Chapter VISHIPPING AND THE WAR

She walks the water like a thing of lifeAnd seems to dare the elements to strife.—Byron.

The active part taken by our merchant ships in the War, and the brave deeds of our seamen are perhaps too recent to be considered “reminiscent,” yet we cannot but feel that any story of the doings of our merchant navy during the past fifty years would be very incomplete without some reference to the noble part it played in the stirring events of the last five years, and how largely it contributed to the glorious and victorious result. The task of giving even a fragmentary account of the part which the Mercantile Marine took in the mighty conflict is rendered difficult in consequence of the lack of authoritative information, owing to the severe (but very proper) censorship exercised over the press during the War, and we shall have to await the official accounts to enable us to appreciate fully its work. But we know, however, sufficient of the arduous work of our seamen during this period, their courage and endurance in times of stress and peril, and their indomitable pluck in going to sea without anyhesitation, knowing by experience the dangers they would encounter, to rank their services among the most valorous in the history of our Country.

War was declared on the 4th August, 1914. This country was slow in realising the gravity of the situation. “Business as usual” expressed the light heart with which we entered upon a campaign which was destined to become a world war, involving us in immense sacrifices, and in responsibilities of which even now we cannot see the end. Warlike operations during the first few months were mostly on land. The seas appeared to be well under the control of the Navy, and therefore when sailing from Liverpool early in December for the Canaries, on the “Anchises” we did not take seriously into account any danger from a submarine attack, and the only special precaution taken during the voyage out was to summon all hands to their boat-stations with their lifebelts on. When we arrived at Las Palmas, we saw fourteen German steamers anchored within territorial waters, while their crews had been interned, a British cruiser paying an occasional visit to see that the ships were all still there.

SS. “Aquitania,” with Convoy, 1918

The sympathy of the people of the Canary Islands was entirely with Germany, which for some time had been carrying on a carefully prepared propaganda. When the time arrived to return home, in April, 1915, the conditions had changed. The Germans had declared a submarine blockade onthe 18th February. The submarine warfare had become active, and special precautions had to be taken. When passing Ushant a destroyer dashed up alongside, and gave the sailing directions upon which we were to proceed going up channel; but even these would not have protected us if we had been a few hours earlier, for a steamer preceding us had been attacked and sunk while following the course we were sailing upon.

Our ship, the White Star steamer “Corinthic,” was bound from New Zealand to London, with a cargo of frozen meat, and also carried many passengers. She was armed with two four-inch guns, manned by a complement of naval gunners.

At Dover we had to pass through a narrow passage protected by mines on either side; off Margate we brought up for the night guarded by a destroyer, while ships of war were continually dashing past. There were evident signs of anxiety and activity, and we began to realise that we were at war, and to consider what could be done to counter the attack of a U boat. We had guns, but when a U boat showed herself, it would be almost too late to fire with effect. We remembered when on board the “Mauretania” on a voyage to New York, hearing at a distance of fourteen miles a fog bell ringing under water at the Nantucket lightship, and we thought the same principle might be utilized to detect a submarine at some distance by thethud made by the propeller. We also thought of the long distance coming up the Channel which our ship had sailed without any protection, and the idea of reverting to the old system of “convoys” suggested itself, and we ventured, on reaching London, to write a letter to theTimes, embodying these ideas, but they were censored by the Admiralty, although both were subsequently, after the lapse of three years, introduced, the “convoy” being found the best means of protecting our merchant fleet.

When the war broke out suddenly, like a bolt from the blue, we were probably better prepared by sea than by land to meet the onslaught which had been so cunningly devised to take us unawares, for it was undoubtedly the intention of Germany to crush us and bring us under her heel within a few months.

The fleet had been summoned for a review by His Majesty the King, it was, therefore, practically mobilized, and ready at once to take up such positions as would paralyze the movements of the German fleet, but much more than this had to be done, our army had to be transported across the Channel, with all its stores and equipment; the forces so nobly supplied by our Dominions beyond the seas had to be brought over, and this had to be done by our merchant ships. The seas had to be policed, our commerce had to be carried on and to be protected, and all this with the knowledge thatGerman fleets still existed in the Pacific and South Atlantic, and also that many armed raiders were about. The rapidity with which all this was organised and carried out reflects the greatest credit upon our Navy and Merchant Service.

We managed to land our “contemptible” little army (as the Kaiser was pleased to term it) of 170,000 men, and place it in battle array on the Belgian soil without our enemy knowing when it arrived or where it was placed, and it was this ignorance of the whereabouts of our forces which we are now told enabled us to turn the defeat of the Marne into a victory.

On the seas our fleet was able to dispose of the German Pacific fleet by sinking it in the battle off the Falkland Islands. The raiders were, however, successful in destroying much shipping before they were run to earth by our navy, which in the end destroyed or captured them. The credit of destroying the “Cap Trafalgar” after a severe fight belongs to a Liverpool merchant ship, the “Carmania.”

The war, however, developed new engines of maritime warfare—the submarine, the mine, and the seaplane—and our enemies speedily let it be known that they intended to carry out the traditions of their Hun forbears, and pursue a ruthless war, in which they would slay every man, woman and child, however peaceful might be their occupations, if they stood in their way—a policy which they carriedout with the greatest cruelty, outraging every dictate of humanity.

The U boats, whose legitimate sphere was only to attack warships or those carrying troops or munitions, broke the laws of nations, and attacked Hospital ships, sinking them with their freight of suffering humanity, passenger steamers, and merchantmen of every kind, not merely sinking them, leaving their people to drown or perish, but in many cases adding to their death struggles by firing upon them while in the water, or turning them adrift in their boats hundreds of miles away from the land.

Germany had realised at an early date in the war that she had no chance of defeating our Navy in regular warfare, and that the submarine was not a very effective weapon against a battleship; and therefore, after declaring a submarine blockade of British commerce, entered upon a submarine campaign against our merchant shipping, in which she met with varying success. Between the 24th February and the 13th October, 1916, she sank 183 ships and 144 fishing vessels, the highest number in one week being 35; and in the following year, between February 26th and November 18th (in nine months) the German submarine sank 661 vessels of over 1,600 tons, 247 under 1,600 tons, and 161 fishing craft; the number of ships unsuccessfully attacked being 550. During the war upwardsof 8,000 British sailors lost their lives through submarine attacks.

SS. “Oceanic,” No. 2, 1899

Submarines which at first were limited in the range of their operations by the amount of fuel they could carry, and could only conduct their nefarious warfare within the waters immediately surrounding Great Britain, were eventually built of sufficient size to be able to destroy our shipping when two or three hundred miles to the west of Ireland, and two or three U boats were constructed large enough to cross the Atlantic and destroy some shipping on the American coast; they were also armed with guns, which they freely used. Various estimates were put out as to the number of submarines afloat. They seemed to ever increase in numbers, and in their boldness and unscrupulous mode of warfare. Sometimes their attacks slacked off, as we are now told, while the Kaiser had passing qualms of conscience. Their movements were directed by wireless, and there is little doubt that they had sympathizers on the British coast, from whom they received information. The sinking of our shipping became alarming, sometimes, at the week-ends, the total reaching twenty and more steamers for the two days.

This was the condition of things with which our merchant fleet had to contend. Traversing day by day and hour by hour waters reeking with death and destruction, they knew that a submarine attackprobably meant death to a large number of the people on board, perhaps all; but the British sailors heeded it not, their country’s call sounded in their ears, and without hesitation they went to sea, not only in ships engaged in commerce, but also in vessels acting as armed cruisers and as patrol ships, sweeping the seas in search of the enemy’s raiders; or as transports, in which they conveyed nearly a million of British troops from the most distant parts of the world, and two millions of American troops across the Atlantic, with all their munitions of war and all their impedimenta. Such a brilliant performance must for all time stand forth as one of the greatest achievements in the world’s history. Nor was the great and heroic work of our sailors limited to merchant ships. Our fishing fleets, fitted as minesweepers, carried on without flinching, the highly dangerous task of sweeping the seas to find and destroy the mines which the enemy had strewn in all its pathways. Even their mines were diabolically constructed to destroy innocent life, for contrary to international law, they remained active even after they were detached from their moorings, and were floating about. They were also sown by night, in the busy channels frequented by cross channel steamers and our fishing fleets. That all this was carefully thought out and “according to plan,” is proved by the fact they could and did discriminatewhere and what their submarines attacked, for the Isle of Man boats were immune from attack, because it was known that they regularly carried large numbers of German prisoners of war. The patrol and mine-sweeping services conducted by our fishermen and many yachtsmen were most arduous, exposed not only to submarines and mines, but to the cruel, cold winter weather and heavy seas; yet they never faltered in their duty.

The sea along the east coast of England is sown with wreckage of steamers and fishing craft destroyed while pursuing their ordinary and innocent trades. The Irish Sea and the North Channel are also strewn with the remains of British shipping. For four years or more British ships followed their calling, passing through seas bristling with dangers, and the people of this country, which depends upon its overseas traffic for their daily bread, went about as usual, and suffered no actual privation from the shortage of food.

Such was the position of things—the dangers which our merchant ships had to encounter, and the problems which our Navy had to attack and to conquer. The versatility of our Navy is proverbial. It has been well said “A sailor is a jack of all trades.”

A distinguished officer recently stated that when he retired from the Navy, he bought a brewery, which he worked for some years, and brewed the best beer in the district. He then laid a submarine cablefor the American Government, and ended up by managing a foreign coal-mine. Such is the remarkable adaptability of our naval men. It is not, therefore, surprising that when the submarine menace developed itself our navy was not slow in devising means of counter-attack, and of destroying the U boats. Destroyers and even submarines chased them, dropping depth charges containing high explosives, which were fatal if they struck the submarine, and even the concussion of the explosion at a considerable distance placed their electric batterieshors de combat. Wire netting protected our ships while at anchor, and was used to form a barrier across the Channel and to protect our ports.

It was found that U boats could be seen from an aeroplane when they were some depth under the water. Aeroplanes were, therefore, used to hunt the submarine, and indicate its position to an accompanying destroyer, or the aeroplane itself dropped a depth charge.

Underwater listening apparatus was invented, by which the thud of the propeller of a submarine could be distinctly heard, and the position of the submarine approximately ascertained.

Mystery-ships, fully armed, but having the appearance of an innocent coasting vessel, traversed the adjacent seas, but the most successful protection afforded to our transports and to our commerce was the adoption of the old system of “convoys.”Convoys were seldom very successfully attacked, and ships lost while being convoyed did not exceed 3 per cent. The convoy system required very careful organisation. Ships have different speeds and different destinations, so we had convoys for ships of varying swiftness. We had not sufficient war ships or destroyers to act as convoys from shore to shore in the Atlantic, therefore the convoys crossing the ocean were only under the protection of a ship of war, and only met their escort fleet of destroyers when they reached the danger zone. At a given point the convoy broke up, some ships going up the St. George’s Channel to Liverpool, the others proceeding to London and the Channel ports. The convoy system in the later stages of the war became very perfect, and although some enemy submarines boldly penetrated the protecting line of destroyers, and sank a few ships, they seldom got away again, and the knowledge of this had a very wholesome and a very deterrent effect. The valuable services performed by both English and American destroyers to our Mercantile Marine deserves the highest praise.

The appearance of the River Mersey upon the arrival of a convoy was something to be remembered. Sometimes a convoy would consist of twenty or thirty large merchantmen, all dazzle-painted, stretching out in a long line from New Brighton to the Sloyne, while their escort of Britishand American destroyers made their rendezvous at the Birkenhead floating stage.

Admiral Scheer, in his book, allows that the Germans lost half of their submarines, a considerable number he says were always under repair, and the difficulty of obtaining crews was an increasing one. Therefore, we think that it can be claimed that our navy had already mastered the U boat menace when the war ended.

To make it difficult for a submarine to find the range at which to fire their torpedos, our ships were carefully camouflaged or dazzle-painted, and presented a very grotesque and strange appearance, no two ships being alike. The painting was carefully designed, in many cases by an artist of eminence, the object being to confuse the eyes of a spectator at a distance. In some cases the ship was made to appear as if going the opposite way to that upon which she was actually proceeding. In others the ship gave the appearance of going at a much greater speed than that at which she was actually steaming. In others the ship at a distance had the appearance of being much shorter than she really was. In all these cases the submarine would have difficulty in ascertaining how far his quarry was away from him, which way she was proceeding, and how fast she was going. In order to render a submarine attack still more ineffective, our ships during the day time followed a zig-zag course,proceeding for a given period on a certain course, then suddenly changing it by several degrees, thus rendering it difficult for a submarine to get into a position to fire a torpedo.

SS. “Mauretania,” Camouflaged, 1918Built 1907

Another device adopted by our ships when pursued by a submarine was to throw out a smoke screen, which for some minutes entirely hid them from the enemy, enabling them to alter their course and steal away from their pursuers.

The promiscuous mine-laying was a source of many disasters, but fortunately the invention of the “paravane” by a naval officer, proved an excellent protection. It consisted of two long steel bars, one on either side of the ship, attached at one end to the bows a few feet below the water, and at the other to an “otter,” which, as the ship proceeded, spread the bars out and kept them away from the ship’s side. When a mine was struck, the buoy-rope of the mine slid down and along the bar, and when it reached the “otter” the rope was caught and cut by a steel knife, and the mine was sunk.

Sufficient has been said to prove the very active and noble part taken by our Mercantile Marine during the war. Although we do not claim that they won the war, we can, at least, say that the war could not have been won without them.

We would also wish to bear testimony to the excellent spirit displayed by the Royal Navyto the Merchant Navy. They were in the highest and best sense “comrades-in-arms,” and we in Liverpool also gratefully recognize our debt to the United States. American destroyers were continually in the Mersey. We admired their seamanlike trim, and the smartness of the officers and crews, and we appreciate the excellent and arduous work they did in safeguarding our convoys, which not only demanded the exercise of great skill, but called forth courage and endurance.

The following Chapter was published during the War, and fairly describes the attitude taken by shipowners towards the War, and the great work they successfully performed.

It is unfortunate that no adequate statement has been forthcoming setting before the public the important services shipowners are performing for the country, and the serious position of the shipping industry. Even in the House of Commons the voice of the shipowner has never been effectively raised.

It is no exaggeration to say that the shipping interest of Great Britain has sacrificed more than any other leading industry—and the country does not realise the serious difficulties which are in front of shipowners if they are to “carry on” after the war and maintain our maritime position. Indeed, so far from the true position of the shipowner being realised, there appears to be a general impression that he has made undue profits out of the war, and is still in a privileged position, and is gathering in exceptional riches.

It will scarcely be disputed that the material prosperity of the country depends upon the existence of a great mercantile marine, and that our shippingindustry is vital to the existence of the nation. In times of peace we depend upon it to feed and clothe our people, and to bring us the necessary raw products, the manufacturing of which gives employment to our industrial population. We are apt to forget that we live upon an island, and with the exception of coal and iron, we depend almost entirely upon our shipping to supply the wants of our forty-five millions of people and to maintain our industries.

Were it not for our merchant ships the present war could not have been carried on. It would, ere now, have been lost, and the people of this country would be in the grip of famine. Nor have our shipowners merely supplied our commercial wants; our merchant ships have been turned into armed cruisers, patrol ships, hospital ships, and transports, and have thus rendered the most effective assistance in the conduct of the war.

Anyone who realises these facts will see how important it is that our shipping interest should be supported, so that it may be in a position to resume its activities; and that its individuality should not be crushed and extinguished by Government control and bureaucracy. As a proof of the successful enterprise of our shipowners in the twenty years prior to the war, our tonnage increased from 8,653,543 tons to 19,145,140 tons, and we owned 43 per cent. of the world’s shipping.

SS. “Olympic,” 1911

It may be well to deal at once with the allegation that shipowners have made excessive profits. There is no doubt that during the first two years of the war ships earned large freights, not, however, due to what is commonly called “profiteering,” but simply because the Government hesitated to check the imports of merchandise of a bulky character. After the Government had taken up the tonnage necessary for their transport purposes, what remained was not sufficient to convey the produce pressing for shipment. If imports had been regulated as they are now, the pressure for freight room would have been reduced and freights kept within moderate limits.

The urgent need for checking imports of a bulky character was, I know, urged upon the Government by shipowners who foresaw the scramble for freight space, but the Government failed to respond to these representations. Their hands were very full, the tonnage problem was a new and difficult one, opening up many embarrassing questions, viz., as to what imports should be checked, the effect of this upon our manufacturers, and what would be the result of checking trade in one direction, in causing its dislocation in another, and the consequent disturbance of our foreign exchanges. All these and others were points upon which we had little or no experience to guide us,and the position was aggravated by the loss of tonnage due to the ravages of the submarine.

Taking a calm view of the retrospect, and the gigantic and unique task with which the Government has been faced, they have accomplished their work with fewer blunders than might have been expected. After all, freights have not bulked largely in the increased cost of produce; a freight of £10 per ton is only 1d per pound. If we are to find the true cause of our high cost of living we must look at the inflation and consequent depreciation of our currency, the high rate of wages, and increased spending power of our working classes, and the indifferent harvests of last year in all parts of the world.

The high freights earned by our shipping in 1914, 1915, and part of 1916 naturally caused the value of shipping to rapidly advance. Very few new merchant ships were being constructed; ships were being destroyed, and shipowners possessing established lines were forced to buy to maintain their services, and thus the value of secondhand steamers advanced to two, three, and even four times their pre-war values. Many holders, especially of tramp steamers, sold out and realised great fortunes, and these unexpected and unprecedented profits unfortunately escaped taxation, on the ground that they represented a return of capital; and it is these profits that have appeared unduly large in the public eye.

The shipowners who remained in business, and this comprised the great majority, were deprived of 80 per cent. of all their profits above their pre-war datum, and afterwards this tax on their excess profits was relinquished, and the Government requisitioned all tonnage on what are known as Blue Book rates—which on the basis of the present value of shipping yield only a poor return.

It is difficult to understand why the Government should have placed shipping on a basis of taxation differing from all other industries—it is the industry which beyond all others is essential to the conduct of the war, and which is exceptionally subject to depreciation. The Chancellor of the Exchequer (The Right Hon. A. Bonar Law) was undoubtedly carried away by his own amateur experience as a shipowner, and thought there was no limit to the extent he might filch away the shipowner’s earnings, little recking that if the shipowner is unable to put on one side a reserve to replace the tonnage he loses, he is forced to go out of the trade; and also utterly disregarding the rapid headway being made by neutral countries, who are profiting by the high freights and using their profits to greatly extend their mercantile fleets.

In estimating the financial results of our shipowning industry during the early period of the war, allowance must be made for the increased cost of working a steamer. Coals, wages, insurance,port charges, and cost of repairs, and upkeep were all very high; indeed, it may be said that the nett results to the shipowner of the high freights which prevailed in 1915 and 1916 were not very excessive when all these things are considered, for in addition to the increased cost of working, there was heavy depreciation to provide for, the shipowner suffered a complete dislocation of his trade, and in many cases lost his entire fleet, the creation of long years of toil, and with this his means of making a livelihood.

We have considered the position of shipping as the paramount industry of the country—its great services in the conduct of the war, and what it is suffering in consequence of the diffusion of fairy tales of the excessive profits made by shipowners. We can now turn our attention to the extraordinary difficulties which stand in the way of the restoration of the shipping industry, which are fraught with considerable peril to the future of our Empire.

Shipping may be divided into two classes, both of which are of national importance. The liners, which comprise fixed services of passenger and cargoships. These services must be maintained, and new tonnage built at whatever cost to replace lost ships. The other class is our cargo ships. Many of these conduct regular services; others are what are known as “tramps,” and go where the best freights offer. It is the owners of the tramp steamers who have realised large profits by selling their ships. The Government in their shipping policy have entirely failed to discriminate between these classes, not recognising that the liner services involve a complete and costly system of organisation both at home and abroad, which, once dislocated, is difficult to restore. The urgency for additional cargo ships prevents the building of liners, and there must be a considerable shortage of this description of vessel when the war ends.

Probably the cause which has been most detrimental and disastrous to shipping was the obstinacy of the Admiralty in declining to recognise the urgent necessity for building more merchant ships. They filled all the yards with Admiralty work, and when the violence of the submarine attack aroused the nation to a sense of the danger before it, and the cry went up throughout the land “Ships, ships, and still more ships,” the Government then—only then—responded, and decided that further merchant ships must be built at once. There was great delay in giving effect to their decision to build “standard” ships—plans had to be submittedand obtain the approval of so many officials that many months elapsed before the keel of the first standard ship was laid, and in the meanwhile the losses through the submarine attack continued.

The destruction of tonnage by submarine attack in 1917 assumed very serious proportions, but latterly the number of vessels sunk has been gradually reduced, and we have the recent assurance of the Secretary to the Admiralty that our methods of dealing with submarines have improved, and that we are now achieving considerable success in destroying them. The following statement gives the position to-day in gross tonnage:—

1917.U.K.World.Sunk4,009,5376,623,623Built1,163,4742,937,785Nett loss2,846,0633,685,838January-March, 1918.Sunk687,5761,123,510Built320,280864,607Nett loss367,296258,903

The nett loss of British tonnage of 367,296 tons during the first three months of 1918 was still very serious, but we were told that we were making distinct progress in our rate of shipbuilding, and the following returns seem to bear this out.

The United Kingdom monthly output of new ships from May, 1917, was in tons:—

May69,773June109,847July83,073August102,060September63,150October148,309November158,826December112,486January58,568February100,038March161,674April111,533

In the year ended April, 1917, new U.K. ships totalled 749,314 tons, and for the year ended April, 1918, 1,279,337 tons.

The growing scarcity of shipping, the urgent need of providing tonnage for the food supplies, not only for this country, but also for our Allies, forced the Government to consider in what way they could make the most economical use of the tonnage available. The position was rendered more acute by the entry of America into the war, and the adoption of the “convoy” system as a protection against submarine attack.

There were two policies open for adoption by the Government. One was to marshal and organise shipowners, and place in their hands the provisionof the necessary tonnage, thus securing the co-operation and assistance of trained specialists. The other policy was to “control” the trade, requisition the whole of our shipping, and to work it themselves. They unfortunately adopted the latter policy, and by so doing they not only lost the individual enterprise and supervision of the trained shipowners, but practically placed shipowners out of business, and this at a time when “neutrals,” who continue to benefit by the high freights, are making rapid strides as shipowners.

The shipping control, under the able direction of Sir Alexander Maclay, is doing its work on the whole better than might have been expected—thanks to the voluntary assistance of many of our younger shipowners. Under the control, the shipowner is paid at rates laid down in the Blue Book, and without going into figures it may be roughly stated that on the pre-war values of steamers these rates leave him 6 per cent. or 7 per cent. on his capital, and 6 per cent. for depreciation, but on to-day’s values the return upon his capital is very poor. A steamer now costs to build at least three times its pre-war cost. Therefore, it is obvious a provision of 15 per cent. for interest and depreciation on pre-war cost is only 5 per cent. on to-day’s values. This affords no inducement to enterprise, and it is not surprising that many shipowners have gone out of business.

The Government control has taken ships out of the long voyage trades and placed them in the Atlantic trade, where they are required as transports and for the conveyance of food. This policy, which was perhaps inevitable, may involve far-reaching consequences. The long voyage trades have been built up by shipowners at a heavy cost, and are also the creation of generations. These services involve costly adjuncts in the shape of docks, piers, barges, repairing shops, branch steamers, and through traffic arrangements. It may be said all this will be recovered after the war; but this loses sight of the difficulty of regaining a trade once its associations and connections are severed; and also of the probable competition of America and neutral countries. Certainly, the Blue Book rates give no compensation for such a disturbance.

The Government are making huge profits out of shipping, but what becomes of these profits we have been unable to discover; they do not appear in any returns we have seen. But the time has arrived when the “Blue Book” rates require to be revised—this, in view of the heavy cost of the repairs which will be necessary when the war is over, and the necessity of placing the shipowner in a position to replace his tonnage at the enhanced prices which will prevail.

We can now proceed to consider what will be the position of shipping after the war. This involves much clear thinking, and the discussion of several questions upon which no definite statement can be at present made.

We start with a tonnage deficit as compared with 1914 of approximately 3,000,000 tons. The output of new tonnage at present falls short of our losses; last quarter to the extent of 367,296 tons. This is serious, but we are gradually overtaking it. We built last quarter 320,280 tons, and other countries did still better, turning out 864,607 tons, and it would appear as if we might now claim with some confidence that while the curve of the destruction by submarines is decreasing, the curve of the output of tonnage is increasing, and we may reasonably hope that at the end of the year our gains and losses of tonnage will balance. This will leave us still to make good the losses by submarine prior to this year. We have also to keep in mind that our shipbuilding yards are still much occupied with Admiralty work and with the repair of ships damaged by submarine attack.

After the war the Government will have to demobilise, and the repatriation of armies comprising 5,000,000 men, with their munitions and impedimenta, can scarcely occupy less than two years,and will engage probably one-third of our available tonnage.

Europe will be very short of raw materials of every kind; the importation of them will be very urgent, and food will also be short for some time.

With the heavy weight of taxation which we shall have to bear, an increased output of manufactures will be necessary if the prosperity of the country is to be restored. This will not be possible without an abundant supply of raw materials.

The repatriation of our armies and the urgent need for raw produce would indicate that the Government will retain their control of shipping for some time after the war.

The British and American Governments are building standard and wooden merchant ships, but they will not last long, and will have to be replaced by more substantial and suitable vessels.

The prospect before shipowners, therefore, is that there will be a prolonged period of Government control and of high freights, which will greatly benefit neutral shipowners. And the serious question arises, how is the British merchant service to be built up again? The position is one full of difficulty. Prices of new ships will probably rule very high, and the Blue Book rates afford no encouragement to build. In America, France, and Germany the difficulty will probably be solved by the granting of subventions; but in this country we have a profounddistrust of subventions, as they are invariably associated with Government control, which has always been destructive of enterprise.

Nothing could be more unfortunate than the prolongation of the shipping control one day longer than is necessary. It is undoubtedly paralysing the industry, and any attempt, such as has been fore-shadowed, to nationalise shipping would be most disastrous. How could a State department administer the shipping industry of this country in competition with foreign private enterprise?

The national control of our shipping and other leading industries may be expedient in the present war crisis, but it has taught us that the nationalisation of any industry penalises it with so many restrictions, and surrounds it with so many unnecessary difficulties that it is foredoomed to failure, and would inflict infinite damage to the prosperity of the country.

Advances of money by the Government at a low rate of interest would no doubt be an encouragement—and those shipowners who can afford to be bold and accept the position will probably be rewarded; but to go on building ships at the very high prices may be beyond the prudent reach of the average private shipowner. This rather points to the creation of large companies.

In shipowning, as in every other department of industrial life, “scale” may be the dominant factor, and the shipowning companies who, during the war, have been able to lay by large reserves, will find themselves in a position of great advantage. In view of the necessity for strengthening the hands of shipowners and enabling them to carry on in the difficult times before them, the Government is making a mistake in not giving more encouragement to shipowners.

Experience teaches us that shipowners may be trusted to quickly adopt every modern means to work their ships economically, and to adapt them to the trades they serve; but do our port authorities equally recognise their duties to provide the most up-to-date methods and machinery for the handling of our cargoes? We may economise in the working of our ships at sea, but if on their arrival in port they have to wait for berths to discharge and load, and if these operations are hampered by the lack of mechanical appliances or labour, the shipowners’ exertions are in vain. Nor does the difficulty end here: docks lose their value and attractiveness if the cost of moving cargoes from the ship’s side to the warehouse, or to the manufacturing districts, forms a heavy addition to the freight. In Liverpool we have, unfortunately, the costly, cumbrous, and old-fashioned system of cartage still prevailing. There is a lack of good road approaches to the docksand railway termini—a wholly inadequate means of conducting the cross-river traffic. Our trade has out-grown our railway communications with the interior, and our railways continue, as they have always done, to strangle our trade by their excessive charges, and thus to deprive our port of the advantage of its unique geographical position. We want cheap and abundant water, and cheap electrical energy to extend our local manufacturing industries. All these things point to a quickening of Dock Board methods, but still more to the awakening of the City Council to its responsible duties as the custodians of a great seaport, and the urgent necessity that they should do their part in its restoration and development, and make it ready to do its share in the revival of trade after the war.

Our City Fathers cannot rest content with carrying out what Disraeli, in one of his ironical moods, called “a policy of sewage.” We want a wider outlook, and a more generous appreciation of the fact that Liverpool depends upon her commerce. Every expenditure which the city has made in the past upon its development has resulted not only in its growth and prosperity, but in the well-being of her people.

The British mercantile marine has for long been the envy of neighbouring nations, who are watching the opportunity to seize the businesswhich our ships have been compelled to abandon. We have lost a large proportion of our tonnage, and what is left is taken out of the control of the shipowner. The situation constitutes a serious national danger, and we may some day awake to the fact that we have lost beyond recovery the industry which is above and beyond all others, the great national asset, and shall rue the day when our Chancellor of the Exchequer became interested in four small vessels and drew conclusions from his experience which are not supported by the wider and more expert knowledge of the shipowner.

Such is the present position of shipping and its future outlook—

A considerable reduction in the available tonnage.Government control for a lengthened period.High freights and high cost of new ships.The probability of a great increase in American and neutral shipping.

A considerable reduction in the available tonnage.

Government control for a lengthened period.

High freights and high cost of new ships.

The probability of a great increase in American and neutral shipping.

We cannot leave the subject without indicating that everything may be greatly changed by the attitude of labour. If the present “ca-canny” and “down tool” policies are to continue it is difficult to see how we can recover our prosperity. Labour will have to realise that it has its value, and that the receipt of wages carries with it the obligation to give an honest day’s work. And equally employers will have to recognise that labour must have afuller share of the fruits of their labour and better conditions of life. Strikes will not settle these matters; they only serve to intensify distrust and ill-feeling. We must hope that our men returning from the front will have a wider outlook and altered views of life, and that employers will also generously recognise the changed conditions. We trust also that the Whitley report may be quickly followed by the establishment of Industrial Councils, and that these Councils will be able to promote confidence and good feeling and remove the friction and distrust which has too long existed between capital and labour. Meanwhile a propaganda might be started to instruct our people in those elementary principles of economic science which govern their labour, and about which so much ignorance unhappily prevails.

We are justly proud of the development of our steamships—their size, speed, and magnificent equipment—and we are apt to forget that this has always been characteristic of British shipping. In the old sailing-ship days, about 1850-1860, a walk round the Prince’s Dock, crowded with clipper ships, was something to fill an Englishman with pride. The beautiful symmetry of the hull, the graceful sweep of the sheer fore and aft, the tautness of the spars, the smartness of the gear and equipment attracted the eye; but, perhaps, above all, the romance of the sea attached itself to the sailing-ship and appealed to the imagination in a way which does not gather round a steamer, however large and magnificent. We realised that the sailing-ship had to do battle with wind and waves in far distant seas single-handed, relying entirely upon her sails and equipment and the skill of her crew; whereas a steamer tells us at once of her unseen power which makes her independent of winds and weather, and enables her to make her voyages with almost the regularity of the railway train. All this, the achievement of the steam engine and the development of the screw propeller, is verysplendid to think upon, but the old romance of the sea has gone.

The inspiring and wonderful sight of the Liverpool docks, a forest of the masts of English and American clippers; the river Mersey at high water, alive with splendid sailing vessels leaving or entering our docks, and at anchor in a line extending from the Sloyne to New Brighton, or towing out to sea, or may be sailing in from sea under their own canvas—all was activity and full of life and motion. I remember seeing one of Brocklebank’s ships—the “Martaban,” of 600 tons—sailing into the George’s Dock Basin under full canvas; her halliards were let go, and sails were clewed up so smartly that the ship as she passed the Pierhead was able to throw a line on shore and make fast. It is difficult in these days to realise such a thing being possible. It was skill supported by discipline.

When I was young I was a keen yachtsman, and had the good fortune to make a voyage to Australia in one of the most famous of our clipper ships, the “Red Jacket.” Some account of the first few days of my voyage may be of interest, and bring into contrast the ease and luxury enjoyed on board an Atlantic liner, with the hard life on board a first-class clipper ship. It is not too much to say that on board an Atlantic liner the weather does not count; on board an old sailing-ship the weather meant everything.

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