—Appearance of that place—Character and hospitality of the inhabitants—Change of plans—Moore and Smith pursue the enemy; Hurlbut and Scott move directly toward the railroad—Noon at Shelbyville—Another proclamation—A man straggles ahead of the column and is shot by bushwhackers—Night at Shelbina—The situation—We proceed to Brookfield.
Lieut. Call reconnoiters and reports the enemy's position—Col. Scott desires to attack him with the Third Iowa, the Home Guards, and the Artillery—General Hurlbut declines his consent—Dangers of such a movement—Disappointment of the men—The General reviews the troops—And issues a proclamation—He sends it by flag of truce to Green's camp—Green don't see the point, but takes the hint and gets ready to leave—The General issues an order against plundering—Further details of our condition—A detachment goes to Lancaster after supplies—Escape and pursuit of Green—Details of the march—Suffering, straggling and plundering—Night at Wilsonsville—Night at Bear Creek—Scouts from Moore—Junction with Moore at Bethel—Appearance of that place—Character and hospitality of the inhabitants—Change of plans—Moore and Smith pursue the enemy; Hurlbut and Scott move directly toward the railroad—Noon at Shelbyville—Another proclamation—A man straggles ahead of the column and is shot by bushwhackers—Night at Shelbina—The situation—We proceed to Brookfield.
On the evening of General Hurlbut's arrival at Kirksville, Lieut. Call reconnoitered Green's camp and the approaches to it. Since our arrival at this place, he had changed his camp to another point on Salt River bottom, several miles south. One main road, crossing this stream in an east and west direction, ran through it. Thus it could be approached from front and rear. It was about fourteen miles distant. The road approaching it from the rear could be gained by performing a detour ofseven or eight miles. His camp was surrounded by a high range of hills over which he could not retreat without the loss of his baggage and artillery. Hence, in case of his defeat, if these two roads were held with sufficient force, his entirematerielwould fall into our hands. It would require only a simultaneous attack on these two roads to insure a speedy and decisive victory. It was ten o'clock at night when Lieut. Call reported the result of his reconnoissance. Colonel Scott immediately requested General Hurlbut to allow him to march that night and attack the enemy with his own regiment, the mounted Missourians and Madison's artillery. The news of this proposal spread quickly among the men. We expected nothing else than an immediate night march upon the enemy. The enthusiasm was unbounded. Meanwhile the General was consulting with Col. Scott and one or two other officers. Most of the officers of our regiment were in favor of Col. Scott's proposition. Whatever doubts they may have entertained of our ability to cope with the large force Green had gathered, they knew that nothing less than a victory would quiet the murmurs of their men, and repay them for the needless sufferings they had undergone. But General Hurlbut was of a different mind. He thought that the Sixteenth having marched sixteen miles that day, would not be in a condition to fight after marching sixteen more. There was much truth in this, although its importance might not have been appreciated at that time. To Colonel Scott's request to be allowed to march and attack the enemy with his own force, the mounted Missourians and Madison's artillery, he at first assented. But soon after,a lieutenant of the artillery came in with a groundless report that Green had received reinforcements. This determined the General not to run the risk of dividing his command. Besides, he is said to have made a remark which induced the belief that he expected aid from General Pope. It may be that the consideration of co-operation from Col. Moore had some influence on this decision.
At all events, it is doubtful whether it would have been safe to allow Col. Scott to move as he desired. Night is a poor time to fight battles. A single mistake, caused by the darkness, might bring about the heaviest disasters. To attack an enemy in the night, unless the attacking party is thoroughly acquainted with his situation, is exchanging probability for chance. Our enemy was constantly on the alert, and Colonel Scott could not hope to surprise him. His force was camped in a dense forest, and Colonel Scott did not know the ground. To attack him in the rear, he would be compelled to make a circuit of more than twenty miles before gaining the required position. This would place Green between him and Hurlbut at Kirksville, in a central position between two forces which united were numerically inferior to his own. Colonel Scott would not have attempted to divide so small a force to attack Green at once in front and rear. Had he moved at all, he would have moved in but one way—directly upon the enemy, with his force united and Hurlbut at Kirksville at his back. This plan might have succeeded, but the risk would have been great. But there is no doubt that if General Hurlbut had moved in the morning with his now unitedforce, he would have compelled the enemy's retreat or beaten him badly if he had stood.
When his decision not to allow Colonel Scott to move that night was known, we were ordered to stack arms and go to sleep. The order was sulkily given and as sulkily obeyed. But we went to sleep in the hope that an advance would take place next day.
Instead of fulfilling our expectations, next day Gen. Hurlbut did two things, both of which were generally considered out of place. He reviewed the troops, and issued a proclamation to the insurgents. The review would have been well enough, if it had not been so near the enemy. I have no desire to comment on the proclamation more than to say that we were at a loss to conjecture the motives which dictated it. In it he proposed to visit every county seat in his district with an armed force, and there establish a committee of citizens of both parties, and make them responsible for the preservation of the peace in their counties. As far as we could learn, this proposition was not less obnoxious to the Union men than to the rebels. He concluded by offering all armed bands of the enemy five days in which to lay down their arms, and should they fail to do so in that time, he would convince them of the perils of pursuing this irregular warfare.
There was a printing office in town, that of theKirksville Democrat, a rebel sheet, whose editor had fled at our approach. This had been taken possession of by some members of the Third Iowa, who proposed issuing a sheet of a different character. This was fortunate for the General, as it afforded him means of publishing hisproclamation. A number of copies were sent by flag of truce to the insurgents! Green doubtless chuckled over this, while General Hurlbut's officers and men gnashed their teeth with rage. Those five days were days of grace to Green. He believed General Hurlbut would not move against him till the expiration of that time. He employed it in completing his preparations to get away. Meanwhile, we lay at Kirksville doing nothing, the General probably waiting for his proclamation to ferment.
The Sixteenth on their march hither, if we may believe their own accounts, had been pretty free in the use of property belonging to citizens. After their arrival at Kirksville, a store had been broken open and robbed. This called forth an order from the General, announcing that any soldier of his command who should break open a private house or store for the purpose of robbery, should be "shot at once." There was doubtless a demand for an order of this kind, but we thought that a threat less violent would have answered the purpose equally well.
On the 25th, we attended religious exercises in the open air, and heard an army chaplain preach for the first time since entering the service. The meeting took place in the grove where we were then bivouacked, behind our breastworks of brush. The sermon was preached by the chaplain of the Sixteenth. It seemed strange, indeed, to see men with weapons of death by their sides, mingling their voices with the aged and innocent, in praise to the same God. It seemed a monstrous inconsistency. But nature is full of inconsistencies.The God that gives joy to innocence, swallows up cities with earthquakes.
As has been said, we were compelled to subsist on the country. Sergeant Mix was careful to impress nothing except from enemies. A bakery was taken possession of, and men detailed to run it. This furnished us with an insufficient supply of corn bread. The Union people of Kirksville treated us with great hospitality, and did all they could to promote our comfort. But they could not furnish us with shoes in place of those we had worn out, or with shirts in place of those we had left behind. These things must be taken from the enemy. Accordingly, an expedition, consisting of Companies I and B, of our regiment, under Major Stone, proceeded to the town of Lancaster, about thirty miles to the north, near the Iowa State line, and impressed from rebel citizens several wagon-loads of boots, shoes and the like, which were distributed among those who needed them most.
General Hurlbut issued his proclamation on the 26th. On the 30th, Green began to retreat toward the south. The same morning orders were issued to the troops at Kirksville to be ready to move. We were ready to all appearance to take up the march at an early hour; but, for some reason, the departure of the column was delayed till nearly noon. Meanwhile a rumor circulated through the ranks that Green had gone; and, in our mortification and rage, we could assign but one reason for this delay; we said that the General wished to make an outward show of courage by pursuing, but did not wish to overtake the enemy. There seemed tobe an universal murmur against him. No one spoke in defense of him or attempted to justify his measures. Who would then have believed that under this same man we were destined to be led to honor and glory? We can not but suppose that he was either trammeled by his orders, or laboring like Bonaparte at Borodino, under some strange spell of mental lassitude. Nothing less could have made such a failure of him who was to be the honored General of the Fourth Division and Sixteenth Army Corps.
At 11 A. M., the column moved; the direction was southeast toward the late camp of Green. The most unpleasant feature of the day's march was, that we had nothing to eat. The day was quite hot, and the roads dusty. The country through which we passed was not as thickly settled as between Macon and Kirksville, and it was consequently difficult for the men to procure water. They straggled from the ranks in great numbers, and ran to the wells, at every one of which would take place a scene of indescribable greediness and confusion. A bucket of water would be drawn, and a hundred men would endeavor to get their canteens into it. A score of hungry wolves wrangling over one carcass, would scarcely be an adequate comparison. Hunger oppressed as much as thirst, and from the wells crowds would rush into the houses. What could be procured by asking, was taken. But the column was moving on. There was scarcely time to ask; and, in many cases, the people were too much frightened to answer, or to keep track of the confusion of questions with which they were assailed. In such cases the soldierseized whatever he could see that he could eat, and hurried on. As the day wore away, these matters grew worse. Taking advantage of these circumstances, acts of unlicensed plundering took place, which would disgrace troops under any circumstances. Many gave out and fell behind the column without the hope (and sometimes with little expectation) of overtaking it, till it should halt for the night. Some of these were most dangerous plunderers. No longer under the control of their officers, and counting every citizen an enemy, they committed acts which they will be ashamed to remember, and which I have no desire to record.
Under ordinary circumstances, the less revolting acts of this kind which attended this march would be deserving of no apology. But most of them in this case were caused by absolute hunger. We had not had enough to eat since arriving at Kirksville, and now that we had begun a vigorous march our hunger was almost insufferable. Surely it is not hard then to understand that we could not resist taking food from hostile citizens. General Hurlbut used his best endeavors to correct these irregularities; but, in consequence of a hurt he had received on the day of the review, he was compelled to ride in a buggy, and was not able to put forth much exertion.
A march of sixteen miles brought us at dark to the little town of Wilsonsville, where we halted for the night. Some bread that had been baked at Kirksville and brought along was issued to us. There was not enough for supper and breakfast, but it helped us greatly. The quartermaster promised us fresh beef, but it was slow, very slow in coming. Our patience became exhausted.In place of beef we took chickens. The town and surrounding country were our commissariat. We sent in noreturns. We needed no issuing clerk. We drew from the henroosts by thetail. A strong camp guard was established with orders to let no one out except at the gate with vessels for water. But we found it very easy to go out, with a camp kettle for water, and to return with chicken soup all ready, except what could be done by fire and seasoning. Thus we behaved that night at Wilsonsville; and though we were very quiet about our depredations, and limited ourselves to supplying our actual wants, the people pronounced us vandals. But they saw only the outward manifestation; they knew nothing of the inward cause.
The column moved at daylight, our regiment in advance. A march of eighteen miles brought us to Bear creek, a tributary of Salt river, where we bivouacked in a timbered bottom. Again, as last night, we had nothing in our haversacks to eat. There were but two or three houses near, and guards were placed over them to prevent plundering, and we were compelled to wait till something was issued to us. Food came at last, in the shape of some fresh mutton and musty corn meal. We stewed the meat, made the meal into mush, and ate them both fresh; for we had no salt. Many were then suffering from diarrhœa, and were unable to eat their food at all; but went to sleep without supper hoping to be able to procure something they could eat at the houses we should pass, and so endure the march. The dust had filled our shoes, and there were few among us whose feet were not blistered. The creek on which wewere camped, like all the streams of North Missouri, was muddy and full of logs. But its waters were cool and afforded us a bath, which, under the circumstances, was indeed a luxury.
Several days previous to our departure from Kirksville, we had had rumors of Colonel Moore marching from Edina to join us. Some may have supposed that General Hurlbut was waiting for Moore to march upon Green from the opposite direction, and that his proclamation was intended to delay the retreat of the latter, till this could be effected. Events were transpiring which tended to make this supposition probable. Scouts arrived during the night from Colonel Moore, with the information that he was marching in the direction of Bethel in pursuit of Green. This news was very cheering, although we knew that Grant was twenty-five miles ahead of us, and that his force being mounted, we could not possibly overtake him.
At eight in the morning, we resumed the march, and having proceeded about thirteen miles arrived at two in the afternoon, at Bethel, a beautiful free labor village, inhabited entirely by Germans. These people seemed, indeed, models of good citizens. Every one seemed comfortable and prosperous. Their town was built of brick, and there was no air of dilapidation about it such as characterizes nearly all the interior towns of the South. The reason was obvious—there were no negro huts adjacent to the comfortable residences. Vice accompanies indolence whether among rich or poor; virtue is the companion of industry. There never was a better illustration of this truth than this little community.They seemed to live in perfect harmony with themselves and the world around them. Hitherto, they had taken little or no part in the war. True to the thinking, honest character of the German, they had sat unmoved, and watched the strife around them, and smoked their pipes and thought. We call them phlegmatic; but while thus unmoved, they were moved the most. Every feature of the struggle must be submitted to the slow scrutiny of reason, and every motive which the struggle stirred within them, to the great magistrate, Conscience. This magistrate gave his decisions with the slowness of Justice. When he had answered all these questions they would be prepared to act. And when they began to act, the zeal of self-approbation would quicken them; the "fire of God" would fill them; nothing could cause them to halt or falter.
They fulfilled the Scriptures in point of obeying "the powers that be." Yesterday Martin Green was the commanding power; to-day, it was General Hurlbut. Yesterday Green had passed through their town; his people, they said, had treated them quite civilly. No wonder; such a community should be the pride of any people. Brigands would scarcely have done less. Like sensible people, they knew it was best to submit with patience to evils they could not resist. Green wanted flour and meal; he took all they had in their mill, and paid them in rebel State scrip, to which they knew it was useless to demur. They behaved towards his men with respect. It was an honest respect, but it was also that respect which is always inspired by power.
But it was plain to see which party had their sympathies. They heard of our approach some time before our arrival. They threw open their doors and spread their boards. Foot-sore, weary and weak with hunger, we entered their village,—they had enough to eat for all. They came out to meet us,—men, women and children; and, in that plain, artless way which tells that the heart speaks and does not deceive, invited us into their houses to eat and to rest. We halted and stacked arms. There was no need of a soldier being without an invitation. He could not walk half way through the town without being asked by a dozen different persons. And if any one should be so unfortunate as not to be noticed, he had but to present himself at a door-step, and what he wanted was known immediately. At least, he would not be long in divining what was wanted of him; for another plate would make its appearance on the table as soon as there was room for it. Then there would be a nod or a motion to him to sit down and eat. Such was the applause with which they greeted us. It needed no display of flags or white handkerchiefs to tell us where their hearts were.
We had not been here long when Colonel Moore arrived with seven or eight hundred men, and bivouacked near the town. This fresh arrival did not discourage the good citizens, but rather increased their hospitable efforts. Before night every man of General Hurlbut's column had received a substantial dinner and supper, and Colonel Moore's men a supper, and many were likewise furnished with lodgings. This was no mock hospitality like that of the Slave aristocracy. Therewas no pride or pompousness about it,—only a smile of satisfaction at whatever was accepted,—an evidence that it was good done for its own sake. The soldier received the same as the officer. No one stopped to ask him what his rank was. It was sufficient to know that he was a soldier and that he was hungry.
I believe that our behavior towards these people was in all respects creditable. We parted as we had met, friends. They taught us a lesson and gave us something to remember. The recollection is still in our minds; the lesson still in our hearts.
Soon after Colonel Moore's arrival a new plan of operations was determined upon. Smith and Moore were to pursue the enemy who had retreated toward the railroad in the direction of Monroe, while the General with our regiment, Madison's artillery, and such of the Sixteenth as were judged unable to further endure the march, were to proceed directly south and strike the railroad at Shelbina. This plan of course comprehended the idea of abandoning the pursuit as soon as we should reach the railroad; for it was evident we should not overtake Green.
In Smith and Moore General Hurlbut had yoked together two characters directly opposite. Smith was tardy and irresolute; Moore fiery, energetic and hopeful. The one would push ahead with might and main; the other would drag behind. "Come," said Moore to Smith, that night at the hotel, "a big work is before us; and we have no time to lose." Smith replied, with two or three whiffs of his pipe, and Moore dragged him along.
Reveille sounded at an early hour. We breakfastedas we had supped, with the good people of Bethel. About 8 o'clock our column moved in the direction of Shelbyville, county seat of Shelby county. This place, only five miles distant, was reached by ten o'clock, and we halted, and under the luxuriant shade trees of the court house square rested, while General Hurlbut got out another proclamation! I need not say what the officers and men thought of this. If the General did not know, it was not their fault.
About 2 P. M. we again moved. As we were about to march, we received the startling intelligence that a member of our regiment who had straggled ahead had been shot. This proved to be true. Three men had straggled ahead when the column halted, and when about three miles from Shelbyville, had been waylaid by citizens, and one of them shot dead, another slightly wounded, while the third escaped and brought back the report. This accident induced the precaution of throwing out skirmishers while passing through the spaces of timber that lay across our route. This was soon abandoned, it being concluded that the accident was only the work of malicious citizens. We passed the body of our unfortunate comrade as we walked along. It was a visible and solemn lesson to those who were not disposed to respect discipline and obey orders. It was put in a wagon and brought with us. We buried it next morning with the usual honors.
About five o'clock a storm came up from the northwest, and the rain fell in torrents. This only hightened the boys' glee. Our gait was accelerated, and with loud yells and constant peals of laughter, we entered Shelbina.It was quite late before we could draw any rations; and the occurrences of the night at Wilsonsville were repeated, and perhaps in a more aggravated manner.
The next morning broke misty and lowry. But by nine o'clock it had cleared off, and the face of nature again looked cheerful. What was now the situation? Green had crossed the railroad near Monroe and was continuing his retreat. He had a wide field before him; but if all the means by which he could have crossed the Missouri had been seized, and a vigorous pursuit continued, he might have been captured or his band dispersed. At the same time Colonel Williams was in the direction of Paris, returning from an expedition which we will discuss in the next chapter. Nevertheless, we did not stay to support him; but leaving him to the mercy of Green who, there was every reason to believe, would proceed in that direction, we got aboard two trains of cars and moved toward Brookfield. We had proceeded but two or three miles when the train in advance was fired into by a concealed enemy. About thirty shots were fired; but no one was hurt. We halted a short time and made an unsuccessful search for them.
When we arrived at Brookfield we found that our tents had been occupied in the absence of Colonel Williams, by recruits for Colonel Morgan's regiment. We were admonished by the sick comrades we found here to give them a thorough cleansing before going into them. But in spite of all our efforts in this direction, we soon had the felicity of making the acquaintance of that charming little insect with whose habits and instincts every soldier is supposed to be familiar.
The expedition to Paris—The forces engaged in it—Details of the movement to that place—Conduct of Colonel Williams and Lieut. Col. Blair, while there—They return rapidly to Shelbina—Green pursues and confronts them with a large force—Details of the affair at Shelbina—Colonel Williams retreats to Hudson, where he meets General Hurlbut with reinforcements—The propriety of the retreat discussed—The account of the Rebellion Record.
The expedition to Paris—The forces engaged in it—Details of the movement to that place—Conduct of Colonel Williams and Lieut. Col. Blair, while there—They return rapidly to Shelbina—Green pursues and confronts them with a large force—Details of the affair at Shelbina—Colonel Williams retreats to Hudson, where he meets General Hurlbut with reinforcements—The propriety of the retreat discussed—The account of the Rebellion Record.
While we were marching from Kirksville to Shelbina, Colonel Williams received an order, it is said, from General Fremont, the precise nature of which I am not able to give. However, he collected his available force, which consisted of the fifty well men left at Brookfield by Colonel Scott, as many of the sick as had convalesced during the subsequent two weeks, and sixty men of Company C, who had been watching the enemy in the vicinity of St. Joseph. With this force he proceeded to Hannibal, where he was joined by six companies, or rather by a remnant of six companies of the gallant Second Kansas, decimated by losses at Springfield and the sufferings of the hard campaign of the Southwest, and now returning home by this route to recruit their numbers and rest. This battalion, one company of which was mounted, together with a company of Missouri cavalry under Captain Dolan, increased his force to 630 men; with which he returned as far asShelbina, where he arrived at nightfall, and leaving the cars began an immediate night march toward Paris, the county seat of Monroe county, a flourishing inland town, where he arrived about daybreak and bivouacked for the day. Learning from reliable citizens that the enemy was in the vicinity with 1,200 men, he threw out pickets in the outskirts of town, and sent out the cavalry to reconnoiter. The latter had an affray with the enemy, and lost an officer captured.
That night both Colonel Williams and Lieut. Colonel Blair, were too much under the influence of liquor to be in a condition to command men. Colonel Williams is said to have behaved most ridiculously. He had his headquarters in the office of the Clerk of the Circuit Court. He told his officers that the force was in imminent danger of attack, and that they must not think of sleeping during the night. As to himself, he was so worn out with fatigue and anxiety, that it would be absolutely necessary for him to get a little sleep in order to be prepared for emergencies that might arise! The officers of the Third Iowa consulted together and decided that Colonel Williams was not in a fit condition to continue in command. Whereupon they reported this fact to Major Cloud, who informed them that Lieut. Col. Blair was in a like condition, and that he had already assumed command of the Kansas troops, and would assume command of the whole force; on which they mutually agreed to obey him should anything occur during the night. Before morning the camp was alarmed by the firing of the pickets, and the troops took position for action. Colonel Williams is said to haverode around the lines and delivered a few drunken orders, which were not heeded, the officers obeying Major Cloud.
Whatever we may say in justification of Colonel Williams' conduct on the following day, we do not attempt to justify this night's debauch. In this, both he and Lieut. Col. Blair committed a fault for which they should have been dismissed from the service. It was one of those faults which amount to a high crime. They got drunk in the presence of a superior enemy, and when they were expecting him to attack the forces under their command. That was the crime. The situation of this little force at best was a dangerous one. That very day Green crossed the railroad in his retreat from Hurlbut. That he united with the rebel force in the vicinity of Paris, and designed attacking Williams while in this isolated position, subsequent events place beyond doubt. Had the latter remained at Paris till noon the following day, it is certain that Green would have inflicted a heavy disaster upon him.
As it was, he began to retreat early in the morning toward Shelbina. The promptness and rapidity of this movement, can not be placed to his credit; for, though he had reason to believe he was followed, he had no knowledge of the presence of Green. He arrived at Shelbina about 2 P. M., and learned, doubtless with regret, of the departure of Hurlbut and Scott from that place for Brookfield the previous day.
He had not been here half an hour when a heavy cloud of dust made its appearance in the direction whence he had come; and soon the head of a column of cavalry began to emerge from the long line of timberwhich skirts the prairie of Shelbina about four miles to the south. This column, lengthening as it emerged, came stretching over the prairie, devouring, in expectation, the little band that was waiting to receive it. Through this prairie runs a small brook, in the valley of which the enemy disappeared in column and then reappeared, a formidable line of battle a mile in length, stretching to the north of the road and steadily advancing; at the same time bodies of troops began to appear to the south of the road, which, when deployed, extended so far as to reach the railroad to the east. The enemy now presented, with two or three slight intervals, a line of battle two miles in length, behind which could be seen, with the aid of a glass, a line of infantry a half mile in length drawn up as a reserve. Green then planted two pieces of cannon at different points, and sent to Colonel Williams by flag of truce a demand for the surrender of his force, giving him half an hour to decide. "Go to h——l!" is said to have been the laconic response of the Colonel. He then ordered the women and children out of the town.
Meanwhile he had been barricading the principal streets with lumber and rubbish to protect his men from the fire of small arms. At the expiration of the half hour, all eyes were strained with expectation in the direction of the enemy. A burst of smoke enveloped one of his pieces, and a nine pounder shot came screeching through the air. After several discharges with this, he opened with his second piece, and his extended flank began to advance, and close slowly toward our right and left. The cavalry and two light companies of theKansas battalion made two or three slight demonstrations toward the enemy. An engine and a car filled with men went to the east and disturbed his flank resting upon the railroad. He made a demonstration on the railroad toward the right; but an engine with two cars filled with men went out and drove him off.
When the enemy first made his appearance, Colonel Williams telegraphed to General Hurlbut a statement of his condition, to which the General replied, telling him to hold out, and promising to reinforce him before night. Two hours and a half had now elapsed without tidings of any assistance. The enemy was advancing his pieces and drawing his lines so as to envelop our flanks, and the situation was evidently becoming critical. The Colonel called together his officers and asked their advice. They were unanimously of the opinion that it was best to move on the cars out of range of the enemy and await the promised reinforcements. But Lieut. Col. Blair and Major Cloud expressed their determination to retreat with their battalion at all events. Col. Williams then said that if he could not induce the Kansas troops to remain, he would not remain with his own men. He therefore ordered a retreat. The men got hastily aboard the cars, leaving behind two or three baggage wagons and a small quantity of camp equipage. The enemy, before he discovered this movement, got his artillery quite close behind the screen of a cornfield, and began to throw grape and canister. The two trains moved rapidly toward the west, the cavalry galloping along on the side opposite the enemy. When the trains reached Clarence, the first station west of Shelbina, andtwelve miles distant from it, they halted. But instead of waiting reinforcements here, the cavalry got hastily aboard the flat cars, and the retreat was continued with every evidence that some one was greatly frightened. When Colonel Williams arrived at Hudson (Macon City), he found General Hurlbut there with about 250 men on the way to reinforce him. General Hurlbut called the Colonel and his officers to account for their conduct on this occasion, and his personal conduct greatly increased the feeling against him, both among the officers and men.
Col. Williams has been greatly censured on account of this retreat from Shelbina, and there may have been some disposed to attach a stigma to our regiment in consequence of it. At least the name of a regiment always suffers more or less with that of its commanding officer. If the Colonel was to blame, his officers, and particularly Colonel Blair and Major Cloud were not less so; the former for advising him to retreat; the two latter for refusing to remain with him with the troops under their command. That he did not await General Hurlbut at Clarence is altogether inexplicable. In continuing the retreat beyond that place in the manner in which it was done, there is every evidence of panic and fright. Nothing could have been lost then by waiting the arrival of reinforcements, or the approach of night or the enemy. This would have supported the confidence of the men, and given it, in the eyes of the public, the appearance of an orderly retreat, instead of a disgraceful flight. If he had waited till night, without the appearance either of reinforcements or of the enemy, itmight have been wiser then to resume the retreat than to run the risk of waking up in the morning to find himself surrounded, as Colonel Smith had been at Monroe, with the track torn up and the wires cut on either side of him. This undoubtedly would have happened to him, had he held out and remained that night at Shelbina. In passing judgment on this affair, we have to consider, first, that to hold out against a superior enemy hightens themoraleof troops; and that it especially discourages men to be compelled to retreat from troops for whom they have a settled contempt, such as lawless insurgents, poorly disciplined and armed, and whom they have come to suppress; and, second, that a successful retreat, from whatever enemy, discourages them less than a disaster. Finally, considering the threatening approach of the enemy in such numbers, the non-arrival of reinforcements, and particularly the refusal of the Kansas field officers to remain, we can not see wherein Colonel Williams was to blame in abandoning Shelbina; but the flight from Clarence demands an explanation which has never been given to the men of the Third Iowa, who suffered a share in the general disgrace. A more resolute commander, one whose conduct on this occasion, as well as previously, had been such as to inspire the respect of all his subordinates, would not have given up the place without a severe fight. Before what happened in this case, the example of Sigel at Carthage or Mulligan at Lexington, would have been far preferable. The whole thing was badly managed. Hurlbut was to blame for not remaining at Shelbina the day before to support Williams. Williamswas to blame for drunkenness at Paris, and for the imbecility of calling a council of officers during the progress of the action. And again, Hurlbut was to blame for not reinforcing him more promptly and with a larger force. To show how this affair figures in history, I give the account found in theRebellion Record, which is also found in theN. Y. Commercialof September 10, 1861:
"This afternoon, Col. N. G. Williams, with eleven hundred troops, Kansas and Iowa Third, was attacked at Shelbina, Mo., by Martin Green, with from fifteen hundred to two thousand troops. Green commenced firing upon them with two pieces of artillery, and kept up fire for about one and a half hours. One man, (Federal), had his leg taken off with a cannon ball. Col. Williams retreated on two trains to Hudson, Mo., leaving a number of horses and a part of his camp utensils in the hands of the rebels. Col. Williams had no artillery. General Hurlbut got as far as Hudson, Mo., from Brookfield, with two hundred and fifty men, to reinforce Williams. When he arrived there, Williams was at Clarence on his retreat."
Our only comment on this is that Lieut. Schrader, acting commissary for the force, stated that he issued rations for 630 men, and that Green, after receiving the reinforcements which joined him south of the railroad, not including the riffraff who joined him for the occasion, could not have had less than 3,000; nor could he have made so formidable display of numbers with a less force. The casualty mentioned was that of a captain of the Kansas troops, who had his foot taken off by a cannon ball while attempting to rally some Missourians.
We break up camp at Brookfield and proceed toward Shelbina—Junction with Smith and Moore—General Pope assumes command—Hurlbut and Williams proceed to St. Louis in arrest—Pope leads a night march against Green at Florida—Feelings of the troops—Circumstances of that affair—Report of General Fremont concerning it—We return to the railroad and proceed to Macon—Arrival of Generals Pope and Sturgis at that point—Prospects of active movements.
We break up camp at Brookfield and proceed toward Shelbina—Junction with Smith and Moore—General Pope assumes command—Hurlbut and Williams proceed to St. Louis in arrest—Pope leads a night march against Green at Florida—Feelings of the troops—Circumstances of that affair—Report of General Fremont concerning it—We return to the railroad and proceed to Macon—Arrival of Generals Pope and Sturgis at that point—Prospects of active movements.
The men who had been with Scott at Kirksville were not allowed as much time to rest as they had expected. On the morning of September 6th, we broke up camp at Brookfield, got aboard a train of cars with our baggage and effects, and moving eastward, arrived at Hudson a little before sunset. Here we found Colonel Williams and his Shelbina command, the detachment of the Sixteenth which General Hurlbut had moved to reinforce him, and the Second Kansas, who had just got aboard a train of cars, and were about to start for their previous destination, their homes. The latter told prodigious stories of the battle of Springfield, and we looked upon them with the respect usually given to veterans.
The other troops at Hudson were not yet ready to move; but Colonel Scott pushed on and halted for the night at Clarence. It was quite dark when we reached that place, and we experienced not a little difficulty ingetting our effects separated properly, and putting ourselves in a situation to pass the night. The greatest trouble was, that we had scarcely anything to eat. But the town had plenty of henroosts, and our ready hands supplied the deficiency. There were some apprehensions, but no positive tidings of the enemy. Early in the morning, a construction train went forward with a guard of thirty men in command of a sergeant.
After Colonel Williams retreated from Shelbina, the enemy had ventilated his rage upon the innocent railroad by tearing up the track, burning culverts, and pulling down the wires for several miles either way from that place. The principal damage done was in the burning of the Salt river bridge, between Shelbina and Hunnewell. The day was spent in repairing these damages, and at night, the forces which had spent the previous night at Clarence and Macon under Hurlbut, Williams and Scott, formed junction with those of Smith and Moore, approaching from the opposite direction. Our regiment, again united, and under Colonel Williams, moved forward early in the night to Hunnewell.
Meanwhile we learned to our great joy that General Pope had arrived from the North Missouri Railway and assumed command of the forces on this road; and it was rumored that he would proceed immediately against Green, who was encamped in the vicinity of Florida, a day's march to the southwest. The rumor was correct; and he would have moved that night, if Colonel Smith had not been too long in getting back from Shelbina.
As might have been expected, the operations of the Federal forces in northeast Missouri, which the last two chapters have attempted to describe, discouraged the Union people and created a general feeling of disappointment against General Hurlbut, both among citizens and soldiers. Both the General and Colonel Williams were the following morning relieved from their commands, and started for St. Louis under arrest.
Daylight found the whole force assembled at Hunnewell under Pope. We waited anxiously to see what he would do. He still hoped to surprise Green. But he knew that the spies of the latter might watch him, and he accordingly adopted a ruse to deceive them. He laid out his camp in regular order, established a brigade camp guard, with Major Stone as officer of the day, and, as far as outward appearances could show, made preparations to remain at Hunnewell for some time. The ruse deceived his own soldiers, who shook their heads and did not like the appearance of things at all. It doubtless likewise deceived the enemy.
All at once, a little before sunset, up came an order to put four days' rations on the wagons and get ready to march immediately. At dusk the column took up the march in a splendid manner. Every step was elastic, and every heart was full of joy and hope. We were about to do now what we had longed to do at Kirksville. Nothing but some egregious blunder on our part, or extreme watchfulness on the part of the enemy, would hinder success.
But General Pope, notwithstanding his skill andenergy, had made one mistake. He had taken too long a train. Two days' rations would have sufficed instead of four. Should he succeed in surprising the enemy, the fight would not last long. Should the enemy retreat either before or after a fight, it would be useless to pursue, unless it were intended to undertake a general pursuit. The wagons, continually halting, embarrassed and impeded the march. Had the train been half as long, we could have moved with much more rapidity and ease.
After keeping the main road two or three hours, we followed by-roads or moved over fields and rough prairies, which rendered the marching tiresome in the extreme. About three o'clock in the morning we crossed Salt river and found ourselves in the streets of Florida. The different battalions twisted themselves together in all possible confusion, and the men, heedless of everything, threw themselves down in all manner of shapes to rest.
But where was Green? He was camped on a wooded bottom three miles below, and the road leading to his camp was on the opposite (east) side of the river. Only three miles off and we were halting! Was it to take rest before falling upon him? or had General Pope missed the way? Probably the latter; for we soon countermarched, crossed the bridge and moved rapidly down the river. Was the enemy there? The citizens said, yes. An old negro, who gazed at us with astonishment, said they were there last night. Soon we heard the crack of muskets. They were certainly there; for Lieut. Call was driving in their pickets.It was our hour of glory. What had we to fear? We were three regiments and four pieces of cannon besides the Home Guards, and following a brave and skillful leader. They were a half organized horde, armed with citizen's rifles and shot guns. Soon we would have victory for the stigmas and sufferings of the past. Seldom have men felt more joy.
Suddenly we were in the enemy's camp; but the enemy was not there. Our feelings experienced a sudden shock of disappointment. Victory, glory,—a moment ago almost within our possession, now lost. Each man felt as though he had suddenly lost a fortune. But this is a tame comparison; for what is money compared with the reward of the soldier who participates in a successful battle? The enemy was gone; he had taken everything. Nothing was left but a United States baggage wagon, about ten bushels of unshelled corn and a broken shot gun. A few coals smoldered beneath the ashes of his camp-fires. Every thing indicated that his scouts had informed him of the movements against him, and that he had evacuated early in the night.
Those who participated in this affair will not recall without a smile the report of General Fremont to Adjutant General Townsend concerning it. It represented Pope as having defeated Green, capturing his baggage, besides recapturing that lost by our forces at Shelbourne (Shelbina); that his infantry was exhausted but his cavalry pursued. It is needless to say, that these statements were entirely without foundation. The only cavalry the General had was a few Home Guards,armed with muskets and mounted on farm horses. It is true that they pursued; but they did not overtake the enemy. It is also true that the infantry pursued; that is, a great many small straggling parties went out in the direction of the enemy, levied contributions of warm meals upon the inhabitants, and captured animals of various sizes, from chickens in pin feathers up to horses. General Pope observed this conduct on the part of his men with deep regret. But he doubtless felt a little indulgent toward us, as every good commander will feel toward his men when they have done something praiseworthy.
His men needed rest. He accordingly posted no infantry guard—only kept his mounted men on the line of the enemy's retreat. This will account for an incident which occurred during the afternoon, and of which my comrades have a vivid recollection. A party of rebels, probably a detachment of Green's main force, rode leisurely into our camp. Colonel Moore was the first to discover them, and to recognize them as enemies. He sprang to the nearest stack of guns, seized a musket, and fired at the advanced man, giving him a mortal wound in the breast. A number of soldiers imitated his example, and another man was wounded; but the remainder fled in amazement and consternation. Toward night the column marched back to Florida and camped. Here, also, a number of depredations were committed on the property of rebel citizens. Consequently for the return march the following day, General Pope issued an order requiring the commandants of regiments to ride in the rear of their respective commands,and allow no soldier to leave the ranks except in case of absolute necessity; and that whoever should break ranks to plunder should be shot. This order did not sound at all pleasant to some of us, but it was nevertheless obeyed. The march was begun early. The day was cool, and three o'clock found us at Hunnewell. We found that the camp of our regiment had been removed to the Salt river bridge by the guards and men left with it, for the better protection of that work. We joined them, tired and foot-sore enough.
After a fruitless chase that had promised such splendid results, we could not but have a feeling of disappointment. The enemy had not out-generaled us; he had out-marched us. We needed cavalry. Of what avail was it for a man to take his household goods on his back and endeavor to catch a horse? We must have dragoons to ride down and saber to pieces the mounted forces. This was the universal opinion among us. Our campaign against Green had taught us to value cavalry. At this time it seemed that the whole country was agreeing with us. "The man on the horse" was the rage, both in the army and out of it. The War Department was increasing the cavalry force to 75,000. We had rumors, too, that General Pope proposed to mount two or three regiments, including ours, and with them clear north Missouri of all irregular forces. The mere mention of it threw some of us into ecstacies.
But this expectation was suddenly disappointed, when the following morning our regiment got aboard a train of cars with all its baggage, moved westward and camped at Macon City. We did not lay out a regular camphere. No one expected that we would remain long. It seemed as though we were only waiting for further orders.
The following day, September 12th, General Sturgis arrived from St. Louis, by way of the North Missouri Railroad, with four companies of the Thirty-ninth Ohio. General Pope also arrived from Hunnewell with the Sixteenth Illinois. These two brigadiers established their headquarters in the same hotel. It now looked like work. Fremont had sent two of his best generals to command the forces here. We had seen enough of Pope to have confidence in him. We knew that Sturgis had won laurels at Springfield. We had read unbounded praises of him in the St. Louis papers. His presence gave us great confidence in future movements.
Col. Smith with his own regiment and five companies of the Thirty-ninth Ohio proceeds west to Platte river bridge, and commences repairing it—Col. Scott is ordered to co-operate with him against the rebels in that vicinity—We proceed to Cameron by railroad, impress transportation and march toward Liberty—The first night—Second day's march—Second night at Centerville—Cannonading in the distance—Our feelings—Lieut. Call reconnoiters as far as Liberty—We move at 3 A. M.—At sunrise drive back the enemy's pickets and camp at Liberty—No tidings from Smith—Cannonading in the direction of Independence, and probabilities of an engagement across the river—Col. Scott resolves to attack.
Col. Smith with his own regiment and five companies of the Thirty-ninth Ohio proceeds west to Platte river bridge, and commences repairing it—Col. Scott is ordered to co-operate with him against the rebels in that vicinity—We proceed to Cameron by railroad, impress transportation and march toward Liberty—The first night—Second day's march—Second night at Centerville—Cannonading in the distance—Our feelings—Lieut. Call reconnoiters as far as Liberty—We move at 3 A. M.—At sunrise drive back the enemy's pickets and camp at Liberty—No tidings from Smith—Cannonading in the direction of Independence, and probabilities of an engagement across the river—Col. Scott resolves to attack.
BATTLE OF BLUE MILLS LANDING.
We expected that the troops now under these two generals would be directed in pursuit of Green. In this we were disappointed. There were now far more important movements on foot, but of which we could conjecture nothing. Both the Sixteenth Illinois and the detachment of the Thirty-ninth Ohio were sent west under Smith. This seemed a little strange; but in reality it was not at all so; for we had already learned that the enemy had captured St. Joseph, and we had just received intelligence of the Platte river bridge tragedy with which the country is familiar. The Twenty-seventh Ohio and the additional five companies of the Thirty-ninth Ohio arrived by way of the North MissouriRailroad, and, under Sturgis, proceeded west as far as Utica, when leaving the railroad, they moved south toward Lexington. I have been unable to ascertain the orders under which these columns moved. There is a chaos about the loss of Lexington, out of which it is scarcely possible to bring any thing tangible or intelligible. It seems, however, that General Pope had control of the movements designed to reinforce that garrison from the north, and that General Sturgis was under his command. Be this as it may, the dispositions were faulty in the extreme. It seems that the Union Guards designed reinforcing Mulligan from the line of the Hannibal and St. Joseph Railroad, and, at the same time, driving out the rebels from the vicinity of St. Joseph. Col. Smith, whom we supposed sent to effect the latter purpose, proceeded as far west as Platte river bridge, nine miles from St. Joseph, and commenced repairing it. Why he did not proceed against the enemy is inexplicable. If his force was insufficient, why was our regiment still lying at Macon? Above all, why were these movements delayed a day when Lexington was in such peril? Such questions will ever recur to us when we remember what an annoyance the operations of the western army received in the surrender of that garrison. The rebels began to retreat from the vicinity of St. Joseph, and what then? Why, it was now time to organize pursuit!
For this purpose, the Third Iowa was to go west and co-operate with Smith. On the morning of September 15th, Colonel Scott received orders to this effect, and, in less than two hours those of the regimentwho were able to endure a forced march were aboard a train of cars and proceeding rapidly toward the west. The Colonel compelled many partially ill or convalescent, who wished to join in the movement, to remain behind; because he expected to perform rapid marches, and did not wish to be embarrassed by straggling.
At 1 P. M. we arrived at Cameron, a station about forty miles east of St. Joseph, and got our effects off the train. Here we heard the first rumors of Price's movements, and began to have glimpses of what was before us. Colonel Scott's orders from General Sturgis were to leave the railroad at Cameron, march upon Liberty, act against the rebels and co-operate with Smith. The plan seems to have been that Smith and Scott should unite at Liberty, defeat the St. Joseph rebels and capture their immense train before they could cross the Missouri; and then, following them down the north bank of that stream, unite with Sturgis, who would then be able to appear before Lexington in such force as to raise the siege. It is easy to see wherein this plan was defective. It involved, first, a division of our forces in the presence of an enemy who was numerically our superior; and, secondly, the accomplishing of two objects almost simultaneously when the whole force should have been concentrated for the accomplishment of the main one, the relief of Mulligan. As will be shown in the following pages, the faults in executing were not less than those in planning, and the whole thing was a total and disgraceful failure, relieved only by two bright tints of glory, the heroism of Mulligan at Lexington and of Scott at Blue Mills. In justice toColonel Smith, however, it is proper to state here, that, as will be seen by theSt. Louis Republican'saccount, given in the next chapter, orders to proceed to Lexington, after cutting off Boyd and Patton, did not reach him at all.
We were not long getting our baggage and effects off the cars. But how were we to move without transportation? Colonel Smith had taken our wagons from us on a previous occasion, and still had them. Colonel Scott, with his characteristic energy, set himself to work to solve this problem. Before the men had got their dinners, he had put into requisition several teams belonging to citizens, on which we loaded our subsistence and the few cooking utensils we took along. We were joined by a detachment of Captain Schwartz's Missouri Battery, fourteen men and a six pounder, under command of a sergeant.
At three o'clock, we began to move. It had been raining slowly since noon; but, though the roads were slippery, the mud was not deep, and the wagons and artillery proceeded without difficulty. After a steady march of seven miles, we bivouacked on an open meadow. It continued to drizzle slowly till sunset, and finally the wind rose in the northwest, damp and raw, which rendered the night very comfortless. The common ration of food being found insufficient to satisfy our hunger, Colonel Scott humanely and wisely ordered extra issues to be made.
The march was resumed at an early hour. The scenery through which we passed this day was sufficiently pleasing to repay even the toils of the tiresomemarch. The day was clear and warm, and by noon the roads were quite dry. We halted for dinner and rest at the small town of Hainesville. As will be seen by Colonel Scott's official report, it was from this point that he sent his first messenger to Smith. [What became of these messengers? Were they captured by the enemy? Or were they too timid to go far? To suppose that they were unable to find Colonel Smith would be preposterous.]
After a short rest, we resumed the march, and arrived at Centerville at sunset. We had scarcely stacked arms, when we heard toward the west the firing of cannon. Every pulse beat quicker. There was not a man who did not listen with interest. Every jar seemed an earnest of something to come. Each seemed to tell of human passions broke loose, of men turned demons, of carnage and of death. There was to us a strange romance in those sounds. We rejoiced; for we knew that in that direction were both friends and foes. That the latter were there, gave us a double joy. We would meet them, and wipe out the unjust reproach of Shelbina. We would show the country, that under a brave leader, we were no cowards. We would make good our promises to our friends and loved ones at home. We would earn the right to be called comrades of the gallant men who fought at Springfield. The fact that friends were there, gave us the assurance that we should not meet the enemy alone and without hope of success.
We found Centerville almost entirely deserted. The inhabitants were rebels. They had heard of our approach and fled. Nothing belonging to them, however,was disturbed except their henroosts. It requires no more than the teachings of ordinary experience to show that pilot bread and fat bacon will not support great fatigue. The country through which we passed supplied us in a measure with what our commissariat lacked. No one went beyond the bounds of reason, and the people were surprised that we took so little. Thus every man had plenty of good food; his blood flowed vigorously; and what, under other circumstances, would have cost him great fatigue, he now endured with comparative ease.
Colonel Scott sent another messenger to Smith, and Lieut. Call reconnoitered as far as Liberty. He reported the enemy marching through that place. This was sufficient to determine Scott. The sound of Madison's guns convinced him that the enemy was closely pursued. He was determined, that, if decisive results were not attained, it should not be through any fault of his.
Accordingly the drums beat reveille at two o'clock. We breakfasted hastily, and at three the column was in motion. There was an inspiration in this hurried march which the memory loves to recall. Colonel Scott since said in a private letter, "My impression at this moment of the proudest conduct of the old Third runs me back to the morning of Sept. 17th, '61, driving in the rebel pickets, and, with the eye of an eagle and the tread of a wild stag, closing up that heavy march and advancing upon Liberty, in the expectation of meeting thousands of rebels at any moment." At sunrise we came in sight of Liberty. There were indeed enemies at hand, but no friends. Lieut. Call drove the wholerebel pickets through the town, and we bivouacked on the hill overlooking it from the north. But where was Smith? Colonel Scott could not suppose that his last messenger had not reached him. He accordingly waited with great impatience for his arrival. Nine o'clock—ten—twelve; but no tidings from him.
On the other hand, we heard the firing of cannon in the direction of Independence. This led us to believe that troops from the other side of the Missouri were engaging the enemy while he was attempting to cross. Colonel Scott seems to have been convinced on this point; for it had been his understanding before leaving the railroad, that troops from Kansas City were to co-operate. There was no mistaking the sounds. Six discharges were heard, loud and distinct. Besides, citizens actually reported that a fight was taking place on the other side of the river. This left it impossible for Colonel Scott to doubt that such was the case. He was, then, governed by two considerations:First, our friends were engaging the enemy and needed assistance. To hesitate or delay could not receive too much reproach.Second, if the enemy was not entirely across, he was divided by the river. Thus it was not only an absolute duty to attack at all hazards; but, in doing so, it was probable that he would be able to strike a decisive blow. Nevertheless, it was plain to see, that the undertaking involved great hazard. The lowest reports of the citizens placed the enemy's force at 3,000 men, with three pieces of cannon. Universally hostile to us, and chagrined that their friends had fled before so small a force, it is reasonable to suppose that theyrepresented his numbers less than they really were. But Colonel Scott accepted the hazard and determined to attack without delay. It was a resolution worthy of our old commander, and every soldier rejoiced to join in executing it.
This was between the hours of one and two. Colonel Scott started a messenger to Smith, and ordered the men to fall in. In a few minutes the regiment was marching through the town, keeping a buoyant tread to martial notes that had never sounded so sweetly before. The people, mostly ladies—for there were few men to be seen—gathered upon the street corners and watched us as we passed. We were marching to attack their sons and brothers, and yet in our enthusiasm, we thought we could see a gleam of admiration in their eyes. We subsequently learned that we were not deceived. We almost fancied we heard them murmur; "Those are five thousand; these, five hundred. Ah, how great the odds! Brave men! with what a tread they march forward to slaughter and defeat! But they are enemies, and it must be so."
I can imagine, too, the feelings of Colonel Scott, as he rode at the head of these devoted men. I believe he recognized in the coming hour not only duty but glory. There are moments in men's lives when a vigorous blow seems to revolutionize their destiny. The man who watches for these moments, who hails them in the distance, who recognizes them when they arrive, and who then strikes, may almost be said to be master of his fortune. It is given to few men to command a force, acting independently against an enemy, when there isan opportunity to strike a decisive blow. Colonel Scott, then, doubtless recognized this as his hour of destiny. And such it was; for though success might not attend the blow, a failure to strike quickly would bring upon him the imputation of cowardice, and consign his name to irreparable disgrace. His force was small; but to each man the hazard was no less, than if they were a hundred thousand. Besides, it was at a period of the war when we had not begun to fight great battles; but when small successes made generals, and gave opportunity for greater ones. It must have been an anxious hour to Scott. But he was equal to it, and rode on, cool and firm as a Roman.
Lieut. Call with his mounted Missourians had the advance. They encountered the enemy's pickets about two miles from Liberty, drove them in and closely followed them. Anticipating this, his rearguard, a battalion of cavalry under Colonel Childs, ambushed themselves in a ravine behind a dense thicket, having previously picketed their horses in the rear, and awaited their approach. The Lieutenant and his party rode almost on to the muzzles of their guns, when the rebels discovered themselves by a simultaneous volley, which emptied five saddles, killing four men instantly and wounding a fifth. What was to be done? The enemy was dismounted and posted. The Home Guards had no sabers, only muskets, and could not charge. It was a trying moment; but they fully vindicated their courage. Not a man drew rein to retreat. They returned the fire, and only retired at the command of Lieut. Call. In this encounter, Capt. Cupp of the Home Guards was killed.Capt. Hawk was also wounded in such a manner that it seemed half a miracle that it did not kill him. A ball struck him full on the corner of the forehead, but by some means glanced, and spared the gallant Captain's life. This affair won for Lieut. Call's Home Guards our highest respect; for it taught us that they were brave men.
The four ghastly bodies, as we passed them, were visible presages of what was to come. Near the scene of this occurrence, Colonel Scott halted the battalion, and brought it to a front. He ordered us to inspect our ammunition, and untie the bunches in the lower partition of our boxes. He then gave the command to load, and rode along the line cautioning the men to be steady and fire low. He caused the artillery to take position in the center of the column, and a company of infantry to be deployed forward as skirmishers. He ordered the mounted men to bring up the rear as a reserve.
These dispositions being made, the column continued to advance. It will be remembered that, at this point, we were perhaps half way between Liberty and Blue Mills Landing; two miles from either place. We were in a wooded bottom which continued to the river, interrupted by one or two small corn-fields. The timber was very dense, and the fallen trees and tangled vines rendered it almost impenetrable. It would be impossible for a battalion deployed in line to advance through it with any degree of rapidity or order. This induced Colonel Scott to keep the battalion marching by the flank in the road, and to trust to the skirmishers to discover the enemy in time to allow him to make dispositionsto attack him. Thus, making frequent halts to relieve the skirmishers with fresh companies, we felt our slow way forward.
That the character of the ground in a manner compelled us to advance thus, proved to be the chief misfortune of the day. We however reached a point before finding the enemy, that presented a favorable opportunity for preventing this. The road on which we advanced led north and south. We came to a square corn field lying to the left of the road and bordering upon it. On the south side of this field came a heavily traveled road from the east, entering the one on which we were marching at right angles. On the right of the north and south road and about three rods from it, ran parallel to it a slough several rods in width, unobstructed save by occasional logs, and, at this time, dry. We were now not more than a mile from the river, General Atchison's report to the contrary, notwithstanding. The enemy was between us and the river, if he had not crossed; and being so near, it was time to begin to proceed with greater caution. I have always believed that the Colonel's greatest mistake was in not forming line here, where the ground presented so favorable an opportunity, and advancing cautiously thus, the cannon in the road, and the skirmishers well in advance. But this is only the opinion of a soldier, given after the battle is over. Probably no one knew what to dothenbetter than Colonel Scott; and when it was over, no one knew what should have been done better than he.
As it was, the column halted and the skirmishers now in advance were relieved by Company B, CaptainLong, which was deployed forward on the left of the road, and by twelve men of Company F, under First Sergeant Abernethy, who were deployed forward on the right of the road in the dry slough. Company I was now in the lead of the battalion, next the artillery, and then Company F, followed by the other companies. In this order the column again advanced, with no signs of the enemy until Captain Long is said to have reported from the line of skirmishers that he could hear the enemy advancing, their officers giving commands, and the ground shaking with their tread. For some reason, the Colonel paid no heed to this report, but rode very coolly on, cautioning the skirmishers not to get too far ahead. The enemy was indeed advancing, and the skirmishers were not more than twelve rods beyond the head of the column.
All at once, we heard a few sharp reports, and then a deafening crash of musketry. It was on the right in front of Sergeant Abernethy's skirmishers. They had unmasked the enemy and opened fire upon him, and with what fury he was returning it! Brave comrades! we knew that they were suffering, but we had scarcely time to think of them before the firing became general, and the enemy's balls flew thick and fast along the entire length of the column. The situation was disastrous in the extreme. It did not require a second thought to comprehend it. While marching to attack the enemy, he had ambushed us and attacked us in column. All that we could now do was to make the best of a desperate situation. The men moved quickly to the right and left without regard to their positions in ranks, concealedthemselves as best they could, and began to return the enemy's fire.
Colonel Scott immediately ordered the cannon forward. It was brought forward a short distance, got into position and fired two discharges of canister, which are said to have done great execution. This is doubtless the case; for the rebels were almost under its muzzle. But they opened upon the artillerists with rifles and shot guns—for they were within buckshot range—and in a few moments disabled several of their horses and killed and wounded half the squad. Soon after this, the Colonel is said to have given the order to "fall back a little." If such an order was given, it was intended only for those who had got too far in advance, and was heard by few and heeded by none. The enemy began to push a column past our right; but this proved a disastrous attempt; for, being exposed to the fire of our entire column across the slough, it was soon scattered and beaten back. Company I was particularly prominent in this. Colonel Scott put forth every effort to bring the companies into line parallel with that of the enemy; but the men could not be brought out of the confusion, and in the noise, the commands could not be heard. But he himself resolutely kept the extreme advance, and his example was almost worth a battalion of reinforcements.
Every moment matters grew worse. Out of sixteen commissioned officers ten had fallen. The cannon was totally disabled. The enemy, though he had been checked in his charges on our front, and in his attempt to flank our right, had fallen back to his cover, and hisbullets rained as thickly as at first. We began to give back slowly, keeping up an unabated fire, and carrying off our wounded. Only three wounded men were left on the field. We, the men, evidently thought that it was "advisable to fall back." But we had no orders to this effect,—at least, none that many of us heard, though a dozen might have been given. We were simply repulsed; driven out of the woods perforce; compelled to get out of the enemy's ambuscade or stand where we were and be shot down to no purpose. If orders to retreat were not given, they should have been. The enemy's long line, masked in a dry ravine, extended around us in the shape of a crescent, and we were exposed to a concentrated fire from its center and both flanks. Under the circumstances, we did the bravest thing possible; we retired slowly, disputing the enemy's advance. Our caisson had got clogged between two trees, and, as most of its horses were shot down, and the enemy pressing upon it, we were compelled to abandon it. But the cannon must be saved. Captain Trumbull waved his sword, and called on the men around him to help drag it off. As many seized hold of it as could, including Lieut. Crosley, Sergeant Abernethy, and the sergeant who commanded the artillery squad. It was with great difficulty that it was got away, and three men were shot while hold of it.
Colonel Scott who had been in the advance during the fight, was still nearest the enemy in the retreat. Two or three times he endeavored, but without success, to re-form the regiment before getting out of the timber. These efforts sadly demonstrated the advantages accruingin battle from good discipline among troops. We had been too little accustomed to implicit obedience of orders, and the tyrannical conduct of Colonel Williams had exerted a bad influence on us in this respect. Under the Colonel's direction, however, a number of men, mostly members of Companies E and F, rallied; these to the flag, their Company's colors, presented to them by the ladies of Fayette county, Iowa, and now borne by the gallant Lakin, one of their number; those to their former captain, Scott, who lingered near the enemy, so loth was he to give up the field. They formed a platoon across the road and drove back the enemy's cavalry which attempted to charge our rear in pursuit.
As soon as we reached the open ground, the battalion was again formed. It was now nearly night. The enemy would not attack us on open ground, and we would not venture to attack him again in his ambuscade. Accordingly we began to retire toward Liberty. We soon met Colonel Smith's advance of mounted men. A brief consultation ensued, and then the march was resumed, and we soon reached our camp on the hill, where we had bivouacked in the morning.