Cairo, Illinois,April 24, 1864.
Major General Steven A. Hurlbut, sworn and examined.
By the chairman:
Question. What is your rank and position in the army?
Answer. I am a major general of volunteers, commanding the 16th army corps.
Question. Where have you been stationed?
Answer. I have been stationed at Memphis for the last sixteen months.
Question. How long have you been stationed along the river?
Answer. Ever since the battle of Shiloh. I have commanded at Bolivar and Jackson, Tennessee, until about the 20th of November, 1862, when I was ordered to Memphis.
Question. Now, with regard to this raid of Forrest, was that raid made in your department?
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. Please give us, in your own way, a brief account of that raid.
Answer. Forrest first crossed the Memphis and Charleston railroad last December. I organized a force in Columbus, and moved it down and drove him out. General Sherman then ordered all the available troops in my command to be got together—leaving very small garrisons at the important points—for the Meridian expedition. I marched and crossed there, and marched back again. Two divisions of my command were then detailed to go up Red river, under General Banks. As an auxiliary to the infantry movement to Meridian, General W. S. Smith came to Memphis and took command of all my cavalry and another brigade which he brought over, all amounting to about seven thousand effective men, to move across the country, drive the enemy's force out, cut his way across to Columbus and Aberdeen, and to go down to the Mobile and Ohio railroad, and join us at Meridian. He failed to make that junction; was met by Forrest about West Point, and for some reason or other (I do not know what) retreated and fell back to Memphis. The effect of a retreat, at the rate at which they retreated, and the loss they met with, and the retreating before an inferior force, demoralized the cavalry very seriously. I returned to Memphis about the Three Points, marched, and found that Forrest was organizing a very considerable force, so far as I could find out, with the intention of moving up to West Tennessee. I had orders from the War Department to send home all the veteran regiments (cavalry especially) as rapidly as possible. I took an inventory of my force, and found that I had about six thousand cavalry to two thousand two hundred horses, which limited the efficiency of the cavalry. I furloughed and sent home the 3d Michigan, 2d Iowa, 3d, 6th, 7th, and 9th Illinois, and distributed their horses among the men that were left, so as to keep men enough always, and more, to mount with horses. Forrest moved up, and crossed the line of the Charleston and Memphis railroad, towards Jackson, Tennessee, and occupied it. General Grierson was directed by me to go out with his cavalry, feel him, attack him, and cripple him as much as possible. He went out, and reported that he was "a little too strong for him, and he could not touch him." My effective force at Memphis consisted of 2,200 cavalry, 2,100 white infantry, and 2,400 colored infantry. I had the choice to move out a force sufficiently strong to attack Forrest and leave Memphis open, with its immense amount of government stores, ordnance, hospitals, and everything of that nature. I became satisfied that if I moved out 4,000 men, (which was the lowest I considered safe to send out,) and they should move out 50 or 60 miles into the country, the enemy, being all mounted, would turn that force and come in and occupy Memphis, which I considered would be a greater disaster than to allow Forrest to range in West Tennessee. I therefore did not send them out, but I kept the cavalry out as far as we could go, or dared go. It was not possible to divine precisely what Forrest's intentions were. My own opinion was, that it was his intention to organize a force, cross the Tennessee river, and operate upon General Sherman's line of communication. I was at Cairo at the time Union City was attacked. Four regiments and a battery of one of my divisions, which were ordered up the Tennessee river, were here also. I directed General Brayman to take them and throw them up to Columbus in rear of Forrest when he was at Paducah, but they were peremptorily ordered up the Tennessee river.
Question. Ordered up by General Sherman?
Answer. Yes, sir. The result was, that there was not force enough, in my opinion, in the command on the Mississippi river, from Paducah to Memphis, to operate upon Forrest with any prospect of success.
Question. What was the estimated strength of Forrest's forces?
Answer. Forrest's entire force, according to the best of my information, was between 8,000 and 9,000 men altogether. That includes this division of Buford's that operated up here. I have somewhere among my papers a list of all his brigades. I know nearly all of them. I have run against nearly all ofthem. He had five of the oldest regiments in the confederate service detailed expressly for this purpose as a nucleus of his organization. These were troops that had seen a great deal of service along the line below Memphis—Chalmers's brigade, Ely's brigade, Bell's brigade, and McCullough's. I cannot estimate Forrest's force at less than between 8,000 and 9,000 men. The cause of his raid, unquestionably, was the fact that so large an amount of troops which had been holding this region of country had been removed—a portion of them up the Tennessee river to Decatur, and a portion up the Red river—also the fact that he knew perfectly well, from his spies at Memphis, the condition of our cavalry. Memphis, from the nature of the ground there, is a place that requires not less than five thousand men to garrison the outer line. It is the worst place to cover that I ever saw. We have a fort there that was built that would take seven thousand men as a reasonable amount to line the parapets. We have immense stores there, for from Memphis not only the 16th and 17th army corps are supplied, but General Steele's army at Little Rock are supplied from there also. We have large hospitals there, scattered all over the city. We have an unsteady and unreliable population; and the daily interior guard duty, for the city proper, requires over 300 men. I considered then, and I consider now, that the removal of any force competent to make any serious impression upon Forrest would have imperilled Memphis; and I believe that was what General Forrest wanted done.
Question. How large a force did you retain there for the safety of that place?
Answer. I retained the infantry—four thousand men. I kept the cavalry out all the time as far as they could go.
Question. How came you to reoccupy Fort Pillow? Had it been abandoned?
Answer. No, sir. When I moved to Meridian, the 52d Indiana regiment which had been there was withdrawn, and made a part of the expedition, and the 13th Tennessee cavalry, which was recruiting, was moved down there as a recruiting point. I afterwards re-enforced it by sending up Major Booth with four companies of colored heavy artillery and six guns, and a section of light artillery, making in all about 600 men.
Question. Do I understand you to say that the post had never been entirely abandoned?
Answer. No, sir. When the 52d Indiana was taken away it was temporarily abandoned until the 13th Tennessee came down to hold it as a recruiting point. I considered Fort Pillow as a place which ought to be held with a small garrison, and I think so yet, and any navy officer or river man will tell you that the situation of the channel there requires it.
Question. I am not questioning that at all. I merely inquired as to the fact.
Answer. I sent Major Booth there because I had great confidence in him as a soldier. He was an old soldier who had served in the regular army, and I considered him the best man I had for that purpose. I received a report from him "that he could hold that post against any force for forty-eight hours," which was all I expected him to do, and if he had not been killed I think he would have held it. I have no doubt that his death was the immediate cause of the capture of the place.
Question. Just in this connexion, please to state why you deemed it important to keep up a garrison at that place.
Answer. The steamboat channel at Fort Pillow runs right under the bluff, and brings every boat as it passes within musket-shot of the shore, and a couple of guns mounted up above there would stop most effectually the navigation of the river, and drive away any of the tin-clad gunboats we have, for a plunging fire would go right through them, and they could not get elevation enough to strike. The whole life of the army below, especially while these large movements were going on, depended upon an uninterrupted communication by the river, and the stopping that communication for two or three days might depriveus of necessary supplies just at the moment that they were required. These were my reasons for holding the place.
Question. What information have you in regard to the attack upon Fort Pillow; its capture, and the barbarities practiced there?
Answer. I am not positive about dates, but my recollection is that Fort Pillow was attacked on the 12th of April. Just about dusk of the 12th a boat came down to Memphis from Fort Pillow, bringing information that the place was attacked, but that Major Booth was perfectly confident of being able to hold out until he could be re-enforced. I immediately ordered a regiment to be got ready, with four days' rations and an extra supply of ammunition; took the steamer "Glendale," dropped her down to Fort Pickering, and the regiment was in the very act of going on board when another boat came down with the information that the fort was captured. The order to move up the regiment was countermanded, for there was no use in sending it then. There were at Fort Pillow two 10-pound Parrotts, two 6-pounder field guns, and two 12-pounder howitzers, and about 600 men. I cannot tell precisely the number of the 13th Tennessee cavalry, for it was a recruiting regiment, and filling off and on. If the men had been left in the position in which they had been placed by Major Booth, and from which position he had already repelled an assault of the enemy, I think they would have been able to have held the fort until re-enforced. I believe that the ground there is so strong that 600 men with that artillery ought to have held it; but the command devolved upon a very good gentleman, but a very young officer, entirely inexperienced in these matters. The enemy rushed on the fort from two or three directions, and confused him, I think, and broke him and carried it. The information which I have from all sources, official and otherwise, is that—whether by permission of their officers, or contrary to their permission, I cannot say—a butchery took place there that is unexampled in the record of civilized warfare. We always expect, in case of a place carried by assault, that some extravagance of passion will occur; but this seems to have been continued after resistance had ceased, when there was nothing to keep up the hot blood, and to have been of a nature brutal to an extent that is scarcely credible, and I have embodied in my official report to General McPherson (my present superior officer) my opinion that the black troops will hereafter be uncontrolable, unless the government take some prompt and energetic action upon the subject. I know very well that my colored regiments at Memphis, officers and men, will never give quarter.
Question. They never ought to.
Answer. They never will. They have sworn it; and I have some very good colored regiments there.
Question. What do you say of the fighting qualities of the colored troops?
Answer. That depends altogether upon their officers. If they are properly officered, they are just as good troops as anybody has. I have two or three regiments at Memphis that I am willing to put anywhere that I would put any soldiers which I have ever seen, with the same amount of experience.
Question. Did you learn anything of the particulars of those atrocities that were committed there at Fort Pillow?
Answer. I learned the particulars from the reports of the officers.
Question. Did you learn anything about any flags of truce being taken advantage of?
Answer. They always do that; that is a matter of habit with them.
Question. And they took advantage of them in this case, as you learn?
Answer. Yes, sir; and they did it at Paducah, and they tried it at Columbus.
Question. Did you hear anything about their setting fire to hospitals, while the wounded were in there?
Answer. I learn from what I consider unquestionable authority, that bodies were found which had been wounded by musket shots, and then their eyesbayoneted out; men wounded in a similar way, with their bowels cut open; and I have heard many other instances of equal barbarity.
Question. Did you hear, recently after that capture, of anybody being nailed to a building and burned?
Answer. I heard that Lieutenant Akerstrom was so treated.
Question. Did you learn that from a source that you could give credit to?
Answer. I had no reason to doubt it, with the exception of the identification of the body. The fact that somebody was so treated, I consider to be sufficiently proven; the identification I think is doubtful.
Question. Is there anything more you wish to state? If so, will you state it without further questioning?
Answer. I do not know that I can state anything more than my opinion in regard to certain things that might have been done. I do not know that it is worth while to do that. As I am under censure myself, at present I prefer not to.
Question. Will you give us a description of the situation of Fort Pillow?
Answer. It is a very difficult thing to describe. The original fortifications, as made by the rebels, were very much too large to be held by any force that we could spare. It was intended for a very large force; but there are two crowning heights—bold knobs—that stand up there, which command the entire region of approach, and which Major Booth was directed to occupy. He went up and examined the ground, and reported to me. A light work was thrown up upon one of them, and there was a portion of a work upon the other. The one to the south was not occupied during the fight; the one to the north of the ravine, which leads down to the landing, was occupied. That was the point which I considered should have been held; and I think yet it could have been, and would have been, if Major Booth had lived.
Question. Can you describe the position in which the men were placed by Major Booth?
Answer. Major Booth had his artillery upon this knoll, and held the slope of the hill with some rifle pits. From these rifle pits, as I am informed, he repulsed the enemy. The troops were afterwards drawn in by Major Bradford, into the fortification proper, and that was attacked on all sides. My opinion is that Major Bradford lost his head—got confused. The rush was too strong for him. The amount of the enemy's force that actually attacked there I do not know, but from all the testimony I could get, I should judge it to have been not less than 2,500 men.
Question. Who do you understand led the enemy's forces?
Answer. Forrest was there personally. I understand, however, that the main body of the force was Chalmers's command, who was also there. There was also a portion of Forrest's force there. Forrest will carry his men further than any other man I know of; he is desperate.
Question. Have we any force at Fort Pillow now?
Answer. No, sir.
Question. Do you consider that a point which should be occupied by a force, in order to make the navigation of the river safe?
Answer. I do.
Question. What force do you deem should be placed there to hold it?
Answer. I think 500 steady troops, properly supplied with artillery, and properly covered with works, could hold the place until re-enforced—hold it, all that is necessary.
Question. Did you ever have any instructions or orders to evacuate Fort Pillow? or did you, at any time, ever propose to evacuate it?
Answer. I never had any orders to evacuate it. My orders from General Sherman were to hold certain points on the river. I never had any instructions with regard to Fort Pillow one way or the other that I recollect. I considered it necessary to hold it, and never intended to abandon it.
Question. Had it been held by us for some considerable time?
Answer. It had been held since we first occupied the river.
Question. Do not the same reasons exist for holding it now, that had existed during all that period?
Answer. The same. The reasons are geographical, and do not change.
By Mr. Gooch:
Question. Then I understand you to state that your instructions, in spirit, required you to hold it, and that it was necessary that it should be held?
Answer. My opinion is distinct that it should be held always, and there is nothing in my instructions that requires it to be abandoned. Some discretion, I suppose, belongs to an officer in charge of as much range as I have had to hold; and I certainly should not abandon that place, if I had troops to hold it.
By the chairman:
Question. Will you tell us what you know about the attack on Union City?
Answer. Colonel Hawkins, of the 7th Tennessee regiment, was at Union City as an advanced post. He had in round numbers about six hundred men. He was threatened by about fifteen hundred, I should think. They attacked him, and were repulsed. General Brayman moved from here with two thousand troops, and got down as far as the bridge, six miles from Union City, before Hawkins surrendered. They commenced the flag-of-truce operation on him, when they found they could do nothing else, threatening to open upon him with artillery, and to give no quarter. Contrary to the entreaties, prayers, and advice of all his officers and all his men, he did surrender his post, with a relieving force within six miles of him; and surrendered it, as I have no doubt, from pure cowardice.
Question. Was he aware of the re-enforcements approaching?
Answer. I think so, but I will not be positive. General Brayman can tell more about that than I can. I was at Columbus when General Brayman returned.
Question. Where is Colonel Hawkins now?
Answer. He is a prisoner. This is the second time he has surrendered to Forrest.
Captain Thomas P. Gray, sworn and examined.
By Mr. Gooch:
Question. What is your rank and position in the army?
Answer. For the last four months I have been holding the place of captain in the 7th Tennessee cavalry, but I have not been mustered in yet.
Question. Had you been in service before?
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. For how long?
Answer. I enlisted in Illinois on the 24th of July, and was mustered into the United States service August 1, 1861.
Question. Were you at Union City when the late attack was made there?
Answer. I was.
Question. Will you give us an account of what occurred there?
Answer. On the 23d of March last it was generally understood by the troops there that the rebels were advancing upon us; we supposed under General Forrest. That night two companies, I think, were ordered to keep their horses saddled. The first orders I received were about half-past four, the morning of the 24th. The adjutant of our regiment came to me and told me to have my horses saddled. In perhaps half an hour after that we were ordered into line, and I held my company in line for some time waiting for orders. As ColonelHawkins came by I asked him if he wanted me to take my position at the breastworks, and he said he did. I then took my position at a place where I thought I was most needed, at some breastworks that my company had thrown up on the east side. At this time the rebels were firing on our pickets. I think there was no general charge until about half-past 5 or 6 o'clock. That charge was made by cavalry, on the south side. They did not charge a great way, and were easily repulsed. The same men then reassembled, dismounted, and charged on the fort. This time they came very close to the breastworks, but were again repulsed. After that our troops were very exultant, and ready to meet the rebels anywhere. The next charge was made on the northwest; that was easily repulsed. The last charge was made on the northeast, fronting my position; that was repulsed tolerably easily, but with more loss to the rebels than previously. Then there was sharpshooting for about an hour and a half, and we were all in good spirits. At the expiration of that hour and a half a flag of truce came in in my front. I sent word to Colonel Hawkins that there was a flag of truce coming. I went in person to meet the flag, and halted it about two hundred yards from the breastworks, and asked them what they desired. They said they wished to see the commander of the forces there. I told them I had notified him, and he would be there in a moment. At that time they ordered me under arrest, because I made myself easy looking around upon their position. I demanded their right to order me under arrest under a flag of truce, and told them I had as much right to look around as they had. They then ordered me to sit down. I told them that was played out; that I was not only there under the right of a flag of truce, but that I was there to give them their orders if they made any mismoves. They gave up then, as Colonel Hawkins was in sight. When the colonel came a document was handed him. I do not know anything about it; for, as soon as the colonel came near, I went back to the breastworks. The flag of truce then retired. As soon as I got back I made it my business to go around inside the breastworks to get a view of the rebel troops. They were there upon stumps and logs, and every place where they could see.
In about twenty minutes, I think it was, they came again with another flag of truce. I met them as before. This time a demand for surrender was handed to Colonel Hawkins. I remained there this time, and saw the communication. I could once give almost the exact language of it. At any rate, it was a demand for unconditional surrender, promising us the rights of prisoners of war if the surrender was made; if not, then we must take the consequences. After consulting with them for a little time Colonel Hawkins was allowed fifteen minutes to go to camp and back again. I remained there about fifteen minutes with the rebel truce bearers. During this time I could observe in every move and remark they made that they were beaten. Perhaps I should have said before, that when Colonel Hawkins was talking about the matter, I gave my opinion in regard to it. This was before the flag of truce came in at all. Colonel Hawkins came down to my corner of the breastworks. I told him that the rebels were beaten on their first programme, at any rate; that it was my opinion that they would either consolidate and make a charge on one side, or else they would leave the field, or else lie there and sharpshoot until they could get re-enforcements. I state this merely to show what our feelings were—that we were satisfied they were whipped, were beaten.
When the colonel came back from his second flag of truce I left them and went inside the breastworks. I was satisfied from appearances that the surrender would be made, and I hid a couple of revolvers and some other things I had; I did not know whether I should ever find them again or not. The troops considered that the surrender was made as soon as they saw a rebel officer coming back with the colonel, and every man tried to hide his stuff. Some broke their guns, and all were denouncing Colonel Hawkins as a coward, in surrenderingthem without cause. That is all I know of the matter up to the time of the surrender.
Question. Do you say it was the opinion of all the officers and men, so far as you know, that the surrender was wholly unnecessary?
Answer. Yes, sir; every man I ever heard say anything about it.
Question. To what cause do you attribute the surrender?
Answer. Some said that the colonel was half rebel, anyway; others said that he was a little cowardly, and surrendered to an imaginary foe—to a force that was not there. Those were the reasons that I have heard.
Question. What was your force there?
Answer. About 500 men.
Question. Did you have any colored troops?
Answer. None.
Question. What was the force of the enemy?
Answer. As near as I could judge—and I tried to estimate their number—they had about 800 after the surrender; I think they must have had a thousand at first.
Question. Could you have held that position against them?
Answer. I am satisfied we could have held it all day, unless our ammunition had given out.
Question. Had you any information in regard to any re-enforcements approaching to your relief?
Answer. For the last two hours we had expected to see them at any time.
Question. What reason had you to expect re-enforcements?
Answer. We had a communication that they knew our situation at Columbus, that they knew the rebels were advancing on us, and, of course, I thought they would send us re-enforcements.
Question. From what point did you expect re-enforcements?
Answer. From Columbus. I remarked to the men, as soon as the surrender was made, that I would be ten times more mad if I should hear afterwards that our re-enforcements were right close to us, which I expected was the case.
Question. What occurred after the surrender?
Answer. The men were marched on foot; the officers were allowed to ride their horses. They were marched two days—it was rainy and muddy weather—nearly east, towards Dresden. They had nothing to eat for two days, until eight o'clock the second night, and then we got some corn-bread and meat. The second day they turned from the Dresden road, towards Trenton, through the country, not in the regular road. On the evening of the third day we arrived at Trenton, Tennessee. There all our money, and I think all our watches, were taken—I know some of them were—and the pocket-knives were taken from the men: all done officially, one company at a time.
We laid over the fourth day at Trenton. On the fifth day at noon we marched toward Humboldt, and arrived there in the evening, just before dark. At seven o'clock, or nearly seven o'clock, I left them. My intention was to go to the commander at Memphis and get him to send a force out to make the rebels release our troops. Before I left the rebels, after I had concluded to leave them, I commenced getting up a plot to break the guards, and see if we could not redeem our name a little in that way and get off. It was working finely, but I met the opposition of the officers, because it was the general opinion that if we were caught, one in every ten would be killed. I abandoned that and escaped. I travelled on foot twenty-five hours without stopping, through the brush, dodging the rebels and guerillas. I was then directed by a negro to a farm where there were no whites, and where, he said, I could get a horse. When I got there I found I was so tired and sleepy that I dared not risk myself on a horse, and I secreted myself and rested there until early the next morning; I got a little refreshment there, too. I then got an old horse, with no saddle, androde into Fort Pillow, just forty miles, in a little more than five hours. I reached there a little before noon, on the 30th of March.
The morning after I escaped from the rebels I wrote myself a parole, which screened me from a great many rebels whom I could not avoid. I was chased by two guerillas for some distance at this place, where I stopped over night, and got a horse. I knew two guerillas had been chasing me over ten miles. I told the negroes, as I laid down, that if any strangers came on the place, or any one inquiring for Yankees, to tell them that one had been there and pressed a horse and gone on. They did so; and more than that, they told the guerillas that I had been gone but a few minutes, and if they hurried they would catch me. They dashed on five miles further, and then gave up the chase and turned back. That is the way I avoided them.
After I got to Fort Pillow I got on a boat and went to Memphis, reaching there before daybreak on the morning of the 31st of March, and waked General Hurlbut up just about daybreak, and reported to him.
Question. Did you have much conversation with these rebels, or hear them express opinions of any kind, while you were with them?
Answer. I was talking almost continually with them. Somehow or other I got a little noted in the command, and a great many came to me to discuss matters about the war. They seemed to be confident that they were all right, and would succeed. I did not hear the command I was with say they intended to attack Fort Pillow; but while I was on my way from there to Fort Pillow, the report was current along the road that the rebels were going to attack it. But I reported to Major Booth, when I got to Fort Pillow, that I did not think there was any danger of an attack, because I thought I should have seen or heard something more to indicate it. I told him, however, that I thought it would be well to be on the lookout, though I did not think they would attack him. I heard the rebels say repeatedly that they intended to kill negro troops wherever they could find them; that they had heard that there were negro troops at Union City, and that they had intended to kill them if they had found any there. They also said they had understood there were negro troops at Paducah and Mayfield, and that they intended to kill them if they got them. And they said that they did not consider officers who commanded negro troops to be any better than the negroes themselves.
Question. With whom did you have this conversation?
Answer. With officers. I did not have any extensive conversation with any officer higher than captain. I talked with three or four captains, and perhaps twice that number of lieutenants.
Question. Did you see Colonel Hawkins, or have any conversation with him, after the surrender?
Answer. I did not. I felt so disgusted with him that I never spoke a word to him after the surrender.
Captain John W. Beattie, sworn and examined.
By Mr. Gooch:
Question. To what regiment do you belong?
Answer. I am a captain in the 7th Tennessee cavalry.
Question. Were you at Union City when it was surrendered?
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. What was our force there?
Answer. Something near five hundred, altogether. There were some there that did not belong to our regiment.
Question. What was the force that attacked you?
Answer. From 1,500 to 1,800, as near as we could learn from the rebel officers while we were with them.
Question. What rebel officers were in command there?
Answer. The surrender was made to Colonel Duckworth; but I am not certain whether it was Duckworth or Faulkner who had the command.
Question. Will you state briefly the circumstances attending the attack and surrender of Union City?
Answer. Our pickets were driven in about 4 o'clock in the morning. We sent some men out to see what force it was. As soon as it was light enough to see we found the rebels were all around our camp. Skirmishing commenced all around. Those of our men who were out, and could get in, came in; but some of the pickets did not get in at all. My company were almost all out on picket. The enemy, mounted men, made a charge on our camp; they came up on all sides, but we drove them back. They then dismounted and made three other charges, and we drove them back each time. I did not see but one of our men killed; and I did not see any that were wounded at all. One of my sergeants was killed. About 9 o'clock, I should think, the enemy got behind logs and stumps, and all such places, and commenced sharpshooting. If a man raised his head up, there would be a shot fired at him. We put out the best of our men as sharpshooters. A great many of our men lay down inside of our works and went to sleep, as they felt altogether easy about the matter. I think it was about half past ten o'clock when the bugle was sounded to cease firing; and fifteen minutes before eleven they sent in a flag of truce demanding an unconditional surrender. Colonel Hawkins called the officers together and asked them what they thought best to be done. All were in favor of fighting. When he asked me about it I told him that if they had artillery they could whip us; but if they had no artillery we could fight them till hell froze over; those were my very words. Then the telegraph operator said that he had seen two pieces of artillery. He had my glass, and had been up in a little log shanty, where he could see all over the ground. Colonel Hawkins said if they had artillery, and we renewed the fight, like enough they would kill every man of us they got. So we agreed then he should make the surrender on condition that we should be paroled there, without being taken away from the place, and each one allowed to keep his private property, and the officers allowed to keep their fire-arms. He went out to make the surrender on those conditions; and if they did not accept them, then we were to fight them as long as a man was left. He went out, and the next thing I knew there was an order came there for us to march our men out and lay down their arms. We marched them out in front of his headquarters and laid down our arms. The rebels then piled into our camp and cleaned out everything; what they could not carry off they burned. We were then marched off. The colonel had not then told us on what conditions the surrender was made; he only said he supposed we would be paroled.
Question. The enemy had used no artillery?
Answer. No, sir.
Question. Did you find out subsequently whether or not they had any artillery?
Answer. They had two pieces of artillery, but they did not have them at Union City.
Question. Where was it?
Answer. On the way from Dresden to Paducah. They told me it was in supporting distance; that they could have had it at Union City in a short time; but I heard so many stories I did not know what to believe.
Question. Did you suppose at the time you made the surrender that re-enforcements were approaching you?
Answer. The colonel could not tell us whether any re-enforcements were coming or not.
Question. How far was Union City from Columbus?
Answer. I think it was twenty-six miles; but I am not certain.
Question. You supposed re-enforcements would come from there, if at all?
Answer. From Cairo.
Question. How far were you from Cairo?
Answer. It is about forty-six miles from here to Union City. You would have to go from here to Columbus, and from Columbus out to Union City.
Question. How long did you remain with the enemy?
Answer. From Thursday until Monday night.
Question. How did you effect your escape?
Answer. We were not guarded very closely. When I was ready to leave I went into the kitchen, just after supper, and asked for some bread and meat for a man who was sick. The cook gave it to me, and I then went out the door and called Captain Parsons, and asked him if he did not want to go down and see the boys; that I had got a piece of meat to take down. He said yes; but instead of going down to see the boys we turned off into the woods.
Question. At what point did you come into our lines?
Answer. We came in at Waverly landing.
By the chairman:
Question. Have you heard since that re-enforcements under General Brayman were approaching to your relief?
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. Did you hear how near they had got to you?
Answer. Within six miles of the place at four o'clock that morning.
By Mr. Gooch:
Question. Had you any conversation with the rebel officers while you were with them?
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. Did you hear them say anything about negro troops, &c.?
Answer. Not much. I was talking with them about our regiment. They said when they first started to come there that they were going to get us, and seemed to be surprised to think we had fought them as well as we did, for they said they expected to get us without any trouble.
Question. Did they say why they expected to get you without any trouble?
Answer. No, sir. They said they would parole Hawkins again, and let him get some more horses, and knives, and things, and then they would come when they wanted him again.
Question. How did they treat our men?
Answer. They gave them nothing to eat until the second night, when they gave them about an ounce of fat bacon each. Some got a little bread, but a few of them, however. On Sunday morning they marched the men up in front of the court-house, passed them in one at a time and searched them, taking boots, hats, coats, blankets, and money from them.
Question. Did they leave you without boots, coats, or blankets?
Answer. There were a great many of our men who had new boots, and the rebels would take the new boots and give them their old ones, and so they exchanged hats and blankets.
Question. How many days were you in reaching our lines after you escaped from the rebels?
Answer. I reached Waverly landing on Thursday, the 7th of April, and Cairo in two weeks from the time that I got away from them.
Captain P. K. Parsons, sworn and examined.
By Mr. Gooch:
Question. Were you at Union City when that place was surrendered?
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. State briefly the circumstances attending the attack there and the surrender.
Answer. I think it was a few minutes after 4 o'clock in the morning that our pickets were driven in by the enemy. I was then sent out to look after them, and commenced skirmishing with them just at daylight. Before sun-up they had surrounded the fort. They then made three or four charges, two on horseback, I believe, but they were repulsed very easily. They then did not do anything but use their sharpshooters until about ten minutes before 11 o'clock, when they sent in a flag of truce demanding an unconditional surrender. The colonel went out and received the demand and brought it in. He then called the officers together and asked what we thought of the matter. He turned to Captain Harris, as the oldest officer, and asked him what we should do. The captain said he was for fighting, and I believe other officers there said "fight." The colonel then asked me to ride out with him, and I did so. On our way out I told the colonel that I thought we had the rebels whipped unless they had re-enforcements, which I did not think they had. They gave us fifteen minutes more to consider. Then some officers said they thought they saw artillery out there. Captain Beattie said if they had artillery they could whip us, but not without. The colonel then went out and made an unconditional surrender of the fort, about sixteen officers and about 500 men. I guess there were 300 men and officers out of the 500 who wanted to fight.
Question. Did you see any artillery?
Answer. No, sir.
Question. They had none there?
Answer. No, sir; I rode out as far as I dared go to see, and I did not see anything with the glass I had but an ambulance; there was no artillery there at all.
Question. To what do you attribute the surrender by Colonel Hawkins?
Answer. It is hard for me to make up my mind about that. Colonel Hawkins was a first lieutenant of a company in the Mexican war and I fought under him there, and I have fought under him in this war, and I never saw any cowardice about him before. I think this was one of the most cowardly surrenders there ever was. Still, I cannot think Colonel Hawkins is a coward; at least I never saw any show of cowardice in him before. I could see no reason for surrendering when we had but one man killed or hurt in the fort.
Question. You escaped from the enemy?
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. How did you effect your escape?
Answer. I escaped with Captain Beattie.
Question. How long were you with the enemy?
Answer. Four days and a half.
Question. Who did you understand was in command of the rebels?
Answer. Colonel Duckworth.
Question. How many men did he have?
Answer. From the best information I could get there were about 1,500 of them. Several of their officers said they had 1,250 men, regular troops, and four independent companies. That was their statement to me.
Question. Had you a good position at Union City?
Answer. It was a very good position against small arms; it was not strong against artillery.
Question. Did you know anything about re-enforcements coming to you?
Answer. We were looking for re-enforcements. We had a despatch to hold the place, that re-enforcements would be sent.
Question. From whom was that despatch?
Answer. From General Brayman.
Question. Did Colonel Hawkins receive that despatch before he surrendered?
Answer. Yes, sir; the day before the fight, before the wire was cut. He was getting a despatch when the wire was cut; we did not know what that despatch was. But the one he got before was an order to hold the place, that re-enforcements would be sent to him. We were looking for them to come that morning or that night. I heard some rebel officers and men say they had come 450 miles for our regiment, and that they had known they would get it. I asked them how they knew they would get it, but they would not tell me. A rebel cursed Colonel Hawkins; said he was a God damned coward, but he had good men.
Question. Were our men in good spirits before the surrender?
Answer. They were just as cool and quiet as you ever saw men; not a bit excited, but talking and laughing.
Mrs. Rosa Johnson, sworn and examined.
By Mr. Gooch:
Question. Where have you been living?
Answer. I have a home at Hickman, Kentucky, but have been at Fort Pillow.
Question. Did you live there?
Answer. No, sir; my son was there, and I went down to stay with him.
Question. Where were you during the fight?
Answer. I was on a big island, where the gunboat men took us. I staid there a part of two days and one night.
Question. Did you go back to Fort Pillow after the fight?
Answer. Yes, sir; the gunboat took us over there.
Question. When did you go back there?
Answer. The battle was on Tuesday, and I went back Wednesday evening.
Question. Had our wounded men been taken away when you went back?
Answer. Yes, sir, I believe so.
Question. How long did you stay there?
Answer. I went about 2 o'clock in the evening, and staid till night.
Question. Did you go about the fort after you went back?
Answer. Yes, sir; I went up in it, expecting to find my son lying there, and I went around, where I saw some half buried, some with feet out, or hands out, or heads out; but I could not find him. I was so distressed that I could not tell much about it.
Question. Did you see anybody nailed to any boards there?
Answer. We saw a man lying there, burned they said; but I did not go close to him. I was looking all around the fort for my child, and did not pay attention to anything else.
Question. You came away that night?
Answer. I think we did.
Question. Is that all you know about it?
Answer. That is about all I know about it. There was a pile of dirt there, and there was a crack in it, which looked like a wounded man had been buried there, and had tried to get out, and had jammed the dirt, for they buried the wounded and the dead altogether there. There were others knew about that.
Mrs. Rebecca Williams, sworn and examined.
By Mr. Gooch:
Question. Where do you reside?
Answer. In Obion county, Tennessee.
Question. Was your husband in that fight at Fort Pillow?
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. Were you there during the fight?
Answer. I was over on the island with Mrs. Johnson.
Question. Did you go back to Fort Pillow after the battle?
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. What did you see there?
Answer. I did not see anything more than what Mrs. Johnson saw. I saw a burned man. He was lying right where a house was burned. He was a white man, but as I was alone by myself, I felt frightened, and did not look at it. I saw many buried there, some half buried, and negroes lying around there unburied. I heard that there was a man nailed up to a building and burned, but I did not see it.
Question. What time of day was it that you were there?
Answer. About 2 o'clock, the day after the fight. I saw that the man who was burned was a white man. Mrs. Ruffin was there and examined it, and can tell you all about it.
Captain James H. Odlin, sworn and examined.
By the chairman:
Question. What is your rank and position in the service?
Answer. I am a captain, and assistant adjutant general and chief of staff for General Brayman, for the district of Cairo, where I have been stationed since the 23d of January, 1864.
Question. Do you know anything about the capture of Fort Pillow?
Answer. Only from hearsay.
Question. You are acquainted somewhat with the circumstances attending the surrender of Union City?
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. Will you tell us about that?
Answer. About 4 o'clock on the evening of the 23d of March we received a telegram that it was likely Union City would be attacked within two days. Shortly afterwards we received a telegram from Colonel Hawkins that he would be attacked within 24 hours. He said his men had not seen the enemy, but that his information was reliable. General Brayman instructed me to proceed by special boat to Columbus, and from thence, by special train, to Union City, to inquire into the matter, find out the truth of the case, and let him know; also, to find out whether re-enforcements were necessary. I left Cairo about 5 p. m. on the 23d, arrived at Columbus about half past seven o'clock, and immediately proceeded to the telegraph office and telegraphed to Colonel Hawkins, asking him if he had any further information. He answered that he had none. I then asked him if his information and his despatches could be relied upon, and whether he had seen the enemy. He answered that none of his men had seen the enemy; that he had not seen any one who had seen the enemy, but that his information was entirely reliable, and that he would be attacked, there was no doubt of it.
I then proceeded, by special train, to Union City, and had a consultation with Colonel Hawkins. He told me that the ferries on the Obion had been destroyed, and that scouts whom he had expected in the day before had not returned; that he supposed that they were captured, or that it was impossible for them to get across the Obion. He said that his men had not seen the enemy; that he could not get any of them across the Obion in consequence of the rebel forces having destroyed the private ferries, and guarding the other places.
About half past 3 o'clock on the morning of the 24th a messenger came in and stated that the pickets at the bridge on the Dresden and Hickman road had been attacked and driven in, and that they were probably cut off, which afterwards proved to be the fact. The messenger also reported that, when shots were exchanged, he thought the rebels had brought artillery to the front, buthe could not be certain of that; that it sounded on the bridge like artillery. I immediately directed Colonel Hawkins to have his men saddle their horses ready for a fight. I instructed him, if he saw fit, and thought he could not hold the place, to abandon it and fall back on Columbus. He asked me how soon I would re-enforce him if he remained there. I told him I would re-enforce him just as quick as I could get the troops up there. He said he thought he could hold the place with his regiment if he had some artillery; but that he could not contend against artillery without he had some himself. I told him I did not want him to retreat without having seen the enemy; that he must have a skirmish with them, and feel their strength, before falling back to Columbus; that I did not want the command disgraced by retreating without seeing the enemy, which it would be if the reports should prove false, or he found that he had fallen back before a small number of men.
I then told Colonel Hawkins I must leave, for my orders were not to endanger the train, but to save it. The train consisted of nine cars and a locomotive, and was loaded with stores from Union City belonging to the government and to the railroad company, and 150 contrabands, (railroad hands.) The last words I said to Colonel Hawkins were, that if he found he could not whip the enemy, he should immediately retreat to Columbus. He said that, if he did not fall back, he would hold the place until re-enforcements reached him. I told him I would immediately push forward re-enforcements; that the garrison at Columbus consisted of only 1,100 men in all, and that 900 and odd of them were negroes, who had never been in a fight, and that re-enforcements would have to come from Cairo. I wrote a telegraphic despatch at the time to General Brayman, giving all the facts. But while it was being sent, the wires were cut, and we did not get the half of it through.
I then started to return to Columbus with the train, with the distinct understanding with Colonel Hawkins that he should either hold Union City until re-enforcements should arrive, or fall back to Columbus. The State line bridge was burning as I crossed it with the train, the evident intention of the rebels being to capture the train. I succeeded, however, in getting it through to Columbus safe.
Colonel Lawrence, commanding at Columbus, had telegraphed General Brayman that communications with Union City were cut off; that I was on the opposite side of the bridge, and that Colonel Hawkins was probably attacked. General Brayman immediately forwarded re-enforcements to Columbus, taking 2,000 men belonging to General Veatch's command, then on their way up the Tennessee river. He had received telegraphic orders from General Sherman not to take any of those troops out of their proper course, but forward them as soon as possible up the Tennessee. As transports were not ready for them, and as General Brayman could go to Union City and back again before transportation would be ready, he concluded to use some of the troops for the purpose of re-enforcing Union City. The movement was made with as little delay as possible. He arrived at Columbus about ten or half past ten o'clock on the morning of the 24th, and immediately proceeded on a railroad train towards Union City. Upon arriving within about seven miles of Union City, we were informed, by citizens and some scouts, that Colonel Hawkins had surrendered at 11 o'clock of that day; that the rebels had destroyed all the works and the government property, and had retreated. General Brayman being fully convinced that Union City had been surrendered, everything there destroyed, and that the enemy had fled, returned to Columbus, and from thence to Cairo, with the troops ready to be forwarded up the Tennessee in obedience to the orders of General Sherman.
Question. Will you now state what you know in relation to the attack on Paducah?
Answer. About 8 o'clock on the night of the 25th of March we received atelegraphic despatch from the operator at Metropolis, stating that a big light was seen in the direction of Paducah; that it looked as if the town or some boats were burning. The despatch also stated that the telegraph repairer had come in and reported that he had been within two miles of Paducah, and had heard firing there. We had received, previous to this, no intimation from Colonel Hicks, commanding at Paducah, that the place was in danger of an attack. In obedience to instructions from General Brayman, I immediately got on a despatch boat, furnished by Captain Pennock, of the navy, and with Captain Shirk, of the navy, proceeded to Paducah. We found, on our arrival there, that General Forrest, with his command of about 6,500 men, had attacked Paducah in the afternoon, about 3 o'clock, the troops under Colonel Hicks having only about fifteen minutes notice of their coming. Colonel Hicks's scouts had returned from the road over which the rebels had come in, and reported that they had heard nothing of the enemy. They were just about sending out new scouts when the rebels dashed into the town, driving our pickets in, and driving our troops into the fort. As the rear of the battalion of the 16th Kentucky cavalry were marching into the fort they were fired upon by the rebels.
After fighting a short time, the rebels sent in a demand, under flag of truce, for the unconditional surrender of all the forces under Colonel Hicks's command, and all the government property, stating that, if he should comply with the demand, his troops should be treated as prisoners of war; if not, then an overwhelming force would be thrown against him, and no quarter would be shown him. Colonel Hicks replied by stating that he had been placed there by his government to hold and defend the place and the public stores there, and that he should obey the command of his superior officer, and do so; that he was prepared for the enemy, and should not surrender.
Forrest then again attacked the fort, making three different charges. Our troops, both black and white, behaved in the most gallant and meritorious manner, fighting most bravely. After fighting until half past seven or eight o'clock in the evening our ammunition began to run short, so much so that men and officers began to count their cartridges. Colonel Hicks had only 3,000 rounds of small ammunition left when Forrest made the second demand for a surrender. But Colonel Hicks, as before, positively refused to comply with the demand. Firing then ceased until daylight the next morning.
During this cessation of firing I succeeded in getting into the fort with re-enforcements and a small supply of ammunition from the gunboats. The supply of ammunition from Cairo did not arrive until the evening. As it was impossible to get any despatches through from Colonel Hicks, the line being cut, we knew nothing when I left Cairo of his being short of ammunition. The understanding we had with Colonel Hicks, before any attack was made, was that we had a large supply of ammunition on hand; that there were about 33,000 cartridges, calibre 58, on hand—that being the calibre used by the troops there—and a large supply of artillery ammunition in the fort.
The next morning, about six o'clock, the enemy again advanced in line of battle towards the fort. There was some firing on both sides, but it did not amount to much. Some of the rebel troops, while their main body was firing at the fort, were engaged in pillaging the town, stealing property from private citizens, horses, and government stores, burning houses, and committing all sorts of depredations.
While the flag of truce was at the fort the first, second, and third times, the rebel troops were taking new positions in line of battle, although they had made a distinct agreement and understanding with Colonel Hicks that while the flag of truce was in there should be no movements of troops on either side; that everything should remain as it was.
While the fight was going on, women, children, and other non-combatantscame running down to the river towards the gunboats. The officers in the fort and on the gunboats called to them to run down to the river bank to the left of our fort. They did so, and under cover of the gunboats they got on a wharf boat or a little ferry-boat and were ferried across the river as fast as possible. While they were doing this the rebel sharpshooters got in among them, so that we could not fire upon them without killing the women and children, and fired on our troops in the fort and on the gunboats, wounding one officer on a gunboat and two men. They also made women stand up in front of their sharpshooters, where it was impossible for us to return the fire without killing the women. They also fired into houses where there were women, and where there were none of our soldiers. They also went into a hospital, took the surgeon of the hospital prisoner, and took a lady that was there and carried her off and took her clothing from her, leaving her nothing but an old dress to cover herself with. This woman, as well as Dr. Hart, the surgeon of the hospital, were taken away by them as prisoners. All the prisoners taken there by Forrest, with the exception of three or four men, were sick men from the hospital, unable to move or walk from the hospital to the fort without injury to their health. All the men who were able to walk were brought from the hospital to the fort. They took the rest of the men from the hospital, and under the third flag of truce offered to exchange them. This Colonel Hicks and myself refused, because we thought it treachery on their part. We also refused for the reason that we did not think they had a right to take as prisoners of war men in the hospital who were unable to walk without danger to their lives. Yet the rebels took those men and marched them ten miles, and then camped them down in a swampy piece of ground at night, with their clothes nearly all taken from them. Some of them were left bareheaded and barefooted, with nothing on but their pants and shirts, compelled to stay in that swampy ravine all night long, with nothing to eat, and not permitted to have fires. The next morning they were marched off again. I have certain knowledge that for two days and one night those sick men were compelled to march with the rebel troops without anything to eat, with hardly any clothing, and a number of them without any boots or shoes.
Question. Do you know that the rebels placed women and other non-combatants in front of their lines as they advanced towards the fort?
Answer. They had women and children between us and their lines, and they stood behind them, the women and children forming a sort of breastwork for the rebels, as we were unable to return their fire for fear of killing the women and children. Colonel Hicks reported to me that they took several women and compelled them to stand in front of their lines during the fight; that there were women and children between our fire and theirs; that as the women moved the rebels moved along with them, keeping behind them.
Question. Have you any idea of the number of women and children they had thus placed in front of them?
Answer. It varied at different times. Colonel Hicks informed me that at one time the rebels held six women in front of them, refused to let them escape, but compelled them to stand there under the hottest of the fire.
Question. Were those women so placed that we could not fire upon the enemy with advantage without endangering the lives of the women?
Answer. We could not fire upon them at that particular point without endangering the lives of the women and children.
Question. Do you know whether the flag of truce was violated by the rebels at any time?
Answer. Yes, sir, it was. While the flag of truce was in they moved their troops into new positions; they marched their troops around to the back of the fort, and brought them up through the timber, dashed up towards the fort at full speed, then turned off towards the right of the fort, taking up their positionbetween the fort and the town. During the first flag of truce they marched the majority of their forces, if not the whole of them, down into an open common between the fort, the river, and the town, along the river bank, then obliqued off to the left, and took position in line of battle off to the right of the fort as you faced the town; and at one time, while their troops were taking position between the town and the fort during a flag of truce, they had women placed in front of their lines.
Question. While they were making the movement?
Answer. Yes, sir. The rebel General Thompson with his forces took position on the right of the fort between the hospital and the fort while the flag of truce was at the fort. The fact of the rebel movements was reported to Colonel Hicks, and he requested of the flag of truce that they should be stopped, as they had violated their word, it being distinctly understood that there should be no movements during that time, and the officer sent an orderly to stop it, but it was not done; the troops continued to move. After they had placed their troops in position the flag of truce left the fort. As the flag of truce passed from the fort down through the town, the rebel troops escorting the flag shot down in the streets some citizens and some men straggling from the hospital. A charge was then immediately made on the fort, at which time the rebel General Thompson was killed. The rebels also, while the flag of truce was at the fort, pillaged the town, and robbed citizens on the streets who were on their way down to the river for the purpose of going across. They pillaged the town right in view of our gunboats; and as soon as the flag of truce left the fort our gunboats opened upon the rebels, and drove them out of that part of the town.
The morning after I arrived there, when the rebel forces advanced on the fort, they sent in a flag of truce asking for an exchange of prisoners, which was refused. It was a written communication from General Forrest, asking, if his request was granted, that Colonel Hicks, with one or two staff officers, would meet him at a point designated, when they would agree between themselves upon the exchange. Colonel Hicks replied that he had no authority to exchange prisoners; otherwise he would be happy to do so. When this written reply was handed to the rebel officer in charge of the flag of truce, he asked three or four questions for the purpose of gaining time. Colonel Hicks and I both noticed this, and sent him off as soon as possible. While this flag of truce was at the fort the rebels were taking position. They afterwards fell back into the timber.
The main body of the rebels, Forrest with them, retreated on the Mayfield road, while about 300 of his men remained in the town making movements and feints on the fort, to prevent our sending out and ascertaining his movements. Forrest, by that time, had found out that we had been re-enforced with troops, and that more boats were arriving; also, that the navy had re-enforced us with two or three more gunboats.
In the afternoon, about 5 o'clock, by Colonel Hicks's consent and direction, I sent word to the gunboats to move up opposite the town and shell it at the head of Jersey street, our troops having seen squads of rebels in that part of the city. This the gunboats did. After that the town was quiet, the rebels who had remained there having been driven out by the shells.
Question. Do you know what was our loss and the loss of the enemy there?
Answer. Our loss altogether was 14 killed—of which 11 were negroes—and 46 wounded; I do not know how many of them were negroes. The rebels lost about 300 killed, and from 1,000 to 1,200 wounded. That is what the citizens reported Forrest said, and we believed it to be correct from the number of graves we found, and from other circumstances. Forrest seized the Mayfield and Paducah train and carried all his wounded off to Mayfield, except a few who lay near the fort.
Our black troops were very much exposed. The fort was in bad condition,and the negro troops, with the heavy artillery, were compelled to stand up on the platforms to man the guns, their only protection there being a little bank or ridge of earth about knee high. Our loss in killed resulted from this exposure. The rebel troops got up on the tops of houses, and also in the hospital, and fired down into the fort upon our gunners. But the troops fought bravely, without flinching; as soon as a man fell at the guns, one of his comrades would drag him out of the way and take his place. The black troops, having muskets as well as serving the artillery, would load and fire their muskets while the artillery was being fired. The white troops were better covered and had more protection; but they fought as well as any men could be expected to fight.
Question. Will you state to us what you know about the operations of the rebels against Columbus?
Answer. The first news we received of any operations against Columbus was about 12 o'clock in the day—I do not remember the exact day, but it was just before the attack on Fort Pillow. I received a written communication by despatch boat from Colonel Lawrence, commanding the post at Columbus, stating that he had received a communication from General Buford demanding an unconditional surrender of the forces under his command, with all government property, with the assurance that the white troops would be treated as prisoners of war, while the black troops, I think, would either be returned to their masters, or made such disposition of as the rebels should see fit. To this Colonel Lawrence replied that he had been placed there by his government to defend the place and the government property and stores there, and that he should obey the orders of his superiors; surrender, therefore, was out of the question.
The rebel general then offered to give Colonel Lawrence half an hour to remove the women and children out of the town. Colonel Lawrence replied that he should immediately notify the women and children to leave on a boat; that if he (the rebel general) attempted to attack the place, the lives of the women and children would rest on his head, but if he waited half an hour he would have them all out; that he (Colonel Lawrence) would not ask them to wait, for he felt amply prepared to receive their attack.
The flag of truce then returned. On their way out, or while the flag of truce was at the fort, the rebel cavalry occupied themselves in stealing horses that had been brought in by Union citizens, and stabled near our picket lines for protection. The rebels stole something like twenty-five or thirty horses belonging to Union men while this flag of truce was in. That was the last Colonel Lawrence heard of the enemy that day. Colonel Lawrence then gave notice that he should receive no more flags of truce from Forrest; that as Forrest did not respect them, he should not himself respect them. That was all that occurred at Columbus.
Question. You have said that you went up to Paducah on a gunboat with Captain Shirk, of the navy: did he co-operate cordially with the land forces in repelling the attack upon Paducah?
Answer. He did. Captain Shirk and all his officers did everything in their power to aid us. He was very accommodating, even furnishing us with ammunition, although he himself was getting short of it. He had but a very small amount, yet he divided with us, giving us a share of what he had. He also sent by boat to Metropolis all the despatches that were sent by Colonel Hicks and myself to General Brayman, and he sent a despatch boat to Cairo. To make sure that the information should get through, and to have supplies forwarded to us, the gunboats did everything in their power, and rendered great assistance in defending the place.
Question. Has Captain Pennock, of the navy, co-operated cordially with the military authorities in their operations in this vicinity, where it has been possible for the navy to co-operate?