CHAPTER XXIII.

One of my regiments, the 17th Georgia, had a skirmish day before yesterday. They acted splendidly, charging the Yankees, and driving them from the rifle-pits, killing, wounding, and taking prisoners over one hundred of the enemy. I lost but two killed and a few wounded.

At the siege of Yorktown in the early part of May, 1862, General Toombs commanded a division consisting of his own and Semmes' brigades. He had 2357 men in his own and 2342 in Semmes' brigade, making about 4700 troops in line. During this siege General Magruder reports that General Toombs supported Cobb's brigade, and promptly and energetically led the remainder of his command under fire, arriving just before the enemy ceased their attack, and in time to share its danger. General Magruder had only 11,000 men under him in the peninsula, and General Huger but 8000, to oppose McClellan's march with 80,000. Johnston and Lee both pronounced the peninsula untenable, and on the 4th of May Yorktown was evacuated.

After the retreat from the peninsula, General Johnston concentrated his entire army behind the Chickahominy River, sixteen miles from Richmond. On the 12th of May General Toombs writes home that his command near the Chickahominy was "resting easily after a disagreeable march from Yorktown. I hear that there is great consternation in Richmond.... The loss of New Orleans gives us a terrible blow, and, followed by Norfolk, makes it necessary for us to strike a decisive blow somewhere." On 19th of May, 1862, he writes home from the camp near Richmond:

We seem to have come up here to defend this city. You ask me my opinion of the present state of the country. It is bad enough. The utter incompetency of Mr. Davis and his West Point generals have brought us to the verge of ruin. If McClellan is unwise enough to fight us here, we shall whip and drive him out of Virginia.... As to Richmond, it will never be taken while this army is here.

General Toombs' estimate of the army and of the futility of an attack from McClellan was justified when, after the 26th of June, the Army of the Potomac, almost in sight of the spires of Richmond, was forced to reel back, in the deadly clinch of a seven days' combat, to the James River. The Confederate army changed its position from one of retreat to a brilliant and aggressive policy, and the subtle tactics of Johnston gave way to the bold strokes of Lee. The South was thrilled with victory.

General Toombs frequently referred to the incompetency of Mr. Davis. The letters which have just been quoted were written to his wife, and were not made public then, but he did not hesitate to express his opinion openly. Jefferson Davis and Mr. Toombs had some differences while the former was Secretary of War under Franklin Pierce and Mr. Toombs was in the Senate. Mr. Toombs believed that President Davis was too partial to West Point, at which school Mr. Davis had been trained, and that in his management of the army he showed the tenacity of a martinet rather than the breadth of a statesman.

In February, 1859, the Army Appropriation bill had come up before the United States Senate. Mr. Toombs attacked, and Mr. Davis defended the whole system. Mr. Toombs contended that the compensation of army officers was too great. It was more than the same talent could command in any other walk of life. It was upon a wrong basis. "You take a boy of sixteen and send him to West Point, and when he comes out you give him $1400 a year. In the course of a few years you carry him up to $3000, $6000, or $8000. Take the general employment of the youths of the country who are educated at the different colleges for all civil purposes. You may have the highest amount of genius and intellect, and you get nothing like such average there. It will take them many years to make that much money." Mr. Toombs declared that a brigadier general's commission was higher than that of a United States Senator. "I think," said he, "it requires as great qualifications to govern this country as it does to be a brigadier general." Officers had increased far beyond the wants of the country. Members of Congress appoint cadets for the different districts; "they are generally associated in some way, as brothers, sons, or cousins, with the governing power." He thought a salary of $600 or $900 for the West Point graduates enough. According to the way army commissions were valued in England, the commission of a lieutenant who graduated at West Point could not be worth less than $50,000. The pay of a captain was higher than that of a judge. That position required the highest ability and integrity, and the average salary of a judge was but $2000, without traveling expenses. Mr. Toombs contended that West Point men seldom reflected any opinions but those of the government which employed them. They seldom sympathized with the people, and he wanted a government of the people. "You take a boy to West Point," he said, "give him quarters, and fuel, and clothes, and maintain him, and you say he has rendered service. When the citizens of this country send their sons to college they pay their expenses or work their way through; but when a boy is carried to West Point he is taken care of; a house is provided for him; clothes are provided for him; instructors are provided for him, and that is called being in service. I lay down the proposition that the true theory of wages, if you employ these people to keep the peace, is exactly the same—a constable's pay—you ought to pay them what they can be had for."

Mr. Davis held that army officers were constantly tempted to resign by offers of higher pay. It was the training of these men in the service, not for the service, it was their attachment for thecountry which made them so valuable. It was better to instruct men for officers' places and then appoint them, than to appoint them and then instruct them. He thought appointments were free from partisan selection. A soldier's devotion was as broad as the continent. A West Point cadet is a warrant officer; he goes there to serve the government as it may direct. It directs him to stay there until he has sufficient elementary instruction to properly discharge the duties of an officer.

The debate showed the views of the two men, and indicated the differences which, from points of public policy, soon deepened into personal dislike. On the 30th of May, Toombs wrote from the army, "Davis is polite and formal; so am I."

In the latter part of 1862 it was evident that the two armies must meet and contend for the mastery in Virginia. The day before the seven days' fighting commenced, Dr. Steiner said to General Toombs, his intimate friend: "General, I have a favor to ask of you. Keep your mind unclouded during these important operations." Dr. Steiner knew that during the heat and excitement of battle, temptation was great among soldiers to take ardent spirits, a practice that had grown somewhat upon General Toombs during his service in the field, and which at times deprived him of his best powers. "Why, doctor, I gladly promise," said the great Georgian. Nor did he,during the week, take a glass of any sort of liquor.

General Toombs' brigade was the First Brigade, First Division, Army of Northern Virginia, and during the campaign of the peninsula, was in Magruder's division. On June 15, 1862, Toombs occupied the most exposed position, which was held for nine days. Magruder recommended relief for his troops, which had been suffering from lack of rest and care. Just before the seven days' fight Toombs' brigade was placed in D. R. Jones' division and Magruder commanded his own, Jones', and McLaw's divisions, holding about 13,000 men. Toombs' brigade was composed of the 1st, 15th, 17th, and 20th Georgia regiments.

On the 26th of June Toombs' brigade was posted upon the east of Garnett's House, on Golding's farm, just in front of the enemy. Both sides threw up breastworks so near that neither could advance its picket line. "Just before dark," says Dr. Steiner,"Mr. Toombs received ordersto charge the enemy, firing having been heard on the left. The position was a dangerous one. A charge at that time of the evening was perilous. Just in front lay a deep gulch—Labor-in-Vain Ravine—which was alive with the enemy, and the charge must be through an unprotected field of wheat and clover. GeneralToombs was astonished at the order. His first instructions had been to put himself near Garnett House, to hold his position and to take advantage of any retreat of the enemy. He doubted the authenticity of the order, and sent word that he would not obey unless in writing. Pretty soon written instructions were returned and General Toombs prepared for what he believed to be a forlorn hope. He advanced seven companies of the 2d Georgia Regiment, 750 men, under Colonel B. M. Butt, toward the enemy in the face of a heavy front and flank fire. Colonel Williams' regiment crossed the field at double-quick under a galling fire from the opposite side of the ravine. Unshaken by fearful odds, they held their ground and replied with spirit. The 15th Georgia Regiment, under Colonel McIntosh then entered the fight, and this gallant officer was mortally wounded. The 17th Georgia charged on the left and the 20th on the right. The engagement was a very bloody one. Over 200 of Toombs' men were lost and several valuable officers were killed. The opposing troops were a part of General Hancock's command, and the firing ceased only with the night. Next morning the enemy retreated, and Toombs' men pressed forward and held their position. General Toombs was censured for this engagement, for which, it seems, he was in no wise responsible.

On the 1st of July, about three o'clock in the afternoon, commenced one of the famous battles of the war. McClellan's army had gotten away from its perilous position astride the Chickahominy, and now found itself united and strongly intrenched on the heights of Malvern Hill. All hope of destroying that army was gone, and it was evident that an engagement must ensue, with the odds in favor of the Union army. It was in many respects like the battle of Gettysburg, except that the Confederate forces were not handled with the precision and effectiveness of the historic sorties against Cemetery Heights. The battlefield was in plain range of the enemy's gunboats, and there was much surprise that General Lee should have sanctioned an engagement at that point. General D. H. Hill misunderstood the signal for attack at Malvern Hill, and late in the afternoon ordered the charge. Toombs' brigade had been marching and countermarching all day, and went into action much thinned from the effects of the sharp fighting at Labor-in-Vain Ravine. There was no concerted attack. The charge seems to have been made by brigades, even single regiments being thrown forward. They advanced through a swamp, and the difficulties of the charge, owing to a murderous fire which raked the plain from the hills, 600 yards away, cannot be exaggerated. Toombs' brigade was one of the first to reach theplateau swept by fifty guns. It advanced with Anderson's brigade, but obliqued to the left about half-way up the hill, and took position near a fence, where the troops, suffering fearfully from the cool, deadly aim of the Federal gunners, were ordered to lie down and secure some shelter from the cannon-shot. It was at this time that General D. H. Hill rode up to General Toombs and ordered his brigade forward. Some sharp words ensued between these officers, and the men moved forward handsomely to the brow of the hill. At this time, however, the steady stream of fugitives pressing back from the charge, broke the alignment of the brigade and separated the regiments. Colonel Butt's regiment went forward with Kershaw's brigade. The whole Confederate charge was soon checked and the troops fell back in disorder. Their loss was fully 5000 men, and the loss in Toombs' brigade was 219 men, making his losses in the two engagements over one-third of his entire number. Malvern Hill was a blunder which was never repeated, but it was a disastrous one for the Georgia troops.

The subjoined correspondence will be understood in the light of the meeting of General D. H. Hill and General Toombs near Malvern Hill during the progress of the charge of the Confederate forces.

Headquarters First Brigade, First Division,In the Field, July 6, 1862.Major General D. H. Hill.Sir: Military movements since Tuesday last have prevented an earlier reply to your conversation with me on the battlefield that evening. I understood you to say, among other things, that "Your (my) brigade would not fight"; that you "always knew it would not fight"; that it "pretended to want to fight, but would not"; "Where were you when I was riding in front on my horse trying to rally your brigade?" I desire first to know whether I am correct in my understanding of your language, and if not, wherein I am mistaken.And secondly, to request of you such explanation of that language as you may choose to give.I am sir,Your obedient servant,Robert Toombs.

Headquarters First Brigade, First Division,In the Field, July 6, 1862.

Major General D. H. Hill.

Sir: Military movements since Tuesday last have prevented an earlier reply to your conversation with me on the battlefield that evening. I understood you to say, among other things, that "Your (my) brigade would not fight"; that you "always knew it would not fight"; that it "pretended to want to fight, but would not"; "Where were you when I was riding in front on my horse trying to rally your brigade?" I desire first to know whether I am correct in my understanding of your language, and if not, wherein I am mistaken.

And secondly, to request of you such explanation of that language as you may choose to give.

I am sir,Your obedient servant,Robert Toombs.

July 6, 1862.General: Your note has just been received. My remarks were personal to yourself and not to your brigade. I did not in the slightest degree reflect on your men. What I said was in substance this: "You have been wanting to fight, and now that you have one, you have got out of it." There were witnesses to our conversation, and if my remarks were severer, I will let you know.It may be well to suggest to you that, as the commanding officer on the field, I have an official report to make which will not be modified by your note.It is notorious that you have a thousand times expressed your disgust that the commanding general did not permit you to fight. It is equally notorious that you retired fromthe field. These are the two facts of which I reminded you on Tuesday. I made no comment upon them, and if the simple truth has been offensive, the interpretation of it has been your own.Yours truly,D. H. Hill,Major General.Brigadier General Toombs.

July 6, 1862.

General: Your note has just been received. My remarks were personal to yourself and not to your brigade. I did not in the slightest degree reflect on your men. What I said was in substance this: "You have been wanting to fight, and now that you have one, you have got out of it." There were witnesses to our conversation, and if my remarks were severer, I will let you know.

It may be well to suggest to you that, as the commanding officer on the field, I have an official report to make which will not be modified by your note.

It is notorious that you have a thousand times expressed your disgust that the commanding general did not permit you to fight. It is equally notorious that you retired fromthe field. These are the two facts of which I reminded you on Tuesday. I made no comment upon them, and if the simple truth has been offensive, the interpretation of it has been your own.

Yours truly,D. H. Hill,Major General.

Brigadier General Toombs.

Headquarters First Brigade, First Division,July 6, 1862.General D. H. Hill.Sir: Your note of this date has just been received. It is scarcely necessary for me to say it is not satisfactory. It would be inappropriate to comment upon it properly in this note, and for that reason alone I waive it for the present.As to your remark that you were the commanding officer on the field on the 1st inst., I never before heard of it, nor do I now think so, but, however that fact may be, I am at a loss to know for what reason you state it unless it was to menace and intimidate me in the pursuit of proper satisfaction for the unprovoked insult you have cast upon me. If that was your object, this note will satisfy you that you have failed in your object. I now demand of you personal satisfaction for the insult you cast upon my command and myself on the battlefield on the 1st inst., and for the repetition and aggravation thereof in your note of this day. I refer you to my friend Colonel Benning for all necessary arrangements.Your obedient servant,Robert Toombs.

Headquarters First Brigade, First Division,July 6, 1862.

General D. H. Hill.

Sir: Your note of this date has just been received. It is scarcely necessary for me to say it is not satisfactory. It would be inappropriate to comment upon it properly in this note, and for that reason alone I waive it for the present.

As to your remark that you were the commanding officer on the field on the 1st inst., I never before heard of it, nor do I now think so, but, however that fact may be, I am at a loss to know for what reason you state it unless it was to menace and intimidate me in the pursuit of proper satisfaction for the unprovoked insult you have cast upon me. If that was your object, this note will satisfy you that you have failed in your object. I now demand of you personal satisfaction for the insult you cast upon my command and myself on the battlefield on the 1st inst., and for the repetition and aggravation thereof in your note of this day. I refer you to my friend Colonel Benning for all necessary arrangements.

Your obedient servant,Robert Toombs.

Camp Near Richmond, Va.,July 12, 1862.General: Your note of the 6th was received yesterday. I must again enter my protest against your second declaration that I reflected upon your brigade in the battle ofMalvern Hill. Witnesses to our interview affirm that my remarks were entirely personal to yourself.In regard to your demand for satisfaction, I construe it to mean either that I must apologize to you for the language used by me on the battlefield, or that I must grant you a hostile meeting. If the first interpretation be correct, I will state that I will make full, public, and ample concessions when satisfied that I did you injustice; and this I would do without any demand. I certainly thought that you had taken the field too late, and that you left it too early. You may, however, have done your whole duty, and held your ground as long as it was possible for a brave and skillful officer to hold it. If the facts prove this to be so, no one will be more gratified than myself, and my acknowledgment of error will be cordial and complete.But if your demand means a challenge, its acceptance, when we have a country to defend and enemies to fight, would be highly improper and contrary to the dictates of plain duty, without reference to higher grounds of action. I will not make myself a party to a course of conduct forbidden alike by the plainest principles of duty, and the laws which we have mutually sworn to serve.Yours truly,D. H. Hill, Major General.Brigadier General Robert Toombs.

Camp Near Richmond, Va.,July 12, 1862.

General: Your note of the 6th was received yesterday. I must again enter my protest against your second declaration that I reflected upon your brigade in the battle ofMalvern Hill. Witnesses to our interview affirm that my remarks were entirely personal to yourself.

In regard to your demand for satisfaction, I construe it to mean either that I must apologize to you for the language used by me on the battlefield, or that I must grant you a hostile meeting. If the first interpretation be correct, I will state that I will make full, public, and ample concessions when satisfied that I did you injustice; and this I would do without any demand. I certainly thought that you had taken the field too late, and that you left it too early. You may, however, have done your whole duty, and held your ground as long as it was possible for a brave and skillful officer to hold it. If the facts prove this to be so, no one will be more gratified than myself, and my acknowledgment of error will be cordial and complete.

But if your demand means a challenge, its acceptance, when we have a country to defend and enemies to fight, would be highly improper and contrary to the dictates of plain duty, without reference to higher grounds of action. I will not make myself a party to a course of conduct forbidden alike by the plainest principles of duty, and the laws which we have mutually sworn to serve.

Yours truly,D. H. Hill, Major General.

Brigadier General Robert Toombs.

Just what General Toombs replied to this is not known. The letter has not been preserved in this correspondence. It evidently declared that the explanation was not satisfactory. Major R. J. Moses, Jr., a member of General Toombs' staff, submitted in writing the following report of his recollection ofGeneral Hill's words to General Toombs at Malvern Hill:

Where is your brigade, sir? I told you that I wanted a fighting brigade, and your brigade will not fight. I knew it would not, and you are the man who pretends to have been spoiling for a fight. For shame! Rally your troops! Where were you when I was riding up and down your line rallying your troops?

Major Moses adds:

As aid-de-camp of General Robert Toombs, I remained with him until some time after this conversation. Previous to this conversation General Toombs had been about fifteen yards to the rear of the center of his line and his troops were unbroken. There were many men coming by us, but I saw not over ten from General Toombs' brigade. The order was given "Forward, left oblique," and General Toombs moved to the left of his line. When General Hill met him and commenced this attack on the character of himself and his brigade without the slightest provocation, General Toombs had not only been rallying the troops, but continued to use his best endeavors to rally them till late at night. I was with General Toombs the whole time from the commencement of the action until half or three-quarters of an hour after the conversation.

The following is the concluding letter of the correspondence:

July 15, 1862.General: I regret that my last note, which was intended to be conciliatory, has been misunderstood or misappreciated. I take it for granted that you know enough of my previous history to be aware that a hostile meeting, underany circumstances, would be abhorrent to my principles and character. At this time it would be in the highest degree improper. I have offered you the only redress which I could make even after a meeting, viz., an acknowledgment of error when convinced of that error. As no good can result from a continued correspondence, it will close on my part with this communication.Yours truly,D. H. Hill, Major General.Brigadier General Robert Toombs.

July 15, 1862.

General: I regret that my last note, which was intended to be conciliatory, has been misunderstood or misappreciated. I take it for granted that you know enough of my previous history to be aware that a hostile meeting, underany circumstances, would be abhorrent to my principles and character. At this time it would be in the highest degree improper. I have offered you the only redress which I could make even after a meeting, viz., an acknowledgment of error when convinced of that error. As no good can result from a continued correspondence, it will close on my part with this communication.

Yours truly,D. H. Hill, Major General.

Brigadier General Robert Toombs.

General Hill was a good man and a brave soldier. His devotion to the Confederate cause was undoubted, but his zeal sometimes made him harsh, and more than once he placed himself in the position of reflecting upon the conduct of others. On one occasion at the battle of Chickamauga, where General Hill was in command of the extreme right of the Confederate line, on the second day of the battle information was brought to him of the sudden and unexpected advance of a strong Federal force against his line. It proved to be the division of the Federal General Gordon Granger. General Hill and General W. H. T. Walker, who commanded two divisions under General Hill, proceeded at once to the threatened point, to ascertain the situation of affairs, accompanied by some members of their staff. Arrived at a point where this new arrival of Federal forces could be seen, General Walker deferred to General Hill and asked him, "What do you wish me to do?"

"What do I want you to do?" said Hill with severity, and even with something like a snarl, "I want you to fight."

General Walker flushed up in a moment. He was not a man to deserve any reflection upon his courage or to bear it when offered. No man in the old army had a higher and more deserved reputation for dashing courage. He had been desperately wounded in Florida, and again wounded, supposed to be mortally, in leading the assault on Chapultepec in the Mexican War, and had, on many occasions, given undoubted evidence of his valor and fidelity. He answered hotly, "Of course I will fight; you know that, General Hill, well enough; but, by God! sir, there are two ways of fighting, one to whip and the other to get whipped."

The point was a good one. Major Joseph B. Cumming, chief of General Walker's staff, who related this incident, says it had the desired effect.

When Longstreet marched against Pope he stationed General Toombs' brigade to guard one of the fords of the Rapidan. Toombs was absent at the time and when he rode up ordered them back to camp. General Longstreet heard of Toombs making stump speeches and "referring in anything but complimentary terms of his commander." He sent General Toombs to Gordonsville. Afterward he received an apology from Toombs and directed him to joinhis command.["]As we were preparing for the charge at Manassas (second battle), Toombs got there, riding rapidly with his hat in his hand, and was much enthused. I was just sending a courier to his command with a dispatch. 'Let me take it,' he exclaimed. 'With pleasure,' I responded, and handed him the paper. He put spurs to his horse and dashed off, accompanied by his courier. When he rode up and took command of his brigade there was wild enthusiasm, and, everything being ready, an exultant shout was sent up, and the men sprang to the charge. I never had any more trouble with Toombs. We were afterward warm personal friends."

On the 30th of August, 1862, Hon. A. H. Stephens wrote to Mrs. Toombs that General Toombs was still at Gordonsville. He said:

How long he will remain, I do not know. I thought at first that it would only be for a day or two, or until General Longstreet could receive and reply to two notes he had written, explaining to my mind very fully and satisfactorily his acts and conduct, which, it seems to me, General Longstreet had misunderstood. Such is still my opinion, and yet I may be mistaken. I do not know much of General Longstreet. I only know that General Toombs, who does know him, always expressed very high admiration of him as an officer.

At the second battle of Manassas, August 29, 1862, Toombs' brigade in Jones' division held therear of Longstreet's corps. Early in the morning the brigade took up the march in the direction of the old battlefield of Manassas, where heavy firing was heard. Arriving at noon it was stationed on the extreme right, or upon the Manassas Gap railroad. The brigades formed in echelon. General Longstreet in his published report commended especially General Toombs for gallant conduct at Manassas Plain.

General D. R. Jones, in his report of Manassas, says:

General Toombs, released from arrest, under which he had been since the 18th of August, came upon the field shortly after his brigade went in under fire and accompanied it in action.

Captain H. L. French, of the 17th Georgia Regiment, says: "Soon after our engagement, to our great satisfaction, we unexpectedly met our gallant commander, Brigadier General Robert Toombs, who, anticipating the fight, had ridden hard all day. He was greeted with hearty cheers, and said, 'Boys, I am proud of the report given of you by General Jones. I could not be with you to-day, but this was owing to no fault of mine. To-morrow I lead you.'"

One report of this engagement declares that as Toombs dashed into the fire and joined his men, he waved his hat and shouted, "Go it, boys! I amwith you again. Jeff Davis can make a general, but it takes God Almighty to make a soldier!"

The expulsion of Pope only accelerated the momentum of the Army of Northern Virginia. From the front of Richmond, the theater of operations was transferred at once to the front of Washington, and the Union army was again on the defensive. General Lee, freed from the necessity of guarding the Confederate capital, resolved to invade Maryland. He reasoned that the prestige of the invasion would advance the cause of the young nation abroad; that it would relieve Virginia from incursions during the winter, and that the presence of the army in Maryland would raise the standard of revolt and cause the liberation of that State from the Union cause. Lee's army, however, was not equal to such an expedition. It was not well clothed or armed, and barely numbered 40,000, while McClellan had 80,000.

Toombs' brigade accompanied Longstreet's corps in its counter-march fromHagarstownto Hill's support. On the 14th of September these were withdrawn to the valley of the Antietam. The creek of Antietam runs obliquely to the source of the Potomac, and empties into that river six miles above Harper's Ferry. The Confederate lines were, on the 15th, drawn up in front ofSharpsburg, Longstreet being on the right of the road from Sharpsburg.

In this place the creek is crossed by four stone bridges, and three of these were strongly guarded by the Confederates. Burnside's army corps was stationed on the Sharpsburg Turnpike, directly in front of bridge No. 3. The preliminary deploy occupied the 16th of September, an artillery duel enlivening the time before the battle. Burnside lay behind the heights on the east bank of the Antietam and opposite the Confederate right, which, Swinton says, it was designed he should assail, after forcing the passage of the Antietam by the lower stone bridge. The part assigned to General Burnside was of the highest importance, for a successful attack by him upon the Confederate right, would, by carrying the Sharpsburg Crest, force Lee from his line of retreat by way of Shepherdstown. Swinton says this task should have been an easy one, for the Confederate forces at this point had been drawn upon to recruit the left where Hooker had made his furious assaults.

There was left in the right wing of the Confederate army but a single division of 2500 men under General D. R. Jones, and the force actually present to dispute the passage of the stone bridge did not exceed 400. These troops were under the direction of General Robert Toombs, and this engagement made his reputation as a fighter andwas one of the most brilliant and memorable of the Civil War. It was one o'clock before Burnside charged. General Lee, in his report of the battle, said:

In the afternoon the enemy advanced on our right, where General Jones' division was posted, who handsomely maintained his position. General Toombs' brigade, guarding the bridge on Antietam Creek, gallantly resisted the approach of the enemy, but his superior number enabling him to extend his left, he crossed below the bridge and assumed a threatening attitude on our right, which fell back in confusion. By this time, between 3 and 4 o'clockp. m., A. P. Hill, with five of his brigades, reached the scene of action and drove the enemy from the position they had taken. The bridge was defended with two regiments of Toombs' brigade (2d and 20th) and the batteries of General Jones. General Toombs' small command repulsed five different assaults made by greatly superior forces, and maintained its position with distinguished gallantry.... Toombs charged the flank of the enemy, while Archer moved upon the front of the Federal line. The enemy made a brief resistance and then ran in confusion.

Such commendation from the commander-in-chief of the Confederate army speaks for itself.

Speaking of the last charge, when the Federals were driven back over the creek in the counter-attack, General Jones says:

General Toombs, whom I had sent for, arriving from the right with a portion of his brigade (11th Georgia Regiment) was ordered to charge the enemy. This he did most gallantly, supported by Archer's brigade, delivering fire at less than fifty yards, dashing at the enemy with the bayonet, forcing him from the crest and following him down the hill.

General Garnett's report credits Toombs with having "reënforced the right just after it had been driven back, and restored the fortunes of the day in that quarter."

From the report of General Toombs it appeared that when he first moved into Maryland he was assigned to command a division composed of Toombs', Drayton's, and Anderson's brigades, and took possession ofHagerstown. On September 14 he was ordered to Sharpsburg, two of his regiments having been sent to Williamsport to protect the wagon trains. With two small regiments left, General Toombs took position near the bridge over the Antietam on the road to Harper's Ferry. He took possession of the ground with the 20th Georgia Regiment, commanded by Colonel Jonathan B. Cumming, and the 2d Georgia Regiment, commanded by Colonel Holmes. The creek was comparatively straight by this bridge. He formed his regiments along the creek in more open order than was desirable on account of the smallness of his number. Subsequently the 50th Georgia, with scarcely 100 men, was placed under his command. Colonel Eubanks' battery was byorder of General Longstreet placed in his rear. The enemy opened on his position on Tuesday evening, the 16th of September. On Wednesday morning, his pickets were driven in and the enemy menaced his position. The ground descended gently to the creek covered with a narrow strip of woods, affording slight protection. The enemy approached by the road parallel with his line of battle, he says, exposing his flank to a destructive fire. Between 9a. m.and 1p. m.the Federals made five attempts to carry the bridge, and were repulsed by the 2d and 20th Georgia regiments. Failing to wrest the bridge from its heroic defenders, the enemy turned his attention to the fords. "Not being able to get reënforcements, and seeing that the enemy would cross and attack my front, right flank, and rear, Colonel Holmes having been killed, Major Harris wounded, both regiments having suffered heavily, ammunition nearly exhausted, and the battery withdrawn, I withdrew my command to a position, designated by Longstreet, opposite the lower fords. This change of position was made very satisfactorily and without serious loss. The 15th and 17th Georgia regiments and part of the 11th, previously detached, now came up and occupied the new position. The 20th and 2d went to the ammunition train to replenish their cartridge boxes. The enemy moved through the bridge and ford withextreme caution, and lost nearly two hours in crossing, about which time A. P. Hill's division came from Harper's Ferry. I was ordered by Longstreet to put my command in motion to meet the enemy. I found them in possession of the ground I was ordered to occupy, including the bridge road and the suburbs of Sharpsburg. With less than one-fifth the numbers of the enemy and within 100 paces of his lines I determined to give battle. I had instantly to determine either to retreat or to fight. A retreat would have left the town of Sharpsburg and General Longstreet's rear open to the enemy. The enemy advanced in good order to within sixty or eighty paces, when the effectiveness of the fire threw his column into considerable confusion, perceiving which I instantly ordered a charge, which was brilliantly executed by my whole line. The enemy fled in confusion toward the river, making two or three efforts to rally, which were soon defeated. The enemy brought over the bridge a battery. I ordered Richardson's battery to open upon it, and at the same time the 15th and 20th Georgia charged upon it and compelled it to rejoin the flying infantry. I desired to pursue the enemy across the river, but, being deficient in artillery, I sent to General Lee for a battery, which came up too late. I then determined to move my troops to my first position along the river, but received the order to occupy the heightson the opposite side of the road leading to the bridge from Sharpsburg, and there the troops bivouacked for the night."

The gallant conduct of Toombs' brigade at Sharpsburg was the theme on both sides. The country rang with its exploits and the fiery Georgia brigadier became the toast of the army. Burnside's heavy losses abundantly proved the stoutness of the resistance and the deadliness of the charges of the Georgia troops.

The next evening, on the edge of Sharpsburg, General Toombs and his aids crossed a little branch on his way to the headquarters of Colonel Benning. General Toombs rode his famous mare "Gray Alice," so well known to his command. He was not very far over when a troop ofcavalryrode up. He challenged them, and they answered "We are friends." Captain Troup of his staff, however, detected the ruse and fired into them. The squad returned the fire. General Toombs was shot through the hand with which he was holding the reins. The gray mare at once became unmanageable and ran back across the branch. As soon as he could control the mare, General Toombs rode back to Colonel Benning and, reporting his wound, turned his brigade over to Colonel Benning. When it became known that General Toombs was wounded his men were deeply pained. Always solicitous for their welfare, his soldierswere devotedly attached to him. He took care of his brigade even to the extremity of violating army discipline. He exacted the utmost consideration for his men, and the officer who periled their safety, or disputed their efficiency, was quickly called to account. Whether against Johnston, Longstreet, or Hill, the First Brigade, First Division, was sure of a fearless champion in the person of its commander.

The battle of Sharpsburg was a very bloody one. The losses on the Federal side were nearly 12,500, while the Confederates lost 8000. Lee withdrew into Virginia, and McClellan was too much demoralized to follow. Longstreet, in summing up the Manassas and Maryland campaign, declared that in one month the troops had marched over two hundred miles upon little more than half rations and fought nine battles and skirmishes. They had "killed, wounded, and captured nearly as many men as we had in our ranks, besides taking arms and other munitions of war in large quantities." General Longstreet compliments Brigadier General Toombs for his "gallant defense at the bridge of Antietam and his vigorous charge upon the enemy's flank; he was severely wounded at the close of the engagement."

General Toombs returned to his home after Sharpsburg, and remained several months. He rejoined his command near Fredericksburg, but in March, 1863, wrote a touching farewell to his brigade and resigned his commission in the army of Northern Virginia. It seemed to him that he did not have justice done him at Richmond. He aspired, with the ambition of a soldier, to be promoted in his country's service. His conduct at Sharpsburg, where he wrung admiration from his superior officers, appeared to call for recognition from the President, but he did not receive his major-generalship, and, although more than once in the actual command of a division, did not secure that title. It is true that he would have liked the promotion; but he did not expect it. He had written to his wife that he would not be driven from the army until after some great battle, when he should have the opportunity of doing something for his country. "The day after such an event, I will retire if I live through it." The battle had occurred, his record was written upon the stone bridge of Antietam, and his work was at an end.

Postmaster-General Reagan was one of those who recognized the merits of General Toombs. Twice did he approach President Davis with the request that General Toombs be promoted to the command of a division. That official replied promptly that he did not oppose it himself, but that he could not do it without the recommendation of the army officers, and that recommendation had not been given. Possibly the field officers believed the suggestion would have been ungracious to Mr. Davis. General Toombs had not hesitated to criticise the policy and appointments of the Richmond administration. That practice had strained his relations with the Confederate Government, but Toombs was a man who "would not flatter Neptune for his trident."

General Toombs was not a trained soldier, but he had some fine points of a great commander. He was the soul of energy and common sense. He was bold, dashing, magnetic. He had the quality of infusing his spirit into his men. His quick mind seized the points of a campaign, and his intellect was broad and overmastering. It is related of him that one day in Virginia he hurried to the rear for a conference with Jefferson Davis, to which the President had summoned him, upon some point of civil administration. This business over, he dashed back to the front, where he had an engagement with General Lee over a plan of attack. General Longstreet said Toombs had the kindling eye and rare genius of a soldier, but lacked the discipline of a military man. This was the serious flaw in his character. He had what General Johnston declared was the great drawback about the Southern soldier, "a large endowment of the instinct of personal liberty," and it was difficult to subordinate his will to the needs of military discipline. He had beenaccustomed to priority, and in whatever company, under whatever conditions he found himself, his had been the part to lead and to rule. As Colonel Thomas W. Thomas had said of him, "Toombs has always been the big frog in the pond." Men conceded to him this prestige. Under the cast-iron rule of the army he found himself subordinated to men intellectually beneath him, but trained and skilled in the art of war. He was swift to detect error, and impatient in combating blunder. The rule of mediocrity, the red tape of the service, the restraints of the corps, the tactics of the field galled his imperious spirit. He commanded his brigade as he had represented his State in the Senate—as a sovereign and independent body, and like the heroic Helvetian had blazoned on his crest, "No one shall cross me with impunity."

Robert Toombs made a mistake in sinking himself in the routine of a brigade commander. He should have taken the War Department, or, like Pitt, have pushed the war from the floor of the Senate. Swinton says that Abraham Lincoln brought the habits of a politician to military affairs, in which their intrusion can only result in confusion of just relations. There is ineradicable antagonism between the maxims which govern politics and those which govern war.

During General Toombs' absence in the field, he opposed the Conscript Acts of the Confederateadministration. He believed them arbitrary and unjust. He considered that this was a tendency toward centralization which the Confederate Government was fighting; that it placed too much power in the hands of one man; that it was deadly to States' Rights and personal liberty, and that it would impair the efficiency of the army by lowering its patriotism. The champion of this anti-administration policy in Georgia was Linton Stephens, the brother of the vice president. Toombs in the field, the elder Stephens in Congress, and Linton Stephens in the Georgia Legislature, fought the Conscription and Impressment Acts. Hon. Joseph E. Brown, the war Governor of Georgia, was also a vigorous opponent of this policy. This influence gave rise, in the early part of 1864, to the Peace Resolutions of Linton Stephens, who sustained Governor Brown in his policy, to inaugurate State action for "the preservation of rights and the attainment of peace." Linton Stephens, in a strong letter to General Toombs at that time, called attention to the fact that since the war began neither side had made any effort to stop the effusion of blood. He believed that the professional soldiers and West Point generals would never permit the cessation of hostilities. Such men, he thought, would not, in human nature, desire peace. "How can it be explained," he wrote, "that both governments have fought on during these long years of blood and tears anddesolation, without either one offering terms of peace, and with both running a swift race of rivalry in usurping the most despotic power under the ever-recurring and false plea of necessities of war? Have both governments formed designs that cannot be accomplished in peace, and which seek opportunity and shelter in the confusion and panic of war?"

Mr. Linton Stephens was a leading lawyer and legislator in Georgia. He was a man of great ability. He had started the practice of law in the office of Robert Toombs, and had been a political follower and close friend of the great Georgian. He had served upon the bench of the Supreme Court of his State, and at the close of the war his political influence was probably greater than that of any man at home. He was fearless, inflexible, high-toned, and full of power. He did not hesitate to condemn the legislation asked for by Mr. Davis, and joined Mr. Toombs in opposing the appointment of General Bragg as supervisor of all military operations. Mr. Stephens believed that the next step after the Impressment Act would be the organization of all labor into a military system under government control.

The result of the policy of Mr. Davis justified the protest of the Georgians, but there is nothing to warrant the belief that Mr. Davis was moving toward military despotism or that he relished the continuance of strife. He saw that the South wasin for the war. Desperate situations required desperate remedies. He grasped the government with a strong hand, and lacked neither nerve nor patriotism. The principles of this policy were unsound, but the motives of Jefferson Davis were pure. Nor was there reason to sustain the wholesale denunciation of West Point. That school of soldiers was the backbone of the army, and the fact that so many Southern men gave up commissions in the United States army and came South when their States seceded, overthrew the idea that they were tools of the general government and had lost identity or sympathy with people at home. But General Toombs was bold and impatient in his positions.

Equally opposed was he to the policy adopted in Georgia of recommending the planting of all grain and no cotton. From Richmond he wrote in March, 1864, directions to his brother Gabriel Toombs, who managed his plantations in Washington:

I do not care to change my crops. I wish to raise an abundant provision crop and then as much cotton as I can.... Brown's and Chambers' policy is all foolishness.... As to what I shall choose to plant on my own estates, I shall neither refer it to newspapers, nor to public meetings, nor to legislatures. I know what sort of people compose these classes. Let them take up arms and come with me to drive the intruders away from our soil, and then we will settle what sort of seed we will put into it.

General Toombs' next appearance in the field was as adjutant and inspector-general of General G. W. Smith's division of Georgia militia. He was present during the battles before Atlanta, the engagement at Peachtree Creek, and the siege of the city. General J. E. Johnston had just been relieved from command of the Confederate forces, and General J. B. Hood placed in charge. General Toombs wrote from Atlanta:

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